THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


(J  ^UL^uz^jUJ^^^ 

&• 


ftL^^s^^^ 


THE  SPECIAL  LAW  GOVERNING 

PUBLIC  SERVICE 
CORPORATIONS 


AND  ALL  OTHERS  ENGAGED  IN 
PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT 


BY 

BRUCE   WYMAN,  A.M.,    LL.B. 

PROFESSOR    OF   LAW    IN    HARVARD    UNIVERSITY 


VOLUME  I 


NEW    YORK 

BAKER,  VOORHIS  &  CO. 
1911 


T 

u) 

1911 


COPYRIGHT,  1911,  BY 
BRUCE  WYMAN 


T.  MOBET  &  SON,  PRINTERS  AND  ELECTROTYPERS 

GREENFIELD,  MASS. 


TO 
JOSEPH  HENRY  BEALE,   A.M.,   LL.B.,   LL.D. 

CARTER  PROFESSOR  OF  GENERAL  JURISPRUDENCE    IN 
HARVARD    UNIVERSITY 

Since  with  characteristic  generosity  he  will 
not  permit  his  name  to  be  upon  the 

TITLE-PAGE 

With  deep  gratitude 

I  inscribe 
THIS  DEDICATION 


PREFACE 

I  have  felt  for  many  years  that  the  distinction  between 
the  private  callings — the  rule — and  the  public  callings — 
the  exception — was  the  most  striking  feature  of  the  law 
governing  business  relations.  The  causes  of  the  division 
are  economic  rather  than  strictly  legal.  Free  competition, 
the  very  basis  of  the  modern  social  organization,  super- 
seded almost  completely  medieval  restrictions,  but  it  has 
just  come  to  be  recognized  that  the  process  of  free  com- 
petition fails  in  some  cases  to  secure  the  public  good,  and 
it  has  been  at  last  admitted  that  some  control  is  necessary 
over  such  lines  of  industry  as  are  affected  with  a  public 
interest.  At  this  point  the  problem  of  public  callings  be- 
comes a  legal  one. 

From  the  earliest  times  some  restraint  has  been  exer- 
cised over  such  lines  of  industry  as  are  of  vital  interest  to 
the  public.  The  establishment  of  the  peace,  the  protec- 
tion of  the  weak  against  the  physical  violence  of  the 
strong,  is  a  fundamental  function  of  government;  but  of 
equal  importance  and  of  almost  equal  antiquity  is  the 
protection  of  the  common  people  against  the  greed  and 
oppression  of  the  powerful.  In  matters  not  vital  to  the 
life  and  well-being  of  mankind  the  laws  of  society  may  be 
left  free  to  operate,  without  limitation  by  the  sovereign 
power;  but  in  all  that  has  to  do  with  the  necessaries  of 
life  the  protection  of  the  sovereign  is  extended.  The  mod- 
ern State  protects  equally  against  physical  violence  and 
against  oppression  that  affects  the  means  of  living. 

As  a  result  of  that  economic  evolution  from  mediaeval 

[v] 


PREFACE 

times  to  the  present  day  which  I  have  sketched  in  my  first 
chapter,  there  have  come  into  being  in  the  last  generation 
a  considerable  number  of  employments  which  have  gained, 
if  not  a  legal  monopoly,  at  any  rate,  as  a  result  of  circum- 
stances, a  virtual  monopoly  in  matters  of  public  necessity. 
The  positive  law  of  the  public  calling  is  the  only  protection 
that  the  public  have  in  a  situation  such  as  this,  where 
there  is  no  competition  among  the  sellers  to  operate  in  its 
favor.  So  much  has  our  law  been  permeated  with  the 
theory  of  laissez  faire,  which  was  but  lately  so  prominent 
in  the  policy  of  our  State,  that  the  admission  has  been 
made  with  much  hesitation  that  State  control  is  ever  nec- 
essary. But  the  modern  conclusion,  after  some  bitter 
experience,  is  that  freedom  can  be  allowed  only  where 
conditions  of  virtual  competition  prevail,  for  in  conditions 
of  virtual  monopoly,  without  stern  restrictions,  there  is 
always  great  mischief. 

The  spirit  of  our  present  age  demands  that  the  great 
business  enterprises  shall  be  conducted  in  accordance  with 
the  requirements  of  society.  The  present  programme  of 
organized  society  is  to  see  to  it  that  those  who  have  gained 
a  substantial  control  of  their  market  shall  not  be  left  free 
to  exploit  those  who  look  to  them  to  supply  their  needs. 
Men  now  see  clearly  that  freedom  of  action  may,  even  in 
the  industrial  world,  work  injuriously  for  the  public,  and  it 
must  then  be  restrained  in  the  public  interest.  We  have 
seen  the  results  of  unrestrained  power;  and  we  no  longer 
wish  those  who  have  control  over  our  destinies  left  free  to 
do  with  us  as  they  please.  Liberty  does  not  mean  to  men 
at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  what  it  meant  to 
men  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

While  State  regulation  is  the  prevailing  philosophy  of 

the  people  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  it 

must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  has  been  the  result  of  a 

gradual  progress  of  thought,  and  that  this  progress  has  not 

[vi] 


PREFACE 

affected  all  men  equally.  Now,  as  at  all  times,  there  are 
conservatives  and  radicals,  the  former  as  far  behind  the 
prevailing  spirit  of  the  time  as  the  latter  go  beyond  it.  In 
every  change  of  popular  thought  there  have  been  those 
who  have  been  unable  to  appreciate  the  change;  and  in 
every  such  change  there  have  been  those  who  are  unable 
justly  to  estimate  the  true  meaning  of  the  change.  We 
have,  therefore,  three  general  types  of  thought  at  every 
time:  the  conservatives,  the  moderates  and  the  radicals. 
And  this  is  as  true  of  legal  as  of  economic  thought.  Many 
lawyers  still  hold  conservative  views  as  to  the  application 
of  the  law  of  public  callings  to  modern  conditions.  They 
believe  that  the  conductors  of  every  business,  however 
necessary  to  public  welfare,  should  do  whatever  seems 
good  in  their  own  eyes. 

It  has  been  remarked  many  times  that  the  common  law 
may  be  relied  upon  to  meet,  by  the  continual  develop- 
ment of  its  fundamental  principles,  the  complex  condi- 
tions created  by  the  constant  evolution  in  the  industrial 
organization.  One  of  the  most  striking  of  modern  in- 
stances of  this  capacity  of  growth  in  the  common  law  is 
the  astonishing  progress  in  the  working  out  of  the  detail 
of  the  exceptional  law  governing  the  conduct  of  public 
callings.  In  recent  times  there  undoubtedly  is  an  in- 
creasing need  of  this  stricter  regulation  of  all  employments 
which  appear  to  be  affected  with  a  public  interest.  The 
most  of  men  appreciate  that  the  law  has  already  taken 
control  of  the  situation  for  all  time.  It  is  hardly  too  much 
to  say  that  the  efficient  regulation  of  the  public  employ- 
ments by  sufficient  law  is  the  most  pressing  problem  con- 
fronting this  nation;  and  it  must  be  met  without  further 
hesitation.  Great  power  brings  as  its  consequence  the 
need  of  control  of  that  power  for  the  good  of  the  whole 
people. 

In  this  crisis  of  affairs  the  people  must  be  assured  that 

[vii] 


PREFACE 

the  law  is  adequate  to  deal  with  the  situation,  that  it  has 
not  only  elaborated  detail  to  meet  obvious  wrongs  seldom 
defended,  but  also  enlightened  comprehension  to  deal  with 
the  large  policies  openly  justified,  which  are  truly  incon- 
sistent with  public  duty.  That  those  who  profess  a  public 
employment  owe  the  utmost  public  service  should  be  gen- 
erally accepted  as  the  fundamental  principle  upon  which 
the  law  governing  public  employment  is  to  be  based.  It 
is  not  agreed,  however,  how  far  this  principle  should  be 
pressed;  there  is  a  clash  of  interests  here,  and  there  is  an 
inclination  on  the  part  of  those  who  conduct  the  public 
services  to  contest  every  issue.  This  is  not  even  an  en- 
lightened selfishness. 

The  time  has  come  when  extension  of  the  law  and  en- 
forcement of  it  should  be  the  avowed  attitude  of  all  con- 
servative persons  who  wish  the  perpetuation  of  present 
conditions.  It  would  be  well,  therefore,  if  the  restless  and 
the  doubting  who  see  many  abuses  and  many  wrongs  in 
the  conduct  of  our  public  services  without  prompt  remedy 
or  adequate  redress,  might  be  relieved  and  heartened  by 
being  shown  that  the  common  law  is  adequate  to  deal  with 
all  real  industrial  wrongs,  and  that  with  the  aid  of  reme- 
dial statutes  the  administration  of  the  law  can  be  relied 
upon.  The  proprietors  of  the  public  services  should  be 
told  sharply  that  they  may  not  adopt  to  the  prejudice  of 
their  public  various  profitable  policies,  and  then  justify 
them  as  inherent  rights  which  other  men  in  ordinary  busi- 
ness may  use  in  the  advancement  of  their  interests. 

This  principle  of  State  control  does  not  lead  one  to 
socialism;  indeed,  it  saves  one  from  socialism  if  truly  un- 
derstood. It  is  only  in  those  few  businesses  where  the 
conditions  are  monopolistic  that  dangerous  power  over 
their  public  has  been  attained  by  those  who  have  the  con- 
trol. In  most  businesses  the  virtual  competition  which 
prevails  puts  the  distributors  at  the  mercy  of  their  public. 
[  viii  ] 


PREFACE 

In  current  opinion  the  recognition  of  this  distinction  is 
manifest.  Men  are  as  eager  for  an  open  market  as  ever; 
but  they  wish  the  control  of  monopoly  to  insure  it.  The 
demand  is  for  freer  trade  where  competition  prevails  and 
stricter  regulation  where  monopoly  is  found.  So  long  as 
virtual  competition  prevails  there  is  no  necessity  for 
coercive  law  since  there  is  then  no  power  over  the  pur- 
chasing public.  But  where  in  any  business  virtual  mo- 
nopoly is  permanently  established  the  people  will  not  be 
denied  in  their  deliberate  policy  of  effectual  regulation  of 
such  public  services  for  the  common  good. 

Only  to  this  extent  the  individualistic  ideal  of  society 
gives  place  to  the  collectivist  policy.  It  is  with  true  ap- 
preciation of  the  real  issue  that  we  are  contending  for 
State  control  to  gain  individual  liberty.  It  may  once 
have  been  the  ideal  of  industrial  freedom  that  a  man 
might  do  as  he  pleased  with  his  own;  in  any  event  that  is 
no  longer  our  notion  of  social  justice.  It  is  believed  now 
that  with  increase  in  power  over  the  particular  market 
comes  increase  in  responsibility  to  the  dependent  public. 
Socialism  would  destroy  all  private  interests  in  the  name 
of  the  public;  regulation  would  preserve  private  interests 
by  reconciling  them  with  public  right.  Socialism  attacks 
all  capital  to  whatever  business  it  is  devoted;  regulation 
grapples  with  monopoly  only  when  it  is  convinced  that 
there  is  no  other  way  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  the 
public. 

There  is  now  fortunately  almost  general  assent  to  State 
control  of  the  public  service  companies.  Two  ways  only 
can  be  found  to  exercise  such  control.  One  way,  that  ad- 
vocated by  the  most  radical  statesmen,  is  the  government 
ownership  and  operation  of  these  services.  The  other  way, 
which  is  in  fact  the  conservative  method  of  dealing  with 
the  problem,  is  the  control  of  the  rates  and  practices  of  the 
utilities  for  the  public  good.  One  or  the  other  of  these 

[ix] 


PREFACE 

methods  must  be  finally  adopted.  The  conservative 
method  is  now  on  trial.  It  behooves  the  lawyers  to  see  to 
it  that  it  be  so  intelligently  tried,  and  that  the  law  ap- 
plicable to  the  case  be  so  accurately  enforced,  that  we 
may  not  be  driven  perforce  to  the  radical  alternative  of 
public  ownership.  The  belief  that  this  duty  has,  almost 
without  warning,  been  thrust  upon  the  profession,  and 
that  the  lawyer  has  not  been  at  all  prepared  by  his  train- 
ing to  solve  the  difficult  questions  that  may  arise,  has  led 
the  author  to  publish  this  treatise,  with  the  hope  that  it 
may  help  the  profession  to  meet  its  new  and  perplexing 
problems. 

No  one  can  carefully  study  the  authorities  on  this  sub- 
ject without  feeling  that  we  are  just  entering  upon  a  great 
and  important  development  of  the  common  law.  What 
branches  of  industry  will  eventually  be  of  such  public 
importance  as  to  be  included  in  the  category  of  public 
callings,  and  to  what  extent  the  control  of  the  courts  will 
be  carried  in  the  effort  to  solve  by  law  the  modern  eco- 
nomic problems,  it  would  be  rash  to  predict.  Enormous 
business  combinations,  virtual  monopolization  of  the  nec- 
essaries of  life,  the  strife  of  labor  and  capital,  now  the 
concern  of  the  economist  and  the  statesman,  may  prove 
susceptible  of  legal  control  through  the  doctrines  of  the 
law  of  public  callings.  These  doctrines  are  not  yet  clearly 
defined.  General  rules,  to  be  sure,  have  been  established, 
but  details  have  not  been  worked  out  by  the  courts;  and 
upon  the  successful  working  out  of  these  details  depends 
to  a  large  extent  the  future  economic  organization  of  the 
country.  Only  if  the  courts  can  adequately  control  the 
public  service  companies  in  all  contingencies  may  the 
business  of  these  companies  be  left  in  private  hands. 

All  businesses  both  public  and  private  are  subject,  to  be 
sure,  to  that  general  police  power  of  the  State  whereby  in 
any  civilized  society  the  effort  is  made  to  so  order  things 
[x] 


PREFACE 

that  one  may  not  use  his  own  so  as  to  injure  another.  But 
the  comparison  of  the  large  amount  of  regulation  which  it 
is  considered  proper  for  the  State  to  impose  in  regard  to 
public  services  with  the  small  amount  of  regulation  which 
it  is  considered  proper  for  the  State  to  enforce  in  regard  to 
private  business  is  in  itself  significant  enough.  The  dif- 
ference which  is  shown  is  more  than  one  of  degree,  it  be- 
comes one  in  kind.  It  is  only  in  public  business  that  the 
law  imposes  affirmative  duties;  generally  speaking  the 
duties  imposed  upon  those  in  private  business  are  nega- 
tive. The  law  says  to  those  in  public  business  you  must 
do  this  for  this  applicant,  and  you  must  do  it  thus.  To 
those  in  private  business  it  says  you  must  not  do  this,  or 
if  you  do  this  you  must  do  it  thus.  This  is  the  chief  dis- 
tinction between  public  calling  and  private  calling. 

It  is  in  the  firm  belief  that  the  law  governing  the  public 
services  will  prove  upon  analysis  to  be  a  unified  body  that 
the  author  has  been  at  work  for  many  years,  and  this  first 
treatise  upon  the  subject  has  been  written.  General 
principles  will  be  developed  throughout  the  work  and 
corrollaries  to  them  established  by  the  use  and  with  the 
co-ordination  of  cases  from  a  variety  of  public  employ- 
ments. Not  only  are  the  fundamental  principles  true  as 
to  all  public  employments — that  all  must  be  served,  ade- 
quate facilities  must  be  provided,  reasonable  rates  must 
be  charged,  and  no  discriminations  must  be  made.  But 
also  in  dealing  with  the  minor  detail  of  these  principles, 
cases  from  one  service  will  be  found  in  point  in  another — 
as  to  what  conditions  there  are  precedent  to  service,  what 
will  excuse  failure  in  provision  of  facilities,  what  is  a  proper 
basis  for  calculating  rates  and  what  differences  constitute 
discrimination.  This  is  the  way  our  law  grows,  by  break- 
ing down  the  partitions  between  departments  of  the  law 
which  have  been  built  up  separately. 

The  public  service  law  has  at  length  reached  a  stage  of 

[xi] 


PREFACE 

development  in  which  it  may  be  possible  to  state  its 
principles  with  some  degree  of  confidence.  It  is  only 
within  the  last  few  years  that  it  would  have  been  within 
the  range  of  possibility  to  do  this.  Twenty-five  years  ago 
the  public  services  that  were  recognized  were  still  few,  and 
the  law  as  to  them  imperfectly  realized.  It  was  known 
from  olden  times  that  those  who  professed  a  public  em- 
ployment must  serve  all  at  a  reasonable  rate.  As  to  the 
duty  to  serve,  it  was  recognized  that  there  were  certain 
excuses.  As  to  the  restriction  to  reasonable  rates,  there  was 
no  standard  unless,  indeed,  the  customary  charge.  But 
the  important  duty  to  provide  adequate  facilities  had 
hardly  advanced  beyond  the  general  law  as  to  negligence. 
And  the  duty  not  to  discriminate,  which  according  to 
present  ideas  is  the  most  important  of  all,  was  denied 
altogether  by  the  weight  of  authority. 

Even  ten  years  ago  when  these  four  obligations  had 
become  generally  recognized,  the  details  as  to  them  in  re- 
gard to  any  particular  employment  had  been  worked  out 
only  in  very  fragmentary  manner;  but  at  the  present  day 
it  is  just  being  appreciated  that  rapid  progress  may  be 
made  by  the  general  recognition  of  the  unity  of  the  public 
service  law,  whereby  cases  as  to  one  calling  may  be  used 
to  show  the  law  in  all.  This  treatise  is  based  upon  this 
method.  But  it  is  only  in  our  present  day  that  the  at- 
tempt to  treat  the  public  service  law  as  a  consistent  body 
of  law  could  be  made  with  any  hope  of  success.  As  it  is 
the  law  of  public  service  is  not  much  further  developed 
than  that  of  sales  was  two  centuries  ago. 

As  time  goes  on,  I  am  finding  myself  almost  among 
the  conservatives  in  standing  by  the  original  program  for 
State  control.  It  is  still  my  belief  that  the  State  should 
as  far  as  possible  confine  itself  to  regulation,  leaving  the 
companies  to  work  out  their  own  problems  of  manage- 
ment. State  control  need  seldom  go  further  than  regula- 
[xii] 


PREFACE 

tion  in  this  sense.  Whatever  the  companies  may  do  should 
be  subject  to  immediate  revision  by  the  constituted  au- 
thorities. There  should  be  swift  reparation  provided  for 
any  individual  who  has  suffered  harm  in  the  meantime. 
And  that  should  be  the. full  extent  of  governmental  regu- 
lation, generally  speaking.  When  the  State  goes  further, 
and  attempts  to  dictate  as  to  the  policies  which  the  com- 
panies shall  adopt,  it  usually  goes  too  far.  Legislation 
going  to  this  extent  really  crosses  the  line  which  divides 
State  control  from  State  operation.  The  next  step  would 
be  government  ownership  with  its  unknowable  conse- 
quences. I  feel,  therefore,  that  the  restriction  which  the 
Federal  Government  has  thus  far  put  upon  itself  in  regu- 
lating interstate  carriage  is  well  advised.  The  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  still  has  virtually  only  the  power 
of  revision.  In  some  of  the  States,  however,  the  Commis- 
•sions  are  virtually  given  'the  power  to  determine  of  their 
own  motion  what  the  carrier  shall  do  for  the  public. 
This  imposes  government  operation,  without  relieving  the 
railroad  from  its  responsibilities  in  any  way. 

This  does  not  mean  that  everything  shall  be  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  companies,  as  the  conservatives  claim. 
Discretion  should  be  left  to  the  companies,  but  it  should  be 
made  clear  that  this  discretion  may  be  abused.  Although 
the  companies  should  be  left  as  free  as  possible  to  work 
out  then-  own  problems  within  the  law,  they  should  be 
warned  that  they  must  not  go  outside  the  limits  which 
the  law  is  fixing.  For  example,  the  railroad  people  once 
claimed  the  right  to  make  such  rates  as  it  seemed  to  them 
would  be  for  the  best  interests  of  all  concerned.  But  so 
long  as  this  power  is  left  in  the  hands  of  the  railway  man- 
agement without  power  of  review  by  any  authority  upon 
any  fundamental  principle,  it  is  in  the  hands  of  the  rail- 
road officials  to  build  up  an  artificial  market  where  the 
natural  conditions  are  adverse,  or  to  turn  an  industrious 

[xiii] 


PREFACE 

city  into  a  wilderness  again.  It  is  believed  that  these  are 
too  great  powers  to  intrust  to  private  hands  without 
governmental  control  based  upon  some  recognized  stand- 
ards. Indeed  the  public  law  in  this,  as  in  the  other  cases, 
should  put  sufficient  limitations  upon  any  business  policy, 
however  profitable,  which  comes  in  conflict  with  the 
fundamental  principle  of  equal  service  to  all. 

The  whole  problem  of  the  regulation  of  public  utilities 
has  been  seen  more  steadily  of  late  years.  It  has  been 
appreciated  that  in  dealing  with  a  public  service  com- 
pany the  State  is  really  dealing  with  a  private  business 
concern,  however  many  the  obligations  may  be  which  it 
owes  to  the  public.  The  risks  its  proprietors  run  are  such 
that  their  financial  management  should  be  left  to  them, 
unless  they  be  shown  to  be  taking  profit  with  outrageous 
disregard  of  their  public  obligations.  With  these  broader 
views,  it  would  be  surprising  if  more  consideration  were 
not  paid  to  the  rights  of  the  owners  of  public  services. 
Perhaps  for  the  moment  there  is  danger  that  in  emphasiz- 
ing their  duties,  their  rights  may  be  forgotten.  Except  in 
the  most  highly  developed  communities  public  service  has 
certain  risks  even  as  compared  with  private  business,  be- 
sides its  obvious  advantages.  Public  services  must  run 
whatever  the  times;  and  their  fate  is  linked  with  that  of 
the  community.  They  are  engaged  in  a  business  with  the 
ordinary  incidents  of  a  business,  with  some  of  the  hopes 
and  hazards  of  a  business. 

That  the  courts  are  approaching  this  great  issue  of 
State  control  with  the  enlightened  policy  of  fair  com- 
promise of  conflicting  interests  is  plain.  Regulation  of 
public  service  corporations,  which  perform  their  duties 
under  conditions  of  necessary  monopoly,  will  occur  with 
greater  and  greater  frequency  as  time  goes  on.  It  is  a 
delicate  and  dangerous  function,  and  ought  to  be  exer- 
cised with  great  caution.  The  courts  ought  not  to  bear 
[xiv] 


PREFACE 

the  whole  burden  of  saving  property  from  confiscation. 
The  legislative  bodies  ought  to  do  their  part.  Our  social 
system  rests  largely  upon  the  basis  of  private  property, 
and  that  community  which  seeks  to  alter  this  will  soon 
discover  its  error  in  the  disaster  which  follows.  The  slight 
gain  to  the  consumer,  which  he  would  obtain  from  a 
reduction  in  the  rates  charged  by  public  service  corpora- 
tions is  as  nothing  compared  with  his  share  in  the  ruin  of 
which  would  be  brought  about  by  denying  to  private 
property  its  just  reward,  thus  unsettling  values  and  de- 
stroying confidence.  With  these  the  views  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  it  would  seem  that  the  present 
crisis  may  be  faced  with  confidence. 

Much  that  I  have  just  written  I  have  said  in  this  book 
and  elsewhere;  but  I  thought  it  might  make  clearer  my 
point  of  view  to  my  readers  if  I  brought  the  argument  to 
a  focus  here,  at  the  outset.  Personally  I  have  no  inclina- 
tion to  paraphrase  what  I  have  said  formerly  in  one  place 
when  I  wish  to  say  the  same  thing  in  another  connection, 
for  fear  that  the  repetition  may  be  pointed  out.  As  it 
happens,  many  topics  in  this  book  could  be  identified  in 
other  writings  of  mine  upon  this  general  subject.  But 
in  reality  this  treatise  was  largely  written  before  these 
publications — not  since.  I  wrote  out  the  general  scheme 
of  this  treatise  about  ten  years  ago  and  I  have  been  using 
it  as  the  basis  for  class  discussion  since,  so  that  I  have 
had  the  incalculable  advantage  of  discussing  this  scheme 
with  thousands  of  fellow  students.  From  tune  to  time  I 
have  finished  off  various  chapters  as  contributions  to 
various  magazines,  and  here  again  I  have  had  the  great 
advantage  of  intelligent  criticism.  I  should  not  in  this 
preface  have  pointed  this  out,  had  it  not  been  that  I  felt 
that  I  owed  it  to  myself  to  explain  why  certain  portions 
of  this  treatise  have  been  in  print  before.  In  particular  I 
thought  it  was  only  fair  to  say  that  most  of  what  has  been 

[xv] 


PREFACE 

apparently  taken  from  Beale  and  Wyman  on  Railroad 
Rate  Regulation  was  the  part  I  contributed  to  that  work 
from  my  draft  for  this  treatise,  which  I  had  already  in 
hand  five  years  ago  at  the  time  we  were  writing  that  book. 
In  the  next  edition  of  the  Railroad  Rate  Regulation  we 
shall  omit  most  of  this  matter,  confining  ourselves  to 
commentary  upon  the  current  legislation,  Federal  and 
and  State.  The  general  principles  of  the  public  service 
law  are  now  well  enough  understood,  so  that  the  inclusion 
of  this  general  matter  will  be  unnecessary. 

For  my  general  scheme,  which  I  have  been  working  over 
so  long  I  can,  therefore,  offer  no  apology;  indeed,  I  am 
rather  proud  of  this  first  analysis  of  this  new  division  of 
the  law.  For  the  detailed  execution,  however,  I  must  offer 
the  usual  excuses;  for  I  have  been  too  busied  in  my  profes- 
sion to  give  to  this  work  all  the  tune  I  could  have  wished. 
Some  portions  of  the  subject  have  perhaps  interested  me 
more  and  got  in  consequence  greater  care.  I  have  had  a 
policy  of  a  sort  in  writing  the  text,  however.  Where  I 
have  been  dealing,  as  hi  the  first  third  and  the  last  third  of 
the  treatise,  with  the  new  law  of  public  service,  I  have 
cited  all  the  cases  I  could  find  and  given  constant  quota- 
tions from  the  decisions,  so  as  to  show  that  I  was  stating 
the  law  as  it  was,  not  as  I  was  imagining  it  to  be.  In  the 
middle  third  of  the  treatise  I  have  dealt  with  much  more 
familiar  law,  which  I  have  summarized  as  briefly  as  I 
could,  citing  only  such  cases  of  the  thousands  I  have 
handled  as  I  thought  would  be  of  the  greatest  use.  In  the 
last  few  months  I  have  hurried  the  whole  work  to  conclu- 
sion as  one  will,  feeling  that  I  wanted  to  have  what  I  had 
to  say  read  while  the  law  was  in  the  making.  For  those 
who  can  realize  by  experience  the  labor  of  writing  and  put- 
ting through  the  press  a  work  of  this  size  and  scope  its  er- 
rors and  omissions  will  appear  not  unnatural  or  altogether 
inexcusable.  I  feel,  however,  that  nothing  of  the  sort  will 
[xvi] 


PREFACE 

be  so  serious  as  to  obscure  the  meaning  of  the  text,  and 
that  the  practical  usefulness  of  the  book  will  not  be  af- 
fected. In  regard  to  the  revision  of  the  citations  I  have 
been  fortunate  in  having  this  painstaking  work  done,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  chapters  when  the  printer  was  press- 
ing us,  by  Miss  Helen  Thompson,  the  expert  assistant  to 
the  Faculty  of  the  Law  School  in  the  writing  of  our  books. 
Not  only  has  she  taken  charge  of  that  very  difficult  part  of 
modern  bookmaking,  the  extension  of  the  citations,  but 
she  has  been  of  great  assistance  to  me  in  many  things  out- 
side of  this  feature  of  the  work.  Further  I  should  acknowl- 
edge considerable  aid  in  writing  certain  chapters  from  my 
brother-in-law,  Albin  L.  Richards,  Esq.,  of  the  Boston 
Bar.  But  most  of  all  I  would  express  my  great  gratitude 
to  my  colleague,  Professor  Joseph  H.  Beale,  whose  wise 
counsel  has  been  my  constant  inspiration. 

B.  W. 

CAMBRIDGE,  January,  1911. 


[xvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

HISTOKICAL   INTRODUCTION 

§    1.  Public  callings  and  private  business. 

Topic  A.  The  Mediaeval  Policy  of  Regulation 

§    2.  The  mediaeval  theory  of  State  control. 

3.  The  regulation  of  business  in  the  middle  ages. 

4.  Early  differentiation  of  the  public  service  law. 

5.  Examination  of  the  early  public  employments. 

6.  The  surgeon. 

7.  The  tailor. 

8.  The  smith. 

9.  The  victualler. 

10.  The  baker. 

11.  The  miller. 

12.  The  innkeeper. 

13.  The  carrier. 

14.  The  ferryman. 

15.  The  wharfinger. 

Topic  B.  Persistence  of  this  Police  Power 

§  16.  Continuance  of  State  regulation. 

17.  Parliamentary  regulation  of  rates. 

18.  Restriction  of  prices  in  the  colonies. 

19.  Persistence  of  the  legislative  power. 

20.  Survival  of  the  common  law. 

21.  Callings  connected  with  transportation. 

22.  Introduction  of  improved  highways. 

23.  Toll  bridges. 

24.  Turnpikes. 

25.  Canals. 

26.  Railways. 

[xix] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  C.  The  Period  of  Laissez  Faire 

27.  Alteration  in  economic  conditions. 

28.  Development  in  the  common  law. 

29.  Freedom  of  business  from  State  control. 

30.  Special  restrictions  in  early  charters. 

31.  Gas  supply. 

32.  Water  supply. 

33.  The  struggle  against  encroaching  monopoly. 

34.  Conservative  and  radical  views  of  regulation. 

Topic  D.  Present  Control  of  Public  Employment 

35.  Economic  conditions  at  the  present  time. 

36.  Control  of  the  public  services  necessary. 

37.  Variety  of  the  public  services. 

38.  Differentiation  of  the  public  service  law. 

39.  Unity  of  the  public  service  law. 

40.  Present  development  of  the  public  service  law. 

41.  Imperative  need  of  effective  regulation. 

42.  Ultimate  limitations  upon  public  employment. 


BOOK  I.     ESTABLISHMENT  OF  PUBLIC 
CALLING 

PART  I.    PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT 
CHAPTER  II 

MONOPOLY   DUE   TO   LEGAL   PRIVILEGE 

§  50.  Legal  privileges  accompanying  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Exclusive  Franchise 
§  51.  Exclusive  franchise  for  public  purposes. 

52.  Ferries. 

53.  Bridges. 

54.  Bonded  warehouses. 

55.  Log  driving. 

Topic. B.  Eminent  Domain 
§  56.  Eminent  domain  for  public  purposes. 
57.  Tramways. 

[XX] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  58.  Railways. 

59.  Pipe  lines. 

60.  Transmission  lines. 

61.  Elevated  conveyors. 

62.  Lumber  flumes. 

63.  Mining  tunnels. 

Topic  C.  Aid  from  Taxation 

§  64.  Public  purposes  of  taxation. 

65.  Gristmills. 

66.  Sawmills. 

67.  Drainage. 

68.  Sewerage. 

69.  Cemeteries. 

70.  Hospitals. 

Topic  D.  Use  of  Public  Highways 
§  71.  Public  purposes  in  highway  use. 

72.  River  improvements. 

73.  Booms. 

74.  Sluices. 

75.  Turnpikes. 

76.  Street  railways. 

77.  Subways. 

78.  Wire  conduits. 

79.  Pole  lines. 

80.  Constitutional  situation  as  to  special  privileges. 


CHAPTER  III 

NATURAL   MONOPOLY 

§  90.  Natural  limitation  creates  public  employment. 

To-pic  A.  Restriction  of  Supply 
§  91.  Limitation  of  the  sources  of  supply. 

92.  Waterworks. 

93.  Irrigation  systems. 

94.  Natural  gas. 

95.  Water  powers. 

Topic  B.  Scarcity  of  Sites 
§  96.  Scarcity  of  advantageous  sites. 
97.  Grain  elevators. 

[xxi] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§    98.  Mechanical  conveyors. 
99.  Cotton  presses. 

100.  Stock  yards. 

101.  Freight  sheds. 
107.  Docks. 

103.  Basins. 

104.  Dry  docks. 

Topic  C.  Limitation  of  Time 
§  105.  Instant  need  creates  monopoly. 

106.  Innkeepers. 

107.  Hackmen. 

108.  Messenger  service. 

109.  Call  boxes. 

Topic  D.  Difficulty  of  Distribution 
§  110.  Inherent  limitation  upon  competition. 

111.  Gas  works. 

112.  Fuel  gas. 

113.  Electric  plants. 

114.  Electric  power. 

115.  Steam  heat. 

116.  Refrigeration. 

117.  Public  need  creates  public  interest. 

CHAPTER  IV 

VIRTUAL   MONOPOLY 

§  120.  Economic  limitations  create  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Cost  of  the  Plant 
§  121.  Financial  limitations  upon  potential  competition. 

122.  Canals. 

123.  Channels. 

124.  Railroads. 

125.  Railway  terminals. 

126.  Railway  bridges. 

127.  Car  ferries. 

128.  Railway  tunnels. 

129.  Union  railways. 

130.  Belt  lines. 

Topic  B.  Service  on  a  Large  Scale 
§  131.  Disadvantages  of  the  individual. 
132.  Signal  service. 


,   TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

133.  Telegraph  lines. 

134.  Wireless  telegraph. 

135.  Submarine  cables. 

136.  Telephone  systems. 

137.  Ticker  service. 

138.  Associated  press. 

Topic  C.  Inadequacy  of  Available  Substitutes 

139.  Insufficient  substitutes  for  service. 

140.  Public  stores. 

141.  Grain  storage. 

142.  Tobacco  warehouses. 

143.  Cold  storage. 

144.  Safe  deposit  vaults. 

145.  Market  places. 

146.  Stock  exchanges. 

Topic  D.  Subordinate  Services 

147.  Dependent  position. 

148.  Port  lighters. 

149.  Floating  elevators. 

150.  Tugboats. 

151.  Switching  engines. 

152.  Parlor  cars. 

153.  Sleeping  cars. 

154.  Refrigerator  cars. 

155.  Tank  cars. 

156.  Necessary  regulation  of  virtual  monopoly. 


CHAPTER  V 

COMMON   CARRIAGE   AS   A    PUBLIC   EMPLOYMENT 

§  160.  Who  are  common  carriers. 

Topic  A.  Carriers  of  Goods 
§  161.  Pack  carriers. 

162.  Wagoners. 

163.  Porters. 

164.  Hoymen. 

165.  Shipmasters. 

166.  Canal  boats. 

167.  River  craft. 

168.  Draymen. 

[  xxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  169.  Truckmen. 

170.  Furniture  movers. 

171.  Baggage  transfer. 

172.  Steamboats. 

173.  Towing  lines. 

174.  Wagon  trains. 

175.  Automobile  lines. 

176.  Railways. 

177.  Industrial  railways. 

178.  Express  companies. 

179.  Pneumatic  tubes. 

180.  Dispatch  companies. 

181.  Fast  freight  lines. 

Topic  B.  Carriers  of  Passengers 
§  182.  Ferries. 

183.  Ships. 

184.  Stagecoaches. 

185.  Omnibus  lines. 

186.  Hacks. 

187.  Taxicabs. 

188.  Passenger  railways. 

189.  Street  railways. 

190.  Elevated  railways. 

191.  Underground  railways. 

192.  Interurban  railways. 

193.  Passenger  elevators. 

194.  Moving  platforms. 

195.  Pleasure  railways. 

196.  Common  carriage  as  a  public  employment. 


PART  II.     PUBLIC  PROFESSION 
CHAPTER  VI 

EXPRESS   UNDERTAKING   OP   PUBLIC   EMPLOYMENT 

§  200.  Public  profession  an  essential  element. 

Topic  A.  Explicit  Profession  of  Public  Service 
§  201.  Early  assumpsit  associated  with  public  calling. 
202.  Express  assumption  of  a  public  trust. 

[  xxiv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

\  203.  Displaying  signs. 

204.  Public  advertisement. 

205.  General  solicitation. 

206.  Express  disclaimer. 

207.  Service  before  business  begun. 

208.  Profession  made  without  authority. 

209.  Service  undertaken  beyond  obligation. 

210.  Service  undertaken  in  unusual  manner. 

Topic  B.  Implicit  Undertaking  of  Public  Employment 
i  211.  Charter  stipulation. 

212.  Permissive  charter. 

213.  Taking  out  public  license. 

214.  Exercise  of  eminent  domain. 

215.  Acceptance  of  municipal  franchises. 

216.  Entering  into  municipal  contract. 

217.  Aid  from  taxation. 

218.  Governmental  participation. 


CHAPTER  VH 

IMPLIED   PROFESSION   OF   PUBLIC   EMPLOYMENT 

§  220.  Conduct  evidencing  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Public  Employments  and  Private  Enterprises 

§  221.  Potential  use  by  the  public. 

222.  Public  access  held  indispensable. 

223.  Industrial  railroads. 

224.  Lateral  branches. 

225.  Public  spur. 

226.  Private  siding. 

Topic  B.  Characteristics  of  Public  Business 

§  227.  Public  service  in  regular  course. 

228.  Public  employment — carter. 

229.  Regular  service — shipmaster. 

230.  Established  charge — expressmen. 

231.  Indiscriminate  service — irrigation. 

232.  Public  profession — warehousing. 

Topic  C.  Characteristics  of  Private  Business 
§  233.  Private  contract  as  the  basis. 
234.  Occasional  business — householders. 

[  XXV  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  235.  Casual  employment — shipowners. 

236.  Intermittent  employment — teamsters. 

237.  Limited  undertaking — ferries. 

238.  Incidental  service — merchants. 

Topic  D.  Particular  Illustrations  of  the  Distinction 

§  239.  Public  and  private  carriers  in  general. 

240.  Public  inn  and  private  house. 

241.  Public  and  private  highways  of  every  sort. 

242.  Public  and  private  waterworks. 

243.  Public  and  private  gas  and  electricity. 

244.  Public  and  private  telephone  and  telegraph. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

EXTENT   OF   SERVICE    PROFESSED 

§  250.  Limitations  upon  the  profession. 

Topic  A.  Kinds  of  Service  Undertaken 

§  251.  Extent  to  which  limitations  may  be  imposed. 

252.  Businesses  of  limited  scope. 

253.  Obligation  in  respect  to  the  usual  class. 

254.  No  obligation  to  undertake  different  services. 

255.  Carriage  of  valuables  separable. 

256.  Carriage  of  live  stock. 

257.  Carriage  of  rolling  stock. 

258.  Profession  limited  to  car  service. 

259.  Extraordinary  service  in  transporting  freight. 

260.  Extraordinary  service  in  delivering  freight. 

Topic  B.  Separable  Services  for  Different  Purposes 

§  261.  Separable  services  in  general. 

262.  Carriers  of  passengers  and  goods. 

263.  Divisibility  of  the  innkeeper's  undertaking. 

264.  Purposes  for  which  water  is  supplied. 

265.  Gas  for  illuminating  and  for  fuel. 

266.  Distinct  kinds  of  telephone  service. 

Topic  C.  Profession  Defined  by  its  Physical  Limitations 
§  267.  Profession  to  devote  facilities. 

268.  Profession  to  render  service. 

269.  Obligation  limited  to  existing  premises. 

[  xxvi  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  270.  Profession  limited  to  original  plant. 

271.  Profession  limited  to  natural  supply. 

272.  Carriage  confined  to  established  route. 

Topic  D.  Territorial  Limits  upon  the  Service  Professed 
§  273.  General  problem  of  community  service. 

274.  Territorial  limits  fixed  by  franchise. 

275.  Change  in  municipal  boundaries. 

276.  Obligation  beyond  the  profession. 

277.  Establishment  of  delivery  limits. 

278.  What  limits  are  reasonable. 

279.  Individual  installation  within  the  territory. 

280.  Rights  of  abutting  owners. 

281.  Obligation  to  the  community. 

282.  Reasonable  limitation  upon  expansion. 


CHAPTER  IX 

WITHDRAWAL   FROM   PUBLIC   EMPLOYMENT 

§  290.  Elements  of  the  problem. 

Topic  A.  Possibility  of  Total  Withdrawal 
§  291.  Closing  an  inn. 

292.  Discontinuing  a  ferry. 

293.  Making  a  warehouse  private. 

294.  Withdrawing  a  wharf  from  public  use. 

295.  Giving  up  common  carriage. 

296.  Taking  up  a  railway. 

297.  Shutting  off  water  supply. 

298.  Discontinuing  further  gas  supply. 

299.  Duty  devolved  upon  municipality. 

300.  No  excuse  for  default  in  charter  obligation. 

301.  Effect  of  absolute  insolvency. 

302.  Obligation  persists  so  long  as  franchise  retained. 

Topic  B.  Abandonment  of  a  Certain  District 

§  303.  Right  to  withdraw  from  particular  district. 

304.  Doctrine  applies  only  to  constructed  portions. 

305.  Discontinuance  by  public  permission. 

306.  System  constructed  under  permissive  charter. 

307.  Cases  permitting  partial  withdrawal. 

308.  Abandoned  service  must  be  separable. 

[  xxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  C.  Abandonment  of  a  Particular  Service 
§  309.  Right  to  withdraw  from  a  particular  service. 

310.  Service  demanded  by  charter. 

311.  Partial  withdrawal  generally  permitted. 

312.  Temporary  withdrawal  not  permissible. 

313.  Service  abandoned  must  be  separable. 

Topic  D.  Reasonable  Notice  of  Withdrawal 
§  314.  Notice  of  withdrawal  necessary. 

315.  Colorable  withdrawal. 

316.  Situation  requires  reasonable  notice. 

317.  What  constitutes  reasonable  notice. 

318.  Substituting  one  service  for  another. 

319.  Results  of  consolidating  services. 

320.  Division  of  territory  served. 


BOOK  II.    OBLIGATIONS  OF  PUBLIC  DUTY 

PART  III.    DUTY  TO  THE  PUBLIC 
CHAPTER  X 

NATURE   OF   PUBLIC   DUTY 

§  330.  Public  obligation  the  fundamental  principle. 

Topic  A.  Essential  Character  of  the  Obligation 

§331.  Nature  of  the  public  duty. 

332.  Obligations  of  the  subsequent  relationship. 

333.  The  original  obligation  is  sui  generis. 

334.  Nature  of  the  obligation  after  acceptance. 

335.  Chief  reliance  upon  tort. 

336.  No  dependence  upon  contract. 

337.  Essential  elements  in  contract  not  necessary. 

338.  Contract  cannot  be  required. 

339.  Applicant  need  not  have  the  capacity  to  contract. 

340.  Incapacity  of  the  proprietor  to  contract  no  excuse. 

341.  Relationship  established  although  another  pays. 

342.  Statutory  provisions  for  public  service. 

343.  Franchise  provisions  for  public  service. 

[xxviii] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  B.  To  Whom  the  Obligation  fs  Owed 
§  344.  The  duty  is  owed  to  a  particular  public. 

345.  What  constitutes  a  default  to  an  individual. 

346.  Applicants  must  be  desirous  of  service. 

347.  Application  to  test  rights. 

348.  Liability  to  sendee  of  telegram. 

349.  Discussion  of  the  conflicting  theories. 

350.  Individual  rights  to  fire  protection. 

351.  Common-law  basis  for  individual  rights. 

352.  Extent  of  public  interest. 

353.  Personal  character  of  the  individual  right. 

354.  Statutory  requirements  for  service. 

355.  Statutory  penalties  for  default. 


CHAPTER  XI 

OBLIGATION  LIMITED  TO  CERTAIN  CLASSES 

§  360.  Inherent  limitation  of  the  public  service  duty. 

Topic  A .  Duty  Limited  to  Travelers 

§  361.  Special  need  of  travelers. 

362.  Carriers'  obligation  limited  to  travelers. 

363.  Innkeepers'  duty  owed  only  to  travelers. 

364.  Who  is  a  traveler? 

365.  How  long  one  remains  a  traveler. 

366.  When  one  ceases  to  be  a  traveler. 

Topic  B.  Obligations  Incidental  to  the  Service 

§  367.  Persons  properly  upon  the  premises. 

368.  Persons  desiring  shelter  merely. 

369.  Persons  assisting  or  meeting  passengers. 

370.  Convenience  of  the  patron  the  test. 

371.  Right  involved  is  that  of  the  person  served. 

372.  Extent  of  the  duty  to  such  persons. 

Topic  C.  Duty  Limited  to  Occupiers 
§  373.  Special  need  of  occupiers. 

374.  Obligation  limited  to  supply  at  premises. 

375.  Necessity  of  telephone  service  at  residence. 

376.  Duty  owed  to  occupiers. 

377.  Certain  consequences  of  this  doctrine. 

[  xxix  j 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  378.  Supply  to  incumbered  premises. 

379.  Services  to  separate  premises. 

380.  Supply  to  buildings  divided  into  tenements. 

Topic  D.  Other  Limitations  to  Particular  Classes 
§  381.  When  special  limitations  are  justifiable. 

382.  Sleeping  and  parlor  car  service. 

383.  Rights  hi  a  public  conduit. 

384.  Irrigation  in  accordance  with  water  rights. 

385.  Basis  of  the  public  duty. 

CHAPTER  XII 


$  390.  Nature  of  the  conditions  precedent. 

Topic  A.  Service  Must  Be  Asked  at  Proper  Time 

§  391.  Whether  carrier  must  receive  goods  in  advance. 

392.  How  long  in  advance  goods  must  be  received. 

393.  Acceptance  long  in  advance. 

394.  Goods  tendered  too  late. 

395.  Passengers  must  come  at  proper  time. 

396.  Services  which  may  be  demanded  at  any  time. 

397.  Time-tables. 

398.  Office  hours. 

Topic  B.  Service  Must  Be  Demanded  at  Proper  Place 

§  399.  Tender  of  goods  to  the  carrier. 

400.  Placing  goods  in  proper  position  not  delivery. 

401.  Passengers  must  be  upon  the  premises. 

402.  When  passengers  are  accepted. 

403.  Establishment  of  regular  stations. 

404.  Service  at  private  sidings. 

405.  Service  only  obligatory  within  proper  territory. 

406.  Services  to  abutting  owners. 

Topic  C.  There  Must  Be  Application  in  Proper  Form 

§  407.  Applicant  must  give  notice. 

408.  Requisitions  made  in  advance. 

409.  Effect  of  mere  notification. 

410.  Signal  to  passenger  carrier. 

411.  Formal  application  for  supply. 

412.  Use  of  telegraph  blanks. 

[  XXX  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  D.  Service  Must  Be  Demanded  in  Proper  Manner 

§  413.  Goods  must  be  tendered  properly  packed. 

414.  Freight  loaded  by  shipper. 

415.  Special  freight  may  require  special  tender. 

416.  Service  upon  fungible  basis. 

417.  Proper  conditions  imposed  upon  installation. 

418.  Premises  must  be  properly  prepared. 

419.  Conditions  imposed  must  be  reasonable. 

420.  Improper  conditions  cannot  be  imposed. 

CHAPTER  XIII 

PREPAYMENT   AS   A    CONDITION 

§  430.  Payment  as  a  condition. 

Topic  A .  Prepayment  May  Be  Required 

§  431.  Prepayment  made  a  condition. 

432.  Compensation  due  upon  acceptance. 

433.  Service  partially  completed  before  demand. 

434.  Deposit  required  when  charges  are  undetermined. 

435.  Whether  different  treatment  constitutes  discrimination. 

436.  Security  required  for  reply  telegram. 

437.  Security  for  additional  charges. 

Topic  B.  Sufficiency  of  Tender 
§  438.  What  is  proper  tender. 

439.  Denomination  of  money  tendered. 

440.  Reasonable  time  to  produce  payment. 

441.  Tender  must  be  in  proper  currency. 

442.  Waiver  of  prepayment. 

443.  Conduct  dispensing  with  tender. 

Topic  C.  The  Unit  of  Service 
§  444.  Public  service  upon  a  unit  basis. 

445.  Company  cannot  insist  upon  more  than  one  unit. 

446.  The  journey  as  a  single  unit. 

447.  Forfeiture  of  right  to  original  journey. 

448.  Effect  of  outright  repudiation. 

449.  Present  unit  distinguished  from  past  unit. 

Topic  D.  Payment  of  Arrearages  Demanded 
§  450.  Payment  for  previous  carriage  not  required. 
451.  Payment  of  arrearages  not  generally  required. 

[  xxxi  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  452.  Cases  requiring  payment  of  arrearages. 

453.  Applicant  in  default  at  other  premises. 

454.  Payment  of  collateral  claims  cannot  be  demanded. 

455.  Cannot  urge  another's  default. 

456.  No  requirement  to  pay  arrears  of  predecessors. 

457.  Assumption  of  predecessor's  arrears. 

458.  Cannot  shut  off  service  for  disputed  arrearages. 

459.  Character  of  the  dispute. 

460.  Waiver  of  right  to  refuse. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


PUBLIC   DUTY   AS  TO    DEPENDENT   SERVICES 

§  470.  Nature  of  the  problem. 

Topic  A.  Public  Duty  Involved 

§  471.  The  argument  is  close. 

472.  No  direct  duty  to  the  dependent  service. 

473.  Real  duty  is  to  patrons  themselves. 

474.  Conservative  view  of  the  duty  involved. 

475.  Progressive  view  of  the  duty  involved. 

476.  Necessity  for  the  public  service  law. 

Topic  B.  Transportation  Services  in  Particular 

§  477.  Express  companies:  conservative  view. 

478.  Comment  thereon. 

479.  Express  companies:  radical  view. 

480.  Discussion  thereof. 

481.  Exclusive  contracts  with  private  car  lines. 

482.  Arrangements  for  hauling  sleeping  cars. 

483.  Hack  service:  conservative  view. 

484.  Objections  thereto. 

485.  Hack  service:  radical  view. 

486.  Argument  therefor. 

487.  Access  to  connecting  steamboats. 

488.  No  access  owed  except  at  wharf  stations. 

489.  Treatment  of  baggage  transfer  men. 

490.  Rights  of  competing  draymen. 

491.  Arrangements  with  stock  yards. 

492.  Contracts  with  grain  elevators. 

[  xxxii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  C.  Public  Services  in  General 
\  493.  Exclusive  arrangements  by  innkeepers. 

494.  Equal  facilities  for  ticker  service. 

495.  Canal  company  giving  monopoly  of  towage. 

496.  Arrangement  for  sprinkling  service. 

497.  Telephone  installation  in  public  premises. 

Topic  D.  No  Public  Duty  Involved 

498.  Special  concessions  when  no  public  duty  involved. 

499.  Special  concessions  for  private  business. 

500.  Whether  service  provided  is  necessary. 

501.  Additional  favors  beyond  obligation. 

502.  Exclusive  contracts  in  private  capacity. 

503.  Private  activities  often  held  ultra  vires. 


CHAPTER  XV 

OBLIGATION  AS  TO  CONNECTING   SERVICES 

§  510.  Public  duty  as  to  connecting  services. 

Topic  A.  Basis  on  Which  Through  Service  Is  Undertaken 
§  511.  Through  service  may  be  undertaken. 

512.  English  presumption  of  through  carriage. 

513.  American  presumption  of  successive  service. 

514.  What  constitutes  connecting  service. 

Topic  B.  Mutual  Obligations  in  Successive  Service 
§  515.  Obligation  of  initial  service  to  take  to  connection. 

516.  Special  law  applicable  thereto. 

517.  Special  duty  to  make  delivery  to  connection. 

518.  Further  duties  of  the  initial  service. 

519.  Obligation  of  second  service  to  accept. 

520.  Peculiar  rules  relating  thereto. 

521.  Observance  of  patron's  directions. 

522.  Results  of  any  disobedience. 

523.  Discrimination  permissible  in  granting  favors. 

524.  Discrimination  forbidden  where  public  duty  involved. 

Topic  C.  Facilities  for  the  Interchange  of  Business 
§  525.  Construction  of  physical  connections  not  obligatory. 

526.  Statutory  requirements  go  further. 

527.  Obligation  to  have  transfer  facilities  at  junction  points. 

3  [  xxxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  528.  Whether  freight  must  be  taken  in  original  care. 

529.  Such  transportation  now  usually  held  obligatory. 

530.  Qualifications  of  the  doctrine. 

531.  Provision  of  cars  for  further  service. 

532.  Statutory  requirement  of  through  facilities. 

Topic  D.  Joint  Through  Routing  and  Rating 
§  533.  Through  arrangements  not  obligatory. 

534.  Initial  company  may  select  connecting  line. 

535.  Limitations  upon  joint  rates. 

536.  Statutory  provision  for  through  routes. 

537.  Constitutionality  of  such  statutes. 

538.  Application  of  these  statutes. 

539.  Statutory  regulation  of  connecting  services. 

540.  Policy  of  such  legislation. 

PART  IV.     JUSTIFICATION  FOR  REFUSING 

SERVICE 

CHAPTER  XVI 

INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES  OF  PUBLIC  DUTY 

5  550.  Refusal  illegal  without  proper  justification. 

Topic  A.  Distasteful  Service 
§  551.  Malicious  motives. 

552.  Malice  as  a  factor. 

553.  Refusal  dictated  by  favoritism. 

554.  Discrimination  for  its  own  ends. 

555.  Disagreeable  persons. 

556.  Unmannerly  persons. 

557.  Slight  misbehavior. 

558.  Personal  objections. 

559.  Immoral  persons. 

560.  Undesirable  persons. 

561.  Supposed  interest  of  patron. 

562.  Wiser  course  for  patron. 

563.  Unwelcome  service. 

564.  Wrongful  refusal. 

Topic  B.  Disadvantageous  Service 
§  565.  Race  prejudice. 
566.  Separation  of  the  races. 

[xxxiv] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  567.  Class  distinctions. 

568.  Social  differences. 

569.  Unpopular  organizations. 

570.  Labor  demands. 

571.  Assumption  of  peculiar  risks. 

572.  Service  involving  unusual  care. 

573.  Indirect  advantage  in  refusing. 

574.  Ultimate  advantage  in  refusing. 

575.  Particular  service  peculiarly  expensive. 

576.  Extensions  limited  by  profitableness. 

577.  Service  in  unprofitable  ways. 

578.  Unprofitableness  seldom  an  excuse. 

579.  Particular  service  not  indispensable. 

580.  Substitute  for  service  available. 

CHAPTER  XVII 

REFUSAL   BECAUSE    OF   ILLEGALITY   INVOLVED 

§  590.  Illegality  involved  in  performing  service. 

Topic  A.  Subservience  to  Governmental  Authority 
§  591.  Obedience  to  executive  orders. 

592.  Subservience  to  military  necessity. 

593.  Prohibitions  in  administrative  regulations. 

594.  Obedience  to  legal  processes. 

595.  Contravention  of  charter  limitations. 

596.  Situation  at  expiration  of  franchise. 

Topic  B.  Contravention  of  Statutory  Provisions 

§  597.  Statutes  expressly  controlling  service. 

598.  The  criminal  law  generally. 

599.  Sunday  laws. 

600.  Liquor  laws. 

601.  Game  laws. 

602.  Health  regulations. 

603.  Gaming  statutes. 

Topic  C.  Service  Promoting  Illegal  Transaction 

§  604.  Participation  in  the  illegality. 

605.  Implication  in  illegality. 

606.  Service  aiding  immoral  business. 

607.  Service  indispensable  to  illegal  business. 

608.  Reasonable  rejection  usually  justified. 

609.  Cases  holding  that  rejection  is  at  peril. 

[  XXXV  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Topic  D.  Proximity  to  the  Illegality 
§  610.  Service  promoting  the  illegality. 

611.  Illegality  prior  to  service. 

612.  Illegality  subsequent  to  service. 

613.  Public  policy  the  explanation. 


CHAPTER  XVIH 

REJECTION   FOR   PERSONAL   DISQUALIFICATION 

§  620.  Right  of  protection  the  basis  of  the  defense. 

Topic  A.  Self-Protection 

§  621.  Dangerous  service. 

622.  Risk  of  possible  liability. 

623.  Fraudulent  customers. 

624.  Abuse  of  privileges. 

625.  Interference  with  the  service. 

626.  Persons  bringing  dangerous  things. 

Topic  B.  Protection  of  Others  Served 
§  627.  Dangerous  persons. 

628.  Suspected  criminals. 

629.  Violent  passengers. 

630.  Disorderly  guests. 

631.  Persons  having  contagious  disease. 

632.  Intoxicated  persons. 

633.  Profane  patrons. 

634.  Ejection  governed  by  same  general  principles  as  rejection. 

Topic  C.  Applicant  Under  Disability ' 
§  635.  Disabled  persons  in  general. 

636.  Persons  subject  to  an  incapacity. 

637.  Blind  persons. 

638.  Sick  persons. 

639.  Insane  persons. 

640.  Arrested  persons. 

Topic  D.  Basis  for  Rejection 
§  641.  Rejection  for  present  misconduct. 
642.  Rejection  for  past  misconduct. 

[  xxxvi  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

643.  Rejection  upon  probable  cause. 

644.  Ejection  before  actual  misconduct. 

645.  Whether  refusal  should  be  at  peril. 

646.  Rejection  for  misconduct  of  companion. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


JUSTIFICATION   FOR  SUSPENDING   SERVICE 


§  650.  General  situations  justifying  suspension. 

Topic  A.  Natural  Conditions 

§  651.  Failure  of  water  supply. 

652.  Exhaustion  of  irrigation  supply. 

653.  Division  of  natural  gas. 

654.  Service  dependent  on  water  power. 

Topic  B.  Inevitable  Accidents 

§  655.  Convulsions  of  nature. 

656.  Storms  and  floods. 

657.  Electrical  disturbance. 

658.  Normal  conditions. 

659.  Unavoidable  accidents. 

Topic  C.  Insufficient  Facilities 

§  660.  When  accommodations  offered  are  exhausted. 

661.  Limitations  upon  the  carrier's  obligation. 

662.  Extended  obligation  of  the  railroads. 

663.  Facilities  unexpectedly  become  outgrown. 

664.  Normal  fluctuations  of  business. 

665.  Division  of  facilities  among  applicants. 

Topic  D.  Human  Obstacles 

§  666.  Enemy  forces. 

667.  Domestic  violence. 

668.  Refusal  to  receive  because  of  strike. 

669.  Refusal  to  receive  because  of  violent  strike. 

670.  Situation  when  sympathetic  strike. 

671.  How  employe's  of  the  carriers  are  affected. 

[  xxxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
CHAPTER  XX 

PROMOTION    OF   ITS   BUSINESS   INTERESTS 

§  680.  Business  policies  inconsistent  with  public  employment. 

Topic  A .  Unfair  Competition 
§  681.  Exclusive  custom  cannot  be  demanded. 

682.  Partial  service  already  rendered  by  rival  carrier. 

683.  Telephone  companies  cannot  forbid  rival  installation. 

684.  Exclusive  regulations  by  the  associated  press. 

685.  Status  of  exclusive  contracts. 

686.  Refusal  to  take  another's  customers. 

Topic  B.  Contracts  Opposed  to  Public  Service 
§  687.  Contract  not  to  deal  with  other  applicants. 

688.  Special  contract  for  priority. 

689.  Contract  to  exclude  others  from  simultaneous  service. 

690.  Exclusive  contracts  with  an  intermediate  service. 

691.  Effect  of  restrictive  covenants  in  conveyances. 

692.  Contract  limitations  upon  licensees. 

693.  Contract  for  division  of  territory. 

694.  Pooling  agreements  usually  void. 

Topic  C.  Refusal  of  the  Demands  of  a  Rival 
5  695.  Shipments  made  by  a  rival. 

696.  No  obligation  to  carry  packed  parcels. 

697.  Competitor  must  be  taken  as  a  passenger. 

698.  Railroad  not  compelled  to  give  running  rights. 

699.  Obligation  to  give  trackage. 

700.  Connections  with  another  telephone  system. 

701.  Utilization  of  the  waterworks  of  another. 

702.  Gas  works  not  bound  to  supply  rivals. 

Topic  D.  Promotion  of  a  Collateral  Business 

§  703.  Right  to  engage  in  a  collateral  business. 

704.  Telephone  company  favoring  its  messenger  service. 

705.  Municipality  promoting  its  water  service. 

706.  Electric  company  favoring  its  wiring  department. 

707.  Railroad  cutting  its  own  rates  for  itself. 

708.  Grain  elevators  storing  their  own  grain. 

709.  Constitutionality  of  statutory  prohibition. 

710.  Argument  for  radical  law. 

[  xxxviii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

BOOK  III.     CONDUCT  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOY- 
MENT 

PART  V.     COMMENCEMENT  OF  SERVICE 
CHAPTER  XXI 

BEGINNING   OF   THE    UNDERTAKING 

§  720.  Commencement  of  the  relation. 

Topic  A.  When  Public  Service  is  Begun 

§  721.  Position  of  prospective  customers. 

722.  Requisitions  made  for  service. 

723.  Actual  agreement  must  be  shown. 

724.  Acceptance  as  common  carrier. 

725.  Reception  as  a  guest. 

726.  Goods  withheld  from  transportation. 

727.  Goods  at  carrier's  disposal. 

728.  Conditional  acceptance. 

Topic  B.  How  the  Relationship  is  Established 
§  729.  Evidence  of  actual  acceptance  necessary. 

730.  Notice  not  enough  in  itself. 

731.  When  acceptance  takes  place. 

732.  Where  acceptance  takes  place. 

733.  Consent  to  delivery  implied. 

734.  Customary  acceptance  of  goods. 

735.  Acceptance  of  passengers  at  stations. 

736.  Boarding  a  moving  vehicle. 

737.  Carriage  of  goods  secured  by  fraud. 

738.  Stealing  a  ride. 

Topic  C.  Whether  Acceptance  is  Authorized 
§  739.  Who  is  the  real  proprietor. 

740.  Situation  after  railroad  leases. 

741.  Dealings  with  unauthorized  persons. 

742.  For  whom  a  servant  acts. 

743.  Independent  service  by  servant. 

744.  Private  arrangements  with  employe". 

745.  Guests  invited  by  servants. 

[  xxxix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

746.  Service  obtained  by  connivance. 

747.  Bill  of  lading  issued  without  goods. 

748.  Jurisdictions  holding  carrier  liable. 


PART  VI.     MANAGEMENT  OF  THE 
BUSINESS 

CHAPTER  XXII 

BASIS   OF   THE   UNDERTAKING 

§  750.  Whether  the  transaction  is  public  or  private. 

Topic  A.  Service  Rendered  upon  a  Special  Basis 
§  751.  Boarders  at  an  inn. 

752.  Special  acceptance  as  guest. 

753.  Chartered  accommodations. 

754.  Special  passenger  trains. 

755.  Special  freight  trains. 

756.  Regular  train  established  upon  special  guaranty. 

757.  Excursion  trains. 

758.  Chartered  train. 

Topic  B.  Unusual  Methods  of  Service 
§  759.  Passengers  traveling  in  an  unusual  place. 

760.  Whether  there  is  acceptance  in  such  cases. 

761.  Vehicle  not  intended  for  passengers. 

762.  Carriage  on  construction  trains. 

763.  Passenger  carriage  on  freight  trains. 

764.  Such  transportation  often  upon  a  private  basis. 

765.  Special  services  in  telephoning. 

766.  Unrepeated  telegrams. 

Topic  C.  Peculiar  Conditions  of  Service 
§  767.  Owner  accompanying  his  goods. 

768.  Carrier  in  general  control. 

769.  Luggage  carried  by  passengers. 

770.  Special  arrangements  with  innkeepers. 

771.  Goods  taken  across  a  ferry. 

772.  Owner  going  with  his  freight. 

773.  Switching  cars. 

774.  Towing  vessels. 

[Xl] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  775.  Responsibility  for  through  cars. 
776.  Relations  with  the  dependent  services. 

Topic  D.  Special  Arrangements  with  Particular  Classes 
§  777.  Mail  clerks. 

778.  Express  messengers. 

779.  Employe's  of  car  companies. 

780.  Owners  accompanying  their  shipments. 

781.  Employe's  of  contracting  shippers. 

782.  Concessionaires  in  general. 

783.  Employe's  while  on  duty. 

784.  Employe's  receiving  independent  service. 

785.  Full  liability  in  gratuitous  service. 

786.  Explicit  limitation  to  private  basis. 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

PROVISION   OP   ADEQUATE   FACILITIES 

§  790.  Basis  of  the  duty  to  supply  equipment. 

Topic  A.  Provision  of  Proper  Facilities 
§  791.  Profession  limited  to  original  facilities. 

792.  Adherence  to  the  original  scope. 

793.  Proper  equipment  must  be  provided. 

794.  Ultimate  responsibility  for  proper  equipment. 

795.  Improvement  of  present  facilities. 

796.  Provision  of  special  equipment. 

Topic  B.  Obligation  to  Increase  Facilities 
§  797.  Facilities  which  the  service  requires. 

798.  The  obligation  is  not  absolute. 

799.  Equipment  sufficient  for  expected  business. 

800.  Expected  business  not  provided  for. 

801.  Demand  foreseen  although  unusual. 

802.  Reasonable  time  to  increase  facilities. 

803.  Pressure  for  short  periods. 

804.  Equipment  beyond  its  control. 

Topic  C.  Establishment  of  Stational  Facilities 
5  805.  Establishment  of  stations  by  legislation. 

806.  Requirement  of  stations  by  commissions. 

807.  Requirement  of  stations  by  the  courts,  conservative  view. 

808.  Progressive  view  of  the  question  of  stations. 

[xli] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  809.  Where  stations  are  required. 

810.  Closing  stations. 

811.  Exact  location  of  stations. 

812.  Proper  facilities  at  stations. 

813.  Establishment  of  freight  stations. 

814.  Establishing  offices  in  other  services. 

Topic  D.  Provision  of  Private  Installation 

§  815.  No  right  to  private  sidings  generally. 

816.  Rights  of  the  railroad  paramount. 

817.  When  private  switches  must  be  granted. 

818.  The  problem  of  stock  yards. 

819.  Constitutionality  of  further  legislation. 

820.  Railroad  never  obliged  to  construct  siding. 

821.  Duty  confined  to  permitting  connection. 

822.  Obligation  to  receive  upon  spurs. 

823.  The  company  need  only  provide  requisite  facilities. 

824.  Provision  of  service  pipes  and  feed  wires. 

825.  Provision  of  transformers  and  meters. 

826.  Dictation  as  to  fittings. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

DISTRIBUTION   OF   FACILITIES   AVAILABLE 

§  830.  Proper  management. 

Topic  A.  Arrangements  Made  for  Facilities 
§  831.  Notice  necessary  for  special  requirements. 

832.  Reservation  of  accommodations  granted. 

833.  Contract  obligation  to  supply  facilities. 

834.  New  business  accepted  without  notification. 

835.  Statutory  definition  of  these  obligations. 

836.  Constitutionality  of  legislative  regulation. 

Topic  B.  Proper  Priorities  in  Service 

§  837.  Imperative  need  of  the  company  itself. 

838.  Emergency  calls  given  precedence. 

839.  Personal  requirements. 

840.  Perishable  freight. 

841.  Business  needs  of  the  country. 

842.  Priority  of  accepted  business. 

[Xlii] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  C.  Assignment  of  Available  Facilities 
§  843.  Right  to  assign  facilities. 

844.  Separate  accommodations. 

845.  Changing  accommodations. 

846.  Insistence  upon  the  unit  of  service. 

847.  Choice  of  facilities. 

848.  Separation  based  upon  race. 

849.  Nor  is  discrimination  permissible. 

Topic  D.  Fair  Apportionment  of  Service 

$  850.  Duty  not  to  discriminate. 

851.  Serving  applicants  in  rotation. 

852.  Proration  of  limited  supply. 

853.  Distribution  of  cars  to  stations. 

854.  No  part  of  the  system  given  preference. 

855.  Apportionment  of  cars  to  shippers. 

856.  Basis  of  prorating  cars. 

857.  Private  facilities  considered  in  the  apportionment. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

REGULATION   OF   THE   SERVICE 

J  860.  The  function  of  regulations. 

Topic  A.  Establishment  of  Regulations 
§  861.  Who  may  make  regulations. 

862.  Publication  of  regulations. 

863.  Changing  regulations. 

864.  Waiver  of  regulations. 

865.  Essential  elements  of  valid  regulations. 

866.  Proper  enforcement  of  regulations. 

Topic  B.  Regulations  Governing  the  Service 
J  867.  Regulations  for  limiting  the  service. 

868.  Regulations  relating  to  acceptance. 

869.  Reasonable  conditions  of  performing  service. 

870.  Establishment  of  stopping  places. 

871.  Delivery  districts. 

872.  Time-tables. 

873.  Waiting  rooms. 

874.  Office  hours. 

875.  Proper  baggage. 

876.  Unusual  baggage. 

[  xliii 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  C.  Regulation  of  Patron's  Conduct 

877.  Regulations  requiring  prepayment. 

878.  Regulations  to  prevent  escape  from  payment. 

879.  Personal  behavior  of  patron. 

880.  Bringing  dangerous  things  prohibited. 

881.  Restriction  of  patron's  position. 

882.  Passengers  forbidden  upon  platforms. 

883.  Regulations  governing  the  supply. 

884.  Use  made  of  equipment. 

Topic  D.  Regulations  Relating  to  Tickets 
i  885.  Ticket  may  be  made  indispensable. 

886.  Failure  to  produce  ticket. 

887.  Extra  charge  when  fare  is  paid  on  train. 

888.  No  opportunity  to  obtain  ticket. 

889.  Ticket  agent's  mistake. 

890.  Mistakes  of  the  conductors. 

891.  Argument  for  the  passenger. 

892.  Argument  for  the  carrier. 


PART  VII.     LIABILITY  FOR  DEFAULT 
CHAPTER  XXVI 

CONDUCT   OF   THE    UNDERTAKING 

§  900.  Proper  conduct  of  the  undertaking. 

Topic  A.  Delay  in  Performing  Service 

§  901.  Duty  to  act  promptly. 

902.  Reasonable  time  allowed  for  performance. 

903.  Special  circumstances  calling  for  haste. 

904.  Adherence  to  schedule  time. 

Topic  B.  Deviation  from  the  Undertaking 
§  905.  Usual  course  of  performing  service. 

906.  Performance  in  unauthorized  manner. 

907.  Transportation  over  wrong  route. 

908.  Essential  change  by  deviation. 

Topic  C.  Excuses  for  Default  in  Performing  Service 

§  909.  Natural  forces. 
910.  Governmental  authority. 

[  xliv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

J911.  Violent  intervention. 

912.  Interruption  by  strike. 

913.  Interference  of  patron. 

914.  Press  of  business. 

Topic  D.  Liability  Consequent  upon  Default 

915.  Delay  must  be  negligent. 

916.  Loss  directly  caused  by  delay. 

917.  Loss  merely  concurrent  with  delay. 

918.  Extreme  liability  according  to  other  authorities. 

919.  Negligence  contributing  to  the  catastrophe. 

920.  Negligence  in  not  avoiding  the  catastrophe. 

921.  Absolute  liability  the  result  of  deviation. 

922.  Absolute  liability  of  special  contract. 


CHAPTER  XXVH 

PROTECTION   OWED   DURING   PERFORMANCE 

§  930.  Extent  of  duty  to  protect. 

Topic  A.  Duty  to  Care  for  Patrons 

§  931.  Duty  to  care  for  patrons. 

932.  Extent  of  duty  to  care  for  patrons. 

933.  Special  care  in  particular  cases. 

934.  Disposition  of  dangerous  persons. 

Topic  B.  Liability  for  Injuries  Caused  by  Its  Own  Servant 

§  935.  Duty  to  protect  passenger. 

936.  Obligation  to  protect  guest. 

937.  Blameworthiness  must  be  shown. 

938.  Basis  of  liability  for  unauthorized  injury. 

939.  Action  outside  of  the  employment. 

940.  Cumulative  liability  where  two  services  involved. 

Topic  C.  Protection  Against  Injury  by  Third  Parties 

§  941.  Limited  extent  of  the  duty. 

942.  Protection  against  fellow  passengers. 

943.  Injuries  from  negligent  conduct. 

944.  Liability  for  injuries  by  outsiders. 

945.  Injuries  resulting  from  overcrowding. 

946.  Proper  extent  of  the  duty. 

[xlv] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

i  947.  Duty  of  innkeepers  to  protect  from  third  parties. 

948.  Special  protection  in  sleeping  cars. 

Topic  D.  Duty  to  Act  in  Emergencies 

949.  Duty  to  meet  emergencies. 

950.  Duty  to  repair  damage. 

951.  Duty  to  stop  performance. 

952.  Duty  to  take  appropriate  action. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

FAILURE   IN   THE   UNDERTAKING 

§  960.  General  theory  of  the  liability. 

Topic  A.  Abnormal  Liability  as  an  Insurer 

§  961.  Early  liability  in  common  calling. 

962.  Subsequent  development  of  the  carrier's  liability. 

963.  Absolute  liability  of  the  common  carrier. 

964.  Subsequent  development  of  innkeeper's  liability. 

965.  Conflict  in  the  American  authorities. 

966.  Insurance  liability  not  extended  to  persons. 

967.  Responsibility  for  animate  chattels. 

Topic  B.  Abnormal  Liability  Rigidly  Confined 
§  968.  The  service  must  be  public. 

969.  The  service  must  be  upon  a  public  basis. 

970.  Service  undertaken  gratuitously. 

971.  Compensation  included  in  the  whole  transaction. 

972.  The  business  must  be  carriage. 

973.  Carrier's  liability  not  extended  to  other  similar  employments. 

974.  The  business  must  be  innkeeping. 

975.  The  innkeeper's  liability  not  extended  to  other  employments. 

Topic  C.  Extent  of  Normal  Liability 
§  976.  Absolute  and  relative  liability  contrasted. 

977.  Development  of  the  rule  requiring  blameworthiness. 

978.  Liability  of  the  carrier  of  passengers. 

979.  Liability  of  innkeepers  for  guests  personally. 

980.  Liability  of  telegraph  companies. 

981.  Liability  of  water  companies. 

982.  Liability  of  gas  companies. 

983.  Liability  of  electric  companies. 

[  xlvi  1 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  D.  Established  Excuses  from  All  Liability 
§  984.  What  constitutes  act  of  God. 

985.  Act  of  God  merely  contributory. 

986.  Damage  by  public  enemies. 

987.  How  far  the  defense  extends. 

988.  Vice  of  the  property. 

989.  Natural  propensities  of  animals. 

990.  Interference  by  patron. 

991.  Assumption  by  patron. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


§  1000.  Limitation  upon  liability  possible. 

Topic  A.  Methods  of  Making  Limitations 
§  1001.  Mere  notice  not  sufficient. 

1002.  Special  contract  necessary. 

1003.  Acceptance  of  an  instrument. 

1004.  Such  acceptance  not  conclusive. 

1005.  Where  consideration  is  found. 

1006.  Certain  authorities  more  easily  satisfied. 

Topic  B.  Limitation  of  Exceptional  Liability  as  Insurer 
§  1007.  Such  limitation  not  inconsistent  with  public  duty. 
100S.  Statutory  regulation  of  such  contracts. 

1009.  Construction  of  the  contract. 

1010.  Conflict  of  laws. 

Topic  C.  Stipulations  against  Liability  for  Negligence 
§  1011.  Such  stipulation  inconsistent  with  public  duty. 

1012.  Authorities  permitting  such  limitation. 

1013.  Such  stipulations  invalid  in  other  services. 

1014.  Difficulties  in  the  telegraph  cases, 

1015.  Services  outside  of  the  profession. 

1016.  Services  in  course  of  business. 

1017.  Arrangements  with  connecting  services. 

1018.  Stipulations  in  gratuitous  arrangements. 

Topic  D.  Validity  of  Special  Stipulations 
§  1019.  Limitation  of  valuation  generally  permitted. 
1020.  Qualification  of  this  statement. 

[  xlvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  1021.  Liability  limited  to  set  amount. 

1022.  Authorities  opposed  to  such  limitation. 

1023.  Stipulation  for  notification  of  loss. 

1024.  Little  qualification  of  this  doctrine. 

1025.  Similar  stipulations  in  telegraph  blanks. 

1026.  What  time  is  reasonable. 


PART  VIII.    TERMINATION  OF  SERVICE 
CHAPTER  XXX 

END    OF  THE  UNDERTAKING 

§  1030.  When  the  undertaking  is  completed. 

Topic  A.  How  Long  Service  Continues 

§  1031.  Interruption  in  transit. 

1032.  Temporary  absence  from  an  inn. 

1033.  Transfer  to  connecting  service. 

1034.  End  of  innkeeper's  liability  as  such. 

1035.  Termination  of  the  carrier's  liability  as  such. 

1036.  End  of  transportation. 

1037.  Reasonable  time  for  removal. 

1038.  Whether  notification  is  necessary. 

Topic  B.  How  the  Service  Is  Terminated 

§  1039.  Extent  of  obligation  to  deliver. 

1040.  Delivery  by  express  companies. 

1041.  Delivery  by  telegraph  companies. 

1042.  Delivery  of  goods  by  railroad  companies. 

1043.  Delivery  of  bulky  freight. 

1044.  Setting  down  passengers. 

Topic  C.  Whether  Delivery  Is  Properly  Made 

§  1045.  Performance  according  to  instructions. 

1046.  Legal  excuse  for  withholding  delivery. 

1047.  Delivery  to  true  owner. 

1048.  Delivery  to  wrong  person. 

1049.  Delivery  to  the  designated  person. 

1050.  Demurrage  charges. 

1051.  Full  completion  of  performance. 

[  xlviii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

BOOK  IV.     REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC 
SERVICE 

PART  IX.     RESTRICTION  OF  CHARGES 
CHAPTER  XXXI 

GENERAL  THEORY  OF  RATE  REGULATION 

§  1060.  General  principles  governing  reasonableness. 

Topic  A.  The  Schedule  as  a  Whole 
§  1061.  Reasonableness  of  the  schedule  as  a  whole. 

1062.  Many  elements  to  be  taken  into  account. 

1063.  Reduction  of  particular  rates  leaving  sufficient  total  earnings. 

1064.  Rule  of  proportionality  in  sharing  costs. 

1065.  Rates  must  be  fair  to  all  concerned. 

1066.  Interests  of  the  companies  to  be  considered. 

1067.  Interests  of  the  public  to  be  considered. 

1068.  Accommodation  of  both  sought. 

1069.  Enlightened  policy  in  rate  regulation. 

Topic  B.  The  Particular  Rate 

§  1070.  Reasonableness  of  the  separate  rate. 

1071.  Relation  of  the  particular  rate  to  the  whole  schedule. 

1072.  Rates  unreasonable  in  themselves. 

1073.  Value  of  the  service. 

1074.  What  the  traffic  will  bear. 

1075.  Making  rates  compared  with  levying  taxes. 

1076.  Service  of  unusual  value. 

1077.  Service  not  worth  usual  amount. 

1078.  Average  cost  always  modified. 

CHAPTER  XXXH 

PROPER   BASIS   OF   CAPITALIZATION 

§  1080.  Various  theories  as  to  proper  capitalization. 

Topic  A.  The  Original  Cost  as  the  Common-law  Basis 
§  1081.  Actual  investment  entitled  to  return. 

4  [  xlix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  1082.  Argument  for  the  rule  of  total  investment. 

1083.  What  is  the  actual  cost. 

1084.  Cost  enhanced  by  fraudulent  contract. 

1085.  Plant  built  unnecessarily  large. 

1086.  Plant  adapted  for  a  larger  population. 

1087.  Construction  now  thought  unwise. 

1088.  Proportion  of  plant  not  now  utilized. 

1089.  Equipment  long  since  superseded. 

1090.  Capital  sunk  in  past  operations. 

Topic  B.  Outstanding  Capitalization 
§  1091.  Normal  capitalization  outstanding  unconclusive. 

1092.  The  problem  of  watered  stock. 

1093.  Abandonment  of  par  values. 

1094.  Bonded  indebtedness  beyond  actual  value. 

1095.  Stock  issues  based  upon  surplus  earnings. 

1096.  Securities  issued  upon  reorganization. 

1097.  State  scrutiny  of  the  issue  of  securities. 

1098.  Existing  capitalization  hardly  excessive. 

Topic  C.  Present  Value  as  the  Constitutional  Basis 
§  1099.  Protection  of  present  values. 

1100.  Original  cost,  as  affecting  present  value. 

1101.  Value  as  a  going  concern. 

1102.  Whether  return  allowed  on  such  value. 

1103.  Franchise  value  upon  purchase. 

1104.  Franchise  values  not  considered  in  rate  regulation. 

1105.  Values  returned  for  taxation  inconclusive. 

1106.  Tax  valuation  does  not  estop  the  State. 

Topic  D.  Cost  of  Reproduction  as  the  Basis 

§  1107.  The  Minnesota  rule. 

1108.  The  Federal  courts  opposed. 

1109.  Explanation  of  the  California  decisions. 

1110.  Factors  disregarded  by  the  reproduction  rule. 

1111.  Abandonment  of  the  investment  test  impolitic. 

1112.  Two  principles  still  persist. 

CHAPTER  XXXIII 

RATE   OF   RETURN 

§  1120.  Elements  in  determining  a  fair  return. 

Topic  A.  Establishment  of  the  Doctrine 
§  1121.  Establishment  of  the  power  to  restrict  charges. 

[1] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

1122.  Rates  fixed  must  not  produce  a  deficit. 

1123.  Adequate  return  must  be  left. 

1124.  Reduction  leaving  reasonable  return. 

Topic  B.  Extent  to  Which  Return  Is  Protected 
Reasonableness  of  return  now  judicial  question. 
Fair  return  generally  conceded. 
Reasonable  rates  not  necessarily  profitable. 
Reduction  ruinous  only  to  certain  companies. 
Possibility  of  increase  of  business  at  the  lowered  rates. 
Reasonable  profit  upon  each  transaction. 

Topic  C.  Fair  Rate  of  Return 
§  1131.  Interest  upon  bonds  protected. 

1132.  Dividends  upon  stock  protected. 

1133.  Current  rate  of  return. 

1134.  Reasonable  profits  sufficiently  safe. 

1135.  Unreasonable  profits  not  protected. 

1136.  Business  profit  now  recognized. 

1137.  Greater  profit  for  better  service. 

Topic  D.  Character  of  the  Enterprise 
§  1138.  Larger  returns  in  risky  enterprises. 

1139.  Public  service  has  its  peculiar  risks. 

1140.  Special  hazards  of  the  business  considered. 

1141.  Commercial  conditions  affecting  dividends. 

CHAPTER  XXXIV 

OPERATING   EXPENSES 

§  1150.  Real  cost  of  operation. 

Topic  A.  Cost  of  Performing  Service 
§  1151.  Cost  of  rendering  service. 

1152.  Salaries  paid  to  officials. 

1153.  Expenditures  to  get  business. 

1154.  Current  taxes. 

1155.  Outstanding  loans. 

1156.  Interest  payable. 

1157.  Dividends  declared. 

Topic  B.  Expenditures  on  the  Plant 
§  1158.  Expense  of  maintaining  equipment. 
1159.  Losses  due  to  accident. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  1160.  Betterments  considered  as  maintenance. 

1161.  Replacement  considered  as  repair. 

1162.  Renewal  of  equipment  to  offset  depreciation. 

1163.  Permanent  improvements  should  not  be  annual  charge. 

1164.  New  construction  should  be  charged  to  capital  account. 

1165.  A  liberal  policy  desirable. 

Topic  C.  Amortization  Requirements 

§  1166.  Depreciation  now  generally  allowed. 

1167.  Full  allowance  still  begrudged. 

1168.  Refusal  to  allow  depreciation. 

1169.  Fund  to  repair  depreciation. 

1170.  Capitalization  of  past  depreciation. 

1171.  Payments  into  sinking  fund. 

1172.  Sinking  fund  for  municipal  bonds. 

1173.  Amortization  of  franchise  rights. 

Topic  D.  Operations  of  Consolidated  Properties 

§  1174.  Complications  in  case  of  systems. 

1175.  System  generally  taken  as  a  whole. 

1176.  Unprofitable  portions  of  the  line  not  considered. 

1177.  Expenditures  for  different  parts  apportioned. 

1178.  Constituent  companies  operated  under  separate  charters. 

1179.  Rent  of  leased  portions. 

1180.  If  rental  becomes  unjustifiable. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

DETERMINATION   OF   PARTICULAR  RATES 

§  1190.  Various  theories  as  to  rate  making. 

Topic  A.  Cost  of  the  Service  as  the  Basis 
§  1191.  Proper  proportion  of  total  costs. 

1192.  Apportionment  of  separate  costs  to  different  services. 

1193.  Alteration  of  joint  costs. 

1194.  Apportionment  between  interstate  and  intrastate  business 

1195.  Apportionment  of  total  expense. 

1196.  Basis  of  the  distribution. 

1197.  Proportionate  share  of  different  classes. 

1198.  Average  rate  per  unit  of  service. 

1199.  Recognition  of  the  ton-mile  cost  basis. 

1200.  Ton-mile  cost  basis  not  oppressive. 

Fliil 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  1201.  Authorities  permitting  disproportionate  rates. 
1202.  Authorities  opposed  to  disproportion. 

Topic  B.  Factors  Modifying  Average  Cost 

§  1203.  Cost  of  service  insufficient  in  itself. 

1204.  Current  theories  as  to  relative  rates. 

1205.  Amount  of  service  asked  as  a  factor. 

1206.  Local  business  peculiarly  expensive. 

1207.  Special  conditions  affecting  cost. 

1208.  Circumstances  of  particular  service. 

1209.  Proportionate  rates  always  legal. 

1210.  Full  extent  of  the  doctrine. 

Topic  C.  Value  of  Service  as  the  Basis 
§  1211.  What  the  traffic  will  bear. 

1212.  Necessity  of  legal  limitation. 

1213.  Worth  of  the  service  to  the  individuals  taken  as  a  whole. 

1214.  Cost  of  obtaining  a  substitute  for  the  service. 

1215.  External  standards  of  value 

1216.  Rates  reasonable  per  se. 

1217.  The  Kansas  City  Stock  Yards  Case. 

1218.  The  Niagara  Bridge  Case. 

1219.  These  cases  apparently  distinguishable. 

Topic  D.  Economic  Principles  Affecting  Rate  Making 
§  1220.  Law  of  decreasing  costs. 

1221.  Exceptions  to  law  of  decreasing  cost. 

1222.  Competition  as  a  factor. 

1223.  Policy  for  permitting  competitive  rates. 

1224.  Necessary  limitation  upon  these  principles. 

1225.  Equalization  of  commercial  advantage. 

1226.  Argument  against  preferential  rates. 

1227.  Conclusion  as  to  proportional  rate. 

1228.  Conflicting  theories  still  persist. 

CHAPTER  XXXVI 

CHARACTERISTICS   OF   THE   RATE 

§  1230.  Fixing  the  particular  rate. 

Topic  A.  Classification  in  Rate  Schedules 
§  1231.  Prevelance  of  classification. 
1232.  History  of  railroad  classification. 

[liii] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

i  1233.  Usual  division  into  classes. 

1234.  Distribution  of  the  burden  by  classification. 

1235.  Reasonableness  of  classification  requisite. 

1236.  Influences  determining  proper  classification. 

1237.  Like  classification  for  similar  goods. 

1238.  Different  classification  for  dissimilar  goods. 

1239.  Business  expensive  to  handle. 

1240.  Service  performed  at  lower  cost. 

Topic  B.  Method  of  Fixing  Rates 

i  1241.  Basis  upon  which  charges  may  be  made. 

1242.  Establishment  of  the  unit  of  charge. 

1243.  Methods  of  computing  freights. 

1244.  Different  basis  in  supply  services. 

1245.  Requiring  metering  not  discrimination. 

1246.  Query  as  to  the  flat  rate. 

1247.  Justification  of  the  minimum  charge. 

1248.  Principle  applicable  in  all  public  service. 

1249.  Unit  must  be  reasonable. 

1250.  Reasonableness  of  the  period  fixed. 

1251.  Minimum  rate  distinguished  from  equipment  charge. 

1252.  Initial  unit  distinguished  from  repeat  unit. 

Topic  C.  The  Journey  the  Unit 

1253.  The  journey  is  a  single  entire  unit. 

1254.  Ticket  good  only  for  through  transportation. 

1255.  Passenger  cannot  take  two  journeys  for  a  single  fare. 

1256.  Two  partial  fares  for  a  single  journey. 

1257.  Part  of  journey  completed  before  fare  collection. 

1258.  Resumption  of  journey  by  ejected  passenger. 

1259.  Passenger  expelled  at  a  regular  station. 

1260.  Change  of  destination  during  the  journey. 

1261.  Second  journey  on  same  train. 

1262.  No  separate  charge  for  a  part  of  the  transit. 

Topic  D.  The  Shipment  the  Unit 

1263.  Maritime  freight. 

1264.  Right  to  freight  on  land. 

1265.  Effect  of  carriage  over  a  portion  of  the  journey. 

1266.  No  freight  without  delivery. 

1267.  Effect  of  partial  delivery. 

1268.  Freight  indivisible  as  a  rule. 

1269.  Entire  freight  when  goods  arrive  damaged. 

1270.  General  principles  as  to  additional  charges. 

[livl 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PART  X.     PREVENTION  OF  DISCRIM- 
INATION 

CHAPTER  XXXVII 

PROHIBITION   OF   DISCRIMINATION 

§  1280.  The  rule  against  discrimination. 

Topic  A.  Development  of  the  Rule 
§  1281.  Evolution  of  the  rule. 

1282.  No  law  originally  against  discrimination  as  such. 

1283.  Later  rule  against  unreasonable  differences. 

1284.  Special  rates  may  not  be  discriminatory. 

1285.  Exclusiveness  once  held  indispensable. 

1286.  Discrimination  as  evidence  of  unreasonable  rates. 

1287.  Complainant  charged  more  than  regular  rates. 

1288.  Others  charged  less  than  regular  rates. 

1289.  Outright  discrimination  universally  condemned. 

1290.  Modern  law  against  all  discrimination. 

1291.  Necessity  for  the  rule  against  discrimination. 

1292.  Discrimination  inconsistent  with  public  duty. 

Topic  B.  What  Constitutes  Illegal  Discrimination 
§  1293.  What  amounts  to  a  rebate. 

1294.  Sanctity  of  the  schedule  rate. 

1295.  Explanation  of  this  policy. 

1296.  Decisions  inconsistent  with  this  policy. 

1297.  Continuing  contracts  no  justification. 

1298.  Executed  contracts  on  a  different  basis. 

1299.  Rule  not  limited  to  discrimination  between  competitors. 

1300.  Rule  universal  in  public  service. 

1301.  Giving  free  passes  discrimination. 

1302.  Statutory  exceptions  usually  made. 

1303.  Reductions  for  charitable  purposes. 

1304.  Concessions  for  government  business. 

1305.  Reductions  for  general  classes. 

1306.  No  obligation  to  grant  such  concession. 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

ILLEGAL   DISCRIMINATION 
§  1310.  What  constitutes  illegal  discrimination. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  A.  Concessions  to  get  Competitive  Business 
§  1311.  Concessions  once  allowed  in  competition. 

1312.  Competitive  conditions  no  justification. 

1313.  Concessions  to  get  outside  business. 

1314.  Rebating  to  get  business  illegal. 

1315.  Competitive  rates  for  through  business. 

1316.  Additional  services  performed  for  certain  customers. 

1317.  Customers  induced  to  make  expensive  preparations. 

Topic  B.  Concessions  to  Large  Customers 

§  1318.  Whether  concessions  may  be  made  to  large  customers. 

1319.  Unreasonable  differences  universally  forbidden. 

1320.  Reasonable  differences  sometimes  permitted. 

1321.  Authority  for  such  differentials. 

1322.  Prevelant  doctrine  against  such  concessions. 

1323.  Services  to  large  and  small  customers  practically  identical. 

1324.  Company  need  never  grant  such  reductions. 

Topic  C.  Rebates  to  Exclusive  Customers 

§  1325.  Whether  exclusive  policies  may  be  adopted. 

1326.  Such  discriminations  foster  monopolies. 

1327.  Those  who  use  rival  line  charged  more  than  usual. 

1328.  Lower  rates  to  exclusive  customers  sometimes  permitted. 

1329.  Comparison  of  these  decisions. 

1330.  Customers  contracting  for  large  amounts. 

1331.  Customers  under  exclusive  contract  to  give  business. 

Topic  D.  Concessions  for  Special  Kinds  of  Business 
§  1332.  Different  rates  for  service  differently  employed. 

1333.  Such  rates  allowed  by  some  cases. 

1334.  Repudiation  of  this  doctrine. 

1335.  Supply  put  to  different  uses. 

1336.  Discrimination  in  such  supply. 

1337.  Commodities  carried  of  different  character. 

1338.  Supply  under  different  conditions. 

CHAPTER  XXXIX 

JUSTIFIABLE   DIFFERENCES 

§  1340.  Propriety  of  proportionate  rates. 

Topic  A.  Actual  Differences  in  Total  Costs 

1341.  Extent  of  the  rule  against  discrimination. 

1342.  Differences  in  the  cost. 

[Ivi] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  1343.  Economies  in  passenger  transportation. 

1344.  Economies  in  freight  transportation. 

1345.  Different  charges  for  different  service. 

1346.  Difference  in  the  nature  of  the  service. 

1347.  Both  rates  must  be  open  to  all. 

Topic  B.  Service  in  More  Convenient  Units 
§  1348.  Shipment  in  carloads. 

1349.  Shipments  made  in  bulk. 

1350.  Comparison  of  bulk  and  package  rates. 

1351.  Shipments  in  train  loads. 

1352.  Regular  shipments  in  large  units. 

1353.  Units  in  passenger  service. 

1354.  Operating  units  in  supplying  service. 

1355.  Such  reductions  apparently  discriminatory. 

Topic  C.  Facilities  Furnished  by  Customers 
§  1356.  Terminal  facilities  furnished  by  shippers. 

1357.  Transportation  expenses  paid  by  shipper. 

1358.  Rental  paid  for  shipper's  cars. 

1359.  Allowances  for  facilities  closely  scrutinized. 

1360.  Allowances  for  facilities  still  permissible. 

Topic  D.  Independent  Consideration  for  Reductions 
§  1361.  When  consideration  is  given  for  reduction. 

1362.  Indefinite  considerations  considered  dangerous. 

1363.  Reductions  for  services  rendered. 

1364.  Continuing  obligations  for  past  consideration. 

1365.  Concessions  to  those  with  whom  it  deals. 

1366.  Rates  adopted  to  foster  its  interests. 

CHAPTER  XL 

RELATIVE  DISCRIMINATION 

§  1370.  Essential  illegality  of  relative  discrimination. 

Topic  A.  Discrimination  Between  Localities  Served 
§  1371.  Unjust  rates  between  localities. 

1372.  Evidence  of  disproportionate  charging. 

1373.  Railroad  rates  not  upon  a  mileage  basis. 

1374.  Various  systems  of  making  distance  rates. 

1375.  Long  and  short  haul. 

1376.  The  similar  circumstances  proviso. 

[Ivii] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  1377.  Competition  as  a  justification  for  disproportion. 

1378.  Undue  preference. 

1379.  Argument  for  competitive  rates. 

1380.  Competitive  rates  must  not  be  ruinous. 

1381.  Reconsignment  arrangements. 

1382.  Back  freights. 

1383.  Equalization  of  economic  advantage. 

1384.  Law  against  commercial  equalization. 

1385.  No  obligation  to  make  preferential  rates. 

1386.  Due  consideration  of  true  differences. 

Topic  B.  Discrimination  Between  Services  Rendered 
§  1387.  Disproportionate  rates  for  different  services. 

1388.  Charging  what  the  traffic  will  bear. 

1389.  Difference  in  rate  between  freight  classes. 

1390.  Differences  should  not  be  grossly  disproportionate. 

1391.  Comparison  the  basis  of  the  differential. 

1392.  Difference  in  commodity  rates. 

1393.  Rates  vary  with  values. 

1394.  Improper  to  equalize  values. 

1395.  Policy  against  all  discrimination. 

1396.  Relative  discrimination  inconsistent  with  public  duty. 

CHAPTER  XLI 

CONSTITUTIONAL   SUMMARY 

§  1400.  Control  of  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Character  of  the  Power  to  Regulate 
5  1401.  Nature  of  the  power  to  regulate. 

1402.  Power  to  regulate  not  a  judicial  power. 

1403.  Power  to  regulate  not  strictly  legislative. 

1404.  Power  to  regulate  is  administrative. 

1405.  Regulating  body  presumably  reasonable: 

1406.  Duty  of  the  courts  to  decide  reasonableness. 

Topic  B.  Method  of  Exercising  the  Power  to  Regulate 
§  1407.  Fixing  rules  by  legislation. 

1408.  Delegation  of  regulating  power. 

1409.  Functions  of  administrative  commissions. 

1410.  Action  by  municipal,  or  other  local  government. 

1411.  Function  of  the  courts  in  declaring  regulation  void. 

1412.  When  suit  is  against  State  official. 

[  Iviii  1 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Topic  C.  Division  Between  Federal  and  State  Jurisdiction 

1413.  What  constitutes  interstate  commerce. 

1414.  Continuous  carriage  under  common  control. 

1415.  Continuity  of  interstate  shipment. 

1416.  Carriage  wholly  within  the  State. 

1417.  State  legislation  burdening  interstate  commerce. 

1418.  Scope  for  State  police  power. 

1419.  Effect  of  action  by  Congress. 

1420.  Power  of  Congress  to  regulate. 

Topic  D.  Impairing  Obligation  of  Contract 

1421.  Contract  character  of  charter  privileges. 

1422.  Express  contractual  provision  necessary. 

1423.  Conferring  powers  does  not  create  contract. 

1424.  Contracts  made  by  municipal  ordinance. 

1425.  Loss  of  the  privilege. 

1426.  Assignment  of  the  privilege. 

Topic  E.  Confiscation  of  Property 

1427.  The  doctrine  of  the  "Granger"  cases. 

1428.  Early  modification  of  the  doctrine. 

1429.  Fair  return  finally  protected. 

1430.  When  rates  are  confiscatory. 

1431.  When  fair  net  earnings  left. 

1432.  Reasonable  rates  not  necessarily  profitable. 

Topic  F.  Due  Process  of  Law 

1433.  Imposition  of  absolute  liability. 

1434.  Requiring  service  outside  employment. 

1435.  Police  power  unusually  extensive. 

1436.  Regulation  must  not  be  discriminatory. 

1437.  New  limitations  upon  industrial  liberty. 

1438.  Differentiation  of  the  public  services. 

1439.  Ultimate  regulation  of  all  monopoly. 

1440.  State  control  not  socialism. 


APPENDIX  A 

THE   INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   ACT 

1.  Regulation  of  transportation. 

2.  Unjust  discrimination  defined  and  forbidden. 

3.  Undue  or  unreasonable  preference  or  advantage  forbidden. 

4.  Long  and  short  hand  provision. 

[lix 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

!    5.  Pooling  of  freights  and  division  of  earnings  forbidden. 

6.  Printing  and  posting  of  schedules. 

7.  Continuous  carriage  of  freights. 

8.  Liability  of  common  carriers  for  damages. 

9.  Election  whether  to  complain  to  the  commission  or  bring  suit. 

10.  Penalties  for  violations  of  act  by  carriers. 

11.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

12.  Powers  and  duties  of  the  commission. 

13.  Complaints  to  commission. 

14.  Commission  must  make  reports. 

15.  Commission  may  prescribe  rates  and  classifications. 

16.  Award  of  damages  by  commission. 
16a.  Commission  may  grant  rehearings. 

17.  Form  of  procedure. 

18.  Organization  of  the  commission. 

19.  Office  of  the  commission. 

20.  Annual  reports  to  commission. 

21.  Annual  reports  of  the  commission. 

22.  Persons  and  property  that  may  be  carried  free  or  at  reduced  rates, 

23.  Jurisdiction  of  United  States  courts. 

24.  Constitution  of  the  commission. 

APPENDIX  B 

THE   COMMERCE    COURT  ACT 

1.  Creation  and  jurisdiction  of  Commerce  Court. 

2.  Appeals  to  Supreme  Court. 

3.  Suits  to  enjoin  orders  of  commission. 

4.  Suits  to  be  brought  by  or  against  United  States. 

5.  Control  of  such  suits. 

6.  Pending  and  other  proceedings. 

7.  Pending  cases. 

8.  Special  commission  to  investigate  securities. 

9.  Interlocutory  injunctions  restraining  enforcement  of  State  statutes. 
10.  When  act  effective. 

APPENDIX  C 

THE   ELKINS   ACT 

1.  Carrier  corporation  as  well  as  officer  liable  to  conviction. 

2.  Persons  interested  may  be  made  parties. 

[Ix] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

§  3.  Proceedings  to  enjoin  departures  from  published  rates. 
4.  Conflicting  laws  repealed. 

APPENDIX  D 

THE   EXPEDITING   ACT 

§  1.  Expedition  of  cases. 
2.  Appeal  to  Supreme  Court. 

APPENDIX  E 

FORMS   FOR   PROCEEDINGS  BEFORE   COMMISSIONS 

§  1.  Complaint  of  unreasonable  charges. 

2.  Complaint  of  wrong  classification. 

3.  Answer  on  the  merits. 

4.  Answer  denying  the  jurisdiction. 

APPENDIX  F 

FORMS  FOR  PROCEEDINGS   INVOLVING  COMMISSIONS 

§  1.  Bill  to  enforce  order  of  the  Commission. 

2.  Abstract  of  answer  to  above  complaint. 

3.  Bill  to  enjoin  order  of  the  Commission. 

4.  Abstract  of  answer  to  this  bill. 


[Ixi 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Abbey  v.  Steamboat  Stevens,  22 
How.  Pr.  78  (1861),  173,  774. 

Abbot  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co., 
46  Oreg.  549  (1905),  398,  873. 

Abbott  v.  Bradstreet,  55  Me.  530 
(1868),  769. 

Abraham  v.  Western  Union  Tel- 
egraph Co.,  23  Fed.  315 
(1885),  980,  1014. 

Abrams  v.  Platt,  23  N.  Y.  Misc. 
637  (1898),  741. 

Adams  v.  Clem,  41  Ga.  65  (1870), 
1034. 

Adams  v.  Freeman,  12  Johns.  408, 
7  Am.  Dec.  327  (1815),  106. 

Adams  v.  Union  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
R.  I.  134  (1899),  347. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Bratton, 
106  111.  App.  563  (1902),  902. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Carnahan, 
29  Ind.  App.  606  (1902), 
1003,  1021. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth, 33  Ky.  L.  Rep.  967 
(1908),  600. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth, 29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  224 
(1906),  600. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Cressap,  6 
Bush,  572  (1869),  970. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Darnell,  31 
Ind.  20  (1869),  1040. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Harris,  120 
Ind.  73  (1889),  1005,  1022. 


Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Kentucky, 

206  U.  S.  129  (1907),  1418. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Kentucky, 

214  U.  S.  218  (1910),  1418. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  McCon- 

nell,   27   Kans.   238   (1882), 

178,  776. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Nock,  2 

Duv.  562  (1866),  1003. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Reagan,  29 

Ind.  21  (1867),  1026. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  State,  161 

Ind.  328  (1903),  178. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Stettaners, 

61  111.  184  (1871),  1020. 
Adams  &  Co.  v.  Blankenstein,  2 

Cal.  413  (1852),  1048. 
Agee  &  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

Co.,  142  Ala.  344  (1904),  224, 

225,  822. 
Agnew  v.  Steamer  Contra  Costa, 

27  Cal.  425  (1865),  963. 
Ahern  v.  Minn.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  102 

Minn.  435  (1907),  754. 
Aiken  &  Co.  v.  Eager  &  Co.,  35 

La.   Ann.   567    (1883),    102, 

232. 

Aiken   v.   Western   Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  5  S.  C.  358  (1874), 

348,  1014. 
Airey  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co., 

50  La.  Ann.  648  (1898),  776. 
Akron    v.    East   Ohio  Gas   Co., 

53  Oh.  L.  Bull.  441  (1908), 

305. 

[Ixiii] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bri- 

chett,  72  Miss.  891   (1895), 

952. 

Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Missis- 
sippi R.  R.  Comm.,  203  U.  S. 

496  (1906),  1385. 
Alabama  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Comm.,  86  Miss.  667 

(1905),     682,     1132,     1315, 

1381. 
Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tirelli 

Bros.,  93  Miss.  797  (1909), 

1046. 

Alabama  Gt.  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ar- 
nold, 84  Ala.  159  (1888),  398, 

873. 
Alabama  Gt.  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mt. 

Vernon    Co.,    84    Ala.    173 

(1887),  726. 
Alabama    Gt.    So.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Quarles  &  C.,  145  Ala.  436 

(1906),  902,  918. 
Alabama    Gt.    So.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Thomas,  89  Ala.  294  (1889), 

525. 
Alair  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

53  Minn.  160  (1893),  1021. 
Albany  Tel.  Co.  v.  Terry  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.),  127  S.  W.  567 

(1910),  533. 
Albers  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

98   Iowa,    51    (1896),    1025, 

1026. 
Albert   v.    Davis,   49   Neb.    579 

(1896),  825. 
Albin  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,     103    Mo.     App.     308 

(1903),  735. 
Albin  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  95  S.  W. 

589  (1906),  872. 
Albion  Lumber  Co.  v.  De  Nobra, 

72  Fed.  739  (1896),  207,  223, 

340. 

[Ixiv] 


Albright  v.  Penn,   14    Tex.  290 

(1855),  182. 
Alden  v.  New  York  C.  R.  R.  Co., 

26  N.  Y.  102  (1862),  977. 
Aidrich  C.  S.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican Exp.  Co.,  117  Mich.  32 

(1898),  1048. 
Alexander   v.    Green,    3   Hill,   9 

(1842),  7   Ibid.  533   (1844), 

150,  160,  173,  774,  972. 
Alexander  v.  Nanticoke  Light  Co., 

209  Pa.  St.  571  (1904),  983. 
Alexandria  Bay  Stb.  Co.  v.  New 

York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 

18    N.    Y.    App.    Div.    527 

(1897),  102,  488. 
Alexandria  Bay  Stb.  Co.  v.  New 

York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 

45  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091  (1897), 

811. 
Alexandria,  The  City  of,  28  Fed. 

202  (1886),  732,  741. 
Aliso  Water  Co.  v.  Baker,  95  Cal. 

268  (1892),  221,  242. 
Allam  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

183  Pa.  St.  174  (1897),  1007, 

1042. 
Allen  v.  Jay,  60  Me.  124,  11  Am. 

Rep.  185  (1872),  64. 
Allen  v.  Lake  Shore  &  Mich.  S. 

Ry.    Co.,    57    Ohio    St.    79 

(1897),  763,  870. 
Allen  v.  Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

79  Me.  327  (1887),  1046. 
Allen  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co., 

98  Fed.  16  (1899),  534. 
Allen  v.  Sackrider,  37  N.  Y.  341 

(1867),  235,  239. 
Allen  v.  Sewell,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

327  (1829),  255. 
Allen  v.  Smith,  12  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 

638  Eng.  (1862),  1032. 
Allen  v.  Somers,  73  Conn.  355, 

(1900),  143. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Allen  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  100 
Tex.  525  (1907),  798,  835, 
836,  1433. 

Allen  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Shreveport  Wa- 
terworks Co.,  113  La.  1091 
(1905),  350. 

Allen  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Can.  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  42  Wash.  64  (1906), 
512. 

Allender  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
R.  Co.,  37  la.  264  (1873), 
401. 

Allis  v.  Voigt,  90  Mich.  125  (1892), 
238,  239,  968. 

Allnutt  v.  Inglis,  12  East,  527 
(1810),  54. 

Alpena  Electric  Co.  v.  Alpena, 
130  Mich.  413  (1902),  1123, 
1430. 

Alsop  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  104 
N.  C.  278  (1889),  178,  392, 
477,  868. 

Altoona  v.  Shellenberger,  6  Pa. 
Dist.  Rep.  544  (1897),  456. 

Alvord  v.  Syracuse,  103  N.  Y. 
158  (1900),  824. 

American  Banana  Co.  v.  United 
Fruit  Co.,  160  Fed.  184 
(1908),  695,  707. 

American  Dist.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Walker,  72  Md.  454  (1890), 
108. 

American  Express  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 30  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
207  (1906),  600. 

American  Express  Co.  v.  Green- 
halgh,  80  111.  68  (1875),  1047. 

American  Express  Co.  v.  Hag- 
gard, 37  111.  465  (1865),  1040. 

American  Express  Co.  v.  Hockett, 
30  Ind.  250  (1868),  776, 1040. 

American  Express  Co.  v.  Ken- 
tucky, 206  U.  S.  139  (1907), 
600. 


American  Express  Co.  v.  Ogles 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  81   S.  W. 

1023  (1904),  758. 
American  Express  Co.  v.  Perkins, 

42  111.  458  (1867),  991. 
American  Express  Co.  v.  Second 

Nat.  Bank,  69  Pa.  St.  394 

(1871),  1003. 
American  Express  Co.  v.  Smith, 

33  Ohio  St.  511  (1878),  178, 

776,  903,  909,  951,  952. 
American  Express  Co.  v.  Southern 

Indiana  Exp.  Co.,  167  Ind. 

292  (1906),  523, 682,  871. 
American  Express  Co.  v.  United 

States,  212  U.  S.  522  (1909), 

1290,  1302. 
American  Grocery  Co.  v.  Staten 

Island  R.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  51  N. 

Y.  Supp.  307  (1898),  1023. 
American  Lighting  Co.  v.  Public 

Service  Corporation,  132  Fed. 

794  (1904),  374,  702. 
American  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  General 

Electric  Co.,  71  N.  H.  192 

(1901),  113. 
American  L.  S.  Commission  Co. 

v.  Chicago   L.  S.  Exchange, 

143  111.  210  (1892),  146. 
American  Merch.  Union  Exp.  Co. 

v.  Milk,  73  111.  224  (1874), 

1048. 
American    Merch.    Union    Exp. 

Co.  v.  Phillips,  29  Mich.  515 

(1874),  256. 
American  Rapid  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Connecticut  Telephone  Co., 

49   Conn.   352   (1881),    136, 

692. 
American  St.  Ship  Co.  v.  Bryan, 

83  Pa.  St.  446  (1877),  769. 
American  Tie  &  Timber  Co.  v. 

Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Co.,  175 

Fed.  28  (1909),  850,  1365. 

[Ixvl 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


American    Union    Coal    Co.    v. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  159 

Fed.  278  (1908),  1294. 
American    Waterworks    Co.    v. 

State,  46  Neb.  194  (1895),  92, 

215,  451,  690,  866. 
Arnes  v.  Fargo,  114  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.   666   (1906),   393,   414, 

727,  989,  991. 
Ammons  v.  Railroad,  138  N.  C. 

555  (1905),  878. 
Anchor  Line  v.  Dater,  68  111.  369 

(1873),  1004. 
Ancrum  v.  Camden  Water,  L.  & 

I.  Co.,  82  S.  C.  284  (1908), 

350. 
Anderson  v.  Citizens'  St.  R.  R. 

Co.,  12  Ind.  App.  194  (1894), 

1044. 
Anderson  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

R.  Co.,  62  Fed.  46  (1894), 

848. 
Anderson  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

Co.,  134  Ky.  343  (1909),  440, 

886. 
Anderson  v.  Mobile  &  0.  R.  R. 

Co.  (Miss.), 38  So.  661  (1905), 

409,  730. 
Anderson  v.  St.  Cloud,  79  Minn. 

88  (1900),  795. 
Anderson  v.  Village  of  Berwyn, 

135  111.  App.  8  (1907),  825. 
Anderson  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  84  Tex.  17  (1892), 

412,  437. 
Andrews  v.  North  River  Electric 

Co.,   53   N.   Y.   Supp.   810 

(1898),  411. 
Andrus  v.  Columbia  &  0.  Stb. 

Co.,  47  Wash.  333  (1907),  520, 

521,907,952. 
Annas  v.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  67  Wis.  46  (1886),  785, 

786,  1018. 

[  Ixvi  ] 


Anniston  Cordage  Co.  v.  Western 

Union    Telegraph    Co.,    161 

Ala.  216  (1909),  348. 
Annon,  Matter  of,  50  Hun,  413 

(1888),  149. 

Anonymous,  F.  N.  B.  948,  961. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  11  Ed.  IV,  6, 

pi.  10,  6. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  22  Ed.  IV,  49, 

pi.  15,  7,  8,  12. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  42  Ed.  Ill,  11, 

pi.  13  (1367),  770. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  42  Ed.  Ill,  3, 

pi.  11,  961. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  43  Ed.  Ill,  6, 

pi.  11,  6. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  43  Ed.  Ill,  33, 

pi.  38,  961. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  46  Ed.  Ill,  19, 

pi.  19,  8,  201. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  11  Hen.  IV,  45, 

pi.  18  (1410),  12,  770. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  3  Hen.  VI,  36, 

pi.  33,  6. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  10  Hen.  VII, 

8,  pi.  14  (1494),  9, 12,  430. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  14  Hen.  VII, 

22,  pi.  4,  12. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  14  Hen.  VII, 

Rast.  Ent.  2,  6,  1,  201. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  19  Hen.  VI, 

49,  pi.  5,  6,  201. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  21  Hen.  VI,  55, 

pi.  12,  8. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  27  Lib.  Assis. 

138,  pi.  44,  10. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  39  Hen.  VI, 

18,  pi.  24,  9,  430. 
Anonymous,  Godbolt,  345,  pi.  440 

(1623),  12,  203,  315. 
Anonymous,  Keilway,  50,  pi.  4,  8, 

12. 
Anonymous,  Y.  B.  22  Lib.  Assis. 

94,  pi.  41,  14,  201. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Anonymous,  Dall.  8,  Y.  B.  42  Lib. 
Assis.  260,  pi.  17,  961. 

Anonymous,  12  Mod.  3  (1702), 
255. 

Anonymous,  1  Roll.  Abr.  10,  pi. 
5,6. 

Apex  Transportation  Co.  v.  Gar- 
bade,  32  Oreg.  582  (1898), 
222. 

Apollon,  The,  9  Wheat.  362 
(1824),  1050. 

Arcade  Hotel  Co.  v.  Wiatt,  44 
Ohio  St.  32  (1886),  970. 

Archambault  v.  Gt.  North  West- 
ern Telegraph  Co.,  14  Que- 
bec, .8  (1886),  605,  633. 

Archer  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 
110  Mo.  App.  349  (1905); 
395,  873. 

Arctic  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  54 
Barb.  559  (1869),  173,  774. 

Arkansas  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sain, 
90  Ark.  278  (1909),  371. 

Arkansas  Railroad  Rates,  163 
Fed.  141  (1908),  1129,  1195, 
1196,  1220. 

Arkansas  R.  R.  Rates,  168  Fed. 
920  (1909),  1086,  1127,  1152, 
1159,  1201. 

Arkansas  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
German  Nat.  Bank,  77  Ark. 
482  (1906),  1045. 

Armfield  v.  Humphrey,  12  111. 
App.  90  (1882),  170,  236,  238. 

Armour  v.  Michigan  Central  Ry. 
Co.,  65  N.  Y.  Ill  (1875), 
748. 

Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  Edison 
Electric  Illuminating  Co., 
115  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  51 
(1906),  113,  214,  215,  243, 
605, 1290,  1300. 

Amour  Packing  Co.  v.  United 
States,  209  U.  S.  56,  1297. 


Armstrong  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 

P.   Ry.  Co.,   53  Minn.   183 

(1893),  1023,  1026. 
Armstrong,  Admx.,  v.  Montgom- 
ery St.  Ry.  Co.,  123  Ala.  233 

(1898),  865. 
Arnold  v.  Cov.  &  Cin.  Bridge  Co., 

1  Duval,  372  (1864),  53,  241. 
Arnold  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

115  Pa.  St.  135  (1887),  738. 
Arnold  v.  Rhode  Island  Co.,  28 

R.  I.  118  (1907),  890. 
Arrowsmith  v.  Nashville  &  D.  Ry. 

Co.    (C.    C.),    57   Fed.    165 

(1893),  777. 
Arthur  v.  Texas   &   P.  Ry.  Co., 

204  U.  S.  505  (1907),  399,  727 

732. 
Arthur  et  al.  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  Ry. 

Co.,    38    Minn.    95    (1887), 

1036. 
Asher  v.  Hutchinson  Water,  L. 

&  P.  Co.,  66  Kan.  496  (1903), 

92,  242,  297,  306,  307. 
Ashley  v.  Rocky  Mountain  Bell 

Telephone  Co.,  25  Mont.  286 

(1901),  431,  443. 
Ashmore  v.  Penn.  Steam  Towing 

Trans.    Co.,   28   N.   J.    180 

(1860),  173,  774,  1011. 
Astor  v.   Arcade   Ry.   Co.,    113 

N.  Y.  93  (1888),  179. 
Atchison  &  Neb.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Miller,  16  Neb.  661  (1884), 

1002. 

Atchison  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wash- 
burn,  5  Neb.  117  (1876),  256. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Denver  &  N.  0.  R.  R.  Co., 

110  U.  S.  667  (1884),  527, 

533,  805,  807,  811. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Dill,    48   Kan.    210    (1892), 

1003,  1005. 

[  Ixvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Ditmars,  3    Kan.  App.  459 

(1896),  772. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Gants,  38  Kan.  608  (1888), 

865,  870,  872. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Jandera,  24  Okla.  106  (1909), 

367. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Headland,   18    Colo.  477 

(1893),  745,  746. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Holmes,  18  Okla.  92  (1907), 

1294. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Morris,  65  Kan.  532  (1902), 

1023. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Roberts,  3  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

370  (1893),  438. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Schriver,  72  Kan.  550  (1906), 

1045. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Weber,  33  Kan.  543  (1885), 

629,  639,  933,  934. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.   R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Wood  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

77  S.  W.  964  (1903),  629, 

633. 
Atkinson  v.  Sellers,  5  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 

442  (1858),  364. 
Atlanta    Baggage    Cab    Co.    v. 

Mizo,  4  Ga.  App.  407  (1908), 

171. 
Atlanta,  City  of,  v.  Burton,  90 

Ga.  486  (1892),  456. 
Atlanta  Consol.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Keeny,  99  Ga.  266  (1896), 

441. 
Atlanta  Terminal  Co.  v.  American 

Baggage  &  T.  Co.,  125  Ga. 

677  (1906),  390,  391,  501. 

F  Ixviii  1 


Atlantic  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United 
States,  76  Fed.  186  (1896), 
1099,  1175,  1407. 

Atlantic  &  Pac.  Tel.  Co.  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  4 
Daly  (N.  Y.),  527  (1873), 
516,  520. 

Atlantic  City  v.  Dehn,  69  N.  J.  L. 
233  (1903),  107,  185,  213. 

Atlantic  City  v.  Fansler,  70  N.  J. 
L.  491  (1904),  205. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 102  Va.  599 
(1904),  1409. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Florida, 
203  U.  S.  256  (1906),  1071, 
1078,  1198,  1199. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Geraty, 
166  Fed.  10  (1908),  399,  795, 
801. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mazur- 
sky,  216  U.  S.  122  (1910), 
1418. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  North 
Carolina  Corp.  Comm.,  206 
U.  S.  1  (1907),  211,  540,  836, 
1434. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rice 
(Ala.),  52  So.  918  (1910),  413, 
414,  991. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Whar- 
ton,  207  U.  S.  328  (1907), 
797,  1417. 

Atlantic  Express  Co.  v.  Wilming- 
ton &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C. 
463  (1892),  477. 

Attorney  General,  In  re,  113  Wis. 
623  (1902),  305. 

Attorney  General  of  New  Bruns- 
wick, Ex  parte,  1  Pug.  &  Bur. 
667,  211. 

Attorney  General  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton, 123  Mass.  460  (1877), 
299. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Attorney  General  v.   Detroit  & 

Erie  Plank  Road  Co.,  2  Mich. 

138  (1851),  75,  241. 
Attorney  General  v.  Great  North- 
ern  R.    R.    Co.,    29    L.    J. 

Eq.  (N.  S.)  794  (1860),  503, 

703. 
Attorney  General  v.  Pingree,  120 

Mich.  550  (1899),  64. 
Atwater  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  L.  55  (1886), 

449,  450,  642. 
Atwater  v.  Sawyer,  76  Me.  539 

(1884),  106,  213,  569,  646. 
Audenried  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R. 

R.  Co.,  68  Pa.  St.  370  (1871), 

232,  501,  1282. 
Auerbach  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 

R.   R.   Co.,   89   N.   Y.   281 

(1882),  446,  1254. 
Augusta  Ry.  &  El.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

121  Ga.  29  (1904),  864. 
Augusta  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Wrightsville 

&  T.  R.  Co.,  74  Fed.  522 

(1896),  534,  1373,  1414. 
Aurora,  City  of,  v.  West,  9  Ind. 

74  (1857),  217. 

Aurora  v.  Elgin  Traction  Co.,  227 

111.  485  (1907),  192. 
Aurora  Water  Co.  v.  Aurora,  129 

Mo.  540  (1895),  981. 
Austin  v.  Great  W.  Ry.,  L.  R.  2 

Q.  B.  442  (1867),  341. 
Austin  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 

(Mo.  App.),  130  S.  W.  385 

(1910),  1031. 
Averill  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  75 

Fed.  736  (1896),  694. 
Avery  v.  Vermont  Electric  Co., 

75  Vt.  235  (1902),  60,  95, 113, 
114,  243. 

Avinger  v.  South  Carolina  Ry. 
Co.,  29  S.  C.  265  (1888),  224, 
225,  551,  822,  1282,  1311. 


Ayer  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Co.,  79  Me.  493  (1887),  244, 

766,  1014,  1025. 
Ayers    v.    Western    Union  Tel. 

Co.,  72  N.  Y.  S.  634  (1901), 

1041. 
Aymar  v.  Astor,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 

266  (1826),  235. 
Ayres  v.  Chicago  &  Northwestern 

Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372  (1888), 

256,  345,  408,  662,  663,  664, 

665,  722,  799,  800,  831,  834, 

853,  854,  914. 
Ayres  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,   28   N.   Y.    Supp.   789 

(1894),  943. 

B 

Babcock  v.  Herbert,  3  Ala.  392 

(1842),  160,  182,  213,  239. 
Babcock  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 

Ry.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  491  (1872), 

515,  531. 
Bachant  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,   187  Mass.   392  (1905), 

1042. 
Bacon  v.  Casco  Bay  Steamboat 

Co.,  90  Me.  46  (1897),  1017. 
Bacon  v.  Pullman  Co.,  159  Fed.  1 

(1908),  769. 
Baehr  v.  Downey,  133  Mich.  163 

(1903)  1034. 
Baggett  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  D.  C.  App.  Gas.  522 

(1894),  889. 
Bailey  v.  Damon,  3  Gray  (Mass.), 

92  (1854),  1263. 
Baillie  v.  Larson,  138  Fed.   177 

(1905),  63,  222. 
Baily  v.  Fayette    Gas  Co.,  193 

Pa.  St.  175  (1899),  265,  70f>, 

1336. 
Baird  v.  Supervisors,  138  N.  Y. 

95  (1893),  299. 

[Ixix] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Baker  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  74  N.  H.  100  (1906), 

481,  781,  796,  1016. 
Baker  v.   Dessaner,  49  Ind.   28 

(1874),  965. 
Baker  v.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co., 

141  Cal.  710  (1904),  438. 
Bald   Eagle  Valley   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Nittany  Valley  Ry.  Co.,  171 

Pa.  St.  284  (1895),  685,  1325. 
Baldwin    v.    American    Express 

Co.,  23  111.  197  (1859),  1040. 
Baldwin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  50  la. 

680  (1879),  529. 
Baldwin  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry. 

Co.,    128   Ga.    567   (1907), 

602. 
Baldwinsville     Telephone     Co., 

Matter  of,  24  N.  Y.  Misc. 

221  (1898),  526,  700. 
Ball  v.  Beck,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  1,161, 

968. 
Ball  v.  Mobile  Light  &  R.  R.  Co., 

146  Ala.  309  (1905),  341. 
Ball  v.  New  Jersey  Stb.  Co.,  1 

Daly,  491  (1865),  730. 
Ball  v.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  93 

Fed.  513  (1889),  1124,  1407, 

1421,  1426,  1430. 
Ballentine  v.  North  Missouri  R. 

R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  491  (1867), 

79,  256,  664,  665,  800,  909, 

914. 
Ballou  v.   Earle,    17   R.   I.   441 

(1891),  1003,  1021. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Adams  Exp.  Co.,  22  Fed.  32 

(1884),  523,  682. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Barger,  80  Md.  23   (1894), 

935,  937,  938. 
Baltimore   &   O.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Blocher,  27  Md.  277  (1867), 

935. 

[Ixx] 


Baltimore  &  0.   R.   R.  Co.  v. 

Brady,  32  Md.  333  (1869), 

1002,  1011. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Campbell,  36  Ohio  St.  647 

(1881),  512. 
Baltimore   &   O.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Diamond  Coal  Co.,  61  Ohio 

St.  242  (1899),  1290. 
Baltimore   &   0.    R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Gray's  Ferry  Abattoir  Co., 

27  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  511  (1905), 

1050. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Hubbard,   72   Ohio  St.   302 

(1905),  1026. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Norris,    17    Ind.    App.    189 

(1896),  341,  438. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Pitcairn  Coal  Co.,  215  U.  S. 

481  (1910),  665,  857. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Pumphrey,      59      Md.     390 

(1882),  1046. 
Baltimore   &   0.    R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Rathbone,     1    W.    Va.    87 

(1865),  1012. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Shumacher,     29     Md.     168 

(1868),  518,  1033. 
Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 

72  Md.  36  (1890),  777. 
Baltimore  &  0.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Voigt,  176  U.  S.  498  (1899), 

777,  1015. 
Baltimore   &   0.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Whitehill,      104     Md.     295 

(1906),  662,  831. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 

kens,  44  Md.  11  (1875),  747. 
Baltimore    &    P.     Ry.    Co.    v. 

Mackey,  157  U.  S.  72  (1895), 

530. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Baltimore  &  P.  Steamboat  Co.  v. 

Brown,  54  Pa.  St.  77  (1867), 

511. 
Baltimore  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wilkinson,  30  Md.  224  (1868), 

862. 
Bamberg  v.  So.  Carolina  R.  Co.,  9 

S.  C.  61  (1877),  160,  256. 
Bancroft   &   Co.   v.    Merchants' 

Despatch    Transp.    Co.,    47 

Iowa,  262  (1877),  180,  1017. 
Bank   of   Havelock   v.    Western 

Union    Telegraph    Co.,    141 

Fed.  522  (1905),  412,  605. 
Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press   Co.,    93    U.    S.    174 

(1876),  178,  776,  1011. 
Bank  of  W.  V.  v.  Southern  Exp. 

Co.,    71    Miss.    741    (1894), 

902. 
Bankers'  Mutual  Casualty  Co.  v. 

Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S. 

M.  Ry.  Co.,  117  Fed.  434 

(1902),  776. 
Bard  v.   Pennsylvania  Traction 

Co.,  176  Pa.  St.  97  (1896), 

760. 
Bardsly  v.  Boise  Irr.  &  L.  Co.,  8 

Idaho,  155  (1901),  434,  652, 

877. 
Bare    v.    American    Forwarding 

Co.,    242    111.    298    (1909), 

206. 
Barker  v.  Central  Park  N.  &  E. 

R.  R.  Co.,  151  N.  Y.  237 

(1896),  439,  877. 
Barker  v.  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L. 

Ry.  Co.,  243  111.  482  (1909), 

777. 
Barker  v.  New  York  C.  R.  R.  Co., 

24  N.  Y.  599  (1862),  904. 
Barnard  Castle  Urban  Dist.  v. 

Wilson,  2  Ch.   813   (1901), 

264. 


Barnes  v.  Long  Island  Ry.  Co., 

100  N.  Y.  Supp.  593  (1906), 

1008. 
Barnes  v.  Marshall,  18  Q.  B.  785 

(1852),  433. 

Barnes  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    24    Nev.     125 

(1897),  1014. 
Barney    v.    Oyster    Bay    &    H. 

Steamboat  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  301 

(1876),  472,  498. 
Barre  Water  Co.,  Re,  62  Vt.  27 

(1889),  92,  264. 
Barrett   v.    Market    Street    Ry. 

Co.,  81  Cal.  296  (1889),  189, 

438,  439,  877. 
Barrickman  v.  Marion  Oil  Co.,  45 

W.  Va.  634  (1898),  982. 
Barrington    v.    Commercial    D. 

Co.,    15  Wash.    170   (1896), 

102,  232. 
Barren  v.  Eldridge,  100  Mass.  455 

(1868),  393,  726. 
Barrott  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car 

Co.,  51  Fed.  796  (1892),  769. 
Barry  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  105  N. 

Y.    App.    Div.    520    (1905), 

623,  738,  746. 
Bartlett  v.  Carnley,  6  Duer  (N. 

Y.),  194  (1856),  1263. 
Bartlett  v.  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L. 

Ry.  Co.,  94  Ind.  281  (1883), 

668,  912. 

Bartlett  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  62  Me.  209  (1873), 

133,  980,  1346. 
Bartwell  v.  Northern  Pacific  Exp. 

Co.,  5  Dak.  463  (1889),  1004. 
Basnight  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R. 

R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  592  (1892), 

293,  409,  726,  730. 
Bass  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  36  Wis.  450  (1874),  844, 

847,  881. 

[Ixxi] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


References  are  to  sections] 


Bassett  &  Stone  v.  Aberdeen  Coal 

&  Mining  Co.,  120  Ky.  728 

(1905),  235. 
Bastian  v.  Keystone  Gas  Co.,  50 

N.  Y.  Supp.  537  (1898),  417, 

622,  1013. 
Bates  v.  Chicago,  M.   &  St.   P. 

Ry.  Co.,  60  Wis.  296  (1884), 

1046. 
Bates  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co., 

147  Mass.  255  (1888),  777, 

778. 
Bates   v.    Stanton,    1    Duer,    79 

(1852),  1047. 
Batson  v.  Donovan,  4  B.  &  Aid. 

21  (1820),  623,  737. 
Batton  v.  So.  &  No.  Alabama  R. 

R.  Co.,  77  Ala.  591  (1884), 

933,  941,  942,  944. 
Baughman  v.  Louisville,  E.  &  St. 

L.    Ry.    Co.,    94    Ky.    150 

(1893),  1005,  1020. 
Baxendale  v.  Great  Western  R. 

Co.,   5   C.   B.    (N.   S.)   309 

(1858),  1331. 
Baxendale  v.  So.  West.  Ry.  Co., 

35  L.  J.  Exch.  108  (N.  S.) 

(1866),  696. 
Baxley  v.  Tallahassee  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,    128   Ala.    183    (1900), 

833,  922. 
Baxter   v.    Dominion   Telegraph 

Co.,   37   U.   C.   Q.   B.   470 

(1875),  766,  1014. 
Baxter  v.  Louisville,  N.,  A.  &  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  165  111.  78  (1897), 

1023,  1026. 
Baxter  &  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  49  N.  H. 

9  (1869),  181. 
Bay  City  Irrigation  Co.,  Re,  135 

Fed.  850  (1905),  352. 
Bayles  v.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

13  Colo.   181    (1889),   1282, 

1286,  1299. 

[  Ixxii  ] 


Beadell  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry. 

Co.,   2   C.   B.    (N.   S.)   509 

(1854),  420. 
Beale    v.    Posey,    72    Ala.    323 

(1882),  365,  751. 
Beall  v.  Beck,  Fed.  Cas.   1,161 

(1829),  240. 
Bean  v.  Sturtevant,  8  N.  H.  146 

(1835),  743. 
Beard  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  79  Iowa,  518  (1890),  988. 
Beard  v.  St.  L.,  Alton  &  T.  H. 

Ry.  Co.,  79  la.  527  (1890), 

512,  796. 
Beardslee     v.    Richardson,      11 

Wend.  25  (1833),  970. 
Beardsley  v.  New  York,  L.  E  & 

W.  R.  R.  Co.,  162  N.  Y.  230 

(1900),  836. 

Beasley  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    39    Fed.     181 

(1889),  412,  909. 
Beatty  Lumber  Co.  v.  Western 

Union  Telegraph  Co.,  52  W. 

Va.  410  (1903),  1014. 
Beck  v.  Indianapolis  L.  &  P.  Co., 

36  Ind.  App.  600  (1905),  113, 

685. 
Beck  v.   Kittanning  Water  Co. 

(Pa.),  11  Atl.  300  (1887),  350. 
Becker  v.  Haynes,  29  Fed.  441 

(1887),  730. 
Beckman  v.  Shouse,  5  Rawle,  179 

(1835),  171,   184,   204,   262, 

743,  1001. 
Beckwirth  v.  Cheshire  R.  R.  Co., 

143  Mass.  68  (1886),  341. 
Beckwith  v.  Frisbie,  32  Vt.  559 

(1860),  236,  909,  968. 
Bedford-Bowling  Green  Stone  Co. 

v.  Oman,  115  Ky.  369  (1903), 

224,  404,  817,  822,  1043. 
Bedford  E.G.  S.  Co.  v.  Oman,  134 

Fed.  441  (1904),  403, 815,822. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Beech  Creek  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Olanta 

Coal  Mining  Co.,   158  Fed. 

36  (1907),  574. 
Beers  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

67   Conn.   417   (1896),   875, 

970. 
Beeson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac. 

Ry.  Co.,  62  la.  173  (1883), 

606. 
Behlmer  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,    83    Fed.    898    (1900), 

1226. 
Belcher  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  St. 

Louis  Grain    Elevator  Co., 

101  Mo.  192  (1890),  141. 
Belfast  &  B.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Keys,  9 

H.  L.  Cas.  556  (1861),  876. 
Belger  v.  Dinsmore,  51  N.  Y.  166 

(1872),  178,  776. 
Bell  v.  Drew,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  59 

(1855),  876. 
Bell  v.  Pidgeon,  5  Fed.  634  (1882), 

753. 

Bell  Telephone  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth,  3   Atl.   825    (1886), 

136,  244,  692. 
Bellaire  Goblet  Co.  v.  Findlay,  5 

Oh.  Cir.  Ct.  418  (1891),  452, 

502. 
Bellsdyke    Coal    Co.    v.    North 

British  Ry.  Co.,  2  Ry.  &  C. 

Tr.  Cas.    105   (1875),   1331, 

1373. 
Belvidere  Gaslight  &  F.  Co.  v. 

Jackson,    81    111.    App.    244 

(1898),  982. 
Benbow  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R. 

Co.,  Phillips  L.  421  (1868), 

1042. 
Benedict  v.  Arthur,  6  Up.  Can. 

Q.  B.  204  (1849),  238. 
Benedict  v.  Columbus  Construc- 
tion Co.,  49  N.  J.  Eq.  23 

(1891),  982. 


Benignia  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  197  Pa.  St.  384  (1900), 

783. 

Benner    Livery  &  U.  Co.  v.  Bus- 
son,  58  111.  App.  17  (1894), 

785. 
Benett  v.  Peninsular  Co.,  6  C.  B. 

775  (1848),  183. 
Bennett  v.  American  Express  Co., 

83  Me.  236  (1891),  1046. 
Bennett  v.  Byram  &  Co.,  38  Miss. 

17  (1859),  905,  909,  921. 
Bennett  v.  Button,  10  N.  H.  481 

(1839),  184,  524,  682. 
Bennett  v.  East  Chester  Gaslight 

Co.,  54  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  74 

(1900),  411,  434. 
Bennett  v.   Filyaw,    1   Fla.   403 

(1847),  172,  229,  239. 
Bennett  v.  Mellor,  5  T.  R.  273 

(1793),  333,  725. 
Bennett  v.  Northern  Pac.  Exp. 

Co.,  12  Oreg.  49  (1885),  178, 

776,  1040. 
Benson  v.  American  Illuminating 

Co.,   102  N.   Y.   Supp.   206 

(1907),  418,  622,  826. 
Benson  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,  98  Cal.  45  (1893),  916. 
Benson  &  Co.,  Ex  parte,  18  S.  C. 

38  (1882),  1282,  1283,  1311, 

1377. 
Benson  v.  Gray,  154  Mass.  391 

(1891),  1042. 
Benson  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

99  Pac.  1072  (1909),  169, 170, 

230,  236. 

Berg  v.  The  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 
.   R.    R.    Co.,    30    Kan.    561 

(1883),  513,  1017. 
Bergan  v.  Central  Vt.  Ry.  Co.,  82 

Conn.  574  (1909),  764. 
Berje  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  37 

La.  Ann.  468  (1885),  901. 

[  Ixxiii  1 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Berkshire  Woolen  Co.  v.  Proctor, 

7  Gush.  (Mass.)  417  (1851), 

751. 
Bernard  v.  Lalonde,  8  Leg.  News, 

215  (Can.,  1885),  725. 
Berrien  Springs  Water  Power  Co. 

v.  Berrien  Circuit  Judge,  133 

Mich.  48  (1903),  95. 
Berry  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.  (S.  D.),  124  N.  W.  859 

(1910),  796,  872. 
Berry  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  109  Ky.  727  (1901),  369. 
Berry  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

124  Mo.  223  (1894),  762. 
Berry  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  122 

N.  C.  1002  (1898),  727. 
Berry  v.  West  Virginia  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  44  W.  Va.  538  (1898), 

1037,  1038. 
Bessette  v.  People,  193  111.  334 

(1905),  8. 
Betts  v.  Farmers'  Loan  Co.,  21 

Wis.  80  (1866),  256. 
Bevard  v.  Lincoln  Traction  Co., 

74  Neb.  802  (1905),  941,  944. 
Bibb  Broom  Corn  Co.  v.  Atchi- 

son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  94 

Minn.  269  (1905),  656,  901, 

918,  921,  984. 
Bibber- White  Co.  v.  White  River 

Valley  Electric  Co.,  175  Fed. 

470  (1910),  1281,  1286. 
Bienville   Water   Supply   Co.   v. 

Mobile,  112  Ala.  260  (1895), 

316,  458. 
Bierhaus  v.  Western  Union  Tel. 

Co.,  8  Ind.  App.  246  (1893), 

851. 
Bigbee  &  W.  R.  P.  Co.  v.  Mobile 

&  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  Fed.  545 

(1893),  682,  1315. 
Bigelow  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co., 

161  Mass.  393  (1894),  1044. 

F  Ixxiv  ] 


Billings  Mutual  Telephone  Co.  v. 

Rocky  Mt.   Bell  Telephone 

Co.,    155   Fed.   207    (1907), 

539,  700. 
Binghamton  Bridge,  The,  3  Wall. 

51  (1865),  23,  53. 
Bird  v.  Bird,  1  And.  29  (1558), 

725,  745. 

Bird  v.  Cromwell,  1  Mo.  81,  920. 
Bird  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Ga. 

655  (1884),  522. 
Bird  v.  Railroad  Co.,  99  Tenn. 

719  (1897),  435,  518,  1033. 
Birkett  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph  Co.,    103   Mich.   361 

(1894),  980,  1014. 
Birmingham  v.  Birmingham  Wa- 
terworks Co.   (Ala.),  42  So. 

10  (1906),  264,  275. 
Birmingham  v.  Birmingham  Wa- 
terworks Co.,   152  Ala.  306 

(1907),  380. 
Birmingham    Ry.    &   E.    Co.    v. 

Baird,  130  Ala.  334  (1900), 

935,  938,  941. 
Birmingham  Ry.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

Lee,  153  Ala.  386  (1907),  341. 
Birmingham  Ry.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

McDonough,    153   Ala.    122 

(1907),  878. 
Birmingham  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Truss, 

135  Ala.  530  (1903),  1244. 
Birney  v.  New  York  &  W.  P. 

Telegraph  Co.,  18  Md.  341 

(1862),  874,  980. 
Black  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  0.  R.  R. 

Co.,  30  Neb.  197  (1890),  920, 

949. 
Black  Lick  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Saltsburg 

Gas   Co.,    139   Pa.    St.   448 

(1891),  852. 
Blackstock  v.  New  York  &  E.  R. 

R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  48  (1859), 

668,  912. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Blackwell  M.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Western 

Union    Telegraph    Co.,     17 

Okla.  376  (1906),  980. 
Blair  v.  Cuming  County,  111  U.  S. 

363  (1884),  65. 
Blair  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  66  N.  Y. 

313  (1876),  778. 
Blair  v.  Sioux  City  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

109  la.  369  (1899),  535,  1377, 

1378. 
Blanchard  v.  Abraham,  115  La. 

989  (1906),  237. 
Blanchard  v.  Isaacs,  3  Barb.  (N. 

Y.)  388  (1848),  741,  876. 
Bland  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  1 

Duv.  232    (1864),  666,  911, 

986. 

Bland  et  al.  v.  Womack,  2  Mur- 
phy, 373  (1818),  875. 
Blank  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co., 

182  111.  332  (1899),  477,  778, 

779,  1015. 
Blissett    v.    Hart,    Willes,    508 

(1744),  52. 
Bliven  &  M.  v.  Hudson  River  R. 

R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  403  (1867), 

1046. 
Block  v.  Sherry,  43  N.  Y.  Misc. 

342  (1904),  263,  974. 
Blodgett  v.  Abbott,  72  Wis.  516 

(1888),  902. 
Blondell  v.  Consolidated  Gas  Co., 

89  Md.  732  (1899),  826. 
Blood  v.  McCarty,  112  Cal.  561 

(1896),  75. 
Bloomfield    &    R.    Natural    Gas 

Light  Co.  v.  Richardson,  63 

Barb.  437  (1872),  59,  94. 
Blomsness   v.   Puget   Sound   El. 

Ry.     Co.,    47    Wash.     620 

(1907),  939. 
Blondell  v.  Consolidated  Gas  Co., 

89    Md.    732    (1899),    418, 

622. 


Blossom  v.  Dodd,  43  N.  Y.  264 

(1870),  1004. 
Blossom  v.  Griffin,  13  N.  Y.  569 

(1856),  724. 
Blower  v.  Gt.  Western  Ry.  Co., 

L.  R.  7  C.  P.  655  (1872),  256, 

989. 
Blum  v.  Southern  P.  P.  C.  Co.,  1 

Flip.  500  (1876),  153,  975. 
Blumantle   v.   Fitchburg   R.   R. 

Co.,  127  Mass.  322  (1879), 

875,  876. 
Blumenthal  v.  Brainerd  et  al.,  38 

Vt.  402  (1866),  1037. 
Blumenthal  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

84    Fed.    920    (1898),    413, 

600. 
Blunk  v.  Dennison  Water  Co.,  71 

Ohio,  250  (1905),  350. 
Blythe  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry. 

Co.,  15  Colo.  333  (1891),  655, 

984. 
Boal  v.  Citizens'  Nat.  Gas  Co.,  23 

Pa.  Super.   Ct.   339   (1903), 

654. 

Board  of  R.  R.  Commrs.  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Kan. 

193  (1905),  806. 
Board  of  Trade  v.  Christie  Grain 

&  Stock  Co.,  198  U.  S.  236 

(1905),  137,  138,  603,  607. 
Board  of  Trustees  of  Elizabeth- 
town  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.,  R. 

R.  Co.,  94  Ky.  377  (1893), 

212. 
Boering  v.  Cheaspeake  Beach  Ry. 

Co.,  193  U.  S.  442  (1903), 

786,  1004,  1018. 
Boerth  v.  Detroit  City  Gas  Co., 

152  Mich.  654  (1907),  1321, 

1335,  1354. 
Boggess  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry. 

Co.,  37  W.  Va.  297  (1892), 

738,  763. 

[Ixxv] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Boggs   v.    Martin,    13   B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)  239  (1852),  1269. 
Boise  City  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Clark, 

131  Fed.  415  (1904),  93, 1085. 
Boise  City,  City  of,  v.  Artesian 

Hot  &  Cold  Water  Co.,  4 

Idaho,  392  (1895),  1304. 
Bolles  v.  Kansas  City  So.   Ry. 

Co.,  134  Mo.  App.  696  (1909), 

440. 
Bomar  v.  Maxwell,  9  Humph.  620 

(1849),  185. 
Bonce  v.  Dubuque  St.  Ry.  Co., 

53  Iowa,    278    (1880),    107 

186. 
Boner  &  C.  v.  Merchants'  So.  Co., 

1  Jones  L.  211  (1853),  901, 

915. 
Bonner    v.    DeMendoza    (Texas 

Civ.   App.),   16   S.    W.  976 

(1891),  769. 
Bonner  v.  Welborn,  7  Ga.   296 

(1849),  240,  968. 

Bonner  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    71    S.    C.    303 

(1904),  398,  874,  1041. 
Boom  Co.  v.  Patterson,  98  U.  S. 

403  (1878),  55,  73. 
Boonton  v.  United  Water  Supply 

Co.,  69  N.  J.  Eq.  23  (1904), 

216. 
Boonton  v.  United  Water  Supply 

Co.,  70  N.  J.  Eq.  692  (1906), 

264,  839. 
Boorman   v.    American    Express 

Co.,    21    Wis.    152    (1866), 

1004,  1007. 
Booth  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S. 

W.  168  (1896),  522. 
Bordeaux  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  8  Hun, 

579  (1876),  873. 
Borsum  v.  Hardie,  23  Sup.  Ct. 

479  (1898),  483. 

[  Ixxvi  ] 


Boscowitz  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 

93  111.  523  (1879),  178,  776. 
Bosley  v.  Baltimore  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,  54  W.  Va.  563  (1904), 

902. 
Boster  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  36  W.  Va.  318  (1892) 

865. 
Boston  v.  Richardson,  13  Allen, 

160  (1866),  71. 
Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 

177  Mass.  65  (1900),  483. 
Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shanly, 

107  Mass.  568  (1871),  621. 
Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sulli- 
van, 177  Mass.  230  (1900), 

483. 
Boston  &  Roxbury  Mill  Corp.  v. 

Newman,  12  Pick.  467  (1832), 

65. 
Boston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 

&  P.  Ry.  Co.,   118  la.  423 

(1902),  776. 
Boswell  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R. 

Co.,    5    Bosw.    699    (1860), 

1007. 
Bosworth  v.  Union  R.  R.  Co.,  26 

R.  I.  309  (1904),  944. 
Bothwell  v.  Consumers'  Co.,  13 

Idaho,  568  (1907),  279,  406, 

443,  824. 
Bouker  v.  Long  Island  Ry.  Co., 

89   Hun,    202    (1895),    392, 

792. 
Bowden  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

148  Ala.  29  (1906),  1037. 
Bowen  v.  Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co., 

136  Fed.  306  (1905),  939. 
Bowie  v.  Bait.  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co., 

1    MacArthur,    609    (1874), 

400,  772. 
Bowie  v.  Birmingham  Ry.  &  El. 

Co.,    125   Ala.    397    (1899), 

566,  848. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Bowman  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,   125  U.  S.  465  (1881), 

1418. 
Bowman  v.  Hilton,  11  Ohio,  303 

(1842),  522. 
Bowring  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  90 

Mo.  App.  324  (1901)  1005. 
Boyce  v.  Anderson,  2  Pet.   150 

(1829),  341,  636,  967. 
Boylan  v.  Hot  Springs  R.  Co.,  132 

U.  S.  146  (1889),  431. 
Boyes  v.  Moss  &  Co.,  18  Viet. 

L.  R.  225  (1892),  148. 
Boyle  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

13  Wash.  383  (1896),  176. 
Boys  v.   Pink,   8  C.   &   P.   361 

(1838),  732. 
Bradford  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,   160  Mass.  392  (1894), 

367,  372. 
Bradford  v.  Citizens'  Telephone 

Co.  (Mich.),  126  N.  W.  444 

(1910),  1300. 
Bradford  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So. 

Ry.  Co.   (Ark.),   124  S.  W. 

516  (1910),  566,  848,  881. 
Bradley  v.   Fallbrook   Irrigation 

Co.,    68    Fed.    948    (1895), 

242. 
Bradley  v.  Waterhouse,  3  C.  &  P. 

318  (1828),  623,  737. 
Bradner  v.  Mullen,  27  N.  Y.  Misc. 

479  (1899),  770. 
Bradshaw  v.  South  Boston  Ry. 

Co.,   135  Mass.  407  (1883), 

889,  890,  892. 
Brady  v.  Springfield  Traction  Co. 

(Mo.  App.),  124  S.  W.  1070 

(1910),  933. 
Braithwaite  v.  Power,  1  N.  Dak. 

455  (1891),  1047,  1264,  1266. 
Branch  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  77  N.  C.  347   (1877), 

663,  799,  914. 


Branch  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,   88  N.   C.  570  (1883), 

835. 
Brandt  Milling  Co.  Case,  4  Can. 

Ry.  Gas.  259  (1904),  1315. 
Bras  v.  McConnell,  114  la.  401 

(1901),  535. 

Brashears  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  45  Mo.  App.  433 

(1891),  563,  1041. 
Brass  v.  North  Dakota,  153  U.  S. 

391  (1894),  141. 
Brass  v.  Rathbone,  153  N.  Y.  435 

(1897),  377,  452. 
Brass  v.  Rathbone,  8  App.  Div. 

78  (1892),  1244. 

Brass  ex  rel.  v.  Stoesser,  153  U.  S. 

391  (1894),  232. 
Braun  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

79  Minn.   404   (1900),   341, 
636,  866. 

Braymer  v.  Seattle  &  So.  Ry.  Co., 

35  Wash.  346  (1904),  890. 
Breen  v.  St.  Louis  Tr.  Co.,  102 

Mo.  App.  479  (1903),  441. 
Breese  v.  United  States  Tel.  Co., 

48  N.  Y.  132  (1871),  766. 
Brehme  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  25 

Md.  328  (1866),  1003. 
Bremner  v.  Williams,  1  C.  &  P. 

(Eng.)  414  (1824),  977. 
Bresewitz  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 

So.   Ry.   Co.,   75  Ark.   242 

(1905),  844. 
Bretherton  v.  Wood,  3  Brod.  & 

Bing.  54  (1821),  334. 
Brevig  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  0. 

Ry.  Co.,  64  Minn.  168  (1896), 

745. 
Brewer  v.  Caswell,  132  Ga.  563, 

(1909),  725. 
Brewer  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co., 

84   Fed.    258    (1897),    1342, 

1384. 

f  Ixxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Brewer  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W. 
R.   R.   Co.,    124  N.   Y.   59 

(1891),  778. 
Brewing  Co.   v.   Southern  Exp. 

Co.,  109  Va.  22  (1908),  600. 
Brewster  v.  Miller's  Sons  Co.,  101 

Ky.  368  (1897),  9,  105. 
Bricker  v.  Philadelphia  &  Read- 
ing R.  R.  Co.,  132  Pa.  St.  1 

(1890),  760,  761. 
Bridal    Veil    Lumbering    Co.    v. 

Johnson,  30  Oreg.  205  (1896), 

222,  223,  224. 
Briddon  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 

Co.,  28  L.  J.  Ex.  51  (1858), 

665,  839,  901,  914. 
Bridgeport,   City    of,   v.   Housa- 

tonic  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Conn.  475 

(1843),  217. 
Bridgeton  v.  Bridgeton  Traction 

Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  592  (1898), 

211. 
Brien  v.  Bennett,  8  Car.  &  P. 

(Eng.)  724  (1839),  410,  736. 
Briggs  v.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R. 

Co.,  6  Allen,  246  (1863),  522. 
Briggs  v.  Durham  Traction  Co., 

147  N.  C.  389  (1908),  985. 
Bright  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,    132   N.   C.   317 

(1903),  871,  874. 
Brind  v.  Dale,  8  C.   &  P.   207 

(1837),  228,  767. 

Bristol  v.  Bristol  &  Warren  Wa- 
terworks, 28  R.  I.  274  (1901), 

1103. 
Brit  tan    v.    Barnaby,    21    How. 

(U.S.)  170(1859),  1266, 1267. 
Britton  v.  Atlanta  &  C.  A.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  88  N.  C.  536  (1883), 

566,  848,  881,  942. 
Britton  v.  Green  Bay  &  Ft.  H. 

Waterworks  Co.,  81  Wis.  48 

(1892),  350. 

[  Ixxviii  1 


Broadway,    etc.,    Ferry    Co.    v. 

Hankey,  31  Md.  346  (1869), 

52. 
Brockway  v.  American  Express 

Co.,  168  Mass.  257  (1897), 

1010. 
Brooke  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W. 

Ry.   Co.,    108   Pa.    St.    529 

(1885),  748. 
Brooke  v.  Pickwick,  4  Bing.  218 

(1827),  185. 
Brooklyn  &  R.  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  72 

App.  Div.  496  (1902),  305. 
Brooklyn  Union  Gas  Co.  v.  City 

of  New  York,  115  App.  Div. 

69  (1906),  1123,  1430. 
Brooks  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry. 

Co.  (N.  C.),  68  S.  E.  243 

(1910),  821,  1043. 
Brooks  v.  Sullivan,  129  N.  C.  190 

(1901),  440. 
Brouncker  v.  Scott,  4  Taunt,  1 

(1811),  1050. 
Brown  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  15 

W.  Va.  812  (1879),  1002. 
Brown  v.  Atlanta  &  C.  A.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  19  S.  C.  39  (1882),  399, 

403. 
Brown  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co., 

128  Ga.  635  (1907),  888,  890. 
Brown  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  139  Fed.  972  (1905),  941. 
Brown  v.  Chicago  G.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

137  Mo.  529  (1897),  225. 
Brown  v.  Clayton,   12  Ga.  564 

(1853),  165,  229. 
Brown  v.  Clegg,  63  Pa.  St.  51 

(1869),  173,  774. 
Brown  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  147 

Mass.  58  (1888),  1020. 
Brown  v.  Farmers'  H.  L.  Canal  & 

Reservoir  Co.,  26  Colo.  66 

(1899),  652. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Brown  v.  Georgia  C.  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  119  Ga.  88  (1903),  873. 
Brown  v.  Gerald,   100  Me.  351 

(1905),  50,  56,  60,  95,  114, 

221,  271,  654. 
Brown  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,    100   Ky.    525    (1897), 

1024. 
Brown  v.  Inter  borough  R.  T.  Co., 

56  N.  Y.  Misc.  637, 107  N.  Y. 

Supp.  629  (1907),  448. 
Brown  v.  Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  G. 

R.    R.    Co.,    38    Kan.    634 

(1888),  862. 
Brown  v.  Memphis  &  C.  Ry.  Co., 

5  Fed.  499  (1880),  559,  565, 

606,  610,  844,  881. 
Brown  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun,  355 

(1894),  107. 
Brown  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.,  151  N.  Y.  674 

(1897),  483,  514. 
Brown  v.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  Ill  N. 

C.  187  (1892),  766,  1014. 
Brown  v.   Rapid   Ry.   Co.,    134 

Mich.  591  (1903),  890. 
Brown  v.  Scarboro,  97  Ala.  316 

(1893),  395. 
Brown  v.  Weir,  95  N.  Y.  App.  78 

(1904),  755,  772. 

Brown  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    6    Utah,    219 

(1889),  874. 
Brown  &  B.  Coal  Co.  v.  Grand 

Trunk  Ry.  Co.,   159  Mich. 

565  (1910),  435,  877. 
Brown  &  Haywood  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Co.,  63  Minn.  546 

(1896),  521,  907. 
Brown  Hotel  Co.  v.  Burckhardt, 

13  Col.  App.  59  (1899),  1032. 
Browne  v.  Brandt,   1  K.  B.  696 

(1902),  269,  660,  791,  846. 


Brownell  v.  Columbus  &  C.  M.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C.  (O.  S.) 
638  (1893),  1237. 

Brownell  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co., 
164  Mass.  29  (1895),  211, 
300. 

Brumm's  Appeal  (Pa.),  12  Atl. 
855  (1888),  452,  456. 

Brundred  v.  Rice,  49  Ohio  St.  640 
(1892),  681, 1290, 1312, 1317, 
1358. 

Brunswick  v.  United  States  Ex- 
press Co.,  46  Iowa,  77  (1877), 
1049. 

Brunswick  &  T.  Water  District  v. 
Maine  Water  Co.,  99  Me. 
371  (1904),  92,  1070,  1076, 
1085,  1099,  1101,  1104,  1132, 
1136,  1138,  1139,  1151,  1212, 
1213. 

Brunswick  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Moore,  101  Ga.  684  (1897), 
946. 

Brunswick  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ponder,  117  Ga.  63  (1903), 
640. 

Brunswick  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rot- 
child  &  Co.,  119  Ga.  604 
(1904),  1048. 

Brunswick  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 
United  Gas,  etc.,  Co.,  85  Me. 
532  (1893),  111,  215. 

Brush  Elec.  Illuminating  Co.  v. 
Consolidated  T.  &  E.  Sub- 
way Co.,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  81 
(1891),  78,  1402. 

Bryan  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 
32  Mo.  App.  228  (1888),  786, 
1018. 

Bryan  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  133  N.  C.  603 
(1903),  871. 

Bryant  v.  Rich,  106  Mass.  180 
(1870),  939. 

[Ixxix] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Bryant  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,     17    Fed.    825 

(1883),  603,  607. 
Brymer  v.  Butler  Water  Co.,  179 

Pa.  St.  231  (1897),  92,  1062, 

1081,  1082,  1095,  1131,  1133, 

1171,  1401,  1408. 
Buck  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  15 

Daly,  48  (1888),  945. 
Buck  v.  People's  St.  Ry.  &  E.  L. 

&  P.  Co.,  108  Mo.  179  (1892), 

745. 
Buck  v.  People's  St.  Ry.,  E.  L. 

&  P.  Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  555 

(1891),  785. 
Buckland  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 

97  Mass.    124    (1867),    178, 

776,  1002. 
Buckman  v.  Levi,  3  Camp.  414 

(1813),  400,  741. 
Buckmaster  v.  Gt.  Eastern  Ry. 

Co.,  23  L.  T.   (N.  S.)   471 

(1870),  872. 
Budd  v.  New  York,  143  U.  S.  517 

(1891),  97,  232,  1401,  1407. 
Buffalo  v.  Buffalo  Gas  Co.,  81 

App.  Div.  505  (1903),  825, 

1251. 
Buffalo   v.   Delaware,    L.  &  W. 

Ry.,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  4  (1895), 

102. 
Buffalo  &  New  York  R.  R.  v. 

Brainard,  9  N.  Y.  100  (1853), 

217. 
Buffalo  Bayou  Ship  Channel  Co. 

v.  Milby  &  Dow,  63  Tex.  492 

(1885),  73, 123,  451,  455,  495. 
Buffalo  P.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

O'Hara,  3  Pennyp.  (Pa.)  199 

(1882),  785. 
Buffalo  County  Telephone  Co.  v. 

Turner,   82    Neb.   841,   693 

(1908),  431,  444,   459,   846, 

902,  1250. 

[  Ixxx  ] 


Bulkley  v.  Naumkeag  S.  C.  Co., 

24  How.  (U.  S.)  386  (1860), 

732. 
Bull  v.  New  York  City  Ry.  Co., 

192  N.  Y.  361  (1908),  347. 
Bullard  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry., 

107  Mich.  695, 277, 871, 1039, 

1040. 
Bullard  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,    10  Mont.   168   (1890), 

1294. 
Bullock  v.  Adair,  63  111.  App.  30 

(1895),  240,  263. 
Bullock  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  55  S.  W. 

184  (1900),  371. 
Bundred   v.   Rice,   49   Ohio   St. 

640  (1892),  1317. 
Burgess  v.  Gun,  3  Har.  &  J.  (Md.) 

225  (1811),  1263. 
Burgin  v.  Richmond    &  D.  Ry. 

Co.,  115  N.  C.  673  (1894), 

1044. 
Burke  v.  City  of  Water  Valley,  87 

Miss.  732  (1906),  377,  456. 
Burke  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

51  Mo.  App.  491  (1892),  864. 
Burke   v.    Platt,    172   Fed.   777 

(1909),  255. 
Burkett  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H. 

R.    R.    R.    Co.,    24    Misc. 

(N.  Y.)  76  (1898),  875. 
Burlington,  Township  of,  v.  Beas- 

ley,  94  U.  S.  310  (1876),  65. 
Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Dey,  82  la.  312  (1891),  529, 

1405. 
Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry^  Co. 

v.  North  Western  Fuel  Co., 

31  Fed.    652    (1887),    1286, 

1319. 
Burlington  County  Ferry  Co.  v. 

Davis,  48  la.   133,  30  Am. 

Rep.  390  (1878),  52. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Burlington  &  M.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Chicago  Lumber  Co.,  15  Neb. 

390  (1884),  1050. 
Burlington  &  M.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Rose,    11   Neb.   177    (1881), 

431,  878. 
Burlington    v.    Unterkircher,    99 

Iowa,  401  (1896),  107. 
Burnett  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  39  Mo.  App.  599 

(1890),  599. 
Burnham  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  91 

Mich.  523  (1892),  1044. 
Burns,  Matter  of,  155  N.  Y.  23 

(1898),  55,  72. 
Burns  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co., 

101  Minn.  363  (1907),  503. 
Burr  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  71 

N.  J.  L.  263  (1904),  1040. 
Burrowes  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

R.  Co.,  85  Neb.  497  (1909), 

399. 
Burrowes  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 

Co.  (Neb.),  126  N.  W.  1084 

(1910),  390. 
Burrows  v.  Trieber,  21  Md.  320 

(1863),  770. 
Burten  v.  Wilkinson,  18  Vt.  86 

(1846),  1046. 
Burton  v.  West  Jersey  Ferry  Co., 

114  U.  S.  474  (1885),  803. 
Bush  v.  Artesian  Hot  &  Cold  Wa- 
ter Co.,  4  Idaho,  618  (1895), 

350. 

Bussey  &  Co.  v.  Mississippi  Val- 
ley Transp.  Co.,  24  La.  Ann. 

165  (1872),  150,  173,  774. 
Bussey  v.   Gilmore,   3  Me.  191 

(1824),  241. 
Bussey  v.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R. 

Co.,  4  McCrary,  405  (1882), 

834. 
Buston  v.  Pennsylvania  Ry.  Co., 

116  Fed.  235  (1902),  413. 

6 


Buston  v.  Pennsylvania  Ry.  Co., 
119  Fed.  808  (1903),  518, 
1033. 

Butcher  v.  Commonwealth,  103 
Pa.  St.  528  (1883),  140. 

Butcher  v.  London  &  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  C.  B.  13  (1855),  769. 

Butchers'  &  D.  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Fed. 
35  (1895),  491,  818. 

Butler  v.  Basing,  2  Car.  &  P.  613 
(1827),  262,  743. 

Butler  v.  East  Tennessee  &  V.  R. 
R.  Co.,  8  Lea,  32  (1881), 
1036. 

Butler  v.  Glens  Falls,  S.  H.  &  F. 
E.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  N.  Y. 
112  (1890),  736. 

Butler  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 
59  Minn.  135  (1894),  1044. 

Butler  v.  Tifton  Ry.  Co.,  121  Ga. 
817  (1904),  223,  224,  822. 

Butner  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  2  Okla.  234 
(1894),  348. 

Butte,  A.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mon- 
tana Union  Ry.  Co.,  16 
Mont.  504  (1895),  223,  224 
225. 


Cain  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Co.,  18  Cinn.  Wk.  Bui.  267 
(1887),  603,  607. 

Cairns  v.  Robins,  8  M.  &  W.  258 
(1841),  726. 

Calderon  v.  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.,  170 
U.  S.  272  (1898),  1022. 

Calderwood  v.  North  Birming- 
ham St.  Ry.  Co.,  96  Ala.  318 
(1892),  1044. 

Caldwell  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.,  89  Ga.  550  (1892),  188, 
212,  214,  1044. 

[  Ixxxi  1 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Caldwell  v.  Southern  Express  Co., 
1  Flipp,  85  (1866),  920. 

Calender  v.  Vanderhoof  Co.,  99 
Minn.  295  (1906),  414,  796, 
991. 

California  v.  Central  Pacific  Ry., 
127  U.  S.  1  (1887),  51. 

California  Powder  Works  v.  A.  & 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Cal.  329 
(1896),  254. 

Callen  v.  Columbus  Edison  Elec- 
tric Co.,  66  Oh.  St.  166 
(1902),  56. 

Gallery  v.  Water  Works  Co.,  35 
La.  Ann.  798  (1883),  264, 
496. 

Calor  0.  &  G.  Co.  v.  Franzell,  128 
Ky.  715  (1908),  691. 

Calye's  Case,  8  Coke,  202  (1584), 
363. 

Cambridge  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Charles 
R.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  139  Mass. 
454,  1  N.  E.  925  (1888),  699. 

Camden  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bausch 
(Pa.),  7  Atl.  731  (1887),  786, 
1018. 

Camden  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Belk- 
nap,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  354 
(1839),  724. 

Camp  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  164 
(1858),  766,  1014. 

Campbell  v.  Duluth  &  Northeast- 
ern R.  R.  Co.,  107  Minn.  358 
(1909),  223,  763. 

Campbell  v.  East  London  Water- 
works, 26  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  475 
(1872),  838. 

Campbell  v.  Morse,  Harper 
(N.  C.),  468  (1824),  916,  963. 

Campbell  v.  Perkins,  4  Selden 
(N.  Y.),  430  (1853),  753. 

Campbell  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co., 
42  Fed.  484  (1890),  940. 

[  Ixxxii  ] 


Campbell  v.  The  Bark  Sunlight,  2 

Hughes,  9  (1877),  732. 
Campbell  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    74    S.    C.    300 

(1906),  871. 
Campbellsville  Telephone  Co.  v. 

Lebaron  L.  &  L.  Telephone 

Co.,  118  Ky.  277  (1904),  780. 
Campion  v.  Canadian  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  43  Fed.  775  (1890),  726, 

906. 
Canada,  Attorney  General  of,  v. 

City    of   Toronto,    23    Can. 

Sup.  514  (1892),  432. 
Canada  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Interna- 
tional Bridge  Co.,  8  Fed.  190 

(1881),  126. 

Canada  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Interna- 
tional Bridge  Co.,  L.  R.  8 

App.  Cas.  723  (1883),  1130, 

1140,  1214,  1218. 
Canterbury  Meat  Co.  v.  Shaw  & 

Co.,  7  L.   R.    (N.   Z.)   708 

(1889),  143,  972. 
Cantling  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  Joe 

R.  R.  Co.,  54  Mo.  385  (1873), 

862. 
Cantwell  v.  Pacific  Express  Co., 

58  Ark.  487  (1894),  872,  922. 
Cantu  v.  Bennett,  39  Tex.  303 

(1873),  610. 
Capehart  v.  Seaboard  &  R.  R.  R. 

Co.,   81   N.  C.  438   (1879), 

1024,  1026. 
Capital  City  Gas  Co.  v.  Central 

Vt.  Ry.  Co.,  11  Int.  Comm. 

Comm.    Rep.     103    (1906), 

1334. 
Capital  City  Light  <fe  Fuel  Co.  v. 

Tallahasse,    186   U.    S.   401 

(1902),  113. 
Capital  City  Water  Co.  v.  State, 

105   Ala.   406   (1894),    651, 

797. 


TABLE  OP  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Capital  Gas   Light  Co.   v.   Des 

Moines,  72  Fed.  829  (1896), 

1085,  1086,  1087,  1090. 
Capital  Gas  &  Elec.  L.  Co.  v. 

Gaines,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  1464 

(1899),  825. 
Cappel  y.  Weir,  45  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 

419  (1904),  1040. 
Cargo  ex  "  Argos,"  L.  R.  5  P.  C. 

134  (1873),  1265. 

Garland  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,   118   Mich.   369 

(1898),  412,  862. 
Carleton  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry. 

Co.,  155  Ala.  326  (1908),  881. 
Carlisle  v.  Carlisle  G.  &  Water  Co. 

(Pa.),  4  Atl.  179  (1886),  430, 

1306. 
Carlyle  v.  Carlyle  Water  L.  &  P. 

Co.,  52  111.  App.  577  (1893), 

92. 
Carpenter  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 

Co.  (Md.),  64  Atl.  252  (1906), 

160. 
Carr  v.  Milwaukee  L.,  H.  &  P. 

Co.,    132  Wis.    662    (1907), 

410. 
Carrey  v.  Spencer,  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 

886  (1895),  848,  1414. 
Carr's  Case,  1  Roll.  Abr.  3,  pi.  4 

(1583),  364. 
Carroll  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

88  Mo.  239  (1885),  780. 
Carroll  v.  Staten  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 

N.  Y.  126  (1874),  336,  599, 

785. 
Carswell  v.  Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  R. 

Co.,  118  Ga.  826  (1903),  784. 
Carter  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Va. 

Gas.  354  (1823),  182,  292. 
Carter  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  3  Ga. 

App.  34  (1907),  1010. 
Carter  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  141  N.  C. 

374  (1906),  398,  874. 


Case   v.    Midland   Ry.    Co.,    27 

Beav.  247  (1859),  122. 
Cash  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  81 

Mo.  App.  109  (1899),  989. 
Cassilay,  etc.,  v.  Young  &  Co.,  39 

Am.  Dec.  505  (1843),  905. 
Castle  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R. 

Co.,  8  Int.  Comm.  Rep.  333 

(1899),  1357. 
Cathey  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

Co.,  130  S.  W.  130  (1910), 

866,  878. 
Caton  v.  Romney,  13  Wend.  387 

(1835),  173,  774. 
Cau  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  194 

U.  S.  427  (1904),  1006. 
Cavallaro  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry. 

Co.,  110  Cal.  348  (1895),  513, 

1038. 
Cayle's  Case,  8  Coke,  63  (1574), 

964. 
Cayo  v.  Pool,  108  Ky.  124  (1900), 

230. 
Caze  v.  Baltimore  Ins.  Co.,  7  Cr. 

(U.  S.)  358  (1813),  1265. 
Cedar  Lumber  Products  Case,  3 

Can.   Ry.   Gas.  312   (1903), 

1365. 
Cedar  Rapids  &  I.  C.  Ry.  &  L.  Co. 

v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.  (Iowa),  124  N.  W.  323 

(1910),  815,  820. 
Cedar  Rapids  Water  Co.  v.  Cedar 

Rapids,  118  la.  234  (1902), 

1099,  1102,  1124,  1132,  1134, 

1168,  1410,  1430. 
Central  Bridge  Corp.  v.  Lowell, 

15  Gray,  106  (1860),  53. 
Central  Bridge  Corp.  v.  Sleeper,  8 

Gush.  324  (1851),  241. 
Central  D.  &  P.  Telegraph  Co. 

v.  Commonwealth,  114  Pa. 

St.    592   (1886),   273,    405, 

1345. 

[  Ixxxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Central  Elevator  Co.  v.  People, 

174  111.  203  (1898),  708. 
Central  Iron  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 

R.  R.  Co.,  17  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  651 

(1895),  1378. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Augusta 

Brokerage  Co.,  122  Ga.  646 

(1905),  532,  840,  1283. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown 

(Ala.),  51  So.  565  (1910),  844, 

882. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Butler 

Marble  &  G.  Co.  (Ga.),  68 

S.  E.  775  (1910),  394,  868. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cook  & 

L.,  4  Ga.  App.  698  (1908), 

414,  528,  530. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall, 

124  Ga.  322  (1905),  256,  659, 

1011. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lipp- 

man,  110  Ga.  665  (1900),  763, 

1002. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Madden 

(Ga.),  69  S.  E.  165  (1910), 

933,  951. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McLen- 

don,    157   Fed.   961    (1907), 

1063,  1124,  1129,  1201,  1220, 

1430,  1431. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Motes, 

117  Ga.  923  (1903),  879,  884. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mur- 

phey,  196  U.  S.  194  (1905), 

1418. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Commission,    161    Fed.   925 

(1908),  1132,  1133. 
Central  New  York  Tel.  &  Tel. 

Co.  v.  Averill,  55  N.  Y.  Misc. 

346  (1907),  493,  497. 
Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son, 58  Ga.  393  (1877),  758, 

775. 

[  Ixxxiv  ] 


Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Dwight 

Mfg.  Co.,  75  Ga.  609  (1885), 

1004. 

Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Lamp- 
ley,  76  Ala.  357  (1884),  776. 
Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Perry, 

58  Ga.  461  (1877),  735. 
Central  R.  R.  &  Banking  Co.  v. 

Strickland,  90  Ga.  562  (1892), 

865,  873. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Georgia  F.  & 

V.  Exch.,  91  Ga.  389  (1893), 

668,  670,  912. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hasselkus, 

91  Ga.  382  (1893),  511. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  76 

Ga.  209  (1886),  812. 
Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Peacock,  69 

Md.  257  (1888),  939. 
Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  74  Md. 

212  (1891),  736. 
Central  S.  &  G.  Exch.  v.  Board  of 

Trade,   196   111.  396  (1902), 

603,  607. 
Central  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Louisville  & 

N.  R.  R.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  568 

(1904),  491,  514,   534,   698, 

813,  818. 
Central  Texas  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hollo  way  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

54  S.  W.  419  (1899),  635. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Pittsburg  S. 

&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  Y. 

Misc.  195  (1906),  709. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash  St. 

L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Fed.  247 

(1887),  1033. 
Central  Union  Telephone  Co.  v. 

Fehring,  146  Ind.  189  (1896), 

266. 
Central  Union  Telephone  Co.  v. 

State    ex    rel.    Falley,    118 

Ind.  194    (1888),    136,   266, 

375. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Central  Union  Telephone  Co.  v. 

State,   123  Ind.   113  (1889), 

266,  375. 
Central  Union  Telephone  Co.  v. 

Swoveland,  14  Ind.  App.  341 

(1895),  765,  865,  1013. 
Cereghino  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

26  Utah,  467  (1903),  226. 
Chagrin  Falls  &  C.  Plank  Road 

Co.  v.  Cane,  2  Ohio  St.  419 

(1853),  75,  241. 
Chamberlain    v.    Milwaukee    & 

Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Wis.  238 

(1860),  777. 
Chamberlain  v.  Pierson,  87  Fed. 

420  (1898),  778. 
Chapman  v.  Great  Western  Ry. 

Co.,  5  Q.  B.  D.  278  (1880), 

1037. 

Chapman  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  90  Ky.  265  (1890), 

348. 
Charge  to  Grand  Jury,  66  Fed. 

146  (1895),  1301. 
Charles  Nelson,   The,    149   Fed. 

846  (1906),  597,  655. 
Charles    Simon's    Sons    Co.    v. 

Maryland  T.  &  T.  Co.,  99 

Md.  141  (1904),  1410. 
Charleston  Natural  Gas  Co.  v. 

Lowe,  52  W.  Va.  662  (1901), 

94,  112,  243,  273,  405. 
Chase,  The  M.  M.,  37  Fed.  708 

(1889),  1046. 
Chattanooga  R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 

Liddell,  85  Ga.  482  (1890), 

207. 
Chattanooga  Terminal  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Felton,  69  Fed.  273  (1895), 

226. 
Chattock  v.  Bellamy,  64  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  250  (1895),  238,  972. 
Cheney  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

11  Met.  121  (1846),  446, 1255. 


Cherry  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co., 
191  Mo.  489  (1905),  885. 

Chesapeake  &  D.  Canal  Co.  v. 
Gring,  159  Fed.  662,  (1908), 
495. 

Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beas- 
ley,  104  Va.  788  (1906),  1008. 

Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
tucky, 179  U.  S.  388  (1900). 
566,  848. 

Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pat- 
ton,  23  App.  D.  C.  113 
(1904),  777. 

Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sauls- 
berry,  112  Ky.  915  (1902), 
632,  933. 

Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sauls- 
berry,  126  Ky.  179  (1907), 
908. 

Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Standard  Lumber  Co.,  174 
Fed.  107  (1909),  820,  1359. 

Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wilson,  21  Gratt.  654  (1872), 
970. 

Chesapeake,  O.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Wells,  85  Tenn.  613  (1887), 
566,  848,  881. 

Chesapeake  &  P.  Telephone  Co. 
v.  Baltimore  &  0.  Telegraph 
Co.,  66  Md.  399  (1886),  136, 
244,  692. 

Chesapeake  &  P.  Telephone  Co. 
v.  Manning,  186  U.  S.  238 
(1902),  136,  823,  1121,  1407, 
1420. 

Chesapeake  Steamship  Co.  v. 
Merchants'  Bank,  102  Md. 
589  (1906),  1045. 

Chevallier  v.  Straham,  2  Tex.  115 
(1847),  162, 236, 239, 968, 985. 

Chicago,  City  of,  v.  Mutual  Elec- 
tric Light  &  Power  Co.,  55 
111.  App.  429  (1894),  273. 

[  Ixxxv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Chicago,  City  of,  v.  Northwestern 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  218  111. 
40  (1905),  377,  456. 

Chicago,  City  of,  v.  Openheim, 
229  111.  313  (1907),  878. 

Chicago  v.  Rogers  Pk.  Co.,  214 
111.  212  (1905),  1123,  1124, 
1430. 

Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ackley, 
94  U.  S.  179  (1876),  214. 

Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thompson,  19  111.  578  (1858), 
255. 

Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood- 
ward, 164  Ind.  360  (1904), 
256. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnol, 
144  111.  261  (1893),  763. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buck- 
master,  74  111.  App.  575 
(1897),  626,  943. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago V.  &  W.  Coal  Co.,  79 
111.  121  (1875),  1297,  1311, 
1330. 

Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  159  111.  53  (1895),  796. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dumser, 
161  111.  190  (1896),  801. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Erick- 
son,  91  111.  613  (1879),  408, 
662,  722,  831. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission, 
173  Fed.  930  (1908),  857. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Michie, 
83  111.  427  (1876),  745. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People, 
152  111.  230  (1894),  810. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pills- 
bury,  123  111.  9  (1887),  570, 
942,  944. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott, 
42  111.  132  (1866),  1036. 

[  Ixxxvi  ] 


Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shea, 
66  111.  471  (1873),  623,  737. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Suffern, 
129  111.  274  (1889),  224,  300, 
308,  681,  822,  1327. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son, 19  111.  578  (1858),  176, 
623,  737. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thrapp, 
5  111.  App.  502  (1880),  922. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tracey, 
109  111.  App.  563  (1903),  946. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  United 
States  (C.  C.  A.),  156  Fed. 
558  (1907),  1293,  1359. 

Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker, 
118  111.  App.  397  (1905),  398. 

Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Willard,  31  111.  App.  435 
(1888),  440. 

Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Winters,  175  111.  293  (1898), 
763,  932. 

Chicago  &  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Flexman,  103  111.  546  (1882), 
951. 

Chicago  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Field, 
7  Ind.  App.  172  (1893),  738, 
759. 

Chicago  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
ley,  6  Ind.  App.  9  (1892),  890. 

Chicago  &  E.  I.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jen- 
nings, 190  111.  478  (1901), 
401. 

Chicago  &  E.  I.  Ry.  Co.  v.  People, 
222  111.  396  (1906),  810. 

Chicago  &  G.  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dane, 
43  N.  Y.  240  (1870),  723. 

Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Well- 
man,  143  U.  S.  339  (1892), 
1122,  1152,  1176,  1407,  1411. 

Chicago  &  Gt.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Dunlap,  71  Kan.  67  (1905), 
921. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Chapman,  133  111.  96  (1890), 
1022. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  V.  &  W.  Coal  Co., 
79  111.  121  (1875),  1357. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dey, 
35  Fed.  866  (1888),  1094, 
1122,  1129,  1131,  1151,  1156, 
1220,  1403,  1408,  1409. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jen- 
kins, 103  111.  588  (1882), 
1050. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Lawyer,  69  111.  285  (1893), 
1042. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  More- 
house,  112  Wis.  1  (1901),  224. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,  132  Fed.  593  (1904), 
778. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Os- 
borne,  3  C.  C.  A.  912  (1892), 
534. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Peo- 
ple, 56  111.  365  (1870),  404, 
492,  817,  1043. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 
74  Neb.  77  (1905),  808. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 55  111.  185  (1870),  566, 
844,  849,  865,  881. 

Chicago  &  P.  M.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Becker,  35  Fed.  883  (1888), 
1122. 

Chicago,  B.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Porter,  43  Minn.  527  (1890), 
225. 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 72  Neb.  856  (1907), 
1378. 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Boger,  1  111.  App.  472  (1877), 
878. 


Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
lington, C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co., 

34  Fed.  481  (1888),  570,  670. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Curtis,  51  Neb.  442  (1897), 

529,  530. 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gar- 
diner,   51    Neb.    70    (1897), 

1010. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

George,   19  111.   510  (1858), 

904. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Griffin,   68   111.   499    (1873), 

935. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gus- 

tin,  35  Neb.  86  (1892),  513. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Iowa,  94  U.  S.  155  (1876), 

124,  1121,  1427. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Jones,   149    111.  361   (1894), 

1403,  1405,  1409. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Mehlsack,  131  111.  61  (1889), 

623,  738. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Parks,  18  111.  460  (1857),  1282, 

1287. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Powers,  73  Neb.  816  (1905), 

727. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Slat- 

tery,  107  N.  W.  1045  (1906), 

772. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Troyer,  70  Neb.  293  (1905), 

763. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Williams,  61  Neb.  608  (1901), 

796,  989. 
Chicago,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Bozarth,    91    111.    App.    68 

(1900),  1026. 

[  Ixxxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pelletier, 

134  111.  120  (1890),  632,  933. 
Chicago  Dock,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Gar- 

rity,    115    111.    155     (1885), 

225. 
Chicago  Exchange  Bldg.  Co.  v. 

Nelson,  197  111.  334  (1902), 

193. 
Chicago  G.  L.  &  C.  Co.  v.  People's 

G.  L.  &  C.  Co.,  121  111.  530 

(1887),  687,  693. 

Chicago,  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road   Commission,    39    Ind. 

App.  358  (1907),  1099,  1124, 

1430. 

Chicago,  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  South- 
ern Ind.   Ry.   Co.,  38  Ind. 

App.  234  (1904),  693. 
Chicago,   K.   &  W.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Frazer,  55  Kan.  582  (1895), 

207,  762,  1044. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Ackley,  94  U.  S.  179  (1876), 

124,  1121,  1427. 
Chicago,  M.  &  P.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Minnesota,    134    U.    S.    418 

(1889),     1409,     1411,     1422, 

1429. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Smith,  110  Fed.  473  (1901), 

1195. 
Chicago,   M.   &   St.  P.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Tompkins,    90    Fed.  363 

(1898),  1409. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Tompkins,    176    U.    S.    167 

(1900),     1151,     1175,     1195, 

1196,  1206. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

61  Fed.  993  (1894),  694. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wallace,  66  Fed.  506  (1895), 

259,  755,  772,  969. 

[  Ixxxviii  ] 


Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Williams, 

61  Neb.  608  (1901),  256. 
Chicago,  P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Chicago, 

88  111.  225,  30  Am.  Rep.  545 

(1878),  1410. 
Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

People,  136  111.  App.  2  (1909), 

1215. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Barrett,     16    111.    App.     17 

(1884),  1044. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Conklin,  32  Kan.  55  (1884), 

876. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Fairclough,  52  111.  106  (1869), 

769. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v, 

Hamler,  215  111.  525  (1905), 

779,  1015. 

Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  In- 
terstate Comm.  Comm.,  171 

Fed.  680  (1909),  1226,  1378, 

1387. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Kendall,    72    111.    App.    105 

(1897),  1042,  1043. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Moran,    117    111.    App.    42 

(1904),  498,  782. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Nebraska  State  Ry.  Commis- 
sion, 85  Neb.  818  (1910),  809. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Pffeifer,  90  Ark.  524,  905. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Risley  Bros.  &  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.),  119  S.  W.  897  (1909), 

394,  408. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Ry.  Co.  v.  War- 

•ren,  16  111.  502  (1855),  1036. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Witty,  32  Neb.  275  (1891), 

1011. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wood,  104  Fed.  663  (1900), 

1044,  1045. 
Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Graham,    3    Ind.    App.    28 

(1891),  865,  888,  891. 
Chicago,  St.  L.   &  P.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Holdridge,    118  Ind.  287 

(1889),  862. 
Chicago,  St.  Louis  &  Pittsburg 

R.   R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  141 

Ind.    267    (1894),   345,   511, 

663,    664,    665,    799,    841, 

853. 
Chicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  0.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Abels,    60    Miss.     1017 

(1883),  256,  1020. 
Chicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  0.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  139  U. 

S.  79  (1890),  482. 
Chicago,  St.  P.  Mo.  &  0.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Becker,  35  Fed.  883  (1888), 

1192. 
Chicago,  St.  P.  Mo.  &  0.  Ry.  Co. 

v.     Bryant,    65     Fed.     969 

(1895),  745. 
Chicago  Telephone  Co.  v.  Illinois 

Mfgrs.  Assn.,   106  111.  App. 

54  (1903),  136. 

Chicago  Telephone  Co.  v.  North- 
western Telephone  Co.,  199 

111.  324  (1902),  211. 
Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Helbreg,  99  111.  App. 

563  (1902),  1044. 
Chicago  T.  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Don- 

nell,    213    111.    545    (1905), 

783. 
Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.  v. 

Chicago,  199  111.  484  (1902), 

1096,  1410,  1426. 
Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.   v. 

O'Brien,  219  111.  303  (1906), 

410. 


Chiles  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry. 

Co.,  30  Ky.   L.   Rep.    1332 

(1907),  566,  848,  881. 
Chiles  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry. 

Co.,  218  U.  S.  71  (1910),  566, 

848,  881,  1417. 
Chilton  v.  St.  Louis  &  I.  M.  Ry. 

Co.,  114  Mo.  88  (1892),  566, 

844,  848,  881. 
Choctaw,  0.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Hill,  110  Tenn.  396  (1903), 

447,  1259. 
Choctaw,  0.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

State,   73  Ark.  373   (1904), 

415,  665,  854. 

Chouteau  v.  Steamboat  St.  An- 
thony,   16  Mo.  216  (1852), 

255,  743,  792. 
Christenson  v.  American  Express 

Co.,    15  Minn.   270   (1870), 

178,  776,  963. 
Christian  v.  Augusta  &  A.  Ry.  Co. 

(S.  C.),  69  S.  E.  17  (1910). 
Christie  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

94   Mo.    453    (1887),    1282, 

1285,  1286. 
Church  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  6  S.  D.  235  (1894), 

905,  921. 
Churchman  v.  Tunstall,  Hardres, 

162  (1659),  52. 
Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Bowling  Green,  57  Oh.  St. 

336  (1897),  113,  214,  215,  243, 

692,  1290. 
Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Interstate     Comm.    Comm., 

206  U.  S.  142  (1907),  1238, 

1391. 
Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Carper,  112  Ind.  26  (1887), 

738. 
Cincinnati,  I.,  St.  L.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Case,  122  Ind.  310(1889),  902. 

[  Ixxxix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Cincinnati,  I.,  St.  L.  &  C.  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Cooper,  120  Ind.  469 

(1889),  933. 
Cincinnati,  I.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

City  of  Connersville,  170  Ind. 

316  (1908),  214. 
Cincinnati,  J.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Morley,  4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  559 

(1890),  761. 
Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Interstate  Comm.  Comm., 

162  U.  S.  184  (1896),  1222, 

1377,  1414,  1420. 
Cincinnati,  N.  0.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Raine,  130  Ky.  454  (1908), 

832. 
Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co. 

v.   Sanders   &   Russell,    118 

Ky.  115  (1904),  1008. 
Cincinnati,   etc.,    R.    R.    Co.   v. 

Commissioners    of    Clinton 

County,  1  Oh.  St.  77  (1852), 

217. 
Cincinnati  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pontius, 

19  Ohio  St.  221  (1869),  1017. 
Citizens'     Bank    v.     Nantucket 

Steamboat  Co.,  2  Story  (U. 

S.),  16  (1841),  172,  255,  743. 
Citizens'  Gas  &  0.  Co.  v.  Whip- 
pie,  32  Ind.  App.  203  (1904), 

417. 
Citizens'  St.  R.  R.  Co.  of  Ind.  v. 

Merl,  134  Ind.  609  (1893), 

1031. 
Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Twiname, 

111  Ind.  587  (1887),  189,  756. 
City  Electric  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shrop- 
shire,   101    Ga.    33    (1897), 

937. 
City  of, — See  the  particular  city 

by  name. 
City  Water  Co.  v.  State  (Tex. 

Civ.   App.),   33   S.   W.   259 

(1895),  92. 

[xc] 


Clancy  v.  Barker,  131  Fed.  161 

(1904),  936,  947. 
Clancy  v.   Barker,   71   Neb.   83 

(1904),  936. 
Clapp  v.  Stanton,  20  La.  Ann. 

495  (1868),  173. 
Clark  v.  Barnwell,  12  How.  272 

(1851),  165. 
Clark  v.  Burns,  118  Mass.  275 

(1875),  21,  769,  975. 
Clark  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  148  Fed. 

243  (1905),  747. 
Clark  v.  Colorado  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,   165    Fed.  408   (1908), 

745. 
Clark  v.  Ulster  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 

189  N.  ¥.93(1907),  833. 
Clark  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  91  N.  C.  506  (1884), 

440,  447,  1259. 
Clarke  v.  Blackmar,  47  N.  Y.  150 

(1871),  225. 

Clarke-Lawrence  Co.   v.   Chesa- 
peake &  0.  Ry.  Co.,  63  W. 

Va.  423  (1908),  1048. 
Clarke  v.  Needles,  25  Pa.  St.  338 

(1855),  724,  727. 
Clarke  v.  Rochester  &  S.  R.  R. 

Co.,  14  N.  Y.  570  (1856),  256. 
Clary  v.  Willey,  49  Vt.  55  (1876), 

234,  240,  968. 
Claypool  v.  McAlister,  20  111.  504 

(1858),  182,  241,  843. 
Cleburne  Water,  I.  &  L.  Co.  v. 

City  of  Cleburne,   13  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  144  (1896),  443. 
Clemson   v.    Davidson,    5   Binn. 

(Pa.)  392  (1813),  1263. 
Clerc  v.  Morgan's  La.  &  Tex.  R. 

R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  107  La.  370 

(1902),  944. 

Cleveland  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cleve- 
land,  94   Fed.   385   (1899), 

1410. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Cleveland  v.  Cleveland  City  Ry. 
Co.,  194  U.  S.  517  (1904), 
1411, 1424. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Closser,  126  Ind.  348  (1890), 
694,  1284. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Coburn,  91  Ind.  557  (1883), 
811. 

Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Bartram,  11  Ohio  St.  457 
(1860),  431,  446,  878,  885, 
1255. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Heath,  22  Ind.  App.  47 
(1899),  901,  909,  915. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Henry,  170  Ind.  94 
(1908),  259, 755, 772, 792, 969. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Illinois,  177  U.  S.  544 
(1900),  1417. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Ketcham,  133  Ind. 
346  (1893),  777,  778. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Louisville  Tin.  &  S.  Co.  (Ky.), 
Ill  S.  W.  358  (1908),  794. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Moline  Plow  Co.,  13 
Ind.  App.  225  (1895),  1047. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  S.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Scott,  111  111.  App. 
234  (1903),  442. 

Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Wright,  25  Ind.  App. 
525  (1900),  1048. 

Cleveland  Electric  Co.  v.  Cleve- 
land, 204  U.  S.  116  (1906), 
298. 

Cleveland  G.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Cleve- 
land, 71  Fed.  610  (1896), 
1099,  1123,  1132,  1138,  1410, 
1430. 


Cleveland  P.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Curran,  19  Ohio  St.  1  (1869), 

780. 
Clifford  v.  Stafford,  145  111.  App. 

247  (1908),  366. 
Clough  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

155  Fed.  81  (1907),  259. 
Coal,  318^  Tons  of,  14  Blatch. 

453  (1878),  415,  420. 
Coal  &  Coke  Ry.  Co.  v.  Conley 

(W.Va.),67S.E.613(1910), 

1061,  1068,  1081,  1084,  1091, 

1092,  1099,  1126,  1127,  1128, 

1132,  1135,  1138,  1163,  1175, 

1193,  1202. 
Coal  Co.  v.  Caledonia  Ry.  Co.,  2 

Ry.  &  C.  Tr.  Cas.  39  (1874), 

1373. 
Cobb  v.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,  179 

Mass.  212  (1901),  943. 
Cobb  C.  &  Co.  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 

R.  Co.,  88  111.  394  (1878),  914. 
Cobb  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  R.  Co., 

(1894),  A.  C.  419,  944. 
Coe  v.  Columbus,  P.  &  I.  R.  R. 

Co.,  10  Ohio  St.  372  (1859), 

296. 
Coe  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Fed.  775  (1880),  491,  492, 

574,  1043. 
Coe  v.  N.  J.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  30 

N.  J.  Eq.  440  (1879),  264, 

457. 
Coger  v.  North  Western  Union 

Packet  Co.,  37  la.  145  (1873), 

566,  848,  849,  881. 
Coggs  v.  Barnard,  2  Ld.  Raym. 

909,  962. 
Cogswell  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

Ry.  Co.,  23  Okla.  181  (1909), 

370. 
Cogswell  v.  West  St.  &  N.  E. 

Elec.   R.   Co.,   5   Wash.   46 

(1892),  207. 

[xci] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Cohen    v.    Frost,    2    Duer,    335 

(1853),  767. 
Cohen  v.  Platt,  48  N.  Y.  Misc. 

378  (1906),  413, 991. 
Cohn  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  181  Mo.  30,  79  S.  W.  961 

(1904),  1377. 
Coit  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

130  Cal.  657  (1900),  348,  766, 

1014. 
Colbath  v.  Bangor  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,  105  Me.  379  (1909),  906. 
Cole  v.  Goodwin,  19  Wend.  (N. 

Y.)  251  (1838),  172,  262. 
Cole  v.  La  Grange,  113  U.  S.  1 

(1884),  64. 
Cole    v.    Logan,    24    Oreg.    304 

•   (1893),  852. 
Cole   v.   Rowen,   88   Mich.    219 

(1891),  484. 
Cole  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Co.,   33  Minn.   227   (1885), 

1025. 
Coleman  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  84 

Ga.  1  (1889),  372. 
Coleman  v.  New  York  &  N.  H. 

R.  R.  Co.,   106  Mass.   160 

(1870),  935. 
Colfax   Mountain   Fruit   Co.    v. 

Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  46 

Pac.   668   (1896),   511,   517, 

1033. 
Collenberg,  The,  1  Black  (U.  S.), 

170  (1861),  988,  1267. 
Collett  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  16  Q.B.  984  (1851) ,777. 
Collier  v.  Langan,  T.  S.  &  M.  Co. 

(Mo.  App.),  127  S.  W.  435 

(1910),  170,  230,  239,  254. 
Collier  v.  Swinney,  16  Mo.  484 

(1852),  922. 
Collins  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  169  (1897), 

757. 

[xcii] 


Collman  v.  Collins,  2  Hall  (N. 

Y.),  569  (1829),  1263. 
Colorado   Springs   v.    Smith,    19 

Colo.  554  (1894),  484. 
Colt  v.  McMechen,  6  Johns.  160 

(1810),  984. 

Columbia  Conduit  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 90  Pa.   St.  307 

(1879),  59. 
Columbus  v.  Columbus  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  45  Ohio  St.  98  (1886), 

1424. 
Columbus  &  I.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Arnold,  31  Ind.  174  (1869), 

783. 
Columbus  Ry.  Co.  v.  Christian, 

97  Ga.  56  (1895),  939. 
Commander  in  Chief,  The,  1  Wall. 

43  (1863),  172. 
Combs  v.  Lakewood,  68  N.  J.  L. 

582  (1902),  186. 

Commercial  Bank,  Re,  and  Lon- 
don Gas  Co.,  20  Up.  Can.  Q. 

B.  233  (1860),  454. 
Commercial  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  New 

England  T.  &  T.  Co.,  61  Vt. 

241  (1889),  136,  244,  692. 
Commonwealth     v.    Bacon,     13 

Bush.  210  (1877),  51. 
Commonwealth  v.  Corey  &  Co.,  2 

Pittsburg,  444  (1863),  98. 
Commonwealth  v.  Cuncannon,  3 

Brewst.  344  (1869),  240. 
Commonwealth      v.      Delaware 

Canal  Co.,  43  Pa.  St.  295 

(1862),  122,  241. 
Commonwealth  v.  Eastern  R.  R. 

Co.,  103  Mass.  254  (1869), 

805. 
Commonwealth  v.  Fitchburg  R. 

R.  Co.,  12  Gray,  180  (1858), 

188,  262,  306,  311,  792. 
Commonwealth  v.  Goldman,  205 

Mass.  400  (1910),  187. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Commonwealth  v.  Hancock  Free 

Bridge  Corporation,  2  Gray, 

58  (1854),  23. 

Commonwealth  v.  Interstate  Con- 
solidated Ry.,  187  Mass.  436 

(1905),  189. 
Commonwealth   v.   Louisville   & 

Nashville  R.  R.  Co.,  68  S.  W. 

1103  (1902),  1337. 
Commonwealth    v.  Louisville    & 

N.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

509  (1902),  1238. 
Commonwealth    v.    Lo,well    Gas 

Light     Co.,    12    Allen,    75 

(1866),  31,  111. 
Commonwealth    v.   Mitchell,    2 

Parsons    (Pa.),    431    (1850), 

106,  368,  370,  628. 
Commonwealth  v.  Norfolk  &  W. 

Ry.  Co.  (Va.),  68  S.  E.  351 

(1910),  125,699,  811.- 
Commonwealth  v.  People's  Exp. 

Co.,  201  Mass.  564  (1909),  236. 
Commonwealth   v.   Philadelphia, 

132  Pa.  St.  288  (1890),  456. 
Commonwealth  v.  Power,  7  Met. 

596  (1844),  484,  861. 
Commonwealth     v.     Wetherbee, 

101  Mass.  214  (1869),  263. 
Commonwealth  v.   Wilkes-Barre 

Gas  Co.,  2  Kulp  (Pa.),  499 

(1883),  31,  280. 
Commonwealth    v.  Worcester  & 

N.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Mass.  561 

(1878),  1377,  1378. 
Concord  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greely,  17 

N.  H.  47  (1845),  58. 
Concord  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  N.  H. 

464    (1893),    125,    527,   808, 

811,  1401. 
Concord  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  For- 

saithe,  59  N.  H.  122  (1879), 

1282,  1320. 


Condit  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co., 

54  N.  Y.  500  (1873),  513. 
Condon  v.  New  Rochelle  Water 

Co.,  136  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  879 

(1909),  1121. 
Condran  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  67  Fed.  522  (1895), 

743,  746. 
Conemaugh  Gas  Co.  v.  Jackson 

Farm  Gas  Co.,  186  Pa.  St. 

443  (1898),  688. 
Congar  v.  Galena  &  Chicago  U. 

R.    R.    Co.,    17    Wis.    477 

(1863),  521. 
Conklin  v.  Prospect  Park  Hotel 

Co.,    1    N.    Y.    Supp.    406 

(1888),  291. 
Conley  v.  Watauga  Water  Co.,  99 

Tenn.  420  (1897),  1300. 
Connell  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  93  Va.  44  (1896),  941, 

944,  948. 
Connell  v.  Mobile  &  O.  Ry.  Co. 

(Miss.),  7  So.  344  (1890),  869. 
Conolley  v.  Crescent  City  R.  R. 

Co.,  41  La.  Ann.  57  (1889), 

631,  638,  933. 
Connolly  v.  Warren,  106  Mass. 

146  (1870),  875. 
Connolly   v.    Woods,    13   Idaho, 

573  (1907),  206. 
Connors  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  204 

Mass.  310  (1910),  631,  635, 

638,  643,  953. 
Conroy  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  & 

0.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Wis.  243 

(1897),  949. 
Consolidated  Gas  Co.  v.  Blondell, 

89  Md.  732  (1899),  883. 
Consolidated  Gas  Co.  v.  Willcox, 

157  Fed.  849  (1907),  1092. 
Consolidated    Traction    Co.     v. 

Taborn,  58  N.  J.  L.  1  (1895), 

863. 

[  xciii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Continental  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.,  13  Pa.  Dist. 

Ct.  702  (1904),  404,  817. 
Contra  Costa  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moss, 

23  Cal.  323  (1863),  176,  223. 
Converse  v.   Norwich  &   N.  Y. 

Transp.  Co.,  33  Conn.   166 

(1865),  733. 
Converse  v.  Washington  &  G.  R. 

R.  Co.,  2  MacAr.  504  (1876), 

632,  933. 

Conyers    v.    Postal    Telegraph- 
Cable  Co.,  92  Ga.  619  (1893), 

520. 
Cook  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,   81    Iowa,   551    (1890), 

1282,  1283,  1286,  1303,  1320. 
Cook  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  78  Neb.  64  (1907),  1024. 
Cook  v.  Gourdin,  2  N.  &  McC.  19 

(1819),  771. 
Cook  &  Wheeler  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 

&  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  81  Iowa,  551 

(1890),  1080,  1289. 
Cooley  v.  Minnesota  Transfer  Ry. 

Co.,  53  Minn.   327   (1893), 

1046. 
Cooney  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car 

Co.,  121  Ala.  368  (1898),  769. 
Cooper   v.    Berry,    21    Ga.    526 

(1857),  1001. 
Cooper  v.  Goodland,  80  Kan.  121 

(1909),  406,  825,  1251. 
Cooper,  Matter  of,  28  Hun,  515 

(1883),  145. 
Cooper  v.  Raleigh  &  G.  R.  R.  Co., 

110  Ga.  659  (1900),  1012. 
Cope  v.  Cordova,  1  Rawle  (Pa.), 

203  (1829),  1039. 
Copland  v.   American  DeForest 

Wireless  Telegraph  Co.,  136 

N.  C.  11  (1904),  134. 
Copeland  v.  Draper,  157  Mass. 

558  (1893),  107. 
[  xciv  ] 


Coppin  v.  Braithwaite,  8  Jurist, 
875  (1844),  598,  608,  627, 
634. 

Corbet  v.  Oil  City  Fuel  Supply 
Co.,  21  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  80 
(1902),  273. 

Cordell  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  149  N.  C.  402 
(1908),  562. 

Cordillera,  The,  5  Blatch.  518 
(1867),  731. 

Corwin  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
2  N.  Y.  City  Ct.  106  (1885), 
431,  878,  885. 

Cosgrove  v.  City  Council  of  Au- 
gusta, 103  Ga.  835  (1898), 
484. 

Coskery  v.  Nagle,  83  Ga.  696 
(1889),  744. 

Getting  v.  Kansas  City  Stock 
Yards  Co.,  183  U.  S.  79 
(1901),  100, 1068,  1123, 1128, 
1130,  1132,  1135,  1138,  1217, 
1420,  1436. 

Cotton  v.  Mississippi  River  Boom 
Co.,  22  Minn.  372  (1876),  55, 
73. 

County  of  Hennepin  v.  Brother- 
hood of  Gethsemane,  27 
Minn.  460  (1881),  70. 

Coup  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  56  Mich.  Ill  (1885), 
259,  755,  772,  792. 

Coupland  v.  Housatonic  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  Atl.  870  (1892),  796, 
847,  862,  951,  989,  1002, 
1021. 

Coventry  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry. 
Co.,  11  Q.  D.  776  (1883),  748. 

Covington  v.  Ratterman,  128  Ky. 
336  (1908),  377,  450. 

Covington  &  C.  Bridge  Co.  v.  So. 
Covington  &  C.  St.  Ry.  Co., 
93  Ky.  136  (1892),  53,  699. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


References  are  to  sections] 


Covington  &  L.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Sandford,    164    U.    S.    578 

(1896),    24,    75,    241,    1067, 

1411,  1426. 

Covington  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Cov- 
ington,  22    Ky.   Law   Rep. 

796  (1900),  1103. 
Covington  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Keith,  139 

U.  S.  128  (1891),  491,  813, 

818,  1043. 
Cowden  v.  Pacific  C.  S.  S.  Co.,  94 

Cal.  470  (1892),  1282. 
Cownie  Glove  Co.  v.  Merchants' 

Dispatch   Transp.    Co.,    106 

N.  W.  749  (1906),  180,  963. 
Cox  v.  Cook,  14  Allen  (Mass.), 

165  (1867),  611. 
Cox  v.  Maiden  &  M.  Gaslight 

Co.,  199  Mass.  324  (1908), 

457. 
Cox  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 

81  Kan.  186  (1909),  408. 
Coxe  v.  Heisley,  19  Pa.  St.  243 

(1852),  1002. 
Coy  v.  Detroit,  Y.  &  P.  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  125  Mich.  616  (1901), 

887. 
Coy  v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  146 

Ind.  655  (1897),  335,  982. 
Coykendall  v.  Eaton,  55  Barb. 

188  (1869),  970. 
Coyle  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  112 

Ga.    121    (1900),    432,    433, 

887. 
Cozard  v.   Kanawha   Hardwood 

Co.,  139  N.  C.  283  (1905), 

206,  214,  223. 
Cragin  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  51  N.  Y.  61  (1872),  1012. 
Craig    v.    Childress,    Peck,    270 

(1823),  963. 
Craker  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  36  Wis.  657  (1875),  933, 

935,  938. 


Cramer  v.  American  M.  U.  Ex- 
press Co.  &  Merchants'  Dis- 
patch Co.,  56  Mo.  524  (1874), 

518,  1033. 
Cravens  v.  Rodgers,  101  Mo.  247 

(1890),  485,  489. 
Crawford  v.  Cincinnati,  H.  &  D. 

R.  R.  Co.,  26  Ohio  St.  580 

(1875),  886. 
Crawfordsville    v.    Braden,    130 

Ind.  149  (1891),  218. 
Creech  v.  Charleston  &  W.  C.  Ry. 

Co.,  66  S.  C.  528  (1903),  395. 
Crescent  City  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 

New  Orleans  Gas  Light  Co., 

27  La.  Ann.  138  (1875),  51. 
Crescent  Liquor  Co.  v.  Platt,  148 

Fed.  894  (1906),  600. 
Crescent  Steel  Co.  v.  Equitable 

Gas  Co.,  23  Pitts.  L.  Jour. 

316  (1892),  553, 1288. 
Cresson  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R. 

Co.,  11  Phila.  597  (1875),  886. 
Crine  v.  East  Tennessee  V.  &  G. 

Ry.  Co.,  84  Ga.  651  (1890), 

763. 
Crocker  v.  New  London,  W.  &  P. 

R.    R.    Co.,    24   Conn.    249 

(1855),  888. 
Crommelin  v.  New  York  &  H.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.,  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 

77  (1862),  1050. 
Cromwell   v.    Stephens,    2   Daly 

(N.  Y.),  15  (1867),  263. 
Cronan  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

(Mo.  App.),  130  S.  W.  437 

(1910),  801. 
Cronkite  v.  Wells,  32  N.  Y.  247 

(1865),  394. 
Groom  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  52  Minn.  296  (1893), 

631,  635,  638,  933. 
Crooms  v.   Schad,   51   Fla.    168 

(1906),  560,  566,  849. 

[  xcv] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Crosby  v.  City  Council,  108  Ala. 

498  (1895),  1410,  1424. 
Crosby  v.  Fitch,   12  Conn.  410 

(1838),   165,   172,  229,  239, 

905,  921. 
Crosby  v.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R. 

Co.,  131  Mich.  288  (1902), 

519. 
Cross  v.  Andrews,  Cro.  Eliz.  622 

(1598),  340. 
Crossan  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R. 

R.  Co.,  149  Mass.  196  (1889), 

522. 
Crouch  v.  Arnett,  71  Kans.  49 

(1905),  273,  276,  405,  797. 
Crouch  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  14  C.  B.  255  (1854),  420, 

696. 
Crouch  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  42  Mo.  App.  248  (1890), 

513. 
Crow  v.  San  Joaquin  &  K.  R.  C. 

&  Irrigation  Co.,    130  Cal. 

309  (1900),  451. 
Crozier  v.  Boston,  N.  Y.  &  M. 

Steamboat  Co.,  43  How.  Pr. 

(N.   Y.)    466    (1871),    769, 

975. 
Crumley  v.  Watauga  Water  Co., 

99  Tenn.   420   (1897),   451, 

454,  1290. 
Cuba,  The,  3  Ware,  260  (1860), 

1269. 
Cullen,  Matter  of,  106  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.   250   (1905),   603,   605, 

608,  646. 
Culvar  v.  Lester,  37  Can.  L.  J. 

421  (1901),  169,  230. 
Cumberland  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Baker,  85  Miss. 

489  (1905),  458,  866. 
Cumberland    Telephone    Co.    v. 

Brown,  104  Tenn.  56  (1900), 

210. 

f  xcvi 1 


Cumberland  Telephone  &  T.  Co. 

v.  Cartwright  C.  Telephone 

Co.,  128  Ky.  395  (1908),  244, 

700. 
Cumberland  Telephone  &  T.  Co. 

v.  Kelly,  160  Fed.  316  (1908), 

136,  244,  273,  405,  576,  664, 

797,  802. 
Cumberland  Telephone  &  T.  Co. 

v.  Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  R. 

Co.,  51  La.  Ann.  29  (1889), 

260,  687,  816,  817,  1043. 
Cumberland  Telephone  &  T.  Co. 

v.  Railroad  Comm.,  156  Fed. 

823  (1907),  1099,  1133. 
Cumberland  Telephone  &  T.  Co. 

v.    Sanders,    83    Miss.    357 

(1904),  412. 
Cumberland  Valley  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Baab,  9  Watts,  458  (1840), 

811. 
Cunningham  v.  Bucky,  42  W.  Va. 

671  (1896),  965. 
Cunningham  v.  Seattle  El.  R.  & 

P.  Co.,  3  Wash.  471  (1892), 

938. 
Curling  v.    Long,    1   Bos.   &   P. 

(Eng.)  634  (1797),  1263. 
Curran  v.  Olson,  88  Minn.  307 

(1903),  936,  947. 
Currell  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  Ry. 

Co.,  97  Mo.  App.  93  (1902), 

833,  922. 
Currie  v.  Railroad  Co.,  135  N.  C. 

535  (1904),  414,  723. 
Curry  v.  Georgia  M.  &  G.  R.  R. 

Co.,  92  Ga.  293  (1893),  395. 
Curry  v.  Kansas  &  C.  P.  R.  Co., 

58  Kan.  6  (1897),  341,  1298, 

1364. 
Curtis  v.  Dinneen,  4  Dak.  245 

(1886),  947. 
Curtis   v.    Murphy,    63    Wis.    4 

(1885),  559,  6io,  623. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Cutler  v.  Bonney,  30  Mich.  259 

(1874),  965. 
Cutting  v.  Florida  Ry.  &  Nav. 

Co.,  30  Fed.  663  (1887),  524. 
Cutting  v.  Florida  Ry.  &  Nav. 

Co.,  46  Fed.  641  (1891),  1415. 
Cutts   v.  Brainerd,   42  Vt.    566 

(1870),  1042. 


Dale  v.  Hall,  1  Wils.  Reports,  281 

(1750),  164. 
Dalles  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Urqu- 

hart,  16  Oreg.  67  (1888),  62. 
Dalzell  v.  Steamboat  Saxon,   10 

La.   Ann.   280   (1855),   518, 

917,  1033. 

Dan,  The,  40  Fed.  691  (1889),  235. 
Dana  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  How.  Pr. 

428  (1875),  522. 
Danaher  v.  Brooklyn,  119  N.  Y. 

1  (1890),  981. 

Danaher  v.   Southwestern  Tele- 
phone &  T.  Co.  (Ark.),  127 

S.  W.  963  (1910),  451,  1300. 
Daniel  v.  New  Jersey  St.  Ry.  Co., 

64  N.  J.  L.  603  (1900),  629, 

880. 
Daniel  v.  Petersburg  Ry.  Co.,  117 

N.  C.  592  (1895),  946. 
Daniel  Ball,  The,   10  Wall.  557 

(1871),  1413. 
Daniel  Burns,  The,  52  Fed.  159 

(1892),  753. 
Daniels  v.  Ballantine,  23  Ohio  St. 

532  (1872),  917. 
Danville  v.  Noone,  103  111.  App. 

290  (1901),  484. 

Da  Ponte  v.  New  Orleans  Trans- 
fer  Co.,    42    La.    Ann.    696 

(1890),  171. 
Darden  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  2 

Ga.  App.  66  (1907),  403. 

7 


Darlington  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R. 

Co.,  99  Mo.  App.  1  (1903), 

1050. 
Darwin  v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,    23    S.  C.    531  (1885), 

761. 
Dave  v.  Morgan's  Louisiana  &  T. 

R.  R.  &  Steamship  Co.,  47 

La.  Ann.  576  (1895),  1044. 
Davenport  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  Daven- 
port, 124  la.  22  (1904),  51. 
Davenport  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  173  Pa.  St.  398  (1896), 

796. 
Davey  v.  Greenfield  &  T.  F.  St. 

Ry.    Co.,    177    Mass.    106 

(1900),  736. 
Davey  v.  Mason,  Car  &  M.  45 

(1841),  732. 
David  &  C.,  The,  5  Blatchf.  266 

(1865),  413,  981. 
Davidson,   The,    122   Fed.    1006 

(1903),  488. 
Davies  v.   Williamson,   21    New 

South  Wales  L.  R.  (Law)  124 

(1900),  446,  1256,  1260. 
Davis   v.    Button,    78   Cal.    247 

(1889),  262,  739. 
Davis  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  R.  Co., 

66  Vt.  290  (1893),  917,  1003, 

1007. 
Davis  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  122  Ky.  528  (1906),  477, 

781,  787. 
Davis  v.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  93  Wis.  470  (1896), 

1011. 
Davis  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  0. 

R.R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  543  (1891), 

758. 
Davis  v.  Clinton  Waterworks  Co., 

54  Iowa,  59  (1880),  350. 
Davis  v.  Coventry,  65  Kans.  557 

(1902),  69. 

[  xcvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Davis  v.  Electric  Reporting  Co., 

19  Weekly  N.  C.  567  (1887), 

137. 
Davis  v.   Garrett,   6  Bing.   716 

(1830),  905,  908,  921. 
Davis   v.    Gay,    141    Mass.    531 

(1886),  263,  974. 
Davis  v.  Kansas  City,  S.  J.  &  C. 

B.  R.  R.,  53  Mo.  317  (1873), 

433,  800,  1257. 
Davis  v.  Mayor,  14  N.  Y.  506 

(1856),  75. 
Davis  v.  Pacific  Tel.  &  Teleg.  Co., 

127  Cal.  312  (1899),  135. 
Davis  v.  Paducah  Ry.  &  L.  Co., 

113  Ky.  267  (1902),  919. 
Davis  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  89  Mo.  340  (1886),  918. 
Davis   v.    Western   Union   Tele- 
graph  Co.,   46   W.   Va.    48 

(1899),  398,  874,  1041. 
Davis   v.    Western   Union   Tele- 
graph   Co.,     107    Ky.    527 

(1900),  1026. 
Davison  v.  Gillies,  16  Ch.  D.  347n 

(1879),  1169. 
Davis  v.  Williams,  2  Starkie,  279 

(1817),  1001. 
Dawley  v.  Wagner  P.  C.  Co.,  169 

Mass.  315  (1897),  153. 
Dawson  v.  Channey,  5  Q.  B.  164 

(1843),  964. 
Dawson  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,  79  Mo.  296  (1883),  663, 

914. 
Dawson  v.  New  York  &  Brooklyn 

Bridge,    31   App.    Div.    537 

(1898),  945. 
Day  v.  Bather,  2  H.   &  C.   14 

(1863),  964. 
Day  v.  Owen,  5  Mich.  520  (1858), 

566,  848,  849,  865,  881. 
Dayton  v.  Quigley,  29  N.  J.  Eq. 

77  (1878),  378,  453,  456. 

f  xcviii  1 


Dean  v.  Chicago  General  Ry.,  64 
111.  App.  165  (1896),  189. 

Dean  v.  King,  22  Ohio  St.  118 
(1871),  747. 

De  Bary  Baya  M.  L.  v.  Jackson- 
ville, T.  &  K.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  40 
Fed.  392  (1889),  1282,  1287. 

De  Board  v.  Camden  Int.  Ry. 
Co.,  62  W.  Va.  41  (1907),  862. 

De  Camp  v.  Hibernia  R.  R.  Co., 
47N.J.  L.  43  (1885),  63,  222, 
224. 

Decker  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  3  Okla.  553  (1895),  593, 
866,  910. 

Decker  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  102  Minn.  99  (1907), 
777. 

De  Colange  v.  The  Chateau  Mar- 
gaux,  37  Fed.  157  (1888),  908. 

De  La  Grange  v.  Southwestern 
Telegraph  Co.,  25  La.  Ann. 
383  (1873),  348. 

Delaware,  The,  14  Wail.  579 
(1871),  165. 

Delaware  &  A.  Telegraph  &  Tele- 
phone Co.  v.  State  of  Dela- 
ware, 50  Fed.  677  (1892),  136, 
692. 

Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ashley,  67  Fed.  209  (1895), 
780. 

Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bullock,  60  N.  J.  L.  24 
(1897),  880. 

Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Central  Stockyards  Co.,  46 
N.  J.  Eq.  280  (1889),  100. 

Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Railroad  Commission  (N.  J.), 
74  Atl.  269  (1909),  806,  810. 

Deming  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R. 
Co.,  38  N.  H.  455  (1869),  833, 
922. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Deming  v.    Merchants'   Cotton- 
Press  &  Storage  Co.,  90  Tenn. 

306  (1891),  1015. 
Dempsey  v.  New  York  C.  &  H. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.,  146  N.  Y.  290 

(1894),  1304,  1363. 
Denaby    Main    Colliery    Co.    v. 

Manchester,  S.  &  L.  R.  Co., 

L.  R.  11  App.  Cas.  97,  1314. 
Denny  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  481 

(1859),  917. 
Densmore    Commission    Co.    v. 

Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co., 

101  Wis.  563  (1899),  796. 
Dent  v.  London  Tramway  Co.,  16 

Ch.  Div.  344  (1880),'  1169. 
Denton  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

5  El.  &  Bl.  860  (1856),  872, 

904. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hill, 

13  Colo.  35  (1889),  522. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  De 

Witt,     1     Colo.    App.    419 

(1892),  905,  921,  1008. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Whan, 

39  Colo.  230  (1908),  482. 
Denver  Consolidated  Electric  Co. 

v.   Lawrence,   31   Colo.   301 

(1903),  983,  1013. 
Derosia  v.  Winona  &  St.  Paul  R. 

R.  Co.,  18  Minn.  133  (1872), 

1037. 
De  Rutte  v.  New  York,  A.  &  B. 

Electric  Magnetic  Telegraph 

Co.,  1  Daly,  547  (1866),  133. 
Des  Moines  v.  Des  Moines  Water 

Works    Co.,    95    Iowa,    348 

(1895),  92,  1410. 
Detroit  v.  Detroit  Citizens'  St. 

Ry.  Co.,  184  U.  S.  368  (1902), 

1421,  1424,  1426. 
Dewing  v.  Button,  46  W.  Va.  538, 

866. 


Dibble   v.    Brown,    12   Ga.    217 

(1852),  185. 
Dickerson  v.  Rogers,  4  Humph. 

179    (1843),    106,   203,   213, 

234,  263,  979. 

Dickerman  v.  St.  Paul  Union  De- 
pot Co.,  44  Minn.  433  (1890), 

431,  866,  878,  885. 
Dickinson  v.  West  End  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  177  Mass.  363  (1901), 

784. 
Dietrich  v.  Murdock,  42  Mo.  279 

(1868),  223. 
Di  Giorgio  Imp.  &  S.  S.  Co.  v. 

Pennsylvania  Ry.   Co.,    104 

Md.   693    (1906),   408,   662, 

722,  796,  799,  831. 
Dillard  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  2  Lea,  288  (1879),  1004, 

1007. 
Dillon  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  19  N.  Y. 

Misc.  116  (1897),  1413. 
Diphwys    Casson    Slate    Co.    v. 

Festining  R.  Co.,  2  Nev.  & 

Mac.  73  (1860),  1331. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Johnson, 

1   Mackey,   51    (1881),   102, 

232. 
Dittmar  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

R.   Co.,   91   App.   Div.   378 

(1904),  945. 
Dittmar  v.  City  of  New  Braunfels, 

20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  293  (1899), 

338,  411,  1013,  1289,   1290, 

1300. 
Dixon  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co., 

110  Ga.  173  (1899),  130,  726. 
Dixon  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  64  la.  531  (1884),  665. 
Dixon  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

3  App.  Div.  60  (1896),  1014. 
Dobbins  v.  Little  Rock  Ry.  &  El. 

Co.,  79  Ark.  85  (1906),  822, 

843. 

[  xcix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Dobson  v.  New  Orleans  &  W.  R. 

R.   Co.,   52  La.   Ann.    1127 

(1900),  783. 
Dodd  v.  Central  R.  R.  of  N.  J. 

(N.  J.  L.),  76  Atl.  544  (1910), 

778,  1015. 
Doland  v.  Clark,   143  Cal.   176 

(1904),  852. 

Dominion  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Sil- 
ver,  10  Can.   Sup.   Ct.  238 

(1881),  605. 
Donlon  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co., 

151   Cal.   763   (1907),   1008, 

1019. 
Donovan  v.  Hartford  St.  Ry.  Co., 

65   Conn.   201    (1894),   410, 

736. 
Donovan   v.    Pennsylvania   Co., 

199  U.  S.  279  (1905),  483. 
Doorman  v.  Jenkins,  2  Ad.  &  El. 

256  (1834),  970. 
Doran  v.  East  River  Ferry  Co.,  3 

Lans.   (N.  Y.)   105    (1870), 

738. 
Dorr  v.  New  Jersey  Steam  Nav. 

Co.,   11   N.  Y.  485   (1854), 

1002. 
Dorsey  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

Ry.  Co.,  83  Mo.  App.  528 

(1900),  785. 
Doss  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.,  59  Mo.  27  (1875),  369, 

372. 
Doty    v.    Strong,    1    Pinn.    313 

(1843),  160,  204,  239,  723. 
Dougherty   v.  New  York  Cent. 

&   H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  N. 

Y.    Supp.  746   (1904),   402, 

735. 
Douglas  v.  People's  Bank,  86  Ky. 

176  (1887),  1045. 
Douglas  Co.  v.  Minnesota  Trans- 
fer Ry.  Co.,  62  Minn.  288 

(1895),  1019,  1020,  1021. 

[c] 


Dow  v.  Beidelman,  125  U.  S.  680, 

31  L.  ed.  841  (1888),  1122, 

1411,  1428. 
Dowd  v.  Albany  Ry.  Co.,  47  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  202(1900),626,880. 
Dowd  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  84  Wis.  105  (1893),  369. 
Downing    v.     Mt.     Washington 

Road   Co.,    40   N.    H.    230 

(1860),  823. 
Downs  v.  New  York  &  N.  H.  R. 

R.  Co.,  36  Conn.  287  (1869), 

886. 
Downs  v.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  135 

Mo.  App.  330  (1909),  1040. 
Doyle  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  162 

Mass.  66  (1894),  785,  1016. 
Doyle  v.  Kiser,  6  Ind.  242  (1855), 

876. 
Doyle  v.  Walker,  26  Up.  Can.  Q. 

B.  502  (1867),  432,  844,  84,'. 
Drake  v.  Penna.  Ry.  Co.,  137  Pa. 

St.  352  (1890),  864. 
Draper  v.  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R. 

R.  Co.,  165  Ind.  117  (1905), 

398,  873. 
Dresbach  v.  California  R.  R.  Co., 

57  Cal.  462  (1881),  1039. 
Drew,  The,  15  Fed.  826  (1883), 

1049. 
Drew  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

51  Cal.  425  (1875),  1255. 
D.  R.  Martin,  The,   11  Blatch. 

(U.  S.)  233  (1873),  697. 
Drummond  v.   Southern  Pacific 

Co.,  7  Utah,  118  (1891),  1004. 
DuBois  Borough  v.  DuBois  City 

Waterworks  Co.,  176  Pa.  St. 

430  (1896),  981. 
Duchemin  v.  Boston  E.  Ry.  Co., 

186  Mass.  353  (1904),  736. 
Dudley  v.  Camden  &  P.  Ferry 

Co.,  42  N.  J.  Law,  25  (1880), 

771,  969,  972. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Dudley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.    Co.,    58    W.    Va.    604 

(1906),  1042. 
Duff  v.  Allegheny  V.  R.  R.  Co., 

91  Pa.  458  (1879),  746. 
Dufur  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

75  Vt.  165  (1902),  944. 
Duke  v.  Central  N.  J.  Telephone 

Co.,  53  N.  J.  L.  341  (1891), 

136. 
Dulaney  v.  United  Ry.  &  Electric 

Co.,  104  Md.  423  (1906),  225, 

477. 
DuLaurans  v.  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  15  Minn.  49  (1870),  888. 
Duling  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B. 

R.  R.  Co.,  66  Md.  120  (1886), 

872,  904. 
Dunbar  v.  Charleston  &  W.  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  62  S.  C.  414  (1902), 

1003. 
Dunbar  v.  Port  Royal  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  368.0.110(1891),  513, 

519. 
Dunbier  v.  Day,   12  Neb.   596 

(1882),  965. 
Duncan  v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  R. 

Co.  (N.  D.),  118  N.  W.  826 

(1908),  414,  991. 
Dunham  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R. 

R.  Co.,  70  Me.  164  (1879), 

519,  520. 
Dunn  v.  Ashville  &  C.  M.  Ry. 

Co.,  141  N.  C.  521  (1906), 

740. 
Dunn  v.  Bean,  Quebec  Rep.,  11 

Super.  Ct.  538  (1897),  974. 
Dunn  v.  Beecknall  Bros.,  2  K.  B. 

614  (1902),  592,  910. 
Dunn  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

58  Me.  187  (1870),  763,  764. 
Dunn  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R. 

R.  Co ,  68  Mo.  268  (1878), 

1033. 


Dunn   v.   Western   Union   Tele- 
graph Co.,  2  Ga.  App.  845 

(1908),  133,  931. 
Dunne  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,  99  App.  Div.  571  (1904), 

369. 
Dunseth  v.  Wade,  2  Scam.  285 

(1840),  172. 
Dunston  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  Lans.  265  (1870),  1033. 
Duntley  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  66  N.  H.  263  (1890), 

1021. 
Durden  v.  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Ga.  App.  66  (1907),  317,  399, 

815,  822,  1043. 
Durgin  v.  American  Express  Co., 

66  N.  H.  277  (1890),  1011, 

1019. 
Duval  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.,  62 

Fed.  265  (1894),  845. 
Duvenick  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  57 

Mb.  App.  550  (1894),  772. 
Dwight  v.  Brewster,  1  Pick.  50 

(1822),   160,   184,   255,  262, 

743. 
Dwinelle  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  N.  Y. 

117   (1890),   776,   935,   938, 

940. 
Dwyer  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 

69  Tex.  707  (1888),  1045. 


Eads  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co., 

43  Mo.  App.  536  (1891),  556, 

933. 
East  Canada  Creek  Electric  Light 

&  Power  Co.,  Re,  49  N.  Y. 

Misc.  565  (1905),  95,  114. 
East   Grand   Forks   v.   Luck,   9 

Minn.  373  (1906),  377. 
East    India    Co.    v.    Pullen,    2 

Strange,  690  767,  771. 

[ci] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


East  Indian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kalidas 

Mukeriee,    App.    Cas.    396 

(1901),  943. 
East  Ky.  Ry.  v.  Holbrook,  4  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  730  (1883),  480. 
East  Line  &  Red  River  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hall,    64    Tex.    615  (1885), 

724. 
East  London  Waterworks  Co.  v. 

Kellerman,  2  Q.  B.  72  (1892), 

456. 
East  Ohio  Gas  Co.  v.  Akron,  81 

Ohio  St.  33  (1909),  212,  298, 

302,  306,  316,  596. 
East  Omaha  Ry.  Co.  v.  Godola, 

50  Neb.  906  (1897),  76. 
East  St.   Louis  Connecting  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  123  111.  594  (1888), 

1043. 
East  Tennessee  &  Georgia  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Montgomery,  44  Ga. 

278  (1871),  1017. 
East  Tennessee  Telephone  Co.  v. 

Harrodsburg  (Ky.),  122  S.  W. 

126  (1909),  1246,  1300. 
East  Tennessee,  Va.  &  Ga.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Brumley,  5  Lea,  401 

(1880),  1005. 
East  Tennessee,  Va.  &  Ga.  R.  R. 

Co.   v.   Hunt,    15  Lea,   261 

(1885),  1050. 
East  Tennessee,  Va.  &  Ga.  R.  R. 

Co.    v.    Interstate    Comm. 

Comm.,  181  U.  S.  1  (1901), 

1204,  1222,  1373,  1377,  1380. 
East  Tennessee,  Va.  &  Ga.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Whittle,  27  Ga.  535 

(1859),  176,  758,  775. 
Eaton  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  382  (1874), 

764. 
Ebling  v.  Second  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  69 

N.  Y.  Supp.  1102  (1901),  864. 

[cii] 


Eddy,  The,  5  Wall.  481  (1866), 

1038,  1039. 
Eddy  v.  Elliot,  4  Tex.  Ct.  of  App. 

248  (1890),  341. 
Eddy    v.    Harris,    78   Tex.    661 

(1890),  872,  904. 
Eddy  v.  Rowell  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

26  S.  W.  875  (1894),  862. 
Edgar    Lumber    Co.    v.    Cornie 

Stave  Co.  (Ark.),  130  S.  W. 

452   (1910),   223,   226,   792, 

822. 
Edgerly  v.  Union  St.  Ry.  Co.,  67 

N.  H.  312  (1892),  632,  933. 
Edgerton  v.  New  York  &  H.  R. 

R.   R.   Co.,   39  N.   Y.   227 

(1868),  763. 
Edison  U.  M.  Co.  v.  Farmington 

Electric  L.  &  P.  Co.,  82  Me. 

464  (1890),  113. 
Edson  v.  So.  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  144 

Cal.  182  (1904),  1353. 
Edwards  v.  Burke,  36  Wash.  107 

(1904),  193. 
Edwards  v.  Mfrs.  Building  Co.,  27 

R.  I.  248  (1905),  193. 
Edwards  v.  Sherratt,  1  East,  604 

(1801),  667. 
Edwards    v.    Todd,    2    111.    462 

(1837),  1269. 
Edwards  v.  White  Line  Tr.  Co., 

104  Mass.  159  (1870),  1046. 
Edwin,  The  Bark,   1   Spra.  477 

(1859),  732. 
Eells  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  52  Fed.  903  (1892),  1022. 
Eels  v.   American  Telephone  & 

Telegraph   Co.,    143   N.   Y. 

133  (1894),  56. 
Eichorn  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.,  130  Mo.  575  (1895),  812. 
Ela   v.  American  Merch.  Union 

Exp.  Co.,  29  Wis.  611(1872), 

1048. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Elder  v.  International  Ry.  Co., 

122  N.  Y.  Supp.  880 '(1910), 

431,  432,  877. 
Electric    Despatch    Co.    v.    Bell 

Telephone  Co.,  20  Can.  Sup. 

Ct.  83  (1891),  704. 
Elgin,  J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bates 

Machine   Co.,    200   111.    636 

(1903),  413,  414,  991. 
Elkins  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

23  N.  H.  275  (1851),  167, 176, 

239,  741. 
Ellinghouse  v.  Taylor,  19  Mont. 

462  (1897),  93,  242. 
Elliott  v.   Rossell,    10   Johns.    1 

(1813),  165,  229. 
Ellis  v.  American  Telegraph  Co., 

13  Allen,   226    (1866),   348, 

1014. 
Ellis  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,    120   Wis.    645   (1904), 

1044. 
Ellis  v.  Houston,  E.  &  W.  Tex. 

Ry.  Co.,  30  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

172  (1902),  885. 
Ellison  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  245 

111.  410  (1910),  1020. 
Elsworth  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 

Co.,  95  Iowa,  98  (1895),  866, 

887,  889. 
El  Paso  Electric  Ry.  Co.  v.  Al- 

derete,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  142 

(1904),  557,  633. 
Elvira  Harbeck,  The,  2  Blatchf. 

336  (1851),  875. 
Elwell  v.  Skiddy,  77  N.  Y.  282 

(1879),  1269. 
Emerson  v.  Babcock,  66  la.  257 

(1885),  71. 
Emerson  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  75  N.  H.  427   (1910), 

1298. 
Emerson  v.  McNeil,  84  Ark.  552 

(1907),  484. 


Emersbn  v.  St.  Louis  &  H.  Ry. 

Co.,  Ill  Mo.  161(1892),  796. 
Emiliusen  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  30  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  203 

(1898),  173,  774. 
Emily,  The,  5  Kans.  645  (1864), 

172. 
Empire  State  Cattle  Co.  v.  Atch- 

ison,  T.  &  S.   F.   Ry.  Co., 

135   Fed.    135    (1905),  656, 

917. 
Empire  State  Cattle  Co.  v.  Atchi- 

son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  210 

U.  S.  1  (1908),  522,  656,  907. 
Empire    Transportation    Co.    v. 

Wallace,    68    Pa.    St.    302 

(1871),   901,  905,  906,  909, 

921,  949,  952. 
Employers'  Liability  Cases,  The, 

207  U.  S.  463  (1908),  1419. 
Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Hart- 
ford &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Conn.  40  (1845),  53. 
Equitable  Securities  Co.  v.  Mont- 
rose  &  D.  Canal  Co.,  79  Pac. 

747  (Col.,  1905),  378. 
Erie  v.  Erie  Gas  &  M.  Co.,  78 

Kans.  348  (1908),  1158,  1164, 

1197. 
Erie  Ry.  Co.  v.  Littell,  63  C.  C.  A. 

44  (1904),  889. 
Erie  Ry.   Co.   v.   Lockwood,   28 

Ohio  St.   358   (1876),   1009, 

1021. 
Erie  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  84  111. 

239  (1870),  990. 
Erie  &  North-East  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Casey,  26  Pa.  St.  287  (1856), 

212,  305. 
Erie  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Douthet,  88 

Pa.  St.  245  (1878),  1364. 
Ernst   &    Co.    v.    New    Orleans 

Waterworks  Co.,  39  La.  Ann. 

550  (1887),  458,  459. 

[ciii] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Eureka  Basin,  Matter  of,  96  N.  Y. 

42  (1884),  103. 
Eureka  Springs  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tim- 

mons,   51   Ark.  459   (1888), 

740. 
Evans  v.  Boston  Heating  Co.,  157 

Mass.  37  (1892),  115. 
Evans  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill 

Mass.  142  (1872),  256,  989. 
Evans  v.  Hughes  County,  3  So. 

Dak.  580  (1893),  52. 
Evans  v.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,  56  Ala.  246  (1876),  873. 
Evans   v.    Rudy,    34   Ark.    383 

(1879),  771. 

Evans  v.   Western  Union  Tele- 
graph  Co.,    56   S.    W.    609 

(1900),  765,  1345. 
Evansville  &  H.  Traction  Co.  v. 

Henderson  Bridge  Co.,   134 

Fed.  973  (1904),  53,  126,  699. 
Evansville  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Barnes,  137  Ind.  306  (1893), 

207,  208,  762,  783. 
Evansville  &  R.   R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Maddux,  134  Ind.  571  (1893), 

783. 
EvansviUe  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Keith,  8  Ind.  App.  57  (1893), 

409,  724,  733. 
Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Wilson,    20    Ind.    App.    5 

(1898),  870. 
Everett  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  69  Iowa,  15  (1886),  873. 
Everett  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

138  N.  C.  68  (1905),  1020, 

1022. 
Everett  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N. 

Ry.  Co.,  9  Utah,  340  (1893), 

764. 
Evergreen    Cemetery    Assn.    v. 

Beecher.  53  Conn.  551  (1885), 

69,  430. 

[civ] 


Evershed  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  254  (1877), 

1293. 
Evershed  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  L.  R.  3  App.  Gas.  1029 

(1878),  1316,  1328. 
Evershed  v.  Railway  Co.,  3  Q.  B. 

Div.  135  (1878),  1287,  1328. 
Ewald  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  70  Wis.  420  (1888),  783. 
Ewart  v.  Street,  2  Bailey  (S.  C.), 

157  (1831),  920. 
Exchange    &    Building    Co.    v. 

Roanoke  &   Water  Co.,   90 

Va.  83  (1893),  1244,  1245. 
Ex    parte, — see    the    particular 

party  by  name. 
Express  Cases,  The,  117  U.  S.  1 

(1886),  474,  477,  690,  776. 
Express  Co.  v.  Caldwell,  21  Wall. 

264  (1874),  1023,  1024,  1026. 
Express  Co.  v.  Jackson,  92  Tenn. 

326  (1893),  920. 
Express  Co.  v.  Kountz,  8  Wall. 

342  (1870),  905,  911,  920. 
Extinguisher  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co., 

137  N.  C.  278  (1904),  917, 

921. 
Exton  v.  Central  Ry.  Co.,  63  N. 

J.  L.  356  (1899),  942. 


Faber  v.  Chicago  Gt.  Western 
Ry.  Co.,  62  Minn.  433 
(1895),  878. 

Fahey  v.  Northern  Transportation 
Co.,  15  Wis.  129  (1862),  905. 

Fairchance  Window  Glass  Co.  v. 
Star  Gas  Co.  (Pa.  Co.  Ct.), 
66  Leg.  Intelligencer,  409, 
544  (1909),  653,  688. 

Fairfax  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 
R.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  Y.  516 
(1874),  875,  907. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Fairford    Lumber   Co.   v.  Tom- 

bigbee    Valley    R.    R.    Co. 

(Ala.),    51    So.    770    (1910), 

1072. 
Falk  v.  New  York,  S.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  56  N.  J.  L.  380  (1894), 

1044. 
Fallbrook   Irrigation   District   v. 

Bradley,     164    U.     S.     112 

(1896),  64,  93,  242. 
Fallsburg  Power  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

Alexander,  101  Va.  98  (1903), 

60,  95,  113,  114,  243. 
Falmouth,  Town  of,  v.  Falmouth 

Water  Co.,   180  Mass.   325 

(1902),  1083. 
Falvery  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  76 

Ga.  597  (1886),  1033. 
Farber  v.   Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  116  Mo.  81  (1893),  430. 
Fargo  v.  Ledger  Standard  Co.,  59 

Ind.  496  (1877),  213. 
Farley  v.  Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R. 

R.  Co.,  108  Fed.  14  (1901), 

395. 
Farley  v.  Lavary,  107  Ky.  523 

(1900),   169,  209,  213,   230, 

272,  511,  963. 

Farmers'  &  M.  Bank  v.  Cham- 
plain  Tr.   Co.,   23   Vt.    186 

(1851),  255,  743,  1002. 
Farmers'  H.  L.  C.  &  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Southworth,    13    Colo.    Ill 

(1889),  852. 
Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  Hen- 

ning,     8    Fed.     Gas.    4,666 

(1878),  211,  305. 

Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  North- 
ern Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  112  Fed. 

829  (1902),  592. 
Farnsworth  v.  Groot,  6  Cow.  698 

839. 
Farrant  v.  Barnes,  11  C.  B.  (N. 

S.)  553  (1862),  621. 


Faucher  v.  Wilson,  68  N.  H.  338 

(1895),   169,   170,   230,  236, 

239,  968,  988. 
Faulkner  v.  Wright,  Rice  (Law), 

107  (1838),  172. 
Faust  v.   South  Carolina  R.  R. 

Co.,8S.  C.  118(1877),  1046. 
Favor  v.  Philbrick,  5  N.  H.  358 

(1831),  915. 
Fay  v.  Pacific  Improvement  Co., 

93  Cal.  253  (1892),  205,  751, 

770. 
Fay,    Petitioner,    15    Pick.    243 

(1834),  52. 
Fay  v.   Steamer  New  World,   1 

Cal.  348  (1850),  255,  970. 
Feary  v.    Metropolitan   St.   Ry. 

Co.,    162    Mo.     75    (1901), 

966. 
Feaver    v.    Montreal    Telegraph 

Co.,  23  Upp.  Can.  C.  P.  150 

(1873),  348. 
Feige  v.  Michigan  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  62  Mich.  1  (1886),  1002. 
Feinberg  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W. 

R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  L.  451 

(1890),  772,  989. 
Fell  v.  Knight,  8  M.  &  W.  269 

(1841),  431,  442,  843,  846. 
Fellows  v.  Los  Angeles,  151  Cal. 

52  (1907),  297,  302,  305. 
Fellows  v.   The  Powell,   16  La. 

Ann.  316  (1851),  747. 
Felton  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 

R.  Co.,  69  Iowa,  577  (1886), 

942. 
Fenner  v.  Buffalo  &  S.  L.  R.  R. 

Co.,  44  N.  Y.  505   (1871), 

1031,  1037,  1038. 
Ferguson    v.    Brent,    12    Md.    9 

(1857),  985. 
Ferguson    v.    Metropolitan    Gas 

Co.,  37  How.  Pr.  189  (1868), 

380,  406,  824,  883. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Ferguson  v.  Michigan  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  98  Mich.  533  (1894), 

440. 
Ferguson  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,     144    Mo.    App.     262 

(1910),  889. 
Ferris  v.  Carson  Water  Co.,  16 

Nev.  44  (1881),  350. 
Ferry  Companies  v.   White,   99 

Tenn.  256  (1897),  942. 
Fewings  v.  Mendenhall,  83  Minn. 

237  (1903),  667. 
Fewings  v.  Mendenhall,  88  Minn. 

336  (1903),  669,  944. 
Fick  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

68  Wis.  469  (1887),  939. 
Fifth  Ave.   Coach  Co.   v.   New 

York,  126  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

657  (1908),  503. 
Fillebrown  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 

Co.,    55    Me.    462    (1867), 

1002. 
Finkeldey  v.  Omnibus  Cable  Co., 

114  Cal.  28  (1896),  736. 
First  Nat'l  Bk.   v.   Hendrie,  49 

Iowa,  402  (1878),  811. 
First  Nat'l  Bk.  v.  Marietta  &  C. 

R.  R.  Co.,  20  Ohio  St.  259 

(1870),  875. 
First  Nat'l  Bk.  v.  Northern  R.  R. 

Co.,  58  N.  H.  203  (1877), 

1045. 
Fish    v.    Chapman,    2    Ga.    349 

(1847),   160,    162,   239,   252, 

661,  1001. 
Fish   v.    Clark,    49    N.    Y.    122 

(1872),  166,  228. 
Fisher  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  99  Me.  338  (1904),  518, 

1033. 
Fisher    v.    Clisbee,    12    111.    344 

(1851),  771,  843. 
Fisher  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  89 

Cal.  399  (1891),  978. 

[evil 


Fisher  v.  West  Virginia  Co.,  42 
.  W.  Va.  183  (1896),  632,  882, 
933. 

Fitch  v.  Newberry,  1  Doug.  1 
(1843),  431,  522. 

Fitch  v.  Seymour  Water  Co.,  139 
Ind.  214  (1894),  350. 

Fitch  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  (Mo.  App.),  130 
S.  W.  44  (1910),  1041. 

Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gage,  12 
Gray  (Mass.),  393  (1859), 
685,  1238,  1282,  1287,  1328. 

Fitchburg  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hanna,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  539 
(1856),  393,  724,  726,  727. 

Fitzgerald  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
24  Ind.  447  (1865),  255,  413. 

Fitzgerald  v.  Grand  Trunk  R. 
R.  Co.,  63  Vt.  169  (1890), 
681,  1290,  1297,  1299,  1312, 
1322. 

Fitzgerald  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 
Co.,  4  Ont.  App.  601  (1880), 
1002. 

Fitzgibbons  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  108  la.  614  (1889), 
757. 

Fitzmartin  v.  New  York  City  Ry. 
Co.,  51  N.  Y.  Misc.  36 
(1906),  347. 

Fitzmaurice  v.  New  York,  N.  H. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  192  Mass. 
159  (1906),  738. 

Flannery  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.,  4  Mackey,  111  (1885), 
942. 

Flannery  v.  Hastings,  15  Austral. 
L.  T.  1  (1893),  1261. 

Flautt  v.  Lashley,  36  La.  Ann.  106 
(1884),  236,  237,  241,  968. 

Fleischner  v.  Pacific  Postal  Tele- 
graph Cable  Co.  (C.  C.),  55 
Fed.  738  (1893),  657. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Fleming  v.  Kansas  City  Suburban 

Belt  Ry.  Co.,  89  Mo.  App. 

129  (1901),  130,  177. 
Fleming    v.    Montgomery    Light 

Co.,    100  Ala.    657    (1892), 

346. 
Flinn  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R. 

R.  Co.,  1  Houst.  (Del.)  469 

(1857),  780,  1001,  1004,  1011. 
Flint  &  Pere  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Weir, 

37  Mich.  Ill  (1877),  785,  875, 

970. 
Flint  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

73  N.  H.  141  (1905),  813. 
Flint  v.  Norwich  &  N.  Y.  Transp. 

Co.,   34   Conn.    554    (1868), 

941,  942. 
Flint   v.    Transportation   Co.,    6 

Blatch.  158  (1868),  626. 
Florence  &  C.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jen- 
sen   (Colo.),    108    Pac.    974 

(1910),  1047. 
Florida,  C.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

State   ex   rel.,   31    Fla.   482 

(1893),  808,  811. 
Florida  Southern  R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Hirst,  30  Fla.  1  (1892),  881, 

978. 
Florida  Southern  R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Katz,  23  Fla.  139  (1887),  872. 
Fluker  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  &  Bank- 
ing Co.,  81  Ga.  461  (1888), 

500. 
Fonsler  v.  Atlantic  City,  70  N.  J. 

L.  125  (1903),  107,  175,  213. 
Forbes  v.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R. 

Co.,  133  Mass.  154  (1882), 

1045. 
Ford  v.  Brooklyn  Gaslight  Co.,  3 

Hun,  621  (1875),  434,  877. 
Ford  v.  Cottesworth,  L.  R.  4  Q. 

B.  127  (1868),  1050. 
Ford  v.  East  Louisiana  Ry.  Co., 

110  La.  414  (1903),  499,  697. 


Fordyce  &  S.  v.  Manuel,  82  Tex. 

527  (1891),  888. 
Fordyce  v.  Jackson,  56  Ark.  594 

(1892),  778. 
Fordyce  v.  McFlynn,  56  Ark.  424 

(1892),  256, 259, 758, 772,775. 
Fordyce    v.    Nix,    58    Ark.    136 

(1893),  800. 
Forepaugh  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W. 

R.  R.  Co.,  128  Pa.  St.  217 

(1889),   259,   755,  772,   792, 

969,  1015. 
Forrester  v.   Southern  Ry.  Co., 

147  N.  C.  553  (1908),  796. 
Forsee  v.  Alabama  Gt.  So.  R.  R. 

Co.,  63  Miss.  66  (1885),  888. 
Forsythe  v.  Walker,  9  Pa.  St.  148 

(1848),  522,  1033. 
Fort  Scott,  W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Sparks,  55  Kans.  288  (1895), 

881. 
Fort   Smith  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Chandler    Cotton    Oil    Co. 

(Okla.),  106  Pac.  10  (1909), 

1072. 
Fort  Street  Union  Depot  Co.  v. 

Morton,  83  Mich.  265  (1890), 

125. 
Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Greathouse  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

17  S.  W.  834  (1891),  989. 
Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Masterson,     95     Tex.     262 

(1902),  602,  910,  1033. 
Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Riley  (Tex.  App.),  1  S.  W. 

446  (1886),  393,  727. 
Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

State,  99  Tex.  34  (1905),  482. 
Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Whitehead,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

595  (1894),  1416. 
Fortain  v.  Smith,   114  Cal.  494 

(1896),  52. 

[  cvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Forward  v.  Pittard,  1  T.  R.  27 

(1785),  962. 
Fosdick  v.  Schail,  99  U.  S.  235 

(1878),  352. 
Foss  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  66  N.  H.  256  (1890), 

635,  638. 

Foster  v.  Gas  Works  of  Philadel- 
phia, 12Phila.511  (1878),  622. 
Foster  G.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  So. 

Ry.  Co.,  121  La.  1053  (1908), 

1294. 
Fowler  v.  City  Waterworks  Co., 

83  Ga.  219  (1889),  350. 
Fowler  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  80  Me.  381  (1888), 

980. 
Fox  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co., 

148  Mass.  220  (1889),  916, 

988. 
Fox  v.  Philadelphia,  208  Pa.  St. 

127  (1904),  193. 
Frank  Bird  Transfer  Co.  v.  Krug, 

30  Ind.  App.  602  (1902),  169, 

185. 
Frank  and  Willie,  The,  45  Fed. 

488  (1891),  761. 
Franke  v.  Paducah  Water  Supply 

Co.,  88  Ky.  467  (1889),  92, 

417,  622,  826. 

Franklin  National  Bank  v.  White- 
head,   149  Ind.  560  (1898), 

140. 
Frazier  &  Co.  v.  Kansas  City,  St. 

J.  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  48  la.  571 

(1878),  394,  403,  868. 
Frazier  v.  Western  Telegraph  Co., 

45  Greg.  414  (1904),  348. 
Frederick  v.  Marquette,  H.  &  0. 

R.    R.    Co.,    37   Mich.    342 

(1877),  889. 
Fredericks  v.  Northern  Cent.  R. 

R.    Co.,    157    Pa.    St.    103 

(1893),  978. 

[  cviii  ] 


Freedon  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  App.  Div. 

306  (1897),  632. 
Freeman  v.  Detroit,  M.  &  M.  R. 

R.  Co.,  65  Mich.  577  (1887), 

410. 
Freeman  v.   Macon  Gaslight  & 

Water    Co.,    126    Ga.    843 

(1906),   92,    215,   216,    242, 

451. 
Freeport  Water  Co.  v.  Freeport, 

180  U.  S.  587  (1901),  1410, 

1424. 
Fremont,  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Hagblad,  72  Neb.  773  (1904), 

735. 
Fremont,  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Waters,  50  Neb.  592  (1897), 

515. 
French  v.  Star  Union  Transp.  Co., 

134  Mass.  288  (1883),  1046. 
Frey  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 

R.  Co.,  114  App.  Div.  747 

(1906),  840,  901,  903. 
Frierson  v.  Frazier,  142  Ala.  232 

(1904),  182,  241. 
Frink  v.  Coe,  4  Green,  555  (1854), 

184. 
Frink   v.   Schroyer,    18   111.   416 

(1857),  442. 
Frothingham  v.  Bensen,  20  N.  Y. 

Misc.  132  (1897),  380. 
Fry    v.    Louisville    &    N.    Ry. 
"  Co.,    103    Ind.   265    (1885), 

1333. 
Fuller  v.  Azusa  Irrigating  Co.,  138 

Cal.  204  (1902),  448. 
Fuller   v.    Dame,    18   Pick.   472 

(1836),  81i: 
Fuller  v.  Naugatuck  R.  R.  Co.,  21 

Conn.  557  (1852),  176. 
Fulton  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

17   Upp.    Can.   Q.    B.    428 

(1858),  407,  439,  440. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Funderburg  v.  Augusta  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  81  S.  C.  141  (1908),  439, 

877. 
Furgason  v.  Citizens'  Street  Ry. 

Co.,  16  Ind.  App.  171  (1896), 

635. 


Gabbert  v.  Hackett,  135  Wis.  86 

(1908),  785. 
Gage    v.    Tirrell,    9    Allen,    299 

(1864),  165,  963. 
Gaines  v.  Union  Transp.  &  Ins. 

Co.,  28  Ohio  St.  418,  1002, 

1004,  1007. 
Gainesville  Water  Co.  v.  City  of 

Gainesville  (Tex.),  128  S.  W. 

370  (1910),  651. 
Gainey    v.    Telegraph    Co.,    136 

N.  C.  261  (1904),  278,  871. 
Galena  &  C.   U.   R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Rae,  18  111.  488  (1857),  431, 

854. 
Galena  &  C.  U.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Yar- 

wood,    15    111.    468    (1854), 

188. 
Galesburg  &   G.   E.   R.   R.  Co. 

v.  West,   108    111.  App.  504 

(1903),  1316. 
Gallagher  v.  Equitable  Gaslight 

Co.,  141  Cal.  699  (1904),  460, 

1317. 
Gallagher   v.    Gt.    Western    Ry. 

Co.,  1  R.  8  C.  L.  326  (1874), 

1005. 
Galloway  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co., 

87  Iowa,  458  (1893),  369. 
Galloway  v.  Huges,  1  Bailey,  553 

(1830),  1039,  1042. 
Gait  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  Mac- 
Arthur  and  M.  124  (1879), 

178,  776,  1012,  1022. 
Galveston  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hewitt, 

67  Tex.  473  (1887),  756. 


Galveston,  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  v.  Alli- 
son, 59  Tex.  193  (1883),  905, 

921. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Ball,    80   Tex.    602    (1891), 

1020. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Jones  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  123 

S.  W.  737  (1910),  1042. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Matzdorf,  102  Tex.  42  (1908), 

371. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Morris,  94  Tex.  505  (1901), 

800. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Schmidt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  25 

S.  W.  452  (1894),  442,  443. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Tuckett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  25 

S.  W.  150  (1894),  904. 
Gamble-Robinson       Commission 

Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,    168   Fed.    161    (1909), 

435,  552,  564,  1341. 
Gardner  v.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co., 

51  Conn.  143  (1883),  738. 
Gardner  v.  Providence  Telephone 

Co.,  23  R.  I.  312  (1901),  136, 

625,  826,  884,  1240,  1346. 
Gardner  v.  Southern  R.  R.  Co., 

127  N.  C.  293  (1900),  1002, 

1005. 
Garner  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 

Ry.  Co.,  79  Ark.  353  (1906), 

727,  888. 
Garrett  v.   Western  Union  Tel. 

Co.,   83   Iowa,    257    (1891), 

1014. 
Garrison  Co.,  W.  B.,  v.  Southern 

Ry.    Co.,    150    N.    C.    575 

(1909),  399. 
Garrison  v.  United  Ry.  &  E.  Co., 

97  Md.  347  (1903),  447,  1259. 

fcixl 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Garton  v.  Bristol  &  E.  R.  R.  Co., 

1  Nev.  &  Mac.  218  (1856), 

1331. 
Gaslight  Co.  v.  Cannon  Brewery 

Co.,  1  K.  B.  593  (1903),  457. 
Gaslight  Co.  v.  Colliday,  25  Md. 

1  (1866),  111,  353,  451,  453, 

456. 
Gaslight  Co.  v.  Zanesville,  47  Oh. 

St.  35  (1889),  302. 
Gas  Co.  v.  Lowe  &  Butler,  52  W. 

Va.  662  (1901),  274. 
Gassenheimer  v.  District,  26  D.  C,'. 

App.  Gas.  557  (1906),  187. 
Gastenhofer  v.   Clair,    10   Daly, 

265  (N.  Y.,  1881),  725. 
Gast  v.  Gooding,  1  Ohio  Dec.  315 

(1849),  964,  965. 
Gates  v.  Bekins,  44  Wash.  422 

(1906),  169,  170,  230,  236. 
Gates  v.  Quincy,  O.  &  K.  C.  R. 

R.  Co.,    125   Mo.  App.  334 

(1907),  886. 
Gates  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

151  N.  C.  497  (1909),  1041. 
Gay's  Gold,  13  Wall.  358  (1871), 

592. 
Gay  lord  v.  Sanitary  District,  204 

111.  576  (1903),  65,  66,  95. 
Geer  v.  Michigan  Central  Ry.  Co., 

142  Mich.  511  (1905),  863, 

872. 
Geismer  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 

Ry.    Co.,    102    N.    Y.    563 

(1886),  667,  669. 
George  &  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N. 

Ry.  Co.,  88  Miss.  306  (1906), 

1045. 

Georgetown  v.  Georgetown  Wa- 
ter, G.  &  E.  P.  Co.,  121  S.  W. 

428  (1909),  981. 

Georgia  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Robin- 
son, 68  Miss.  643  (1891),  395, 

410,  736. 

[cx] 


Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cole  &  Co., 

68  Ga.  623  (1882),  521,  522. 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gann,  68  Ga. 

350,  102. 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greety,  5 

Ga.  App.  424  (1909),  1294. 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  113 

Ga.  589  (1901),  876. 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Richmond, 

98    Ga.    495    (1896),    372, 

939. 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  70 

Ga.  694  (1883),  1409. 
Georgia  R,  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  128 

U.  S.  174  (1888),  1411,  1421, 

1422. 
Georgia  Ry.  &  El.  Co.  v.  Baker, 

125  Ga.  562  (1906),  885. 
Georgia  So.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  As- 
more,  88  Ga.  529  (1891),  447, 

1259. 
Georgia    So.   &  F.    Ry.   Co.  v. 

Johnson,  121  Ga.  231  (1904), 

1021. 
Georgia   So.    &   F.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Marchman,     121     Ga.     235 

(1904),  399,  732,  734. 
Getchell  v.  Benton,  30  Neb.  870 

(1890),  56,  65,  851. 
Ghormley  v.  Dinsmore,  19  Jones 

&  S.  196  (1885),  1026. 
Gibbon  v.  Paynton,  4  Burr.  2298 

(1769),  623,  737,  990,  1001. 
Gibbons  v.  Farwell,  63  Mich.  344 

(1886),  1046. 
Gibbs  v.  Consolidated  Gas  Co., 

130  U.  S.  396  (1889),   111, 

243,  686,  694. 
Gibson  v.  Culver,  17  Wend.  305 

(1837),  1039. 
Gibson   v.   Mason,   5   Nev.   283 

(1869),  214,  217. 
Gibson  v.  Silva,  Rama-Nathan, 

105  (1848),  236. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Giffiii  v.   South  West  Pa.   Pipe 

Lines,  172  Pa.  St.  580  (1896), 

59. 

Gilbert  v.  Duluth  General  Elec- 
tric Co.,  93  Minn.  99  (1904), 

983. 
Gilbert  v.  Hoffman,  66  Iowa,  205 

(1885),  602,  936,  947. 
Giles  v.  Fauntleroy,  13  Md.  126 

(1858),  1034. 
Gillenwater  v.  Madison  &  Ind.  R. 

R.  Co., 5  Ind.  339  (1854), 785. 
Gillespie  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

R.  Co.,  178  N.  Y.  347  (1904), 

935. 
Gilliland  &  G.  v.  South  Ry.  Co., 

85  S.  C.  26  (1910),  1011. 
Gillingham  v.  Ohio  River  R.  R., 

35  W.  Va.  588  (1891),  167, 

183,  239,  646,  661,  938,  978. 
Gillis  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  59 

Pa.  St.  129  (1868),  371,  946. 
Gillis  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Co.,  61  Vt.  461  (1889),  133, 

984,  1014. 
Gillshannon  v.  Stony  Brook  R.  R. 

Corp.,  10  Cush.  228  (1852), 

783. 
Gilman  v.  Postal  Telegraph  Co., 

48  N.  Y.  Misc.  372  (1905), 

108. 
Gilmore  v.  Carman,  1  Sm.  &  M. 

279  (1843),  172,  985. 
Gilson  v.  Jackson  Co.  Horse  Ry. 

Co.,  76  Mo.  282  (1882),  978. 
Girard   Life   Ins.    Co.   v.   Phila- 
delphia, 12  Phila.  293  (1878), 

456. 
Girard    Life    Insurance    Co.    v. 

Philadelphia,  88  Pa.  St.  393 

(1879),  452,  456. 
Girard  Storage  Co.  v.  Southwark 

Co.,  105  Pa.  St.  248  (1884), 

232. 


Gisbourn  v.  Hurst,   1  Salk.  249 

(1710),  160,  162,  228, 
Gist  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  45  S.  C. 

344  (1895),  607. 

Given  v.    Western   Union  Tele- 
graph    Co.,     24    Fed.     119 

(1885),  874,  1041. 
Glaessner     v.     Anheuser    Busch 

Brewing  Assn.,  100  Mo.  508 

(1890),  226. 
Glass   v.    Davis,    23   Gratt.    184 

(1873),  293,  314. 
Gleason  v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co., 

32  Wis.  85  (1873),  741,  769, 

875. 
Gleason    v.    Waukesha    County, 

103  Wis.  225  (1899),  824. 
Gleeson  v.  Virginia  Midland  R.  R. 

Co.,   140  U.  S.  435  (1889), 

655,  777,  984. 
Glenn  v.   Jackson,   93  Ala.   342 

(1890),  1032. 
Glenn  v.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  165  Ind.  659  (1905),  964, 

1044. 
Glenn  &  Sons  v.  Southern  Express 

Co.,   86  Tenn.    594   (1888), 

1026. 
Gloucester  Water  Supply  Co.  v. 

Gloucester,    179    Mass.    365 

(1901),  1083,  1101,  1103. 
Glover  v.  Cape  Girardeau  &  So. 

Ry.  Co.,  95  Mo.  App.  369 

(1902),  905. 
Godbout  v.  Union  Depot  Co.,  79 

Minn.  188  (1900),  483. 
Goddard  v.    Grand  Trunk   Ry. 

Co.,  57  Me.  202  (1869),  935, 

938. 
Goddard  v.  Mallory,  52  Barb.  87 

(1868),  906. 
Godwin  v.  Carolina  Tel.  &  Tel. 

Co.,  136  N.  C.  158  (1904), 

136,  606. 

[cxi] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Goebel    v.    Gross    Point    Water 

Works,  126  Mich.  307  (1901), 

1244. 
Gold  Hunter,  The,  1  Blatchf.  & 

H.  300  (1832),  165. 
Goldey  v.   Pennsylvania   R.   R. 

Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  242  (1858), 

659. 
Goldsmith  v.  Holland  Bldg.  Co., 

182  Mo.  597  (1904),  193. 
Goodbar  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  53 

Mo.  App.  434  (1893),  393, 

726. 
Goodenow   v.   Travis,    3   Johns. 

(N.  Y.)  427  (1808),  620,  630. 
Goodloe  v.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,  107  Ala.  233  (1894),  937. 
Goodman  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 

Ry.  Co.,  71  Mo.  App.  460 

(1897),  1020. 
Goodman  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav. 

Co.,  22  Oreg.  14  (1892),  414, 

991. 
Goodridge  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,    73    Fed.    182    (1889), 

1362. 
Gordon  &  Ferguson  v.  Doran,  100 

Minn.  343  (1907),  264,  459. 
Gordon  v.  Grand  St.  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  40  Barb.  546  (1863),  402, 

735. 
Gordon  v.  Hutchinson,  1  W.  &  S. 

285   (1841),    160,    162,   205, 

228,  236,  272,  792,  968. 
Gordon  v.  Manchester  &  L.  R.  R. 

Co.,  52  N.  H.   596  (1873), 

397,  663,  664,  799,  801,  803, 

872,  904. 
Gordon  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.,  175 

Mass.  181  (1900),  736. 
Gore  v.  Norwich  Trans.  Co.,  2 

Daly  (N.  Y.),  254(1867),  769. 
Gorman  v.  Southern  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  97  Cal.  1  (1892),  890. 

[xcii] 


Gorrell  v.  Greensboro  Water  Sup- 
ply Co.,  124  N.  C.  328  (1899), 

350. 
Gott  v.  Dinsmore,  111  Mass.  45 

(1872),  1003. 
Gould  v.  Edison  Electric  Co.,  29 

N.  Y.  Misc.  241  (1899),  825, 

1251,  1252,  1345. 
Gould  v.  Hill,  2  Hill,  623  (1842), 

985. 
Gould  v.  Maricopa  Canal  Co.,  8 

Ariz.  429  (1904),  93,  242. 
Goup  v.  Wabash  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,   56   Mich.    Ill    (1885), 

969. 
Grace  v.  Adams,  100  Mass.  505 

(1868),  1003. 
Graeff  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R. 

Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  230  (1894), 

941,  943. 
Graffam  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  67  Me.  234  (1877),  875. 
Graham  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co., 

149  N.  Y.  336  (1896),  978. 
Graham  v.   McNeill,   20  Wash. 

466  (1899),  864. 
Graham  v.  Toronto,  etc.,  R.  Co., 

23U.C.C.P.541(1874),207. 
Grahn  v.  International  &  G.  N. 

Ry.  Co.,  100  Tex.  27  (1906), 

746. 
Grande   Ronde   Electric   Co.   v. 

Drake,  46  Oreg.  243  (1905), 

95,  114,  243. 
Grand  Haven  v.   Grand  Haven 

Water  Works,  119  Mich.  652 

(1899),  1166. 
Grand    Junction   Water   Co.    v. 

City  of  Grand  Junction,  14 

Colo.  App.  424,  60  Pac.  196 

(1900),  981. 
Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Diether,    10  Ind.  App.   206 

(1894),  433,  442,  518. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Grand  Tower  M.  &  Transp.  Co. 

v.  Ullman,  89  111.  244  (1878), 

393,  724,  727. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stevens, 

95  U.  S.  655  (1877),  1016. 
Grant  v.  Norway,  10  C.  B.  665 

(1851),  747. 
Grant  v.  Raleigh  &  Gaston  R.  R. 

Co.,  108  N.  C.  462  (1891), 

777. 
Gratiot  St.  W.  Co.  v.  Missouri,  K. 

&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  124  Mo.  App. 

545  (1907),  442. 
Graves  v.   Adams  Express  Co., 

176  Mass.  280  (1900),  1003. 
Graves  v.  Hartford  &  N.  Y.  Stb. 

Co.,    38  Conn.   143    (1871), 

1037. 
Graves  v.  Key  City  Gas  Co.,  83 

Iowa,  714  (1891),  458. 
Graves  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 

R.  Co.,  137  Mass.  33  (1884), 

1011,  1019. 
Graves  v.  Ticknor,  6  N.  H.  537 

(1834),  970. 
Gray  v.  Cincinnati  Southern  Ry. 

Co.,  11  Fed.  683  (1882),  865, 

881. 
Gray  v.  Drepel  Arms  Hotel,  145 

111.  App.  604  (1909),  366. 
Gray  v.   Jackson,    51    N.   H.   9 

(1871),  1010. 
Gray  v.  Missouri  River  Packet 

Co.,  64  Mo.  47  (1876),  971. 
Gray  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  119 

Mo.  App.  144  (1906),  656. 
Gray  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Co.,  87  Ga.  350  (1891),  605, 

607,  609,  610. 

Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harri- 
son,    10    Exch.    Rep.    376 

(1854),  623,  738. 

Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shep- 
herd, 8  Exch.  30  (1852),  876. 


Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burns, 
60  111.  284  (1871),  850,  914. 

Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Carthy, 12  App.  Cas.  182 
(1887),  1021. 

Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.,  101 
Wis.  258  (1892),  973,  981. 

Green  v.  Chelsea  W.  W.  Co.,  70 
L.  T.  547  (1894),  981. 

Green  v.  Louisville  &  R.  R.  Co., 
50  So.  937  (1909),  109. 

Green  v.  Milwaukee  &  S.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  38  la.  100  (1874),  409, 
733. 

Green  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.,  121  Mo.  App.  720 
(1906),  763. 

Green  v.  Portland,  32  Me.  431 
(1851),  226. 

Green  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  136  N.  C. 
489  (1904),  133,  214,  244. 

Green  &  B.  R.  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Marshall,  48  Ind.  596  (1874), 
906. 

Green  Bay  Lumber  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  102 
Iowa,  292  (1897),  528,  530. 

Green  Wheeler  Shoe  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  130 
Iowa,  123  (1906),  656,  918, 
984. 

Greene  v.  St.  John  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 
22N.B.  (P.  &T.)  252  (1882), 
257. 

Greenfield  v.  Detroit  &  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  133  Mich.  557  (1903),  763. 

Greenfield  First  National  Bank  v. 
Marietta  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
Ohio  St.  259  (1870),  769. 

Greenwald  v.  Weir,  111  N.  Y. 
Supp.  235  (1908),  1020. 

Gregory  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  100  Iowa,  345  (1896), 
626,  646,  866,  880. 

[  cxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Grier  v.  St.  Louis  Merchants'  B. 

T.  Ry.  Co.,  108  Mo.  App. 

565  (1904),  917. 
Grieve  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,   104  Iowa,  659  (1898), 

1024. 
Griffen  v.  Manice,  166  N.  Y.  188 

(1901),  193. 
Griffin  v.  Goldsboro  Water  Co., 

122  N.  C.  206  (1898),  92,  242, 

280,  1091,  1094,  1287,  1288, 

1290,  1300. 
Griffith   v.    Cave,    22    Cal.    534 

(1863),  862. 

Griffith  v.   New   England   Tele- 
phone Co.,  72  Vt.  441  (1900), 

1051. 
Griffith  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  116  S.  W. 

648  (1909),  408. 
Grigsby  v.  Chappell,  5  Rich.  L. 

(S.  C.)  443  (1852),  53,  771, 

972. 
Grimes  v.  Minneapolis,  L.  &  M. 

Ry.  Co.,  37  Minn.  6  (1887), 

1364. 
Grimes  v.  Pennsylvania  Ry.  Co., 

36  Fed.  72  (1888),  398,  873. 
Grindle  v.  Eastern  Exp.  Co.,  67 

Me.  317  (1877),  901. 
Grinnell  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph  Co.,    113   Mass.    299 

(1873),  980. 
Grismer  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 

Ry.    Co.,    102    N.    Y.    563 

(1886),  912. 
Griswold,  Adm.,  v.  New  York  & 

N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Conn. 

371  (1885),  498,  872. 
Griswold  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  64  Wis.  652  (1885),  372. 
Griswold  v.  Illinois  Central  Ry. 

Co.,   90   Iowa,    265    (1894), 

1008. 

[  cxiv  ] 


Griswold  v.  New  York  &  N.  E. 

R.    R.    Co.,    53   Conn.    371 

(1885),  746,  786,  1015,  1018. 
Griswold  v.  Webb,  16  R.  I.  649 

(1889),  473. 
Grocery  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  136 

N.  C.  396  (1904),  407,  901, 

990. 

Grogan  &  Merz  v.   Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,   114  Pa.  St.  523 

(1886),  178,  776,  1022. 
Grogan  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

R.   Co.,   97  App.   Div.   413 

(1904),  945. 
Grosvenor  v.  New  York  Central 

R.    R.    Co.,    39    N.    Y.    34 

(1868),  400,  729,  734. 
Guardian  Trust  Co.  v.  Fisher,  200 

U.  S.  57  (1906),  350. 
Guinn  v.  W.  St.  L.  &  Pac.  Ry. 

Co.,  20  Mo.  App.  453  (1886), 

599. 
Gulf  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fuqua,  84 

Miss.  490  (1904),  1037. 
Gulf   &    Interstate    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Texas  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  93 

Tex.  482  (1900),  519. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baird, 

75  Tex.  256  (1889),  513. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bunn, 

41  Tex.  Civ.  App.  503  (1908), 

440. 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell,   76    Tex.    174   (1890), 

764. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cole, 

8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  635  (1894), 

780. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Comp- 

ton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  38  S. 

W.  220  (1896),  727. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fort 

Grain  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

72  S.  W.  419  (1903),  1415. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Geer,  5 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  349  (1893), 

412,  742. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Heffey, 

158  U.  S.  98  (1895),  1419. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hodge 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W. 

829  (1895),  914. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hume, 

6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  653,  914. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Levi, 

76  Tex.  337  (1889),  667,  669, 

987. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Levy, 

59  Tex.  542  (1883),  599. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lone 

Star  Co.,  26  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

531  (1901),  529. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Aulay,  26  S.  W.  475  (1894), 

842,  914. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Gown,  65  Tex.   640  (1886), 

785,  786,  1018. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miami 

S.  S.  Co.,  86  Fed.  407  (1898), 

435,     488,     523,     527,    534, 

682. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Moody 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W. 

574  (1895),  862. 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nel- 
son, 4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  345 

(1893),  1414. 
•Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter, 

25  Tex.  Civ.  App.  491  (1901), 

904. 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Commission  (Tex.),  116 

S.  W.  795  (1909),  1064,  1191, 

1199,  1202,  1210. 
Gulf,   C.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Rather,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  72 

(1893),  889. 


Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Robin- 
son  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  72  S. 

W.  71  (1903),  907. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 

72  Tex.  404  (1888),  694. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 

97  Tex.  274  (1904),  1415. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  120  S.  W. 

1028  (1909),  531,  1408. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas, 

204  U.  S.  403  (1907),  1415, 

1416. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tra- 

wick,   68   Tex.    314    (1887), 

1024. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tra- 

wick,    80   Tex.    270    (1891), 

393  727 
Gulf,   C.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Vaughn  (Tex.  App.),  16  S. 

W.  775  (1890),  1017. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
son,   79    Tex.    371    (1891), 

778. 
Gulf,   C.   &   S.   F.    Ry.    Co.   v. 

Wright,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  402 

(1892),  1006. 

Gulf,  T.,  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Coop- 
wood   (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  96 

S.  W.  102  (1906),  933. 
Gulf,     W.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wittnebert,    101    Tex.    368 

(1908),  414,  991. 
Gurney    v.    Minneapolis    Union 

Elev.     Co.,    63    Minn.    70 

(1895),  193. 
Gustafson  v.  Hamm,   56  Minn. 

334  (1894),  226. 
Gwynn    v.    Citizens'    Telephone 

Co.,  69  S.  C.  434  (1904),  683, 

685. 
Gyle  v.  Joline,  120  N.  Y.  Supp. 

761  (1910),  402, 

[  cxv] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Haas  v.  Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  G. 

R.  R.  Co.,  81  Ga.  792  (1888), 

911,  912. 
Hadd  v.  United  States  Exp.  Co., 

52  Vt.  335  (1880),  178,  513, 

776. 
Haff  v.  Adams,  6  Ariz.  395  (1899), 

366,  751,  969. 
Haggerty  v.  Flint  &  P.  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,   59   Mich.   366   (1886), 

889. 
Hahl  v.  Laux  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

93  S.  W.  1080  (1906),  227, 

228. 
Haines  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  & 

0.  Ry.  Co.,   29  Minn.  160 

(1882),  876. 
Hale  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co., 

60  Vt.  605  (1888),  367,  372. 
Hale  v.  New  Jersey  Nav.  Co.,  15 

Conn.  539  (1843),  165,  1001. 
Halifax  v.  Local  Board,  30  L.  T. 

(N.  S.)  513  (1874),  701. 
Hall  v.  Connecticut  River  Stb. 

Co.,    13   Conn.   319    (1839), 

978. 
Hall   v.    Decuir,   95   U.   S.   485 

(1877),  848,  1417. 
Hall  v.  Murdock,  114  Mich.  233 

(1897),  193. 
Hall  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

14   Phila.   414   (1880),   667, 

669. 
Hall    v.    Pike,    100    Mass.    495 

(1868),  751,  969. 
Hall  v.  Renfo,  3  Met.  51  (1860), 

182,  241,  256,  989. 
Hall  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Co.,  51  So.  819  (1910),  142. 
Halliday  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  N. 

Ry.  Co.,  74  Mo.  159  (1881), 

1017. 

[  cxvi  ] 


Halsted  v.  Postal  Telegraph-Cable 

Co.,  193  N.  Y.  295  (1908), 

1014. 
Ham  v.  Delaware  &  H.  C.  Co., 

142  Pa.  St.  617  (1891),  341, 

468,  886. 
Ham  v.  McPherson,  6  Upp.  Can. 

Q.  B.  (O.  S.)  360  (1871),  393, 

726. 
Hamburg-Am.    Packet     Co.    v. 

Gattman,  127  111.  598  (1889), 

876. 
Hamilton  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

64  Tex.  251  (1855),  372. 
Hamilton  City  v.  Hamilton  Gas 

L.  &  C.  Co.,  11  Ohio  Dec. 

513  (1901),  705,  1166. 
Hammond  v.  North  Eastern  R. 

R.  Co.,  6  S.  C.  130  (1874), 

777. 
Hampton  v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  42 

Mo.  App.  134  (1890),  769. 
Hams    v.    Stevens,    31    Vt.    79 

(1858),  878. 
Hancock  v.   Rand,  94  N.  Y.   1 

(1883),  365,  751. 
Hanley  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

R.  Co.,  110  App.  Div.  429 

(1905),  878. 
Hanley  v.  Kansas  City  Ry.  Co., 

187  U.  S.  617,  1413. 
Hanlon  v.  Central  Ry.  Co.,  187 

N.  Y.  73,  635. 
Hanna  v.  Nassau  Electric  R.  R. 

Co.,  18  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  137 

(1897),  663,  803,  866. 
Hannah  v.   People,    198  111.   77 

(1902),   141,  232,  416,  708, 

791. 
Hannibal  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  12 

Wall.  262  (1870),  414,  768, 

775,  876. 
Hansen  v.  Flint  &  P.  M.  R.  Co., 

73  Wis.  346  (1889),  511. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Hansen  v.  North  Jersey  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  64  N.  J.  L.  686  (1900), 

945. 
Hansley  v.  Jamesville  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  115  N.  C.  602  (1894), 

872,  1044. 
Hansley  v.  Jamesville  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  117  N.  C.  565  (1895), 

662,  664,  800,  904. 
Harbison  v.  Knoxville  Water  Co. 

(Tenn.  Chan.  App.),  53  S.  W. 

993    (1899),   431,   444,    624, 

806,  846,  883. 
Hardenberg  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M. 

Ry.  Co.,  39  Minn.  3  (1888), 

800. 
Hardin  v.  Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  R. 

R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  100 

S.  W.  995  (1907),  881. 
Harding    v.    Goodlett,    3    Yerg. 

(Tenn.)  41  (1832), 56,  65,  851. 
Harding  v.  International  Naviga- 
tion Co.,  12  Fed.  168  (1882), 

522. 
Hardware  Co.  v.   Railroad  Co., 

150  N.  C.  703  (1909),  798, 

835,  1433. 
Hare  v.  London  &  Northwestern 

Ry.  Co.,  3  Johns.  &  H.  80 

(1861),  694. 

Harkness  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    73    Iowa,    190 

(1887),  348. 
Harmon  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  R. 

Co.,  28  S.  C.  401  (1887),  757. 
Harmony  v.   Bingham,    1    Duer 

(N.  Y.),  209  (1852),  922. 
Harp  v.  Choctaw,  O.  &    G.  Ry. 

Co.,    118   Fed.    169    (1902), 

250,  665. 
Harp  v.  Choctaw,  0.  &  G.  Ry. 

Co.,    125   Fed.   445    (1903), 

399,  404,  415,  420,  813,  817, 

1360. 


Harp  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  119 

Ga.  927  (1904),  878,  886. 
Harriman,    The,    9    Wall.    161 

(1869),  922. 
Harrington  v.  Lyles,  2  Nott  & 

McCord,  88  (1819),  166. 
Harrington  v.  McShane,  2  Watts, 

443  (1834),  172. 
Harris  v.  Cockermouth  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.,   1  C.  B.   (N.  S.)  454, 

1288,  1314. 
Harris   v.    Howe,    74   Tex.    534 

(1889),  1011. 
Harris  v.  Northern  Indiana  R.  R. 

Co.,  20  N.  Y.  232  (1859),  772. 
Harris   v.   Rand,   4  H.   N.   259 

(1827),  1266. 
Harris    v.    Stevens,    31    Vt.    79 

(1858),  431. 

Harris  v.   Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    121    Ala.    519 

(1889),  412,  1076. 
Harrisburg,  Appeal  of,  107  Pa.  St. 

102  (1884),  456. 
Harrison  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  62 

L.    J.    Q.    B.    (N.    S.)    225 

(1893),  530. 
Harrison  v.  Roy,  39  Miss.  396 

(1860),   162,  228,  236,   239, 

968. 

Harrison  Granite  Co.   v.   Penn- 
sylvania   R.    R.    Co.,    145 

Mich.  712  (1906),  443,  1072. 
Harrold  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  47  Minn.  17  (1891),  632. 
Hart  v.  Atlanta  Terminal  Co.,  128 

Ga.  754  (1908),  489. 
Hart  v.  Baxendale,  16  L.  T.  (N. 

S.)  390  (1867),  413. 
Hart  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

69  Iowa,  485  (1886),  990. 
Hart  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

112  U.  S.  331  (1884),  1019, 

1020,  1021. 

[  cxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Hart    v.    State,    100    Md.    595 

(1905),  848. 
Hartwell  v.  Northern  Pac.  Exp. 

Co.,  5  Dak.  463  (1889),  1001, 

1011. 
Hartzig  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co., 

154  Pa.  St.  364  (1893),  1044. 
Harvey  v.  Deep  River  Logging 

Co.,  49  Oreg.  583  (1907),  208, 

223. 
Harvey  v.  Potter,  19  La.  Ann. 

264  (1867),  241. 
Harvey  v.  Rose,  26  Ark.  3  (1870), 

182,  241,  771,  969. 
Harvey  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R. 

R.  Co.,  74  Mo.  538  (1881), 

1019,  1021. 

Haskell  v.  Boston  Dist.  Messen- 
ger   Co.,    190    Mass.     189 

(1906),  108. 
Haslam  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  6 

Bosw.  235  (1860),  1040. 
Hasseltine  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

75  S.   C.    141    (1906),  602, 

834. 
Hastings  Express  Co.  v.  Chicago, 

135   111.    App.    268    (1907), 

169,  213. 
Hastings  v.  Pepper,  11  Pick.  41 

(1838),  172. 
Hatch    v.    Consumers'    Co.,    17 

Idaho,  204  (1909),  824. 
Hatch  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  & 

S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  15  N.  D. 

490  (1906),  1023. 
Hatten  v.  Turnan,  123  Ky.  844 

(1906),  237. 
Haug  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

8  N.    D.   23    (1898),    933, 

1044. 
Haugen  v.  Albina  Light  &  Water 

Co.,  21  Oreg.  411  (1891),  92, 

212,  214,  215,  242,  273,  280, 

281,  379,  405,  690,  797. 

[  cxviii  ] 


Hauk  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 

R.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

434  (1898),  372. 
Haurigan  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  80  Neb.  139  (1908), 

1294. 
Haverford  Electric  Co.  v.  Hart, 

13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  369  (1891), 

56. 
Haverhill  G.  L.  Co.  v.  Barker, 

109  Fed.  694  (1901),  1409. 
Haver  v.  Central  of  N.  J.  R.  R. 

Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  282  (1898), 

938,  941. 
Hawgood  v.  1,310  Tons  of  Coal, 

21  Fed.  681  (1884),  1050. 
Hawkins  v.  Great  Western  R.  R. 

Co.,    17    Mich.    57    (1868), 

1011. 
Hawthorn  v.  Hammond,  1  Car. 

&  K.  404  (1844),  106,  407. 
Hayne  v.  Union  St.  Ry.  Co.,  189 

Mass.  551  (1905),  958. 
Haynie  v.  Baylor,   18  Tex.  498 

(1857),  208,  228. 
Hays  v.  Millar,  77  Pa.  St.  238 

(1874),  173,  774. 
Hays  v.   Paul,   51   Pa.   St.   134 

(1865),  173,  774. 
Hays  v.   Pennsylvania  Co.,    12 

Fed.  309  (1882),  1286,  1289, 

1290,  1305,  1322,  1342,  1343. 
Hays  v.  Risher,  32  Pa.  St.  169 

(1858),  225. 
Hays    v.    Turner,    23    la.    214 

(1867),  1032. 
Hazard  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

Co.,  1  Biss.  503  (1865),  763. 
Hazard,  etc.,  v.  Illinois  Central 

R.    R.    Co.,    67    Miss.    32 

(1889),  747. 
Hazel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.     Co.,     82    Iowa,     477 

(1891),  1007. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Head  v.  Georgia  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

79  Ga.  358  (18,87),  889. 
Heaiey    v.    Gray,    68    Me.    489 

(1878),  725. 
Hedding  v.  Gallagher,  72  N.  H. 

377   (1903),   171,  474,   483, 

489. 

Heimann  v.  Western  Union  Tel- 
egraph   Co.,    57    Wis.    562 

(1883),  1025. 
Heinlein  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  147  Mass.  136  (1888), 

368,  402,  735. 
Heirn  v.  McCaughan,  32  Miss. 

17  (1856),  842. 
Helena  Power  Transmission  Co. 

v.    Spratt,    35    Mont.    108 

(1907),  95,  114. 

Helena  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Hel- 
ena, 195  U.   S.   383  (1904), 

1422. 

Hellams  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    70    S.    C.    83 

(1904),  278,  871. 
Heller  v.  Chicago  Gt.  Northern 

Ry.     Co.,     109     Mich.     53 

(1896),  989. 
Helliwell  v.   Grand  Trunk   Ry. 

Co.,  7  Fed.  68  (1881),  799, 

834,  914. 
Hellraan  v.  Holladay,  1  Woolw. 

365  (1868),  255. 
Helphery  v.  Perrault,  12  Idaho, 

451  (1906),  379. 
Henderson  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S. 

A.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

38  S.  W.  1136  (1896),  849, 

881. 
Henderson   v.    Louisville   &    N. 

R.   R.   Co.,    123   U.    S.    61 

(1887),  769. 
Hendrick  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  136  Mo.  548  (1896), 

1044. 


Hennington  v.  Georgia,  163  U.  S. 

299  (1896),  599,  1418. 
Henson  v.  Urbana  &  C.  Sy.  Ry. 

Co.,  75  111.  App.  474  (1897), 

939. 
Herbert  v.  Portland  R.  R.  Co., 

103  Me.  315  (1907),  784. 
Herf  &  Frericks  Chemical  Co.  v. 

Lackawanna  Line,  100  Mo. 

App.  164  (1903),  1038. 
Hergog    v.    Municipal    Electric 

Light  Co.,  89  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  569  (1904),  983. 
Hermann  et  al.  v.  Goodrich,  21 

Wis.  536  (1867),  1038. 
Hermann    v.    St.    Joseph    Ry., 

Light,   Heat  &   Power  Co. 

(Mo.  App.),  129  S.  W.  414 

(1910),  754. 
Herndon  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

R.   R.  Co.,  218  U.  S.   135 

(1910),  1417. 
Hernshem     Bros.     v.     Newport 

News    &   M.     V.    Co.,    18 

Ky.   Law  Rep.  227  (1896), 

918. 
Herring    v.    Chesapeake    &    W. 

R.    R.    Co.,    101    Va.    778 

(1903),  913,  917. 
Herring  v.  Utley,  8  Jones'  L.  270 

(1860),  171. 
Herron  v.   Western  Union  Tel. 

Co.,  90  la.  129  (1894),  1041. 
Hervey  v.   Hart,    149  Ala.   604 

(1906),  845. 
Hett  v.   Boston    &    M.    R.    R. 

Co.,  69  N.  H.  139  (1897), 

1046. 
Hewett  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Quincy 

Ry.     Co.,     63     Iowa,     611 

(1884),  842,  916. 
Hewlett  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    28    Fed.     181 

(1886),  436,  877. 

[  cxix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


References  are  to  sections] 


Hibbard  v.  New  York  &  E.  Ry. 

Co.,  15  N.  Y.  455  (1857), 

878,  886,  937. 
Hickinbottom  v.  Delaware,  L.  & 

W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  11  (1888),  395. 
Hickox  v.  Naugatuck  R.  R.  Co., 

31   Conn.  281   (1863),   724, 

875. 
Hide  v.  Proprietors  of  T.  &  M. 

Navigation  Co.,   1  Esp.  36 

(1793),  1001. 
Hieronymus  v.  Bienville  Water 

Co.,    131   Ala.   447    (1901), 

431,  432,  433,  460. 
Higgins  v.  Cherokee  R.  R.  Co., 

73  Georgia,  149  (1884),  761, 

762. 
Higgins  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  R. 

Co.,  36  Mo.  418  (1865),  784. 
Higgins  v.  New  Orleans,  M.  & 

C.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  La.  Ann. 

133  (1876),  498,  782, 1015. 
Higgins  v.  New  York  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,    2   Bosw.    132    (1857), 

882. 
Higley  v.   Gilmer,   3  Mont.  90 

(1878),  623,  738. 
Hill  v.  Boston,  H.  T.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  144  Mass.  284  (1887), 

1019. 
Hill  v.  Georgia,  C.  &  N.  Ry.  Co., 

43  S.  C.  461  (1895),  1017. 
Hill  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 

124  Ga.  243  (1905),  369,  372. 
Hill  v.  Thompson,  18  Jones  &  S. 

165  (1884),  825. 
Hill  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Co.,  85  Ga.  425  (1890),  1026. 
Hill  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Boston  &  Lowell 

R.  R.  Co.,  104  Mass.   122 

(1870),  511. 
Billiard  v.  Goold,  34  N.  H.  230 

(1856),  888. 

[  cxx  ] 


Hilliard   v.    Wilmington   &   W. 

R.   R.  Co.,  51   N.   C.  343 

(1859),  1036, 1038. 
Hillman  v.  Georgia  R.  &  Bank- 
ing Co.,  126  Ga.  814  (1906), 

848. 
Hilton   v.    Adams,    71    Me.    19 

(1879),  979. 
Hilton  Lumber  Co.  v.  Atlantic 

C.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  136  N.  C. 

479  (1904),  1305,  1334. 
Hinckley  v.  New  York  Central 

&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  Y. 

429  (1874),  521,  548. 
Hinkle  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  126 

N.  C.  932  (1900),  1024. 
Hinshaw  v.  Raleigh  &  A.  L.  R. 

R.    Co.,    118   N.    C.    1047 

(1896),  1044. 
Hinson  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co., 

132  N.  C.  460  (1903),  1041. 
Hirsch  v.  Am.  Dist.  Telegraph 

Co.,   98  N.   Y.   Supp.   371 

(1906),  108. 
Hix    v.    Gardner,    2    Bulstrode 

(Eng.),  195,  11. 
Hoadley    v.    Northern    Transp. 

Co.,  115  Mass.  305  (1874), 

917,  1001. 
Hoar  v.  Me.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  70 

Me.  65  (1879),  785. 
Hobart  Lee  Tel.  Co.  v.  Stone, 

117  S.W.  604(1909),  501. 
Hockett  v.  State,  105  Ind.  250 

(1885),  244,  279,  1407. 
Hoddesdon  Gas  &  Coke  Co.  v. 

Haselwood,  6  Com.  B.  (N. 

S.)  239  (1859),  31. 
Hodges  v.  New  Hanover  Transit 

Co.,  107  N.  C.  576  (1890), 

395. 
Hodgman  v.  West  Midland  Ry. 

Co.,  5  B.  &  S.  173  (1865), 

256. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Hoehle  v.  Allegheny  Heating  Co., 

5  Pa.  Sup.  Ct.  21   (1897), 

112,  982. 
Hoffbauer  v.  0.  &  N.  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  52  la.  342  (1879),  447, 

1259. 
Hoffman  v.  Cumberland  R.  R. 

Co.,    85    Md.    391    (1897), 

513. 
Hoffman  v.   Denver   &   N.   W. 

R.  R.  Co.,  52  la.  342  (1879), 

432. 
Hoffman   H.    &   S.    Co.    v.    St. 

Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 

119  Mo.  App.  495  (1906), 

723,  800. 

Holland  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 
.     Ry.  Co.,  139  Mo.  App.  702 

(1910),  409. 
Holland  v.  Festiniog  Ry.  Co.,  2 

Nev.   &   Mac.   278   (1876), 

1352. 
Holland    v.    Pack,    Peck,     151 

(1823),  334. 
Hollister  v.   Nowlen,   19  Wend. 

234  (1838),   172,  262,  767, 

1002. 
Hollister  v.   State,   9   Idaho,   8 

(1903),  95,  114. 
Holly  v.   Atlanta  St.   Ry.   Co., 

61    Ga.    215    (1878),     190, 

943. 
Holly  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  8 

Gray,  123  (1857),  982. 
Holmes  v.  Moore,  17  L.  C.  R. 

143  (1867),  970. 
Holmes  v.   North  Eastern   Ry. 

Co.,  L.  R.  4  Ex.  254  (1869), 

367,  372. 
Holmes  v.   Union  Teleg.   &  T. 

Co.,   16  N.   Y.   Supp.   563 

(1891),  109. 
Holstein  v.  Phillips,  146  N.  C. 

366  (1907),  240,  751,  968. 


Home  Telephone  Co.  v.  Granby 

&  N.  Telephone  Co.   (Mo. 

App.),  126  S.  W.  773  (1910), 

1300. 
Home  Telephone  Co.  v.  North 

Manchester  Telephone   Co. 

(Ind.  App.),  92  N.   E.   558 

(1910),  526,  539,  693,  700. 
Home   Telephone   &   Telegraph 

Co.  v.  Los  Angeles,  155  Fed. 

554  (1907),  1124,  1430. 
Hone  v.  Presque  Isle  Water  Co., 

104  Me.  217  (1908),  350. 
Honeyman  v.  Oregon,  etc.,  Ry. 

Co.,    13   Oreg.   352    (1886), 

160. 
Hood  v.  New  York  &  N.  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,    22    Conn.    1     (1852), 

1033. 
Hooker  v.  Vandewater,  4  Denio, 

349  (1847),  694. 
Hooper  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

R.   R.   Co.,   38   Minn.   281 

(1888),  1409. 
Hooper  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

R.    R.    Co.,    91    Iowa,   639 

(1894),  1215. 
Hooper    v.    Chicago    &    N.    W. 

R.  R.  Co.,  27  Wis.  81  (1870), 

169,  490,  514,  515,  1033. 
Hoover  v.   Pennsylvania  R.   R. 

Co.,  156  Pa.  St.  220  (1893), 

1077,  1299,  1305, 1333, 1336. 
Hope  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas  & 

P.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C. 

Rep.  696  (1905),  1315. 
Horner  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  38  Wis.  165  (1875), 

811. 
Horner  v.  Harvey,  3  N.  Mex.  197 

(1885),  365,  751. 
Horton    v.    Norwalk    Tramway 

Co.,  66  Conn.  272  (1895), 

599. 

[  cxxi  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Hosea  v.  M'Crory,  12  Ala.  349 

(1847),  255. 
Hoskins  v.   Northern  Pac.   Ry. 

Co.,  39  Mont.  394  (1909), 

777. 
Hot  Springs  v.  Curry,  64  Ark. 

152  (1897),  472. 
Hot  Springs  Ry.  Co.  v.  Deloney, 

65  Ark.  177,  889. 
Hotel  Assn.  v.  Walters,  23  Neb. 

280  (1888),  979. 
Houck  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

38   Fed.    Rep.    226    (1888), 

566,  848,  849,  881. 
House  v.   Houston  Waterworks 

Co.,    88   Tex.    233    (1895), 

264,  350. 
Houser    v.    Tully,    62    Pa.    92 

(1869),  744. 
Houston  &  T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Batchler,  37  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

116  (1904),  946,  1044. 
Houston   &  T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Buchanan,     42    Tex.     Civ. 

App.  620  (1906),  792,  804. 
Houston  &  T.   C.    Ry.   Co.   v. 

Burke,  55  Tex.  323  (1881), 

1008. 
Houston  &   T.   C.    Ry.   Co.   v. 

Davis,   11    Tex.  Civ.  App. 

24  (1895),  1414. 
Houston    &  T.  C.    Ry.  Co.  v. 

Ford,   53  Tex.  364   (1880), 

889. 
Houston  &  T.   C.'  Ry.   Co.   v. 

Goodyear,     28    Tex.     Civ. 

App.  206  (1902),  932. 
Houston  &  T.   C.    Ry.   Co.   v. 

Mayes,  201  U.  S.  321  (1906), 

650,   722,    798,    836,    1417, 

1418, 1433. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Cullough,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

208  (1899),  777. 

[  cxxii  1 


Houston   &  T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Phillio,  98  Tex.  18  (1902), 

369,  372,  946. 
Houston   &  T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Rust    &    D.,    58    Tex.    98 

(1882),  1282,  1297. 
Houston  &   T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Smith,  63  Tex.  322  (1885), 

850. 
Houston   &  T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Storey,  149  Fed.  499  (1906), 

1092,  1171. 
Houston   &  T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Washington       (Tex.      Civ. 

App.),  30  S.  W.  719  (1895), 

442. 
Houston  &  T.   C.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

White     (Tex.     Civ.     App., 

1901),  61  S.  W.  436,  889. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams (Tex.  Civ.  App.,  1895), 

31  S.  W.  556,  1414. 
Houston,   D.   &   N.  Co.   v.  In- 
surance   Co.,     89    Tex.     1 

(1895),  1415. 
Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Campbell,     91     Tex.     551 

(1898),  399,  439,  563,  835. 
Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Rogers,   16  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

19  (1897),  949. 
Houtz  v.   Union  Pacific   R.   R. 

Co.,   33  Utah,   175   (1908), 

1023,  1024. 
Howe  v.  Orange,  70  N.  J.  Eq. 

648  (1906),  456. 
Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Pease,  49 

Vt.  477  (1877),  965. 
Howell  v.  Jackson,  6  Car.  &  P. 

(Eng.)  723  (1834),  630. 
Howth  v.  Franklin,  20  Tex.  798 

(1858),  234,  240,  965,  968. 
Hoyt  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

Co.,  93  111.  601  (1879),  272. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Hrebrik  v.  Carr,  29  Fed.  Rep. 
298  (1886),  402,  735. 

Huba  v.  Schenectady  Ry.  Co., 
85  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  199, 
(1903),  440. 

Hubbard  &  Co.  v.  Harnden  Ex- 
press Co.,  10  R.  I.  244 
(1872),  666,  986. 

Hudson  v.  Kansas  Pacific  Ry. 
Co.,  3  McCrary  (U.  S.),  249 
(1882),  353. 

Hudson  v.  Lynn  &  Boston  R.  R. 
Co.,  178  Mass.  64  (1901), 
632,  634,  644,  866,  933, 
934. 

Hudson  &  Co.  v.  Northern  Pa- 
cific Ry.  Co.,  92  Iowa,  231 
(1894),  1010,  1026. 

Hudson  River  L.  Co.  v.  Wheeler 
C.  &  E.  Co.,  93  Fed.  374 
(1899),  1042. 

Hudson  Trust  &  S.  Inst.  v.  Carr- 
Curran  Paper  Co.,  58  N.  J. 
Eq.  59  (1899),  456. 

Hudson  Valley  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  106 
App.  Div.  375  (1905),  529, 
539. 

Hudston  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  L. 
R.  4  Q.  B.  366  (1869). 

Huffman  v.  Marcy  Mutual  Tel- 
ephone Co.,  143  la.  590 
(1909),  557,  625,  633,  642, 
866,  879,  884. 

Hughes  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co:,  202  Pa.  St.  222  (1902), 
1010,  1020. 

Hulett  v.  Swift,  33  N.  Y.  371 
(1865),  965. 

Hull  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  0. 
Ry.  Co.,  41  Minn.  510 
(1889),  1007. 

Humphreys  v.  Perry,  148  U.  S. 
627  (1893),  876. 


Humphreys  v.  Reed,  6  Whart. 

435  (1841),  166. 
Hunt  v.  New  York  &  E.  R.  R. 

Co.,  1  Hilton  (N.  Y.  C.  P.), 

228  (1856),  1017. 
Hunter    v.     Prinsep,     10    East 

(Eng.),  378  (1808),  1265. 
Huntley    v.     Dows,     55    Barb. 

(N.  Y.)  310  (1864),  1037. 
Huntress,     The,     2     Ware,     89 

(1840),  229,  990. 
Hurley  v.  Big  Sandy  &  C.  Ry. 

Co.,  125  S.  W.  302  (1910), 

1298. 
Hurley  v.  Eddingfield,  156  Ind. 

416  (1901),  6,  105,213. 
Hurst  v.  Gt.  Western  Ry.  Co., 

19  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  310  (1865), 

904. 
Husdpeth  v.  Hall,  111  Ga.  510 

(1900),  52. 
Huston  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  63 

Mo.  App.  671  (1895),  831. 
Hutchings  v.  Ladd,  16  Mich.  493 

(1868),  518,  522,  1033. 
Hutchinson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  140 

N.  C.  123  (1905),  872,  889. 
Hutchinson  v.  United  States  Ex- 
press Co.,  63  W.  Va.    128 

(1907),  1039,  1040. 
Huzzey  v.  Field,  2  C.  M.  &  R. 

432  (1835),  52. 
Hyde  v.  Trent  Nav.  Co.,  5  T.  R. 

389  (1793),  166,  1040. 
Hyndman    Water    Co.    v.    Bor- 
ough  of   Hyndman,    7   Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  191  (1898),  273, 

281. 
Hynds  v.  Wynn,  71  Iowa,  593 

(1887),  910. 


Idaho,  The,  93  U.  S.  575  (1876), 
1047. 

[  cxxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Idaho  Independent  Telephone  Co. 
v.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  R. 
Co.,  8  Idaho,  175  (1901),  497. 

Illinois  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Peo- 
ple, 19  111.  App.  141  (1886), 
415,  721. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Allen, 
28  Ky.  Law.  R.  108  (1905), 
637. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son, 184  111.  294  (1900),  780, 
1016. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ash- 
mead,  58  111.  487  (1871),  666, 
726,  838. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beebe, 
174  111.  13  (1898),  1010,  1011. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brels- 
ford,  13  111.  App.  251  (1883), 
989. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bundy, 
97  111.  App.  202  (1901),  408, 
722,  831. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cobb, 
48  111.  402  (1868),  1046. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cobb, 
Christy  &  Co.,  64  111.  128 
(1872),  664,  666,  800,  901, 
910. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cru- 
dup,  63  Miss.  291  (1885),  777. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Daven- 
port, 177  111.  110  (1898), 
763. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dun- 
nigan  (Miss.),  50  So.  443 
(1909),  1306. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Eblen, 
71  S.  W.  919  (1903),  772. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Frank- 
enberg,  54  111.  88  (1870),  160, 
176,  431,  963,  1002,  1033. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gorti- 
kov,  90  Miss.  787  (1907),  889. 

[  cxxiv] 


Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
80  Fed.  278  (1897),  372. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall, 
58  111.  409  (1871),  256. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Handy, 
63  Miss.  609  (1886),  153,  769, 
975. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Horn- 
berger,  77  111.  457  (1875),  592, 
666,  726. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
state Comm.  Comm.,  206 
U.  S.  441  (1907),  1163. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 117  Ky.  L.  Rep.  208 
(1904),  889. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kerr, 

68  Miss.  14  (1890),  513. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Laloge, 

1 13  Ky.  896  (1902),  944. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lou- 

tham,  80  111.  App.  579  (1898), 

431,  866,  878. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Clennan,  54  111.  58  (1870), 

592,  838,  910,  986. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Kendree,    203    U.    S.    514 

(1906),  593,  1419. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mea- 

cham,  91  Term.  428  (1892), 

762. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Minor, 

69  Miss.  710  (1892),  942. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mit- 
chell,   68    111.    471    (1873), 
1033. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v. 
O'Keefe,  168  111.  115  (1897), 
395,  736,  760. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Parks, 
54  111.  294  (1870),  1048. 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Peo- 
ple, 121  111.  304  (1887),  1377. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Phelps, 

4  111.  App.  238  (1879),  591. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Por- 
ter, 117  Tenn.  13  (1908),  777. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Scruggs, 

69   Miss.    418    (1891),    989, 

1007. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Seitz, 

214    111.    350    (1905),    1234, 

1295. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shee- 

gog,  215  U.  S.  308  (1909), 

740. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

85  Miss.  349  (1905),  637. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smy- 

ser,  38  111.  354  (1865),  733. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Trous- 

tine,    64   Miss.   834   (1887), 

393,  726. 
Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Whitte- 

more,  43  111.  420  (1867),  431. 
Ilwaco  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Oregon 

Short  Line  Ry.  Co.,  6  C.  C. 

A.   495    (1893),    488,    527, 

811. 
Imhoff  v.  Chicago  &  M.  R.  Co.,  20 

Wis.  344  (1866),  1044. 
Independence  Mills  Co.  v.  Bur- 
lington, Cedar  R.  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  72  la.  535  (1887),  1043. 
Independent   School   District   v. 

Le  Mars  City  Water  &  Light 

Co.,  131  Iowa,  14  (1906),  273, 

280. 
Indian  River  Steamboat  Co.  v. 

East    Coast    Transportation 

Co.,  28  Fla.  387  (1891),  102, 

232,  485,  487,  811. 
Indiana  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mundy,  21 

Ind.  48  (1863),  786,  1018. 
Indiana,  I.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dore- 

meyer,    20    Ind.    App.    605 

(1898),  594. 


Indiana  Natural  &  111.  Gas  Co.  v. 

Anthony,  26  Ind.  App.  307 

(1900),  658,  826. 
Indiana  Natural  &  111.  Gas  Co.  v. 

Long,     27    Ind.    App.    219 

(1901),  982. 
Indiana  Natural  &  111.  Gas  Co.  v. 

State  ex  rel.,   158  Ind.  516 

(1901),  653,  1290. 
Indiana  Natural  Gas  &  0.  Co.  v. 

State  ex  rel.  Armstrong,  162 

Ind.  690  (1904),  852. 
Indiana  Natural  Gas  &  O.  Co.  v. 

State  ex  rel.,   162  Ind.  690 

(1904),  271,  653. 
Indiana  Pullman  P.   C.   Co.   v. 

Taylor,  65  Ind.  153  (1879), 

845. 
Indiana  Traction  &  Terminal  Co. 

v.  Klentschy,  167  Ind.  598 

(1907),  785. 
Indianapolis  v.  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind. 

396  (1879),  71. 
Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas 

Co.,  35  Ch.  Leg.  News,  165 

(1902),  317. 
Indianapolis  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Cox,    29    Ind.    360    (1868), 

1002. 
Indianapolis  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Rutherford,     29     Ind.     82 

(1867),  795. 
Indianapolis  &  St.  Louis  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Juntgen,  10  111.  App. 

295  (1881),  667,  669,  912. 
Indianapolis,  Decatur,  etc.,  R.  R. 

Co.   v.   Ervin,   118  111.   250 

(1886),  1289. 
Indianapolis  P.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Anthony,  43  Ind.  183  (1873), 

935. 
Indianapolis  Traction  &  T.  Co.  v. 

Lawson,  143  Fed.  834  (1906), 

785. 

[ cxxv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Indianapolis  Traction  &  T.  Co.  v. 

Romans,  40  Ind.  App.   184 

(1907),  784. 
Indianapolis  U.  Ry.  v.  Dohn,  153 

Ind.  10  (1899),  485,  489. 
Industrial  Siding  Case,  140  N.  C. 

239  (1905),  404,  816,  819. 
Ingalls  v.  Bills,  9  Met.  1  (1845), 

977,  978. 
Ingate  v.  Christie,  3  C.  &  K.  61 

(1850),  164,  203,  227. 
Inman  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  39 

(1896),  521,  537. 
In  re, — see   the  particular  thing 

by  name. 
Insurance  Co.  v.   Railroad   Co., 

8    Baxt.    268    (1874),    517, 

1033. 
Insurance  Co.   v.   Railroad  Co., 

104  U.  S.  146  (1881),  513. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Anderson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

21  S.  W.  691  (1893),  914. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Bergman  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

64  S.  W.  999  (1901),  917. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Davis,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  340 

(1897),  777. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Dwight   &    Co.    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.),  100  S.W.  1011(1907), 

414,  991. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Gilmer,   18  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

680  (1898),  635. 
International  &  G.   N.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Goldstein,    2   Tex.    Civ. 

App.  Cas.  274  (1884),   431, 

885. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Harder,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

151  (1904),  901. 

[  cxxvi  ] 


International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hynes,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  20 

(1893),  909,  915,  949. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Irvine,  64  Tex.  529  (1885), 

763. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Lecus  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  23 

S.  W.  323  (1893),  914. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Railroad   Commission   of 

Texas,  99  Tex.  332  (1905), 

526. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Thorton,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

197  (1893),  740. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Tisdale,   74  Tex.   8   (1889), 

668,  912. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wilkes,  68  Tex.  617  (1887), 

440. 
International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Young  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28 

S.  W.  819  (1894),  833,  922. 
International  Boom  Co.  v.  Rainy 

Lake   River   Boom   Co.,   97 

Minn.  513  (1906),  73. 
International     Express     Co.     v. 

Grand  Trunk  Ry.,  81  Me.  92 

(1888),  479. 
International   Water   Co.   v.    El 

Paso  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  112 

S.  W.  816  (1908),  824. 
Inter-Ocean    Publishing    Co.    v. 

Associated  Press,  184  111.  438 

(1900),  684. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Alabama  Mid.  Ry.  Co.,  69 

Fed.  227  (1895),  1223. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Alabama  Mid.   Ry.  Co., 

168  U.  S.  144  (1897),  1204, 

1222,  1377,  1380. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

Co.,    50    Fed.    295    (1892), 

1222. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Baird,  194  U.  S.  25  (1904), 

707. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Baltimore    &  0.    R.   R. 

Co.    (C.    C.),   43    Fed.   37, 

1204. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co., 

145  U.  S.  263  (1892),  1204, 

1302,  1304,  1353. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.   Bellaire,    Z.    &    C.    Ry. 

Co.,    77    Fed.    942    (1897), 

1416. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry.  Co., 

128   Fed.    59    (1904),    1295, 

1362. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.   Chicago  &  Alton  R.   R. 

Co.,  215  U.  S.  479  (1910), 

857. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

Co.,   186  U.  S.  320  (1902), 

491,  818. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Chicago  Gt.  Western  R. 

R.  Co.,  141  Fed.  1003  (1905), 

1070,  1074,  1204,  1211,  1377, 

1379. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Chicago  Gt.  Western  Ry. 

Co.,  209  U.  S.  108  (1908), 

830,  1225,  1238,  1392. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,   218  U.   S.   88   (1910), 

1226,  1384. 


Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P. 

R.   R.   Co.,   167  U.   S.  479 

(1897),  1402,  1420. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Cincinnati,  P.  &  V.  R.  R. 

Co.,    124   Fed.   624    (1903), 

1377. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  181  U.  S. 

291  (1901),  1222. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 

64   Fed.    723    (1894),    1238, 

1393. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  216  U.  S.  531   (1910), 

224,  538. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Detroit,  Grand  Haven  & 

Milwaukee  R.   R.   Co.,   167 

U.  S.  633  (1897),  1204,  1316, 

1378. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G. 

Ry.  Co.,  85  Fed.  107  (1898), 

1372. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

215  U.  S.  452  (1910),  837, 

857. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry. 

Co.,    134   Fed.    942    (1905), 

1391. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.    Lehigh   Valley    Railroad 

Co.,    74    Fed.    784    (1897), 

1208. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

v.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R. 

R.  Co.,  190  U.  S.  273  (1903), 

1204,  1377. 

[cxxvii] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
73  Fed.  409  (1896),  1215, 
1371. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
118  Fed.  613  (1902),  1072, 
1175,  1215,  1372,  1384. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  120  Fed.  934  (1903), 
1372,  1377. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 
216  U.  S.  538  (1910),  538. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Reichman,  145  Fed.  235 
(1905),  1359. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  105 
Fed.  703  (1900),  1222,  1377. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  117 
Fed.  741  (1902),  1372,  1377. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Stickney,  215  U.  S.  98 
(1909),  1270. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Texas  &  Pacific  Railroad 
Co.,  52  Fed.  187  (1892),  1312. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
v.  Western  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  88 
Fed.  186  (1898),  1209. 

Interstate  Comm.  Comm.  v.  West- 
ern &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Fed. 
38  (1899),  1371. 

Interstate  Consolidated  St.  Rjr. 
Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  207 
U.  S.  79  (1908),  1063,  1201, 
1431. 

Interstate     Stockyards     Co.     v. 
Indianapolis    Ry.     Co.,     99 
Fed.   472   (1900),    129,   256, 
258,  815,  1043,  1414,  1415. 
[  cxxviii  1 


lonnone  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H. 

R.    R.    Co.,    21    R.    I.    452 

(1899),  783. 
Irvin    v.    Rusville    Cooperative 

Telephone  Co.,  161  Ind.  521 

(1903),  452,  877. 
Isaacson  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  94  N.  Y. 

278  (1884),  907. 
Isham  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  112  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  612  (1906),  1026, 

1033. 
Ives  v.  Smith  et  al.,  8  N.  Y.  Supp. 

46  (1889),  693. 
Izlar  v.  Manchester  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,  57  S.  C.  332  (1889),  369. 


Jack  v.  Williams,  113  Fed.  823 

(1902),  296. 
Jackson,    City    of,    v.    Anderson 

(Miss.),  51  So.  896  (1910), 

824. 
Jackson  Architectural  Iron  Wks. 

Co.  v.  Hurlbut,  158  N.  Y.  34 

(1899),    163,   169,   230,  239, 

254,  414,  991. 
Jackson  Electric  Ry.,  L.  &  P.  Co. 

v.     Lowry,     79    Miss.     431 

(1901),  410,  870. 
Jackson  v.  Ellendale,  4  N.  D.  478 

(1894),  824. 
Jackson  v.  Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Co., 

118  Mo.  199(1893),  189,870, 

1044. 
Jackson  v.  Missouri  P.  Ry.  Co., 

104  Mo.  448  (1891),  942. 
Jackson  v.  Railway  Co.,  87  Mo. 

422  (1885),  604. 
Jackson  v.  Rogers,  2  Show,  327 

(1683),  661. 
Jackson  v.  Sacramento  &  V.  R. 

R.Co.,  23  Cal.  268  (1863), 

963. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Jackson  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 

Ry.  Co.,  87  Mo.  422  (1885), 

640. 
Jackson  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co., 

74  Minn.  48  (1898),  933. 
Jackson's  Case,  Peake's  Add.  Gas. 

185  (1800),  431. 
Jacksonville  Electric  Light  Co.  v. 

Jacksonville,     36    Fla,     229 

(1895),  113. 
Jacobs    v.    Tutt,    33    Fed.    412 

(1888),  876. 
Jacobs  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co., 

178  Mass.  116  (1901),  945. 
Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin,  M.  &  P. 

R.    R.   Co.,    71    Minn.    519 

(1898),  539,  698. 
Jacobus  v.  St.  Paul  &  C.  Ry.  Co., 

20   Minn.   125   (1873),   785, 

786,  804,  1018. 
Jacquelin  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  69 

N.  J.  Eq.  432  (1905),  807, 

810. 
Jalie  v.   Cardinal,   35  Wis.    118 

(1874),  751. 
Jamiet  v.  American  Storage  Co., 

109   Mo.   App.   257   (1904), 

170,  230,  236. 
Jaquet  v.  Edwards,  1  Jamaica,  4 

(1867),  220,  567.    , 
Jardine  v.  Cornell,  50  N.  J.  L. 

485  (1888),  641. 
Jarmy  v.  Duluth  St.  Ry.  Co.,  55 

Minn.  271  (1893),  945. 
Jasper  Trust  Co.  v.  Kansas  City, 

M.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  99  Ala. 

416  (1892),  748. 

Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleve- 
land,   2   Bush,    468    (1867), 

1037. 
Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers, 

28  Ind.  1  (1867),  888. 
Jeffords  v.  Crump,  12  Phila.  (Pa.) 

500  (1878),  751. 

9 


Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Draining 

Co.,  12  Neb.  163  (1881),  67. 
Jencks  v.  Coleman,  2  Sumner,  221 

(1835),    172,   183,   362,  499, 

612,  631,  632,  641,  697. 
Jenkins  v.  Columbia  Land  Co.,  13 

Wash.  502  (1896),  264,  452. 
Jenkins  v.   Picket,  9  Yerg.  480 

(1836),  208. 
Jennings  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

52    Hun,    227    (1889),    901, 

1006. 
Jennings  v.  Smith,  106  Fed.  139 

(1901),  1021. 
Jerome    v.    Smith,    48    Vt.    230 

(1876),  886. 
Jersey  City  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Morgan,    52    N.    J.    L.    60 

(1889),  433,  441. 
Jetter  v.  New  York  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,    2    Abb.    (N.    Y.)    456 

(1865),  775. 
Jevons  v.   Union  Pacific  R.   R. 

Co.,  70  Kan.  491  (1904),  889. 
Jewell  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

55  N.  H.  845  (1874),  1042. 
Jewett  v.   Olsen,    18  Oreg.   419 

(1890),  1046. 
Johnson's  Appeal,  115  Pa.  St.  129 

(1886),  94. 
Johnson  v.  Atlantic  City  Gas  Co., 

65  N.  J.  Eq.  129  (1903),  456. 
Johnson  v.  Belmer,  58  N.  J.  Eq. 

354  (1899),  602. 
Johnson  v.  Chadbourn  Furnace 

Co.,   89  Minn.   310   (1903), 

240,  263. 
Johnson  v.  Concord  R.  R.  Corp., 

46  N.  H.  213  (1865),  862. 
Johnson  v.  Dominion  Exp.  Co., 

28  Ont.  Rep.  203  (1896),  178, 

696. 
Johnson  Express  Co.  v.  Chicago, 

136  111.  App.  368  (1907),  169. 

[  cxxix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Johnson  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  104  Ala.  241  (1893),  632, 

933. 
Johnson  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  4 

Exch.  (Eng.)  367  (1849),  251, 

295,  568. 
Johnson  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  33  N.  Y.  610  (1865), 

522,  952,  1053. 
Johnson  v.  Pensacola  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  16  Fla.  623  (1878),  1282, 

1283,  1287,  1299,  1311,  1361. 
Johnson  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B. 

R.  R.  Co.,  63  Md.  106  (1884), 

1004,  1044. 
Johnson  v.  Reynolds,  3  Kan.  257 

(1865),  751. 
Johnson  v.  Richardson,  17  111.  302 

(1855),  965. 
Johnson  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  53 

C.  S.  203  (1898),  312. 
Johnson  v.  State,  113  Ind.  143 

(1887),  795,  884. 
Johnson  v.  Texas  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  93  S.  W. 

433  (1906),  783. 
Johnson  v.  Toledo,  S.  &  M.  Ry. 

Co.,  133  Mich.  596  (1903), 

511,  796. 

Johnson  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    33     Fed.    362 

(1887),  1025. 
Johnston  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

R.  Co.,  70  Neb.  364  (1903), 

902. 
Johnston  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  4 

Exch.  867  (1849),  361. 
Johnstone  v.  Richmond  R.  R.  Co., 

39S.C.  55  (1892),  1019, 1021. 
Jolley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,   119  Iowa,  491   (1903), 

347. 
Jordan  v.  Fall  River  R.  R.  Co.,  5 

Gush.  69  (1849),  876. 

[  cxxx  ] 


Jordan  v.  Indianapolis  Water  Co. 

(Ind.   App.),    61    N.   E.    12 

(1901),  264. 
Jones  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

63  Me.  188,  522. 
Jones  v.  Durham  Water  Co.,  135 

N.  C.  553  (1904),  351. 
Jones  v.  Earl,  37  Cal.  630  (1869), 

1046. 
Jones  v.  Mayor  of  Nashville,  109 

Tenn.  550  (1903),  452,  455, 

456,  457. 
Jones  v.  Newport  N.  &  M.  V.  R. 

R.  Co.,  65  Fed.  736  (1895), 

404,  816,  822. 
Jones  v.  North  Georgia  Electric 

Co.,  125  Ga.  618  (1906),  56, 

60,  95,  113,  114,  243. 
Jones  v.  Pitcher,  3  Stew.  &  P.  136 

(1833),  172. 
Jones  &  Price  v.  Mahaska  County 

Coal  Co.,  47  Iowa,  35  (1877), 

222. 
Jones  v.  Priester,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

Cas.  613  (1877),  876. 
Jones  v.  Roach,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

301  (1899),  511. 

Jones  v.  Rochester  Gas  &  Elec- 
tric Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

465   (1896),   273,   281,   405, 

458,  579. 
Jones  v.  St.  Louis  Southwestern 

Ry.  Co.,  125  Mo.  666  (1894), 

778,  1011. 
Jones  &  Co.  v.  Venable,  120  Ga. 

1  (1904),  225. 
Jones  v.  Voorhees,  10  Ohio  St.  145 

(1840),  185,  262. 
Jones  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  17  Mo.  App.  158  (1885), 

763. 

Jones   v.    Western   Union   Tele- 
graph   Co.,     18    Fed.    717 

(1883),  1025. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Judson  v.  Western  R.  R.  Corp.,  4 
Allen,  520  (1862),  726. 

Julia,  The,  14  Moore  P.  C.  210 
(1860),  173,  774. 

Julian  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  98  Ind.  327 
(1884),  902. 

Junction  Creek  &  N.  D.  D.  &  I. 
Ditch  Co.  v.  Durango,  21 
Colo.  194  (1895),  701. 

June  v.  Boston  &  Albany  R.  R. 
Co.,  153  Mass.  79  (1891), 
401. 


Kalamazoo  Hack  &   B.    Co.   v. 

Sootsma,  84  Mich.  194  (1890), 

485,  489,  514. 

Kallman   v.   United   States   Ex- 
press Co.,  3  Kan.  205  (1865), 

1012. 
Kansas  &  A.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ayres, 

63  Ark.  331  (1897),  575, 1026. 
Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  M.  Ry.  Co. 

v.   McGahey,   63   Ark.    344 

(1897),  876,  1057. 
Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.   Morrison,    34   Kan.    502 

(1886),  875. 
Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Washington,   74   Ark.    9 

(1905),  512. 
Kansas  City  Interurban  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Davis,  197  Mo.  669  (1906), 

305. 
Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.   Lilly,  8  So.  644  (1891), 

403. 
Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Riley,  68  Miss.  765  (1891), 

890. 
Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Spencer,    72    Miss.    491 

(1894),  669,  912. 


Kansas  City,  M.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

State  (Okla.),  107  Pac.  912 

(1910),  809. 
Kansas  City  &  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Baker,  183  Mo.  312  (1904), 

125. 
Kansas  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Holden, 

66  Ark.  602  (1899),  433. 
Kansas  City,  S.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Louisiana  W.  Ry.  Co.,  116 

La.  178  (1905),  224,  225,  822. 
Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Rodebaugh,  38  Kan. 

45  (1887),  1004. 
Kansas  &  G.  S.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Dorough,  72  Tex.  108  (1888), 

736. 
Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Cann,  2  Wyo.  3  (1877),  1050. 
Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nichols, 

Kennedy  &  Co.,  9  Kan.  235 

(1872),   204,   212,   252,   256, 

662.  769,  796,  989. 
Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 8  Kan.  623  (1871),  256. 
Kates  v.  Atlantic  Baggage,  etc., 

Co.,  107  Ga.  636  (1899),  483, 

489,  501. 
Kean  v.  Driggs  Drainage  Co.,  45 

N.  J.  L.  91  (1883),  67. 
Kearney    v.    Borough    of    West 

Chester,    199    Pa.    St.    392 

(1901),  306. 
Keen  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of 

Waycross,  101  Ga.  588  (1897), 

706. 
Keene  Syndicate  v.  Wichita  Gas, 

E.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  69  Kan.  284 

(1904),  693. 
Kellogg  v.   Sowerby,   87   N.   Y. 

Supp.  412  (1904),  224,  822. 
Kellogg  v.  Suffolk  &  C.  Ry.  Co., 

100  N.  C.  158  (1888),  399, 

403,  812. 

[  cxxxi ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Kellow,  Jr.,  Admr.,  v.  Cent.  la. 

Ry.  Co.,  68  Iowa,  470  (1886), 

756. 
Kelly  v.  New  York  Excise  Comrs., 

54  How.  Pr.  327  (1877),  263, 

974. 
Kelly  v.  C.,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

93  Iowa,  436  (1895),  500. 
Kelsey  v.  Board  of  Fire  &  Water 

Commissioners,     113    Mich. 

215  (1897),  380. 
Kember  v.  Southern  Express  Co., 

22  La.  Ann.  158  (1870),  1022. 
Kemp  v.  Coughtry,  11  Johns.  (N. 

Y.)  107  (1814),  255,  971. 
Kennebec     Water     District     v. 

Waterville,     97     Me.      185 

(1902),  92,  1065,  1067,  1068, 

1073,  1084,  1091,  1099,  1100, 

1101,  1102,  1103,  1124,  1138, 

1139,  1166,  1175,  1213,  1430. 
Kennedy  v.  Birmingham  Ry.  L. 

&  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  138  Ala.  225 
.(1902),  888. 
Kenney  Co.  v.  Atlanta  &  W.  P. 

R.  R.  Co.,  122  Ga.  365  (1905), 

1042. 

Kennon  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,     92    Ala.     399 

(1890),  348. 

Kenrig  v.  Eggleston,  Al.  93,  13. 
Kentucky  &   L.   Bridge  Co.   v. 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  37 

Fed.  567  (1889),  53, 126, 151, 

525,  534,  773,  972,  1416. 
Kentucky  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Biddle,  17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1363 

(1896),  932. 
Kentucky  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Thomas,  79  Ky.  160  (1880), 

760, 761. 
Kentucky   Wagon   Mfg.   Co.   v. 

Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Ky. 

152  (1895),  866, 1050. 

[  cxxxii  ] 


Kerr  v.  Willan,  6  M.  &  S.  150 

(1817),  1001. 
Kesten  v.  Hildebrand,  9  B.  Mon. 

72  (1848),  106. 
Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  356 

(1856),  145. 
Ketchum  v.  New  York  City  Ry. 

Co.,  118  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  248 

(1907),  878. 
Kettle  River  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eastern 

Ry.     Co.,     41     Minn.     461 

(1889),  223,  685. 

Kevoy  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    4    S.    D.    105 

(1893),  338. 
Kidder  v.  Fitchburg  Ry.  Co.,  165 

Mass.  398  (1896),  477. 
Kilduff  v.  Boston  Elev.  Ry.  Co., 

195  Mass.  307  (1907),  783. 
Kiley   v.    Western   Union   Tele- 
graph Co.,   109  N.   Y.  231 

(1888),  980. 
Killmer  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.Co.,  100  N.Y.  395  (1885), 

1282,  1287. 
Kimball  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids, 

99   Fed.    130    (1900),    1124, 

1430. 
Kimball   v.    Rutland,    etc.,    Ry. 

Co.,  26  Vt.  247  (1854),  256, 

758,  775,  989,  1001. 
Kimmich  v.  Ball,  129  U.  S.  217 

(1889),  1418. 
King  v.   Lenox,    19  Johns.   235 

(1821),  743. 
King,  The,  v.  Severn  &  Wye  Ry. 

Co.,  2  B.  &  Aid.  646  (1819), 

299. 

King    v.    Western    Union    Tele- 
graph   Co.,    89    Ark.    402 

(1909),  1041. 
Kingsley  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P. 

R.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed.  18  (1888), 

1322,  1323. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Kingsley  v.  Lake  Shore  Ry.  Co., 

125  Mass.  54  (1878),  769. 
Kinney  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  34 

N.   J.    L.   513   (1869),   786, 

1018. 
Kinney  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  99  Ky.  59  (1896),  942. 
Kirby  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  2 

Mo.  App.  369  (1876),  178, 776. 
Kirby  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  146 

111.  App.  31  (1908),  833. 
Kirby  v.   Western   Union   Tele- 
graph   Co.,    4    S.    D.    439 

(1892),  133,  412. 

Kirby   v.   Western   Union   Tele- 
graph   Co.,    7    S.    D.    623 

(1895),  1026. 
Kirkland  v.  Charleston  &  W.  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  79  S.  C.  273  (1907), 

757,  758. 
Kirkland  v.  Dinsmore,  62  N.  Y. 

171  (1875),  1003. 
Kirkland     v.     Montgomery,      1 

Swan,  452  (1852),  172,  255. 
Kistern  v.  Hildebrand,  9  B.  Mon. 

72  (1848),  234,  240,  263. 
Klauber  v.  American  Express  Co., 

21  Wis.  21  (1866),  963. 
Klugherz  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  90  Minn.  17  (1903), 

370. 
Knapp  v.  McCaffrey,  178  111.  107 

(1899),  173,  774,  972. 
Knapp,  Stout  &  Co.  v.  Transfer 

Co.,  126  Mo.  26  (1894),  226. 
Knight  v.  Providence  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  13  R.  I.  572  (1882),  513, 

522. 
Knight  v.  Quincy,  O.  &  K.  C.  R. 

R.  Co.,  120  Mo.  App.  311 

(1906),  413,  650,  659. 
Knight  v.  Wrightsville  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.,    127    Ga.    204    (1906), 

1056. 


Knott  v.  Raleigh  &  Gaston  R.  R. 

Co.,  98  N.  C.  73  (1887),  513, 

1033. 
Knottnerus  v.  North  P.  S.  R.  R. 

Co.,   93   Mich.   348   (1892), 

195. 
Knowles  v.  Atlantic  &  St.  L.  R. 

R.  Co.,  38  Me.  55  (1854), 

970. 
Knowles  v.  Railroad  Co.,  102  N. 

C.  59  (1809),  440. 
Knox    v.    Rives,    14    Ala.    249 

(1848),  743,  971. 
Knoxville  Traction  Co.  v.  Lane, 

103  Term.  376  (1899),  935. 
Knoxville  Traction  Co.  v.  Wilker- 

son,   117  Tenn.  482  (1907), 

439,  862,  863,  877. 
Knoxville    v.    Knoxville    Water 

Co.,  212  U.  S.  1  (1909),  1069, 

1084,  1091,  1094,  1110,  1166, 

1170,  1410. 
Koehler,  Ex  parte,  30  Fed.  867 

(1887),  1222,  1414,  1416. 
Koelle   v.    Knecht,    99    111.    396 

(1881),  226. 
Kopper  v.   Willis,   9   Daly,   460 

(1881),  341. 
Koretke  v.  Irwin  &  Co.,  100  Ala. 

323  (1893),  658. 
Kremer  v.  Southern  Express  Co., 

6  Cold.  356  (1869),  1040. 
Kroeger  v.  Seattle  Electric  Co., 

37  Wash.  544  (1905),  401. 
Krohn  v.  Sweeney,  2  Daly,  200 

(1867),  263. 
Krumenaker  v.  Dougherty,  77  N. 

Y.   Supp.   467    (1902),   623, 

883. 
Kuhlen  v.  Boston  &  N.  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  193  Mass.  341  (1907), 

945. 
Kuhn  v.  Knight,  115  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  837  (1906),  79. 
[  cxxxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Kuter  v.  Michigan  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  1  Biss.  35  (1853),  255, 

792. 
Kyle  v.  Texas  &  N.  0.  R.  R.  Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  4  L.  R.  A. 

275  (1889),  224. 


Lackawanna  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Chenewith,  52  Pa.  St.  382 

(1866),  764. 
Lackland  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,     101     Mo.    App.    420 

(1903),  812. 
Ladd  v.  Boston,  170  Mass.  332 

(1898),  1246. 
Ladd  v.  Cholard,  Minor  (Ala.), 

366,  739. 
Ladd  v.  Cotton  Press.  Co.,  53 

Tex.  172  (1880),  99. 
Laddonia  v.  Poor,  73  Mo.  App. 

465  (1898),  472. 
Lafaye  v.  Harris,   13  La.  Ann. 

553  (1858),  553. 
Laguna    Drainage    District    v. 

Martin   Co.,    144   Cal.   209 

(1904),  67. 
La  Harpe  v.  Elm  Township  G. 

L.,  F.  &  P.  Co.,  69  Kans.  97 

(1904),  94. 
Laighton  v.  Carthage,  175  Fed. 

145  (1909),  302,  316,  596. 
Lake    Erie  &  W.    Ry.   Co.    v. 

Acres,  108  Ind.  548  (1886), 

188. 
Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Hatch,  52  Oh.  St.  408  (1895), 

1037,  1038. 
Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

James,    10    Ind.    App.    550 

(1894),  597. 
Lake  Erie  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

State,  139  Ind.  158  (1894), 

211,300. 

[  cxxxiv  ] 


Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Anderson,  39  Ind.  App.  112 

(1906),  408,  722. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Bennett,  89  Ind.  457  (1883), 

669,  912. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Brown,  123  111.  162  (1887), 

761,  862. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Foster,  104  Ind.  293  (1885), 

728. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Greenwood,  79  Pa.  St.  373 

(1875),  863. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hodapp,     83    Pa.    St.     22 

(1876),  996,  1048. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Ohio,  173  U.  S.  285  (1899), 

1417. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Orndorff,    55    Oh.    St.    716 

(1897),  341. 
Lake   Shore    &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Perkins,    25    Mich.  329 

(1872),  256. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Pierce,  47  Mich.  277  (1882), 

864,  870,  872. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Prentice,     147    U.    S.     101 

(1893),  935,  938. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Smith,  173  U.  S.  684  (1899), 

830,  836,  1201,  1344,  1353, 

1431. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Teeters,  166  Ind.  335  (1906), 

881. 
Lamb  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry . 

Co.,  101  Wis.  138 (1898),  796. 
Lamb  v.   Parkman,    1   Sprague, 

343  (1857),  235,  239,  968. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


(References  are  to  sections] 


Lambert-Murray  Co.  v.  South- 
ern Express  Co.,  146  N.  C. 

321  (1907),  903. 
Lamond  v.  Richard,  1  Q.  B.  541 

(1897),  366,  579. 
Lamont  &  Co.  v.  Nashville  &  C. 

R.    R.    Co.,    9    Heisk.    58 

(1871),  917. 
Lancy   v.    Pennsylvania   R.    R. 

Co.,  154  Pa.  St.  342  (1893), 

987. 
Landa  v.  Hoick  &  Co.  et  al.,  129 

Mo.  663  (1895),  1046. 
Lane  v.   Cotton,   12   Mod.   472 

(1701),  106,  202,  391. 
Lane  v.  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Ga. 

R.    R.    Co.,    5    Tenn,    124 

(1880),  885. 
Lane  v.  Penniman,  4  Mass.  91 

(1808),  1266. 
Lang  v.   Brady,  73  Conn.   707 

(1901),  345. 
Lang  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

154  Pa.  St.  342  (1893),  667, 

911,950. 
Langley  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,   10  Gray  (Mass.),  103 

(1859),  740. 

Langley  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    88    Ga.     777 

(1892),  436. 
Lanier  v.  Youngblood,  73  Ala. 

587  (1883),  213,  964,  1001. 
Lannen  v.  Albany  Gaslight  Co., 

46  Barb.  264  (1865),  982. 
Lanning  v.  Sussex  R.  R.  Co.,  1 

N.   J.   L.   Jour.   21    (1878), 

551. 
Laporte  v.  Wells-Fargo  Exp.  Co., 

23   App.   Div.    267   (1897), 

1040. 
Larabee  Flour  Mills  v.  Missouri 

Pacific  Ry.   Co.,  74  Kans. 

808  (1906),  130, 1413. 


Latour  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  71 

S.  C.  532  (1904),  904. 
Laughlin  v.  Chicago  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,    28    Wis.    204    (1871), 

1033. 
Laurel  Fork  &  S.  H.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

West   Virginia   T.    Co.,    25 

W.    Va.    324    (1884),    176, 

1421. 
Laveroni  v.  Drury,  8  Exch.  166 

(1852),  165. 
Lawler  v.  Baring  Boom  Co.,  56 

Me.  443  (1869),  73. 
Lawrence  v.  Denbreens,  1  Black 

(U.  S.),  170  (1862),  1269. 
Lawrence  v.   Howard,    1   Utah, 

142  (1874),  751. 
Lawrence  v.  New  York  P.  &  B. 

R.    R.    Co.,    36    Conn.    63 

(1869),  1002. 
Lawrence  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co., 

144    Mass.    1    (1887),    153, 

382,  847. 
Lawrenceburgh  &  U.  M.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Montgomery,  7  Ind. 

474  (1856),  762. 
Lawson  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  & 

0.   Ry.   Co.,   64   Wis.   447 

(1885),  780. 
Leach  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 

H.  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Hun,  377 

(1895),  433. 

Leavell  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,   116  N.  C.  211 

(1895),  688,  801,  837. 
Leavenworth,  L.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Maris,     16     Kan.    333 

(1876),  1037. 
Le  Barren    v.    East    B.    Ferry 

Co.,  11    Allen,   312   (1865), 

182. 

Lechowitzer  v.  Hamburg-Amer- 
ican Packet  Co.,  27  N.  Y. 

Supp.  140  (1894),  1004. 

[cxxxv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Le  Conteur  v.  London  &  S.  W. 

Ry.    Co.,    6   B.    &   S.    961 

(1865),  769. 
Lee    v.    Burgess,    9    Bush,    652 

(1873),  255. 
Lee  v.  New  Orleans  Gt.  No.  R. 

R.  Co.,  125  La.  236  (1910), 

848. 
Lee  v.  Raleigh  &  G.  R.  R.  Co., 

72  N.  C.  236  (1875),  256. 
Lee  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Co.,  51  Mo.  App.  375  (1892), 

348. 
Leech    v.    Baldwin,     5    Watts 

(Pa.),  446  (1836),  1269. 
Leggs  v.   New  York,   N.  H.  & 

H.  R.  R.  Co.,  197  Mass.  88 

(1908),  1044. 

Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania,   145    U.    S.    192 

(1892),  1413. 
Leigh  v.   Garysburg  Mfg.   Co., 

132  N.  C.   167  (1903),  57, 

223. 
Lemon  v.  Chanslor,  68  Mo.  340 

(1878),  185,  364,  785. 
Lemon  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.,  52 

Fed.  262  (1887),  153,  382. 
Lemont  v.  Washington  &  G.  R. 

R.    Co.,    1    Mackey,     180 

(1881),  638,  933. 
Leo  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry. 

Co.,  30  Minn.  438  (1883), 

1033. 
Leonard  v.  American  Exp.  Co., 

26   Up.   Can.    (Q.   B.)    533 

(1867),  251,  254,  792. 
Leonard  v.  Hendrickson,  18  Pa. 

St.  40  (1851),  173,  774. 
Leonard  v.  New  York,  A.  &  B. 

Telegraph  Co.,  41  N.  Y.  544 

(1820),  973. 
Leonard  v.  St.  Louis  Transit  Co., 

115  Mo.  App.  349  (1905),  629. 

f  cxxxvi  1 


Leredo,    City    of,    v.    Interna- 
tional Bridge  Co.,  66  Fed. 

246  (1895),  53. 
Leslie  v.  Lorillard,  110  N.  Y.  519 

(1888),  693. 
Lesson  v.  Holt,   1  Starkie,   186 

(1816),  1001. 
Lester  v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  Ry. 

Co.,  1  K.  B.  878  (1903),  988. 
Leverich  v.  City  of  Mobile,  110 

Fed.  170  (1867),  232. 
Levi  v.  Lynn  &  Boston  R.  R. 

Co.,   11   Allen,  300  (1865), 

262. 
Levien  v.  Webb,  30  N.  Y.  Misc. 

196  (1899),  948. 
Levy  v.  Corey,  1  City  Ct.  Rep. 

Supp.  57  (1884),  631,  638, 

947. 
Lewis  v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Ry. 

Co.,  47  W.  Va.  656  (1900), 

517,  1033. 
Lewis  v.  Flint  &  P.  M.  Ry.  Co., 

54  Mich.  55  (1884),  916. 
Lewis    v.    Houston    Elec.    Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  88  S.  W. 

489  (1905),  736. 
Lewis  v.   Louisville   &   N.   Ry. 

Co.,    135   Ky.    361    (1909), 

1038. 
Lewis  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  49  Barb.  330  (1867), 

441. 
Lewis  v.  Weatherford,  M.,  W.  & 

N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  48  (1904),  501. 
Lewis  v.  Western  R.  R.  Corp.,  11 

Met.  509  (1846),  1042. 
Libby  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  R.  Co., 

85  Me.  34  (1892),  777,  978. 
Light    v.    Abel,    6    Allen,    400 

(1866),  751. 
Linck  v.  City  of  Litchfield,  31 

111.  App.  118  (1888),  306. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Lindsay  v.  Mayor  &  City  Coun- 
cil of  Anniston,  104  Ala.  257 

(1893),  484. 
Lindsley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 

P.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Minn.  539 

(1887),  989. 
Linn  v.  Chambersburg,  160  Pa. 

St.  511  (1894),  218. 
Linne  v.  Bredes,  43  Wash.  540 

86    Pa.    858    (1906),    377, 

456. 
Liquid  Carbonic  Co.  v.  Norfolk 

&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  107  Va.  323 

(1907),  1024,  1026. 
Litchfield  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  The 

People,  222  111.  242  (1906), 

223,  310. 
Little  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

66  Me.  239  (1876),  1021. 
Little   v.    Fargo,    43    Hun,    233 

(1887),  911. 
Littlejohn   v.   Fitchburg   R.    R. 

Co.,  148  Mass.  478  (1889), 

341,  785. 
Littlejohn  v.  Jones,  2  McMull, 

366  (1842),  237,  241,  968. 
Little  Miami  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wash- 
burn,     22     Ohio     St.     324 

(1872),  518,  522,  1033. 
Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Conatser,    61    Ark.    560 

(1896),  723. 
Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Hunter,    42    Ark.    200 

(1883),  726. 
Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Miles,  40  Ark.  298  (1883), 

760,  780,  978. 
Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Oppenheimer,  64  Ark.  271 

(1897),  853,  1378. 
Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Tankersley,  54  Ark.  25 

(1890),  1044. 


Little  Rock,  M.  R.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 

v.   Glidewell,   39   Ark.   487 

(1882),  207,  762,  1048. 
Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  41  Fed.  559(1890),  534. 
Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  59  Fed.  400  (1894),  431, 

435,  523,  528. 
Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

St.    Louis    S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

63  Fed.  775,  435,  523,  534, 

682. 
Little  Rock  Ry.  &  El.   Co.  v. 

Goerner,  80  Ark.  158  (1906), 

890. 
Liver  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson,  L. 

Rep.   9   Exch.   338    (1874), 

148,  164. 
Liverpool  &  G.  W.  Steam  Co.  v. 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  129  U.  S. 

397  (1889),  229,  1010. 
Lloyd  v.  Gaslight  Co.,  1  Mackey, 

331  (1881),  451,  453. 
Lloyd  v.  Haugh  &  K.  Storage  & 

Transfer   Co.,   223   Pa.   St. 

148  (1909),   169,   170,  204, 

206,  220,  230,  236. 
Loader  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

R.  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  996 

(1895),  189,  313,  668. 
Loan  Association  v.  Topeka,  20 

Wall.  655  (1874),  64. 
Lockwood   v.    Boston   Elevated 

Ry.    Co.,    200    Mass.    537 

(1909),  403,  736. 
Lodge  v.  United  Gas  &  Imp.  Co., 

209  Pa.  St.  553  (1904),  982. 
Logan    v.    Mobile    Trade    Co., 

46  Ala.  513  (1871),  1003. 
Logan  v.  Pontchartrain    R.  R. 

Co.,    11    Rob.    24    (1845), 

1002. 

f  cxxxvii  1 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Logan  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 

Ry.     Co.,     154     Fed.     497 

(1907),  857. 
Logansport  Gas  Co.  v.  Pern,  89 

Fed.  185  (1898),  1095. 
Logansport  &  W.  V.  Gas  Co.  v. 

Ott,  30  Ind.  App.  93  (1902), 

1338. 
London  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Evershed,    L.    R.    3    App. 

Gas.  1029  (1878),  1312. 
London  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Hinchcliffe,    2    K.    B.    32 

(1903),  446,  1256, 1260. 
Long  Acre  Light  &  Power  Co., 

Re,   102   N.   Y.   Supp.   242 

(1907),  78,  383. 
Long  Branch  Com.   v.   Tintern 

Manor  Water  Co.,  71  N.  J. 

Eq.  790  (1906),  92. 
Long  Branch  Com.  v.  Tintern 

Manor  Water  Co.,  70  N.  J. 

Eq.  71   (1905),  1086,  1139, 

1151, 1154, 1166, 1167, 1175, 

1197. 
Long  Island  Water  Supply  Co. 

v.  Brooklyn,  166  U.  S.  685 

(1897),  92,  242, 1103. 
Long  v.  Beard,  3  Murphy,  57 

(1819),  52. 
Long  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

147  Pa.  St.  343  (1892),  656, 

984. 
Long  v.  Springfield  Water  Co., 

8  Del.  Co.  (Pa.)  151  (1901), 

435,  877, 1251, 1290, 1300. 
Loon,  The,  7  Blatch.  244  (1870), 

747. 
Loraine  v.  Pittsburg,  J.  E.  &  E. 

R.  R.  Co.,  205  Pa.  St.  132 

(1903),  573,  850,  1366. 
Los  Angeles  v.  Los  Angeles  City 

Water  Co.,   177  U.  S.  558 

(1900),  216,  1424. 

[  cxxxviii  ] 


Lotspeich  v.  Central  Ry.  Co.,  73 

Ala.  306  (1882),  512, 1377. 
Lottery    Case,    178    U.    S.    321 

(1903),  1413. 
Lough  v.  Outerbridge,  143  N.  Y. 

271  (1894),  681,  685,  1282, 

1284, 1289,  1305, 1311, 1328. 
Loughbridge  v.   Harris,  42  Ga. 

500  (1871),  65,  851. 
Louisiana  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 

91  Ark.  358  (1909),  805,  809. 
Louisiana  Nat.  Bank  v.  Lavielle, 

52  Mo.  380  (1873),  747. 
Louisiana  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Reeves   (Ark.),    128  S.   W. 

1051  (1910),  1041. 
Louisiana    Railroad    Comm.    v. 

Cumberland  Telephone  Co., 

212  U.  S.  414  (1909),  1129, 

1170, 1221. 
Louisiana  Ry.   &   Nav.   Co.   v. 

Railroad    Commission,    121 

La.  847  (1908),  806. 
Louisville  v.  Wehmhoff,  116  Ky. 

812  (1903),  603. 
Louisville  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 

85  Ark.  12  (1907),  805. 
Louisville  &  C.  Packet  Co.  v. 

Bottorff,    25   Ky.    L.    Rep. 

1324  (1904),  902,  913. 
Louisville  &  C.  Packet  Co.  v. 

Rogers,   20  Ind.   App.   594 

(1898),  906. 
Louisville  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Nally,  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1357 

(1907),  632. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bal- 

lard,  85  Ky.  307  (1887),  935. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.    R.   Co.  v. 

Behlmer,    175    U.    S.    648 

(1898),  1222,  1377,  1414. 
Louisville    &    N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Bell,   13  Ky.   L.   Rep.   393 

(1891),  667,  669,  912. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Bell,  100  Ky.  203  (1896),780. 
Louisville   &  N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Blair,  104  Tenn.  212  (1900), 

890. 
Louisville   &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Boland,  96  Ala.  626  (1892), 

529. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Breckinridge,     99     Ky.     1 

(1896),  447,  1259,  1261. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Britton,  149  Ala.  552  (1907), 

1045. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Brown,  123  Fed.  946  (1903), 

1105,1133,1138,  1178,1402. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Brownlee,     14     Bush,     590 

(1879),  1001. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.    Co.    v. 

Campbell  et  al.,    7    Heisk. 

253  (1872),  1033. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ca- 

tron,   102  Ky.   323   (1897), 

566,  849. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.  B.   Co.   v. 

Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  30  Ky.  L. 

Rep.    18   (1906),   527,   529, 

539,  804. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S. 

132   (1909),   403,   491,   527, 

532,698,804,811,818,1043, 

1434. 
Louisville   &    N.  R.   R.  Co.  v. 

Com.,  102  Ky.  300  (1897), 

873. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Com.,  105  Ky.  179  (1898), 

1337. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Com.,  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  232 

(1899),  1222, 1377. 


Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Com.,  108  Ky.  628  (1900), 

1337,  1342. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Cottengim  (Ky.),  104  S.  W. 

280  (1907),  438. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Crunk,  119  Ind.  542  (1889), 

369,  372,  638. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Dancy,  97  Ala.  338  (1892), 

872. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Du 

Bose,  120 Ga.  339  (1904),  754. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Duncan  &  Orr,  137  Ala.  446 

(1902),  518,  1033. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eu- 
bank, 184  U.  S.  27  (1902), 

1419. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Farmers'  &  D.  L.  S.  Com. 

Firm,    107   Ky.   53    (1899), 

834,  1033. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ft. 

Wayne    Electric    Co.,    108 

Ky.  113  (1900),  1049. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Fulgham,  91  Ala.  555  (1890), 

1299,  1333. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Gaines,  99  Ky.  411   (1896), 

889. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gar- 

rett,  8  Lea,  438  (1881),  341, 

438,  441,  447,  1259. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gil- 

mer,    89    Ala.    534    (1889), 

1042. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Hine,  121  Ala.  234  (1898), 

763,  889,  891. 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kel- 
ler, 104  Ky.  768  (1898),  1044. 

[  cxxxix  1 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Louisville  &    N.  R.    R.  Co.  v. 

Kelley,  92  Ind.  371  (1883), 

938. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Kingman,  18  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

82  (1896),  777. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Landers,  135  Ala.  504  (1903), 

1007. 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lo- 
gan, 88  Ky.  232  (1889),  620, 

629,  633,  634,  934. 
Louisville   &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Maybin,  66  Miss.  83  (1889), 

440,  646,  878,  886. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Odill,  96  Tenn.  61   (1896), 

905. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Owen,  12  Ky.  L.  Rep.  716 

(1890),  1042. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Pittsburg  &   K.   Coal  Co., 

Ill    Ky.    960    (1901),    223, 

224,  539,  597,  691,  822. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Queen   City   Coal   Co.,    13 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  832  (1892), 

665,  837. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Queen   City   Coal   Co.,    99 

Ky.  217  (1896),  663,  799. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 71  S.  W.  516  (1903), 

735. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Setser's   Admr.    (Ky.),   128 

S.  W.  341  (1910),  646. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.  R.   Co.  v. 

Sherrod,  84  Ala.  178  (1887), 

1021. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Sowell,  90  Tenn.  17  (1891), 

1019. 

[erf] 


Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Stacker,      86     Tenn.     343 

(1888),  754. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

United  States,  39  Ct.  of  Cl. 

405  (1904),  724. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Walker,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  453 

(1901),  1378. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  West 

Coast  Naval  Stores  Co.,  198 

U.  S.  483  (1905),  102,  232, 

488,522,811. 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams,  95  Ky.    199   (1893), 

529,  530. 
Louisville  &   N.   R.    R.   Co.   v. 

Young,   1  Bush  (Ky.),  401 

(1866),  604,  636. 
Louisville  &  W.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Gerson  &  Sons,  102  Ala.  409 

(1893),  970. 
Louisville,  C.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Chappell,  Rice,  383  (1839), 

58. 
Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  C.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Crown  Coal  Co.,  43 

111.  App.  228  (1891),  1299. 
Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Wilson,    132    Ind.    517 

(1892),  554,  685,  1286,  1322, 

1326, 1330, 1344,  1365. 
Louisville  Gas  Co.  v.  Dulaney, 

100   Ky.    405    (1897),    825, 

1251,  1354. 
Louisville,  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Joplin,  21  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

1380  (1900),  432. 
Louisville   Natural   Gas   Co.   v. 

State,   135  Ind.  49  (1894), 

1410,  1424. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Brinley,  17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  9 

(1895),  915. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Craycraft,  12  Ind.  App.  203 

(1894),  1003,  1004. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Flanagan,     113     Ind.     488 

(1887),  399,  403,  723. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Godman,     104     Ind.     490 

(1885),  393,  727. 
Louisville,    N.    A.    &    C.    Ry. 

Co.   v.    Keefer,    146    Ind. 

21    (1896),    477,    777,  778, 

1015. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Snyder,  117  Ind.  435  (1888), 

794. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Taylor,  126  Ind.  126  (1890), 

780. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Thompson,    107    Ind.    442 

(1886),  966. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wolfe,  128  Ind.  347  (1890), 

633. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.' 

Wright,   18  Ind.  App.   125 

(1897),  865,  873. 
Louisville,  N.  &  Gt.  So.  R.  R. 

Co.    v.    Fleming,    14    Lea 

(Tenn.),    128    (1884),    440, 

635,  933. 
Louisville,  N.  0.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Patterson,  69  Miss.  421 

(1891),  662,  800. 
Louisville,  N.  0.  &  Ry.  T.  Co.  v. 

State,  66  Miss.  662  (1889), 

566,  848. 
Louisville,  St.  L.  &  Texas  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Bourne,   16  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  825.  (1895),  517. 
Louisville    Tobacco    Warehouse 

Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  106 

Ky.  166  (1899),  142. 


Louisville  Transfer  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican District  Telegraph  Co., 

1  Ky.  L.  J.  144  (1881),  136, 

704. 
Louisville  Water  Co.  v.  Wiemer, 

130  Fed.  257  (1904),  496. 
Lovejoy    v.    Blessemer    Water- 
works   Co.,    146    Ala.    374 

(1906),  300,  350. 
Loveland  v.   Burke,   120  Mass. 

139  (1876),  414,  991. 
Lovett  v.  Hobbs,  2  Show,  127 

(1680),  184. 
Lowe  v.  Yolo  Co.  Consol.  Water 

Co.,  6  Cal.  App.  646  (1908), 

384,  652. 
Lucas  v.  Herbert,   148  Ind.  64 

(1897),  484. 
Lucas  v.  Michigan  Central  Ry. 

Co.,    98    Mich.    1    (1893), 

886. 
Lucas  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  33  Wis.  41  (1873),  763, 

764. 
Lucas  v.  New  Bedford  &  T.  R. 

R.  Co.,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  64 

(1856),  372. 
Lucas  v.  Taunton  &  N.  B.  R.  R. 

Co.,  6  Gray,  64  (1856),  369, 

372. 
Lucia  v.  Omel,  53  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  641  (1900),  611,  965. 
Lucy  v.  Chicago  Gt.  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,     64    Minn.    7    (1896), 

934. 
Luke  v.  Lyde,  2  Burr.  882  (1759), 

1265. 
Lumbard  v.  Stearns,  4  Cush.  60 

(1849),  32,  92,  242. 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  136 

N.  C.  479,  1077. 
Lumsden  v.  L.  A.  Thompson  S. 

R.  R.  Co.,  130  App.  Div. 

209  (1909),  195. 

f  cxli  1 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Lundquist  v.  Gr.  Tr.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

121  Fed.  915  (1901),  696. 
Lusk  v.   Belote,   22   Minn.   468 

(1876),  365,  964. 
Lyles  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

77S.C.  174 (1906),  765, 1041. 
Lyman  v.  Suburban  R.  R.  Co., 

190  111.  320  (1901),  811. 
Lynch  v.  Met.  El.  Ry.  Co.,  90 

N.  Y.  77  (1882),  866. 
Lyne  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

123  N.  C.  129  (1898),  1041. 
Lyon,  The,  1  Brown's  Admr.  59 

(1861),  173,  774. 
Lyon    v.     Smith,     Morris,     184 

(1843),   203,   213,   233,   234, 

240,  968. 
Lyons  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co., 

120  N.  Y.  S.  1132(1909), 1045. 

M 

Mabb  v.  Stewart,  133  Cal.  556 
(1901),  378. 

Mace  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  151 
N.  C.  404  (1909),  889. 

Mackey  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  16  Nev.  222 
(1881),  851. 

Mackin  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
135  Mass.  201  (1883),  529. 

Mackin  v.  Portland  Gas  Co.,  38 
Oreg.  120  (1900),  111,  452, 
453,  458. 

Maclaren  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  Wis.  138  (1868),  914. 

Macon  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 38  Ga.  409  (1868),  862, 
882. 

Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Graham  &  Ward,  117  Ga.  555 
(1903),  102,  232,  487,  811. 

Macon  Grocery  Co.  v.  Atlantic 
Coast  Line  Ry.  Co.,  163  Fed. 
738  (1908),  1129. 

[  cxlii] 


Macrow   v.   Great  Western  Ry. 
Co.,    L.    R.    6    Q.    B.    612 

(1871),  875. 
McAbsher  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 

R.  Co.,  108  N.  C.  344  (1891), 

831,  833,  922. 
McAllan  v.  Hamblin,  129  Iowa, 

329  (1906),  264. 
McAndrew  v.  Electric  Telegraph 

Co.,  17  C.  B.  3  (1855),  76G, 

1014. 
McAndrew  v.  Whitlock,  52  N.  Y. 

40  (1873),  1043. 
McArthur  v.  Green  Bay  &  M. 

Canal    Co.,    34    Wis.     139 

(1874),  122,  599. 
McArthur  v.  Sears,  21  Wend.  190 

(1839),  172,  985. 
McBee  v.  Carolina  Central  Ry. 

Co.,  89  N.  C.  311   (1883), 

1011. 
McCabe  v.  Narragansett  Electric 

Co.,  26  R.  I.  427  (1904),  983. 
McCarter  v.  Greenville  Tr.  Co., 

72  S.  C.  134  (1905),  754,  890. 
McCarthy    v.    Humphrey,     105 

Iowa,  535  (1898),  377. 
McCarthy  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

R.  Co.,  102  Ala.  193  (1893), 

414,  991. 
McCarthy  v.  New  York  &  Eric 

Ry.    Co.,    30    Pa.    St.    247 

(1858),  1036,  1037. 
McCarty  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

Co.,  79  Tex.  33  (1890),  723, 

1023. 
McCarty  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry. 

Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  54  S. 

W.  421  (1899),  978. 
McCaul  v.   Telegraph  Co.,    114 

Tenn.  661  (1905),  874,  1041. 
McCauley  v.  Tennessee,  C.  I.  & 

R.  R.  Co.,  93  Ala.  356  (1890), 

762,  882. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


McClary  v.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  Neb.  44  (1873),  904. 
McCleary  v.  Babcock,  169  Ind. 

228  (1907),  176. 
McCleneghan  v.  Brock,  5  Rich. 

L.  17  (1851),  183. 
McCluer  v.  Manchester  &  L.  R. 

R.  Co.,  13  Gray,  124  (1859), 

740. 
McClure   v.    Krumbholz,    9   Pa. 

Dist.  R.  544  (1900),  263. 
M'Clures  v.  Hammond,  1  Bay,  99 

(1790),  167,  172. 
McConnell  v.  Pedigo,  92  Ky.  465 

(1892),  485. 
McCook  v.   Northrup,   65  Ark. 

225  (1898),  878,  885. 
M'Cook    Water   Works    Co.    v. 

M'Cook,  85  Neb.  677  (1909), 

1150. 
McCoy  &  P.   v.   Erie  &   West. 

Transp.    Co.,    42    Md.    498 

(1875),  1007. 
McCoy  v.  Railroad  Co.,  44  Iowa, 

424  (1876),  256. 
McCrae  v.  Canada  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 

(Mont.),  L.  R.  4  S.  C.  186 

(1888),  207. 
McCrary  v.  Beaudry,  67  Cal.  120 

(1885),  242. 
McCullough  v.  Hellweg,  66  Md. 

269  (1886),  1266. 
McCune  v.  Norwich    Gas    Co., 

30    Conn.    521    (1862),    31, 

111. 
McDade  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  68  W.  Va.  378  1044. 
McDaniel  v.  Faubush  Telephone 

Co.,    32   Ky.    L.    Rep.    572 

(1908),  21. 
McDaniel  v.  Waterworks,  48  Mo. 

App.  273  (1892),  452. 
McDaniels  v.  Robertson,  28  Vt. 

387  (1856),  1032. 


McDaniels  v.  Robinson,  26  Vt. 

316  (1854),  1032. 
McDermon  v.   Southern  Pacific 

Co.,  122  Fed.  669  (1903),  779. 
McDermont  v.  Anaheim  Union 

Water    Co.,    124    Cal.    112 

(1899),  652. 
McDonald  v.  Edgerton,  5  Barb. 

560  (1849),  770,  1032. 
McDonough  v.  Boston  Elevated 

Ry.    Co.,    191    Mass.    509 

(1906),  864,  882. 
McDuffee  v.  Portland  &  R.  R.  R. 

Co.,  52  N.  H.  430  (1873), 

475,   479,   690,    1286,    1289, 

1303,  1304. 
McDuffie  v.  Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  145  N.  C.  397  (1908), 

408,  722. 
McEacheran  v.  Michigan  Central 

R.   R.   Co.,   101   Mich.  264 

(1894),  1017. 
McEntee  v.  Kingston  Water  Co., 

165   N.   Y.  27   (1900),   458, 

866. 

McEntee  v.  New  Jersey  Steam- 
boat Co.,  45  N.  Y.  34  (1871), 

1046. 
McEwan  v.  Pennsylvania,  N.  J. 

&  N.  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  72  N.  J.  L. 

419  (1905),  128. 

McFadden  v.  County  of  Los  An- 
geles, 74  Cal.  571  (1888),  242. 
McFadden   v.    Missouri,    Pacific 

R.    R.    Co.    92     Mo.    343 

(1887),  963. 
McGearty    v.    Manhattan    Ry. 

Co.,  15  App.  Div.  2  (1897), 

945. 
McGee  v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,  92  Mo.  208  (1887),  763, 

864. 
McGhee  v.   Reynolds,    129  Ala. 

540  (1900),  889. 

[  cxliii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


McGill  v.  Rowand,  3  Barr.  451 

(1846),  185. 
McGilvray  v.  West  End  St.  Ry. 

Co.,   164  Mass.   122  (1895), 

939. 
McGinnis  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  21  Mo.  App.  399  (1886), 

935. 
McGowan  v.  New  York  City  Ry. 

Co.,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  (App. 

Div.)  835  (1906),  862. 
McGowan  v.  Wilmington  &  W. 

R.    R.   Co.,   95   N.   C.   417 

(1886),  913. 
McGowen  v.  Morgan's  La.  &  Tex. 

R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann. 

732  (1889),  887,  888. 
McGrath  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  74 

Minn.  363  (1898),  944. 
McGraw  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R. 

Co.,  18  W.  Va.  361  (1881), 

665,  842,  902,  916,  917,  988. 
McGregor  v.  Kilgore,  6  Ohio,  359 

(1834),  172. 
McGuinn  v.  Forbes,  37  Fed.  639 

(1889),  566. 
McHenry  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  & 

V.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Harr.  448 

(1846),  1036. 
McHugh  v.  Schlosser,  159  Pa.  St. 

480   (1894),   631,   632,   638, 

933. 
Mclntosh  v.  Augusta  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.   (S.  C.),  69  S.  E.   159 

(1910),  626,  880. 
Mclntosh  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav. 

Co.,   17  Idaho,   100   (1909), 

253,  1011. 
McKay  v.  Ohio  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  34 

W.  Va.  65  (1890),  890. 
M'Kean  v.  M'lvor,  L.  R.  6  Ex.  36 

(1870),  1049. 
McKee  v.  Owen,   15  Mich.  115 

(1866),  769. 

[  cxliv  ] 


McKenzie    v.  Michigan   Central 

R.   R.   Co.,   137   Mich.    112 

(1904),  902. 
McKeon  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  94  Wis.  477  (1896), 

932. 
McKibbin  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 

Co.,  78 Minn.  232  (1899), 876. 
McKibbin  v.  Wisconsin  Central 

Ry.    Co.,    100    Minn.    270 

(1907),  769. 
McKinley  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  314  (1877), 

844,  881. 
McKone  v.  Michigan  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,   51    Mich.   601    (1883), 

369,  372. 
McLain  v.  St.  Louis  &  G.  Ry. 

Co.,  131  Mo.  App. 733  (1908), 

845. 
McLean   v.   Interurban  St.   Ry. 

Co.,  102  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  18 

(1905),  347. 
McLean  v.  Rutherford,  8  Mo.  109 

(1843),  875. 
McLeod    v.    Pacific    Telephone 

Co.,  52  Oreg.  22  (1908),  980. 
McLeod  v.  Savannah,  Albany  & 

Gulf  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Ga.  445 

(1858),  241. 
M'Manus,  Ex  parte,  6  Austral.  L. 

T.  (Viet.)  12  (1884),  751. 
McMaster  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  69  Pa.  St.  374  (1871), 

1042. 
McMeekin    v.    Central    Carolina 

Power    Co.,    80    S.    C.   512 

(1908),  114. 
McMillan  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  0. 

Ry.  Co.  (Iowa),  124  N.  W. 

1069  (1910),  519,  529,  1033. 
McMillan  v.  Michigan  S.  &  N.  I. 

R.    R.    Co.,    16    Mich.    79 

(1867),  338,  1002,  1012. 


References  are  to  sections] 


McMillian  v.  Federal  St.  &  P.  V. 

Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  172  Pa.  St.  523 

(1896),  865,  882. 
McNamara  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry. 

Co.,   61   Minn.   296   (1895), 

745. 
McNees  v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,  22  Mo.  App.  224  (1886), 

1287. 
McNeill  v.  Durham  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,  132  N.  C.  510  (1903), 

1295,  1363. 
McNeill  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  202 

U.  S.  543  (1906),  836,  1415. 
McNulty  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  182  Pa.  St.  479  (1897), 

784,  1016. 
McPadden  v.  New  York  Central 

Ry.  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  478  (1871), 

966. 

McPeck  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph  Co.,    107    Iowa,    356 

(1899),  874,  1041. 
McQuerry    v.    Metropolitan    St. 

Ry.  Co.,  117  Mo.  App.  255 

(1906),  879,  939. 
McRae  v.  Canadian  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.  (Montreal),  L.  R.  4  S.  C. 

186  (1888),  762. 
McRae  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,   88   N.   C.  526    (1883), 

865. 
MacVeagh  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

R.    R.   Co.,    3    N.    M.    205 

(1885),  1036,  1046. 
McVeety  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M. 

Ry.  Co.,  45  Minn.  268  (1891), 

745. 
McWhorter  v.  Pensacola  &  A.  R. 

R.  Co.,  24  Fla.  417  (1888), 

1409. 
Mac  Williams  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 

S.  Ry.  Co.,  146  Mich.  216 

(1906),  942. 

10 


Madison  v.  Madison  Gas  &  Elec- 
tric Co.,  129  Wis.  249  (1906), 

111,  113,215,  1216. 
Madison  v.  Morristown  Gaslight 

Co.,  65  N.  J.  Eq.  356  (1903), 

273,  274. 
Maffet   v.    Quine,    93   Fed.   347 

(1899),  62. 
Magee   v.    Pacific    Improvement 

Co.,  98  Cal.  678  (1893),  751. 
Maggie  Hammond,  The,  9  Wall. 

(U.  S.)  435  (1869),  165,  905, 

906,  921. 
Maghee  v.  Camden  &  A.  R.  R. 

Tr.  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  514  (1871), 

905,  908,  921,  1017. 
Maginnis   v.   Knickerbocker   Ice 

Co.,  112  Wis.  385  (1901),  223. 
Magruder  v.   Cumberland  Tele- 
phone &  T.  Co.,  92  Miss.  716 

(1908),  438. 
Mahan   v.    Michigan   Telephone 

Co.,  132  Mich.  242  (1903), 

215,  216. 
Mahon  v.  Blake,  125  Mass.  477 

(1878),  1048. 
Majestic  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Illinois 

Central  R.  R.  Co.,  162  Fed. 

810  (1908),  857. 
Majestic,    The,    166   U.    S.    375 

(1897),  1004. 
Mallon  v.  Board  of  Water  Comrs., 

144  Mo.   App.    104   (1910), 

825. 
Malochee  v.  Gt.  So.  Telephone  & 

T.   Co.,   49   La.   Ann.    1690 

(1897),  431,  442. 
Maloney  v.  Bacon,  33  Mo.  App. 

501  (1888),  730. 
Mallory  v.  Tioga  R.  R.  Co.,  39 

Barb.    (N.  Y.)   488    (1862), 

775. 
Malott  v.  Central  Trust  Co.,  168 

Ind.  428  (1906),  777. 

[  cxlv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Manchester  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Concord  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  H. 

100  (1889),  694. 
Manistee  River  Improvement  Co. 

v.   Lamport,   49  Mich.   442 

(1882),  72,  123. 
Mann  Boudoir  Car  Co.  v.  Dupre, 

54   Fed.    646     (1893),    832, 

845. 
Mann  v.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R. 

Co.,  135  Mich.  210  (1903), 

403,  822,  1015,  1043. 
Mann   v.    White   River   Log   & 

Booming  Co.,  46  Mich.  38 

(1881),  55,  972. 
Mann  &  W.  v.  Birchard  &  P.,  40 

Vt.  326  (1867),  1011. 
Manning  v.  City  of  Devils  Lake, 

13  N.  D.  47  (1904),  241. 
Manning  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  95  Ala.  392  (1891),  433, 

1257,  1258. 
Manufacturers'  Coal  Rates  Case, 

3  Can.  Ry.  Cas.  427  (1904), 

1334. 
Manville  v.  Cleveland  &  T.  R.  R. 

Co.,  11  Ohio  St.  417  (1860), 

783. 
Maples  v.  New  York  &  N.  H.  R. 

R.  Co.,  38  Conn.  557  (1871), 

440,  886. 
Margaret,    The,    94   U.    S.    494 

(1876),  173,  774. 
Markham  v.  Brown,  8  N.  H.  523 

(1837),   106,  370,  493,  628, 

630,  631,  632. 
Marquette,  H.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Kirkwood,     45     Mich.     51 

(1880),  513. 
Marsh  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

3     M'Crary,     236     (1882), 

908. 
Marshall    v.    American    Express 

Co.,  7  Wis.  1  (1858),  1040. 

[  cxlvi  ] 


Marshall  v.  Nashville  R.  &  Light 

Co.,  118  Tenn.  254  (1906), 

786,  1018. 
Marshall  v.  New  York  Central 

R.  R.  Co.,  45  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

502  (1866),  840,  914,  1045. 
Marshall  v.  Pontiac,  0.  &  N.  R. 

R.  Co.,  126  Mich.  45  (1901), 

875. 
Marshall  v.  York  N.  &  B.  Ry. 

Co.,   11   C.   B.   655   (1851), 

341. 
Marshall  &  A.  v.  Kansas  City, 

Ft.  S.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  74  Mo. 

App.  81  (1898),  1017. 
Martin,  The  D.  R.,   11  Blatch. 

233  (1873),  362,  472,  498. 
Martin  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  R. 

Co.,  32  S.  C.  592  (1890),  872. 
Martin  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

110  Minn.  118  (1910),  665, 

803,  854,  885. 
Martin  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  51 

S.  C.  150  (1897),  759. 
Martin  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    81    S.    C.    432 

(1908),  1041. 
Mary  Ann  Guest,  The,  Olcott, 

498,   Fed.    Cas.    No.    9,197 

(1847),  1046. 

Maryland  Telephone  Co.  v.  Sim- 
mons Sons  Co.,  103  Md.  137 

(1906),  1123,  1430. 
Maslin  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R. 

Co.,  14  W.  Va.  180  (1878), 

160,  1011,  1012,  1022. 
Mason  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

37    Upp.    Can.    Q.    B.    163 

(1875),  1031. 
Mason  v.   Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  25  Mo.  App.  473  (1887), 

393,  727. 
Mason  v.  Thompson,  9  Pick.  280 

(1830),  263,  965,  984. 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Massengale    v.    Western    Union 

Telegraph  Co.,  17  Mo.  App. 

257  (1885),  1025. 
Massiter  v.  Cooper,  4  Esp.  260 

(1803),  402,  735. 
Matere   v.    Brown,    1    Cal.    221 

(1850),  965. 
Mathis  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  65 

S.  C.  271  (1902),  796,  833, 

922. 

Mathis  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  94  Ga.  338  (1894), 

338,  412. 
Matter    of, — see    the    particular 

matter  by  name. 
Matthews   v.    Associated    Press, 

136  N.  Y.  333  (1893),  138. 
Matthews  v.  Board  of  Corpora- 
tion  Commrs.,    106   Fed.   7 

(1901),  1141. 
Mauldin    v.     City    Council    of 

Greenville,  33  S.  C.  1  (1898), 

218. 
Mauldin  v.   Seaboard  Air   Line 

Ry.  Co.,  73  S.  C.  9  (1905), 

799,  802. 
Maunheim  Ins.  Co.  v.  Erie  &  W. 

Tr.  Co.,  75  Minn.  357  (1898), 

1294. 
Maving  v.  Todd,  4  Campb.  225 

(1815),  164. 
Maxwell  v.  Gerard,  84  Hun,  537 

(1895),  1034. 
May    v.    Manson,    5    Cal.    360 

(1855),  182,  771. 
May  v.  Ontario  &  Q.  Ry.  Co., 

10    Ont.    Rep.    70    (1885), 

783. 
Mayhew  v.  Eames,  3  B.  &  C.  601 

(1825),  1001. 
Mayo  v.  Village  Fire  Co.,  96  Me. 

539  (1902),  274. 
Mayor    of, — see    the    particular 

city  by  name. 


Mayor  v.  New  England  Transfer 

Co.,  14  Blatch.  159  (1887), 

127. 
Mayor  v.  Norwich  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  109  Mass.  103  (1871), 

805. 
Mayor    v.    Yuille,    3    Ala.    137 

(1841),  10. 
Mays  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry. 

Co.,  75  S.  C.  455  (1906),  403, 

404,  819,  820. 
Meacham  v.  Galloway,  102  Tenn. 

415  (1899),  365,  751,  969. 
Means  v.  Carolina  Central  Ry. 

Co.,  124  N.  C.  574  (1899), 

763. 
Mearns  v.  Central  R.  R.  of  N.  J., 

163  N.  Y.  108  (1900),  932. 
Mears  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H. 

Ry.  Co.,  75  Conn.  171  (1902), 

1003,  1005,  1017. 
Mechanics'  &  T.  Bk.  v.  Gordon,  5 

La.   Ann.    604   (1850),    255, 

743,  792. 
M.    E.    Church    v.    Ashtabula 

Water  Co.,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  578 

(1900),  264. 
Medawar  v.  Grand  Hotel,  2  Q.  B. 

11  (1891),  432,  1034. 
Meier  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

64  Pa.  St.  225  (1870),  189. 
Meisner   v.  Detroit,  B.  I.  &  W. 

Ferry   Co.,    154   Mich.    545 

(1908),  117,237,241,559. 
Mellor  v.   Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  105  Mo.  455  (1891),  777. 
Mellquist  v.  The  Wasco,  53  Fed. 

546  (1892),  442. 
Meloche  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.     Co.,     116     Mich.     69 

(1898),  727. 
Memphis  &  Charleston  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Benson,    85    Tenn.    627 

(1887),  800,  881,  844,  882. 

[  cxlvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Memphis,    etc.,    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Chastine,     54     Miss.     503 

(1877),  441. 
Memphis  Consol.  Gas  &  E.  Co.  v. 

Letson,    68    C.    C.    A.    453 

(1905),  983. 
Memphis  Freight  Co.  v.  Mayor, 

etc.,  of  Memphis,  4  Cold.  419 

(1867),  101,  232. 
Memphis  News  Publishing  Co.  v. 

Southern  Ry.  Co.,  110  Tenn. 

684   (1903),   204,   253,   499, 

689,  750. 
Menacho  v.  Ward,  27  Fed.  529 

(1886),  681,  685,  1286,  1287, 

1327. 
Menaugh   v.   Bedford  Belt   Ry. 

Co.,    157    Ind.    20    (1901), 

207. 
Mendenhall  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S. 

F.   Ry.   Co.,   66  Kans.   438 

(1903),  746. 
Mener  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  5  S.  D.  568  (1894), 

1001,  1010. 
Mercantile    M.    &    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Chase,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  115 

(1850),  180. 

Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Colum- 
bus, S.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  90 

Fed.   148   (1898),   404,   816, 

822. 
Merchants'    &    M.    Tr.    Co.    v. 

Granger  &  L.,  132  Ga.  167 

(1909),  408. 
Merchants'   Bk.   v.   New  Jersey 

Steam    Nav.    Co.,    6    How. 

(U.  S.)  344  (1848),  1017. 
Merchants'  C.  P.  &  S.  Co.  v.  In- 
surance Co.  of  N.  A.,   151 

U.  S.  368  (1894),  1295. 
Merchants'     Dispatch     Co.     v. 

Bolles,  80  111.  473  (1875),  180, 

737. 

[  cxlviii  ] 


Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Corn- 
forth,  3  Colo.  280  (1877),  180, 

776,  795,  1011. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Transp.  Co. 

v.   Furthmann,    149   111.   66 

(1893),  1003. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Joest- 

ing,  89  111.  153  (1878),  180. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Ley- 

sor,  89  111.  43  (1878),  180. 
Merchants'     Dispatch     Co.     v. 

Smith,  76  111.  542  (1875),  985. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Transporta- 
tion Co.  v.  Kahn,  76  111.  520 

(1875),  905,  921. 
Merchants'  Transportation  Co.  v. 

Bloch  Bros.,   86  Tenn.  392 

(1888),  180,  181,  512,  1017. 
Merchants'  Wharfboat  Assoc.  v. 

Wood,  64  Miss.  661  (1887), 

599,  917. 
Mercur  v.  Media  Electric  Light 

Co.,    19   Pa.    Sup.    Ct.   519 

(1902),  113. 
Meredith   v.    Railroad   Co.,    137 

N.  C.  478  (1905),  901. 
Merriam  v.  Hartford  &  N.  H.  R. 

R.  Co.,  20  Conn.  354  (1850), 

393,  409,  733,  727. 
Merrich  v.  Brainard,  38  Barb.  574 

(1860),  173,  774. 
Merrick  v.  Webster,  3  Mich.  268 

(1854),  906. 
Merrill  v.  American  Express  Co., 

62  N.  H.  514  (1883),  1003. 
Merrill  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  139 

Mass.  238  (1885),  395,  736, 

760,  761,  945. 
Merrill  v.  Southside  Irr.  Co.,  112 

Cal.  426  (1896),  384,  652. 
Merrimac,   The,   2  Sawyer,   586 

(1874),  173,  774. 
Merrimack  Bank  v.  Lowell,  152 

Mass.  556  (1891),  451. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Merriman  v.  Great  Northern  Exp. 

Co.,  63  Minn.  543  (1896), 601. 
Merritt  v.  Earle,  29  N.  Y.  115 

(1864),  985. 
Merritt  v.  Old  Colony  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  11  Allen  (Mass.),  80,  83 

(1865),  731. 
Mershon  v.  Hobensack,  22  N.  J. 

L.  372  (1850),  160,  229,  963. 
Merwin  v.  Butler,  17  Conn.  138 

(1845),  184,  262. 
Merz  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

86  Minn.  33  (1902),  910. 
Messenger  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.), 

407  (1874),  1290,  1291,  1312, 

1341. 
Metcalf  v.  Hess,  14  111.  129  (1852) 

965. 
Metcalf  v.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  Ry. 

Co.    (Miss.),    52    So.    355 

(1910),  402. 
Metropolitan     Electric     Co.     v. 

Ginder,  2  Ch.  D.  799  (1901), 

1240,  1321,  1338. 
Metropolitan  Co.  v.  Houston  & 

T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Fed.  683 

(1898),    1066,     1082,     1089, 

1090,  1108,  1136,  1138,  1341, 

1160,  1409. 
Metropolitan  Trust  Co.  of  New 

York  v.  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K. 

C.   Ry.   Co.,    107  Fed.   628 

(1901),  1023. 
Metz  v.  Cape  Girardeau  Water 

Works    Co.,    202    Mo.    324 

(1907),  350. 
Metzger  v.  Schnabel,  23  N.  Y. 

Misc.  698  (1898),  365,  751. 
Meuer  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  5  S.  D.  568  (1894),  780. 
Mexican  Nat.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Savage 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  41  S.  W. 

663  (1897),  1415. 


Meyer  v.  Dresser,  10  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 

646  (1864),  1269. 
Meyer  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  54  Fed.  116  (1893),  638, 

639,  934. 

Meyers  v.  Hudson  County  Elec- 
tric Co.,  63  N.  J.   L.  573 

(1899),  71. 
Michaels  v.  New  York  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,   30  N.   Y.   564   (1864), 

918. 
Michalitschke    Bros.    &    Co.    v. 

Wells,  F.  &  Co.,  118  Cal.  683 

(1897),  1020. 
Michie  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H. 

R.  Co.,  151  Fed.  694  (1907), 

813. 
Michigan  Box  Co.  v.  Flint  &  P. 

M.  R.  R.,  6  I.  C.  C.  Rep.  335 

(1897),  1237. 
Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Burrows,  33  Mich.  6  (1875), 

836,  914,  916,  917. 
Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Carrow,  73  111.  348  (1874), 

875,  876,  971. 
Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Curtis,  80  111.  324  (1875),  665, 

842,  916. 
Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Lantz,  32  Mich.  502  (1875), 

1036. 
Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co., 

128  Mich.  333  (1901),  698. 
Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Smithson,     45     Mich.     212 

(1881),  529. 
Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Ward,  2  Mich.  538  (1853), 

1038,  1039,  1042. 
Michigan  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

McDonough,   21   Mich.   165 

(1870),  256,  967. 

[  cxlix  1 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Michigan  S.  &  N.  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Day,  20  111.  375  (1858),  518, 

901,  1053. 
Michigan  S.  &  N.  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Shurtz,  7  Mich.  515  (1859), 

393,  726. 
Midland  Nat.  Bank  v.  Missouri 

Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  132  Mo.  492 

(1896),  1045. 
Midland  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoffman 

Coal  Co.,  91  Ark.  180  (1909), 

804. 
Millard  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  R. 

Co.,  86  N.  Y.  441  (1881),  876. 
Milledgeville  Water  Co.  v.  Ed- 
wards, 121  Ga.  555  (1904), 

690,  701. 
Miller  &  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  & 

Banking    Co.,    88    Ga.    563 

(1891),  861,  1050. 
Miller  v.  Federal  Coffee  Palace,  15 

Victorian  Law  R.  30  (1889), 

263. 
Miller  v.  Mansfield,  112  Mass.  260 

(1873),  1050. 
Miller  v.  Peeples,  60  Miss.  819 

(1883),  1032. 
Miller  Bros.  v.  Railway  Co.,  33 

S.  C.  359  (1890),  1033. 
Miller  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  69 

S.  C.  116  (1903),  904. 
Miller  v.  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.,  5 

Mo.  App.  471  (1878),  932. 
Miller  v.  Wilkes-Barre  Gas  Co., 

206  Pa.  St.  254  (1903),  456. 
Milliken  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,    110  N.   Y.  403 

(1888),  348. 
Milliman  v.  New  York  C.  &  H. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  642 

(1876),  632. 
Milloy  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

21    Ont.  App.    404    (1894), 

726. 

[cl] 


Mills  v.  Seattle,  Renton  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  50  Wash.  20  (1908), 
878. 

Millville  Improvement  Co.  v. 
Pitman  G.  &  C.  Gas  Co.,  75 
N.  J.  L.  410  (1907),  274. 

Miltimore  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  37  Wis.  190  (1875), 
414,  530,  991. 

Milwaukee  Elec.  Ry.  &  L.  Co. 
v.  Milwaukee,  87  Fed.  577 
(1898),  189,  1081, 1089, 1108, 
1123,  1132,  1138,  1162,  1166, 
1171,  1173,  1430. 

Milwaukee  M.  E.  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  73  la.  98 
(1887),  600. 

Mims  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry., 
69  S.  C.  338  (1904),  341. 

Minneapolis  v.  Minneapolis  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  417  (1910), 
1424,  1425. 

Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Minnesota,  186  U.  S.  257 
(1902),  1063,  1124,  1157, 
1175,  1201,  1210,  1405,  1430, 
1431. 

Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Minnesota,  193  U.  S.  53 
(1904),  806. 

Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S.  M. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion, 136  Wis.  146  (1908), 
806,  809,  811,  812. 

Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S.  M. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion, 137  Wis.  80  (1908), 
1124. 

Minnehaha,  The,  1  Lush,  335 
(1861),  173,  774. 

Minnesota  B.  &  C.  Co.  v.  St. 
Paul  Cold-Storage  Ware- 
house Co.,  75  Minn.  445 
(1899),  143. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Minnesota  C.   &  Power  Co.   v. 

Koochiching  Co.,  97  Minn. 

429  (1906),  95,  114,  221. 
Minter  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  82  Mo.  App.  130  (1899), 

901. 
Minter  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  41 

Mo.  503  (1867),  876. 
Mires  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

Co.,     134    Mo.    App.    379 

(1908),  1294. 

Mississippi  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 41  Miss.  671   (1868), 

876. 
Missouri  &    N.    A.   R.    Co.  v. 

Sneed,  85  Ark.  293  (1908), 

794. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Allen,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  236 

(1905),  1024. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Beard,  34  Tex.  Civ.  App.  188 

(1904),  729. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Byrne,  100  Fed.  359  (1900), 

813. 

Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Car- 
ter, 9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  677 

(1895),  1004. 
Missouri,  K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Cook,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  376 

(1894),  881. 
Missouri,   K.  &  T.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Davis,  24  Okla.  677  (1909), 

1011. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Dinsmore,     108    U.    S.    30 

(1882),  178,  776. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Fookes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  49 

S.  W.  858  (1897),  1414. 
Missouri,  K.   &  T.  Ry.   Co.  v. 

Haber,  169  U.  S.  613  (1898), 

1413. 


Missouri,  K.   &  T.   Ry.  Co.  v. 

Huff,  98  Texas,  110  (1904), 

763. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ken- 

drick   (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  32 

S.  W.  42  (1895),  932,  935. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Kyser,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App.  355 

(1905),  804. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Love,  177  Fed.  493  (1910), 

1061,  1099,  1126,  1133,  1138, 

1141,  1196,  1206,  1373. 
Missouri,   K.  &   T.    Ry.    Co.  v. 

May,   194    U.  S.  267  (1904), 

1436. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Cann,  174  U.  S.  580  (1898), 

511. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Miller,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  241 

(1894),  369,  372. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New 

Era  Milling  Co.  (Kan.),  100 

Pac.   273   (1909),   524,   682, 

1290. 
Missouri,   K.  &  T.  Ry.   Co.  v. 

Smith,  6  Ind.  Terr.  99  (1905), 

341,  438. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Smith,  152  Fed.  608  (1902), 

341,  438,  447,  1259. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Trinity  C.  L.  Co.,  1  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  553  (1892),  1333. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Truskett,    2    Ind.    T.    633 

(1899),  658,  909. 

Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams  (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  40 

S.  W.  350  (1897),  759. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Williams,  91  Tex.  255  (1897), 

759. 

[di] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Divin- 
ney,  66  Kans.  776  (1903), 
939. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Evans, 
71  Tex.  361  (1888),  632. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hams, 
1  W.  &  W.  (Tex.  Ct.  App.), 
Dec.,  §  1263,  252. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Har- 
ris, 67  Texas,  166  (1886),  256, 
662. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hoi- 
comb,  44  Kans.  332  (1890), 
763. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lar- 
abee  Flour  Mills  Co.,  211 
U.  S.  612  (1909),  821,  1416. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Levi 
(Tex.  Ct.  of  App.),  14  S.  W. 
1062  (1889),  668,  912. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ne- 
braska, 164  U.  S.  403  (1896), 
404,  820. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ne- 
braska, 217  U.  S.  196  (1910), 
503,  820,  1434. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nevill, 
60  Ark.  375  (1895),  667, 
987. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Peru- 
Van  Zandt  Imp.  Co.,  73 
Kans.  295  (1906),  916. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sher- 
wood, 84  Tex.  125  (1892), 
1008. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
60  Ark.  221  (1895),  1063, 
1201,  1407,  1431. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Fed.  862 
(1886),  1222. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas 
&  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Fed.  2 
(1887),  1286. 

[Clii] 


Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas 

&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Fed.  864 

(1887),  723,  833. 
Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tiet- 

ken,  49  Neb.  130  (1896),  780. 
Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Weil, 

8   Kans.   App.    839    (1899), 

1048. 
Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Weis- 

man,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  86 

(1893),  413,  431. 
Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wor- 

tham,  73  Tex.  25  (1889),  932. 
Missouri    Pacific     Ry.     Co.     v. 

Young,  25  Neb.  651  (1889), 

514,  525. 
Mitchell  v.  Kansas  City,  C.  &  S. 

Ry.  Co.,  116  Mo.  App.  116 

(1906),  594. 
Mitchell  v.  Marker,  62  Fed.  139 

(1894),  193. 
Mitchell  v.  Negaunee,  113  Mich. 

359  (1897),  218. 
Mitchell  v.  Western  Union  Tel. 

Co.,     12    Tex.     Civ.    App. 

(1896),  1014. 
Mittleman  v.  Philadelphia  R.  T. 

Co.,  70  Atl.  828  (1908),  626. 
Mobile  v.  Bienville  Water  Supply 

Co.,  130  Ala.  379  (1901),  68, 

92,    218,    242,     705,    1290, 

1300. 

Mobile  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cope- 
land,    63    Ala.    219    (1879), 

1033. 
Mobile  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dis- 

mukes,  94  Ala.   135  (1891), 

1286. 

Mobile  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hop- 
kins, 41  Ala.  486  (1868),  786, 

1018. 
Mobile  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People 

ex  rel.,  132  111.  559  (1890), 

808,  810. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Mobile  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tupelo, 

67  Miss.  35  (1889),  1033. 
Mobile  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Weiner, 

49  Miss.  725  (1874),  1004. 
Mobile  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Wis- 
dom, 5  Heisk.    125    (1871), 

441. 
Mobile,  J.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Bay  Shore  L.  Co.  (Ala.),  51 

So.  956  (1910),  1048. 
Mobile,  J.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Mississippi,   210   U.   S.    187 

(1908),  301. 
Mobile  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Walters, 

135  Ala.  227  (1902),  441. 
Moerder  v.  Fremont,  19  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  394  (1899),  484. 
Moffat  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  R.  Co., 

15  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  630  (1867), 

724. 

Mogul    Steamship    Co.    v.    Mc- 
Gregor, 21  Q.  B.  Div.  544 

(1892),  1287,  1328. 
Mohawk,  The,  8  Wall.  153  (1868), 

1047. 
Mohr  &  Smith  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

R.  R.  Co.,  40  la.  579  (1875), 

1036. 
Monnier  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.,   175  N.  Y.  281 

(1903),  888. 
Monopolies,  Case  of,  1 1  Coke,  84b 

(1603),  51. 
Montana,     The,     22    Fed.     715 

(1884),  165,  621. 
Montana  Union  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lan- 

gois,    9    Mont.    419    (1890), 

475,  476,  485. 
Montgomery  v.  Buffalo  Ry.  Co., 

165  N.  Y.  139  (1900),  882, 

885. 
Montgomery  &   E.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Kolb,   73   Ala.    396    (1882), 

409,  733. 


Montgomery  Light  &  P.  Co.  v. 

Watts    (Ala),    51    So.    726 

(1909),  1251,  1354. 
Montgomery  Light  &  Water  P. 

Co.  v.  Citizens'  L.  H.  &  P. 

Co.,  147  Ala.  359  (1906),  79. 
Montgomery    St.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Mason,  133  Ala.  508  (1902), 

1044. 
Montreal  Gas  Co.  v.  Cadieux,  A. 

C.  589  (1899),  453. 
Montrose  Pickle  Co.  v.  Dodson 

&  H.  Mfg.  Co.,  76  Iowa,  172 

(1888),  1046. 
Moore  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R. 

Co.,  103  Va.  189  (1904),  796. 
Moore  v.  Champlain  Electric  Co., 

88    N.    Y.    App.    Div.    289 

(1903),  273,  280,  1346. 
Moore  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

Gray,  465  (1855),  890. 
Moore  v.  Long  Beach  Develop- 
ment Co.,  87  Cal.  483  (1891), 

751. 
Moore  v.  Michigan  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  Mich.  23  (1853),  517, 

1033. 
Moore  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry., 

67  Ark.  389  (1900),  757. 
Moore  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  87  Ga.  613  (1891), 

278. 
Moore-Cortes  Canal  Co.  v.  Gyle, 

36  Tex.  Civ.  App.. 442  (1904), 

93. 

Morgan  v.  Insurance  Co.,  4  Dal- 
las (U.  S.)  455  (1806),  1265. 
Morgan  v.  Ravey,  6  H.  &  N.  265 

(1861),  964. 
Morgan  v.   Saks,    143  Ala.    139 

(1904),  193. 
Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.  v. 

Railroad    Commission,     109 

La.  247  (1902),  806,  809,  812. 

[  cliii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Morning  Star  v.  Louisville  &  N. 

R.    R.    Co.,    135    Ala.    251 

(1902),  446,  890. 
Morrill  v.   Minneapolis  St.   Ry. 

Co.,  103    Minn.  362  (1908), 

889. 
Morris  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayres,  29 

N.  J.  L.  393  (1862),   1038, 

1051. 
Morrison  v.  Davis,  20  Pa.  St.  171 

(1852),  917. 
Morrison  v.  Thistle  Coal  Co.,  119 

Iowa,  705  (1903),  225. 
Morrow  v.  Atlanta  &  A.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  134  N.  C.  92  (1903),  369. 
Morse  v.   Canadian  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  97  Me.  77  (1902),  1007. 
Morse  v.  Slue,  1  Mod.  85  (1671), 

13,  391,  667,  987. 
Moses  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  24  N.  H.  71  (1851),  393, 

724,  726,  727,  1002. 
Moses  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  32  N.  H.  523   (1856), 

1001,  1037,  1038. 
Mosher  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  38 

Ga.  37  (1868),  512,  1017. 
Moss   v.    Bettis,    4    Heisk.    661 

(1871),  167,  228,  236,  968. 
Mott  v.  Cherryvale  Water  Co., 

48  Kans.  12  (1892),  350. 
Mott  v.   Long  I.   Ry.   Co.,    123 

N.  Y.  Supp.  49  (1910),  1048. 
Mottley  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co., 

150   Fed.   406    (1907),   341, 

1298,  1364. 
Moulton  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  N. 

Railroad  Co.,  31   Minn.  85 

(1883),  256,  1022. 
Mountain  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  29  So.  602  (1900),  1005. 
Mt.  Auburn  Cemetery  v.  Cam- 
bridge, 150  Mass.  12  (1889), 

69. 

[  cliv  ] 


Mt.  Vernon  Co.  v.  Alabama  Gt.  S. 

R.  R.  Co.,  92  Ala.  296  (1890), 

1053. 
Mudgett  v.  Bay  State  Steamboat 

Co.,    1   Daly   (N.   Y.),    151 

(1861),  769. 
Muehlhausen  v.  St.  Louis  R.  R. 

Co.,  91  Mo.  332  (1886),  623, 

738,  745. 
Mugge  v.  Tampa  Water  Works 

Co.,     52    Fla.    371    (1906), 

350. 
Muldoon  v.  Seattle  City  Ry.  Co., 

7    Wash.    528    (1893),    786, 

1011,  1018. 
Muldowney  v.  Pittsburg  &  B.  Tr. 

Co.,   8  Pa.   Super.   Ct.  335 

(1898),  439,  877. 
Mullan  v.  Wisconsin  C.  Ry.  Co., 

46  Minn.  474  (1891),  942. 
Mulligan  v.  Illinois  Central  Ry. 

Co.,   36   Iowa,    181    (1873), 

1003. 
Mulligan  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,    4    Dak.    315    (1886), 

726. 
Mulliner  v.  Florence,  3  Q.  B.  D. 

484  (1878),  431. 
Mulrooney  v.  Obear,  171  Mo.  613 

(1903),  379,  690,  701. 
Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113 

(1876),  19,  65,  97,  141,  186, 

202,  232,  293,  294, 1121, 1401, 

1402,  1407,  1427. 
Munster  v.  South   Eastern   Ry. 

Co.,  4  C.  B.   (N.   S.)   676 

(1858),  413,  769. 
Murch  v.  Concord  R.  R.  Corp., 

29  N.  H.  9  (1854),  763. 
Murchison  v.  Sargent,  69  Ga.  206 

(1882),  1001. 
Murdock  v.  Boston  &  Albany  R. 

R.  Co.,  137  Mass.  293  (1884), 

889. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Murphy  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 
Co.,  2  L.  R.  Irish.  301  (1897), 
943. 

Murphy  v.  Innes,  11  So.  Aus- 
tralia, 56  (1877),  364. 

Murphy  v.  Western  &  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  Fed.  637  (1885),  942. 

Murphey  Hardware  Co.  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  150  N.  C.  703 
(1909),  670,  688,  912. 

Murray  v.  International  Steam- 
ship Co.,  170  Mass.  166 
(1898),  769. 

Murray  v.  Marshall,  9  Col.  482 
(1896),  1034. 

Muschamp  v.  Lancaster  &  Pres- 
ton Junction  Ry.  Co.,  8  M.  & 
W.  421  (1841),  512. 

Myers  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  R. 
Co.,  10  App.  Div.  335  (1896), 
347. 

Myers  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  2 
Int.  Com.  Rep.  403  (1889), 
1237. 

Mynard  v.  Syracuse,  B.  &  N.  Y. 
R.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  180 
(1877),  1009,  1012. 

Myrick  v.  Michigan  R.  R.  Co.,  9 
Biss.  44  (1879),  1033. 

Myrick  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.,  107  U.  S.  102  (1882), 
256. 

Mystic  Milling  Co.  v.  C.,  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  131  Iowa,  10 
(1906),  448. 

N 

Nairin  v.  Kentucky  Heating  Co., 

27  Ky.  L.  R.  551  (1900),  112, 

265,  594,  595,  792. 
Nanson   v.   Jacob,   93   Mo.   331 

(1887),  514,  544. 
Napman  v.  People,  19  Mich.  352 

(1869),  484. 


Nash  v.  Page,  80  Ky.  539  (1882), 
142,  146,  293. 

Nashua  Lock  Co.  v.  Worcester  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  339 
(1869),  512. 

Nashua  &  L.  R.  R.  Corp.  v.  Bos- 
ton &  L.  R.  R.  Corp.,  136 
U.  S.  356  (1890),  1162. 

Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Grayson  County  Nat.  Bank, 
100  Tex.  17  (1906),  1045. 

Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Moore,  148  Ala.  63  (1906), 
879. 

Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
State,  137  Ala.  439  (1902), 
806. 

Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Stone  &  H.,  112  Tenn.  348 
(1904),  985,  1005. 

Nashville  Street  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Griffin,  104  Tenn.  81  (1900), 
401,  403,  868,  870. 

Nashville  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 6  Heisk.  271  (1871), 
256. 

Nashville,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mes- 
sino,  1  Sneed,  220  (1853), 
207,  756,  762. 

Nassau  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Corliss,  126 
Fed.  355  (1903),  864. 

Natchez  &  Jackson  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
McNeil,  61  Miss.  434  (1884), 
795. 

National  Bank  of  Commerce  v. 
Chicago,  B.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
44  Minn.  224  (1890),  747, 
1047. 

National  Car  Advertising  Co.  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
110  Va.  413(1909),  503. 

National  Docks  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.,  32  N.  J.  Eq. 
755  (1880),  129. 

[civ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


National  Tel.  News  Co.  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  119 
Fed.  294  (1902),  494,  624. 

Naugatuck  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Water- 
bury  Button  Co.,  24  Conn. 
468  (1856),  513. 

Neaffie,  The,  1  Abb.  (U.  S.)  465 
(1870),  774. 

Nebraska  Meal  Mills  v.  St.  Louis 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  64  Ark.  169 
(1897),  1045. 

Nebraska  Telephone  Co.  v.  Cor- 
nell, 59  Neb.  737  (1900), 
1128,  1404. 

Nebraska  Telephone  Co.  v.  State, 
55  Neb.  627  (1898),  136. 

Nellis  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 
Co.,  30  N.  ¥.505(1864),  873, 
1343. 

Nelson  v.  Bolat,  180  Fed.  779 
(1910),  560,  611. 

Nelson  v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  R. 
Co.,  28  Mont.  297  (1903), 
656,  1020. 

Nelson  v.  Johnson,  104  Minn.  440 
(1908),  263. 

Nelson  v.  Woodruff,  1  Black,  156 
(1861),  988. 

Nettles  v.  South  Carolina  Ry. 
Co.,  7  Rich.  L.  190  (1854), 
915. 

Nevin  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co., 
106  111.  222  (1883),  624,  884. 

Newark,  City  of,  v.  Newark  Wa- 
terworks Co.,  4  Ohio  N.  P. 
341  (1897),  865,  1251. 

Newark  &  S.  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Cann,  58  N.  J.  L.  642  (1896), 
638. 

Newborn  v.  Just,  2  C.  &  P.  76 
(1825),  1001. 

New  Brunswick  &  Canada  Ry. 
Co.,  1  Pugsley  &  Burbridge, 
667  (1878),  310. 
[clvi] 


New  Brunswick  S.  B.  &  C.  Co.  v. 

Tiers,  24  N.  J.  L.  697  (1853), 

985. 
New  Central  Coal  Co.  v.  George's 

Creek  C.  &  I.  Co.,  37  Md. 

537  (1872),  223. 
New  England,  The,  110  Fed.  415 

(1901),  1010. 
New    England    Express    Co.    v. 

Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  57 

Me.    188   (1869),    176,   214, 

479,  1289. 
New  Jersey  City  &  B.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Morgan,    52    N.    J.    L.    60 

(1889),  886. 
New  Jersey   R.    R.   &    Transp. 

Co.    v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  27  N.  J.  L.  100  (1858), 

775. 
New  Jersey  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v. 

Merchants'    Bank,    6    How. 

344  (1848),  1002. 
New   Jersey   Steamboat   Co.    v. 

Brockett,    121    U.    S.    637 

(1886),  938. 
New  Memphis  G.  &  L.  Co.  v. 

Memphis,      72      Fed.      952 

(1896),    1123,    1132,    1410, 

1430. 
New  Mexico  ex  rel.  v.  Denver  & 

R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  203  U.  S. 

38  (1906),  1418. 
New  Orleans  I.  &  Gt.  N.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Tyson,  46  Miss.  729 

(1872),  1038,  1039,  1042. 
New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

George,  82  Miss.  710  (1903), 

1050. 
New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Thomas,  60  Fed.  379  (1894), 

760. 
New  Orleans  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 

Paulding,      12      Rob.      378 

(1845),  111,  377,  456. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Statham,  42  Miss.  607 
(1869),  635,  933. 

New  Orleans,  M.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Southern  &  A.  Telegraph 
Co.,  53  Ala.  211  (1875),  56, 
133. 

New  Orleans,  St.  L.  &  C.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Burke,  53  Miss.  200 
(1876),  942. 

Newport  News  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mendell,  17  Ky.  Law  Rep. 
1400  (1896),  733. 

Newport  News  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mercer,  16  Ky.  Law  Rep. 
555  (1895),  855. 

Newport  News  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mercer  &  W.,  96  Ky.  475 
(1895),  659. 

Newport  News  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Reed,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1020 
(1889),  850,  914. 

New  York  v.  Interborough  R.  T. 
Co.,  53  N.  Y.  Misc.  126 
(1907),  503. 

New  York  v.  Starin,  106  N.  Y. 
1  (1887),  182,  299,  767, 
771. 

New  York,  City  of,  v.  Interbor- 
ough R.  T.  Co.,  125  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  437  (1908),  77. 

New  York  ex  rel.  v.  Knight,  192 
U.  S.  21  (1904),  1416. 

New  York  &  N..  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New 
York  &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  50 
Fed.  867  (1892),  534. 

New  York  &  W.  Printing  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Dryburg.  35 
Pa.  St.  298  (1860),  133,  348, 
980. 

New  York  Cement  Co.  v.  Con- 
solidated Rosendale  Cement 
Co.,  178  N.  Y.  167  (1904), 
315,  707. 


New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Flynn,  74  Hun,  124 

(1893),  483. 
New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Fraloff,  100  U.  S.  24 

(1879),  875. 
New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R. 

R.  Co.  v.  Metropolitan  Gas 

Light    Co.,    63    N.    Y.    326 

(1875),  31,  111. 
New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 

Co.    v.    Sheeley,    27    N.    Y. 

Supp.  185  (1893),  483. 
New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  87 

N.  Y.  486  (1882),  1042. 
New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R. 

R.  Co.  v.  Warren,  64  N.  Y. 

Supp.  781  (1900),  483. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Bork,  23  R.  I.  218  (1901), 

483. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Interstate  Comm.  Comm., 

200  U.  S.  361  (1906), 707,  837. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  New  York,  165  U.  S.  628 

(1897),  1418,  1435. 
New  York,   N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Scovill,  71  Conn.  136 

(1898),  483. 
New  York,  P.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Cromwell,  98  Va.  227  (1900), 

794,  796. 
New   York   Stock    Exchange   v. 

Chicago  Board  of  Trade,  127 

111.  153  (1889),  494. 
New    York    Telephone    Co.    v. 

Siegel-Cooper  Co.,  121  N.  Y. 

Supp.     1033    (1910),     1303, 

1304. 
New  York,  T.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Gallaher,  79  Tex.  685  (1891), 

1348. 

[  clvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Newton  v.  Axon,  1  McCord,  509 

(1821),  964. 
Niagara  v.   Cordes,   21   How.  7 

(1858),  239. 
Niagara  Falls  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Re, 

108  N.  Y.  375  (1888),  117, 

195,  222. 
Niagara  L.  &  O.  Power  Co.,  Re, 

111  App.  Div.  686  (1906),  60. 
Nichol  v.  Huntington  Water  Co., 

53  W.  Va.  348  (1903),  300. 
Nichols  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry. 

Co.,   90   Mich.   203    (1892), 

932. 
Nichols  v.  Mclntosh,  19  Colo.  22 

(1893),  852. 
Nichols  v.  Oregon  Short  Line  Ry. 

Co.,  24  Utah,  83  (1901),  850, 

834,  914. 
Nichols  v.  Smith,  115  Mass.  332 

(1874),  724. 
Nicolette  Lumber  Co.  v.  People's 

Coal  Co.,  26  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

575  (1904),  167,  270. 
Nicolette  Lumber  Co.  v.  People's 

Coal  Co.,   213  Pa.   St.  379 

(1906),  1050. 
Nicoll  v.  East  Tennessee,  Va.  & 

Ga.    Ry.    Co.,    89   Ga.    260 

(1892),  1007. 
Nicholson  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  R. 

Co.,  5  C.  B.   (N.   S.)   366 

(1858),  1282,  1344,  1351, 

1352. 
Nicholson  v.  New  York  City  Ry. 

Co.,     118    App.    Div.*    858 

(1907),  347. 

Nickerson  v.  Bridgeport  Hydrau- 
lic Co.,  46  Conn.  24  (1878), 

350. 
Nitroglycerine  Case,  15  Wall.  (U. 

S.)  524  (1872),  621. 
Nixon  v.  Reid,  8  S.  D.  507  (1896), 

52. 

[  clviii  ] 


Noble  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
R.  Co.,  4  Okla.  534  (1896), 
397,  872. 

Nolan  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.,  41  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct.  541  (1876),  889. 

Noll  v.  Dubuque  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  32  Iowa,  66  (1871),  58. 

Norcross  v.  Norcross,  53  Me.  163 
(1865),  213, 725, 770,  965, 969. 

Norfolk  &  P.  Belt  Line  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 103  Va.  289 
(1904),  130,  151,  773. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 90  Va.  1  (1893),  935, 
938. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 93  Va.  749 
(1896),  1413. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Galli- 
her,  89  Va.  639  (1893),  402, 
735. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Irvine, 
85  Va.  217  (1888),  621. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Marsh- 
all, 90  Va.  836  (1894),  966. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Old 
Dominion  Baggage  Co.,  99 
Va.  Ill  (1901),  171,  489. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania, 136  U.  S.  114 
(1890),  1414. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shott, 
92  Va.  34  (1895),  777. 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wysor, 
82  Va.  250  (1886),  862,  878. 

Norman  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  65 
S.  C.  517  (1903),  1004. 

Normandale  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Knight,  89  Ga.  Ill  (1892), 
223. 

Normille  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry. 
Co.,  36  Wash.  21  (1904), 
1037,  1038,  1042. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Norris  v.  Farmers'  &  Teamsters' 
Co.,  6  Cal.  590  (1856),  53. 

Norris  v.  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  Fla.  182  (1887),  909. 

North  British  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cale- 
donian Ry.  Co.,  3  Ry.  &  C. 
Tr.  Gas.  273  (1878),  775. 

North  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cook,  145  111.  551  (1893), 
943,  978. 

North  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  140  111.  275  (1892), 
736. 

North  Hudson  County  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Anderson,  61  N.  J.  L.  248 
(1898),  441. 

North  Jersey  Street  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Jersey  City,  75  N.  J.  L.  349 
(1907),  803. 

Northern  Central  Ry.  Co.  v. 
O'Connor,  76  Md.  207 
(1892),  431, 441, 865, 878, 885. 

Northern  Colorado  Irr.  Co.  v. 
Richards,  22  Colo.  450 
(1896),  852. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Adams,  192  U.  S.  440  (1904), 
786,  1018. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 
American  Trading  Co.,  195 
U.  S.  439  (1904),  593. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dus- 
tin,  142  U.  S.  492  (1891), 
296,  306. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Keyes,  91  Fed.  47  (1898), 
1099,  1123,  1195,  1196,  1206, 
1373,  1430. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ter- 
ritory, 3  Wash.  Ter.  303 
(1887),  808. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wash- 
ington Territory,  142  U.  S. 
492  (1892),  807. 


Northwestern  Improvement  & 
Boom  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  75 
Minn.  335  (1899),  73. 

Northwestern  Telephone  Ex- 
change Co.  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  76  Minn.  334 
(1899),  64. 

Northwestern  Warehouse  Co.  v. 
Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  32 
Wash.  218  (1903),  404,  820. 

Norway  Plains  Co.  v.  Boston  & 
M.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Gray,  263 
(1854),  1036,  1039,  1042. 

Norwich  Gas  &  E.  Co.  v.  Nor- 
wich, 76  Conn.  565  (1904), 
1101,  1131. 

Notara  v.  Henderson,  L.  R.  7  Q. 
B.  225  (1872),  950. 

Nugent  v.  Smith,  1  C.  P.  D.  19, 
423  (1875),  233,  963. 

Nutting  v.  Connecticut  River  R. 
R.  Co.,  1  Gray,  502  (1854), 
513. 

Nuttleman  v.  Philadelphia  R.  T. 
Co.,  221  Pa.  St.  485  (1908), 
880. 

Nye  v.  Marysville  &  Y.  C.  S.  R. 
R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  461  (1893), 
431,  440,  877,  878. 

O 

Oakes   v.   Northern   Pacific   Ry. 

Co.,  20  Oreg.  392  (1891),  864, 

875,  876. 
Oakey  v.  Russell,  6  Martin  (N. 

S.),  58  (1827),  172. 
O'Bannon   v.    Southern   Express 

Co.,    51    Ala.     481   (1874), 

480. 
Oberndorfer  v.  Pabst,   100  Wis. 

505  (1898),  193. 
O'Brien  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  N.  Y. 

263  (1880),  341,  438. 

[  clix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


O'Brien    v.    Vaill,    22    Fla.    627 

(1886),  1032. 
O'Callaghan  v.  Dellwood  P.  Co., 

242  111.  336  (1909),  195. 
Ocean  Publishing  Co.  v.  Associ- 
ated   Press,     184    111.    438 

(1900),  138. 

Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v.  Savan- 
nah, L.  W.  &  S.  Co.,  131  Ga. 

831    (1909),    172,    229,   253, 

270,  408,  553,  661,  791,  792, 

841,  851. 
Oconto,  The,  5  Biss.  460  (1873), 

173,  774. 
O'Gara  v.  St.  Louis  Transit  Co., 

204  Mo.  724  (1907),  944. 
O'Gorman  v.  New  York  &  Q.  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  89  N.  Y.  Supp.  589 

(1904),  880. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dickerson, 

59  Ind.  317  (1877),  763. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dunbar,  20 

111.  623  (1858),  758,  775. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hatton,  60 

Ind.  12  (1877),  861,  872. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nickless,  71 

Ind.  271  (1880),  785,  875. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  People,  120 

111.  200  (1887),  311. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Swarthout, 

67    Ind.    567    (1879),    397, 

872. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Yohe,  51 

Ind.  181  (1875),  1046. 
Ohio  Coal  Co.  v.  Whitcomb,  123 

Fed.  359  (1903),  1359. 
Ohio  Valley  Gas  Co.,  Re,  6  Pa. 

Dist.  Rep.  200  (1897),  59. 
Ohio  Valley  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watson's 

Admr.,   93  Ky.   654  (1893), 

764. 
Ohio    Valley    Rys.    Receiver    v. 

Lander,  104  Ky.  431  (1898), 

848. 

[clx] 


Oklahoma  City  v.  Oklahoma  Ry. 

Co.,  20  Okla.  1  (1907),  1305. 
Olanta   Coal   M.    Co.    v.   Beech 

Creek  R.  R.  Co.,  144  Fed.  150 

(1906),  404,  817,  819,  1043. 
Olcott  v.   Supervisors,   16  Wall. 

678  (1872),  24. 
Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tripp, 

147   Mass.   35   (1888),   483, 

489. 
Old  Colony  Trust  Co.  v.  City  of 

Atlanta,  83  Fed.  39  (1897), 

1124,  1430. 
Oliver  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  89  Ark.  466  (1909),  798. 
Olmsted  v.  Morris  Aqueduct  Co., 

47  N.  J.  L.  311  (1885),  32, 

242. 
Olson  v.  Grossman,  31  Minn.  222 

(1883),  1001. 
Olson   v.    Northern   Pacific   Ry. 

Co.,   49  Wash.   626   (1908), 

889. 
Olson  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 

45  Minn.  536  (1891),  780. 
Omaha  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chol- 

lete,    33    Neb.    143    (1891), 

1044. 
O'Malley  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 

Co.,  86  Minn.   380   (1902), 

1020. 
O'Neill  v.  Lynn  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  155 

Mass.  371  (1892),  862,  879. 
O'Neill  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  Y. 

138  (1875),  726. 
Opinion    of     the    Justices,     150 

Mass.   592   (1890),   68,   111, 

218,  243. 
Opinion  of  the  Justices,  182  Mass. 

605  (1903),  64. 
Oppenheimer    v.    United    States 

Express  Co.,  69  111.  62  (1873), 

737,  990,  1001,  1021. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Orchard  v.  Bush,  2  Q.   B.  284 

(1898),  364,  752. 
Oregon  Ry.  &  W.  Co.  v.  Campbell, 

173  Fed.  957  (1909),  1124. 
Oregon  Short  Line  Ry.  Co.   v. 

Davidson,     33     Utah,     370 

(1908),  483. 
Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  51 

Fed.  465  (1892),  528. 
Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  61 

Fed.    158   (1894),  523,  534, 

682. 

O'Reiley  et  al.  v.  Kankakee  Val- 
ley  Drainage   Co.,   32   Ind. 

169  (1869),  67. 
Ormandroyd  v.  Fitchburg  &  L. 

St.  R.  R.  Co.,  193  Mass.  130 

(1906),  944. 
Ormsby  Ry.  Co.  v.  Union  Pacific 

Ry.    Co.,    2    McCreary,    48 

(1880),  901,  914,  1026. 
Orndorff  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 

3  Bush,    194    (1867),  1001, 

1022. 
O'Rourke  v.  Citizens'  Street  Ry. 

Co.,   103  Tenn.   124  (1899), 

458. 
Ortt  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,   36   Minn.   396   (1887), 

513. 
Osborne  v.  Adams  County,   106 

U.  S.  181  (1882),  65. 
Osgood  v.  Concord  R.  R.  Co.,  63 

N.  H.  255  (1884),  1377. 
Oshkosh  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Osh- 

kosh,  187  U.  S.  437  (1910), 

1421. 

Oskamp  et  al.  v.  Southern  Ex- 
press Co.,  61  Ohio  St.  341 

(1899),  1049. 
Oswego  v.  Collins,  38  Hun,  171 

(1885),  238. 

11 


Otis  Co.  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,    112    Mo.    622    (1892), 

1010. 
Ottawa  v.  Bodley,  67  Kan.  178 

(1903),  484. 
Overland    Express    Co.    v.    Van 

Meter,   17  Fla.  783   (1880), 

178. 
Overland  Mail  &  Express  Co.  v. 

Carroll,   7  Colo.  43   (1883), 

1020,  1022. 
Overstreet  v.  Moser,  88  Mo.  App. 

72  (1901),  936. 
Oviatt   v.    Dakota   Central   Ry. 

Co.,  43  Minn.  300 (1890), 756. 
Owens  v.  Macon  &  B.  R.  R.  Co., 

119    Ga.    230    (1903),   639, 

640. 
Owensboro    Gas    Light    Co.    v. 

Hildebrand,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  983 

(1897),   111,    113,   214,   215, 

434,    435,    877,    1251,    1290, 

1300. 
Owensboro    Harrison    Telephone 

Co.  v.  Wisdom;  23  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  97  (1901),  704. 
Owensboro    Waterworks    Co.    v. 

Owensboro,    191   U.   S.   358 

(1903),  1422. 
Oxadle  v.  North  Eastern  R.  R. 

Co.,    1   C.   B.    (N.   S.)    454 

(1857),  204,  251,   661,   792, 

1314. 
Ozanne  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  151  Fed.  900  (1907),  795. 
Ozark    Bell    Telephone    Co.    v. 

Springfield,     140    Fed.    666 

(1905),  1123,  1430. 


Pabe  v.  Myers,  5  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P. 

Dec.  578  (1895),  263. 
Pacific,   The,  1   Blatchf.  (U.  S.) 

569  (1850),  183. 

[clxi] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Bancroft- 
Whitney    Co.,   94  Fed.  180 

(1899),  1026. 
Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Darnell,  62 

Texas,  639  (1884),  178,  776. 
Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Foley,  46 

Kan.  457  (1891),  1021.  ' 
Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Hertzberg, 

17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  100  (1897), 

1008,  1049. 
Pacific  Express  Co.   v.   Shearer, 

160  111.  215  (1896),  1049. 
Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Wallace,  60 

Ark.  100  (1895),  1005. 
Pacific  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Under- 
wood, 37  Neb.  315  (1893), 

1011,  1014,  1025,  1026. 
Packard  v.  Earle,  113  Mass.  280 

(1873),  1040. 
Packard  v.  Getman,  6  Cow.  (N. 

Y.)  757  (1827),  407,  733. 
Packard  v.  Getman,  4  Wend.  613 

(1830),  1048. 
Packard  v.  Northcraft's  Admr.,  2 

Met.  439  (1859),  770. 
Packard  v.  Taylor,  C.  &  Co.,  35 

Ark.  402  (1880),  919,  985. 
Paddock  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

R.    R.    Co.,    37    Fed.    841 

(1889),  631,  645. 
Padgitt  v.  Moll.  &  Citizens'  Ry. 

Co.,    159    Mo.    143    (1900), 

498,  746,  782. 
Paducah  Lumber  Co.  v.  Paducah 

Water  Supply  Co.,  89  Ky. 

340  (1889),  350. 
Page  v.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R. 

R.  Co.,  129  Ala.  232  (1900), 

806. 
Paine  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

7  Kulp,  187,  1342. 
Paine  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Lehigh  Val- 
ley R.  R.  Co.,  7  Int.  Comm. 

Rep.  218  (1897),  1351. 

[  clxii  ] 


Painter  v.  London,  B.  &  S.  C.  Ry. 

Co.,   2  C.  B.   (N.   S.)   702 

(1857),  483. 
Palatka  Waterworks  v.  Palatka, 

127  Fed.   161   (1903),   1123, 

1125,  1138,  1410,  1430. 
Pallett  v.  Murphy,  131  Cal.  192 

(1900),  378,  384. 
Palmer  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

Ry.  Co.,  101  Cal.  187  (1894), 

901,  1010. 
Calmer  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

Co.,   56  Conn.    137   (1888), 

517,  1033. 
Palmer  v.  Danville,  154  111.  156 

(1894),  824. 
Palmer    v.    Larchmont    Electric 

Co.,  158  N.  Y.  231  (1899), 

56,  71. 
Palmer   v.    London   &   Southern 

Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  588 

(1866),  392,  868. 
Palmer   v.   Lorillard,    16   Johns. 

348  (1819),  591. 
Palmer  v.  Winston-Salem  Ry.  & 

Elec.    Co.,    131    N.   C.   250 

(1902),  939. 

Palmer  Transfer  Co.   v.  Ander- 
son, 131  Ky.  217  (1909),  489. 
Pannell    v.    Louisville    Tobacco 

Warehouse  Co.,  113  Ky.  630 

(1902),  142,  1153. 
Panton  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Bishop, 

11  Vt.  198  (1839),  75. 
Pardee  v.  Drew,  25  Wend.  459 

(1841),  172. 

Paris  &  G.  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rob- 
inson (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  114 

S.  W.  658  (1909),  632,  933. 
Parish  v.  Ulster  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 

192  N.  Y.  353  (1908),  889. 
Parker  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R. 

R.  Co.,  133  N.  C.  335  (1903), 

901,  1011. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Parker   v.    Flagg,    26    Me.    181 

(1846),  172,  963. 
Parker  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co., 

7  M.  &  G.  253  (1844),  479. 
Parker  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co., 

11   C.   B.    545,   583  (1851), 

479. 
Parks  v.  Alta  Cal.  Telegraph,  13 

Cal.  422  (1859),  973,  980. 
Parks  v.  Jacobs  Dold  Packing  Co., 

6  Misc.  570  (1894),  1282. 
Parks  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 

178  Mo.  108  (1903),  760. 
Parmelee  v.  Lowitz,  74  111.   116 

(1874),  171,  514. 
Parmelee  v.  McNulty,  19  111.  556 

(1858),  171,  185,  364. 
Parsons  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,   167  U.  S.  447   (1897), 

535,  1282,  1286. 
Parsons  v.  Hardy,  14  Wend.  215 

(1835),  915. 
Parsons  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y. 

355  (1889),  1031. 
Passenger  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  21 

Ohio  St.  518  (1871),  935,  938. 
Pate  v.  Henry,  5  Stew.  &  P.  (Ala.) 

101  (1833),  182,  396,  658. 
Paterson      Gas     Light     Co.     v. 

Brady,  3  Dutch.  245  (1858), 

31,  111. 
Patten  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  29 

Fed.  590  (1886),  522,  907. 
Patterson  v.  Mississippi  &  R.  R. 

Boom    Co.,    18    Fed.    Cas. 

10,829  (1875),  73. 
Patterson  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  77  Kan.  236  (1908),  836. 
Patterson  v.  No.  Carolina  R.  R. 

Co.,  64  N.  C.  147  (1870),  666. 
Patterson  v.  Omaha,  etc.,  B.  Ry. 

&    B.    Co.,    90    Iowa,    247 

(1894),  1044,  1045. 


Patterson  v.  Steamship  Co.,  53 

S.  E.  224  (1906),  834,  843, 

850,  851. 
Patterson  v.  Taylor,  51  Fla.  275 

(1906),  848. 
Patterson  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  54  Mich.  91  (1884), 

740. 
Patterson  v.  Wollmann,  5  N.  D. 

608  (1896),  52. 
Pavitt  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Ry.  Co., 

153  Pa.  St.  312  (1893),  1023. 
Pawnee  Land  &  C.  Co.  v.  Jenkins, 

1    Colo.    App.    425    (1892), 

984. 
Paxton  &   H.   Irrigation  Co.  v. 

Farmers'  &  M.  Irr.  Co.,  45 

Neb.    884    (1895),    93,  342, 

701. 
Paxton  Tie  Co.  v.  Detroit  So.  Ry. 

Co.,  10  U.  C.  C.  Rep.  422 

(1905),  1365. 
Payne  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  Ry. 

Co.,  157  Ind.  616  (1902),  786, 

1018. 
Pearce  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  89 

Mo.  App.  437  (1901),  431. 
Pears  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  N. 

Y.  Law  Jour.,  Feb.  3,  1900, 

503. 

Pearsall  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,    124  N.   Y.  256 

(1891),  412,  863. 
Pearson  v.  Duane,  4  Wall.  605 

(1866),  560,  561,  612,  634. 
Pease  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  101  N.  Y.  367  (1886), 

447,  1259. 
Peavey  &  Co.  v.  Union  Pacific 

Ry.  Co.,  176  Fed.  409(1910), 

815,  1360. 

Peavy  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  &  Bank- 
ing Co.,  81  Ga.  485  (1888), 

632,  633,  933. 

[  clxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Peck  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  587 

(1877),  844,  881. 
Peck  v.  Weeks,  34  Conn.    145 

(1867),  950. 
Pecos  &  N.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Evans- 

Snider-Buel  Co.,  42  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  60  (1906),  914. 
Peeples  v.  Brunswick  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,  60  Ga.  281  (1878),  939. 
Peet  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

20  Wis.  594  (1866),  840,  842, 

914. 

Pegram  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    100   N.    C.    28 

(1888),  742. 
Peik  v.  Chicago  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

94  U.  S.   164   (1876),   124, 

1121,  1427. 
Peixotti  v.  McLaughlin,  1  Strob. 

L.  468  (1847),  184,  262. 
Pelton  v.  Rensselaer  &  S.  R.  R. 

Co.,  54  N.  Y.  214  (1873), 

1040. 
Pendall  v.  Rench,  4  McLean,  259 

(1847),  963. 
Pender  v.  Robbing,  6  Jones  (N. 

C.),  207  (1858),  255,  792. 
Pendergast    v.    Adams    Express 

Co.,  101  Mass.  120  (1869), 

1017. 
Pendergast  v.  Compton,  8  C.  &  P. 

654  (1837),  611. 
Peniston  v.  Chicago,  St.  Louis  & 

N.  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  La.  Ann. 

777  (1882),  500,  823. 
Penn  v.  Buffalo  &  E.  R.  R.  Co., 

49  N.  Y.  204   (1872),  949, 

967,  989. 
Penn.  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Dand- 

ridge,  8  Gill  &  J.  248  (1836), 

173. 
Pennewill  v.  Cullen,  5  Harr.  238 

(1849),  228,  235. 

[  clxiv  ] 


Pennington  &  E.  v.  Douglass,  A. 
&  G.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Ga.  App.  665 
(1907),  798,  835. 

Pennington  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  & 
B.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Md.  95 
(1883),  1258. 

Pennsylvania  Central  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Schwarzenberger,  45  Pa. 
St.  208  (1863),  1017. 

Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Dela- 
ware &  Hudson  Canal  Co., 
31  N.  Y.  91  (1865),  122,  241, 
865,  1281. 

Pennsylvania  D.  &  M.  Steam 
Nav.  Co.  v.  Dandridge,  8 
Gill  &  J.  248  (1836),  774, 
972. 

Pennsylvania  Iron  Co.  v.  Lan- 
caster, 17  Lane.  L.  R.  161 
(1900),  458,  549,  1324,  1354. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more &  0.  Ry.  Co.,  60  Md. 
263  (1883),  527. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Berry, 
68  Pa.  St.  272  (1871),  513. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Books, 
57  Pa.  St.  339  (1868),  784. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bray, 
125  Ind.  229  (1890),  864. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 181  111.  289  (1899),  485. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark, 
2  Ind.  App.  146  (1891),  901, 
902. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fries, 
87  Pa. St. 234 (1878), 838,  903. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
wood Bridge  Co.,  170  111.  645 
(1897),  414,  991. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Len- 
hart,  120  Fed.  61  (1903),  888. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Live- 
right,  14  Ind.  App.  518 
(1895),  1037. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mid- 
vale  Steel  Co.,  201  Pa.  St. 
624  (1902),  862,  1050. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Naive, 
112  Term.  239  (1903),  599, 
1038. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Phila- 
delphia County,  220  Pa.  St. 
100  (1908),  1064,  1081,  1082, 
1123,  1128,  1131,  1132,  1133, 
1136,  1166,  1191,  1193,  1202, 
1209,  1430. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Price, 
96  Pa.  St.  256  (1880),  777. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Reed, 
60  Fed.  694  (1894),  736. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Roy, 
102 U.S.  451  (1880),  776, 794. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Shearer,  75  Ohio  St.  249 
(1906),  1023. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sny- 
der,  55  Ohio  St.  342  (1896), 
530. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Spicker, 
105  Pa.  St.  142  (1884),  862. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Van- 
diver,  42  Pa.  St.  365  (1862), 
935. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood- 
worth,  26  Ohio  St.  585 
(1875),  777,  778,  781. 

Pennsylvania  Refining  Co.  v. 
Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  208  U.  S.  208  (1908), 
531,  1350. 

Penny  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Co., 
133  N.  C.  221  (1903),  942. 

Penobscot  Log  D.  Co.  v.  West 
Branch  D.  &  R.  Dam  Co., 
99  Me.  452  (1905),  55. 

Pensacola  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Florida,  25  Fla.  310  (1889), 
1063,  1175,  1201,  1431. 


People  v.  Albany  &  V.  R.  R.  Co., 

24  N.  Y.  261  (1862),  211, 300, 

302,  304. 
People  v.  Albion  Water  Works 

Co.,   121  N.  Y.  Supp.  660 

(1910),  1300. 
People  v.  Babcock,  16  Hun,  313 

(1878),  254,  795. 
People  v.  Board  of  Supervisors, 

142  N.  Y.  271  (1894),  299. 
People  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  Ry. 

Co.,   75   N.   Y.   Supp.   202 

(1902),  312,  319. 
People  v.  Budd,   117  N.  Y.   1 

(1889),  20,  50,  141. 
People  v.  Burnham  Hospital,  71 

111.  App.  246  (1896),  70. 
People  v.  Canal  Co.,  25  Colo.  202 

(1898),  384. 
People  v.  Caryl,  3  Park  Cr.  326 

(1857),  933. 
People  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

55  111.  95  (1870),  272,  531, 

792. 
People  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

130  111.  175  (1889),  808,  809. 
People  v.  Chicago  Gas  Trust  Co., 

130  111.  268  (1889),  686. 
People  v.  Chicago  Telephone  Co., 

220  111.  238  (1906),  795. 
People  v.  Colorado  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  42  Fed.  638  (1890),  212, 

302,  319. 
People  v.  Deehan,  153  N.  Y.  528 

(1897),  275. 
People  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal 

Co.,   52   N.   Y.   Supp.   850 

(1898),  813. 
People  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal 

Co.,  165  N.  Y.  362  (1901), 

806. 
People  v.  Green  Island  Water  Co., 

9  N.  Y.  Supp.   168  (1890). 

1298. 

[  clxv] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


People  v.  Hudson    River   Tele- 
phone Co.,  19  Abb.  N.  C.  466 

(1887),  136,  244,  624,  704. 
People  v.  Illinois  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  & 

Coal  Co.,  122  111.  506  (1887), 

835. 
People  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  233  111.  378  (1908),  391, 

503,  703,  812. 
People  v.   Jones,   54  Barb.   311 

(1863),  234,  974. 

People  v.  Kankakee  River  Im- 
provement Co.,  103  111.  491 

(1882),  72,  241. 

People  v.  Los  Angeles  Independ- 
ent Gas  Co.,   150  Cal.  557 

(1907),  112,  265,  792. 
People  v.   Mago,   69   Hun,   559 

(1893),  237,  241. 
People  v.  McKay,  46  Mich.  430 

(1881),  557,  879. 
People   v.    Manhattan    Gaslight 

Co.,   45   Barb.    136    (1865), 

452,  453,  458,  460. 
People  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Hun,  543 

(1883),  202,  668. 
People  v.  New  York  Suburban 

Water  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  Supp. 

364  (1899),  431,  981. 
People  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W. 

R.   R.  Co.,   104  N.  Y.  58 

(1887),  805,  806. 
People  v.  Northern  Central  Ry. 

Co.,  164  N.  Y.  289  (1900), 

299. 
People  v.  People's  Gas  Light  Co., 

205  111.  482  (1903),  51. 
People  v.  Plainfield  Ave.  Gravel 

Road  Company,  105  Mich.  9 

(1895),  300,  301. 
People  v.  Rome,  W.  &  0.  R.  R. 

Co.,  103  N.  Y.  95  (1886),  299 

306,  319. 

[  clxvi  ] 


People  v.  San  Francisco  &  A.  R. 

R.Co.,35Cal.606(1868),241. 
People  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H. 

R.  R.  Co.,  176  111.  512  (1898), 

211,  578,  740,  794,  797,  839. 
People  v.  St.  Louis  &  B.  Electric 

Ry.  Co.,   122  111.  App.  422 

(1905),  595. 
People  v.  Stevens,  197  N.  Y.  1 

(1909),  1097. 
People  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

166  111.  15  (1897),  412,  472, 

497,  514. 
People's  Gaslight  &  Coke  Co.  v. 

Chicago,  194  U.  S.  1  (1904), 

144,  1421,  1426. 
People's  Gas  Light  &  C.  Co.  v. 

Hale,  94  111.  App.  406  (1900), 

111,    112,   265,    1077,    1225, 

1306. 

Peoria  &  P.  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

109  111.  135  (1884),  529. 
Peoria  &  P.  Union  Ry.  Co.  v. 

United  States  Rolling  Stock 

Co.,  136  111.  643  (1891),  775, 

1043. 
Pepper    v.    Telegraph    Co.,    87 

Tenn.  554  (1889),  1014. 
Pere   Marquette   R.    R.    Co.   v. 

Strange,  171  Ind.  160  (1908), 

402,  735. 
Perkins  v.  Chicago,  S.  L.  &  N.  O. 

R.    R.    Co.,    60    Miss.    726 

(1883),  763. 
Perkins  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,    155   Fed.   445    (1897), 

1166. 
Perkins  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  196  (1862), 

785. 
Perkins  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,    155   Fed.   445    (1908), 

1091,  1092,  1124,  1430. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Perkins  v.  Portland,  S.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  47  Me.  573  (1859),  511, 

513. 
Perkins  v.   Wright,   37   Ind.   27 

(1871),  875,  970. 
Perry  v.  Philadelphia  B.  &  W. 

R.  R.  Co.  (Del.  Supr.),  77 

Atl.  725  (1910),  778. 
Perry  v.  Pittsburg  Union  Pass. 

Ry.   Co.,    153   Pa.    St.    236 

(1893),  862,  877. 
Perth  General  Station  Committee 

v.  Ross,  A.  C.  479  (1897),  500. 
Peters  v.  New  Orleans  &  Gt.  N. 

R.  R.  Co.,  16  La.  Ann.  222 

(1861),  772. 
Petersen  v.   Case,   21   Fed.   885 

(1884),  834. 
Peterson,    In    re,    21    Fed.    885 

(1884),  518,  1184. 
Peterson   v.    Chicago   &   North- 
western Ry.   Co.,   119  Wis. 

197  (1903),  778. 
Peterson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

Ry.  Co.   (Iowa),  45  N.  W. 

573  (1890),  1017. 
Peterson     v.     Seattle     Traction 

Co.,  23   Wash.   615   (1900), 

784. 
Pfister  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,  70  Cal.  169  (1886),  239, 

255,  477,  792. 
Phelan  v.  Boone  Gas  Co.  (Iowa), 

125  N.  W.  208  (1910),  435, 

552,  865,  877,  1300. 
Phelan  v.  Boone  Gas  L.,  F.  &  P. 

Co.  v.  Orr,  27  Ind.  App.  1 

(1910),  1300. 
Phelps  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  94  111.  548  (1880),  666. 
Phelps  v.  Windsor  Stb.  Co.,  131 

N.  C.  12  (1902),  753. 
Phelps,  I.  &  Co.  v.  Hill,  1  Q.  B. 

605  (1891),  909. 


Phenix  Insurance  Co.  v.  Liver- 
pool &  G.  W.  Steamship  Co., 

22  Blatchf.  372  (1884),  165. 
Phettiplace   v.    Northern   Pacific 

R.  R.  Co.,  84  Wis.  412  (1893), 

888. 
Philadelphia  v.  Philadelphia  R.  T. 

Co.    (Pa.   St.),   73  Atl.   923 

(1909),  1344. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Beck,  125  Pa.  St.  620  (1889), 

522,  548,  906. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Derby,  14  How.  468  (1852), 

337,  785. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Interstate   Commerce   Com- 
mission, 174  Fed.  687  (1909), 

1394. 
Philadelphia,   M.  &  S.  St.    Ry. 

Co.'s  Petition,  203  Pa.  St.  354 

(1902),  698. 
Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Anderson,    72    Md.    519 

(1890),  978. 
Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Lehman,    56    Md.    209 

(1881),  599. 
Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Rice,  64  Md.  63  (1885), 

862,  890. 
Phillips  v.  Brigham,  26  Ga.  617 

(1859),  905,  908,  921. 
Phillips   v.    Earle,    8   Pick.    182 

(1829),     737,      990,      1020, 

1021. 
Phillips  v.  Edwards,  3  H.  &  N.  813 

(1858),  1001. 
Phillips  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  114 

Ga.  284  (1901),  697. 
Phillips  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  124 

N.  C.  123  (1899),  398,  873. 
Phillips   v.    Watson,    63    la.    28 

(1884),  223. 

[  clxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Phillips   Co.   v.   Pruitt,   26  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  831  (1904),  193. 
Phipps  v.  London  &  Northwestern 

Ry.   Co.,   2   Q.   B.   D.   229 

(1892),  1204,  1223,  1377. 
Phoenix  L.  &  F.  Co.  v.  Bennett, 

8  Ariz.  314  (1903),  983,  984. 
Phoenix    Powder    Mfg.    Co.    v. 

Wabash  Ry.  Co.,   101   Mo. 

App.  442  (1903),  1005. 
Pickford  v.  Grand  Junction  Ry. 

Co.,  10  M.  &  W.  399  (1842), 

479. 
Pickett  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  69 

S.  C.  445  (1904),  395. 
Piedmont  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.,  19  So.  C.  353  (1882), 

170,  230,  236,  1001. 
Pierce  v.   Drew,    136   Mass.   75 

(1883),  133. 
Pierce  v.  Milwaukee  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

Wis.  38  (1868),  971. 
Pierce  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  120 

Cal.  156  (1898),  907,  1010, 

1021. 
Pike  v.  Nash,  3  Abb.  App.  Dec. 

610  (1864),  55,  238. 
Pinchon's    Case,     9    Coke,     87 

(1611),  442. 

Pinckney  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  19  S.  C.  71  (1883), 

133,  851,  980. 
Pine  Grove,  Township  of,  v.  Tal- 

cott,    19   Wall.    666    (1873), 

217. 
Pingree  v.  Detroit,  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,   66   Mich.    143    (1887), 

1046. 
Pingree  v.  Michigan  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  118  Mich.  314  (1898), 

1407. 
Pinkerton  v.  Woodward,  33  Cal. 

557    (1867),   204,   234,   240, 

263,  725. 

[  clxviii  ] 


Pitcher  v.  Old  Colony  St.  Ry.  Co., 

196  Mass.  69  (1907),  978. 
Pitlock  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  109 

Mass.  452  (1872),  251,  531, 

792. 
Pittsburg  &  B.  Traction  Co.  v. 

Seidell,  6  Pa.  Dist.  R.  414 

(1896),  503. 
Pittsburg  &  M.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Caldwell,    74    Pa.    St.    421 

(1873),  933. 
Pittsburg  &  W.  E.  Pass.  Ry.  v. 

Point  Bridge  Co.,   165  Pa. 

St.  37  (1894),  53,  241,  699. 
Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Barrett,  36  Ohio  St.  448 

(1881),  393,  726. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  City  of  Chicago,  242  111. 

178  (1909),  547,  667,  987. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Daniels,  90  111.  App.  154 

(1899),  886,  889. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Higgs,  165  Ind.  694  (1905), 

1011,  1016. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Hollowell,   65   Ind.    188 

(1879),  669. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Krouse,  30  Ohio  St.  222 

(1876),  1044. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Lyon,    123   Pa.    St.    140 

(1888),  812. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.   Mahoney,    148  Ind.   196 

(1897),  778,  1015. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.   Mitchell,   91   N.   E.  735 

(1910),  916,  1005. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Mooar  Lumber  Co.,  27  Oh. 

Cir.  Ct.  588  (1905),  1050. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Morton,    61     Ind.    539 

(1878),  272,  333,  513,  531, 

792,  804. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Nash,  43  Ind.  423  (1873), 

1042,  1043. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.     Nuzum,     50     Ind.     141 

(1875),  870,  872,  904. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Pillow,    76   Pa.    St.    510 

(1874),  632. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Racer,  10  Ind.  App.  503 

(1894),  831,  833,  922. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Racer,  5  Ind.  App.  209 

(1892),  722,  833. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Sheppard,  56  Ohio  St.  68 

(1897),  1010,  1011. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Street,  26  Ind.  App.  224 

(1901),  889. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Vandyne,    57    Ind.    576 

(1877),  431,  632,  878,  885. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Van  Houton,  48   Ind.  90 

(1874),  800. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Viers,  113  Ky.  526  (1902), 

272,  792. 
Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Wood    (Ind.    App.),    84 

N.  E.  1009  (1908),  408,  443, 

722,  853. 
Pittsburg,  F.  W.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hazen,  84  111.  36  (1876),  668, 

912. 
Pittsburg,  F.  W.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hinds,  53  Pa.  St.  512  (1866), 

942,  944. 


Pittsburg,  W.  &  K.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Ben  wood    Iron    Works,    31 

W.  Va.  710  (1888),  226. 
Planters'  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  West- 
ern Union  Teleg.   Co.,    126 

Ga.  621  (1906),  412. 
Planz  v.  Boston  &  Albany  R.  R. 

Co.,  157  Mass.  377  (1892), 

623,  738. 
Platt  v.  Le  Cocq,  150  Fed.  391 

(1906),   178,  392,  419,  580, 

865,  868. 

Playford  v.  United  Kingdom  Elec- 
tric Telegraph  Co.,  L.  R.  4 

Q.  B.  706  (1869),  348. 
Plessy,  Ex  parte,  45  La.  Ann.  80 

\1893),  848,  849,  566. 
Plessy  v.  Ferguson,  163  U.  S.  537 

(1896),  848. 
Plott  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,    63   Wis.    511     (1885), 

865. 
Pocantico  Water  Works  Co.   v. 

Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249  (1891), 

221,  242. 
Pocatello  Water  Co.  v.  Standley, 

7  Idaho,  155  (1900),  273,  405, 

706,  797,  824. 
Pokrok  Zapadu  Pub.  Co.  v.  Ziz- 

kovsky,  42  Neb.  64  (1894), 

69. 
Polk  v.  Coffin,  9  Cal.  56  (1858), 

213. 
Polk  &  Co.  v.  Melenbacker,  136 

Mich.  611  (1904),  751. 
Pollard  v.  Vinton,   105  U.  S.  7 

(1881),  747. 
Pollits  v.  Consolidated  Gas  Co., 

102  N.  Y.  Supp.  1017  (1907), 

434. 
Pollock   v.    Landis,    36   la.   651 

(1873),  751. 
Pomeroy  v.   Donaldson,   5  Mo. 

36  (1837),  182. 

[  clxix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Poole  v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,  16  Oreg.  261  (1888),  887, 

888. 
Poole  v.  Paris  Mt.  Water  Co.,  81 

S.  C.  438  (1908),  377,  456, 

458. 
Pooling  Freights,  In  re,  115  Fed. 

588  (1902),  694. 
Pope  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

9    HI.  App.  (9  Bradw.)  283 

(1881),  1041. 
Porcher  v.  Northeastern  R.   R. 

Co.,    14    Rich.    Law,     181 

(1867),  663,  664,  800,  831. 
Porter   v.   Gilkey,    57   Mo.    235 

(1874),  1001. 
Porter  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  34  Barb.  353  (1861),  888. 
Porter  v.  Raleigh  &  G.  R.  R.  Co., 

132   N.  C.  71    (1903),   442, 

978. 
Porterfield     v.     Humphreys,     8 

Humph.  497  (1847),  229. 
Portland  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v.  State, 

135  Ind.  54  (1893),  111,  243, 

280,  320,  579,  686,  1325. 
Portland  Ry.  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

Railroad  Commission  (Oreg.), 

109  Pac.  273  (1909),  1377. 
Post  v.  Railroad  Co.,  103  Tenn. 

184  (1899),  521,  907. 
Postal  Cable  Telegraph  Co.   v. 

Cumberland     Telephone     & 

Telegraph  Co.,  177  Fed.  726 

(1910),  700,  704,  1216,  1246, 

1287,  1290.  1300. 
Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co.  v. 

Oregon  S.   L.   Ry.   Co.,   23 

Utah,  474  (1901),  56. 
Potter  v.  Railway  Co.,  95  Mich. 

389  (1893),  241. 
Potwin  Place,  City  of,  v.  Topeka 

Ry.  Co.,  51  Kans.  609  (1893), 

211,  305. 

[  clxx  ] 


Poucher  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  263  (1872), 

735,  780. 
Poulin  v.  Canadian  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  52  Fed.  197  (1892),  889. 
Pounder  v.  North  E.  Ry.  Co.,  1 

Q.  B.  385  (1891),  570,  942, 

944. 
Powell  v.  Duluth,  91  Minn.  53 

(1903),  1245,  1246,  1251. 
Powell  v.   Mills,   37   Miss.   691 

(1859),  182,  241,  743,  963. 
Powell  v.  Myers,  26  Wend.  591 

(1841),  185. 
Powers  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  153  Mass.  188  (1891), 

764. 
Powers  v.  Davenport,  7  Blackf. 

497  (1845),  905,  921. 
Powers  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Wells- 

Fargo  &  Co.,  93  Minn.  143 

(1904),  1010. 
Pratt  et  al.  v.  Ogdensburg  &  L. 

C.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  Mass.  557 

(1869),  990. 
Pray  v.  Omaha  St.  Ry.  Co.,  44 

Neb.  167  (1895),  189,  945. 
Prendergast  v.  Compton,  8  C.  & 

P.  454  (1837),  555. 
Prentice  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  211  U.  S.  210  (1908), 

1124,1125,1430. 
Prescott  &  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 

Co.,  73  Fed.  438  (1896),  534. 
Prescott  Irrigation  Co.   v.  Fla- 

thers,  20  Wash.  454  (1899), 

93,  242. 
Preston  v.  Water  Commissioners 

117  Mich.  589  (1898),  1075, 

1172,  1303,  1304. 
Prevost  v.  Gt.  Eastern  Ry.  Co., 

13  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  20  (1865), 

872. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Price  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry. 

Co.,  46  W.  Va.  538  (1899), 

878. 
Price  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co., 

12  Colo.  402  (1888),  522. 
Price  v.  Oswego  &  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

50  N.  Y.  213  (1872),  1049. 
Price  v.  Riverside  Canal  &  Irr. 

Co.,  56  Cal.  431  (1880),  93, 

242,  411. 
Price  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 

Ry.  Co.,  75  Ark.  479  (1905), 

632,  933. 
Prickett  v.  New  Orleans  Anchor 

Line,     13    Mo.    App.    436 

(1883),  1044. 

Primrose  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    154    U.    S.    1 

(1893),  412,  766,  1014. 
Princeton,    The,    3    Blatch.    54 

(1853),  173,  774. 
Prince  v.  Crocker,  166  Mass.  347 

(1896),  77,  191. 
Prince  v.  International  &  Great 

Northern  Ry.  Co.,  64  Tex. 

144  (1885),  761. 
Prindiville  v.  Jackson,  79  111.  337 

(1875),  406,  824. 
Propeller  Mohawk,  The,  8  Wall. 

(U.  S.)  153  (1869),  1265. 
Propeller  Niagara  v.  Cordes,  21 

How.  7  (1858),  165,  239. 
Provident  Inst.   for  Savings  v. 

Allen,    37    N.    J.    Eq.    36 

(1883),  374. 
Pruitt  v.    Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R. 

R.  Co.,  62  Mo.  527  (1786), 

909. 
Pryor,  In  re,  55  Kan.  724  (1895), 

111,  1410,  1424. 
Public  Service  Corp.  v.  American 

Lighting  Co.,  67  N.  J.  Eq. 

122   (1904),   111,  243,  282, 

374,  406,  702. 


Pudsey  Coal  Gas  Co.  v.  Brad- 
ford,   L.    R.    15    Eq.    167 

(1873),  274. 
Pugh  v.  City  &  Sub.  Telephone 

Assn.,    9    Cinn.    Law   Bull. 

104  (1883),  633. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Adams,  120 

Ala.  581  (1898),  153,  975. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Bales,  80 

Tex.  211  (1891),  606,  608, 

645. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Barker,  4 

Colo.  344  (1878),  635,  933. 
Pullman    P.    C.    Co.    v.    Booth 

(Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  719 

(1894),  153,  832. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Cain,  15 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  503  (1897), 

566,  832,  848,  849,  881. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Freuden- 

stein,    3    Colo.    App.    540 

(1893),  153,  975. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Gavin,  93 

Tenn.  53  (1893),  153,  938, 

975. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Gaylord,  9 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  58  (1887),  153. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Hall,  106 

Ga.  765  (1899),  153,  975. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Hunter,  21 

Ky.   L.   Rep.   1248   (1900), 

769. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Krauss,  145 

Ala.  395   (1906),   631,  638, 

639,  643,  879,  934. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Lawrence, 

74   Miss.   782   (1897),    153, 

940,  975. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Lee,  49 

111.  App.  75  (1892),  382,  847. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Lowe,  28 

Neb.  239  (1889),  21,  153. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Lutz,  154 

Ala.  517  (1908),  932. 
[  clxxi  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.   Martin, 

95  Ga.  314  (1894),  769. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Nelson,  22 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  223  (1899), 

832. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Reed,  75 

111.  125  (1874),  832,  886. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Smith,  73 

111.  360  (1874),  153,  975. 
Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Smith,  79 

Tex.  468  (1891),  932. 
Purcell  v.  Daly,  19  Abb.  N.  C. 

301  (1886),  117. 
Purcell  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  R. 

Co.,  108  N.  C.  414  (1891), 

664,  801. 
Purnell  v.  McLane,  98  Md.  589 

(1904),  78,  383. 
Purple  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,    114  Fed.   123   (1902), 

764. 
Purvis  v.  Coleman,  1  Bosw.  321 

(1860),  1001. 
Putman  v.  Broadway  &  7th  Ave. 

R.  R.  Co.,  55  N.  Y.   108 

(1873),  941,  942. 
Pyle  v.  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Ga. 

Ry.    Co.,    1    I.    C.    C.   465 

(1888),  1237. 


Queen    v.    McFarlane,    7    Can. 

Sup.  216  (1882),  74,  972. 
Quickstep,    The,     9    Wall.     66 

(1869),  173,  774. 
Quigley  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,    11    Nev.    350    (1876), 

938. 
Quimby  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  150  Mass.  365  (1890), 

786,  1004,  1018. 

Quincy,  Inhabitants  of,  v.  Bos- 
ton, 148  Mass.  389  (1889), 

274,  281. 

f  clxxii  1 


Quinn  v.   Louisville  &  N.   Ry. 
Co.,  98  Ky.  231  (1895),  848. 


Radley  v.  Columbia  Southern 
R.  R.  Co.,  44  Oreg.  332 
(1904),  761. 

Rae  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 
14  Fed.  401  (1882),  529. 

Ragan  &  B.  v.  Aiken,  9  Lea,  609 
(1882),  681,  1282,  1283, 
1299,  1311,  1313. 

Rahmel  v.  Lehndorff,  142  Cal. 
681  (1904),  936. 

Railroad  Commission  Cases,  116 
U.  S.  307  (1886),  124,  1122, 
1401,  1408,  1409, 1411, 1420, 
1423,  1428. 

Railroad  Commission  v.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  S.  C.  130 
(1905),  806. 

Railroad  Commission  v.  Hous- 
ton &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  90 
Tex.  340  (1897),  1409. 

Railroad  Commission  v.  Kansas 
City  So.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  La. 
133  (1903),  404,  819. 

Railroad  Commission  v.  Port- 
land &  0.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  63 
Me.  269  (1872),  806. 

Railroad  Commission  v.  St. 
Louis  &  S.  W.  Ry.  (Tex.), 
80  S.  W.  102  (1904), 224, 822. 

Railroad  Commission  v.  Weld, 
96  Tex.  394  (1902),  1348. 

Railroad  Commission  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co., 
113  N.  C.  213  (1893),  814. 

Railroad  Commissioners,  Re,  15 
Neb.  679  (1883),  1404. 

Railroad  Commissioners,  Re,  79 
Vt.  266  (1906),  805,  806. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Bunnell,  138 
Ala.  247,  889. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  Parkes 

&  Co.,  88  Term.  430  (1889), 

1005. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hailey,  94  Tenn. 

383  (1895),  764. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Husen,  95  U.  S. 

465  (1877),  1418. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kelley,  91  Tenn. 

699  (1892),  919. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kuhn,  107  Tenn. 

106  (1901),  966. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Lockwood,   17 

Wall.  357  (1873),  176,  780, 

1002,  1007,  1011. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Manufacturing 

Co.,    16   Wall.   318   (1872), 

1003,  1004. 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Mitchell,    98 

Tenn.  27  (1896),  635. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Odil,  96  Tenn.  61 

(1895),  912. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   O'Donnell,   49 

Ohio   St.   489    (1892),   610, 

667,  910,  913. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Pratt,  22  Wall. 

123  (1874),  794. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reeves,  10  Wall. 

176  (1870),  917,  920. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Skillman,    39 

Ohio   St.   444    (1883),   447, 

887,  1259. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Southern  Seat- 
ing   &    Cabinet    Co.,     104 

Tenn.  568  (1900),  518,  1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  . 

38  Ohio  St.  24  (1882),  814. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Turner,    100 

Tenn.  213  (1898),  862. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Walrath,    38 

Ohio  St.  461  (1882),  776. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bruce,  55  Ark.  65 

(1891),  1042. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lawton,  55  Ark. 

428  (1892),  369. 


Railway  Co.  v.  Murphy,  60  Ark. 

333  (1895),  733,  734. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Neville,  60  Ark. 

375(1895),  911, 1038. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Salzman,    52 

Ohio  St.  558  (1895),  933. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Smith,  60  Ark. 

221  (1895),  577. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sowell,  90  Tenn. 

17  (1890),  1021. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wynn,  88  Tenn. 

320  (1890),  1020,  1022. 
Raleigh  &  Gaston  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Davis,  2  D.  &  B.  451  (1837), 

26,  58. 
Ramberg  v.  South  Carolina  R. 

R.  Co.,  9  S.C.  61  (1877),  989. 
Ramm  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.,  94  la.  296  (1895), 

738,  761. 
Rand   v.    Merchants'    Dispatch 

Transp.  Co.,  59  N.  H.  363 

(1879),  1007. 
Randall  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  102  Mo.  App.  342 

(1903),  341,  440,  468. 
Randall  v.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E. 

R.  R.  Co.,  45  La.  Ann.  778 

(1893),  889,  1011. 
Randall    v.    Railroad    Co.,    108 

N.  C.  612  (1891),  431,  435. 
Randolph  v.   Quincy,   0.   &  K. 

C.  R.  R.  Co.,  129  Mo.  App. 

1  (1908),  889. 
Ransome    v.    Eastern    Counties 

Ry.  Co.,  1  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  437 

(1855),  1313. 
Raritan    River    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Middlesex    &    S.    Traction 

Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  732  (1904), 

694. 

Ratcliff  v.  Wichita  Union  Stock- 
yards Co.,  74  Kan.  1  (1906), 

100. 

[  clxxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Ratliff  v.  Quincy,  0.  &  K.  C.  R. 

R.  Co.,  118  Mo.  App.  644 

(1906),  904. 
Rathbone  v.  Oregon  R.  R.  Co., 

40  Oreg.  225  (1901),  761. 
Ratzer  v.  Burlington,  C.   R.  & 

N.  Ry.  Co.,  64  Minn.  245 

(1896),  1045. 
Rawlins  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  97 

Mo.  App.  515  (1903),  341. 
Rawson  v.  Holland,  59  N.  Y.  611 

(1875),  1053. 
Ray  v.  United  Traction,  96  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  48  (1904),  626. 
Re, — see  the  particular  name. 
R.  E.  Lee,  The,  2  Abb.  (U.  S.) 

49  (1870),  769. 
Read    v.    Amidon,    41    Vt.    15 

(1868),  341,  770,  969. 
Read  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  N. 

R.  R.  Co.,  60  Mo.  199  (1875), 

912. 
Readhead  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co., 

L.   R.  4  Q.  B.  379   (1869), 

977. 
Reagan    v.    Farmers'    Loan    & 

Trust  Co.,    154  U.   S.   362 

(1894),  1091,  1099,  1122, 

1161,  1166,  1401,  1402,  1406, 

1407,  1411,  1412,  1429. 
Reagan  &  B.  v.  Aiken,  9  Lea,  609 

(1882),  1377. 
Reary  v.  Louisville,  N.  0.  &  T. 

Ry.  Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  32 

(1888),  745. 
Reber   v.    Bond,    38    Fed.    822 

(1889),  763. 
Redkey    Natural     Gas    v.    Orr 

(Ind.),  60  N.  E.  716  (1901), 

243,  707,  1288,  1300. 
Redlands  L.  &  C.  D.  Water  Co. 

v.   Redlands,   121   Cal.  365 

(1898),    1099,    1109,    1131, 

1168,  1410. 
[  clxxiv  ] 


Red  Star  Steamship  Co.  v.  Jer- 
sey City,  45  N.  J.  L.  246 

(1883),  406,  825. 
Reed  v.  Duluth  &  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  100  Mich.  507  (1894), 

872. 
Reed  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B. 

R.    R.    Co.,    3   Houst.    176 

(1865),  723,  872,  904. 
Reed    v.    Western   Union   Tele- 
graph   Co.,    135    Mo.    661 

(1896),  133,  1014. 
Reed  v.  Wilmington  Stb.  Co.,  1 

Marv.  (Del.)  193(1893),  727. 
Reed  &  Walker  v.  Philadelphia, 

W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Houst. 

176  (1865),  442. 
Reem  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co., 

77  Minn.  503  (1899),  945. 
Reese  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

131  Pa.  St.  422  (1890),  887. 
Reg.  v.  Bristol  &  Exeter  Ry.  Co., 

4  Q.  B.  162  (1843),  211,  300. 
Reg.  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co., 

10  Ad.  &  El.  531  (1839),  304. 
Reg.  v.  Rymer,  2  Q.  B.  D.  136 

(1877),  263,  626,  974. 
Regan  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

61  N.  H.  579  (1881),  521. 
Reg.   v.  Sprague,   63  J.  P.  233 

(1899),  558,  568. 
Regner  v.  Glens  Falls,  S.  H.  &  F. 

E.  St.   Ry.   Co.,   26  N.  Y. 

Supp.  625  (1893),  638,  645. 
Reid  &  B.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

149  N.  C.  423  (1908),  407. 
Reidman  v.  Brooklyn,  Q.  C.  &  S. 

Ry.  Co.,  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  196 

(1898),  740. 
Relf  v.  Rapp,  3  W.  &  S.  (Pa.)  21 

(1841),  737,  990. 
Relyea  v.  New  Haven  R.  M.  Co., 

42  Conn.   579   (1873),   748, 

1269. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Renneker  v.  South  Carolina  R.  R. 

Co.,  20  S.  C.  219  (1883),  978. 
Renville,   Matter  of,   46   N.   Y. 

App.  Div.  37  (1899),  244. 
Reuter  v.  El.  T.  Co.,  6  E.  &  B. 

341  (1856),  851. 
Rex  v.   Collins,   Palmer,   373,   2 

Rolle,  345  (1623),   12,   106, 

203,  291,  314. 
Rex  v.  Ivens,  7  Car.  &  P.  213 

(1835),   106,  396,  442,   557, 

599,  632,  633. 
Rex    v.    Luellin,    12    Mod.    445 

(1700),  363. 
Rex  v.  Smith,  65  J.  P.  521  (1901), 

106,  569. 

Reynolds  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  81  Mo.  App.  223 

(1899),  871,  1041. 
R.  G.  Winslow,  The,  4  Biss.  13 

(1860),  731. 
Rhinehart,  Matter  of,  93  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  410  (1904),  116. 
Rhodes  v.  Northern  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

34  Minn.  87  (1885),  850. 
Rice  v.  Boston  &  W.  R.  R.  Corp., 

98  Mass.  212  (1867),  1043. 
Rice     v.     Illinois     Central    Ry. 

Co.,  22  111.  App.  643  (1887), 

970. 
Rice  v.  Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  63 

Mo.  314  (1876),  1007. 
Rich     v.     Kneeland,     Hob.    17, 

13. 
Richards  v.  London,  B.  &  S.  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  7  C.  B.  839  (1849), 

769. 
Richards  v.  Wescott,  2  Bosw.  589 

(1858),  171,  990. 
Richardson  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,    149    Mo.    311    (1899), 

1005. 
Richardson  v.  Hallstead,  44  Neb. 

606  (1895),  1033. 


Richardson  v.  North  Eastern  Ry. 

Co.,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  75  (1872), 

414,  991. 
Richardson  v.   Sewell,  2  Smith, 

205  (1805),  229. 
Richardson,  Admr.  v.  Harrison, 

Admx.,   36   Mo.   96   (1865), 

(1033). 
Richberger  v.  American  Express 

Co.,  73  Miss.  161  (1895),  931. 
Richman    v.    Consolidated    Gas 

Co.,     114    App.    Div.    216 

(1906),  1124,  1430. 
Richmond  v.  Dubuque  &  Sioux 

City  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Iowa,  191 

(1868),  404,  492,  817. 
Richmond  v.  Smith,  8  B.  &  C.  9 

(1828),  770,  964. 
Richmond    v.    Southern    Pacific 

Co.,  41  Oreg.  54  (1902),  1011. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jef- 
ferson,  89   Ga.   554   (1892), 

942. 
Richmond  &  D.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Payne,   86  Va.   481   (1890), 

1002,  1021. 
Richmond  &   D.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Trammel,      53      Fed.      196 

(1892),  1405. 
Richmond  &  D.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Trousdale  &  Sons,   99  Ala. 

389  (1893),  916. 
Ricker  v.    Lancaster,   14    Lane. 

L.    Rev.   (Pa.)    393   (1897), 

1159. 
Rickerson    Roller    Mill    Co.    v. 

Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  R.  Co., 

67   Mich.    110   (1887),   517, 

1033. 
Rider  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  14  Mo.  App.  529  (1884), 

876. 
Ridyard  v.  Phillips,  4  Blatch.  443 

(1860),  1269. 

[  clxxv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Riley  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co., 

189  111.  384  (1901),  892. 
Riley    v.    Home,    5    Bing.    217 

(1828),  1001. 
Riley  v.  Vallejo  Ferry  Co.,  173 

Fed.  330  (1909),  402. 
Riley  v.  Wrightsville  &  T.  R.  R. 

Co.,  133  Ga.  413  (1909),  904. 
Ripley  v.  New  Jersey  R.  R.  & 

Transp.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  L.  388 

(1866),  886. 

Rishton  Local  Board  v.  Lanca- 
shire &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  8  R.  &  C. 

T.  C.  74  (1893),  691. 
Ritz  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  3 

Phila.  82  (1858),  256,  989. 
Rixford  v.  Smith,  52  N.  H.  355 

(1872),  256,  989. 
Roach  v.  Canadian  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

1  Manitoba,  158  (1884),  514. 
Robbing  v.  Bangor  Ry.  &  Elec. 

Co.,  100  Me.  496  (1905),  431, 

448,    624,    866,    883,    1244, 

1245. 
Robbins  v.  Western  Washington 

R.  R.  Co.,  31  Pitts.  L.  J.  (N. 

S.)  181  (1900),  226. 
Roberts  v.  Koehler,  30  Fed.  94 

(1887),  353,  1255. 
Roberts  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    73    S.    C.    520 

(1906),  874. 
Robertson  v.  Kennedy,  2  Dana, 

430   (1834),    160,    162,    163, 

168,  184,  228,  239,  262. 
Robertson  v.  New  York  &  E.  R. 

R.  Co.,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  91 

(1856),  745,  761. 
Robertson  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R. 

Co.,  156  Mass.  525  (1892), 

259,  755,  769,  772,  792. 
Robinson  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R. 

Co.,    129  Fed.   753   (1904), 

399,  420,  813,  868. 

[  clxxvi  ] 


Robinson  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 

Co.,  64  W.  Va.  406  (1908), 

1294. 
Robinson  v.  Cornish,  13  N.  Y. 

Supp.  577  (1890),  168,  213. 
Robinson  v.  Dunmore,  2  B.  &  P. 

416  (1801),  767,  769. 
Robinson  v.  Hoist  &  W.,  96  Ga. 

19  (1895),  905. 
Robinson  v.  Merchants'  Dispatch 

Co.,  45  Iowa,  470  (1877),  180. 
Robinson  v.  Rockland,  T.  &  C. 

St.    Ry.    Co.,   87   Me.   387 

(1895),  632,  933. 
Robinson  v.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L. 

C.    Ry.    Co.,    80    Vt.    129 

(1907),  477,  778. 
Roby  v.  State  ex  rel.  Farmers'  G. 

&  L.  S.  Co.,  76  Neb.  450 

(1906),  224,  404,  491,  817, 

822. 
Rochester  v.  Rochester  &  Lake 

Ontario  Water  Co.,  189  N. 

Y.  323  (1907),  92,  274. 
Rochester  &  P.  C.  &  I.  Co.  v. 

Berwind-White  C.  M.  Co., 

24  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  104  (1900), 

226. 
Rockingham    County    Light    & 

Power  Co.  v.  Hobb,  72  N.  H. 

531  (1904),  56,  60,  95,  114, 

243. 
Rockland  Water  Co.  v.  Adams,  84 

Me.   472    (1892),    242,   846, 

1249,  1250. 
Rocky  Ford  Canal,  etc.,  Co.  v. 

Simpson,    5   Colo.   App.   30 

(1894),  242. 

Rocky  Mount  Mills  v.  Wilming- 
ton &  W.  R.  Co.,  119  N.  C. 

693  (1896),  181. 
Rogers  v.   Atlantic   City  R.    R. 

Co.,  57  N.  J.  L.  703  (1895), 

878. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Rogers  v.  Kennebec  Stb.  Co.,  86 

Me.  261  (1894),  786,  1018. 
Rogers  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 

2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  269  (1869), 

409,  730. 
Rogers  v.   Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  75  Kan.  222  (1907),  917, 

921. 
Rogers  v.  Stophel,  32  Pa.  St.  Ill 

(1858),  102. 
Rogers  v.  Wheeler,  52  N.  Y.  262 

(1873),  393,  724,  726. 
Rogers    Locomotive    Works    v. 

Erie  Ry.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq. 

379    (1869),    176,   214,    257, 

473,  479,  695. 

Rogers  Park  Water  Co.  v,  Chi- 
cago, 131  111.  App.  35  (1907), 

273. 
Rogers  Park  Water  Co.  v.  Fergus, 

178  111.  571  (1899),  1410. 
Rogers  Park  Water  Co.  v.  Fergus, 

180  U.  8.624(1901),  1424. 
Rohrig  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,   130  Iowa,  380  (1906), 

742. 
Rome  v.   Oswego   Road  Co.   v. 

Stone,  62  Barb.  601  (1863), 

442. 
Rommel    v.    Schambacher,    120 

Pa.  St.  579  (1887),  936,  947. 
Root  v.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co., 

45N.Y.  524  (1871),  212. 
Root  v.  Long  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  114 

N.  Y.  300  (1889),  1282,  1356. 
Rose  v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.  R. 

Co.,  39  Iowa,  246  (1874),  785, 

1011. 
Rosenberg  v.   Brooklyn  Heights 

St.  Ry.  Co.,  91  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  580  (1904),  558. 
Rosenfield    v.    Express    Co.,     1 

Woods  (U.  S.),  131  (1871), 

1047. 

12 


Rosenfield  v.  Peoria,  D.  &  E.  Ry. 

Co.,    103   Ind.    121    (1885), 

1019. 
Ross   v.    Mellin,   36   Minn.   421 

(1887),  725,  751. 
Ross  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  Y.  617 

(1878),  783. 
Ross  v.  Troy  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  49 

Vt.  364  (1877),  414,  991. 
Rosser  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,    130  N.   C.   251 

(1902),  765. 
Rothschild  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 

R.  R.  Co.,  92  Mo.  91  (1887), 

1287,  1320,  1361,  1363. 
Rott  v.  Forty-second  St.  Ferry  R. 

Co.,  56  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  151 

(1888),  369. 
Roussel    v.    Aumais,    Rap.   Jud. 

Quebec,  18  C.  S.  474  (1900), 

236,  237,  241,  268. 
Rowe  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  Ry. 

Co.,    75   N.    Y.    Supp.    893 

(1902),  881. 
Rowland  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 

H.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Conn.  103 

(1891),  1294. 
Rowley  v.  Home,  3  Bingham,  2 

(1825),  1001. 
Roy  &  R.  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,   42  Wash.   572   (1906), 

747. 
Royston  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  67  Miss.  376  (1889),  942. 
Rucher  v.   Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  61  Tex.  499  (1884),  745. 
Rudell    v.    Grand    Rapids   Cold 

Storage  Co.,  136  Mich.  528 

(1904),  143. 
Rudell  v.  Ogdensburg  Transit  Co., 

117  Mich.  568  (1898),  922. 
Rudy  v.  Rio  Grande  E.  Ry.  Co.,  8 

Utah,  165  (1892),  889. 

[  clxxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Ruggles  v.  Illinois,  108  U.  S.  526 

(1883),  1428. 
Runyan  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  61  N. 

J.  L.  537,  64  N.  J.  L.  67,  65 

N.  J.  L.  228  (1900),  626,  697, 

875. 
Ruppel  v.  Allegheny  Ry.  Co.,  167 

Pa.  St.  166  (1895),  1122. 
Rural   Home  Telephone   Co.   v. 

Kentucky    &    I.    Telephone 

Co.,  32  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1068 

(1908),  700. 
Rusell  v.  Neriemann,  17  C.  B.  (N. 

S.)  163  (1864),  987. 
Rushville   v.    Rushville   Natural 

Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575  (1892), 

94,  112,  273. 
Russ    v.    Steamboat    Eagle,    14 

Iowa,  363  (1862),  442. 
Russell  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  70  N.  J. 

808  (1904),  1007. 
Russell  v.  Fegan,  7  Houst.  389 

(1886),  965. 
Russell  v.  Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St. 

L.   Ry.   Co.,    157   Ind.   305 

(1901),  482,  779,  785,  1015. 
Russell  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    57    Kan.    230 

(1906),  348,  1014,  1025. 
Russel  Grain  Co.  v.  Wabash  R. 

R.  Co.,   114  Mo.  App.  488 

(1905),  834. 
Rutherford  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 

Co.,  5  Rev.  Leg.  (Can.)  483 

(1873),  251,  554. 
Rutland   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Bellows 

Falls  &  S.  R.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  73 

Vt.  20  (1900),  526. 
Ryan  v.  Terminal  Co.,  102  Tenn. 

Ill  (1899),  125. 

S 

Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311 
(1859),  65,  241,  851. 

[  clxxviii  ] 


Safe  Deposit  Co.  of  Pittsburg  v. 

Pollock,    85    Pa.    St.    391 

(1877),  144. 
Sage  v.  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,    134   Ind.    100   (1892), 

887. 
Sager  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

166  Fed.  526  (1908),  259. 
Sager  v.   Portsmouth,   S.   &   B. 

Railroad   Co.,   31   Me.   228 

(1850),     256,      796,     1001, 

1011. 
St.  Glair  v.  Kansas  City,  M.  & 

B.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Miss.  473 

(1899),  602. 
St.  Glair  v.  Kansas  City,  M.  & 

B.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  Miss.  789 

(1900),  602. 
St.   Clair  County  v.   Interstate 

Transfer    Co.,     192    U.    S. 

454  (1904),  127. 
St.  Clair  Tunnel  Co.  v.  Powers, 

138  Fed.  262  (1905),  128. 
St.  John  v.  Express  Co.,  1  Woods, 

612   (1871),  255,  413,  868, 

1017. 
St.  Joseph  &  Denver  City  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Ryan,   11  Kan.  602 

(1873),  811. 
St.  Joseph  &  G.   I.   R.   Co.  v. 

'Palmer,  38  Neb.  463  (1893), 

176,  963. 
St.  Joseph  &  Western  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Wheeler,    35    Kan.    185 

(1886),  745,  762. 
St.  Louis  &  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Dalby,    19  111.  353   (1857), 

888. 
St.   Louis  &   C.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Postal    Tel.    Co.,    173    111. 

508  (1898),  691. 
St.   Louis  &  S.   F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Garner  (Miss.),  51  So.  273 

(1910),  410. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


St.  Louis  &  S.   F.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Gill,    54   Ark.    101    (1891), 

1127,  1175. 
St.  Louis   &   S.    F.    Ry.  Co.  v. 

Gill,  156  U.  S.  649  (1895), 

1063,  1123,  1201,  1411,  1426, 

1430,  1432. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gos- 

nell,  23  Okla. 588 (1909),  763. 
St.  Louis  &  S.   F.  Ry.   Co.  v. 

Hadley,  168  Fed.  317  (1909), 

1099,  1128,  1129,  1132, 1135, 

1152,  1195,  1196,  1206,  1220, 

1301,  1373. 
St.   Louis  &  S.  F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Hurst,  67  Ark.  407  (1900), 

1023. 
St.   Louis  &  S.   F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Marrs,  60  Ark.  637  (1895), 

527. 
St.    Louis  &   S.  F.  Ry.   Co.   v. 

Ostrander,     66      Ark.     567 

(1899),  1294. 
St.   Louis  &  S.   F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Phillips,  17  Okla.  264  (1906), 

1023. 
St.   Louis  &  S.   F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Roane,  93  Miss.  7   (1908), 

602. 
St.   Louis  &  S.  F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

Sherlock,  59  Kan.  23  (1898), 

1022. 
St.  Louis   &    S.    F.  Ry.    Co.  v. 

Vaughan,      84      Ark.     311 

(1907),  872. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Finley,  79  Tex.  85  (1890), 

638. 
St.  Louis,  A.    &  T.   Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hardy,  55  Ark.  134  (1891), 

1239. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.    Hill,    14   111.    App.    579 

(1884),  1286,  1292. 


St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Montgomery,  39  111.  335 

(1866),  726. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

South,  43  111.  176 (1867),  873. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Turner,   1   Tex.   Civ.  App. 

625  (1892),  1026. 
St.  Louis  Brewing  Assn.  v.  St. 

Louis,  140  Mo.  419  (1897), 

1321,  1324,  1335,  1354. 
St.  Louis  Drayage  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Int. 

Com.  Rep.  137  (1894),  534. 
St.  Louis  Drayage  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Fed. 

39  (1894),  490,  514. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Bone,    52   Ark.    26    (1889), 

1007. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Edwards  (Ark.),  127  S.  W. 

713  (1910),  1050. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Green,  85  Ark.  117  (1908), 

933. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Greenthal,     77    Fed.     150 

(1896),  942. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hampton,     162    Fed.     693 

(1908),  799. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Heath,  41  Ark.  476  (1883), 

901. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Jones,  93  Ark.  537  (1910), 

1011. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Knight,  122  U.  S.  79  (1887), 

393,  726,  727. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Lee,    69   Ark.    584    (1901), 

399,  403,  723. 

[  clxxix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Marshall,     74     Ark.      597 

(1905),  794,  796. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Ozier,  86  Ark.   179  (1908), 

394,  399. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Petty,  57  Ark.  359   (1893), 

224. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Renfroe,  82  Ark.  143  (1907), 

795. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Shaw    (Ark.),    125    S.    W. 

654  (1910),  944. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

State,  84  Ark.   150  (1907), 

391,  797,  812. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Taylor,  87  Ark.  331  (1908), 

723. 
St.   Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Tomlinson,   69  Ark.  489 

(1901),  371. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Townes,  93  Ark.  430  (1910), 

1038. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Weakly,  50  Ark.  397  (1887), 

1003,  1021. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wilson,  70  Ark.  136  (1902), 

941. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wynne   H.    &    C.    Co.,    81 

Ark.  373  (1907),  399,  404, 

663,    664,    798,    816,    835, 

1433. 
St.  Louis,  J.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Mathers,  71  111.  592  (1874), 

811. 
St.    Louis    Ry.    Co.    v.    Bland 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34  S.  W. 

675  (1896),  920. 

[  clxxx  ] 


St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clay 
Ginn.  Co.,  77  Ark.  357 
(1906),  798,  802,  835,  855. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grif- 
fith, 12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  631 
(1896),  946. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son &  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
118  S.W.  853  (1909),  514. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 29  Tex.  Civ.  App.  184 
(1902),  938. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Leder,  79  Ark.  59  (1906), 
798. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Cullough,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
534  (1898),  872. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Intyre,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
399  (1904),  1022. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Pho3nix  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  88 
Ark.  594  (1909),  804. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ray 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  127  S.  W. 
281  (1910),  407. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 
85  Ark.  311  (1907),  529,  531. 

St.  Paul  v.  Smith,  27  Minn.  364 
(1880),  484. 

Sales  v.  Western  Stage  Co.,  4 
Iowa,  547  (1857),  262,  978. 

Salt  Lake  City  v.  Salt  Lake  City 
W.  &  E.  Power  Co.,  24 
Utah,  249  (1902),  114. 

Salt  River  Valley  Canal  Co.  v. 
Nelssen,  10  Ariz.  9  (1906), 
93. 

Saltonstall  v.  Stockton,  Taney, 
11(1838),  184,  335. 

Sammons  v.  Kearney  P.  &  I. 
Co.,  77  Neb.  580  (1906),  95, 
687. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Samms  v.  Stewart,  20  Ohio,  70 

(1851),  162,  228. 
Sample  v.  Fresno  F.  &  Irrigation 

Co.,  129 Cal.  222  (1900),  594. 
Samuel  v.  Cheney,  135  Mass.  278 

(1883),  1049. 
Samuels  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  31  Fed.  57  (1887),  524, 

533,  682,  1286,  1287. 
Samuels  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 

R.  Co.,  35  S.  C.  493  (1891), 

1044. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Josey  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  71 

S.  W.  606  (1903),  916. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Lynch  (Tex.),  55  S.  W.  517 

(1900),  864. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Newman,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

606  (1897),  889. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Robinson,     79     Tex.     608 

(1891),  207,  762. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Safford  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  48 

S.  W.  1105  (1898),  410. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Stribling,  99  Tex.  319  (1905) 

515,  521. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Turner,  42  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

532  (1906),  902. 
San    Antonio    St.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

State,  90  Tex.  520  (1897), 

212,  306,  308. 
San  Diego  Flume  Co.  v.  Souther, 

112  Fed.  228  (1901),  652. 
San  Diego  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Jasper, 

189  U.  S.  439  (1903),  1085, 

1099,1124,1166,1410,1430. 
San  Diego  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Na- 
tional   City,    74    Fed.    79 

(1896),  1092, 1177. 


San  Diego  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Na- 
tional City,  174  U.  S.  739 
(1899),  93,  1065,  1091,  1099, 
1124,  1166,  1177,  1410, 
1430. 

San  Diego  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Sharp, 
97  Fed.  394  (1899),  305,  338, 
411. 

San  Diego  Water  Co.  v.  San 
Diego,  118  Cal.  556  (1897), 
1081, 1109, 1111, 1168, 1171, 
1410. 

San  Francisco  A.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Caldwell,  31  Cal.  367 
(1866),  58. 

San  Joaquin  &  Kings  R.  C.  & 
I.  Co.  v.  Stanislaus  County, 
163  Fed.  567(1898),  1166. 

San  Joaquin  Canal  &  Irrigation 
Co.  v.  Stanislaus  County, 
113  Fed.  930  (1902),  1425, 
1430. 

Sanders  v.  Young,  1  Head,  219 
(1858),  182,  241. 

Sanderson  v.  Panther  L.  Co.,  50 
W.  Va.  42  (1901),  783. 

Sandford  v.  Am.  Dist.  Tel.  Co., 
13  Misc.  88  (1895),  108. 

Sandford  v.  Catawissa  R.  R. 
Co.,  24  Pa.  St.  378  (1855), 
473,  479,  1290. 

Sandford  v.  Housatonic  R.  R. 
Co.,  11  Gush.  155  (1853), 
1023. 

Sands  v.  Manistee  River  Im- 
provement Co.,  123  U.  S. 
288  (1887),  72. 

Sandys  v.  Florence,  47  L.  I.  C. 
P.  598  (1878),  966,  979. 

Santa  Fe,  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Grant  Bros.  C.  Co.  (Ariz.), 
108  Pac.  467  (1910),  209, 
239,  250,  253,  259,  399,  750, 
756. 

[  clxxxi  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Sargent  v.  Boston  &  L.  R.  R.  Co., 

115  Mass.  416  (1874),  477, 

1328. 
Sasseen  et  al.  v.  Clark,  37  Ga. 

242  (1867),  1034. 
Satterlee  v.  Groat,  1  Wend.  272 

(1828),  208,  295,  314. 
Savannah   &   O.    Canal   Co.   v. 

Shuman,  91  Ga.  400  (1893), 

122,  212,     241,     299,    302, 

578. 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Boyle,  115  Ga.  836  (1902), 

941,  942,  944. 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Burdick,  94  Ga.  775  (1894), 

1289,  1290,  1294. 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Harris,  26  Fla.  148  (1890), 

513. 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  Y- 

Quo,    103   Ga.    125   (1897), 

935,  938. 
Savannah,  G.  &  N.  A.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Wilcox,  Gibbs  &  Co.,  48 

Ga.  432  (1873),  1046. 
Savannah  Ry.  Co.  v.  Commer- 
cial Guana  Co.,  103  Ga.  590 

(1898),  920. 
Savannah,  S.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Bonand,  58  Ga.  180  (1877), 

872,  904. 
Savannah    Street    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Bryan,  86  Ga.  312  (1890), 

946. 
Savitz  v.  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  150 

111.  208  (1894),  1356. 
Sayre  v.  Louisville  Union  Benev- 
olent  Association,    1    Duv. 

143  (1863),  694. 
Scaife  v.  Farrant,  L.  R.  10  Ex. 

358  (1875),  169. 
Scarfe  v.  Farrant,  L.  R.  10  Exch. 

358  (1875),  230. 
[  clxxxii  ] 


Schalscha  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R. 

Co.,  19  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  141 

(1897),  769. 
Schiffler  v.    Chicago   &   N.   W. 

Ry.  Co.,  96  Wis.  141  (1897), 

397,  804,  861. 
Schlesinger  &  Sons  v.  New  York, 

N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 

85  N.  Y.  Supp.  372  (1903), 

1048. 
Schloss  v.  Wood,   11  Colo.  287 

(1888),  204,  205. 
Schmidt  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  90  Wis.  504  (1895),  393, 

726. 
Schneider   v.    People,    30   Colo. 

493  (1903),  384. 

Schofield  v.  Lake  Shore  &  Mich- 
igan Southern  Ry.  Co.,  43 

Ohio  St.  571   (1885),   1290, 

1291,  1322,  1326,  1356. 
Scholes  v.  Ackerland,  15  111.  474 

(1854),  1039. 
School    District    v.    Enterprise 

Nat.  Gas  Co.,  18  Pa.  Sup. 

Ct.  73  (1901),  216. 
Schooner  Freeman  v.  Bucking- 
ham, 18  How.  (U.  S.)  182 

(1855),  747. 
Schuyler  v.  Southern  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.    (Utah),    109   Pac.   458 

(1910),  777,  1302. 
Schumaker  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  207  111.  199  (1904), 

1050. 

Schwede  v.  Hemrich  Bros.  Brew- 
ing Co.,  29  Wash.  21  (1902), 

226. 
Scioto   Valley   Traction   Co.   v. 

Graybill,  29  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

95  (1906),  629. 
Scull  v.  Atlantic  C.   L.   R.   R. 

Co.,  144  N.  C.    180  (1907), 

1382. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.   Co.   v. 

Florida,     203     U.     S.     261 

(1908),    1078,    1081,    1100, 

1198,      1200,      1209,     1210, 

1385. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.   Co.  v. 

O'Quin,  124  Ga.  357  (1905), 

645. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.   Co.   v. 

Railroad  Comm.,  155  Fed. 

792  (1907),  1123,  1129,  1220, 

1430. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.   Co.   v. 

Seegers,  207  U.  S.  73  (1907), 

1436. 
Seaman  v.  Adler,  37  Fed.  268 

(1889),  1269. 
Searles   v.    Mann   Boudoir   Car 

Co.,  45  Fed.  330  (1891),  153, 

832,  846. 
Sears  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  14 

Allen,  433  (1867),  204,  397, 

863,  872,  904. 
Sears  v.   Street  Commissioners, 

180   Mass.   274   (1880),   64, 

125. 
Sears  v.  Wingate,  3  Allen,   103 

(1861),  747. 
Seasongood  v.   Tennessee  &  0. 

R.  Transp.  Co.,  21  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1142  (1899),  515. 
Seattle  Electric  Co.  v.  Snoqua- 

lime    Falls    Power    Co.,    40 

Wash.  380  (1905),  316,  352. 
Seaver  v.  Bradley,  179  Mass.  329 

(1901),  193. 
Seavey  Co.  v.  Union  Transit  Co., 

106  Wis.  394  (1900),  907. 
Seawell  v.  Carolina  Central  R. 

R.    Co.,    133    N.    C.    515 

(1903),  944. 
Seawell  v.  Kansas  City,  F.  S.  & 

M.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  222 

(1893),  1413. 


Secombe    v.    Milwaukee    &    St. 

Paul  Ry.  Co.,  23  Wall.  108 

(1874),  58. 
Segal  v.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

35    Tex.     Civ.     App.     517 

(1904),  944. 
Seibert  v.  Railway  Co.,  15  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  435  (1900),  1049. 
Selby  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R. 

Co.,  113  N.  C.  588  (1893), 

989. 
Self  v.  Dunn,  42  Ga.  528  (1871), 

237,  239,  241,  968. 
Seligman  v.  Armijo,  1  N.  Mex. 

459   (1870),   174,   666,  911, 

986. 
Seller   v.    Steamship    Pacific,    1 

Oreg.  409  (1861),  1004. 
Selma  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Butts 

&  Foster,  43  Ala.  385  (1869), 

517. 
Selway  v.  Holloway,  1  Ld.  Ray. 

46  (1695),  400. 
Sevier  v.    Vicksburg    &   M.   R. 

R.   Co.,  61   Miss.  8  (1883), 

933. 
Sewall  v.  Allen,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

335  (1830),  255. 
Sewickley  School  Dist.  v.  Ohio 

Valley  Gas  Co.,  154  Pa.  St. 

539  (1893),  458. 
Seybolt  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  & 

W.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  562 

(1884),  777. 
Seyfer  v.  Otoe  County,  66  Neb. 

566  (1902),  795. 
Seymour  v.  Cook,  53  Barb.  451 

(1868),  1034. 
Shackelford's  Heirs  v.  Coffey,  4 

J.J.  Marsh.  40  (1830),  65. 
Sharp  &  M.  v.  Clark  et  al.,  13 

Utah,  510  (1896),  1042. 
Sharrer  v.  Paxson,  171  Pa.  St.  26 

(1895),  736. 

[  clxxxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Shaw    v.    Berry,    31    Me.    478 

(1850),  965. 
Shaw  v.  Gt.   Western  Ry.  Co. 

(1894),  1  Q.  B.  373  (1893), 

1012. 
Shaw  v.   Northern  Pac.   R.   R. 

Co.,  40  Minn.   144  (1889), 

393,  727. 
Shaw  v.  Postal  Telegraph  &  C. 

Co.,   79   Miss.   670   (1901), 

1010. 
Shaw  v.  Ray,  1  Cr.  &  Dix.  C.  C. 

84  (1839),  770,  969. 
Shaw  v.  San  Diego  Water  Co. 

(Cal.),  50  Pac.  693  (1897), 

1244,  1245. 
Shaw   Stocking   Co.   v.    Lowell, 

199  Mass.  118  (1908),  825, 

1244,  1245. 
Sheerman  v.  Toronto,  etc.,  Co., 

34  U.  C.  Q.  B.  451  (1874), 

207. 
Sheets  v.  Ohio  River  Ry.  Co.,  39 

W.    Va.    475    (1894),    863, 

889. 
Sheffer  v.  Willoughby,   163  111. 

518  (1896),  263,  974. 
Sheffield     Waterworks    Co.     v. 

Wilkinson,  4  C.  P.  D.  410 

(1879),  456. 

Shelbyville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ville C.  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  82 

Ky.  541  (1885),  527,  811. 
Shelby  v.  Farmers'  Cooperative 

Ditch   Co.,    10   Idaho,   732 

(1905),  652. 
Shelden  v.   Robinson,  7  N.  H. 

157  (1834),  160,  184,  744. 
Sheldon  v.  New  Orleans  Canal 

Co.,  9  Rob.  (La.)  360  (1844), 

122. 
Shellenberg  v.  Fremont,  E.  &  M. 

V.  R.  R,  Co.,  45  Neb.  487 

(1895),  1047. 

[  clxxxiv  ] 


Shelton  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  73 
N.J.L.  558  (1907),  889. 

Shelton  v.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  29  Ohio  St.  214  (1876), 
890. 

Shenk  v.  Philadelphia  Steam 
Propeller  Co.,  60  Pa.  St.  109 
(1869),  1038. 

Shepard  v.  Gold  &  Stock  Tele- 
graph Co.,  38  Hun,  338 
(1885),  137,  624,  884. 

Shepard  v.  Milwaukee  Gaslight 
Co.,  6  Wis.  539  (1858), 
111,  273,  280,  411,  434,  877, 
883. 

Shepard  v.  Milwaukee  Gaslight 
Co.,  15  Wis.  318  (1862),  31. 

Shepherd  v.  Milwaukee  Gas- 
light Co.,  11  Wis.  234 
(1860),  411. 

Sheridan  v.  Brooklyn  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  36  N.  Y.  39  (1873), 
635,  638,  933. 

Sherley  v.  Billings,  8  Bush  (Ky.), 
147  (1871),  939. 

Sherlock  v.  K.  C.  Belt  Ry.  Co., 
142  Mo.  172  (1897),  226. 

Sherman  v.  Hannibal  &  S.  J. 
R.  R.  Co.,  72  Mo.  62  (1880), 
745. 

Sherman  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R. 
Co.,  64  N.  Y.  254  (1876), 
1033. 

Sherman  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co.,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12,769 
(1880),  667,  987. 

Sherman  v.  Wells,  28  Barb.  403 
(1858),  963. 

Sherrill  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  109  N.  C.  527 
(1891),  348,  1025,  1026. 

Sherwood  v.  Atlantic  &  D.  Ry. 
Co.,  94  Va.  291  (1897), 
306. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Sheward  v.  Citizens'  Water  Co., 

90    Cal.    635    (1891),    452, 

1244,  1245,  1251,  1354. 
Shingleur  v.  Western  Union  Tel- 
egraph Co.,  72  Miss.   1030 

(1895),  348. 
Shinn   v.    Cotton,    52   Ark.    90 

(1889),  237,  239,  241,  968. 
Shipley  v.  Baltimore  &  Potomac 

R.    R.    Co.,    34    Md.    336 

(1871),  58. 
Shipper  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  47  Pa.  St.  338  (1864), 

431. 
Shipton  v.  Thornton,  9  A.  &  E. 

314  (1838),  1264. 
Shiras  v.   Ewing,  48  Kan.   170 

(1892),  411,  452,  866. 
Shoecraft  v.  Bailey,  25  la.  553 

(1868),  751,  969. 
Shoemaker    v.     Kingsbury,     12 

Wall.      369     (1870),     207, 

764. 
Sholl  v.  German  Coal  Co.,  118 

111.  427  (1887),  226. 
Short  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

Co.  (Mo.  App.),  130  S.  W. 

488  (1910),  738. 
Show  v.  Carruth,  1  Sprague,  324 

(1856),  724. 
Shultz  v.  Wall,  134  Pa.  St.  262 

(1890),  964. 
Sibley  v.  Aldrich,  33  N.  H.  553 

(1856),  965. 
Sickles  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

R.   Co.,   99   N.   Y.   S.   953 

(1906),  864. 
Sickles  v.   Manhattan   Gaslight 

Co.,  64  How.  Pr.  33  (1882), 

s.    c.,    66    How.    Pr.    314 

(1884),  458. 

Silkman    v.     Water    Commis- 
sioners, 152  N.  Y.  327  (1897), 

218,  456,  1321,  1354. 


Siller  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  213  U.  S.  175  (1909), 

1408. 
Silver  v.  Hall,  2  Mo.  App.  557 

(1876),  952. 
Simkins  v.  Norwich  &  N.  L.  St. 

Co.,   11   Cush.   102   (1853), 

905,  906,  921. 
Simons  v.  Gt.  Western  Ry.  Co., 

18  C.  B.  805  (1856),  1023. 
Simmons  v.  Oregon  R.  R.  Co., 

41  Oreg.  151  (1902),  784. 
Simmons  v.  Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  133  Ga.  635  (1909),  408. 
Sioux  City  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  First 

Nat.  Bank  of  F.,   10  Neb. 

556  (1880),  748. 
Six   Carpenters'    Case,    The,    8 

Coke  146a  (1610),  630. 
Skinner  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

Ry.  Co.,  39  Fed.  188  (1889), 

937. 
Skinner  v.  Chicago  &  R.  I.  R.  R. 

Co.,   12   Iowa,   191    (1861), 

1046. 
Skinner   v.    Hall,    60    Me.    477 

(1872),  1033. 
Skinner  v.  London,  B.  &  S.  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  5  Ex.  787  (1850), 

757. 
Slater   v.    South    Carolina    Ry. 

Co.,  29  S.  C.  96  (1888),  655, 

984,  985. 
Slim  v.  Great  Northern  R.  R. 

Co.,  14  C.  B.  647  (1854), 

400,  1001. 
Sloman  v.   Great  Western  Ry. 

Co.,  67  N.  Y.  208  (1876), 

876. 
Slosser  v.  Salt  River  Canal  Co., 

7  Ariz.  376  (1901),  93,  231, 

242. 
Smallman  v.  Whilter,  87  HI.  545 

(1877),  500. 

[  clxxxv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Smeltzer  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F. 

Ry.     Co.,     158    Fed.     649 

(1908),  1008. 
Smith  v.  Alabama,  124  U.  S.  465 

(1888),  1418. 
Smith  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

Ry.  Co.,  122  Mo.  App.  85 

(1907),  626,  880. 
Smith  v.  Barre  Water  Co.,  73 

Vt.  310  (1901),  264. 
Smith    v.    Birmingham    Water- 
works, 104  Ala.  315  (1893), 

216,  451,  825. 
Smith  v.  Birmingham  Ry.  L.  & 

P.  Co.,  147  Ala.  702  (1906), 

401. 
Smith  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

44  N.  H.  325  (1862),  875. 
Smith  v.  Capital  Gas  Co.,  132 

Cal.  209  (1901),  825. 
Smith  v.  Chamberlain,  38  S.  C. 

529  (1892),  566,  848,  881. 
Smith  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,    112    Mo.    App.    610 

(1905),  1026. 
Smith  v.  City  &  Surburban  Ry. 

Co.,   29  Oreg.   539   (1896), 

1044. 
Smith  v.   Cleveland,   C.,   C.   & 

St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  92  Ga.  539 

(1893),  915. 
Smith  v.  Gold  &  S.  Tel.  Co.,  42 

Hun,  454  (1886),  137. 
Smith  v.  Great  No.  Ry.  Co.,  15 

N.  D.  195  (1906),  1234. 
Smith   v.    Keyes,   2   Th.    &   C. 

(N.    Y.)    650  "(1874),    432, 

751. 
Smith  v.  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L. 

R.    R.    Co.,    124   Ind.    394 

(1890),  764. 
Smith   v.    Michigan   Cent.    Ry. 

Co.,  100  Mich.  148  (1894), 

256. 

[  clxxxvi  ] 


Smith  v.  Nashville,  88  Tenn.  464 
(1890),  218. 

Smith  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Pa.  St. 
249  (1892),  484. 

Smith  v.  Pierce,  1  La.  349  (1830), 
173. 

Smith  v.  Pittsburg,  Ft.  W.  &  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  Ohio  St.  10 
(1872),  888. 

Smith  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co., 
32  Minn.  1  (1884),  736,  966. 

Smith  v.  Scranton  Gas  &  Water 
Co.,  5  Lack.  L.  News,  235 
(1899),  448,  452. 

Smith  v.  Seward,  3  Pa.  St.  342 
(1846),  182. 

Smith  v.  State,  100  Tenn.  494 
(1898),  566,  848. 

Smith  v.  Western  Ry.  of  Ala.,  91 
Ala. 455  (1890),  656, 920,985. 

Smith  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  83  Ky.  104 
(1885),  1025. 

Smith  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  72  S.  C.  116 
(1905),  599. 

Smith  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  84  Ky.  664 
(1887),  603,  607. 

Smith  &  Melton  v.  North  Car- 
olina R.  R.  Co.,  64  N.  C. 
235  (1870),  1007. 

Smitha  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  86  Tenn.  198  (1887), 
1026. 

Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S.  466 
(1898),  1062,  1067,  1071, 
1091,  1099,  1123,  1131,  1156, 
1194,  1196,  1402,  1411,  1412, 
1430. 

Snaman  v.  Mo.,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  42  S.  W. 
1023  (1897),  876. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Sneider  v.  Geiss,  1  Yeates  (Pa.), 

34  (1791),  743,  744. 
Snell  v.   Clinton  Electric   Light 

Co.,  196  111.  626  (1902),  113, 

243,  502,  706,  823,  824,  825, 

826,  1290,  1300. 
Snelling  v.  Yetter,  25  App.  Div. 

590  (1898),  170,  236,  238. 
Snider  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  63 

Mo.  376  (1876),  1003. 
Snow  v.  Indiana,  B.  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  109  Ind.  422  (1886),  521, 

533. 
Snyder  v.  Depot  Co.,  19  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  368  (1899),  483. 
Snyder  v.  Natchez  R.  R.  &  T.  R. 

R.    Co.,    42    La.    Ann.    302 

(1890),  761,  762. 
Solan  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,    95   Iowa,    260    (1895), 

1022. 
South  &  N.  0.  A.  R.  R.  v.  Henlein, 

52  Ala.  606  (1875),  256,  989, 

1011. 
South  &  N.  Alabama  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Wood,   66  Ala.   167   (1880), 

1042,  1043. 
South  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Calumet   Ry.   Co.,    171   111. 

391  (1898),  693. 
South     Eastern     Ry.     v.      Ry. 

Commrs.,    50    L.   J.   Q.    B. 

201  (1881),  807. 
South    Florida    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Rhodes,  25  Fla.  40  (1889), 

558,  697,  865. 
South  Florida  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Maloney,  34  Fla.  338  (1894), 

345. 
South  Kansas    Ry.  v.  Hinsdale, 

38    Kans.  507    (1888),   431, 

878. 
Southcote's  Case,  4  Coke,  836, 

962. 


Souther  v.  San  Diego  Flume  Co., 
121  Fed.  347  (1903),  93,  852. 

Southern  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Law- 
son,  97  Tenn.  367  (1896),  193. 

Southern  Bell  Telephone  &  T.  Co. 
v.  McTyer,  137  Ala.  601 
(1902),  984,  1051. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Arm- 
stead,  50  Ala.  350  (1873), 
1004,  1040. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Ashford, 
126  Ala.  591  (1899),  230. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Bailey,  7 
Ga.  App.  331  (1910),  988. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Barnes, 

36  Ga.  532  (1867),  1024. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Caper- 
ton,  44  Ala.  101  (1870),  1002, 
1024,  1026. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Crook,  44 
Ala.  468  (1870),  178,  776. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Dixon, 
94  U.  S.  549  (1876),  1045. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Everett, 

37  Ga.  688  (1868),  623,  737, 
990. 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Hess,  53 

Ala.  19  (1875),  776. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Hill,  81 

Ark.  1  (1906),  1022. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Holland, 

109  Ala.  362  (1895),  1040. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Hunni- 

cutt,   54  Miss.   566   (1877), 

1023,  1025. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Kauf- 

mann,  12  Heisk.  161  (1873), 

990. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Memphis 

R.  R.  Co.,  2  McCreary,  570 

(1881),  477. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Meyer 

Co.    (Ark),   125  S.   W.   642 

(1910),  338. 

[  clxxxvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Moon,  39 

Miss.  822  (1863),  178,  1011. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Newby, 

36  Ga.  635  (1867),  178,  732, 

776. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Owens, 

146  Ala.   412   (1906),    1019, 

1020,  1021. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Palmer 

et  al.,  48  Ga.  85  (1873),  1047. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Rose  Co., 

124  Ga.  581  (1905),  178,  600. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 

I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Mc- 

Creary,  872  (1882),  776. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Seide,  67 

Miss.  609  (1890),  1022. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  State, 

107  Ga.  670  (1899),  600,  612. 
Southern    Express    Co.    v.    Van 

Meter,   17  Fla.  783   (1880), 

178,  776,  1049. 

Southern    Express    Co.    v.    Wil- 
liams,   99   Ga.    482    (1896), 

1048. 
Southern   Express   Co.   v.   Wor- 

mack,  1  Heisk.  256  (1870), 

178,  666,  776,  911,  986. 
Southern  111.  &  Mo.  Bridge  Co. 

v.  Stone,  174  Mo.  1  (1902), 

126. 
Southern  Indiana  Express  Co.  v. 

United  States  Express  Co., 

88  Fed.  659  (1898),  523. 
Southern  Indiana  Express  Co.  v. 

United  States  Exp.  Co.,  92 

Fed.  1022  (1899),  431,  435, 

523,  682. 
Southern  Indiana  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Railroad  Commission,  87  N. 

E.  966  (1909),  1127. 
Southern  Kansas  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hins- 

dale,  38  Kans.  507   (1888), 

885. 

[  clxxxviii  ] 


Southern  Kansas  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
ris (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  99  S.  W. 
433  (1907),  833. 

Southern  Kansas  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Samples  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
109  S.  W.  417  (1908), 
833. 

Southern  Light  &  Traction  Co.  v. 
Compton,  86  Miss.  269 
(1905),  848,  881. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Arnett, 
61  C.  C.  A.  131  (1903),  902, 
915. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Bartine, 
170  Fed.  751  (1910),  1086, 
1092,  1099. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Booth 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  39  S.  W. 
585  (1897),  908. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Cavin, 
144  Fed.  348  (1906),  777. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  In- 
terstate Comm.  Comm., 
200  U.  S.  536  (1906),  534, 
694. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Patterson 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  451  (1894), 
126,  1262. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Railroad 
Commissioners,  78  Fed.  236 
(1896),  1099,  1105,  1123, 
1154,  1155,  1156,  1166,  1179, 
1409,  1430. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Robinson, 
132,  Cal.  408  (1901),  347. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Redding 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  43  S.  W. 
1061  (1897),  1294. 

Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Adams,  115 
Ga.  705  (1902),  1023. 

Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Sand 
&  S.  Co.  (Ga.),  68  S.  E.  807 
(1910),  663,  665,  668,  799, 
801,  840,  912,  914. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Southern    Ry.    Co.    v.    Atlanta 

Stove  Works,   128  Ga.  207 

(1907),     1063,     1201,     1225, 

1383. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barlow,  104 

Ga.  213  (1898),  347. 
Southern  Ry.   Co.  v.   Common- 
wealth, 98  Va.  758  (1900), 

540,  872. 
Southern   Ry.  Co.    v.    Deakins, 

107  Tenn.  522  (1901),  914, 

922. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Franklin  Ry. 

Co.,  96  Va.  693  (1899),  211, 

212,  305. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harrington 

(Ala.),  52  So.  57  (1910),  777. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harrison,  119 

Ala.  539  (1898),  1294. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lanning,  83 

Miss.  161  (1903),  410. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lee,  30  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  1360  (1907),  341. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Levy,  39  So. 

95  (1905),  963. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lockwood 

Mfg.     Co.,     142    Ala.     322 

(1904),  1050. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  McNeil,  155 

Fed.  756  (1907),  1063,  1123, 

1201,  1430,  1431. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Moore  (Ga.), 

67  S.  E.  85  (1910),  332. 
Southern    Ry.    Co.    v.    Railroad 

Commission,    42   Ind.    App. 

90  (1907),  1238,  1382. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  H. 

&    G.    Co.,    156    Fed.    728 

(1906),  1373. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  H. 

&  G.  Co.,  214  U.  S.  297 

(1909),  1192. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  86 

Fed.  292  (1898),  401. 


Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  State  (Miss.), 

48  So.  236  (1909),  809. 
Southern  Ry.   Co.   v.  Thurman, 

28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  699  (1906), 

849. 
Southern   Ry.   Co.   v.  Tift,   206 

U.  S.  428  (1906),  1129,  1294. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wallis,  133 

Ga.  553  (1909),  410. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Webb,  143 

Ala.  304  (1905),  772. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  99 

Va.  394  (1901),  723,  915. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood,  114 

Ga.  159  (1901),  844. 
Southern  Wire  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 

B.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Mo. 

App.  191  (1899),  1297. 
Southward  v.  Myers,  3  Bush,  681 

(1868),  240,  968. 
Southwestern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb, 

48  Ala.  585  (1872),  176,  740. 
Southwestern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Single- 
ton, 66  Ga.  252  (1880),  754. 
Southwestern  Teleg.  &  Tel.  Co. 

v.  Luckett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

127  S.  W.  856  (1910),  451, 

1250. 
Southwood  v.  Myers,  3  Bush,  681 

(1868),  234. 
Spade  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 

Barb.  383  (1853),  393,  399, 

726. 
Spade  v.  L.  &  Boston  Ry.  Co.,  172 

Mass.  488  (1899),  943. 
Spalding  v.  Macomb  &  W.  I.  Ry. 

Co.,  225  111.  585  (1907),  262. 
Spangler  v.  St.  Joseph  &  G.  I. 

Ry.  Co.,  68  Kans.  46  (1903), 

942. 
Spannagle  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  31 

111.  App.  460  (1889),  401. 
Sparks  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.,  Ry., 

212  Pa.  St.  105  (1905),  191. 

[  clxxxix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Spears  &  G.  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 

S.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Barb.  513 

(1876),  971. 
Speers  v.  Spartanburg,  U.  &  C.  R. 

R.  Co.,  11  S.  C.  158  (1878), 

1036. 

Spellman  v.  Lincoln  Rapid  Tran- 
sit Co.,  36  Neb.  890  (1893), 

190,  978. 
Spence  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  117  la.  1  (1902),  207. 
Spencer   v.    Daggett,    2   Vt.    92 

(1829),  166,  229,  239. 
Spivy  v.  Farmer,  2  Hawy.  339 

(1805),  182,  241. 

Split  Rock  Cable  Road  Co.,  Mat- 
ter of  the,   128  N.   Y.  408 

(1891),  61,  222. 
Spofford  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,   128  Mass.  326  (1880), 

1283. 
Spofford  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,   11   Pa.   Super.   Ct.  97 

(1899),  400,  729. 
Sprague  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  34  Kans.  347  (1885),  1023. 
Sprague  v.  New  York  Cent.  R. 

R.  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  637  (1873), 

517,  1033. 
Sprague  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  92 

Fed.  59  (1899),  763. 
Springer  v.  Wescott,   29  N.   Y. 

Supp.  149  (1894),  756. 
Springfield  Consolidated  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Flynn,  55  111.  App.   600 

(1894),  942. 
Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v.  San 

Francisco,  82  Cal.  286  (1890), 

92,  1091,  1099,  1123,  1430. 
Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v. 

San  Francisco,  124  Fed.  574 

(1903),  92,  1091,  1099,  1101, 

1104,  1109,  1123,  1131,  1136, 

1410,  1430. 

[  cxc] 


Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v. 

Schottler,    110    U.    S.    347 

(1884),  92,  1428. 
Sproul  v.  Hemmingway,  14  Pick. 

1  (1833),  173,  744. 
Sproule  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  91  S. 

W.  657  (1906),  777. 
Squire  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,   98  Mass.   239   (1867), 

1021. 
Stadhecker   v.    Combs,    9   Rich. 

Law,  193  (1856),  178,  776. 
Stamey  v.  Western  Union  Tel. 

Co.,  92  Ga.  613  (1894),  742, 

980,  1014. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Ind.  v.  United 

States,  164  Fed.  376  (1908) 

1296. 

Standish  v.  Narragansett  Steam- 
ship   Co.,    Ill    Mass.    512 

(1873),  886. 
Stanislaus  Co.  v.  San  Joaquin  C. 

&  I.  Co.,  192  U.S.  201  (1903), 

1099,  1124,  1132,  1135,  1138, 

1423,  1425. 
Stanton  v.  Allen,  5  Denio,  434 

(1848),  694. 
Stapleton  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 

Co.,  133  Mich.  187  (1903),  726. 
Starnes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  91  Term. 

516  (1892),  1020. 
Starr  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  67 

Minn.  18  (1896),  781,  1011. 
State   v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,   171 

Ind.  138  (1908),  277,  1040. 
State  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  85  Neb. 

25  (1909),  1127,  1129. 
State    v.    Allen,    178    Mo.    555 

(1903),  56,  113. 
State  v.  American  &  E.  News  Co., 

43N.J.L.381  (1881),  133,214. 
State   v.    Associated    Press,    159 

Mo.  410  (1900),  684,  1138. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


State  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line,  48 

Fla.  114  (1904),  1193. 
State  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R. 

Co.,  51  Fla.  543  (1906),  260, 

1043. 
State  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R. 

Co.,    52    Fla.     646    (1906), 

816. 
State  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ry. 

Co.,  53  Fla.  650  (1907),  794, 

802. 
State  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ry 

Co.  (Fla.),  52  So.  4  (1910), 

332,  1382. 
State  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

Co.,    176    Mo.    687    (1903), 

1381. 
State  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 

24  Md.  84  (1865),  623,  738. 
State  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  22 

Alb.  L.  J.  363  (1880),  692. 
State  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  36 

Ohio  St.    296    (1880),    136, 

692. 
State  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  23 

Fed.  539  (1885),  136,  692. 
State  v.  Birmingham  Waterworks 

(Ala.),    51    So.    354    (1910), 

1288. 

State  v.  Board  of  Water  Commis- 
sioners,     105      Minn.      472 

(1908),  452,  456. 
State  v.  Boston,  C.  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  25  Vt.  433  (1853),  176. 
State  v.  Bridgeton  Traction  Co., 

62  N.  J.  L.  592  (1898),  189, 

299,  305. 
State  v.  Butte  City  Water  Co.,  18 

Mont.   199  (1896),  92,  214, 

215,  216,  242,  376. 
State  v.  Cadwallader  (Ind.),  87 

N.  E.  644  (1909),  700. 
State  v.  Campbell,  32  N.  J.  L.  309 

(1867),  447,  1259. 


State  v.  W.  W.  Cargill  Co.,  77 

Minn.  223  (1899),  213,  232. 
State  v.  Central  Iowa  Ry.  Co.,  71 

Iowa,  410  (1887),  211,  300. 
State  v.  Central  Vt.  Ry.  Co.,  81 

Vt.  463  (1908),   1123,   1282, 

1283,  1320,  1430. 
State  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co., 

148  Fed.  648,  1295. 
State  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  83  Neb.  518  (1909),  799, 

840,  850,  854. 
State  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 

(Neb.),  120  N.  W.  165  (1909), 

854,  855. 
State  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

Co.,  71  Neb.  593  (1904),  663, 

664,  665,  803,  855. 
State  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

Co.,  72  Neb.  542  (1904),  803, 

855. 
State  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  36  Minn.  402(1887),  492. 
State  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,   38  Minn.   281    (1888), 

1409. 
State  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O. 

R.    R.    Co.,    40   Minn.   267 

(1889),  1413. 
State  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  0. 

R.  R.  Co.,  12  S.  D.  305  (1900), 

806,  812. 
State  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  0.  &  T. 

P.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Ohio  St.  130 

(1890),  155,  796,  1290,  1350, 

1358. 
State  v.  Citizens'  Telephone  Co., 

61  S.  C.  83  (1901),  136,  576, 

580,  G54,  683,  797,  802,  1325. 
State  v.  Connersville    Nat.  Gas 

Co.,  163  Ind.  563  (1904),  306. 
State  v.  Consumers'  Gas  Co.,  157 

Ind.  345  (1901),  94,  214,  215, 

653,  852. 

[  cxci  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


State  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  48  N.  J.  L.  55  (1887), 

1353. 
State  v.  Des  Moines  &  K.  C.  Ry. 

Co.,  87  Iowa,  644  (1893),  806. 
State  v.  Dodge  City,  M.  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.,   53  Kans.   329    (1894), 

296,  301. 
State  v.   Edwards,   86  Me.    102 

(1893),  65,  66,  851. 
State  v.  Fremont  &  E.  M.  V.  R. 

R.  Co.,  22  Neb.  313,  1409. 
State    v.    Frost,    113    Wis.    623 

(1902),  212. 
State  v.  Goodfellow,  1  Mo.  App. 

495  (1876),  417,  826. 
State  v.  Goold,  53  Me.  279  (1865), 

887,  888. 
State  v.   Gosnell,   116  Wis.  606 

(1903),  825,  1245. 
State  v.  Goss,  59  Vt.  266  (1886), 

600. 
State  v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  R.  Co., 

14  Mont.381  (1894),  669,912. 
State  v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  R.  Co., 

100  Minn.  445  (1907),  1097. 
State  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  44  S.  W. 

542  (1898),  1414,  1415. 
State  v.  Hampton,  2  N.  H.  22 

(1819),  75. 
State  v.  Hartford  &  N.  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,   29   Conn.   538   (1861), 

212,  299,  305,  687. 
State  v.  Helena  P.  &  L.  Co.,  32 

Mont.  391  (1899),  189,  212, 

304,  306,  308. 
State  v.  Hungerford,  39  Minn.  6 

(1888),  887. 
State  v.  Independent  Telephone 

Co.,  109  Pac.  366  (1910),  865. 
State    v.    Jacksonville   Terminal 

Co.,  41  Fla.  377  (1899),  125, 

211,  699. 

[  cxcii  ] 


State  v.  Johnson,  61  Kan.  843 

(1900),  1404. 
State  v.  Jones,  125  S.  W.  1169 

(1910),  451,  866,  1051. 
State  v.  Joplin  Waterworks  Co., 

52  Mo.  App.  312  (1893),  92, 

215. 
State  v.  Kansas  City  Ry.  Co.,  51 

La.  Ann.  200  (1899),  807. 
State  v.  Kinlock  Telephone  Co., 

93  Mo.  App.  349  (1902),  136, 

266,  435,  449. 
State  v.  Laclede  Gaslight  Co.,  102 

Mo.  472  (1890),  216,  1410, 

1424. 
State  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 

51  Fla.  311  (1906),  531. 
State  v.  Manitowoc  Waterworks 

Co.,    114  Wis.    487   (1902), 

825. 
State  v.   Martyn,   82  Neb.   225 

(1908),  1301,  1363. 
State  v.  Mathews,  2  Dev.  &  B. 

424  (1837),  240. 
State  v.   Milwaukee   Gas   Light 

Co.,  29  Wis.  454  (1872),  51. 
State  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R. 

R.  Co.,  80  Minn.  191  (1900), 

537,  1063,  1081,  1099,  1100, 

1107,  1124,  1132,  1201,  1225, 

1371,  1377,  1379,  1383,  1430, 

1431. 
State  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R. 

R.  Co.,  87  Minn.  195  (1902), 

806. 
State  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.,  99  Tex.  516  (1906),  479. 
State  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

81  Neb.  174  (1908),  214. 
State  v.  Mobile,  J.  &  K.  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,    86    Miss.    172    (1905), 

305,  806. 
State  v.  Murphy,   134  Mo.  548 

(1896),  78. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


State  v.  National  Subway  Co.  v. 

St.     Louis,     145    Mo.     551 

(1898),  78,  383. 
State  v.  Nebraska  Telephone  Co., 

17  Neb.  126  (1885),  136,  242, 

266,  451,  458,  459,  692. 
State  v.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  37 

Conn.  153  (1870),  805. 
State  v.  New  Orleans  Gas  Co., 

108  La.  67  (1902),  112,  265, 

411,    417,    622,    826,    1077, 

1347. 
State  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

89  Minn.   363   (1903),   318, 
806,  809,  810. 

State  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

90  Minn.  277  (1903),  809. 
State  v.  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co. 

(N.    D.),    120    N.    W.    869 

(1909),  1063,  1201,  1431. 
State  v.  Overton,  24  N.  J.  L.  435 

(1854),  446,  1255. 
State  v.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  85 

Neb.  823  (1908),  178. 
State  v.  Patterson,  50  Fla.   127 

(1905),  849. 
State  v.   Portland   Natural   Gas 

and  Oil  Co.,   153  Ind.  483 

(1899),  686. 
State  v.  Proprietors  of  the  Morris 

Aqueduct,   46   N.  J.  L.  495 

(1884),  651. 
State    v.    Railroad    Commission, 

137   Wis.   80    (1908),    1097, 

1124. 
State  v.   Redman,    134  Wis.   89 

(1908),  846. 
State    v.    Reed,    76    Miss.    211 

(1898),  485. 
State  v.    Republican    Valley  R. 

R.  Co.,  17  Neb.  647  (1885), 

808. 
State  v.  St.  Louis,  161  Mo.  371 

(1901),  71. 

13 


State  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 

Co.,     105    Mo.    App.    207 

(1904),  539,  540. 
State  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  78 

Minn.  331  (1899),  189,  212. 
State  v.  St.  Paul  Gaslight  Co.,  92 

Minn.  467  (1904),  502. 
State  v.  Seaboard  Ry.  Co.  (Fla.), 

37  So.  314  (1901),  1432. 
State  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry. 

Co.,  48  Fla.  129  (1904),  1073, 

1100,  1124,  1127,  1132,  1134, 

1164,  1178,  1430. 
State  v.  Sedalia  Gaslight  Co.,  34 

Mo.  App.   501   (1889),  825, 

1251,  1354. 
State  v.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  7  Neb.  357  (1878),  211, 

300,  302,  305. 
State  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (Tex. 

Civ.   App.),    49  S.   W.  252 

(1899),  1415. 
State  v.  Southern  Minnesota  R. 

R.  Co.,  18  Minn.  40  (1871), 

302. 
State    v.    Southern    Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  52  La.  Ann.  1822  (1900), 

501. 
State   v.    Spokane   Ry.   Co.,    19 

Wash.  518  (1898),  76,   189, 

212,  215,  305. 
State  v.  Steele,   106  N.  C.  766 

(1890),    106,   361,  472,  499, 

565,  631,  632,  660. 
State  v.  Stone,  6  Vt.  295  (1834), 

106,  263. 
State  v.  Superior  Court,  42  Wash. 

660  (1906),  60,  95,  114. 
State  v.  Swett,  87  Me.  99  (1895), 

601. 
State  v.  Telephone  Co.,  61  S.  C. 

83  (1901),  244. 
State  v.  Thompson,  20  N.  H.  250 

(1850),  878. 

[  cxciii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


State  v.  Toledo,  48  Ohio  St.  112 

(1891),  218. 
State  v.    Union   Depot  Co.,   71 

Ohio  St.  379  (1905),  483. 
State  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co. 

(Neb.),     126    N.     W.     859 

(1910),  1302,  1362,  1363. 
State  v.  Union  Stockyards  Co., 

81  Neb.  67  (1908),  130,  151, 

160. 
State  v.  Western  Maryland  R. 

R.  Co.,  63  Md.  433  (1884), 

784,  785. 

State   v.   Western   Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    75    Kan.    609 

(1907),  814. 

State   v.    Western   Union   Tele- 
graph Co.  (Ind.),  87  N.  E. 

641  (1909),  1041. 
State  v.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.,  208 

Mo.  622  (1907),  129. 
State  v.  Willmar  &  S.  F.   Ry. 

Co.,  88  Minn.  448  (1903), 

224,  822. 
State  v.  Wrightsville  &  T.  R.  R. 

Co.,    104   Ga.   437    (1898), 

533. 
State  v.  Wynne,  1  Hawks,  451 

(1821),  213. 
State  v.  Yazoo  &  M.  Valley  Ry. 

Co.,   87   Miss.   679   (1905), 

806. 
State  v.   Young,    119   Mo.   495 

(1894),  842. 
State  Trust  Co.  v.  City  of  Du- 

luth,  70  Minn.  257  (1897), 

651,  797. 
Steamboat  Angelina  Corning,  1 

Ben.  109  (1867),  173,  774. 
Steamboat    Crystal    Palace    v. 

Vanderpool,    16    B.    Monr. 

(Ky.)  302  (1855),  769,  975. 
Steamboat  Keystone  v.   Moies, 

28  Mo.  343  (1859),  1038. 

[  cxciv  ] 


Steamboat  Lynx  v.  King,  12  Mo. 

272  (1848),  950. 
Steamer    New    Philadelphia,    1 

Black,  62  (1861),  173,  774, 

972. 
Steamer    Webb,    14    Wall.    406 

(1871),  173,  774. 
Steamship  Hammoiiia,   10  Ben. 

512  (1879),  638. 
Steenerson    v.    Great    Northern 

Ry.    Co.,    69    Minn.    353 

(1897),     577,     1065,     1084, 

1088, 1091, 1094,  1099, 1107, 

1131,1138,1141,1156,1166, 

1176,  1180,  1194. 
Steiger  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  5  Hun, 

345  (1875),  669,  912. 
Stein  v.   McArdle,  24  Ala.  344 

(1854),.377,  380. 
Stein    v.    State,    37    Ala.    123 

(1861),  981. 
Steinweg   v.   Erie   Ry.    Co.,   43 

N.  Y.  123  (1870),  795,  796. 
Sterling  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 

Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  86 

S.  W.  655  (1905),  519. 
Sternberger  v.  Cape  Fear  &  Y. 

V.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  510 

(1888),  1413. 
Sterrett'  v.    Philadelphia    Local 

Telegraph  Co.,   18  Wk.  N. 

Cas.  77  (1886),  603,  607. 
Stevens  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  1  Gray,  277  (1854),  918. 
Stevens    v.    Boston    Elev.    Ry. 

Co.,  184  Mass.  476  (1907), 

864. 

Stevenson    v.     Montreal    Tele- 
graph  Co.,    16   Upp.    Can. 

Q.  B.  530  (1858),  511. 
Stevenson  v.  West  Seattle  L.  & 

Imp.    Co.,    22    Wash.    84 

(1900),  182,  559,  561,  606, 

612,  632,  633,  642. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Steward  v.   Brooklyn  &  C.  T. 

R.   R.   Co.,   90  N.   Y.   588 

(1882),  939. 
Stewart  v.  Erie  &  W.  Transp. 

Co.,  17  Minn.  372  (1871),  511. 
Stewart   v.    Head,   70   Ga.   449 

(1883),  970. 
Stewart  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R. 

Co.,    38    N.    J.    Law,    505 
'   (1875),  122,  1290. 
Stewart  v.  Merchants'  Dispatch 

Co.,   47   Iowa,   229   (1877), 

180,  906,  921. 
Stiles    v.  Davis,    1    Black,    101 

(1861),  1046. 
Stockton  v.   Frey,   4   Gill,   406 

(1846),  184. 
Stoddard  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 

H.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Mass.  422 

(1902),  777. 
Stone  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,    47    Iowa,    82    (1877), 

1258. 
Stone  v.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R. 

R.  Co.,  116  U.  S.  352  (1886), 

1421. 
Stone  v.  Rice,  58  Ala.  95  (1877), 

1039,  1040. 
Stone  v.  Wisconsin,  94  U.  S.  181 

(1876),  1427. 
Stone  v.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  R. 

Co.,  62  Miss.  607  (1885), 

1294,  1421. 
Stone  Co.  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line 

R.  R.  Co.,   144  N.  C.  220 

(1907),  901. 
Stoneman  v.   Erie  Ry.   Co.,  52 

N.  Y.  429  (1873),  876. 
Stoner  v.  Chicago  Gt.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  109  Iowa,  551  (1899), 

913,  922. 
Storrs  v.  Pensacola  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,    29    Fla.    617    (1892), 

1409. 


Story  v.  New  York  Elevated  R. 

R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  122  (1882), 

190. 
Story  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  R.  Co., 

133  N.  C.  59  (1903),   188, 

588,  632,  642. 
Stott    v.    Churchill,    15    N.    Y. 

Misc.  80  (1895),  966,  979. 
Stoy  v.  Indiana  Hydraulic  Power 

Co.,    166   Ind.   316   (1906), 

95,  114. 
Straight  Creek  Coal  Mining  Co. 

v.  Straight  Creek  Coal,  etc., 

Co.   (Ky.),   122  S.  W.  842 

(1909),  225. 
Strand   v.    Chicago   &   W.    Ry. 

Co.,  67  Mich.  380  (1887), 

933. 
Stranger,  The,  1  Brown's  Adm. 

281  (1871),  173. 
Strauss  v.  County  Hotel  &  W. 

Co.,  12  Q.  B.  D.  27  (1883), 

367. 
Street    v.    Morrison,    5     Allen 

(New  Bruns.),  296   (1862), 

731. 
Streets  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 

178  N.  Y.  553  (1904),  783. 
Strohmeyer  v.  Consumers'  Elec- 
tric Co.,  Ill  La.  506  (1904), 

113. 
Strohn  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  23  Wis.  126  (1868),  904. 
Strohn  v.  Detroit  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 

21  Wis.  554  (1867),  1003. 
Strother  v.  Aberdeen  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,  123  N.  C.  197  (1898), 

937. 
Strough  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 

R.  Co.,  92  App.  Div.  584 

(1904),  665,  799,  903,  1298. 
Strough  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 

R.  Co.,  181  N.Y.  533  (1905), 

842,  850. 

[  cxcv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Suarez   v.    The    Washington,    1 

Woods,  96  (1871),  743. 
Sullivan   v.    Chicago   Board    of 

Trade,    111    111.    App.    492 

(1903),  353: 
Sullivan  v.  Jefferson  Ave.  R.  R. 

Co.,  133  Mo.  1  (1895),  942, 

943. 
Sullivan    v.    Postal    Telegraph 

Cable    Co.,    123    Fed.    411 

(1903),  603,  607. 
Sultan   Ry.    &   T.    Co.    v.    Gt. 

Northern  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.), 

109  Pac.  320  (1910),   1020, 

1361. 
Summerlin  v.  Seaboard  Air  L. 

Ry.  Co.,  56  Fla.  687  (1908), 

256. 
Summit   v.    State,    8   Lea,    413 

(1881),  473. 
Sumner  v.  Caswell,  20  Fed.  249 

(1884),  235. 
Suttle  v.   Western    Union    Tel. 

Co.,  148  N.  C.  480  (1908), 

1041. 
Sutton  v.  Housatonic  R.  R.  Co., 

45  Fed.  507  (1891),  1050. 
Swaffield  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line, 

10  I.  C.  C.  Rep.  281  (1904), 

1237. 
Swan  v.  Manchester  &  L.  R.  R. 

Co.,  132  Mass.  116  (1882), 

873,  888,  1258. 
Swan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  106  Tenn. 

229  (1901),  1050. 
Swan  v.  Williams,  2  Mich.  427 

(1852),  58. 
Swanberg    v.    New    York,    123 

App.  Div.  774  (1908),  825. 
Sweet  v.  Louisville  Ry.  Co.,  113 

Ky.  15  (1902),  1044. 
Sweet  v.    Postal   Tel.  &   Cable 

Co.,  22  R.   I.   344   (1901), 

1041. 

[  cxcvi  ] 


Sweet   v.    Western   Union   Tel. 

Co.,  139  Mich.  322  (1905), 

1041. 
Swetland  v.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

102  Mass.  276  (1869),  665, 

840. 
Swift  &  Co.  v.  Ronan,  103  111. 

App.  475  (1902),  130,  151, 

773,  972. 
Swindler  v.  Hilliard,  2  Rich.  286 

(1845),  165,  229. 
Sword  v.  Young,  89  Tenn.  126 

(1890),  1049. 
Symonds  v.  Pain,  6  Hurl  &  N. 

709  (1861),  173,  774. 
Synder  v.   Colorado  Springs   & 

C.  C.  Dist.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Colo. 

288  (1906),  942,  945. 


Taber  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry. 

Co.,  84  S.  C.  291  (1909),  776. 
Tacoma  Hotel  Co.  v.  Tacoma  L. 

&  Water  Co.,  3  Wash.  316 

(1891),  92,  432,  452. 
Tadhunter  v.   Buckley,  7  L.  T. 

(N.  S.)  273  (1862),  237,  241, 

968. 
Talbert  v.  Charleston  &  W.  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  72  S.  C.  137  (1905), 

888. 
Talbot  v.  Dent,  9  B.  Mon.  526 

(1849),  217. 
Talcott  v.  Pine  Grove,  1  Flipp. 

120  (1872),  211. 
Tall  v.  Baltimore  Steam  Packet 

Co.,  90  Md.  248  (1899),  879, 

942. 
Talley   v.    Gt.     Western   R.    R. 

Co.,  L.  R;  6  C.  P.  44  (1870), 

769. 
Tampa,  City  of,  v.  Tampa  Water 

Works    Co.,    45    Fla.    600 

(1903),  92,  215,  1410. 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Tanner  v.  Treasury  Tunnel  M.  & 

R.  Co.,  35  Colo.  593  (1906), 

63,  222. 
Tarbell  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,  34  Cal.  616  (1868),  431, 

438,  441. 
Tate  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

26  Ky.  L.  Rep.  309  (1904), 

944. 
Tate  v.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 

78  Miss.  842  (1901),  399,  734. 
Taylor   v.   Great   Northern   Ry. 

Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  385  (1866), 

915. 
Taylor  v.  Humphreys,  30  L.  J.  M. 

C.  242  (Eng.,  1861),  364. 
Taylor  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  163  Ky.  1  (1909), 

1041. 

Tecumseh  Celery  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati, J.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Int. 

Com.  Rep.  318  (1893),  1237. 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Frith,  105  Tenn. 

167  (1900),  980. 
Telegraph   Co.    v.    Griswold,    37 

Ohio  St.  301  (1881),  766,  980, 

1014. 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Mellon,  96  Tenn. 

66  (1896),  851. 
Telegraph   Co.   v.    Munford,    87 

Tenn.  190  (1889),  520,  851. 
Telephone  Case,  The,  3  Can.  Ry. 

Cas.  205  (1904),  497. 
Telephone    Co.    v.    Brown,    104 

Tenn.  56  (1900),  516,  765. 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Chicago,  Peoria  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  150  111.  502  (1894),  768. 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Peoria  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  167  111. 

296  (1897),  125,  699. 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Peoria  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  182  111. 

501  (1899),  125. 


Territory  v.  DeWolfe,   13  Okla. 

454  (1903),  51. 
Teutonia,  The,  L.  R.  3  Adm.  394 

(1871),  1265. 
Texarkana  &  F.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Anderson,      67     Ark.      123 

(1899),  757. 
Texas  &  N.  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sabine 

Tram.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

121  S.  W.  256  (1909),  1123, 

1430. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Abilene  Oil 

Co.,  204  U.  S.  426  (1907), 

1050,  1294. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Allen,  42 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  331  (1906), 

798. 
Texas  &  P.   Ry.   Co.  v.  Avery 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  33  S.  W. 

704  (1895),  1415. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Avery,  19 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  235  (1898), 

1005. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barrow,  33 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  611   (1903), 

722,  796,  835. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barrow 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  94  S.  W. 

176  (1906),  804. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Black,  87 

Tex.  160  (1894),  763. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Blocker,  48 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  100  (1907), 

722. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bowlin 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  32  S.  W. 

918  (1895),  946. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Capps,  2 

Wills  App.,  §  34  (1883),  876. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Carlton,  60 

Tex.  397  (1883),  529,  530. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cornelius, 

10  Tex.  Civ.  App.  125  (1895), 

873. 

[  cxcvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dick,  26 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  256  (1901), 

1044. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Diefen- 

bach,    167   Fed.   39    (1909), 

646. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Elliott,  22 

Tex.   Civ.   App.   31    (1899), 

864. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  99 

Tex.  533  (1906),  408. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Interstate 

Comm.  Comm.,  162  U.  S.  197 

(1896),  535,  1204, 1222, 1376, 

1377. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  James,  82 

Tex.  306  (1891),  438. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jones  (Tex. 

Civ.   App.),   39  S.   W.    124 

(1897),  735. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Klepper 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  24  S.  W. 

567  (1893),  1005. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mugg,  202 

U.  S.  242  (1906),  1294. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pearl,  3 

Wills.  4  (1885),  843. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reiss,  183 

U.  S.  621  (1903),  517. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Scott,  64 

Tex.  549  (1885),  783. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shawnee 

Cotton  Oil  Co.    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.),  118  S.  W.  776  (1909), 

833,  922. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smissen,  31 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  549  (1903), 

918. 
Texas  &  P.   Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith 

(Tex.),  84  S.  W.  852  (1905), 

441. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Southern 

Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann. 

970  (1889),  694. 

[  cxcviii  ] 


Texas  &  P.   Ry.  Co.   v.  Texas 

Short   Line   R.   R.   Co.,   35 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  387  (1904), 

529. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Townsend 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  106  S.  W. 

760  (1907),  794. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  W.  Scott  & 

Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  86  S. 

W.  1065  (1905),  833. 
Texas  &  P.   Ry.   Co.  v.  White 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  17  S.  W. 

419  (1891),  872. 
Texas  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dorsey 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  70  S.  W. 

575  (1902),  913. 
Texas  Midland  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ger- 

aldon  (Tex.),  128  S.  W.  611 

(1910),  873. 
Texas  Telegraph  &  Telephone  Co. 

v.  Seiders,  9  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

431  (1895),  412. 
Thayer  v.  Burchard,  99  Mass.  508 

(1868),  914. 
Thayer  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H. 

R.  R.  Co.,  22  Ind.  26  (1864), 

1002,  1007. 
The, — see    the    thing   liable    by 

name. 
Thomas  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

10  Mete.  472  (1845),  176. 
Thomas  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry. 

Co.,   72  Mich.   355   (1888), 

885. 
Thomas  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  0.  &  T. 

P.    Ry.    Co.,    62   Fed.    803 

(1894),  570,  671. 
Thomas    v.    Day,    4    Esp.    262 

(1803),  731. 
Thomas  v.  Frankfort  &  C.  Ry. 

Co.,  25  Ky.   L.   Rep.   1051 

(1903),  513. 
Thomas  v.  Geldart,  20  New  Br. 

(4  Pug.  &  B.)  95  (1880),  440. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Thomas  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  109  Mo.  187  (1891),  529. 
Thomas  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  63  Fed.  200  (1894), 

834,  914. 
Thompson  v.  Alabama  Midland 

Ry.  Co.,  122  Ala.  378  (1898), 

915. 
Thompson  v.  Chicago  &  Alton 

R.  R.  Co.,  22  Mo.  App.  321 

(1886),  1026. 
Thompson  v.  Fargo,  49  N.  Y.  188 

(1872),  1045. 
Thompson  v.  Lacy,  3  B.  &  Aid. 

283    (1820),    106,   240,    263, 

567. 
Thompson  v.  London,  etc.,  Ry. 

Co.,   2   Nev.   &   Mac.    115, 

1314. 
Thompson  v.  Matthews,  2  Edw. 

Ch.  212  (1834),  53,  241,  270. 
Thompson  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  34 

L.T.  (N.  S.)  34  (1875),  872. 
Thompson  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 

Ry.  Co.  (Tex.),  126  S.  W.  257 

(1910),  521,  532. 
Thompson  v.  New  York  Storage 

Co.,  97  Mo.  App.  135  (1902), 

170. 
Thompson    v.    Western    Union 

Telegraph  Co.,  107  N.  C.  449 

(1890),  1014. 
Thompson  Glass  Co.  v.  Fayette 

Fuel  Gas  Co.,  137  Pa.  St.  317 

(1890),  852. 
Thompson-Houston  Electric  Co. 

v.    Newton,    42    Fed.    723 

(1890),  218. 
Thompson-Houston  Electric  Co. 

v.  Simon,  20  Oreg.  60  (1890), 

189,  190,  262. 
Thorley,  Ltd.,  v.  Orchis  S.  S.  Co., 

Ltd.,  1  K.  B.  660  (1907),  908, 

921. 


Thorpe  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y. 

402  (1879),  152,  845,  847. 
Thorpe  v.  Rutland  &  V.  R.  R. 

Co.,  27  Vt.  140  (1855),  1435. 
Thousand  Island  Park  Assn.  v. 

Tucker,     173     N.     Y.     203 

(1903),  51. 

Thousand  Island  Stb.  Co.  v.  Vis- 
gar,  86  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  126 

(1903),  103,  232,  488. 
Thurn  v.  Alta  Telegraph  Co.,  15 

Cal.  472  (1860),  520. 
Thurston  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,   4   Dillon,   321    (1877), 

188,  598,  603,  604,  608,  627, 

631,  641. 
Thweatt  v.  Houston,  E.  &  W.  T. 

Ry.  Co.,  31  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

227  (1903),  942. 

Tidwell  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  (Ala.),  51  So.  934 

(1910),  1041. 
Tierney  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  305 

(1879),  408,   664,   665,  722, 

831,  834,  842. 
Tift  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  138 

Fed.  753  (1905),  1069,  1074, 

1075,  1076,  1211,  1212,  1239, 

1371. 
Tillett  v.  Lynchburg  &  D.  R.  R. 

Co.,  115  N.  C.  662  (1894), 

395. 
Tilley  v.  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  5  Fed.  641  (1881),  1121, 

1409. 
Timpson  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co., 

52  Hun  (N.  Y.),  489  (1889), 

1044. 
Tindall   v.   Taylor,   4   E.   &   B. 

(Eng.)  219  (1854),  1263. 
Tirrell    v.    Gage,    4    Allen,    245 

(1862),  922. 

[  cxcix  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Tobin  v.  London  &  N.  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  2  Ir.  22  (1895),  872. 
Tobin  v.  Portland,  S.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  59  Me.  183  (1871),  369, 

372. 
Todd  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  3 

Allen  (Mass.),  18  (1861),  785. 
Toffe  v.  Oregon  R.  R.  Co.,  41 

Oreg.  64  (1902),  513. 
Toledo    v.    Northwestern    Ohio 

Natural  Gas  Co.,  5  Ohio  C. 

C.  577  (1890),  94,  112,  1300. 
Toledo,  A.,  A.  &  N.  M.  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  54  Fed. 

746   (1893),   352,   570,   670, 

671. 
Toledo  &  0.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bowler 

&  B.  Co.,  63  Ohio  St.  274 

(1900),  876. 
Toledo  &  0.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wren, 

78  Ohio  St.  137  (1908),  850. 
Toledo  Electric  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Toledo  Consolidated  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  26  Ohio  Wk.  L.  Bui.  172, 

698. 
Toledo,  S.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

East  Saginaw  &  S.  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,   72   Mich.   206   (1888), 

224,  225. 
Toledo,  W.   &   W.  Ry.   Co.   v. 

Beggs,  85  111.  80  (1887),  738, 

786,  1018. 
Toledo,   W.   &  W.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Brooks,  81   111.  245   (1876), 

745,  746. 
Toledo,   W.   &   W.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Elliott,    76    111.    67    (1875), 

1285. 
Toledo,   W.   &  W.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Crush,    67   111.   262    (1873), 

367  372 
Toledo, 'w.   &   W.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Lockhart,  71  111.  627  (1874), 

511. 

[cc] 


Tolman   v.  Abbot,  78    Wis.  192 

(1890),  512. 
Tombler  v.  Koelling,  60  Ark.  62 

(1894),  117. 
Tompkins  v.  Boston  Elevated  Ry. 

Co.,  201  Mass.   114  (1909), 

1031. 
Tons  of  Coal,  318^,  14  Blatch. 

(U.  S.)  453  (1878),  867,  1270. 
Toomer  v.   London  Ry.  Co.,  3 

Nev.    &    Mac.    79    (1865), 

1331. 
Topeka,  City  of,  v.  Topeka  Water 

Co.,  58  Kan.  349  (1897),  273, 

282. 
Topeka  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Higgs, 

38   Kans.   375    (1888),   189, 

945. 
Townsend  v.  New  York  Central 

&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  Y. 

295  (1874),  890. 
Towson  v.  Havre  de  Grace  Bank, 

6  Har.  &  J.  47  (1823),  965. 
Tozer  v.  United  States,  52  Fed. 

917  (1892),  535,  1373. 
Tracy  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.,  67 

How.  Pr.   15'4  (1884),   153, 

975. 
Trammell  v.  Dinsmore,  183  U.  S. 

115  (1901),  1409. 
Transit  Co.  v.  Venable,  105  Term. 

460  (1900),  783. 

Transportation   Co.   v.   Parkers- 
burg,  107  U.  S.  691  (1882), 

102,  232. 
Transportation  Line  v.  Hope,  95 

U.  S.  297  (1877),  173,  774. 
Transportation  of  Fruit,  Re,  10 

Int.  Com.  Rep.  360  (1904), 

154. 
Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  116 

Ga.  264  (1902),  783. 
Treadwell   v.   Whittier,   80  Cal. 

574  (1889),  193. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Tremaine  v.  Halifax  Gas  Co.,  3 

Nova  Scotia,  360,  982. 
Trent  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wood,  3  Esp. 

127   (1785),    164,    963,   984, 

985. 

Trenton  &  N.  B.  Tp.  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican &  E.  News  Co.,  43  N.  J. 

L.  381  (1881),  56. 
Trice  v.  Chesapeake   &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  40  W.  Va.  271  (1895), 

889. 
Trinity  Val.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stewart 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  62  S.  W. 

1085  (1901),  780,  1015. 
Trotlinger  v.  East  Tennessee,  Va. 

&  Ga.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Lea,  533 

(1883),  862,  870. 
Trout  v.  Watkins  L.  &  V.  Co. 

(Mo.  App.),  130  S.  W.  136 

(1910),  107. 
Troutman  v.  Smith,  105  Ky.  231 

(1899),     1138,     1140,    11S8, 

1408. 
Trowbridge  v.  Chapin,  23  Conn. 

595  (1855),  409,  733. 
Truax  v.  Philadelphia,  P.  W.  &  B. 

R.    R.    Co.,    3   Houst.    233 

(1865),  513,  850,  872. 
Trumbull  v.   Erickson,   97   Fed. 

891  (1899),  664,  801. 
Trustees  v.  Chesapeake,  0.  &  S. 

W.  R.  R.  Co.,  94  Ky.  377 

(1893),  305. 
Tuckahoe  Canal  Co.  v.  Tuckahoe 

Ry.  Co.,  11  Leigh,  42  (1840), 

65. 
Tucker  v.  Housatonic  R.  R.  Co., 

39  Conn.  447  (1872),  908. 
Tucker  v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.     (Kans.),    108   Pac.   89 

(1910),  1124,  1152,  1193, 

1200,  1210,  1391,  1430. 
Tucker  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  50 

Mo.  385  (1872),  662,  914. 


Tucker  v.  Pennsylvania  Ry.  Co., 

12  N.  Y.  Misc.  117  (1895), 

796. 
Tulane  Hotel  Co.  v.  Holohan,  112 

Tenn.  214  (1904),  728,  744, 

970. 
Tunnel    v.    Pettijohn,    2    Harr. 

(Del.)   48   (1835),   162,   254, 

270,  661,  791,  792. 
Tunney  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  L. 

R.  C.  P.  291  (1866),  783. 
Turner    v.    Huff,    46    Ark.    222 

(1885),  1039. 
Turner  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R. 

Co.,  63  N.  C.  522  (1869),  604. 
Turner  v.  Revere  Water  Co.,  171 

Mass.  329  (1898),  377,  434, 

435,  453,  456,  877,  1250. 
Twellis  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Am.  L. 

Reg.    (N.   S.)    728    (1863), 

1331. 
Twitchell  v.  Spokane,  55  Wash. 

86  (1909),  1166,  1172,  1303, 

1304. 
Tyler    v.    Beacher,    44    Vt.    648 

(1871),  65. 
Tyler  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

60  111.  421  (1871),  766,  980, 

1014. 
Tyler  &  Co.  v.  Western  Union 

Telegraph   Co.,   60   111.   421 

(1871),  133. 

Tyrone  Gas  &  Water  Co.  v.  Bur- 
ley,   19  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  348 

(1902),  433. 


Udall  Milling  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T. 

&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Kans. 

256  (1910),  663,  799. 
Udell  v.  Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.,  152 

Ind.  507  (1899),  760. 
Udell  v.  Illinois  C.  Ry.  Co.,  13 

Mo.  App.  254  (1883),  796. 

[cci] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Ukiah  City  v.  Ukiah  Water  & 
Imp.  Co.,  142  Cal.  173 
(1904),  350. 

Ullman  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  112  Wis.  150  (1901), 
1005,  1021,  1022. 

Ulmer  v.  Lime  Rock  R.  R.  Co., 
98  Me.  579  (1904),  223,  224, 
225. 

Umatilla  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Barn- 
hart,  22  Oreg.  389  (1892), 
93. 

Underwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  Peli- 
can Boom  Co.,  76  Wis.  76 
(1890),  73. 

Union  Depot  &  Ry.  Co.  v.  Meek- 
ing,  42  Colo.  89  (1908),  483. 

Union  Express  Co.  v.  Graham,  26 
Ohio  St.  595  (1875),  413,  414, 
991. 

Union  Express  Co.  v.  Ohleman,  92 
Pa.  St.  323  (1879),  776,  1040. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Evans, 
52  Neb.  50  (1897),  372,  1286. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Good- 
ridge,  149  U.  S.  680  (1893), 
1286. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  91 
U.  S.  343  (1875),  211,  299, 
301. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 45  Neb.  57  (1895),  1045. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mason 
City  &  F.  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  199 
U.  S.  160  (1905),  126. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nichols, 
8  Kans.  505  (1871),  623,  738, 
778. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  United 
States,  117  U.  S.  355  (1886), 
535,  1373. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  United 
States,  99  U.  S.  402  (1878), 
1160,  1166.  ' 

[  ccii  ] 


Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Updike 

Grain    Co.,    178    Fed.    223 

(1910),  854. 
Union  Railway  of  Baltimore  v. 

Canton  R.  R.  Co.,  105  Md. 

12  (1907),  129,  699. 
Union  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Clark,  L.  R. 

(N.  Z.)  2  S.  C.  282  (1884), 

1033. 
United  Fruit  Co.  v.  New  York  & 

B.  Tr.   Line,    104  Md.  567 

(1906),  1038. 
United  Rys.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Deane, 

93  Md.  619  (1901),  941. 
United  Rys.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Hertel, 

97     Md.    382     (1903),   864, 

1044. 

United  States  v.  American  Water- 
works Co.,  37  Fed.  747,  379, 

701. 
United  States  v.  Atchison,  T.  & 

S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  142  Fed.  176 

(1905),  136,  177,  1293. 
United  States  v.  Atchison,  T.  & 

S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  163  Fed.  11 

(1907),  1362. 
United  States  v.  Baltimore  &  0. 

R.  Co.,  153  Fed.  997  (1907), 

815. 
United  States  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.,    148   Fed.    646    (1906), 

1347. 
United  States  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

R.    R.    Co.,    127    Fed.    785 

(1904),  1306. 
United  States  v.  Chicago,  K.  &  S. 

R.  R.  Co.,  81  Fed.  783  (1897), 

1416. 
United  States  v.  Choctaw,  0.  & 

G.   Ry.    Co.,    3   Okla.    404 

(1895),  211. 
United  States  v.  Delaware  &  H. 

Co.,  213  U.  S.  366  (1909), 

709,  1436. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


United  States  v.  Delaware,  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Fed.  101 

(1889),  481. 
United  States  v.  Delaware,  L.  & 

W.   Ry.  Co.,   152  Fed.  269 

(1907),  1153. 
United  States  v.  Illinois  Terminal 

Ry.  Co.,  168  Fed.  546  (1909), 

1295. 

United  States  v.  Joint  Traffic  As- 
sociation,   171    U.    S.    505 

(1898),  694. 
United  States  v.   Lehigh  Valley 

R.    R.    Co.,    115   Fed.   373 

(1902),  1413. 
United  States  v.  M.  &  L.  R.  R.  R. 

Co.,  6  Fed.  237  (1881),  477. 
United  States  v.  Michigan  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.,  122  Fed.  544 

(1903),  1292. 

United  States  v.  Milwaukee  Re- 
frig.  Transit  Co.  (C.  C.  A.), 

145  Fed.  1007  (1906),  1293. 
United  States  v.  Norfolk  &  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  109  Fed.  831(1901), 

665,  856. 
United  States  v.  Norfolk  &  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  138  Fed.  849  (1905), 

665. 
United  States  v.  Norfolk  &  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  143  Fed.  266  (1906), 

665,  856. 
United  States  v.  Northern  Pacific 

Ry.  Co.,  120  Fed.  Rep.  546 

(1903),  516. 
United  States  v.  Oregon  Ry.  & 

Nav.    Co.,     159    Fed.    975 

(1908),  419,  856,  867. 
United    States   v.    Ormsbee,    74 

Fed.  207  (1896),  122. 
United  States  v.  Saul,  58  Fed.  763 

(1893),  763. 
United  States  v.   Seaboard  Ry. 

Co.,  82  Fed.  563  (1897),  1414. 


United  States  v.  Sioux  City  Stock- 
yards   Co.,    162    Fed.    556 

(1908),   130,   160,   258,  773, 

792,  1043. 
United   States  v.   Southern  Ry. 

Co.,  125  N.  C.  666  (1900), 

1301. 
United  States  &  M.  T.  Co.  v. 

Delaware    W.    Const.    Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  H2  S.  W. 

447  (1908),  1097. 
United    States    Express    Co.    v. 

Backman,   28  Ohio  St.   144 

(1875),  1022. 
United    States    Express    Co.    v. 

Harris,  51  Ind.  127  (1875), 

1023. 
United    States    Express    Co.    v. 

Joyce,  36  Ind.  App.  1  (1905), 

1020. 
United    States    Express    Co.    v. 

Root,  47  Mich.  231  (1881), 

178,  776. 
United    States    Express    Co.    v. 

Rush,   24   Ind.   403   (1865), 

1017. 
United    States    Express    Co.    v. 

State,   164  Ind.  196  (1905), 

178,  278,  871. 
United  States  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Gildersleve,     29     Md.     232 

(1868),  348,  412,  766,  1014. 
United  States  Telephone  Co.  v. 

Central     Union     Telephone 

Co.,    171    Fed.    130   (1909), 

700. 
United  States  v.  Tozer,  39  Fed. 

369  (1889),  1323. 
United  States  v.  Trans-Missouri 

Freight  Association,  166  U.  S. 

290  (1897),  694. 
United  States  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  160  U.  S.  1  (1895),  211, 

300. 

[  cciii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


United  States  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co., 
158  Fed.  536  (1908),  1296. 

United  States  v.  West  Virginia 
Northern  Ry.  Co.,  125  Fed. 
252  (1903),  665,  856. 


Valk  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  446  (1910),  1010. 
Van  Buskirk  v.  Purinton,  2  Hall 

(N.  Y.),  561  (1829),  1263. 
Van  Camp  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R. 

R.  Co.,  137  Mich.  467  (1904), 

397,  863,  872,  904. 
Vance,  Ex  parte,  42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

619  (1901),  484. 
Vance  v.  Throckmorton,  5  Bush 

(Ky.),  41  (1868),  770. 
Vance  v.   Vandercook   Co.    110, 

U.  S.  438  (1898),  1418. 
Vanderberg  v.  Kansas  City,  Mo.. 

Gas  Co.,  126  Mo.  App.  600 

(1907),  51,  111,339,  376,434, 

455,  877. 
Vanderslice  v.  The  Superior,  28 

Fed.  Cas.  16,843  (1850),  173, 

774. 
Van  Dusan  v.  Grand  Trunk  R. 

Co.,  97  Mich.  439  (1893),  431, 

855,  862,  878. 
Van  Horn  v.  Kermit,  4  E.  D. 

Smith  (N.  Y.),  453  (1855), 

769. 
Vankirk  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  66  (1874),  446, 

1255. 
Vannatta  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

154  Pa.  St.  262  (1893),  517. 
Van  Nest  Land  Co.  v.  New  York 

Water  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

295  (1896),  458. 
Van  Ostran  v.  New  York  Central 

&    H.  R.   R.  Co.,  35   Hun 

(N.  Y.),  (1885),  1044. 

[  cciv  ] 


Van  Patten  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 

P.  R.  R.  Co.,  81  Fed.  545 

(1891),  1294,  1376. 
Van  Winkle  v.  United  States  Mail 

S.    S.    Co.,    37    Barb.    122 

(1862),  963,  1046. 
Varble  v.  Bigley,   14  Bush,  698 

(1879),  173,  774. 
Varner  v.  Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534 

(1883),  241. 
Vassau  v.  Madison  E.  Ry.  Co., 

106  Wis.  301  (1900),  441. 
Veeder  v.  Fellows,  20  N.  Y.  126 

(1859),  878. 
Vega  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Consolidated 

Elevator  Co.,  75  Minn.  308 

(1899),  141. 
Veneman  v.  Jones,   118  Ind.  41 

(1888),  484. 
Vermilye    v.     Postal    Telegraph 

Cable   Co.,    205   Mass.   598 

(1910),  571,  903. 

Vermont  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fitch- 
burg   R.    R.   Co.,    14  Allen 

(Mass.),  462  (1867),  529, 775. 
Verner  v.  Sweitzer,  32  Pa.  St.  208 

(1858),  876. 
Vickers  v.  Canadian  Pacific  Ry. 

Co.,  13  Ont.  App.  210  (1908), 

477. 
Vicksburg  &  M.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Ragsdale,     46     Miss.     458 

(1872),  901. 
Vicksburg  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  United 

States  Exp.  Co.,  68  Miss.  149 

(1890),  413. 
Vicksburg    Waterworks    Co.    v. 

Vicksburg,    185    U.    S.    65 

(1902),  1424. 
Vidal   Sala,    The,    12   Fed.    207 

(1882),  104. 
Viemeister  v.  Brooklyn  Heights 

R.  R.  Co.,  87  N.  Y.  S.  162 

(1904),  945. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Vincent  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,  49111. 33(1868),  404,817. 
Vincent  v.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co., 

114  La.  1021  (1905),  513. 
Vinton  v.  Middlesex  St.  Ry.  Co., 

11  Allen  (Mass.),  304  (1865), 

644. 
Violett  v.  Stettinius,  5  Cr.  C.  C. 

(D.  C.)  559  (1839),  1264. 
Virginia  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hill, 

105  Va.  729  (1906),  889. 
Virginia  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sayer, 

26  Gratt.  328  (1875),  1011, 

1022. 
Virginia  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Louisville 

&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Va.  77 

(1900),  513. 
Virginia  Canon  Toll-Road  Co.  v. 

People,  22  Colo.  429  (1896), 

75. 
Virginia  Midland  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Roach,  83  Va.   375   (1887), 

761. 
Vitrified  Pipes,  In  re,  14  Blatch. 

274  (1877),  1268. 
Vlierboom  v.  Chapman,  13  M.  & 

W.  (Eng.)  230  (1844),  1265. 
Voight  v.  Baltimore,  O.  &  S.  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  79  Fed.  561  (1897), 

781. 
Volkmar  v.  Volkmar,  147  Cal.  175 

(1905),  852. 
Vreeland  v.  O'Neil,  36  N.  J.  Eq. 

399  (1883),  456. 

W 
Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown,  152 

111.  484  (1894),  1012. 
Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jellison,  124 

111.  App.  652  (1906),  777. 
Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mathew,  199 

U.  S.  605  (1905),  635,  638. 
Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Savage,  110 

Ind.  156  (1886),  939. 


Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sharpe,  76 

Neb.  424  (1906),  656,  918, 

984. 
Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  222 

111.  337  (1906),  512,  1026. 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Illinois,  118  U.  S.  557  (1886), 

1417. 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

McCasland,  11  111.  App.  491 

(1882),  909. 
Wabaska  Electric    Co.   v.   City 

of    Wymore,    60  Neb.   199 

(1900),  1123,  1430. 
Wade  v.  Lutcher  &  Moore  Cy- 
press Lumber  Co.,  74  Fed. 

517   (1896),  207,   212,   223, 

762. 
Wade  v.  Wheeler,  3  Lans.  201 

(1870),  726. 
Wagner  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

R.  Co.,  95  App.   Div.  219 

(1904),  945. 
Wagner  v.  City  of  Rock  Island, 

146    111.    139    (1893),    377, 

1342. 
Wagner   v.    Missouri   Pac.    Ry. 

Co.,  97  Mo.  512  (1888),  754, 

763. 
Wainwright  v.   Queens  County 

Water    Co.,    78    Hun,    146 

(1894),  350. 
Wald  v.  Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St. 

L.  R.  R.  Co.,  162  111.  545 

(1896),  656,918,921,985. 
Walker  v.  Jackson,  10  M.  &  W. 

161  (1842),  771. 
Walker  v.  Keenan,  73  Fed.  758 

(1896),  818. 
Walker  v.   McDonald,  49  Tex. 

458  (1878),  825. 
Walker   v.    Shasta   Power    Co., 

160  Fed.  856  (1908),  60,  95, 

114,  243. 

[  CCV] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Walker  v.  Skipwith,  Meigs,  502 

(1838),  184,  262,  1002. 
Walker  v.  York  &  N.   M.  Ry. 

Co.,  2  E.  &  B.  750  (1853), 

1001. 
Walla    Walla    v.    Walla    Walla 

Water    Co.,    172    U.    S.    1 

(1898),  1424. 
Wallace  v.  Arkansas  Cent.  R.  R. 

Co.,    118  Fed.  422   (1902), 

1409. 
Wallace  v.  Landers,  42  Ga.  486 

(1871),  666. 
Wallace  v.  Pecos  &  N.  T.  Ry. 

Co.   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),   110 

S.    W.    162     (1908),     663, 

799. 
Wallace  v.  Rosenthal,  40  Ga.  419 

(1869),  517,  1033. 
Wallace  v.  Sanders,  50  Ga.  134 

(1871),  986. 
Wallace  v.  Wilmington  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,   8  Houst.   529   (1889), 

1044. 
Walling  v.  Potter,  35  Conn.  183 

(1868),  234,  240,  263,  337, 

364,  751,  752,  969. 
Walsh  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  42  Wis.  23  (1877), 

599,  934. 
Walsh  v.  New  York  Floating  Dry 

Dock   Co.,   77   N.   Y.   448 

(1879),  104. 
Walsh  v.   The  H.   M.   Wright, 

Newb.    Adm.    (U.    S.)    494 

(1854),  769,  975. 
Walston  v.  Myers,  5  Jones,  174 

(1857),  173,  774. 
Waltham  Mfg.  Co.  v.  New  York 

&  T.  S.  S.  Co.,  204  Mass. 

253  (1910),  908. 

Wampum  Cotton  Mills  v.  Caro- 
lina &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  150 

N.  C.  608  (1909),  516,  564. 

[  ccvi  ] 


Wamsley  v.  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.,  168 
N.  Y.  533  (1901),  905. 

Ward  v.  Birmingham  Water- 
works Co.,  152  Ala.  285 
(1907),  1249. 

Ward  v.  Fellers,  3  Mich.  281 
(1854),  1269. 

Ward  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 
Co.,  158  Mo.  226  (1900), 
1023. 

Wardwell  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  46  Minn.  511 
(1891),  432. 

Warfield  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  104  Tenn.  74  (1900), 
636,  646. 

Warner  v.  Burlington  &  Mo. 
R.  R,  R.  Co.,  22  la.  166 
(1867),  875,  970. 

Warner  v.  Western  Transporta- 
tion Co.,  5  Robt.  490  (1868), 
623,  737. 

Warren  v.  Chicago,  118  111.  329 
(1887),  824. 

Warren  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co., 
8  Allen,  227(1864),  401. 

Washburn  v.  Jones,  14  Barb.  193 
(1851),  979. 

Washburn  v.  Nashville  &  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  3  Head  (Tenn.), 
638  (1859),  764. 

Washington  Luna  P.  Co.  v. 
Goodrich  (Va.),  66  S.  E. 
977  (1910),  195. 

Washington  Toll  Bridge  v.  Beau- 
fort, 81  N.  C.  491  (1879), 
53. 

Washington,  Borough  of,  v. 
Washington  Water  Co.,  70 
N.  J.  Eq.  254  (1905),  459. 

Watauga  Water  Co.  v.  Wolfe, 
99  Tenn.  429  (1897),  92, 
212,  214,  215,  216,  242,  264, 
411,  445,  883,  1249,  1250. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Waterbury  v.  New  York  Cen- 
tral &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Fed.  Rep.  671  (1883),  745. 
Waters  v.  Railroad  Co.,  110  N. 

C.  338  (1892),  610. 
Waterworks  Co.  v.  Kansas  City, 

4    McCreary,     198    (1882), 

1304. 
Waterworks  Co.  v.  Kansas  City, 

62  Fed.  853  (1894),  1110. 
Watson  v.   Cross,   2   Duv.    147 

(1865),  339. 
Watson  v.  Memphis  &  Ry.  Co., 

9  Heisk.  255  (1872),  748. 
Watson  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co., 

42  Minn.  46  (1889),  190. 
Watts  v.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R. 

Corp.,  106  Mass.  466  (1871), 

727. 
Way  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac. 

Ry.  Co.,  64  la.  48  (1884), 

623,  738. 
Wear  v.   Gleason,  53  Ark.  364 

(1889),  970. 
Weaver  v.  Wible,  20  Ohio,  270 

(1855),  239. 

Webbe  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,     169    111.    610 

(1897),  862. 
Weber  v.  Brooklyn,  Q.  C.  &  S. 

R.   R.    Co.,   47   App.    Div. 

306  (1900),  937. 
Webster  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co., 

161  Mass.  298  (1894),  401. 
Weed  v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  17  N. 
¥.362(1858),  872, 904,  915. 
Weeks  v.  McNulty,   101  Tenn. 

495  (1898),  966,  978. 
Weeks  v.  New  Orleans,  S.  F.  & 

L.  Ry.  Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  800 

(1888),  399,  403. 
Weeks  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 

H.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  Y.  50 

(1878),  769,  944. 


Weems  Stb.  Co.  v.  People's  Stb. 

Co.,  214  U.  S.  345  (1909), 

102,  232,  294,  314. 
Wehmann    v.    Minneapolis,    St. 

P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  58 

Minn.  22  (1894),  518,  1005, 

1017,  1033. 
Weidenfeld  v.   Sugar   Run  Ry. 

Co.,  48  Fed.  615  (1892),  223. 
Weisinger  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

129  Ky.  592  414,  845. 
Welch  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

41  Conn.  333  (1874),  1011. 
Welch  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.,  16 

Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  352  (1874), 

153. 
Weld  v.   Gas  &  Electric  Light 

Commissioners,    197    Mass. 

556   (1908),   113,  273,  276, 

320,  405,  693,  797. 
Wellman  v.   Chicago   &   Grand 

Trunk     Railway     Co.,     83 

Mich.  592  (1890),  1207. 
Wells  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  55 

Wis.   23   (1882),   178,   776, 

1047. 
Wells  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  44 

Wis.  342  (1878),  990. 
Wells  v.  Maine  Steamship  Co., 

4  Cliff.  (U.  S.)  228  (1879), 

1046. 
Wells  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  24  N.  Y.   181   (1862), 

786,  1018. 
Wells  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co., 

15  Fed.  561  (1883),  1121. 
Wells  v.  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  2  N.  Y. 

204  (1849),  173,  774. 
Wells  v.   Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  123  N.  W.  371 

(1909),  1025. 
Wells  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  6  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  47 

(1858),  729. 

[  ccvii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Northern 

Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  469 

(1884),  477. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry. 

&  Nav.  Co.,  8  Sawyer,  600 

(1883),  477. 
Wells,  Fargo   &  Co.'s   Exp.    v. 

Fuller,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  213 

(1893),  907. 
Welsh  v.  Pittsburg,  Ft.  W.  &  C. 

R.  R.  Co.,  10  Ohio  St.  65 

(1859),  256. 
Wente  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 

Co.,    79    Neb.    175    (1907), 

518. 
Wentz-Bates  Mercantile  Co.  v. 

Union  Pacific  Ry.   Co.,  85 

Neb.  584  (1909),  1294. 
Werbowlsky  v.  Ft.  Wayne  &  E. 

Ry.     Co.,    86    Mich.     236 

(1891),  932. 

Wertz  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph   Co.,    7    Utah,    446 

(1891),  133. 
Wescott  v.  Seattle,  R.  &  S.  R. 

R.  Co.,  84  Pac.  588  (1906), 

626,  942. 
West  v.  Rawson,  40  W.  Va.  480 

(1895),  65,  851. 
West  v.   Thomas,   97  Ala.   622 

(1892),  966,  979. 

West  Branch  Lumbermen's  Ex- 
change v.  Fisher,  150  Pa.  St. 

475  (1892),  73. 
West  Chester  &  Philadelphia  R. 

R.  Co.  v.  Miles,  55  Pa.  St. 

209  (1867),  566,  848,  881. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Walsh,    78    111.    App.    595 

(1898),  1044. 
West    Hartford,    Town    of,    v. 

Board   of   Water   Commis- 
sioners, 68  Conn.  323  (1896), 

273,  274,  405. 

[  ccviii  ] 


West  Memphis  Packet  Co.  v. 

White,  99  Tenn.  256  (1897), 

934. 
West  Side  Electric  Co.  v.  Consol. 

T.  &  E.  Co.,  110  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  171  (1905),  383. 
West  Virginia    Transp.    Co.    v. 

Ohio  R.  Pipe  Line  Co.,  22 

W.  Va.  600  (1883),  59,  687, 

691. 
West   Virginia   Transp.    Co.    v. 

Volcanic   0.    &   C.    Co.,    5 

W.    Va.    382    (1872),   59, 

416. 
Western  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Voils, 

98  Ga.  446  (1896),  635. 
Western  Irrigation  &  L.  Co.  v. 

Chapman    (Kan.),   59   Pac. 

1098  (1899),  93. 
Western  Maryland  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Herold,  74  Md.  510  (1891), 

862. 
Western  Maryland  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Schaun,  97  Md.  563  (1903), 

890. 
Western  Maryland  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Stocksdale,     83     Md.     245 

(1896),  889. 
Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Penna.   Ry.  Co.,   137  Fed. 

343  (1905),  796. 
Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harwell,  91 

Ala.  340  (1890),  1026. 
Western  Ry.   Co.  v.   Little,  86 

Ala.  159  (1888),  1024. 
Western  Transportation  Co.  v. 

Hoyt,  69  N.  Y.  230  (1877), 

1265,  1266,  1268. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Adams,  75  Tex.  531  (1889), 

348. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Allen,  66  Miss.  549  (1889), 

133,  348. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

American   Union   Tel.   Co., 

65  Ga.  160  (1880),  694. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Arwine,   3  Tex.   Civ.   App. 

156  (1893),  412. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Ayers  (Tex.),  93  S.  W.  199 

(1906),  437. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Baltimore  &  0.  Tel.  Co.,  19 

Fed.  Rep.  660  (1884),  691. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Barefoot,  97  Tex.  159  (1903), 

1041. 
Western    Union   Telegraph   Co. 

v.   Beck,   58   111.  App.    564 

(1895),  1025. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Bell  (Tex.  App.),  90  S.  W. 

714  (1905),  348. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Bibb  (Ky.),  125  S.  W.  257 

(1910),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Bierhans,   12  Ind.  App.   17 

(1895),  657. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Birge-Forbes   Co.,   29   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  526  (1902),  657. 
Western   Union    Telegraph   Co. 

v.    Blanchard,   68  Ga.    299 

(1882),  1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Boots  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  31 

S.  W.  825  (1895),  980. 
Western    Union   Telegraph  Co. 

v.   Broesche,    72   Tex.    654 

(1889),  412. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Burns,  51  So.  373  (1910),  871. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Cain  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40 

S.  W.  624  (1897),  871. 

14 


Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Call  Pub.  Co.,  44  Neb.  326 

(1895),  244. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Call  Pub.  Co.,  58  Neb.  192 

(1895),  851. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Call  Pub.  Co.,  181  U.  S.  92 

(1901),  133,  244,  1204,  1290, 

1319,  1322. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Carew,  15  Mich.  525  (1867), 

133,  520,  766,  1014. 
Western    Union   Telegraph   Co. 

v.  Chamblee,  122  Ala.  428 

(1898),  766,  1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Cobb,  95  Tex.  333  (1902), 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Cobbs,  47  Ark.  344  (1886), 

1014,  1025,  1026. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Cooper,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

591  (1902),  1010. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Courtney,    113    Tenn.    482 

(1904),  1025. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Crall,  38  Kan.  679  (1888), 

766,  1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Crider,  107  Ky.  600  (1900), 

398,  874. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Culberson,  79  Tex.  65  (1890), 

1026. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Cullers,  3  Willson  Cir.  Gas. 

Ct.  App.  (Tex.,  1887),  §  289, 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Cunningham,    99   Ala.    314 

(1892),  433,  442. 

[  ccix] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Western    Union   Telegraph    Co. 

v.  Dougherty,   54  Ark.  221 

(1891),  1026. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Dozier,  67  Miss.  288  (1889), 

412. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Dubois,  128  111.  248  (1889), 

348,  436. 
Western   Union   Telegraph    Co. 

v.    Dunfield,   11    Colo.   335 

(1888),  1025, 1026. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Edsall,  63  Tex.  668  (1885), 

742. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Eubank,  100  Ky.  591  (1897), 

1008,  1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Fenton,   52  Ind.    1    (1875), 

348. 
Western   Union    Telegraph   Co. 

v.   Ferguson,    57   Ind.    495 

(1877),  609,  633. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Fisher,   21    Ky.   Law   Rep. 

1293  (1900),  874. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Ford,  77  Ark.  531  (1906),  874. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Foster,  64  Tex.  220  (1885), 

412,  742. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Georgia  Cotton  Co.,  94  Ga. 

444  (1894),  874,  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Gibson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  53 

S.  W.  712  (1899),  874. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Graham,  1  Col.  230  (1871), 

851,  1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Hamilton,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

300  (1904),  21,  133. 
[  CCx] 


Western    Union   Telegraph   Co. 

v.  Harding,    103    Ind.    505 

(1885),     133,      398,      874, 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Harper,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

37  (1896),  607. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Harvey,  67  Kan.  729  (1903), 

1041. 
Western    Union   Telegraph   Co. 

v.  Henderson,  89  Ala.  510 

(1889),  277,  412,  437,  562, 

871,  1014,  1025,  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Hendricks,    29    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  413  (1902),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Henley,  23  Ind.  14  (1899), 

599. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Hill,    163    Ala.    18    (1909), 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Hill   (Tex.),  26  S.  W.  252 

(1894),  874. 
Western    Union   Telegraph  Co. 

v.   Hill  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  65 

S.  W.  1123  (1902),  607. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Hines,  96  Ga.  688  (1895), 

1025. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Hinkle,   3  Tex.   Civ.   App. 

518  (1893),  412. 
Western   Union    Telegraph   Co. 

v.   Hutcheson,   91   Ga.   252 

(1892),  599. 
Western    Union   Telegraph   Co. 

v.  Hyer  Bros.,  22  Fla.  637 

(1886),  133,  980. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Jackson,  163  Ala.  9  (1909), 

1041. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

James,  90  Ga.  254  (1892), 

348,  417. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Johnson,  9  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

48  (1894),  902. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Jones,  69  Miss.  658  (1892), 

412,  1014,  1025. 
Western    Union   Telegraph   Co. 

v.   Lewison,    182   Fed.    369 

(1910),  348. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Liddell,  68  Miss.  1  (1890)  ,412. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Lilliard,  86  Ark.  208  (1908), 

551,  573. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Longwill,  5  New  Mex.  308 

(1889),  1025. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Love  Banks  Co.,  73  Ark.  205 

(1904),  398,  874. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.    Mathews,   107    Ky.   663 

(1900),  437,  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Matthews,  24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  3 

(1902),  575. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

McCaul,  115  Tenn.  99  (1905), 

871,  1041. 
Western   Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.  McGuire,    104    Ind.   130 

(1885),  436,  877. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.  McKibben,  114  Ind.  511 

(1887),  1025. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.    McLaurin,  70    Miss.  26 

(1892),  336,  599. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

McMillan  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

30  S.  W.  298  (1895),  862. 


Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Meredith,  95  Ind.  93  (1888), 

980,  1026. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Milton,  53  Fla.  484  (1907), 

1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Mississippi  R.   R.  Commis- 
sion, 74  Miss.  80  (1896),  244, 

814. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Mitchell,  91  Tex.  454  (1898), 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Moore,    12    Ind.    App.    136 

(1894),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Moran  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  113 

S.  W.  625  (1908),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Moseley,  28  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

562  (1902),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Myatt,  98  Fed.  335  (1899), 

1402,  1404. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Neel,  86  Tex.  368  (1894),  874, 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

O'Keefe    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

29     S.     W.     1137     (1895), 

442. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Pendelton,    122    U.    S.    347 

(1886),  1417. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Phillips  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30 

S.  W.  494  (1893),  1026. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Pierce,  170  S.  W.  360  (1902), 

874. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Power,  93  Ga.  543   (1894), 

438. 

[ccxi] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Pratt,   18  Okla.  274  (1907), 

1010. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Price,    137  Ky.   758   (1910), 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Rains,    63   Tex.    27    (1885), 

1025. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.   Rawls  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

62     S.      W.      136     (1901), 

874. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Reynolds  Bros.,  77  Va.  173 

(1883),  133,  348,  1025. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.   Robinson,    97  Tenn.  638 

(1896),  871. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.  Rosentreter,  80  Tex.  406 

(1891),  688. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Rowell    (Ala.),  21    So.    880 

(1910),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Sanders  (Ind.),  79  N.  E.  406 

(1906),  412,  742. 
Western    Union   Telegraph     Co. 

v.     Schockley     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),  122  S.  W.  945  (1909), 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Scircle,  103  Ind.  227  (1885), 

903. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Scott,  27  Ky.  Law  Rep.  975 

(1905),  871,  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Shaw,  40  Tex.  Civ.  App.  277 

(1905),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Short,  53  Ark.  434  (1890),  56, 

133,  980. 

[  ccxii  ] 


Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Shumate,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

429  (1893),  412. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Simmons  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

93   S.  W.    686    (1906),  515, 

520. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30 

S.  W.  937  (1894),  903. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.    Snodgrass,    94    Tex.  284 

(1901),  433,  442. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Sorsby,  29  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

345  (1902),  1017. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

State,   165  Ind.  492  (1905), 

603,  607. 
Western    Union    Telegraph   Co. 

v.    Stevenson,    128    Pa.  St. 

442  (1889),    412,    742,  766, 

1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

State  ex  rel.,  165  Ind.  492 

(1905),  137,  138. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Swearingen,     95    Tex.     420 

(1902),  278,  871,  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Swoveland,  8  Ind.  App.  563 

(1895),  837,  841. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Taylor,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  310 

(1893),  765. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Todd,    22    Ind.    App.    701 

(1899),  412. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Totten,  141  Fed.  533  (1905), 

605. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Trissal,  98  Ind.  566  (1884), 

1041. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Trotter,    55    111.    App.    659 

(1894),  277,  278,  871,  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Turner,  94  Tex.  304  (1901), 

514,  521. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Tyler,  74  111.  168(1874),  1014. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Van   Cleave,    107    Ky.    464 

(1900),  874. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Ward,  23  Ind.   377   (1864), 

841,  851. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Warren  (Tex.),  36  S.  W.  314 

(1896),  437,  765. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Waters,  139  Ala.  652  (1904), 

597. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.  Waxelbaum  Co.,  113  Ga. 

1017  (1901),  412. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.  Way,  83  Ala.  542  (1887), 

1025. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Whitson,  145  Ala.  426  (1906), 

1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Williams,  86  Va.  696  (1890), 

56. 

Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
.      Wilson,  93  Ala.   32  (1890), 

412,  599. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Wingate,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

394  (1894),  874,  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Woods,  56  Kans.  737  (1896), 

1041. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 

v.    Woodward,  84  Ark.  323 

(1907),  348. 


Western;  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Wright    (Ala.),    53    So.    95 

(1910),  1041. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co  v. 

Yopst,  118  Ind.  248  (1889), 

442,  599,  1025. 
Wey  mouth    v.    Penobscot    Log 

Driving    Co.,     71     Me.    29 

(1880),  55,  211. 
Whalen  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  Co., 

108  Md.  11  (1908),  306,  318. 
Whalen  v.  Consolidated  Traction 

Co.,  61  N.  J.  L.  606  (1898), 

932. 
Wheeler,    Matter  of,   62   N.   Y. 

Misc.  37  (1908),  299. 
Wheeler    v.    Northern    Colorado 

Irr.  Co.,  10  Colo.  582  (1887), 

93,  231,  242,  445,  846,  973, 

1249,  1402. 
Whicher  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

176  Mass.  275  (1900),   153, 

769,  975. 
Whitehead  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 

S.    Ry.    Co.,    99    Mo.    263 

(1889),  745,  763. 
White  v.  Ashton,  51  N.  Y.  280 

(1873),  905,  906,  907,  921. 
White  v.  Atlanta  St.  Ry.  Co.,  92 

Ga.  494  (1893),  736. 
White  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  R.  R. 

Co.,  26  W.  Va. 800 (1885), 888. 
White  v.  Evansville  &  T.  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  133  Ind.  480  (1892),  864. 
White  v.  Highline  Canal  &  Ry. 

Co.,  22  Colo.  191  (1886),  852. 
White  v.  Humphery,  11  Q.  B.  43 

(1847),  393,  726. 
White  v.  Kennon  &  Co.,  83  Ga. 

343  (1889),  223. 
White  v.  Mary  Ann,  6  Cal.  462 

(1856),  173,  774. 
White  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

19  Mo.  App.  400  (1885),  723. 
[  ccxiii  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


White  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

115  N.  C.  631  (1894),  935, 

957. 
White  v.  Postal  Telegraph  Co.,  25 

App.  D.  C.  364  (1905),  108, 

255. 
White  v.  Winnisimet  Ferry  Co.,  7 

Gush.  155  (1851),  771,  772, 

767,  972. 
White  Live  Stock  Commission  Co. 

v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  87  Mo.  App.  330  (1900), 

1047. 
White,  W.  &  K.  v.  Western  Union 

Telegraph  Co.,  14  Fed.  710 

(1882),  657,  984. 

Whitehouse  v.  Staten  Island  Wa- 
ter Co.,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  544 

(1905),  280. 
Whiting  v.  Mills,  7  Upp.  Can.  Q. 

B.  450  (1849),  751. 
Whiting  v.  Sheboygan  &  F.  Du 

Lac,  25  Wis.  167  (1870),  807. 
Whitmore  v.  Bowman,  4  Green, 

148  (1853),  182,  241. 
Whitney  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 

H.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  C.  C.  A.  19 

(1900),  784. 
Whitsell  v.  Crane,  8  Watts  &  S. 

369  (1845),  862. 
Whittimore  v.  Haroldson,  2  Lea 

(Tenn.),  312  (1879),  1032. 
Wibert  v.  New  York  &  E.  R.  R. 

Co.,  12  N.Y.  245  (1855),  663, 

914. 
Wichita  Sav.  Bank  v.  Atchison, 

T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Kans. 

519  (1878),  748. 
Wieland  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  1 

Cal.  App.  343   (1905),  763, 

764. 
Wiemer  v.  Louisville  Water  Co., 

130  Fed.   Rep.  251    (1903), 

264. 

[  ccxiv  ] 


Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  East  St. 

Louis  V.  Ry.  Co.,  107  111.  450 

(1883),   188,  258,  262,  792, 

1043. 
Wight  v.  United  States,  167  U.  S. 

512  (1897),  1293,  1312,  1316. 
Wilcox  v.  Durham  &  C.  R.  R.  Co. 

(N.  C.),  67  S.  E.  758  (1910), 

1317. 
Wilcox  v.  San  Antonio  &  A.  Pass. 

R.  R.  Co.,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

487  (1895),  761. 
Wilde    v.    Merchants'    Dispatch 

Co.,  47    Iowa,   247   (1877), 

180. 
Wilder  v.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L.  C. 

Ry.,  66  Vt.  636  (1891),  346, 

394,  431,  723. 
Wilkes-Barre    v.    Spring    Brook 

Water  Co.,  4  Lack.  (Pa.)  Leg. 

News,  367  (1899),  1082, 1087, 

1111,  1138,  1139,  1146,  1166, 

1167. 

Wilkinson  v.  Light,  Heat  &  Wa- 
ter Co.,  78  Miss.  389  (1900), 

350. 
Will  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  3 

App.  Div.  22  (1896),  742. 
Willcox  v.  Consolidated  Gas  Co., 

212  U.  S.   19  (1909),   1063, 

1088,  1096,  1104,  1106,  1124, 

1129,  1201,  1209,  1220,  1430, 

1431. 
Williams  v.  Branson,  1  Murphy, 

417  (1810),  166. 
Williams  v.  Grant,  1  Conn.  487 

(1816),  985. 
Williams  v.  Maysville  Telephone 

Co.,    26   Ky.    L.    Rep.   945 

(1904),  1252. 
Williams  v.  Mutual  Gas  Co.,  52 

Mich.  449  (1884),  1345. 
Williams  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.,  40 

La.  Ann.  87  (1888),  940. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Williams  et  al.  v.  Judge,  45  La. 

Ann.  1295  (1893),  223. 
Williams  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  150  Ala.  324  (1907),  932. 
Williams  v.   Mut.   Gas  Co.,   52 

Mich.  499  (1884),  111,  434, 

877. 
Williams  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  R.  R. 

Co.,  18  Utah,  210  (1898),  784. 
Williams  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car 

Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  417  (1888), 

367. 
Williams    v.    Webb,    22    Misc. 

(N.  Y.)  513  (1898),  769. 
Williams  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R. 

R.,  93  N.  C.  42  (1885),  747. 
Williamson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

R.  Co.,  53  la.  126  (1880),  811. 
Willis  v.  Atlantic  R.  R.  Co.,  120 

N.  C.  508  (1897),  761. 
Willis  v.  McMahan,  89  Cal.  156 

(1891),  106,  551. 
Willock  v.   Pennsylvania  R.   R. 

Co.,  166  Pa.  St.  184  (1895), 

1011. 

Wilmington  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
mington,   etc.,    Ry.    Co.,    8 

Del.  Ch.  468  (1900),  693. 
Wilsey  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,    83    Ky.    511    (1886), 

887. 
Wilson  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  27 

Mo.  App.  360  (1887),  1049. 
Wilson  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

129  Fed.  774  (1904),  259,  755, 

772. 
Wilson  v.   Atlanta  &   Charlotte 

Ry.  Co.,  82  Ga.  386  (1889), 

399,  729. 
Wilson  v.  California  Central  Ry. 

Co.,  94  Cal.  166  (1892),  1037. 
Wilson  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  R.  R. 

Co.,    21    Gratt.    (Va.)    654 

(1872),  875. 


Wilson  v.  Hamilton,  4  Ohio  St. 

722  (1855),  182,  241,  771. 
Wilson  v.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R. 

R.  Co.,  63  Miss.  352  (1885), 

872,  904. 
Wilson  v.  Platt,  84  N.  Y.  Supp. 

143  (1903),  1003. 
Wilson  v.  Telegram  Co.,  18  N.  Y. 

State  Rep.  78  (1888),  494. 
Wilson  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v. 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  71 

Mo.  203  (1879),  1048. 
Wilson   Water   &   Elec.    Co.    v. 

Arkadelphia,  129  S.  W.  1091 

(1910),  825,  1251. 
Wilterding  v.  Green,  4  Ida.  773 

(1896),  93,  384. 
Wilton  v.  Middlesex  R.  R.  Co., 

107  Mass.  108  (1871),  745. 
Wilton  v.  Middlesex  R.  R.  Co., 

125  Mass.  130  (1878),  785. 
Winchester  &  S.  R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Commonwealth,  106  Va.  264 

(1906),  740,  836. 
Winchester  &c.   Turnpike   Road 

Co.  v.  Croxton,  98  Ky.  739 

(1898),  75,  241. 
Windsor  Glass  Co.  v.  Carnegie 

Co.,  204  Pa.  St.  (1903),  129. 
Wing  v.  New  York,  etc.,  Ry.  Co., 

1  Hilton  (N.  Y.  C.  P.),  235, 

920. 
Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Blake,  94  U.  S.  180  (1876), 

1427. 
Winslow  v.  Vermont  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  42  Vt.  700  (1870),  1049. 
Wintermute  v.  Clarke,  5  Sandf. 

242  (1851),  240,  263,  1032. 
Winters  v.   Cowen,   90  Fed.  99 

(1898),  874. 
Wisconsin,  M.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Jacobson,  179  U.  S.  287 

(1900),  525,  698,  1434. 

[  ccxv  ] 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Wise  v.  Ackerman,  76  Md.  375 

(1892),  193. 
Wise  v.  Covington  &  C.  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  91  Ky.  537  (1891),  939. 
Wiser  v.   Chesley,   53   Mo.   547 

(1873),  970. 
Withey  v.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R. 

Co.,  141  Mich.  412  (1905), 

341. 
Woas  v.  St.  Louis  Transit  Co., 

198  Mo.  664  (1906),  941,  944. 
Wolf  v.  Express  Co.,  43  Mo.  421 

(1869),  916. 

Wolf    v.    Western    Union    Tele- 
graph   Co.,    62   Pa.    St.    83 

(1869),  1025,  1026. 
Wolf  Brothers  v.  Allegheny  Val- 
ley R.  R.  Co.,  7  I.  C.  C.  Rep. 

40  (1897),  1237. 
Wood  v.  City  of  Auburn,  87  Me. 

287  (1895),  451,  458,  460. 
Wood  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,    68   Iowa,   491    (1886), 

833,  922. 
Wood  v.  Crocker,   18  Wis.  345 

(1864),  1037. 
Woods   v.    Devlin,    13    111.    746 

(1852),  724,  875,  971. 
Wood  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co., 

101  Ky.  703  (1897),  848,  849. 
Wood  v.  Maine  Central  Ry.  Co., 

98  Me.  98  (1903),  875. 
Wood  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  27  Wis.  541  (1871),  1033. 
Wood  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  118 

N.  C.  1056  (1896),  1026. 
Woodruff  v.  Havemeyer,  106  N. 

Y.  129  (1887),  232. 
Woodruff  S.  &  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Diehl, 

84  Ind.  474  (1882),  153,  975. 
Woodward  v.  Birch,  4  Bush,  510 

(1869),  979. 
Woodworth  v.  Morse,  18  La.  Ann. 

156  (1866),  965. 

[  ccxvi  ] 


Woolsey  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

R.  Co.,  39  Neb.  798  (1894), 

745,  761. 
Wright  v.  Caldwell,  3  Mich.  51 

(1853),  409,  733. 
Wright  v.  California  Central  Ry. 

Co.,    78    Cal.     360    (1889), 

862. 
Wright  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

Co.,  4  Colo.  App.  102  (1893), 

944. 
Wright  v.  Glen  Telephone  Co., 

112  App.   Div.  745   (1906), 

826. 
Wright  &  C.  Co.  v.  Warren,  177 

Mass.  283  (1901),  1045. 
Wright  v.  Northampton  &  H.  R. 

R.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  852  (1898), 

783. 
Wright  v.  Platte  Valley  Irr.  Co., 

27  Colo.  322  (1900),  384. 
Wright  v.  United  States,  167  U. 

S.  512  (1897),  681. 
Wyckoff  v.  Queen's  County  Ferry 

Co.,  52  N.  Y.  32  (1873),  182, 

241,  771. 
Wyld  v.  Pickford,  8  M.  &  W.  443 

(1841),  431. 
Wyman  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.,  14  Mo.  App.  35  (1877), 

181. 
Wyman  v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,   34  Minn.   210   (1885), 

1044. 
Wynn  v.  City  &  Suburban  Ry. 

Co.  of  Savannah,  91  Ga.  344 

(1893),  738. 
Wynn  v.  Georgia  Ry.  &  El.  Co., 

6  Ga.  App.  77  (1909),  439, 

877. 

X 

Xenia  Real  Estate  Co.  v.  Macy, 
147  Ind.  568  (1896),  458. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED 


[References  are  to  sections] 


Yancey  v.  Batesville  Telephone 

Co.,    81    Ark.     487    (1907), 

435. 
Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blum 

Co.,  88  Miss.  180  (1906),  662, 

664,  801,  803,  914. 
Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Kay,  91   Miss.    138   (1907), 

799. 
Yazoo  &  M.  V.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Searles,  85  Miss.  520  (1904), 

130,  448,  1050. 
Yazoo  &  M.  V.   R.   R.   Co.  v. 

White,  82  Miss.  120  (1903), 

410. 
Yellow  River  Improvement  Co.  v. 

Wood  County,  81  Wis.  554 

(1892),  72. 
Yeomans  v.  Contra  C.  S.  Nav. 

Co.,  44  Cal.  71  (1872),  778. 
Yerkes   v.    Sabin,    97    Ind.    141 

(1884),  771. 
Yoakum  v.   Dryden   (Tex.   Civ. 

App.),  26  S.  W.  312  (1894), 

399,  409,  721,  729,  730. 
York  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  3 

Wall.  107  (1865),  1007. 
York  &  N.  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reg.,  1 

EL  &B1.  858  (1853),  304. 
Yorton  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  54  Wis.  234  (1882), 

890. 
Youghiogheny  &  Ohio  Coal  Co.  v. 

Erie  Ry.  Co.  et  al.,  24  Ohio 

Civ.  Ct.  289  (1902),  98,  689. 
Youmans   v.    Wabash    Ry.    Co. 

(Mo.  App.),  127  S.  W.  959 

(1910),  745. 


Young  v.  Boston,  104  Mass.  95 

(1870),  380. 
Young  v.   Buckingham,  5  Ohio, 

485  (1832),  53,  241. 
Young  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co., 

120  Ga.  25  (1904),  441,  885. 
Young,  Ex  parte,  209  U.  S.  123 

(1908),  1406. 

Young  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  34  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  390  (1872),  1025. 
Younger  v.  Judah,  111  Mo.  303 

(1892),  565. 


Zackery  v.  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  R. 

Co.,    75    Miss.    751    (1898), 

572,  635,  637,  746. 
Zagelmeyer  v.  Cincinnati,  S.  &  M. 

R.  R.  Co.,   102  Mich.  214. 

887. 
Zanesville  v.  Gas  Light  Co.,  47 

Ohio  St.  1  (1889),  31,  111. 
Zehren  v.  Milwaukee  Electric  Ry. 

Co.,  99  Wis.  83  (1898),  192. 
Zenobia,  The,   1  Abb.  Adm.  48 

(1847),  183. 
Zimmer  v.  New  York  Central  & 

H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  137  N.  Y. 

460  (1893),  1019. 
Zinn  v.  New  Jersey  Stb.  Co.,  49 

N.  Y.  442  (1872),  1038. 
Zircle  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  102 

Va.  17  (1903),  225. 
Zollinger  v.  The  Emma,  Fed.  Gas. 

No.  18,218  (1876),  971. 
Zouch  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  36  W.  Va.  524  (1892), 

1002,  1019,  1021. 


[  ccxvii 


PUBLIC    SERVICE 
/        CORPORATIONS 

CHAPTER  I 

HISTORICAL   INTRODUCTION 

§    1.  Public  callings  and  private  business. 

Topic  A .  The  Mediaeval  Policy  of  Regulation 
§    2.  The  mediaeval  theory  of  State  control. 

3.  The  regulation  of  business  in  the  middle  ages. 

4.  Early  differentiation  of  the  public  service  law. 

5.  Examination  of  the  early  public  employments. 

6.  The  surgeon. 

7.  The  tailor. 

8.  The  smith. 

9.  The  victualer. 

10.  The  baker. 

11.  The  miller. 

12.  The  innkeeper. 

13.  The  carrier. 

14.  The  ferryman. 

15.  The  wharfinger. 

Topic  B.  Persistence  of  this  Police  Power 
§  16.  Continuance  of  state  regulation. 

17.  Parliamentary  regulation  of  rates. 

18.  Restriction  of  prices  in  the  colonies. 

19.  Persistence  of  the  legislative  power. 

20.  Survival  of  the  common  law. 

21.  Callings  connected  with  transportation. 

22.  Introduction  of  improved  highways. 

23.  Toll  bridges. 

24.  Turnpikes. 

25.  Canals. 

26.  Railways. 

1  [1] 


§  1  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Topic  C.  The  Period  of  Laissez  Faire 
§  27.  Alteration  in  economic  conditions. 

28.  Development  in  the  common  law. 

29.  Freedom  of  business  from  State  control. 

30.  Special  restrictions  in  early  charters. 

31.  Gas  supply. 

32.  Water  supply. 

33.  The  struggle  against  encroaching  monopoly. 

34.  Conservative  and  radical  views  of  regulation. 

Topic  D.  Present  Control  of  Public  Employment 
§  35.  Economic  conditions  at  the  present  time. 

36.  Control  of  the  public  services  necessary. 

37.  Variety  of  the  public  services. 

38.  Differentiation  of  the  public  service  law. 

39.  Unity  of  the  public  service  law. 

40.  Present  development  of  the  public  service  law. 

41.  Imperative  need  of  effective  regulation. 

42.  Ultimate  limitations  upon  public  employment. 


§  1.  Public  callings  and  private  business. 

The  difference  between  public  callings  and  private 
business  is  a  distinction  in  the  law  governing  business  re- 
lations which  has  always  had  and  will  always  have  most 
important  consequences.  Those  in  a  public  calling  have 
always  been  under  the  extraordinary  duty  to  serve  all 
comers,  while  those  in  a  private  business  may  always 
refuse  to  sell  if  they  please.  So  great  a  distinction  as  this 
constitutes  a  difference  in  kind  of  legal  control  rather 
than  merely  one  of  degree.  The  causes  of  this  division 
are,  of  course,  rather  economic  than  strictly  legal;  and 
the  relative  importance  of  these  two  classes  at  any  given 
time,  therefore,  depends  ultimately  upon  the  industrial 
conditions  which  prevail  at  that  period.  Thus  in  the 
England  which  we  see  through  the  medium  of  our  earliest 
law  reports  the  mediaeval  system  of  established  monopo- 
lies called  for  the  legal  requirement  of  indiscriminate  serv- 
ice from  those  engaged  in  almost  all  employments.  There 
followed  in  succeeding  centuries  an  expansion  of  trade 
[2] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  2 

which  gradually  did  away  with  the  necessity  for  coercive 
law.  Indeed  in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
free  competition  became  the  very  basis  of  the  social  or- 
ganization, with  the  consequence  that  the  recognition 
of  the  public  callings  as  a  class  almost  ceased.  It  is  only 
in  very  recent  years  that  it  has  again  come  to  be  recog- 
nized that  the  process  of  free  competition  fails  in  some 
cases  to  secure  the  public  good;  and  it  has  been  reluc- 
tantly admitted  that  State  control  is  again  necessary  over 
such  lines  of  industry  as  are  affected  with  a  public  in- 
terest. Thus  with  varying  importance  the  distinction 
between  the  public  callings  and  the  private  callings  has 
been  present  in  our  law  from  the  earliest  times  to  the 
present  day.  The  common  law  requiring  public  service 
from  those  who  profess  a  public  calling  has  been  ready  to 
deal  with  every  public  employment  at  the  instant  of  its 
recognition  as  such,  for  the  protection  of  the  whole 
people  so  far  as  it  was  generally  felt  that  such  protection 
was  necessary. 

Topic  A.     The  Mediceval  Policy  of  Regulation 

§  2.  The  mediaeval  theory  of  State  control. 

The  mediaeval  system  involved  almost  universal  reg- 
ulation of  all  the  doings  of  men,  and  therefore  its  com- 
mercial policy  was  almost  completely  restrictive.  The 
ideal  held  was  a  society  in  which  all  things  were  ordered, 
the  full  conception  being  that  every  man  had  a  right  to 
his  place  in  this  established  order.  This  state  of  affairs 
was  by  most  men  greatly  desired.  Indeed,  a  regulated 
monopoly  with  the  corresponding  obligation  of  public 
service  seemed  in  that  age  to  the  great  majority  of  people 
far  better  than  an  unregulated  competition  without  pub- 
lic obligation.  It  was  thought  that  things  were  put  in  a 
true  balance  by  requiring  each  person  to  perform  his  part 
and  allowing  no  person  to  interfere  with  the  employment 

[3] 


§  3  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

of  another.  And  all  of  this  control  of  industrial  affairs 
was  felt  to  be  ultimately  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  pub- 
lic who  could  obtain  thereby  without  favor  at  reasonable 
prices  proper  service  in  accordance  with  their  require- 
ments. In  this  industrial  regulation  it  has  been  well  said 
that  the  medieval  system  was  a  consumer's  policy  far 
more  than  it  was  a  producer's  policy. 

§  3.  The  regulation  of  business  in  the  middle  ages. 

In  mediaeval  England  this  thorough  system  of  State 
control  reached  a  high  state  of  development.  Most  of 
the  trades  in  the  towns  were  parceled  out  to  the  gilds. 
Under  this  system  the  services  to  be  rendered  to  the 
public  in  the  trades  were  governed  by  gild  codes.  These 
by-laws  were  continually  declared  void  by  the  local 
courts  if  they  were  really  inconsistent  with  public  serv- 
ice. In  the  country  at  the  same  time  there  were  to  be 
met  similar  privileges  in  carrying  on  business  in  connec- 
tion with  the  manorial  system.  Some  business  required 
the  investment  of  more  or  less  capital  in  constructing  a 
plant,  as  the  bakehouse  and  the  mill.  It  may  have  been 
necessary  at  the  outset  that  these  should  be  provided  by 
the  lord  of  the  manor;  at  all  events  in  later  times  the 
seignorial  ban  covered  these,  the  lord  granting  franchises 
to  certain  persons.  Here  again  those  who  conducted 
these  businesses  were  bound  to  serve  all  fairly  or  answer 
for  it  to  the  courts  of  the  manor.  But,  upon  the  whole, 
the  ordinary  trades  and  crafts  were  more  freely  open  to 
anyone  in  the  country  than  in  the  towns,  with  their 
craft  gilds  and  merchant  gilds.  This  may  explain  why 
the  cases  requiring  public  service  of  carriers  and  inn- 
keepers, ferrymen  and  farriers,  appear  so  early  in  the 
royal  courts;  for  there  were  no  local  courts  with 
clear  jurisdiction  over  the  lines  of  travel  across  the 
country. 
[4] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §§  4,  5 

§  4.  Early  differentiation  of  the  public  service  law. 

Thus  there  is  to  be  found  from  the  earliest  times  a  pe- 
culiar law  governing  the  conduct  of  those  engaged  in  a 
public  employment.  The  characteristic  thing  then  as 
now  was  the  legal  imposition  of  an  affirmative  duty  of 
proper  actions  upon  those  who  openly  professed  a  public 
employment,  while  those  who  carried  on  private  business 
were  under  practically  no  duties  which  were  not  purely 
negative  in  character.  This  general  distinction  between 
the  legal  obligations  of  those  in  public  calling  and  in 
private  business  was  often  of  the  utmost  importance  in 
our  early  common  law.  Indeed,  whether  the  defendant 
was  in  common  employment  or  not,  made  more  dif- 
ference in  the  success  of  a  plaintiff's  action  or  its  failure 
than  it  does  to-day.  In  those  days  contract  law  was  so 
undeveloped  that  in  an  ordinary  business  one  could  not 
be  held  to  his  bargains,  yet  at  that  time  in  a  public  calling 
one  was  held  to  the  public  undertaking  he  made  to  serve 
all  that  might  apply.  So,  too,  while  the  law  of  tort  as 
yet  gave  no  remedy  against  one  for  negligent  injury  to 
property  voluntarily  intrusted  to  him  in  the  course  of 
ordinary  business,  in  public  employment  one  was  answer- 
able for  failing  to  use  proper  skill  in  the  calling  he  had 
assumed.  However  obsolete  this  substantive  law  may 
be  as  to  private  business,  the  subsequent  developments 
in  the  law  in  no  manner  affect  the  force  of  these  decisions 
in  establishing  the  fundamental  difference  in  legal  sit- 
uation between  those  engaged  in  public  employment  and 
those  in  private  business. 

§  5.  Examination  of  the  early  public  employments. 

The  modern  law  governing  public  employments  may 
therefore  be  said  to  be  a  survival  of  a  more  generally 
applicable  principle  of  the  mediaeval  law.  It  will  be  in- 
structive with  this  in  view  to  examine  some  of  the  early 

[5] 


§  6  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

applications  of  the  mediaeval  law  which  depend  upon 
the  recognition  of  the  common  calling  as  presenting  dif- 
ferent conditions,  and  make  plain,  therefore,  the  neces- 
sity for  this  further  law.  It  will  be  seen  then  that  the 
law  which  suffices  for  ordinary  business  is  never  enough 
for  these  extraordinary  callings.  Moreover,  in  these 
earliest  examples  there  are  certain  elements  in  the  situa- 
tion which  are  so  characteristic  that  the  realization  of 
them  should  lead  to  some  conception  of  the  inherent 
character  of  the  public  employment  and  the  special  law 
necessary  for  its  regulation.  These  principles  of  our 
common  law  are  for  all  time.  It  would  be  too  much  to 
expect  to  see  the  law  finally  settled  in  those  times,  to 
find  modern  aspects  of  the  problem  altogether  antici- 
pated. But  one  may  discover  in  these  early  cases  the 
essential  factors  in  the  establishment  of  public  calling, 
and  the  first  principles  involved  in  the  law  governing 
public  employment. 

§  6.  The  surgeon. 

The  case  dealing  with  the  common  surgeon  most  often 
cited  is  an  anonymous  suit  in  1441. l  This  was  a  writ  of 
trespass  on  the  case  against  one  R.,  a  veterinary  surgeon, 
to  the  effect  that  the  defendant  had  undertaken  to  cure 
the  plaintiff's  horse  with  skill  and  care  of  a  certain  trouble, 
and  that  he  then  so  negligently  and  carelessly  gave  his 
medicines  that  the  horse  died.  But  Judge  Paston  said: 
"You  have  not  shown  that  he  is  a  common  surgeon  to 
cure  such  horses,  and  therefore  although  he  has  killed 
your  horse  by  his  medicines,  you  shall  have  no  action 
against  him  without  an  assumpsit."  The  court  accord- 
ingly decided  that  a  traverse  of  the  assumpsit  made  a 

1  Y.  B.  19  Hen.  VI,  49,  pi.  5.  11  Ed.  IV,  6,  pi.  10;  1  Roll.  Abr.  10, 

See  also  Y.  B.  43  Ed.  Ill,  6,  pi.      pi.  5. 
11;  Y.  B.  3  Hen.  VI,  36,  pi.  33;  Y.  B. 

[6] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  7 

good  issue.  The  significance  of  an  actual  assumpsit  in 
those  days,  as  has  just  been  pointed  out,  was  that  when 
one  man  had  authorized  another  to  deal  with  personal 
property  in  the  course  of  private  business,  the  latter  was 
under  no  legal  liability  to  use  care,  unless  he  had  made 
an  express  undertaking  to  that  effect  and  entered  upon 
the  performance  of  it.  In  public  business,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  legal  obligation  to  perform  the  act  with  proper 
skill  in  accordance  with  the  public  profession  was  well 
established.  From  other  cases  it  is  plain  that  the  curing 
of  man  or  beast  was  considered  a  public  calling.  In  the 
rude  England  of  these  unlettered  times  such  professional 
men  were  comparatively  few.  Frequently  only  one  sur- 
geon would  be  at  hand  in  any  one  district,  so  that  if  he 
should  refuse  his  services,  all  might  be  lost.  Such  being 
the  situation  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  the  law  was 
so  stern  in  the  case  of  the  common  doctor,  requiring 
him  to  cure  all  who  came  by  reason  of  his  general  pro- 
fession and  giving  the  patient  an  action,  although  he  had 
submitted  himself  to  the  operation,  if  the  doctor  was  neg- 
ligent, although  no  care  had  been  promised  in  the  par- 
ticular case.  It  was  the  unusual  situation  which  pro- 
duced this  extraordinary  law.  To-day,  however,  there 
are  so  many  physicians  in  most  communities  that  the 
law  apparently  no  longer  deems  it  necessary  to  compel 
them  to  accept  any  patient  who  may  call  upon  them.1 

§  7.  The  taUor. 

Some  light  upon  the  position  of  the  mediaeval  tailor  be- 
fore the  law  we  obtain  from  an  opinion  of  the  great  Brian: 
"I  know  well,  if  I  put  a  robe  with  a  tailor  to  be  made, 
(or  if  I  come  to  a  common  inn  or  a  common  smith  with  my 
horse)  in  all  cases  of  the  sort  I  may  have  my  robe  lying  in 

1  Hurley  v.  Eddingfield,  156  Ind.      416,  59  N.  E.  1058,  53  L.  R.  A.  135, 

83  Am.  St.  Rep.  198  (1901). 

[7] 


§  8  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  tailor's  shop  as  long  as  I  please  (without  its  being  sub- 
ject to  distraint) ;  for  he  is  compelled  by  the  law  to  do  it, 
and  he  may  by  the  law  detain  until  he  be  satisfied  for  the 
making."  l  It  is  rather  difficult  at  present  to  imagine  a 
state  of  society  where  there  was  not  competition  enough 
among  tailors.  Still,  the  time  was  when  this  most  neces- 
sary calling  was  followed  by  so  few  comparatively,  that 
for  the  protection  of  the  public  coercive  law  was  deemed 
necessary.  But  in  this  calling  there  has  been  lively  com- 
petition for  so  long  that  the  tailor  at  a  very  early  time 
dropped  from  the  list  of  public  callings,  and  is  mentioned 
in  the  books  no  more  as  a  member  of  this  exceptional 
class  of  public  servants. 

§  8.  The  smith. 

Another  instance  is  shown  in  an  anonymous  memoran- 
dum of  1450.2  "Note  that  it  was  agreed  by  all  the  court 
that  where  a  smith  declines  to  shoe  my  horse,  or  an  inn- 
keeper refuses  to  give  me  entertainment  at  his  inn,  I  shall 
have  an  action  on  the  case,  notwithstanding  no  act  is  done; 
for  it  does  not  depend  upon  agreement.  But  where  a 
builder  makes  a  bargain  to  build  me  a  house  and  does 
nothing,  no  action  on  the  case,  because  that  does  sound  in 
agreement."  The  meaning  of  this  is  that  in  those  days 
no  action  lay  upon  a  mere  bargain  and  even  the  promisor 
in  a  contract  need  not  perform;  but  one  who  undertook  a 
public  employment  must  perform,  whether  he  agreed  or 
not.  Here  again  the  obligation  resting  upon  those  in  com- 
mon callings  to  serve  all  that  apply  is  the  basis  of  the  case. 
Why  is  this  entire  distinction  made  between  the  wayside 
smith  and  the  journeyman  carpenter?  Because  again  the 
economic  conditions  of  these  trades  were  so  different. 

1  Y.  B.  22  Ed.  IV,  49,  pi.  15.  19;  Y.  B.  2  Ed.  IV,  13,  pi.  9;  Y.  B. 

2  Anon,  Keilway,  50,  pi.  4.  22  Ed.  IV,  9,  pi.  15;  Y.  B.  21  Hen. 
See  also  Y.  B.  46  Ed.  Ill,  19,  pi.      VI,  55,  pi.  12. 

[8] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  9 

So  far  apart  were  they  in  the  eyes  of  the  courts,  that  the 
ordinary  law  was  protection  enough  for  those  that  dealt 
with  the  carpenter,  while  an  extraordinary  law  was  needed 
in  behalf  of  those  that  came  to  the  smith.  There  is  time 
enough  in  getting  at  builders  to  make  the  situtation  in 
that  business  one  of  virtual  competition,  so  that  there 
would  be  no  hardship  in  leaving  builders  free  to  bargain; 
but  the  farriers  were  so  scattered  that  those  who  required 
their  service  immediately,  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  par- 
ticular one  at  hand.  A  special  code,  therefore,  was  neces- 
sary else  a  good  horse  might  be  ruined  for  want  of  a  shoe, 
if  the  wayside  smith  should  take  it  into  his  head  to  refuse 
service.  Under  modern  conditions  of  trade,  however,  the 
public  need  is  not  so  imperative  as  to  keep  the  blacksmith 
in  the  class  of  public  servants.1 

§  9.  The  victualer. 

There  was  a  time  also  when  common  victualers  were 
strictly  regulated  by  common  law.  The  regular  purveying 
of  food  and  drink  to  the  local  public  was  felt  to  be  of  as 
much  importance  as  the  proper  entertainment  of  the 
traveling  public  at  the  established  inns.  In  a  leading 
case  in  1460  2  Judge  Moill  treated  these  two  callings  as 
analogous.  "  If  I  come  to  an  innkeeper  to  lodge  with  him, 
and  he  will  not  lodge  me,  I  shall  have  on  my  case  an  action 
of  trespass  against  him;  and  in  the  same  way  if  I  come  to 
a  victualer  to  buy  victual  and  he  will  not  sell,  I  shall  have 
an  action  of  trespass  on  my  case  against  him."  Without 
such  regulation  it  was  felt  that  there  might  be  oppressive 
treatment  as  the  need  of  the  purchaser  was  usually  imme- 
diate and  his  market  limited  in  many  ways  by  the  eco- 
nomic conditions  of  early  trade.  And  to  the  strictness 

1  Bessette  v.  People,  193  111.  334,          *  Y.  B.  39  Hen.  VI,  18,  pi.  24. 
62  N.   E.    215,    56  L.    R.   A.   558         See  also  Y.  B.  10  Hen.  VII,  8, 
(1905).  pi.  14. 

[9] 


§§  10,  11  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

with  which  the  sale  of  such  necessities  of  life  as  bread  and 
beer  were  regulated  innumerable  assizes  bear  witness.  A 
certain  police  power  is  still  exercised  to-day  over  these 
matters,  but  beyond  this  even  those  selling  the  most 
necessary  food  may  refuse  to  sell  to  any  person;  a  baker 
may  refuse  to  sell  bread  to  a  starving  man  who  tenders 
payment,  so  far  as  the  modern  law  goes. l  This  is  only  to 
be  explained  on  the  ground  that  there  is  now  usually 
sufficient  competition  among  dealers,  so  that  a  case  of 
the  refusal  of  a  cash  buyer  can  hardly  be  imagined.  Even 
so  a  man  turned  away  can  usually  find  another  shop 
near  by. 

§  10.  The  baker. 

In  the  manorial  economy  the  baker  had  his  established 
place  and  was  obliged  therefore  to  supply  his  patrons  upon 
reasonable  terms,  his  rights  being  recognized  and  his 
obligations  being  enforced  in  the  seignioral  courts.  Even 
after  the  business  of  baking  became  enfranchised  by  the 
breaking  up  of  the  mediaeval  system,  the  bakers  at  hand 
in  any  community  had  still  such  control  of  their  local 
patronage  as  to  make  their  continued  regulation  seem 
still  necessary.  Thus  we  have  the  assize  of  bread  a  regu- 
lar part  of  the  royal  eyres  2  indeed  the  assize  of  bread  was 
defended  as  late  as  the  nineteenth  century  in  an  Alabama 
case.3 

§  11.  The  miller. 

The  early  history  of  the  gristmill  is  of  the  same  tenor. 
Milling  was  originally  a  franchise  in  the  manor  and  sub- 

1  See  Brewster  v.  Miller,  101  Ky.  the  same  principle  is  founded  the 
368,  41  S.  W.  301,  38  L.  R.  A.  505  control  which   the  legislature  has 
(1897).  always  exercised  in  the  establish- 

2  See  for  a  typical  instance,  Lib.  ment  and  regulation  of  mills,  fer- 
Assis.  138,  pi.  44.  ries,   bridges,   turnpike  roads,  and 

3  Mayor  '  v.   Yuille,   3    Ala.    137  other  kindred  subjects." 
(1841),  in  which  it  is  said:  "Upon 

[101 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  12 

ject  therefore  to  seignioral  regulation.1  As  the  miller  had 
the  exclusive  franchise,  he  was  considered  bound  to  be 
ready  to  grind  corn  for  all  comers  at  reasonable  rates  and 
without  discrimination.  After  these  conditions  changed 
the  established  mill  still  retained  its  virtual  monopoly 
over  its  local  district  and  the  miller  was  bound  now  by  the 
common  law  to  grind  for  all  in  rotation.  Indeed  it  remains 
law  to  this  day,  that  the  public  miller  is  in  common  calling 
bound  to  serve  all  without  discrimination.2 

§  12.  The  innkeeper. 

Innkeeping  has  been  regarded  as  a  public  employment 
from  time  immemorial.  In  all  the  cases  from  the  time  of 
our  earliest  reports  the  right  of  the  traveler  to  entertain- 
ment at  the  common  inn  is  affirmed.  Hingham  has  many 
cases  to  support  him  when  he  says  arguing  in  an  early 
case,3  "If  I  come  to  an  innkeeper  and  pray  to  be  lodged 
with  him,  and  he  says  that  at  that  time  he  will  not,  but 
if  I  come  at  another  time  he  will  with  pleasure,  I  shall 
have  an  action  on  my  case  because  it  was  his  duty  to  lodge 
me,  and  by  law  he  was  bound  to  do  it."  The  surrounding 
circumstances  must  again  explain  the  origin  of  this  un- 
usual law.  The  whole  system  of  travel  and  communica- 
tion in  rural  England  at  the  time  the  law  of  inns  was  in  the 
making  required  that  the  weary  traveler  should  find  at 
convenient  places  beside  the  highway  houses  of  entertain- 
ment and  shelter  to  which  he  might  resort  during  his 
journey  for  food,  rest  and  protection.  The  ordinary  laws 
of  supply  and  demand  might  indeed  lead  to  the  establish- 
ment of  such  houses  by  the  roadside  at  places  which 
would  sufficiently  serve  the  public  convenience;  but  those 

1  See  Hix  v.  Gardner,  2  Bulstrode     p.  8;  Y.  B.  22  Hen.  VI,  21,  pi.  38; 
(Eng.),  195.  Y.  B.  22  Ed.  IV,  49,  pi.  15;  Y.  B. 

2  See  cases  cited  §  71,  infra.  10  Hen.  VII,  8,  pi.  14;  Keilway,  50, 

3  Y.  B.  14  Hen.  VII,  22,  pi.  4.  pi.  4;  Rex  v.  Collins,  Palmer,  373; 
See  also  Y.  B.  11  Hen.  IV,  45,      Anonymous,  Godbolt,  345. 

[11] 


§  13  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

laws  could  not  be  trusted  to  secure  to  each  individual  the 
benefit  of  the  food  and  shelter  therein  provided.  In  a 
matter  of  such  importance  the  public  had  an  interest  and 
the  law  must  see  that,  so  far  as  was  consistent  with 
justice  to  the  innkeeper,  his  inn  was  carried  on  for  the 
benefit  of  the  whole  public.  The  inn  has  always  been  in 
a  true  sense  a  public  house.1 

§  13.  The  carrier. 

From  the  earliest  times  also,  it  has  been  agreed  that 
the  common  carrier  of  goods  is  in  a  public  employment. 
A  statement  of  the  early  law  is  to  be  found  in  one  of  the 
leading  cases  on  carriers,  Jackson  v.  Rogers,2  "This  was 
an  action  on  the  case  for  that  whereas  defendant  is  a 
common  carrier  from  London  to  Lymmington  et  abinde 
retrorsum,  setting  forth  as  the  custom  of  England,  that  he 
is  bound  to  carry  goods,  and  that  the  plaintiff  brought 
him  such  a  pack,  he  refused  to  carry  them,  though  offered 
his  hire.  And  held  by  JEFFRIES,  C.  J.,  that  the  action  is 
maintainable,  as  well  as  it  is  against  an  innkeeper  for 
refusing  a  guest,  or  a  smith  on  the  road  who  refuses  to 
shoe  my  horse,  being  tendered  satisfaction  for  the  same. 
Note,  that  it  was  alleged  and  proved  that  he  had  conven- 
ience to  carry  the  same;  and  the  plaintiff  had  a  verdict." 
Again  the  explanation  must  be  sought  in  the  history  of 
the  times.  In  Plantagenet  England  the  population  lived 
apart  in  separate  communities.  Small  attention  was  paid 
to  the  roads  connecting  them  which  were  no  more  than 
trails  winding  through  the  wilderness.  No  cart  could 
pass  over  them,  only  pack  animals  with  the  goods  in  their 
panniers.  So  many  were  the  bands  of  outlaws  in  the 

1  See  the  modern  cases  in  §  121,  See  also  Rich  v.  Kneeland,  Hob. 
infra.  17;   Kenrig   v.   Eggleston,   Al.   93; 

2  2  Show.  327  (1683).    The  whole  Nicholls  v.  More,  1  Sid.  36;  Moree 
report  of  this  case  is  included  in  the  v.  Slue,  1  Vent.  190. 

quotation  which  follows. 

[12] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION          [  §§  14,  15 

greenwood  that  no  man  might  with  safety  traverse  these 
paths  alone.  The  transportation  of  goods  was,  therefore, 
given  over  to  the  carrier,  who  traveled  oftentimes  with 
trains  of  pack  animals,  and  a  considerable  company. 
Few  would  pass  over  the  same  roads  between  the  same 
towns,  because  the  traffic  was  still  comparatively  small, 
as  England  had  as  yet  but  little  beyond  a  local  economy 
where  each  community  was  sufficient  to  itself,  into  a 
national  economy  which  involved  interchanges  of  goods 
between  distant  markets.  The  conditions  surrounding 
transportation,  therefore,  were  those  of  virtual  monopoly. 
The  merchant  must  appeal  to  the  protection  of  the  law, 
a  protection  without  which  he  was  at  the  mercy  of  the 
carrier  with  whom  circumstances  forced  him  to  deal  with- 
out a  chance  for  choice.1 

§  14.  The  ferryman. 

Ferrymen  are  found  in  public  employment  in  our  early 
reports.  Their  necessity  in  maintaining  through  routes 
of  travel  was  most  obvious  in  England  with  its  coast  so 
indented  with  estuaries  and  its  many  rivers  sufficiently 
large  to  make  bridging  in  those  times  a  financial,  if  not 
an  engineering  impossibility.  Apparently  the  most  of  the 
early  cases  in  regard  to  them  had  to  do  with  the  exclusive 
franchise  which  they  almost  invariably  possessed,  although 
there  are  a  few  in  relation  to  their  duties.  In  one  of  these2 
it  was  said  that  a  ferryman  who  invited  business  was  liable 
in  tort  if  he  overloaded  his  boat  whereby  a  passenger's 
horse  was  drowned.3 

§  15.  The  wharfinger. 

In  a  commercial  port  those  who  own  the  convenient 
sites  for  wharfage  upon  deep  water  possess  a  peculiar 

1  See  the  modern   cases,  §§  189,          *  Y.  B.  22,  Lib.  Ass.  94,  pi.  41. 
234,  passim, 

[13] 


§  16  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

advantage.  It  was  of  such  wharfinger  that  Lord  Hale  in 
his  De  Portibus  Man's  1  wrote  the  most  famous  paragraph 
in  the  whole  law  relating  to  public  service.  It  is  there 
that  he  says  that  whenever  the  king  or  a  subject  have  a 
public  wharf  to  which  all  persons  must  come  who  come  to 
that  port  to  unload  their  goods — "in  that  case  there 
cannot  be  taken  arbitrary  and  excessive  duties  for  cranage, 
wharfage,  etc.,  but  the  duties  must  be  reasonable  and 
moderate,  for  now  the  wharf  and  crane  and  other  con- 
veniences are  affected  with  a  public  interest  and  they 
cease  to  be  juris  private  only."  2  No  more  significant 
phrases  were  ever  penned. 

Topic  B.    Persistence  of  this  Police  Power 

§16.  Continuance  of  State  regulation. 

The  irresistible  advances  of  the  modern  competitive 
system  gradually  worked  the  destruction  of  the  mediaeval 
organization  of  industry.  Great,  however,  as  was  this 
change  from  the  old  economic  theory  to  the  new,  it  was 
gradual,  and  it  was  never  complete.  There  was  a  swing 
of  the  pendulum.  General  but  not  absolute  restriction 
of  freedom  of  trade  was  the  policy  of  the  middle  ages; 
general  freedom  of  trade,  with  the  restriction  of  certain 
exceptional  occupations,  has  become  the  policy  of  mod- 
ern times.  A  state  of  free  competition  has  been  for  sev- 
eral centuries  now  considered  to  be  for  the  best  interests 
of  society;  and,  therefore,  in  modern  times  almost  every 
business  has  been  opened  to  almost  every  man.  And 
yet  at  all  times  in  economic  history,  both  restriction 
and  freedom  are  to  be  found  in  the  law.  The  propor- 
tion, however,  changes  greatly.  In  one  epoch  there  is 
much  legal  limitation,  with  little  freedom  left;  in  an- 
other age  there  is  almost  universal  competition,  with 

1  Hargrave  Law  Tracts,  78.  *  See  §  116,  infra. 

[141 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION          [  §§  17,  18 

some  little  franchise  to  be  found.  And  the  rule  will  gen- 
erally hold  true  that  the  more  the  natural  laws  of  com- 
petition regulate  service  and  price,  the  less  the  State 
need  interfere  in  these  respects;  but  conversely  when 
competition  ceases  to  act  efficiently  State  control  becomes 
necessary. 

§  17.  Parliamentary  regulation  of  rates. 

During  this  transitional  period  when  the  mediaeval 
system  of  customary  laws  ceased  to  operate  effectively 
Parliament  itself  frequently  regulated  the  prices  of  nec- 
essaries of  life  by  direct  legislation.  The  great  staples, 
like  wool  and  food,  were  habitually  regulated  in  this  way, 
and  the  employment  and  the  price  of  labor  was  a  subject 
of  statutory  provision.  Thus,  in  1266,  Henry  III,  after 
reciting  former  statutes  to  the  same  effect,  regulated  the 
price  of  bread  and  ale  according  to  the  price  of  wheat  and 
barley,  and  forbade  forestalling;  that  is,  cornering  the 
market.1  In  1337  it  was  made  felony  to  export  wool, 
and  the  importation  of  cloth  was  forbidden.2  In  1349 
all  laborers  were  obliged  to  serve  for  the  customary  wages, 
and  ''butchers,  fishmongers,  regrators,  hostelers  (i.  e., 
innkeepers),  brewers,  bakers,  poulterers,  and  all  other 
sellers  of  all  manner  of  victuals,"  were  bound  to  sell  for' 
a  reasonable  price.3  These  statutes  continued  in  force 
throughout  the  middle  ages,  and  until  after  the  settle- 
ment of  America. 

§  18.  Restriction  of  prices  in  the  colonies. 

This  legislative  power  the  colonists  brought  to  America 
with  them.  In  a  new  colony  life  is  a  serious  thing,  the 
necessaries  of  life  are  scarce,  and  the  needs  of  the  public 
are  pressing.  The  conditions  are  ideal  for  a  distressing 

1  51  Hen.  3  Stat.  1.  » 23  Ed.  3,  cap.  1. 

*  11  Ed.  3,  cap.  1. 

[15] 


§  19  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

cornering  of  the  market  by  merchants.  Accordingly, 
though  most  of  the  statutory  regulations  of  trades  and 
prices  had  either  been  repealed  or  had  become  obsolete 
in  the  mother  country,  the  colonies  at  an  early  time 
passed  statutes  regulating  the  prices  of  staple  commod- 
ities. Thus  in  Massachusetts  in  1635  shopkeepers  and 
merchants  were  forbidden  to  charge  excessive  prices.1 
In  Plymouth  colony  the  price  of  boards  was  fixed  in  1668.2 
Corn  and  tobacco,  beer  and  bread,  beef  and  boards,  all 
that  was  most  important  for  the  colonists  to  have  was 
regulated  as  a  matter  of  course  by  the  assemblies  of  the 
time. 

§  19.  Persistence  of  the  legislative  power. 

This  extreme  form  of  the  police  power  over  public 
employment  remained  in  the  legislative  branch  not- 
withstanding the  general  guaranties  of  individual  liberty 
contained  in  the  American  constitutions.  To  compel  the 
proprietors  of  those  businesses  which  had  been  regarded 
as  peculiarly  affected  with  a  public  interest  to  serve  all 
that  applied  at  reasonable  rates  was  immemorial  practice 
and  therefore  was  indisputably  due  process  of  law.  This 
historical  argument  was  given  chief  place  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  leading  case  3  on  this 
branch  of  the  police  power.  "Under  these  powers,"  said 
the  court,  "the  government  regulates  the  conduct  of  its 
citizens  one  towards  another,  and  the  manner  in  which 
each  shall  use  his  own  property,  when  such  regulation 
becomes  necessary  for  the  public  good.  In  their  exercise 
it  has  been  customary  in  England  from  time  immemorial, 
and  in  this  country  from  its  first  colonization,  to  regu- 
late ferries,  common  carriers,  hackmen,  bakers,  millers, 

1  Mass.    Colon.    Laws,    1672,    p.          *  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113, 
120.  24  L.  ed.  77  (1876). 

2  Plymouth  Colon.  Laws,  p.  46. 

[16] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  20 

wharfingers,  innkeepers,  etc.,  and  in  so  doing  to  fix  a 
maximum  of  charge  to  be  made  for  services  rendered, 
accommodations  furnished,  and  articles  sold.  To  this 
day,  statutes  are  to  be  found  in  many  of  the  States  upon 
some  or  all  these  subjects;  and  we  think  it  has  never  yet 
been  successfully  contended  that  such  legislation  came 
within  any  of  the  constitutional  prohibitions  against 
interference  with  private  property." 

§  20.  Survival  of  the  common  law. 

From  one  point  of  view  the  constitutional  validity  of 
legislative  control  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  persist- 
ence of  the  common-law  principles  regulating  public  em- 
ployments. The  common  law  persists  from  age  to  age, 
and  though  the  instance  of  its  rules  may  be  seen  to  change 
as  old  conditions  pass  away  and  new  conditions  arise, 
its  fundamental  principles  remain.  The  early  cases 
which  were  just  under  discussion  are  illustrations  of  this 
course  of  events.  Barber,  surgeon,  smith  and  tailor  are 
no  longer  in  common  calling  because  the  situation  in  the 
modern  times  does  not  require  it;  but  innkeeper,  carrier, 
ferryman  and  wharfinger  are  still  in  that  classification, 
since  even  in  modern  business  the  conditions  require 
them  to  be  so  treated.  With  changed  economic  condi- 
tions in  modern  times  new  callings  have  come  into  being 
with  such  potentialities  that  this  special  law  has  been 
utilized  as  never  before  in  regulating  them.  Indeed,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  one  who  believes  in  our  common  law 
the  class  of  public  callings  is  capable  of  indefinite  exten- 
sion whenever  new  conditions  bring  new  employments 
within  its  scope.1  And  in  all  times  our  law  has  held  to 
the  principle  that  this  peculiar  regulation  was  necessary 

1  The  historical  argument  is  ef-  than  in  People  v.  Budd,  117  N.  Y. 
fectively  used  in  many  cases,  but  in  1,  22  N.  E.  670,  5  L.  R.  A.  549,  15 
no  one  is  it  more  elaborately  put  Am.  St.  Rep.  460  (1889). 

2  [17] 


§  21  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

in  certain  kinds  of  business.  It  depends  largely  upon 
the  opinion  current  at  the  time  how  far  this  law  shall  be 
extended.  But  however  much  public  opinion  may  change 
this  possibility  of  the  enforcement  of  the  obligation  to 
the  public  owed  by  those  who  conduct  a  business  public 
in  character  remains. 

§  21.  Callings  connected  with  transportation. 

Certainly  as  to  those  callings  intimately  connected 
with  common  carriage  this  regulation  by  the  common 
law  has  always  been  felt  necessary.  The  traveler  who  is 
far  from  home  must  depend  upon  strangers;  and  the 
shipper  who  must  send  his  goods  through  strange  lands 
takes  unknown  risks.  As  has  been  seen  the  situation  is 
such  that  the  carrier  of  passengers  or  goods  by  land  or 
sea  has  always  been  obliged  by  law  to  serve  all,  and  is 
by  the  common  law  under  extraordinary  liabilities.  And 
also  the  situation  continuing  the  same  as  before,  the 
innkeeper  remained  under  obligation  to  serve  all  and  un- 
der other  extraordinary  liabilities.  The  ferryman  too 
remained  in  public  employment  as  a  sort  of  carrier. 
And  the  wharfinger  receiving  goods  in  transit  was  held 
to  be  not  unlike  the  innkeeper  receiving  travelers.  All 
the  other  mediaBval  public  employments  had  disappeared 
and  these  alone  survived.  In  the  first  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  therefore,  the  generalization  was  being 
made  (and  not  without  a  certain  justification  from  the 
facts)  that  all  of  the  public  employments  were  connected 
in  one  way  or  another  with  transportation.  Indeed  this 
generalization  became  so  accepted  that  when  later  in  the 
century  new  conditions  pressed  for  further  application 
of  the  law  requiring  the  service  to  the  public,  the  attempt 
was  made  in  the  first  common-law  decisions  dealing  with 
these  businesses  to  include  other  services  quite  different 
in  character  within  this  generalization.  Thus  telegraph 
[18] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  22 

companies  *  and  even  telephone  companies  2  were  said 
to  be  common  carriers,  and  sleeping  cars  3  and  steam- 
boats 4  were  by  some  thought  to  be  inns.  But  those 
judges  who  looked  at  these  new  callings  in  this  light  saw 
through  a  glass  darkly.  It  was  given  to  others  to  see 
the  vision  of  a  great  class  of  public  callings  of  which 
those  connected  with  transportation  constituted  but  one 
branch,  although  the  principal  one. 

§  22.  Introduction  of  improved  highways. 

What  was  destined  to  give  the  greatest  scope  to  the 
public  service  law  was  the  improved  facilities  for  trans- 
portation. It  was  late  in  the  eighteenth  century  that 
the  need  for  transportation  of  persons  and  goods  more 
quickly  and  more  cheaply  between  distant  communi- 
ties began  to  outgrow  the  facilities  for  commerce  then  at 
the  disposal  of  the  public.  The  solution  of  this  question 
thenceforth  became  one  of  the  most  pressing  economic 
problems  of  the  time,  engaging  the  attention  of  states- 
men, as  every  great  commercial  problem  must.  The 
scheme  gradually  worked  out  was  a  system  of  improved 
turnpikes  all  over  the  country  supplemented  by  toll 
bridges,  and  between  the  most  important  markets  the 
construction  of  canals  and  the  development  of  existing 
water  ways.  The  theory  of  the  statesmen  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century  who  dealt  with  the  conditions  un- 
der which  these  works  of  internal  improvement  should 
be  constructed  was  that  private  enterprises  were  better 
than  State  ownership.  However,  they  were  willing  to 
meet  the  need  of  the  time  for  immediate  construction 

1  See    this    phrase    in    Western  3  See  especially  Pullman  P.  C.  Co. 
Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Hamilton,  v.  Lowe,  28  Neb.  239,  44  N.  W. 
36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  300  (1904).  226,  6  L.  R.  A.  809  (1889). 

2  See  for  one  example  McDaniel  4  See,  however,  Clark  v.  Burns, 
v.  Faubush  Telephone  Co.,  32  Ky.  118  Mass.  275  (1875),  19  Am.  Rep. 
L.  Rep.  572,  106  S.  W.  825  (1908).  456. 

[19] 


§§  23,  24  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

of  these  expensive  works  by  grants  from  the  State  treasury 
or  by  guaranty  of  the  bonds  of  the  private  companies. 
These  improved  highways  were  considered  like  other  high- 
ways, public  in  character  and  open  to  all,  though  main- 
tained by  private  companies  which  were  given  the  franchise 
to  charge  tolls  without  which  none  could  be  demanded. 

§  23.  Toll  bridges. 

On  important  lines  of  travel  even  over  considerable 
spans,  bridges  began  to  replace  the  ferries.  As  the  fer- 
ries had  been  maintained  by  private  parties  with  an  ex- 
clusive franchise,  charging  ferriage,  the  bridges  were 
built  by  private  companies  with  an  exclusive  franchise  x 
such  as  the  ferryman  had,  charging  tolls  as  the  ferryman 
did.  For  the  charging  of  tolls  it  is  to  be  remarked  a 
rough  classification  was  made,  and  on  that  point  there  is 
some  public  service  law  from  this  period.  One  interest- 
ing scheme  was  the  chartering  of  bridge  companies  with 
the  provision  that  when  the  cost  of  the  bridge,  together 
with  a  certain  per  cent  of  profit  should  have  been  repaid 
to  the  proprietors,  the  bridge  should  become  free.2 

§  24.  Turnpikes. 

Throughout  the  country,  turnpikes  were  constructed 
of  various  kinds,  gravel  roads  and  plank  roads,  for  ex- 
ample. These  were  built  by  private  companies  with  a 
protecting  franchise,  charging  tolls  roughly  classified. 
Some  little  public  service  law  dates  from  this  period;  for 
such  improved  highways  were  regarded  as  public  in 
character  by  whomsoever  owned.3  As  one  court 4  put  this 

1  See  the  Binghamton  Bridge,  3      Turnpike   Road   v.   Sandford,    164 
Wall.  51,  18  L.  ed.  137  (1865).  U.  S.  578,  41  L.  ed.  560,  17  Sup.  Ct. 

And  see  generally  §  53,  infra.  198  (1896).    And  see  generally  §  84, 

2  See  Commonwealth  v.  Hancock      infra. 

Free  Bridge  Corporation,  2  Gray,  4  The  quotation  is  from  Olcott 
58  (1854).  v.  Supervisors,  16  Wall.  678,  21  L. 

3  See  citations  in  Covington  &  L.      ed.  382  (1872). 

[201 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION         [  §§  25,  26 

principle  in  those  earlier  days:  "Though  the  ownership  is 
private,  the  use  is  public.  So  turnpikes,  bridges,  ferries 
and  canals,  although  made  by  individuals  under  public 
grants,  or  by  companies,  are  regarded  as  publici  juris." 

§  25.  Canals. 

In  England  the  canal  period  was  of  considerable  dura- 
tion. Construction  was  begun  soon  after  the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  century  and  did  not  noticeably  cease  until 
about  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  From  the 
first  the  canals  carried  a  very  large  traffic  upon  which 
they  imposed  regular  tolls  upon  a  classified  basis.  In 
the  United  States  also  many  canals  were  constructed, 
largely  aided  by  the  State  governments.  At  one  time  it 
seemed  to  the  most  enthusiastic  believers  in  the  canal 
system  that  it  was  the  ultimate  solution  of  the  transpor- 
tation problem.  It  was  recognized  in  all  cases  that  all 
boatmen  had  the  right  to  pass  through  these  canals  upon 
paying  to  their  proprietors  the  established  tolls.1  Much 
public  service  law  dates  from  this  time.  The  cases  upon 
the  proper  priorities  to  be  observed  in  the  management 
of  a  public  business  are  particularly  interesting.2 

§  26.  Railways. 

The  early  railways  as  is  generally  known  were  first  in- 
troduced as  improved  turnpikes,  draft  animals  being- 
used  to  haul  the  wagons  upon  the  rails.  The  invention 
of  the  steam  locomotive  with  its  great  cost  and  high 
speed  soon  put  an  end  to  that  system.3  But  for  a  short 
period  it  was  still  -supposed  that  both  animals  and  loco- 
motives might  be  used  upon  the  same  rails;  the  railroad 
might  both  carry  goods  and  maintain  a  tramway  for  its 
patrons.  However,  it  was  soon  seen  that  the  whole 

1  See  §  142,  infra.  3  See  Raleigh  &  Gaston  R.  R.  v. 

*  See,  for  example,  Farnsworth  v.      Davis,  2  D.  &  B.  451  (1837). 
Groot,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  698  (1827). 

[21] 


§§  27,  28  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

operation  must  be  by  the  railway  company;  and  the 
railroad  entirely  ceased  to  be  a  turnpike  and  became  a 
carrier  altogether.1 

Topic  C.  The  Period  of  Laissez  Faire 

§  27.  Alteration  in  economic  conditions. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  combina- 
tion of  economic  factors  brought  about  in  the  business 
world  as  near  an  approach  to  a  condition  of  freedom  in 
competition  as  can  ever  happen  in  a  world  limited  by 
time  and  space.  Naturally  enough  with  such  individual 
freedom  of  action  laissez  faire  became  the  accepted  pol- 
icy for  dealing  with  the  business  world  as  the  occasions 
for  the  application  of  the  principles  of  law  regulating 
public  callings  become  fewer.  This  condition  of  affairs 
prevailed  to  a  remarkable  extent  in  the  United  States 
during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The 
English  system  of  excessive  legislative  regulation  by  Par- 
liament having  become  distasteful,  the  constitutions  of 
the  original  States  and  of  the  United  States  carefully 
limited  the  power  of  legislatures  to  interfere  with  the 
ordinary  affairs  of  business.  Regulation  of  private  af- 
fairs by  the  law  may  be  said  to  have  been  at  a  minimum 
in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  And  in  this 
time  of  small  enterprises  it  was  safe  to  leave  the  individual 
proprietor  free  to  deal  with  his  customers  as  he  pleased. 

§  28.  Development  in  the  common  law. 

It  is  almost  a  truism  that  the  spirit  of  the  age  molds 
its  law.  Those  who  frame  the  laws  a're  members  of  the 
community  and  share  its  spirit.  The  age's  ideal  of  right 
is  their  ideal,  the  method  of  thought  about  justice  which 
is  prevalent  at  the  time  is  their  method  of  thought,  too; 
and  it  therefore  follows  that  in  working  out  legal  prob- 

1  See  §  144,  infra. 
[22] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  29 

lems,  both  bench  and  bar  work  along  the  lines  prescribed 
by  the  spirit  of  the  age  in  which  they  live.  Nowhere  is 
the  influence  of  the  spirit  of  the  time  on  the  common  law 
more  evident  and  more  potent  than  in  this  question  of 
the  regulation  of  common  callings.  Following  the  change 
in  economic  thought  which  has  been  described,  the 
judges  of  the  last  century  began  to  say  as  to  his  business 
activities  that  it  lay  with  the  tradesman  to  conduct  his 
business  as  he  pleased,  at  his  own  prices.  This  was  a 
period  when  all  men  were  much  attracted  by  the  theory 
of  laissez  faire — that  the  most  desirable  thing  was  the 
least  possible  interference  with  business  relations  by  the 
State.  That  the  coercive  law  of  public  calling  survived 
this  period  is  proof  positive  of  its  absolute  necessity  to 
a  greater  or  lesser  extent  in  every  society. 

§  29.  Freedom  of  business  from  state  control. 

It  will  have  been  noticed,  therefore,  that  the  principle 
of  law  which  permits  the  regulation  of  these  callings  has 
never  been  abandoned,  though  the  conditions  calling 
for  its  application  at  various  times  have  greatly  changed. 
Whenever  the  public  is  subjected  to  a  monopoly  the  power 
of  oppression  inherent  in  a  monopoly  is  restricted  by  law. 
Whenever,  on  the  other  hand,  competition  becomes  free, 
both  in  law  and  in  fact,  the  need  of  governmental  regu- 
lation ceases;  public  opinion  ceases  to  demand  such  regu- 
lation, and  the  law  withdraws  it.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century  was  the  extreme  swing  of  the  pendu- 
lum. In  earlier  times,  when  most  trades  were  privileged, 
it  was  felt  that  there  was  a  correspondingly  great  need 
of  regulation.  In  this  fortunate  time  when  in  most 
businesses  the  field  seemed  free  to  all,  the  belief  was  that 
the  ordinary  processes  of  corhpetition  would  produce 
with  sufficient  certainty  adequate  service  at  fair  prices. 
But  an  absolutely  free  competition  is  practically  an  im- 

[23] 


§  30  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

possible  economic  condition;  and  to  this  men  later  awoke 
when  with  the  growth  in  the  power  of  the  proprietors  of 
the  industries  the  people  still  demanded  protection  from 
the  State  in  many  ways. 

§  30.  Special  restrictions  in  early  charters. 

One  method  of  regulation  of  enterprises  public  in  char- 
acter during  this  period  has  not  been  mentioned  as  yet. 
These  were  great  undertakings  which  were  projected— 
bridges  and  turnpikes,  canals  and  railways.  To  carry 
them  out  required  aggregated  capital;  to  maintain  them 
required  permanent  organization.  There  was  a  form  of 
organization  as  yet  confined  to  purposes  in  some  degree 
governmental,  which  was  best  designed  to  bring  together 
the  necessary  capital  and  give  the  necessary  permanence— 
the  corporation.  And  although  it  was  not  as  yet  con- 
sidered proper  to  give  this  franchise  of  being  a  corpora- 
tion to  men  engaged  in  purely  private  business,  it  was 
thought  most  appropriate  for  the  State  to  create  a  cor- 
poration for  such  purposes.  Moreover  in  granting  the 
franchises  the  State  could  impose  upon  the  grantee  such 
terms  as  it  might  think  necessary  for  the  protection  of 
the  public  in  its  dealings  with  the  corporation.  And  so 
the  charters  of  this  period  are  often  elaborate  in  their 
provisions,  imposing  upon  the  corporation  the  duty  to 
serve  all  that  apply  properly  and  without  exceeding  a 
certain  fixed  profit.  Later  in  the  century,  however,  in- 
corporation under  general  law  for  the  conduct  of  private 
business  became  possible;  and  in  the  case  of  such  corpora- 
tions there  were  no  provisions  for  public  service.  There 
followed  a  short  period  about  the  middle  of  the  century 
when  it  was  felt  by  some  that  unless  in  the  incorporation 
of  an  enterprise  its  public  character  was  sufficiently  de- 
clared by  express  clauses  in  its  charter,  the  proprietors 
were  free  to  carry  on  their  own  business  in  their  own  way. 
[24] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  31 

§  31.  Gas  supply. 

When,  therefore,  the  first  gas  works  were  constructed 
under  general  charters  of  incorporation  imposing  no 
specific  duties  upon  them,  the  courts  declined  to  interfere 
with  them  in  their  dealings  with  their  public,  although 
the  continuous  complaints  of  the  consumers  should  have 
made  obvious  the  necessity  for  relief  from  the  oppression 
of  the  established  monopoly.  Thus  in  Paterson  Gas 
Light  Company  v.  Brady, 1  where  the  plaintiff  complained 
that  although  his  buildings  were  located  upon  the  lines 
of  the  main  pipes  of  the  defendant  company,  it  refused 
to  furnish  him  with  gas,  although  he  was  willing  to  pay 
the  fixed  price,  the  upper  court  held  that  the  action 
should  have  been  dismissed,  Mr.  Justice  Elmer  saying: 
"The  language  of  the  charter  is  throughout  permissive, 
and  not  compulsory.  The  company  may  organize,  may 
make  and  sell  gas,  or  not,  at  their  pleasure;  and  I  see  no 
more  reason  to  hold  that  the  duty  of  doing  so  is  meant 
to  be  imperative,  than  to  hold  that  other  companies  in- 
corporated to  carry  on  manufactures,  or  to  do  any  other 
business,  are  bound  to  serve  the  public  any  further  than 
they  find  it  to  be  their  interest  to  do  so.  It  was  earnestly 
insisted,  on  the  argument,  that  the  community  have  a 
great  interest  in  the  use  of  gas,  and  that  companies  set 
up  to  furnish  it  ought  to  be  treated  like  innkeepers  and 
common  carriers,  and  that,  if  no  precedent  can  be  found 
for  such  a  decision,-  this  court  ought  to  make  one.  But 
that  there  is  no  authority  for  so  holding  in  England  or 
America,  where  companies  have  been  so  long  incorpo- 
rated for  supplying  water  and  gas  to  the  inhabitants  of 
numerous  towns  and  cities,  affords  a  strong  presumption 
that  there  is  no  principle  of  law  upon  which  it  can  be 
supported."  - 

1  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  245,  72  Am.  2  Other  early  cases  to  the  same 
Dec.  360  (1858).  effect  were: 

[25] 


§  32  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  32.  Water  supply. 

The  difficulty  was,  as  the  reader  will  recognize,  that 
these  questions  arose  just  at  a  time  when  the  doctrines 
of  laissez  faire  had  almost  destroyed  the  class  of  public 
employments,  and  almost  obliterated  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  the  common  law  relative  to  public  service.  But 
the  new  situation  called  forth  the  old  law  and  eventually 
restored  it.  In  a  case  J  regarding  the  constitutionality 
of  the  grant  of  eminent  domain  to  a  waterworks  com- 
pany, decided  about  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury by  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  he  worked  out  a  duty  to 
supply  the  public  by  reason  of  the  enabling  clauses  in 
the  charter  of  the  company  in  a  way  which  would  be 
plainly  unjustifiable  unless  there  were  an  underlying 
public  duty.  "The  supply  of  a  large  number  of  inhabit- 
ants with  pure  water  is  a  public  purpose,"  he  said:  "But 
it  is  urged,  as  an  objection  to  the  constitutionality  of  the 
act,  that  there  is  no  express  provision  therein  requiring 
the  corporation  to  supply  all  families  and  persons  who 
should  apply  for  water  on  reasonable  terms;  that  they 
may  act  capriciously  and  oppressively;  and  that  by  fur- 
nishing some  houses  and  lots  and  refusing  supply  to 

Connecticut. — McCune    v.    Nor-  The  honor  of  being  the  first  to 

wich  Gas  Co.,  30  Conn.  521,  79  Am.  appreciate  that  the  gas  business  was 

Dec.  278  (1862).  public  in  character  belongs  to  the 

Massachusetts. — Com.   v.   Lowell  court    which    decided   Shepard    v. 

Gas  Light  Co.,  12  Allen,  75  (1866).  Milwaukee     Gas    Light     Co.,     15 

New  York—  New  York  Central  Wis.  318/82  Am.  Dec.  679  (1862). 

&  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Metropolitan  The  modern  decisions  establishing 

Gas  Light  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  326  (1875).  that  the  gas  companies  are  in  pub- 

Ohio. — See    Zanesville     v.     Gas  lie  calling  are  discussed  in   §  131, 

Light  Co.,  47  Oh.  St.  1,  23  N.  E.  55  infra. 

(1889).  l  Lumbard  v.  Stearns,  4  Gush.  60 

Pennsylvania. — Com.  v.   Wilkes-  (1849).     The  modern  cases  estab- 

Barre  Gas  Co.,  2  Kulp,  499  (1883).  lishing  that  the  water  companies 

England. — Hoddesdon     Gas     &  are  in  public  calling  are  discussed 

Coke  Co.  v.  Haselwood,  6  Com.  B.  in  §  102,  infra. 
(N.  S.)  239  (1859). 

[26] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  33 

others,  they  may  thus  give  a  value  to  some  lots,  and 
deny  it  to  others.  This  would  be  a  plain  abuse  of  their 
franchise.  By  accepting  the  act  of  incorporation,  they 
undertake  to  do  all  the  public  duties  required  by  it.  When 
an  individual  or  a  corporation  is  guilty  of  a  breach  of 
public  duty  by  misfeasance  or  non-feasance,  and  the  law 
has  provided  no  other  specific  punishment  for  its  breach, 
an  indictment  will  lie.  Perhaps,  also,  in  a  suitable  case, 
a  process  to  revoke  and  annul  the  franchise  might  be 
maintained."  1 

§33.  The  struggle  against  encroaching  monopoly. 

As  the  prevalence  of  competitive  conditions  in  busi- 
ness limits  the  application  of  the  principles  of  public 
service  law,  so  the  prevalence  of  monopolistic  conditions 
extends  their  application.  Such  a  change  came  about  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  About  a  gen- 
eration ago  a  change  in  commercial  practice  showed  with 
remarkable  distinctness  the  advantage  of  combination. 
Great  enterprises  took  the  place  of  small  ones,  and  great 
enterprises  required  co-operation  and  combination.  As 
the  people  became  accustomed  to  look  upon  combination 
as  the  price  of  success,  they  came  more  and  more  to  re- 
gard it  as  a  blessing  rather  than  an  evil;  and  public  opin- 
ion has  gradually  turned  away  from  the  individualistic 
ideal  until  to-day  it  has  been  fairly  discarded  by  the  cur- 
rent philosophy.  With  the  principle  of  combination  as 
the  spring  of  action  has  come  a  corresponding  need  of 
controlling  the  action  of  such  combinations  for  the  good 
of  the  whole  public.  As  the  rights  of  the  individual 
trader  yield  to  the  rights  of  the  great  corporation,  so  in 
the  view  of  the  man  of  the  present  day,  the  rights  of  the 
corporation,  should  in  their  turn  yield  to  the  rights  of 
the  whole  people.  The  same  spirit  which  fosters  combi- 

1  See  Olmsted  v.   Morris  Aqueduct  Co.,  47  N.  J.  L.  311  (1885). 

[271 


§  34  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

nation,  fosters  also  control  of  the  combination  for  the 
public  benefit.  The  spirit  of  the  present  age,  therefore, 
has  come  to  be  a  spirit  which  demands  that  great  busi- 
ness enterprises  should  be  conducted  in  accordance  with 
the  requirements  of  society.  The  programme  of  organ- 
ized society  is  practically  to  see  to  it  that  those  who  have 
gained  a  substantial  control  of  their  market  shall  not  be 
left  free  to  exploit  those  who  look  to  them  to  supply  their 
needs.  Men  now  see  clearly  that  freedom  of  action  in 
the  industrial  world  may  work  injuriously  for  the  pub- 
lic, and  it  must  then  be  restrained  in  the  public  interest. 
Having  seen  the  results  of  unrestrained  power  we  no 
longer  wish  those  who  have  control  of  our  destinies  to 
be  left  free  to  do  with  us  as  they  please.  Such  liberty 
for  them  would  mean  enslavement  for  us. 

§  34.  Conservative  and  radical  views  of  regulation. 

While  it  is  generally  agreed  that  a  change  has  come  over 
the  spirit  of  our  time,  that  State  regulation  is  the  prevail- 
ing philosophy  of  the  people  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth  century;  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  has 
been  the  result  of  a  gradual  progress  of  thought,  and  that 
this  progress  has  not  affected  all  men  or  all  lawyers 
equally.  Now,  as  at  all  times,  there  are  conservative 
lawyers  and  radical  lawyers,  the  former  as  far  behind  the 
prevailing  spirit  of  the  time  as  the  latter  go  beyond  it. 
In  every  change  of  popular  thought  there  have  been 
laggards,  and  in  every  such  change  there  have  been  those 
who  are  unable  justly  to  estimate  the  true  meaning  of  the 
change,  and  work  beyond  it  into  eccentricities  in  which 
the  people  will  never  follow  them.  We  have,  therefore, 
three  general  types  of  thought  at  every  time:  the  con- 
servatives, the  moderates  and  the  radicals.  And  this  is 
as  true  of  legal  as  of  economic  thought.  Many  lawyers 
still  hold  conservative  views  as  to  the  application  of  the 
[28] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  |  §  35 

law  of  public  callings  to  modern  conditions.  They  be- 
lieve that  the  conductors  of  every  business,  however 
necessary  to  public  welfare,  should  do  whatever  seems 
good  in  their  own  eyes.  And  some  economists  still  tell 
us  that  the  only  way  to  get  efficient  service  for  the  public 
is  to  allow  the  public  service  companies  the  right  of  ex- 
acting such  rewards  as  they  are  able  to  get.  But  in  spite 
of  these  now  obsolescent  views  there  can  be  no  question 
that  the  tendency  to-day  is  to  restrain  in  the  interests  of 
society  all  business  which  has  obtained  undue  power. 
Individual  freedom  is  limited  by  the  modern  notion  of 
social  justice. 

Topic  D.  Present  Control  of  Public  Employment 

§  36.  Economic  conditions  at  the  present  time. 

As  a  result  of  these  changed  business  ideas,  and  of  the 
great  inventions  which  have  constantly  tended  to  increase 
the  magnitude  of  business  enterprises  there  has  been  as 
has  been  seen  in  the  last  fifty  years  a  great  growth  of  em- 
ployments which  have  gained  virtual  monopoly  in  mat- 
ters of  public  necessity.  The  positive  law  of  the  pub- 
lic calling  is  the  only  protection  that  the  public  have 
in  a  situation  such  as  this,  where  there  is  no  competi- 
tion among  the  sellers  to  operate  in  its  favor.  So  much 
has  our  law  been  permeated  with  the  theory  of  laissez 
faire,  which  was  but  lately  so  prominent  in  the  policy  of 
our  State,  that  the  admission  has  been  made  with  much 
hesitation  that  State  control  is  ever  necessary.  But  the 
modern  conclusion,  after  some  bitter  experience,  is  that 
freedom  can  be  allowed  only  where  conditions  of  virtual 
competition  prevail;  for  in  conditions  of  virtual  mo- 
nopoly, without  stern  restrictions,  there  is  always  great 
mischief.  There  is  now  fortunately  almost  general  assent 
to  State  control  of  the  public  service  companies,  since  it  is 
recognized  that  the  special  situation  requires  a  special  law. 

[29] 


§§  36,  37  j     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  36.  Control  of  the  public  services  necessary. 

The  hypothesis  here  put  forward  is  that  whether  a 
business  is  public  or  not  depends  upon  the  situation  of  the 
public  with  respect  to  it.  Are  there  enough  of  such  pur- 
veyors to  serve  the  public?  or  are  there,  for  permanent 
reasons,  never  enough?  If  so,  there  will  be  virtual  com- 
petition; if  not,  there  will  be  virtual  monopoly.  In  all  of 
the  businesses  to  be  discussed  in  these  chapters,  competi- 
tion, although  from  a  legal  point  of  view  possible,  is  from 
the  economic  point  of  view  improbable.  So  far  as  one  can 
see,  virtual  competition  is  at  an  end  in  these  industries, 
and  virtual  monopoly  will  henceforth  prevail.  Therefore 
it  must  be  said  that  the  public  has  now  an  interest  in  the 
conduct  of  these  businesses  by  their  owners.  They  are 
affected  with  a  public  interest,  since  these  agencies  are  car- 
ried on  in  a  manner  to  make  them  of  public  consequence. 
Therefore,  having  devoted  their  property  to  a  use  in  which 
the  public  has  an  interest,  they  in  effect  have  granted  to 
the  public  an  interest  in  that  use,  and  must  submit  to  be 
controlled  by  the  public  for  the  common  good  to  the 
extent  of  the  interest  they  have  created.  Plainly  we  have 
in  the  accepted  use  of  these  phrases  the  manifestation  of 
a  deep-seated  change  in  habits  of  thought.  Only  twenty- 
five  years  ago  the  general  feeling  as  to  every  sort  of 
industrial  relation  was  that  it  was  better  to  leave  all 
alone,  that  it  was  better  to  leave  people  to  work  out  their 
own  salvation.  But  of  late  years  we  have  been  calling 
upon  the  State  to  save  us  from  monopoly  in  all  its  forms; 
and  we  are  impatient  if  it  delays. 

§  37.  Variety  of  the  public  services. 

The  present  situation  is  plain  enough  to  all  of  us.    What- 
ever way  we  turn  we  depend  upon  a  service  that  is  public 
in  character.    Not  only  in  long  travels  but  in  short  jour- 
neys we  employ  common  carriers — railroads  and  steam- 
[30] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  38 

ships,  coaches  and  cabs,  street  cars  and  omnibuses,  the 
subway  car  and  the  elevated  train.  If  we  ship  goods 
there  are  various  transportation  services  at  our  disposal 
beside  railroads  and  ships,  such  as  express  companies  and 
dispatch  lines,  refrigerator  lines  and  tank  lines.  If  we  are 
journeying  ourselves  we  eat  at  hotel  restaurants,  and  put 
up  at  public  inns,  or  travel  in  palace  cars  and  lodge  our- 
selves in  sleeping  cars.  Our  freight  in  its  transit  has  its 
needs  attended  to — for  our  goods,  warehouses,  for  our 
grain,  elevators,  for  our  cattle,  stockyards,  and  for  our 
exports,  docks.  In  almost  every  community,  even  rela- 
tively small,  we  have  for  our  household  needs  gas,  elec- 
tricity, water  supply  and  sewerage  service  provided  for 
us,  usually,  except  the  last  two,  by  private  companies 
in  public  service,  but  even  where  the  service  is  provided 
by  the  municipality  it  is  subject  to  the  same  law  governing 
public  service.  For  speedy  communication  in  our  business 
and  pleasure,  we  have  the  telephone  and  telegraph  in 
common  use,  and  ticker  service  and  messenger  call  for 
special  needs.  One  may  judge  by  this  incomplete  list  how 
common  to  every  part  of  our  modern  life  are  the  various 
public  services,  and  how  necessary  it  is  that  they  should 
be  required  by  law  to  serve  us  all  with  adequate  facili- 
ties for  reasonable  compensation  and  without  discrimina- 
tion. 

§  38.  Differentiation  of  the  public  service  law. 

It  is  unnecessary  at  this  day  to  point  out  the  plain 
distinction  of  the  law  governing  public  services  from  that 
governing  private  employment.  All  businesses  both  pub- 
lic and  private  are  subject,  to  be  sure,  to  that  general 
police  power  of  the  State  whereby  in  any  civilized  society 
the  effort  is  made  to  so  order  things  that  one  may  not  use 
his  own  so  as  to  injure  another.  But  any  comparison  of 
the  large  amount  of  regulation  which  it  is  considered 

[31] 


§  39  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

proper  for  the  State  to  enact  in  regard  to  public  services 
with  the  small  amount  of  regulation  which  it  is  considered 
proper  for  the  State  to  enact  in  regard  to  private  business 
is  in  itself  significant  enough.  The  difference  thus  shown 
is  more  than  one  of  degree;  it  is  one  of  kind.  For  it  will 
be  noted  that  it  is  in  public  business  that  the  law  imposes 
affirmative  duties;  while  generally  speaking  the  duties 
imposed  upon  those  in  private  business  are  negative. 
The  law  says  to  those  in  public  business  you  must  do  this 
for  this  applicant,  and  you  must  do  it  thus  and  so.  To 
those  in  private  business  it  says  you  must  not  do  this,  or 
if  you  do  this  you  must  do  it  thus  and  so.  As  has  been 
pointed  out  before,  this  is  the  chief  distinction  between 
public  calling  and  private  calling;  in  one  there  is  a  coer- 
cive law  intimate  in  its  details,  in  the  other  there  is  a 
restraining  law  general  in  its  rules. 

§  39.  Unity  of  the  public  service  law. 

Not  only  has  it  been  realized  at  last  that  we  have 
relating  to  the  public  services  a  distinct  department  of 
the  law,  but  also  it  is  becoming  recognized  that  within 
this  department  there  is  a  consistent  body  of  law  in 
process  of  unification.  Not  merely  does  the  law  governing 
the  supply  of  gas  differ  from  the  law  as  to  the  sale  of 
candles,  but  the  law  governing  the  supply  of  gas  is  the 
same  in  all  essentials  as  the  law  as  to  the  supply  of  elec- 
tricity. It  is  in  the  firm  belief  that  the  law  governing  the 
public  services  will  prove  upon  analysis  to  be  a  really 
unified  body  that  the  author  has  been  working  for  many 
years.  General  principles  will  be  developed  throughout 
this  book  and  corollaries  to  them  established  by  the  use 
and  with  the  co-ordination  of  cases  from  a  variety  of 
public  employments.  Certainly  the  general  propositions 
hold  true  as  to  all  public  employments — that  all  must 
be  served,  adequate  facilities  must  be  provided,  reason- 
[32] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  40 

able  rates  must  be  charged,  and  no  discriminations  must 
be  made.  Moreover  in  dealing  with  the  minor  details 
of  these  principles,  cases  from  one  service  will  be  found 
in  point  in  another — what  conditions  there  are  precedent 
to  service,  what  will  excuse  failure  in  provision  of  facilities, 
what  is  a  proper  basis  for  calculating  rates  and  what 
differences  constitute  discrimination. 

§  40.  Present  state  of  the  public  service  law. 

In  the  belief  of  the  writer  the  public  service  law  has  at 
length  reached  a  stage  of  development  in  which  it  may  be 
possible  to  state  its  principles  with  some  degree  of  con- 
fidence. It  is  only  within  the  last  few  years  that  it  would 
have  been  within  the  range  of  possibility  to  do  this. 
Twenty-five  years  ago  the  public  services  which  were  rec- 
ognized were  still  few  and  the  law  as  to  them  imperfectly 
realized.  It  was  known  from  olden  times  that  those  who 
professed  a  public  employment  must  serve  all  at  a  reason- 
able rate.  As  to  the  duty  to  serve  it  was  thought  that 
there  were  exceptions.  As  to  the  restriction  of  rates 
there  was  no  standard.  The  important  duty  to  provide 
adequate  facilities  had  hardly  advanced  beyond  the  gen- 
eral law  as  to  negligence.  And  the  duty  not  to  discrimi- 
nate was  denied  altogether.  Even  ten  years  ago  when 
these  four  obligations  had  become  generally  recognized, 
the  details  as  to  them  in  regard  to  any  particular  employ- 
ment had  been  worked  out  only  in  very  fragmentary 
manner.  But  at  the  present  day  it  is  just  being  appre- 
ciated that  rapid  progress  may  be  made  by  the  general 
recognition  of  the  unity  of  the  public  service  law,  whereby 
cases  as  to  one  calling  may  be  used  to  show  the  law  in  all. 
In  this  treatise  this  method  is  adopted  for  the  first  tune. 
Indeed,  it  is  only  in  our  present  day  that  the  attempt 
to  treat  the  public  service  law  as  a  consistent  body  of 
law  could  be  made  with  any  hope  cf  success. 

3  [33] 


§  41  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  41.  Imperative  need  of  effective  regulation. 

It  has  been  remarked  many  times  that  the  common 
law  may  be  relied  upon  to  meet,  by  the  continual  develop- 
ment of  its  fundamental  principles,  the  complex  condi- 
tions created  by  the  constant  evolution  in  the  industrial 
organization.  One  of  the  most  striking  of  modern  in- 
stances of  this  capacity  of  growth  in  the  common  law  is 
the  astonishing  progress  in  the  working  out  of  the  detail 
of  the  exceptional  law  governing  the  conduct  of  public 
callings.  As  the  public  service  law  grows  it  is  becoming 
both  more  intensive  and  more  extensive.  In  recent  tunes 
there  undoubtedly  is  an  increasing  need  of  this  stricter 
regulation  of  all  employments  which  appear  to  be  affected 
with  a  public  interest.  While  it  is  true  that  there  are 
many  men  who  still  avow  the  principle  of  laissez  faire, 
who  say  that  it  is  the  better  policy  to  leave  all  business 
with  as  little  interference  from  the  law  as  possible;  the 
most  of  men  at  least  appreciate  that  the  law  has  already 
taken  control  of  the  situation  for  all  time.  It  is  hardly 
too  much  to  say  that  the  efficient  regulation  of  the  public 
employments  by  sufficient  law  is  the  most  pressing  prob- 
lem confronting  this  nation;  and  it  must  be  met  without 
further  hesitation.  As  these  great  combinations  of  capital 
have  grown  up  under  the  law,  so  their  legal  rights  must 
be  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  whole  people.  Great  power 
brings  as  its  consequence  the  need  of  control  of  that 
power  for  the  good  of  the  whole  people.  Two  ways  only 
can  be  found  to  exercise  such  control.  One  way,  that 
advocated  by  the  radical  persons,  is  government  owner- 
ship and  operation  of  the  public  utilities.  The  other  way, 
which  is  in  fact  the  conservative  method  of  dealing  with 
the  problem,  is  the  control  of  the  rates  and  practices  of 
the  public  service  corporations  for  the  public  good.  One 
or  the  other  of  these  methods  must  be  finally  adopted. 
The  conservative  method  is  now  on  trial.  It  behooves 
[34] 


HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  [  §  42 

the  lawyers  to  see  to  it  that  it  be  so  intelligently  tried, 
and  that  the  law  applicable  to  the  case  be  so  accurately 
enforced,  that  we  may  not  be  driven  perforce  to  the  radical 
alternative  of  public  ownership. 

§  42.  Ultimate  limitations  upon  public  employment. 

In  this  crisis  of  affairs  the  people  must  be  assured  that 
the  law  is  indeed  adequate  to  deal  with  the  situation, 
that  it  has  not  only  elaborated  detail  to  meet  obvious 
wrongs  seldom  defended,  but  also  enlightened  compre- 
hension to  deal  with  the  large  policies  openly  justified 
which  are  truly  inconsistent  with  public  duty.  That 
those  who  profess  a  public  employment  owe  the  utmost 
public  service,  should  be  generally  accepted  as  the  funda- 
mental principle  upon  which  the  law  governing  public 
employment  is  to  be  based.  It  is  not  agreed,  however, 
how  far  this  principle  should  be  pressed;  there  is  a  clash 
of  interests  here,  and  there  is  an  inclination  on  the  part 
of  those  who  conduct  the  public  services  to  contest  every 
issue.  This  is  hardly  an  enlightened  selfishness;  for  it 
seems  to  many  who  appreciate  the  temper  of  the  public, 
that  the  time  has  come  when  extension  of  the  law  and 
enforcement  of  it  should  be  the  avowed  attitude  of  all 
conservative  persons  who  wish  the  perpetuation  of  the 
present  condition  of  individual  enterprise.  It  would  be 
well,  therefore,  if  the  restless  and  the  doubting  who  see 
many  abuses  and  many  wrongs  in  the  conduct  of  our 
public  services  without  prompt  remedy  or  adequate 
redress,  might  be  relieved  and  heartened  by  being  shown 
that  the  common  law  is  adequate  to  deal  with  all  real 
industrial  wrongs,  and  that  with  the  aid  of  remedial 
statutes  the  administration  of  the  law  can  be  relied  upon. 
And  it  should  be  sufficiently  emphasized  at  all  times  in 
all  situations  that  public  servants  may  not  adopt  to  the 
prejudice  of  their  public  various  profitable  policies,  and 

[351 


§  42  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

then  justify  them  as  inherent  rights  which  other  men  in 
ordinary  business  may  use  in  the  advancement  of  their 
interests. 


[36] 


BOOK  I.     ESTABLISHMENT  OF  PUBLIC 
CALLING 


[37] 


PART  I.    PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT 
CHAPTER  II 

MONOPOLY   DUE   TO   LEGAL   PRIVILEGE 

§  50.  Legal  privileges  accompanying  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Exclusive  Franchise 
§  51.  Exclusive  franchise  for  public  purposes. 

52.  Ferries. 

53.  Bridges. 

54.  Bonded  warehouses. 

55.  Log  driving. 

Topic  B.  Eminent  Domain 
§  56.  Eminent  domain  for  public  purposes. 

57.  Tramways. 

58.  Railways. 

59.  Pipe  lines. 

60.  Transmission  lines. 

61.  Elevated  conveyors. 

62.  Lumber  flumes. 

63.  Mining  tunnels. 

Topic  C.  Aid  from  Taxation 
§  64.  Public  purposes  of  taxation. 

65.  Gristmills. 

66.  Sawmills. 

67.  Drainage. 

68.  Sewerage. 

69.  Cemeteries. 

70.  Hospitals. 

Topic  D.  Use  of  Public  Highways 
§  71.  Public  purposes  in  highway  use. 

72.  River  improvements. 

73.  Booms. 

74.  Sluices. 

[39] 


\  50  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

i  75.  Turnpikes. 

76.  Street  railways. 

77.  Subways. 

78.  Wire  conduits. 

79.  Pole  lines. 

80.  Constitutional  situation  as  to  special  privileges. 


§  50.  Legal  privileges  accompanying  public  employment. 
That  legal  privileges  frequently  accompany  public  em- 
ployment is  the  first  thing  that  has  struck  many  observers 
as  characteristic  of  the  class.  It  is  indeed  common  to  find 
in  the  case  of  certain  public  employments  an  exclusive 
franchise;  and  such  legal  monopoly  has  been  said  to  carry 
with  it  the  consequent  obligation  of  public  service.  To 
aid  in  the  construction  of  its  works,  it  will  frequently  be 
found  that  eminent  domain  has  been  given  to  the  public 
service  companies  conducting  the  business;  and  here  again 
it  is  often  said  that  the  acceptance  of  such  a  special  privi- 
lege creates  obligation  to  serve  the  public.  From  time  to 
time,  the  statement  is  made  that  when  aid  is  granted  from 
the  public  treasury  whether  in  the  form  of  outright  gift  or 
by  guaranty  of  the  securities  of  the  corporation  conduct- 
ing the  services,  the  result  is  that  the  services  of  these  com- 
panies are  at  the  disposal  of  the  public.  Finally,  many 
public  service  corporations  are  given  in  one  way  or  an- 
other special  privileges  in  the  public  highways;  if  these 
companies  accept  these  favors  from  the  public,  it  is  said, 
they  must  serve  the  public.  It  is,  of  course,  true,  that  in 
the  case  of  the  most  of  the  public  services  some  one  of 
these  privileges  will  ordinarily  be  found  in  any  particular 
case.  In  many  instances  several  of  these  different  kinds 
of  aid  from  the  State  will  be  found  to  have  been  given  to 
a  single  company.  That  under  such  conditions  if  the 
grant  is  valid  those  who  are  enjoying  such  special  privi- 
leges must  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  public  is  plain;  but  it 
cannot  be  said  that  such  a  coincidence  establishes  a  con- 
[40] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE          [  §  50 

sequence.  One  insuperable  difficulty  with  this  common 
explanation  that  public  employment  owes  its  origin  to 
the  grant  of  public  privileges,  is  that  there  are  a  con- 
siderable number  of  public  employments  always  recog- 
nized as  such,  which  have  no  such  public  privileges  what- 
soever.1 What  is  perhaps  of  even  greater  significance  is 
that  there  are  very  many  cases  in  which  the  grant  of 
special  rights,  such  as  exclusive  franchises,  eminent  do- 
main, State  aid,  or  highway  franchise  to  a  business  con- 
cern of  private  character  is  held  to  be  wholly  void  upon 
the  ground  that  such  special  rights  may  only  be  given  to 
such  enterprises  as  are  public  in  character.2  It  would 
seem,  therefore,  that  the  effect  has  sometimes  been  mis- 
taken for  cause  here;  that  although  many  of  these  spe- 
cial privileges  often  accompany  public  employment,  the 
truth  is  that  these  very  privileges  could  not  have  been 
validly  granted  unless  these  businesses  were  public  in 
character.  It  is  submitted  therefore,  without  going  into 
more  detail  about  the  matter,  that  under  our  constitu- 
tional system  no  special  privileges  can  be  granted  except 
for  a  public  purpose.  Unless  there  is  public  interest 
apparent  the  grant  is  void.  The  question  thus  arises 
whether  the  conditions  of  virtual  monopoly,  however 
caused,  may  not  give  rise  to  public  calling  if  the  State  has 
had  no  hand  in  the  establishment  of  the  situation.  These 
considerations  are  most  suggestive;  indeed,  one  is  led  by 
them  to  an  entire  inversion  of  the  common  statement  of 
the  relation  between  the  existence  of  public  privileges  and 
the  establishment  of  public  employment.  It  is  common 
to  argue  that  because  a  certain  business  has  had  a  certain 
privilege  granted  to  it,  the  consequence  of  that  limitation 
is  that  the  business  is  put  by  the  courts  in  the  class  of 

1  See  People  v.  Budd,  117  N.  Y.  2  See  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me. 
1,  22  N.  E.  670,  5  L.  R.  A.  559,  15  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A.  472 
Am.  St.  Rep.  460  (1889).  (1905). 

[41] 


§  51  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

public  callings.  But  the  real  truth  of  the  matter  seems  to 
be  in  the  opposite  statement,  that  no  business  can  be 
granted  a  privilege  under  our  constitutional  system  unless 
it  is  public  in  character. 

Topic  A.  Exclusive  Franchise 

§  51.  Exclusive  franchise  for  public  purposes. 

Modern  ideas  as  to  exclusive  franchises  first  appeared 
in  the  opposition  to  the  patents  of  monopoly  which  were 
disposed  of  all  too  freely  by  the  Tudors  and  the  Stuarts. 
Originally  instituted  as  a  method  for  the  encouragement 
of  new  industries  and  large  enterprises,  as  glass  and  steel, 
it  was  naturally  felt  to  have  become  an  abuse  when 
patents  of  monopoly  were  granted  for  ordinary  trades  and 
commodities,  as  oil  and  leather.  These  private  monopolies 
were  decried  in  the  great  Case  of  Monopolies  1  in  language 
as  extreme  as  any  which  has  ever  been  used  since;  "for  the 
end  of  all  of  these  monopolies  is  for  the  private  gain  of  the 
patentees  and  although  provisions  and  cautions  are  added 
to  moderate  them,  yet  res  profecto  stulta  est  nequitice  modus, 
it  is  mere  folly  to  think  that  there  is  any  measure  in  mis- 
chief or  wickedness."  According  to  present  ideas,  there- 
fore, exclusive  franchises  can  only  be  granted  for  public 
purposes.  "Generalized  and  divested  of  the  special  form 
which  it  assumes  under  a  monarchial  government  based 
on  feudal  traditions,  a  franchise  is  a  right,  privilege,  or 
power  of  public  concern  which  ought  not  to  be  exercised 
by  private  individuals  at  their  mere  will  and  pleasure,  but 
should  be  reserved  for  public  control  and  administration 
either  by  the  government  directly,  or  by  public  agents, 
acting  under  such  conditions  and  regulations  as  the  gov- 
ernment may  impose  in  the  public  interest  and  for  the 
public  security."  2  In  this  light  our  problem  is  made  at 

1 11  Coke,  84b.  Ry.,  127  U.  S.  1,  32  L.  ed.  150 

2  California    v.    Central    Pacific     (1887). 

[42] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE         [  §  51 

once  clearer  and  more  difficult.  When  the  validity  of  the 
grant  of  an  exclusive  franchise  to  a  business  enterprise  is 
in  question,  the  rule  is  that  such  franchises  can  be  granted 
only  to  such  businesses  as  are  public  in  character.  It  is 
well  established  that  exclusive  franchises  may  be  given 
for  gas  supply  1  and  electric  lighting,2  to  give  two  modern 
instances.  On  the  other  hand,  when  an  exclusive  right  is 
claimed  by  virtue  of  some  incautious  grant  for  such 
private  businesses  as  baiting  animals  3  or  selling  mer- 
chandise 4  the  grant  is  disposed  of  simply  enough  as 
invalid  under  our  constitutional  law.  No  one  would  think 
of  saying  that  these  businesses  were  made  public  by  the 
grant  of  the  franchise  and  therefore  the  legislation  was 
made  constitutional;  such  a  course  of  reasoning  would  be 
too  patently  circular.  To  this  general  theory  there  are  ap- 
parently two  important  exceptions  at  the  present  time — 
the  patent  and  the  copyright  which  are  still  freely  granted 
for  any  purpose  without  any  corresponding  legal  obliga- 
tion. The  policy  still  seems  to  be  that  new  inventions  and 
novel  ideas  should  be  fostered  and  protected  at  all  costs. 
But,  as  will  be  seen  later,  in  the  case  of  the  telephone  it  is 
already  law  that  a  patent  so  devoted  to  a  public  use  is 
subject  to  the  full  regulation  of  the  public  service  law 
notwithstanding  that  it  is  generally  said  that  the  owner 

1  Illinois.— People  v.  People's  Gas  Gas  Light  Co.,  29  Wis.  454,  9  Am. 

Light  Co.,  205  111.  482,  68   N.  E.  Rep.  598  (1872). 

950,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  244  (1903).  2  Iowa.— Davenport  Gas  &  Elec- 

Louisiana. — Davenport  Gas  &c.  trie  Co.  v.  Davenport,  124  Iowa,  22, 
Co.  v.  Davenport,  124  la.  22,  98  98  N.  W.  892  (1904). 
N.  W.  892  (1904);  Crescent  City  Oklahoma.— Territory      v.     De- 
Gas    Light    Co.  v.    New   Orleans  Wolfe,    13  Okla.  454,  74  Pac.  98 
Gas  Light   Co.,  27   La.  Ann.  138  (1903). 
(1875).  3Com.  v.  Bacon,  13  Bush,  210, 

Missouri.— Vanderberg  v.   Kan-  26  Am.  Rep.  189  (1877). 

sas  City  &c.  Gas  Co.,  126  Mo.  App.  4  Thousand  Island  Park  Assn.  v. 

600  (1907).  Tucker,  173  N.  Y.  203,  65  N.  E. 

Wisconsin.— State  v.  Milwaukee  975  (1903). 

[431 


§  52  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

of  a  patent  can  deal  with  it  as  he  pleases.  So  although  the 
owner  of  a  copyright  is  said  to  be  free  to  get  such  returns 
from  it  as  he  pleases  this  statement  cannot  now  be  made 
with  entire  confidence.  The  publishers  of  market  quota- 
tions for  example  cannot  deal  with  the  public  at  their 
caprice. 

§  62.  Ferries. 

The  practice  of  granting  exclusive  franchises  for  the 
operation  of  ferries  is  found  in  our  earliest  reports,  the 
cases  being  frequent  where  the  franchise  is  recognized  and 
protected  from  invasion.1  The  propriety  of  such  grants 
has  never  been  denied  even  in  those  times  when  there  has 
been  the  most  outcry  against  monopolies.  For  the  ne- 
cessity of  such  protection  to  those  engaged  in  the  service 
is  recognized;  and  the  evil  of  monopoly  is  curbed  by  the 
requirement  of  public  service.  As  a  result  the  exclusion 
of  other  ferrymen  by  an  exclusive  franchise  has  been 
always  held  under  American  constitutions  to  be  due  proc- 
ess of  law.2  In  the  North  Dakota  case  the  propriety  of 

1  Georgia. — Hudspeth  v.  Hall,  111  2  Exclusive  franchises  for  ferries 

Ga.  510,  36  S.  E.  770  (1900).  are  also  justified  under  our  Ameri- 

Massachusetts. — Fay,    Petitioner,  can  constitutional  law  in  the  follow- 

15  Pick.  243  (1834).  ing  cases,  among  others: 

North  Carolina. — Long  v.  Beard,  California. — Fortainv.  Smith,  114 

3  Murphy,  57  (1819).  Cal.  494,  46  Pac.  381  (1896). 

South  Dakota. — Evans  v.  Hughes  Iowa. — Burlington  County  Ferry 

County,  3  So.  Dak.  580  (1893).  Co.  v.  Davis,  48  la.  133,  30  Am. 

England.— Blissettv.Hart,Willes,  Rep.  390  (1878). 

508  (1744) ;  Huzzey  v.  Field,  2  C.  M.  Maryland.— Broadway,  etc.,  Fer- 

&  R.  432  (1835).     See,  however,  ry    Co.  v.    Hankey,  31    Md.  346 

Churchman  v.   Tunstall,   Hardres,  (1869). 

162  (1659),  where  a  Commonwealth  North      Dakota. — Patterson      v. 

court  felt  that  an  exclusive  ferry  Wollmann,  5  N.  D.  608,  67  N.  W. 

was  in  restraint  of  trade.     In  an-  1040,  33  L.  R.  A.  539  (1896). 

other  bill  between  the  same  parties  South  Dakota. — Nixon  v.  Reid,  8 

after  the  Restoration,   Lord  Hale  S.  D.  507,  67  N.  W.  57,  32  L.  R.  A. 

is  said  to  have  decided  in  favor  of  315  (1896). 
the  same  plaintiff.   Huzzey  v.  Field, 
2  C.  M.  &  R.  432  (1835). 

[44] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE         [  §  53 

such  franchises  from  the  modern  point  of  view  was  stated 
thus:  "  For  centuries  such  police  power  has  embraced  this 
element  of  the  right  to  grant  an  exclusive  franchise;  and 
it  has  been  found  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  best  results 
are  obtained  by  granting  an  exclusive  right.  Indeed  it 
often  is  the  case  that  on  no  other  terms  will  the  citizen 
assume  the  burdens  incident  to  the  operation  of  a  ferry. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  the  English  nation  or  of 
the  American  people  which  warrants  the  conclusion  that 
this  practice  has  resulted  in  imposing  intolerable  burdens 
upon  the  public,  or  has  led  to  other  than  beneficial  re- 
sults." 

§  53.  Bridges. 

A  similar  policy  has  been  employed  by  the  State  from 
early  times  in  making  provision  for  long  bridges  on  im- 
portant lines  of  through  travel.  Toll  bridges  built  and 
maintained  under  charters  giving  exclusive  rights  against 
competing  bridges  were  once  much  more  common  than 
they  are  now;  and  the  policy  of  such  arrangements  in 
furtherance  of  the  public  service  1  has  been  vigorously  de- 

1  Toll  bridges  are  of  such  public  E.  Pass.  Ry.  v.  Point  Bridge  Co., 

character  that  all  persons  have  a  165  Pa.  St.  37,  30  Atl.  511  (1894). 

right  of  passage  over  them  upon  But  as  the  owners  of  the  bridge 

payment  of  the  established  rates.  do  not  assume  the  control  or  pos- 

United    States. — See    Evansville  session    of    goods    and    passengers 

Traction  Co.  v.  Henderson  Bridge  conveyed,    or   passing    across    the 

Co.,  134  Fed.  973  (1904).  bridge,  they  do  not  come  under  the 

California. — Norris   v.    Farmers'  extraordinary  liabilities  of  common 

&  Teamsters'  Co.,  6  Cal.  590,  65  carriers. 

Am.  Dec.  535  (1856).  United  States.— Kentucky  &  L. 

Kentucky. — Covington  &c.  Bridge  Bridge  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Covington  &c.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  Co.,  37  Fed.  567  (1889). 

93  Ky.  136, 19 S.  W.  403, 15  L.  R.  A.  South      Carolina—  Grigsby      v. 

828  (1892).  Chappell,  5  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  443 

New  York. — Thompson  v.  Mat-  (1852).  See  §  146,  infra,  as  to  rail- 
thews,  2  Edw.  Ch.  212  (1834).  way  bridges. 

Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg    &    W. 

[45] 


§  54  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

fended.  In  the  leading  case  of  the  Binghamton  Bridge  l 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  said:  "They  are  deemed 
beneficial  to  the  country,  and  this  benefit  constitutes  the 
consideration  and  in  most  cases  the  sole  consideration  for 
the  grant.  The  purposes  to  be  attained  are  generally  be- 
yond the  ability  of  individual  enterprise  and  can  only  be 
accomplished  through  the  aid  of  associated  wealth.  This 
will  not  be  risked  unless  privileges  are  given  and  securities 
furnished  in  the  act  of  incorporation.  The  wants  of  the 
public  are  often  so  imperative  that  a  duty  is  imposed  on 
government  to  provide  for  them;  and  as  experience  has 
proved  that  a  State  should  not  directly  attempt  to  do  this, 
it  is  necessary  to  confer  on  others  the  faculty  of  doing 
what  the  sovereign  power  is  unwilling  to  undertake." 

§  54.  Bonded  warehouses. 

That  an  exclusive  franchise  constituting  a  legal  monop- 
oly puts  the  person  who  possesses  it  in  the  position  of 
public  servant  should  be  clear.  The  leading  case  upon 
legal  monopoly  is  Allnutt  v.  Inglis.2  The  question  raised 
was  whether  the  London  Dock  Company  had  a  right  to 
insist  upon  an  arbitrary  hire  for  receiving  wines  into  its 
warehouses,  or  whether  they  were  bound  to  receive  them 
there  for  a  reasonable  reward  only.  It  appeared  that  by 
virtue  of  the  Warehousing  Act  that  company  alone  had 

1  The     Binghamton     Bridge,     3  Kentucky. — Arnold  v.  Covington 

Wall.  51,  18  L.  ed.  137  (1865).    To  &c.     Bridge    Co.,     1     Duv.    372 

the  same  effect  as  to  the  propriety  (1864). 

of  the  grant  of  special  legal  privi-  Massachusetts. — Central     Bridge 

leges  in  aid  of  the  construction  of  Corp.    v.   Lowell,    15    Gray,     106 

bridges,  see:  (1860). 

United  States. — City  of  Leredo  v.  North  Carolina. — Contra  Wash- 
International  Bridge  Co.,  66  Fed.  ington  Toll  Bridge  v.  Beaufort,  81 
246,  14  C.  C.  A.  1  (1895).  N.  C.  491  (1879). 

Connecticut. — Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Ohio. — Young    v.    Buckingham, 

Co.  v.  Hartford  &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Ohio,  485  (1832). 

17  Conn.  40,  42  Am.  Dec.  716  (1845).  z  12  East,  527  (1810). 

[46] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE        [  §  55 

the  legal  privilege  of  taking  goods  in  bond  in  the  port  of 
London.  What  Lord  Ellenborough  said  in  that  case  de- 
serves careful  consideration:  "There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
general  principle  is  favored  both  in  law  and  justice,  that 
every  man  may  fix  what  price  he  pleases  upon  his  own 
property  or  the  use  of  it;  but  if,  for  a  particular  purpose, 
the  public  have  a  right  to  resort  to  his  premises  and  make 
use  of  them,  and  he  have  a  monopoly  in  them  for  that 
purpose,  if  he  will  take  the  benefit  of  that  monopoly,  he 
must  as  an  equivalent  perform  the  duty  attached  to  it 
on  reasonable  terms.  Here  then  the  company's  ware- 
houses were  invested  with  the  monopoly  of  a  public 
privilege,  and  therefore  they  must  by  law  confine  them- 
selves to  take  reasonable  rates  for  the  use  of  them  for 
that  purpose."1 

§  55.  Log  driving. 

Weymouth  v.  Penobscot  Log  Driving  Company,2  a 
case  outside  the  beaten  track,  is  a  modern  instance  of  this 
principle,  that  the  doctrine  of  public  calling  will  be  ex- 
tended to  any  case  in  which  the  decisive  circumstance  of 
legal  monopoly  is  shown.  This  was  an  action  brought 
against  the  log  driving  company  by  a  lumberman  whose 
logs  had  not  been  taken  although  he  had  notified  the 
company  in  due  form.  The  company  requested  the  court 
to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  corporation  was  not  under  any 
legal  obligation  to  drive  the  logs  upon  request.  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Danforth  held  that  the  instruction  was  properly  re- 
fused under  the  circumstances.  "In  this  case  the  charter 
conferred  the  privilege  of  driving,  not  a  part,  not  such  a 
portion  as  the  company  might  choose,  but  'all'  the  logs 
to  be  driven.  This  right  having  been  accepted  by  the 

1  As  to  the  public  character  of         2  71  Me.  29  (1880). 
warehouses  in  general,  see  the  anno- 
tation to  §  140,  infra. 

[47] 


§  56  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

company,  it  became  a  vested  and  also  an  exclusive  right. 
It  is  therefore  taken  not  only  from  all  other  corporations, 
but  excludes  the  owner  as  well.  By  its  acceptance  and 
exclusion  of  the  owner  from  the  privilege,  in  justice  and 
in  law  it  assumed  an  obligation  corresponding  to,  and 
commensurate  with  its  privilege."1 

Topic  B.  Eminent  Domain 

§  56.  Eminent  domain  for  public  purposes. 

It  has  often  been  remarked  how  frequently  eminent 
domain  is  granted  to  companies  which  are  conducting 
public  services.  Indeed,  it  has  often  urged  that  the  reason 
that  such  companies  may  be  regulated  by  law  is  because 
they  have  been  endowed  with  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main, and  are  therefore  quasi-public  corporations.  This 
reasoning,  however,  seems  to  be  inadequate  if  the  matter  is 
sufficiently  analyzed,  because  it  is  taking  the  effect  for  the 
cause.  A  legislature  can  give  a  railroad  or  a  canal,  the 
right  of  eminent  domain  only  because  the  company,  ir- 
respective of  the  enjoyment  of  that  right,  is  already  public 
in  character;  for  private  property,  under  our  constitutional 
limitations,  cannot  be  taken,  even  when  compensation 
is  given,  except  for  public  purposes.  A  few  examples 
of  the  businesses  for  which  it  has  been  held  eminent 
domain  may  be  given  will  make  the  point  plainer,  that 

1  Log  driving  is  so  affected  with  New  York. — Matter  of  Burns, 
a  public  interest  as  to  justify  the  155  N.  Y.  23,  49  N.  E.  246  (1898). 
grant  of  various  special  legal  privi-  And  yet  as  the  service  is  con- 
leges  to  those  engaged  in  it.  ducted  it  is  not  common  carriage. 

United  Stales. — Boom  Co.  v.  Pat-  Michigan. — Mann  v.  White  River 

terson,  98  U.  S.  403  (1878).  Log  &  Booming  Co.,  46  Mich.  38, 

Maine.— Penobscot  Log  D.  Co.  8   N.   W.   550,   41  Am.   Rep.   141 

v.  West  Branch  D.  &  R.  Dam  Co.,  (1881). 

99  Me.  452,  59  Atl.  593  (1905).  New  York.— Pike  v.  Nash,  3  Abb. 

Minnesota. — Cotton    v.    Missis-  App.  Dec.  610,  1  Keyes,  335  (1864). 
sippi  River  Boom  Co.,  22  Minn.  372 
(1876). 

[48] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PEIVILEGE        [  §  57 


it  is  only  in  public  employment  that  eminent  domain 
may  be  granted.  Thus  according  to  all  the  cases  emi- 
nent domain  may  be  granted  for  such  extraordinary 
businesses  as  electric  plants  1  and  telegraph  lines,2  while 
if  it  is  attempted  to  give  eminent  domain  for  businesses 
essentially  private,  such  as  sugar  factories 3  or  paper 
mills,4  the  grant  is  held  unconstitutional. 

§  57.  Tramways. 

It  is  common  knowledge  that  the  tramway  was  the  di- 
rect successor  of  the  turnpike  and  the  immediate  pred- 
ecessor of  the  railroad.  It  was  expected  at  the  outset 
that  like  the  turnpike  it  would  furnish  a  highway  over 
which  those  who  had  provided  themselves  with  proper 
wagons  and  sufficient  beasts  would  haul  their  goods  as 


1  Georgia. — Jones  v.  North  Geor- 
gia Electric   Co.,  125  Ga.  618,    54 
S.  E.  85  (1906). 

Maine. — Brown  v.  Gerald,  100 
Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A. 
472  (1905). 

Missouri. — State  v.  Allen,  178 
Mo.  555,  77  S.  W.  868  (1903). 

New  Hampshire. — Rockingham 
County  Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Hobb, 
72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.  R.  A. 
581  (1904). 

New  York. — Palmer  v.  Larch- 
mont  Electric  Co.,  158  N.  Y.  231, 
52  N.  E.  1092  (1899). 

Ohio. — Callen  v.  Columbus  Edi- 
son Electric  Co.,  66  Oh.  St.  166,  58 
L.  R.  A.  782,  64  N.  E.  141  (1902). 

Pennsylvania. — Haverford  Elec- 
tric Co.  v.  Hart,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  369 
( 1891 ) .  See  the  full  citation  of  cases 
establishing  that  the  business  of 
electric  lighting  is  public  in  charac- 
ter, §  113, infra. 

2  Alabama. — New  Orleans,  M.  & 


T.  R.  Co.  v.  Southern  &  A.  Tele- 
graph Co.,  53  Ala.  211  (1875). 

Arkansas. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Short,  53  Ark.  434,  14 
S.  W.  649,  9  L.  R.  A.  744  (1890). 

New  Jersey. — Trenton  &  N.  B. 
Tp.  Co.  v.  American  &  E.  News 
Co.,  43  N.  J.  L.  381  (1881). 

New  York. — Eels  v.  American 
Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.,  143 
N.  Y.  133,  38  N.  E.  202,  25  L.  R.  A. 
640  (1894). 

Utah.— Postal  Telegraph  Cable 
Co.  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
Utah,  474,  65  Pac.  735,  90  Am.  St. 
Rep.  705  (1901). 

Virginia. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Williams,  86  Va.  696, 
11  S.  E.  106,  8  L.  R.  A.  429,  19  Am. 
St.  Rep.  908  (1890).  See  §  157, 
infra. 

3  Getchell    v.    Benton,    30    Neb. 
870,  47  N.  W.  468  (1890). 

4  Harding  v.  Goodlett,   3    Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  40,  24  Am.  Dec.  546  (1832). 

[49] 


§  58  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

they  pleased.  Unlike  the  turnpike,  however,  existing 
roads  could  not  be  utilized  and  incorporated  into  the 
system.  Such  railways  must  strike  across  country  for 
themselves,  and  eminent  domain  was  consequently  nec- 
essary to  get  the  right  of  way  without  interruptions.  It 
has  certainly  always  been  law  that  when  such  tramways 
are  thus  open  to  public  use  they  are  in  the  public  service 
and  may  be  given  eminent  domain.1  In  this  way  the 
law  was  prepared  for  that  very  different  business  of  mod- 
ern railroad  operation  where  the  use  of  the  right  of  way  is 
necessarily  confined  exclusively  to  the  company  conduct- 
ing the  transportation.2 

§  68.  Railways. 

When  the  right  of  eminent  domain  was  first  given  to 
the  early  railroads  its  constitutionality  was  doubted.  All 
such  doubts  were  set  at  rest  by  the  masterly  opinion  of 
Chief  Justice  Ruffin  in  Raleigh  &  Gaston  Railroad  v. 
Davis,3  in  the  course  of  which  he  showed  his  apprecia- 
tion of  the  benefits  accruing  from  the  undertaking  of 
public  services  by  private  concerns.  "An  immense  and 
beneficial  revolution  has  been  brought  about  in  modern 
tunes  by  engaging  individual  enterprise,  industry  and 
economy  in  the  execution  of  public  works  of  internal  im- 
provement. The  general  management  has  been  left  to 
individuals  whose  private  interests  prompt  them  to  con- 
duct it  beneficially  to  the  public,  but  it  is  not  entirely 
confided  to  them.  From  the  nature  of  their  undertaking 
and  the  character  of  the  work  they  are  under  sufficient 
responsibilities  to  insure  the  construction  and  preserva- 

1  In  Leigh  v.  Garysburg  Mfg.  Co.,  if  its  proprietors  open  it  to  the  use 

132  N.  C.  167,  43  S.  E.  632  (1903),  of  all  desirous  of  availing  themselves 

it  is  recognized  that  a  tramway  con-  of  it. 

structed  to  haul  out  logs  will  be  2  See  §  144,  infra. 

sufficiently  public  in  character  to  3  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  451  (1837). 
justify  the  grant  of  eminent  domain 

[50] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE       [  §  59 

tion  of  the  work,  which  is  the  great  object  of  the  govern- 
ment." 1 

§  59.  Pipe  lines. 

Upon  the  same  principle  it  has  been  held  that  the  right 
of  taking  property  by  eminent  domain  may  be  conferred 
upon  a  pipe  line  system  constructed  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  oil.  The  right  having  been  conferred  by  the 
West  Virginia  2  legislature  upon  a  certain  company  the 
act  was  attacked  as  unconstitutional,  because  the  taking 
was  not  for  a  public  purpose;  but  the  Supreme  Court  of 
that  State  speaking  by  Mr.  Justice  Moore  said:  "It  has 
been  decided,  time  and  time  again,  and  is  therefore 
settled  by  the  best  authority,  that  the  construction  of 
railroads,  turnpikes,  canals,  ferries,  telegraphs,  wharves, 
basins,  etc.,  constitutes  what  is  generally  known  by  the 
name  of  internal  improvements,  and  gives  occasion  for 
the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  And  other 
measures  of  general  utility  in  which  the  public  at  large 
are  interested,  and  which  require  the  appropriation  of 
private  property,  are  within  the  power  where  they  fall 

1  The  subsequent   decisions   jus-  Michigan. — Swan  v.  Williams,  2 

tifying  the  grant  of  eminent  domain  Mich.  427  (1852). 

in  aid  of  a  public  railway  are  too  New    Hampshire. — Concord     R. 

numerous  to  be  included  here  in  R.   Co.   v.    Greely,    17    N.  H.  47 

full;  the  general  doctrine  is  suffi-  (1845). 

ciently  shown  in  the  earlier  cases,  South  Carolina. — Louisville  C.  & 

such  as:  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chappell,  Rice,  383 

United  States.— Secombe  v.  Mil-  (1839). 

waukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.,  23  Wall.  2  West  Virginia  Transp.  Co.  v. 

108,  23  L.  ed.  67  (1874).  Volcanic  O.  &  C.  Co.,  5  W.  Va.  382 

California. — San  Francisco  A.  &  (1872).    "A  pipe  line  company  is  a 

S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Caldwell,  31  Cal.  common  carrier  bound  to  receive 

367  (1866).  and  transport  for  all  persons  alike 

Iowa. — Noll  v.  Dubuque  B.  &  M.  all   goods   intrusted   to   its   care." 

R.  R.  Co.  32  Iowa,  66  (1871).  Giffin  v.    South    West    Pa.    Pipe 

Maryland.— Shipley  v.  Baltimore  Lines,  172  Pa.  St.  580,  33  Atl.  578 

&  Potomac  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Md.  336  (1896). 
(1871). 

[51] 


§  60  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

within  the  reasons  underlying  the  cases  mentioned.  The 
charter  granted  to  the  West  Virginia  Transportation 
Company  by  special  enactment  of  the  legislature,  shows 
that  the  object  was  to  construct  a  line  for  the  transpor- 
tation of  petroleum.  The  charter  also  established  the 
maximum  charges  the  company  should  make  for  trans- 
portation of  oils.  I  cannot  see  the  propriety  of  admitting 
a  railroad  or  canal  or  aqueduct  to  be  an  internal  improve- 
ment, and  declare  this  tube  highway  not  to  be."  1 

§  60.  Transmission  lines. 

It  is  difficult  to  say,  as  the  authorities  stand  at  the 
present  moment,  whether  the  transmission  of  electric 
energy  to  be  utilized  as  power  is  public  in  character  or 
not.  Of  course  in  particular  cases  there  is  no  public 
employment  if  those  engaged  in  the  transmission  have 
made  no  profession  to  sell  the  power  to  the  public  in 
general,  but  are  either  using  the  power  transmitted  in 
their  own  business  exclusively  or  are  making  special 
contracts  with  particular  customers.2  But  if  the  power 
company  holds  itself  out  as  ready  to  serve  all  customers 
indifferently  to  the  extent  of  its  capacity  it  would  seem 
that  in  such  a  case  the  business  is  sufficiently  public  to 

1  Although  there  are  now  several  Pennsylvania. — Columbia     Con- 
statutes  declaring  that  pipe  lines  duit    Co.    v.    Commonwealth,    90 
shall  be  at  the  service  of  the  public,  Pa.  St.  307  (1879). 
there  are  as  yet  only  a  few  decisions  West    Virginia. — West    Virginia 
to  that  effect;  but  there  are  enough  Transportation  Co.  v.  Ohio  R.  Pipe 
to  make  the  prediction  safe  that  the  Line  Co.,  22  W.  Va.  600,  46  Am. 
constitutionality  of  these  statutes  Rep.  527  (1883). 
will  be  upheld.    The  cases  nearest  2  Vermont. — A  very    v.    Vermont 
in  point  that  have  been  found  are  Electric  Co.,  75  Vt.  235,  54  Atl.  179, 
subjoined:  59  L.  R.  A.  817,  98  Am.  St.  Rep. 

New    York.— Bloomfield    &    R.  818  (1902). 

Natural  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Richard-  Virginia. — Fallsburg    v.  Alexan- 

son,  63  Barb.  437  (1872).  der,  101  Va.  98,  43  S.  W.  194,  61  L. 

Ohio.— Re  Ohio  Valley  Gas  Co.,  R.  A.  129,  99   Am.  St.  Rep.  855 

6  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  200  (1897).  (1903). 

[52] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE       [  §  61 

justify  the  grant  of  eminent  domain  to  gain  right  of  way 
for  its  transmission  lines.1  The  modern  policy  leading 
the  courts  to  this  conclusion,  that  the  business  of  sup- 
plying electricity  for  power  is  now  public  in  character 
is  thus  fully  set  forth  in  a  late  New  Hampshire  case  2 
which  relies  much  upon  the  present  day  demand  for 
power.  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  recent  Maine  case  3  the 
court  insists  that  the  service  is  not  sufficiently  necessary 
to  the  public  to  justify  eminent  domain.4  But  this  ar- 
gument may  easily  be  pressed  too  far  in  this  subject. 
A  man  may  make  provision  for  illuminating  his  premises 
without  the  aid  of  the  State,  and  yet  as  is  conceded  by 
the  court,  the  distribution  of  electricity  for  lighting  is 
public  in  character  beyond  question.5 

§  61.  Elevated  conveyors. 

Another  method  of  transportation  which  is  met  with 
in  the  reports  is  the  elevated  conveyor  or  cable  tramway. 
It  is  described  in  one  case  as  consisting  of  two  elevated 
cables  held  upon  supports  so  as  to  run  parallel  to  each 
other  about  ten  feet  apart  on  which  buckets  are  carried 
along  by  means  of  a  moving  trolley,  one  line  bringing 
the  buckets  in  one  direction,  the  other  in  the  other.6  In 

1  United       States. — Walker       v.  2  Rockingham   County   Light   & 

Shasta  Power  Co.,    160   Fed.  856  Power  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  supra. 

(1908).  3  Brown    v.    Gerald,     100    Me. 

Georgia.— Jones  v.  North  Georgia  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A.  472 

Electric  Co.,  125  Ga.  618,  54  S.  E.  (1905). 

85  (1906).  *  State  ex  rel.  v.  Superior  Court 

New     Hampshire. — Rockingham  of  Thurston  County,  42  Wash.  660, 

County  Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Hobb,  85  Pac.  666,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  672 

72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.  R.  A.  (1906),  is  apparently  in  full  accord 

581  (1904).  with   Brown   v.   Gerald,   which    it 

New  York. — Re  Niagara  L.  &  O.  quoted  with  approval. 

Power  Co.,  Ill  App.  Div.  686,  97  5  See  §  113,  infra. 

N.  Y.  Supp.  853  (1906).    See  also  6  Matter  of  the  Split  Rock  Cable 

the  full  citation  of  cases  relating  to  Road  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  408,  28  N.  E. 

electric  power,  §  114,  infra.  506  (1891). 

[531 


§§  62,  63  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

that  particular  case  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  re- 
fused to  permit  such  a  road  to  exercise  the  power  of  emi- 
nent domain  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  wholly  engaged 
in  serving  the  concern  which  controlled  it,  transporting 
rock  from  its  quarry  to  its  works,  both  termini  being 
upon  its  private  premises.  However,  it  would  seem  that 
if  such  elevated  conveyor  was  really  operated  as  a  common 
carrier  offering  to  transport  all  freight,  that  should  be 
offered  to  it  suitable  to  be  carried  in  buckets,  it  might 
well  be  held  in  public  employment.1 

§  62.  Lumber  flumes. 

Another  unusual  public  service  is  the  maintenance  of 
a  flume  through  which  lumber  may  be  brought  from 
rather  distant  forests  to  convenient  points.  These  flumes 
are  commonly  constructed  by  those  owning  timber  lands 
in  the  region  served;  but  it  is  often  true  that  other  owners 
may  make  use  of  the  flume  by  paying  a  proper  price. 
In  such  a  case  there  would  seem  to  be  no  objection  to 
granting  eminent  domain  to  aid  in  their  construction,  as 
the  service  would  then  be  public  in  character.  In  the 
leading  case  involving  such  flumes,2  Judge  Strahan  for 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Oregon  said:  "The  public  certainly 
have  an  interest  in  the  cheap  delivery  of  the  timber, 
lumber,  and  other  products  of  the  forest,  or  whatever 
other  commodity  may  be  transported  by  being  floated 
to  cities  or  other  places  for  consumption."  3 

§  63.  Mining  tunnels. 

Still  another  enterprise  found  necessary  for  the  de- 
velopment of  natural  resources  is  the  mining  tunnel.  In 
several  of  the  western  States  corporations  are  chartered 

1  See  other  cases  as  to  mechanical      hart,    16    Oreg.   67,    19    Pac.    78 
conveyors,  §  98,  infra.  (1888). 

2  Dalles  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Urqu-         *  To  the  same  effect  is  Maffet  v. 

Quine,  93  Fed.  347  (1899). 

[54] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE        [  §  64 

for  the  sole  purpose  of  boring  such  tunnels  and  are  given 
the  power  of  eminent  domain  to  pass  through  the  various 
locations.  In  defending  the  grant  of  this  power  in  the 
case  of  Tanner  v.  Treasury  Tunnel,  Mining  &  Reduction 
Company,1  Chief  Justice  Gabbert  said:  "The  number 
who  may  avail  themselves  of  the  benefit  of  the  tunnels 
will  be  limited,  but  this  is  merely  the  result  of  natural 
conditions  arising  from  the  character  and  location  of 
mining  properties.  The  use  and  benefit  of  the  tunnel  will 
be  in  common,  and  may  be  enjoyed  by  all  those  whose 
properties  are  so  located  with  reference  thereto  that  they 
may  avail  themselves  if  they  so  desire,  of  the  oppor- 
tunities thus  afforded  for  the  development  and  operation 
of  their  properties."  2 

Topic  C.  Aid  from  Taxation 

§  64.  Public  purposes  of  taxation. 

Another  basis  of  the  right  of  public  regulation  is  said 
to  be  the  receipt  by  the  regulated  company  of  aid  from 
taxation.  And  indeed  it  is  in  public  businesses  that  the 
various  forms  of  State  aid  are  given,  either  in  the  form  of 
direct  grant  or  public  guaranty.  It  is  doubtless  true,  in 
general,  that  a  business  which  receives  public  aid  from 
taxation  is  a  public  business,  and  is  subject  to  public 
regulation;  but  again  the  effect  seems  to  have  been  taken 
for  the  cause.  Under  our  constitutions  State  aid  can  be 
granted  only  for  a  public  purpose;  the  character  of  the 
enterprise  does  not  result  from  the  grant  of  State  aid,  for 
it  must  precede  it  in  order  to  make  the  grant  valid.  Thus 
State  aid  may  be  given  to  such  recognized  public  services 

1  35  Colo.  593,  83  Pac.  464,   4  United  States.— Baillie  v.  Larson, 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  106  (1906).  138  Fed.  177  (1905). 

2  There    are    several    cases    sub-  New    Jersey. — DeCamp    v.    Hi- 
stantially  to  the  same  effect,  among  hernia  R.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  L.  43 
them:  (1885). 

[55] 


§65] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


as  telephone  lines  J  or  irrigation  reservoirs,2  not  to  men- 
tion such  obvious  cases  as  street  railways  3  and  railroad 
terminals; 4  but  State  aid  may  not  be  given  to  such 
private  business  as  a  box  mill 5  and  a  coal  yard,6  or  even 
to  great  enterprises  such  as  foundries  7  and  factories.8 

§  65.  Gristmills. 

From  tune  immemorial  the  gristmill  has  been  held  to 
be  in  public  service.  There  are  many  early  cases  which 
bring  out  the  obligation  of  the  proprietor  of  a  gristmill 
who  is  receiving  the  grain  of  the  community  to  grind,  to 
serve  all  without  discrimination.9  So  necessary  are  such 
mills  in  the  early  economy  when  the  immediate  country 
is  entirely  dependent  upon  turning  its  crops  into  food 
that  the  propriety  of  State  aid  for  such  works  has  seldom 
been  questioned.10  There  is  a  decision  as  to  gristmills  in 


1  Northwestern    Telephone    Ex- 
change Co.  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  76  Minn.  334  (1899). 

2  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District  v. 
Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  41  L.  ed. 
369,  17  Sup.  Ct.  56  (1896). 

3  Attorney-General    v.     Pingree, 
120  Mich.  550,  79  N.  W.  814  (1899). 

4  Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners, 
180  Mass.  274,  62  N.  E.  397  (1880). 

6  Allen  v.  Jay,  60  Me.  124,  11  Am. 
Rep.  185  (1872). 

6  Opinion  of  Justices,  182  Mass. 
605,  66  N.  E.  25  (1882). 

7  Loan  Association  v.  Topeka,  20 
Wall.  655,  22  L.  ed.  455  (1874). 

8  Cole  v.  La  Grange,  113  U.  S.  1, 
28  L.  ed.  896,  5  Sup.  Ct.  416  (1884). 

9  United    States. — Munn    v.     Il- 
linois, 94  U.  S.  113,  24  L.  ed.  77 
(1876),  semble. 

Alabama. — Sadler  v.  Langham, 
34  Ala.  311  (1859). 

Georgia. — Loughbridge  v.  Harris, 
42  Ga.  500  (1871). 

[561 


Maine. — State  v.  Edwards,  86 
Me.  102,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  528 
(1893). 

Nebraska. — Getchell  v.  Benton, 
30  Neb.  870,  47  N.  W.  468  (1890). 

Virginia. — Tuckahoe  Canal  Co. 
v.  Tuckahoe  Ry.  Co.,  11  Leigh,  42 
(1840),  semble. 

West  Virginia. — West  v.  Raw- 
son,  40  W.  Va.  480,  21  S.  E.  1019 
(1895). 

10  Upon  similar  principles  eminent 
domain  may  be  given  to  aid  in  the 
construction  of  the  works  of  a  grist- 
mill, particularly  to  acquire  flow- 
age  rights. 

Illinois. — Gaylord  v.  Sanitary 
District,  204  111.  576,  68  N.  E.  522, 
63  L.  R.  A.  582,  98  Am.  St.  Rep. 
235  (1903). 

Kentucky. — Shackelford's  Heirs 
v.  Coffey,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  40  (1830). 

Massachusetts. — Boston  &  Rox- 
bury  Mill  Corp.  v.  Newman,  12 
Pick.  467,  23  Am.  Dec.  622  (1832). 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE       [  §  66 

the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  1  in  which  the 
tests  are  discussed  by  which  the  public  character  of  a 
business  may  be  judged.  The  issue  was  whether  an  issue 
of  bonds  made  to  aid  in  the  construction  and  completion 
of  a  steam  custom  gristmill  within  the  township,  was 
valid.  The  Constitution  empowered  the  execution  of 
bonds  for  the  purpose  of  building  bridges,  free  or  other- 
wise, or  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  railroads  or  water 
power  by  donation  thereto  or  taking  stock  therein,  or  for 
other  works  of  public  improvement.  Mr.  Justice  Hunt  in 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  said  in  part:  "Does 
such  an  establishment  fall  within  the  description  of  other 
works  of  internal  improvement?  It  would  require  great 
nicety  of  reasoning  to  give  a  definition  of  the  expression 
internal  improvement  which  would  show  that  the  means 
of  transportation  were  more  valuable  to  the  people  of 
Kansas  than  the  means  of  obtaining  bread.  It  would  be 
a  poor  consolation  to  the  people  of  this  town  to  give  them 
the  power  of  going  in  or  out  of  the  town  upon  a  railroad, 
while  they  were  refused  the  means  of  grinding  their 
wheat."2 

§  66.  Sawmills. 

There  is  some  evidence  that  in  certain  States  sawmills 
are v  regarded  as  public   services  also.     They   are  thus 

Tennessee. — Harding  v.  Goodlett,  2  In  view  of  this  decision  it  is 

3  Yerg.  41,  24  Am.  Dec.  546  (1832).  rather  curious  that  in  Osborne  v. 

But  the  mill  must  be  conducted  Adams  County,  106  U.  S.  181,  27 

as  a  public  one  or  special  rights  may  L.  ed.  129  (1882),  it  was  held  that 

not  be  given.  a  steam  power  gristmill  could  not 

Georgia. — Loughbridge  v.  Harris,  be  aided  under  a  Nebraska  statute, 

42  Ga.  500  (1871).  but  the  terms  of  the  Nebraska  acts 

Vermont. — Tyler  v.  Beacher,  44  were  not  so  broad.  In  Blair  v. 

Vt.  648,  8  Am.  Rep.  398  (1871).  Cuming  County,  111  U.  S.  363, 

1  Township  of  Burlington  v.  Beas-  28  L.  ed.  457  (1884),  strangely 

ley,  94  U.  S.  310,  24  L.  ed.  161  enough  a  water  power  gristmill  was 

(1876).  held  within  the  Nebraska  statute. 

[57] 


§  67  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

grouped  with  gristmills  in  State  v.  Edwards,1  Haskell,  J., 
saying,  "Mills  for  the  grinding  of  grain  and  for  the  sawing 
of  lumber  for  all  comers  have  been  aided  or  established  by 
the  legislature  from  the  earliest  Colonial  times.  Those 
mills  were  usually  water  mills;  but  it  is  of  no  moment 
what  the  propelling  power  may  be.  They  have  always 
been  considered  so  necessary  for  the  existence  of  the 
community  that  it  was  proper  for  government  to  foster 
or  maintain  them;  and  in  the  absence  of  government  aid, 
the  individual  proprietor,  not  pretending  to  serve  the 
public,  might  maintain  such  mills  as  private  mills,  free 
from  legislative  interference,  precisely  as  he  might  main- 
tain a  store,  shop  or  other  private  business;  but  when 
such  proprietor  makes  his  mill  public,  assumes  to  serve  the 
public,  then  he  dedicates  his  mill  to  public  use  and  it 
becomes  a  public  mill,  subject  to  public  regulation  and 
control.  He  is  not  compelled  to  continue  such  public  use, 
but  so  long  as  he  does,  he  becomes  a  public  servant  and 
may  be  regulated  by  the  public."  2 

§  67.  Drainage. 

Drainage,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  example  of  a  public 
necessity  3  that  is  almost  always  provided  for  by  the 
State  itself  in  some  other  way  than  by  the  chartering  of 
public  service  companies.  Indeed  it  is  usually  arranged 
for  by  governmental  agencies,  such  as  reclamation  dis- 
tricts, with  the  extraordinary  power  of  levying  assessments 
upon  those  benefited.4  It  is  possible  that  a  public  corpo- 
ration might  be  duly  empowered  to  construct  a  drainage 

^GMe.  102,  29  Atl.  947, 25  L.  R.  s  See  Laguna  Drainage  District 

A.  504,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  528  (1893).  v.  Martin  Co.,  144  Cal.  209,  77  Pac. 

2  Sawmills  are  included   in    the  933  (1904). 

list  of  public  mills  in  Gaylord  v.  4  Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Draining 

Sanitary  Dist.,  204  111.  576,  68  N.  E.  Co.,  12  Neb.  163,  10  N.  W.  547 

522,  63  L.  R.  A.  582,  98  Am.  St.  (1881). 
Rep.  235  (1903). 

[58] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE  [  §§  68,  69 

system  :  and  take  such  reasonable  profit  as  it  might  get 
by  the  charges  it  could  collect  from  those  who  wished  to 
avail  themselves  of  the  benefit  of  its  system.  But  it  is 
beyond  the  range  of  possibility  that  any  corporation  of 
such  sort  can  be  given  the  power  to  coerce  unwilling 
customers  to  deal  with  it  by  compulsory  assessments.2 

§  68.  Sewerage. 

Sewerage  systems  likewise  are  usually  constructed  by 
governmental  bodies  so  that  examples  of  the  conduct  of 
this  service  by  private  corporations  are  practically  un- 
known. But  it  is  plain  that  in  their  conduct  by  a  govern- 
mental body  the  principles  of  the  public  service  law  must 
be  obeyed.  Thus  in  a  recent  case  3  the  city  of  Mobile  was 
enjoined  against  maintaining  a  schedule  outrageously 
discriminatory.  Mr.  Justice  Haralson  saying,  emphatic- 
ally, "These  sewers  of  the  city  are  for  the  public  at  large 
and  every  one  should  be  permitted  to  use  them  without 
any  discrimination  in  charges  against  him.  The  franchise 
to  construct  sewers  being  in  the  nature  of  a  public  use, 
the  duty  is  on  the  city  to  supply  sewerage  at  rates  to  all 
impartially  on  reasonable  terms."  4 

§  69.  Cemeteries. 

The  absolute  necessity  of  public  cemeteries  is  obvious. 
This  necessity  may  be  met  either  by  cemeteries  owned 
directly  by  the  government  or  by  chartered  corporations. 
Such  corporations  are  rarely  empowered  to  take  private 
profit  from  the  conduct  of  the  cemetery,  but  are  obliged 
to  devote  their  receipts  to  the  purposes  of  the  cemetery.5 

1  See  O'Reiley  et  al.  v.  Kankakee     ply  Co.,  130  Ala.  379,  30  So.  445 
Valley  Draining  Co.,  32  Ind.  169      (1901). 

(1869).                                           .  4  See  Opinion  of  the  Justices,  150 

2  See  Kean  v.  Driggs  Drainage  Mass.  592,  596,  24  N.  E.  1084,  8 
Co.,  45  N.  J.  L.  91  (1883).  L.  R.  A.  487  (1890). 

3  Mobile  v.  Bienville  Water  Sup-  6  See  Davis  v.  Coventry,  65  Kans. 

557,  70  Pac.  583(1902). 

[59] 


§  70  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Such  being  the  case  the  law  concerning  them  is  mostly 
that  relating  to  public  charities  which  is  outside  the  scope 
of  this  treatise.  It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  it  is  com- 
mon to  exempt  such  cemeteries  from  taxation  and  these 
exceptions  are  liberally  construed  in  favor  of  the  ceme- 
tery.1 Moreover,  it  is  possible  to  have  cemetery  corpora- 
tions which  are  justified  in  distributing  their  profits  to 
their  stockholders;  and  it  would  seem  on  the  decisions  that 
these  may  receive  State  aid  in  every  form  provided  that 
their  privileges  are  open  to  all  upon  equal  terms.2  "  But  it 
is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  there  are  many 
cemeteries  which  are  strictly  private;  in  which  the  public 
have  not  and  cannot  acquire  the  right  to  bury."  Clearly 
the  proprietors  of  such  cemeteries  cannot  constitutionally 
receive  State  aid.3 

§  70.  Hospitals. 

The  same  situation  exists  as  to  hospitals.  These  are 
usually  organized  as  public  charities  and  the  discussion  of 
the  law  relating  to  them  is  again  outside  the  scope  of  this 
treatise,  which  is  confined  to  such  corporations  engaged 
in  public  service  as  are  entitled  to  take  private  profit. 
Nevertheless  there  may  be  hospitals  of  this  type  which  are 
open  to  all  comers  with  reasonable  restrictions,4  and  it 
would  seem  that  such  hospitals  might  be  given  such  aid 
from  the  State  as  is  deemed  desirable,  particularly  exemp- 
tion from  taxation.  Such  a  hospital  would  seem  to  be 
public  in  character  within  the  definition  of  that  term 
given  in  a  leading  case  5  dealing  with  the  propriety  of 

1  Mt.  Auburn  Cemetery  v.  Cam-     Beecher,  53  Conn.  551,  5  Atl.  353 
bridge,  150  Mass.  12,  22  N.  E.  66,      (1885). 

4  L.  R.  A.  836  (1889).  4  See    People    ex    rel.    Burnham 

2  See  Pokrok  Zapadu  Pub.  Co.  v.  Hospital,  71  111.  App.  246  (1896). 
Zizkovsky,  42  Neb.  64,  60  N.  W.         B  Quoted  from  County  of  Henne- 
358  (1894).  pin  v.  Brotherhood  of  Gethsemane, 

s  Evergreen    Cemetery    Assn.    v.      27  Minn.  460,  8  N.  W.  595  (1881). 

[60] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE        [  §  71 

such  exemptions.  "The  word  'public'  has  two  proper 
meanings.  A  thing  may  be  said  to  be  public  when  owned 
by  the  public  and  also  when  its  uses  are  public." 

Topic  D.  Use  of  Public  Highways 

§  71.  Public  purposes  in  highway  use. 

Many  public  service  companies  are  granted  special 
privileges  in  public  highways  of  one  sort  or  another.  And 
these  rights  in  the  streets  have  often  been  urged  as  a  rea- 
son for  holding  the  user  subject  to  special  regulation  by 
law.  But  here  again  the  point  may  be  urged  that  unless 
these  were  public  purposes  it  would  be  unjustifiable  to 
give  them  special  rights.  Thus  although  special  franchises 
may  be  given  to  gas  companies  to  lay  pipes  through  public 
streets  1  and  to  electric  companies  to  string  their  wires 
along  public  ways  2  these  are  to  be  defended  only  by 
showing  that  the  businesses  themselves  are  public  in 
character.  And  it  is  generally  true  that  the  use  of  high- 
ways may  be  given  in  the  furtherance  of  any  public  pur- 
pose which  is  not  destructive  of  its  use  as  a  highway, 
although  some  uses  are  so  unusual  as  to  constitute  an  ad- 
ditional servitude  for  which  compensation  must  be  made 
to  the  owner  of  the  fee.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  seem 
clear  that  special  rights  in  public  highways  should  not  be 
given  for  private  enterprises  in  which  the  public  has  no 
rights  to  service  even  if  compensation  were  provided, 
such  as  advertising  stands  3  or  private  scales.4  The  en- 

1  Indiana. — See   Indianapolis    v.      mont  Electric  Co.,  158  N.  Y.  231, 
Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396  (1879).  52  N.  E.   1092,  43  L.  R.  A.  672 

Massachusetts. — Boston  v.  Rich-      (1899). 
ardson,  13  Allen,  160  (1866).  »  State  v.  St.  Louis,  161  Mo.  371, 

2  New  Jersey.— Meyers  v.  Hudson      61  S.  W.  658  (1901). 

County  Electric  Co.,  63  N.  J.  L.  «  Emerson  v.  Babcock,  66  la.  257, 
573,  44  Atl.  713  (1899).  26  N.  W.  656,  55  Am.  Rep.  273 

New    York.— Palmer    v.    Larch-      (1885). 

[61] 


§§  72,  73  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

joyment  of  highway  privileges  is  therefore  again  a  case  of 
consequence  rather  than  cause,  since  these  rights  may  only 
be  given  for  the  furtherance  of  a  business  already  deter- 
mined to  be  public  in  character. 

§  72.  River  improvements. 

The  improvement  of  navigable  waters  furnishes  one  of 
the  most  striking  illustrations  of  the  use  of  public  high- 
ways in  enterprises  designed  to  promote  the  service  of  the 
public.  The  improvement  of  rivers  in  particular  has  been 
the  subject  of  great  expenditures.1  This  partial  canaliza- 
tion is  often  accomplished  by  dredging  a  deeper  channel 
by  mechanical  means  or  scouring  it  by  a  jetty  system;  or 
it  may  be  brought  about  by  an  opposite  system  of  slack 
waters  impounded  by  dams  with  weirs,  and  canals  with 
locks.  These  works  are  usually  done  by  the  government 
itself  which,  it  may  be  noted,  often  does  not  charge  toll 
for  their  use.  Still  it  may  be  done  by  private  companies 
specially  chartered,  in  which  case  the  law  is  plain  that 
they  must  permit  all  proper  boats  to  pass  without  dis- 
crimination upon  the  payment  of  reasonable  charges.2 

§  73.  Booms. 

The  boom  companies  which  impound  logs  floated  down- 
stream for  the  benefit  of  their  owners  are  within  the  same 
principles.  As  was  said  in  one  leading  case — Cotton  v. 

1  The     following     cases     among          Wisconsin. — Yellow    River    Im- 

others   relating   to   river   improve-  provement  Co.   v.  Wood  County, 

ments  bear  out  the  text:  81    Wis.   554,   51   N.   W.    1004,  17 

Illinois—  People  ex  rel.  v.  Kan-  S.  R.  A.  92  (1892). 
kakee  River  Improvement  Co.,  103          2  See  the  language  in: 
111.  491  (1882).  United  States.— Sands  v.  Manis- 

Michigan. — Manistee  River  Im-  tee    River    Improvement  Co.,    123 

provement    Co.    v.    Lamport,    49  U.  S.  288,  31  L.  ed.  149  (1887). 
Mich.  442,  13  N.  W.  810.  Texas.— Buffalo      Bayou      Ship 

New    York. — Matter    of    Burns,  Channel  v.  Milby  &  Dow,  63  Tex. 

155,  N.  Y.  23,  49  N.  E.  246  (1898).  492,  51  Am.  Rep.  668,  (1885). 

[62] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE  [  §§  74,  75 

Mississippi  &  Rum  River  Boom  Company 1 — "The 
Mississippi  River  is,  among  other  things,  a  public  high- 
way for  the  running  of  logs,  and  a  boom  company  may 
properly  be  regarded  as  an  improvement  of  the  highway, 
an  improvement,  the  purpose  and  effect  of  which  are  to 
render  the  highway  more  available  and  valuable  for  the 
running  of  logs."  2 

§  74.  Sluices. 

Other  minor  improvements  sometimes  utilized  in  con- 
nection with  river  transportation  are  sluices,  slides,  rollers, 
or  planes  by  which  portages  around  obstacles  are  avoided. 
There  is  a  case  3  as  to  one  such  slide  which  holds  prop- 
erly enough  that  even  if  the  proprietors  are  permitting 
passage  to  all  for  a  regular  toll  they  are  not  common 
carriers.  It  is  obviously  true  that  they  are  not  carriers 
at  all  because  they  do  not  assume  possession  of  what 
passes  through.  Nevertheless  it  should  be  clear  that 
they  are  in  common  employment  and  obliged  to  let  all 
use  the  improved  highway  at  the  established  tolls. 

§  76.  Turnpikes. 

It  has  already  been  made  sufficiently  obvious  that  the 
turnpikes  although  owned  by  corporations  conducting 
them  for  profit  wjere  always  regarded  as  public  highways 
over  which  all  might  pass  by  paying  the  established 

1 22  Minn.  372  (1876).  (1906);  Northwestern  Improvement 

2  See  also  to  the  same  effect:  &  Boom  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  75  Minn. 

United    States—  Boom     Co.     v.  335,  77  N.  W.  989  (1899). 

Patterson,  98  U.  S.  403,  25  L.  ed.  Pennsylvania. — West     Branch 

206  (1878);  Patterson  v.  Mississippi  Lumbermen's  Exchange  v.  Fisher, 

&  R.  R.  Boom  Co.,  18  Fed.   Gas.  150  Pa.  St.  475,  24  Atl.  735  (1892). 

10829(1875).  Wisconsin. — Underwood  Lumber 

Maine. — Lawler  v.  Baring  Boom  Co.  v.  Pelican  Boom  Co.,  76  Wis. 

Co.,  56  Me.  443  (1869).  76,  45  N.  W.  15  (1890). 

Minnesota. — International  Boom  3  Queen  v.  McFarlane,  7  Can.  216 

Co.  v.   Rainy   Lake  River   Boom  (1882). 
Co.,  97  Minn.  513,  107  N.  W.  735 

[63] 


§  76  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tolls.1  This  idea  went  so  far  that  it  was  even  held  jus- 
tifiable for  the  legislature  to  authorize  a  turnpike  com- 
pany to  take  over  existing  public  highways  and  operate 
them  as  part  of  the  turnpike  system,  charging  tolls  for 
passage,  and  to  do  this  without  paying  compensation 
to  the  abutting  owners  as  for  a  change  in  the  character 
of  the  use.  Notwithstanding  what  had  been  a  free  high- 
way before  and  was  now  a  turnpike  with  toll  gates,  the 
court  held  that  it  was  still  a  public  highway  over  which 
all  might  pass,  and  it  was  for  the  legislature  to  judge 
whether  it  was  desirable  to  have  the  public  service  main- 
tained in  this  way.2 

§  76.  Street  railways. 

Of  course  the  most  obvious  illustration  of  the  coinci- 
dence of  street  privileges  with  public  service  is  that  of 
street  railways  with  their  special  rights  to  occupy  the 
public  streets.  And  this  is  seized  upon  in  various  cases  3 
as  the  explanation  of  their  obligations  to  the  public. 
But  this  sort  of  explanation  although  it  contains  a  cer- 
tain truth  4  will  not  account  for  the  fact  that  a  passenger 

1  The     following     cases     among  2  The  following  cases  are  sufficient 

many  others  show  that  turnpikes  evidence  to  this  rule: 

were  commonly  regarded  as  public  California. — Blood  v.   McCarty, 

in  character:  112  Cal,  561,.44  Pac.  1025  (1896). 

United  States. — Covington  &  L.  Michigan. — Attorney  General  v. 

Turnpike  Road  v.   Sandford,    164  Detroit  &  Erin  Plank  Road  Co.,  2 

U.  S.  578,  41  L.  ed.  560,  17  Sup.  Ct.  Mich.  138  (1851). 

198  ( 1896) .  New  Hampshire. — State  v.  Hamp- 

Colorado—  Virginia   Canon   Toll  ton,  2  N.  H.  22  (1819). 

Road  Co.  v.  People,  22  Colo.  429,  Ohio.— Chagrin  Falls  Co.  v.  Cane, 

45  Pac.  398,  37  IT.  R.  A.  711  (1896).  2  Oh.  St.  419  (1853). 

Kentucky. — Winchester  &c.  Turn-  Vermont. — Panton  Turnpike  Co. 

pike  Road  Co.  v.  Croxton,  98  Ky.  v.  Bishop,  11  Vt.  198  (1839). 

739,  34  S.  W.  518,  33  L.  R.  A.  177  3  See  for  one  example  State  v. 

(1898).  Spokane  Ry.  Co.,   19  Wash.  518, 

New    York.— Davis    v.    Mayor,  53  Pac.  719,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  739 

14  N.  Y.  506,  67   Am.    Dec.  186  (1898). 

(1856).  *  See  §  259,  infra. 

[64] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE  [  §§  77,  78 

railway  laid  across  country  without  use  of  the  streets  is 
subject  to  precisely  the  same  law  as  one  laid  upon  the 
highway.  As  is  said  in  East  Omaha  Street  Railway 
Company  v.  Gondola  1  by  Chief  Justice  Post  in  replying 
to  the  contention  that  the  particular  railway  was  not  a 
common  carrier  as  its  right  of  way  was  constructed  upon 
its  own  private  property:  "That  proposition  is  not  it 
seems  to  us  entitled  to  serious  consideration.  The  de- 
fendant by  undertaking  to  transport  passengers  for  hire 
between  Courtland  Beach  and  the  City  of  Omaha  assumed 
the  relation  towards  its  passengers  of  a  common  carrier 
and  the  character  of  the  easement  in  the  right  of  way  is 
wholly  immaterial."  2 

§  77.  Subways. 

Of  late  years  in  many  of  the  largest  cities  subways  have 
been  constructed  beneath  principal  streets.  These  have 
usually  been  built  in  theory  at  least  by  the  municipalities 
themselves  as  special  highways  and  then  exclusive  rights 
for  a  term  of  years  upon  proper  compensation  are  given 
to  some  traction  line  in  analogy  to  street  franchises  for 
surface  railways.  In  litigation  challenging  the  validity 
of  this  method  of  constructing  the  Boston  subway,3  it 
was  held  that  although  these  highways  were  not  free  to 
all  they  provided  facilities  for  public  passage,  and  that 
the  building  of  the  subway  for  the  carriage  of  such  pas- 
sengers as  pay  the  regular  fare  was  therefore  a  proper 
use  of  public  credit.4 

§  78.  Wire  conduits. 

A  late  method  of  permitting  the  use  of  the  streets  by 

1  East  Omaha  Ry  Co.  v.  Goclola,  347,  44  N.  E.  446,  32  L.  R.  A.  610 
50  Neb.  906,  70  N.  W.  491  (1897).  (1896). 

-  See  §  227,  infra,  for  numerous  4  See  also  City  of  New  York  v. 
citations.  Interborough  R.  T.  Co.,  125  N.  Y. 

3  Prince  v.  Crocker,  166  Mass.  App.  D.  437,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  885 

(1908). 

5  [65] 


§  79  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

electrical  companies  is  by  authorizing  the  construction 
of  a  duct  large  enough  to  hold  the  wires  of  various  com- 
panies. The  electrical  subway  company  chartered  for 
such  a  purpose  may  or  may  not  be  given  an  exclusive 
privilege  against  the  construction  of  other  similar  enter- 
prises; it  is  sufficient  that  it  has  a  practical  monopoly. 
For  the  purpose  of  accommodation  of  various  interests 
full  power  of  control  is  often  reserved  by  the  govern- 
mental authority  which  grants  the  rights.  And  some- 
times the  obligations  of  the  conduit  company  to  serve 
proper  applicants  are  defined  in  its  charter.1  In  the  lead- 
ing case  2  it  was  held  that  such  a  corporation  might  prop- 
erly be  given  the  right  to  construct  its  subway  under 
public  streets  although  the  franchise  had  no  provision 
giving  the  electric  companies  the  right  to  use  them.  But 
the  court  held  that  the  business  was  public  in  character 
and  the  use  proposed  to  make  of  the  streets  was  a  public 
one.  "The  corporation  is  not  a  mere  private  one  for 
personal  gain  only,  but  the  business  in  which  it  is  en- 
gaged is  for  the  benefit  of,  and  used  for  the  benefit  of  the 
general  public,  and  in  which  many  companies  are  en- 
gaged all  over  the  United  States  and  elsewhere."  It 
would  seem  plain,  therefore,  that  such  a  conduit  company 
is  a  public  service  itself  and  may  be  obliged  to  give  space 
to  any  applicant  company  having  lawful  power  to  extend 
its  wires  through  the  city. 

§  79.  Pole  lines. 

Upon  the  analogy  of  the  wire  conduit  which  may  either 

1  In  Brush  Elec.  Illuminating  Co.          2  State  ex  rel.  National  Subway 

v.  Consolidated  T.  &  E.  Subway  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  145  Mo.  551,  46 

Co.,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  81  (1891),  it  is  S.  W.  981  (1898),  overruling  State 

held  that  such  explicit  provisions  ex  rel.  St.  Louis  Underground  Serv- 

are    indispensable.     See    also    Re  ice  Co.  v.  Murphy,  134   Mo.  548, 

Long.   Acre  Light  &  P.  Co.,   117  34  S.  W.  51  (1896);  see  also  Purnell 

App.  Div.  80,  102  N.  Y.  Supp.  242  v.  McLane,  98  Md.  589.  56  Atl.  830 

(1907).  (1904). 

[66] 


MONOPOLY  DUE  TO  LEGAL  PRIVILEGE       [  §  80 

be  constructed  by  an  electric  company  engaged  in  public 
service  for  its  own  exclusive  use  or  which  may  be  con- 
ducted for  the  use  of  other  companies  subject  to  the 
public  service  law,  is  the  case  of  the  pole  line  above 
ground.  These  to  be  sure  are  generally  erected  by  an 
electric  company  for  its  own  use;  but  the  other  alterna- 
tive is  not  impossible.  And  the  company  maintaining  a 
pole  line  may  have  so  far  undertaken  to  permit  other 
companies  to  string  wires  on  its  poles  that  it  will  be  com- 
pelled to  do  so  for  subsequent  applicants.  Montgomery 
Light  &  Water  Power  Company  v.  Citizens'  Light,  Heat 
and  Power  Company,1  looks  that  way,  holding  a  fran- 
chise provision  so  providing  enforceable.2 

§  80.  Constitutional  situation  as  to  special  privileges. 

No  attempt  will  be  made  to  write  a  treatise  upon  con- 
stitutional law  here  in  a  few  paragraphs,  for  it  is  recog- 
nized that  one  cannot  make  safe  rules  for  any  branch  of 
the  law  without  the  many  qualifications  which  excep- 
tional cases  dictate.  Yet  as  the  subject  of  constitutional 
law  touches  that  of  the  public  services  so  intimately,  it  is 
fair  to  suggest  what  seems  from  this  inquiry  the  unifying 
principle,  although  in  any  such  generalization  which 
ignores  details,  there  will  necessarily  be  a  certain  per  cent 
of  error.  First  of  all  it  is  clear  from  the  cases  already  cited 
that  none  of  these  special  grants — exclusive  franchise,  emi- 
nent domain,  State  aid,  or  highway  franchises — can  be 
extended  except  for  a  public  purpose.  This  is  the  leading 
principle  in  the  constitutional  law  relating  to  each  of 
these  subjects,  although  there  are  some  negligible  vari- 
ations between  the  various  sets  of  authorities  as  to  what 
is  a  public  purpose,  due  probably  to  the  fact  that  the 
question  has  not  been  considered  as  a  whole,  rather  than 

1  147  Ala.  359,  40  So.  981  (1906).      N.   Y.   App.   Div.  837,  101  N.  Y. 
'See  also  Kuhn  v.  Knight.  115      Supp.  1  (1906). 

[671 


§  80  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

to  any  inherent  differences  as  to  what  constitutes  a  pub- 
lic purpose  in  these  various  subjects.  When  it  is  a  ques- 
tion of  giving  State  aid  in  any  form  to  a  business  enter- 
prise privately  owned  this  public  purpose  must  appear. 
This  does  not  mean  that  such  State  aid  may  always  be 
given  to  the  proprietors  of  all  public  services.  But  unless 
the  public  may  enjoy  the  service  furthered  as  of  right, 
can  the  aid  of  its  owners  truly  be  said  to  be  a  public  pur- 
pose. There  are  several  variations  from  this  rule  in  the 
authorities;  but  properly  considered  they  are  negligible 
in  generalization.  It  is  therefore  only  the  business  which 
is  public  in  character  which  the  State  may  aid  in  further- 
ance of  public  purposes.  For  such  public  businesses  must 
give  the  public  the  service  which  the  law  requires  of  them. 
This  means  that  the  public  businesses  exist  independently 
of  State  aid  and  have  material  differences  from  private 
businesses  which  it  will  be  necessary  to  determine  in  sub- 
sequent chapters.  For  the  present  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
put  forward  as  the  working  hypothesis  that  this  difference 
lies  in  external  conditions.  That  where  there  is  from  any 
cause  a  permanent  condition  of  virtual  monopoly,  whether 
or  not  the  government  has  had  any  hand  in  establishing 
that  monopoly,  the  State  must  take  control  of  the  situa- 
tion for  the  protection  of  the  public,  and  may  constitu- 
tionally do  whatever  the  situation  requires.  The  differ- 
ence between  public  calling  and  private  calling  is  thus 
inherent  in  the  nature  of  things.  This  is  because  the 
conditions  which  permit  competition  or  produce  monopoly 
are  external  matters  with  which  the  law  must  deal  as 
existing  facts. 


68] 


CHAPTER  III 

NATURAL   MONOPOLY 

§  90.  Natural  limitation  creates  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Restriction  uf  Supply 
§  91.  Limitation  of  the  sources  of  supply. 

92.  Waterworks. 

93.  Irrigation  systems. 

94.  Natural  gas. 

95.  Water  powers. 

Topic  B.  Scarcity  of  Sites 
§    96.  Scarcity  of  advantageous  sites. 

97.  Grain  elevators. 

98.  Mechanical  conveyors. 

99.  Cotton  presses. 

100.  Stock  yards. 

101.  Freight  sheds. 
107.  Docks. 

103.  Basins. 

104.  Dry  docks. 

Topic  C.  Limitation  of  Time 
§  105.  Instant  need  creates  monopoly. 

106.  Innkeepers. 

107.  Hackmen. 

108.  Messenger  service. 

109.  Call  boxes. 

Topic  D.  Difficulty  of  Distribution 
§  110.  Inherent  limitations  upon  competition. 

111.  Gas  works. 

112.  Fuel  gas. 

113.  Electric  plants. 

114.  Electric  power. 

115.  Steam  heat. 

116.  Refrigeration. 

117.  Public  need  creates  public  interest. 

[69] 


§§  90,  91  j     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  90.  Natural  limitation  creates  public  employment. 

It  is  common  knowledge  that  there  are  certain  busi- 
nesses which  are  so  affected  with  a  public  interest  that 
those  who  undertake  them  must  serve  the  public  properly. 
It  is  thus  the  character  of  the  business  which  makes  it 
public  and  this  character  it  takes  from  the  conditions 
surrounding  the  business.  This  is  most  clear  in  the  case 
of  those  businesses  which  have  by  reason  of  physical 
limitation  a  natural  monopoly.  In  such  circumstances 
the  ordinary  laws  of  competition  either  practically  fail 
to  operate,  or  act  but  feebly.  Natural  limitation  is  used 
here  in  its  widest  sense.  It  is  not  confined  to  those 
obvious  cases  first  considered  where  there  is  actual  re- 
striction of  supply,  as  in  the  case  of  water  supply  or  nat- 
ural gas.  It  includes  those  physical  limitations  in  the 
character  of  the  supply  which  involve  difficulties  in  its 
distribution,  as  in  the  case  of  gas  supply  or  electric  energy. 
It  includes  also  those  most  fundamental  limitations  of 
space  and  time.  It  is  the  scarcity  of  sites  that  gives  the 
grain  elevator  or  the  stock  yard  its  practical  monopoly. 
And  it  is  because  of  the  instant  need  of  the  customer  that 
the  telegraph  and  the  ticker  are  classed  as  public  neces- 
sities. As  all  these  limitations  are  inherent,  all  of  these 
instances  are  cases  of  natural  monopoly.  And  it  is  sub- 
mitted that  since  this  monopoly  is  essentially  permanent, 
the  situation  requires  the  stern  regulation  of  coercive  law 
for  those  who  undertake  these  services  in  order  to  protect 
those  who  must  deal  with  them  or  go  without  adequate 
service. 

Topic  A.     Restriction  of  Supply 

§  91.  Limitation  of  the  sources  of  supply. 

The  case  for  public  service  is  plainest  in  those  few 
utilities  where  there  are  natural  limitations  upon  the 
sources  of  supply  which  are  essential  to  the  business. 
[701 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  f  §  92 


This  situation  in  itself  gives  some  degree  of  monopoly 
to  those  who  control  the  sources  of  supply  most  accessible 
to  their  market  in  preventing  effective  competition  with 
the  local  service.  Thus  those  who  control  the  most  ad- 
vantageous watershed  have  a  natural  monopoly  of  the 
supply  of  water  in  a  given  district;  and  so  by  established 
law  they  must  supply  all  that  apply  to  the  extent  of  their 
undertaking.  For  the  same  reason  those  who  have  pre- 
empted the  natural  gas  fields  must  deal  without  discrim- 
ination with  the  public  which  they  have  assumed  to 
serve  therefrom.  It  would  be  going  too  far  doubtless  at 
the  present  time  to  claim  that  it  is  accepted  law  that 
natural  limitation  of  a  public  necessity  necessarily  makes 
its  general  sale  public  employment.  So  long  as  those 
who  have  virtual  monopoly  of  the  anthracite  coal  fields 
are  left  free  to  charge  what  prices  they  please,  the  prin- 
ciple is  in  abeyance.  And  so  long  as  those  who  have 
virtual  control  of  the  petroleum  oil  wells  are  left  free  to 
discriminate  as  they  please  between  their  customers,  the 
duty  is  not  recognized.  But  it  may  be  that  in  the  fullness 
of  time  these  now  all  too  powerful  purveyors  to  public 
needs  will  be  brought  within  this  law  and  subjected  to 
public  regulation. 

§  92.  Waterworks. 

The  most  conspicious  example  of  an  employment  which 
is  public  in  character  by  reason  of  the  natural  monopoly 
which  it  enjoys  is  the  waterworks.  The  established  com- 
pany possessing  as  it  does  almost  invariably  the  water 
supply  which  is  most  accessible  has  a  natural  monopoly 
of  the  local  market;  indeed  for  that  reason  it  almost 
always  has  in  fact  a  permanent  monopoly,  no  other  com- 
pany being  able  to  enter  its  field  upon  equal  terms.  As 
one  of  the  earliest  needs  of  a  community  is  a  supply  of 
water  for  domestic  uses,  it  has  been  always  obvious  that 

[71] 


§92 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


this  service  is  a  public  utility.  Accordingly  it  was  con- 
ceded almost  from  the  first  that  the  situation  demanded 
coercive  law.  The  extent  to  which  this  law  takes  the  dis- 
position of  the  business  out  of  the  discretion  of  the  cor- 
poration which  provides  the  supply  may  be  seen  in 
Haugen  v.  Albina  Water  Company, 1  a  late  illustration. 
The  defendant  company  laid  a  main  through  the  street 
upon  which  the  applicant  lived,  refusing,  however,  to 
supply  water  to  persons  living  between  certain  limits. 
But  Mr.  Justice  Lord  said:  "In  such  case,  how  can  the 
defendant,  upon  the  tender  of  the  proper  compensation, 
refuse  to  supply  water  without  distinction  to  one  and  all 
whose  property  abuts  upon  the  street  in  which  its  pipes 
are  laid?  If  the  supplying  of  a  city  or  town  with  water 
is  not  a  public  purpose,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  any 
enterprise  intrusted  to  a  private  corporation  that  could 
be  classed  under  that  head."2 


'21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac.  244,  14 
L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

-  In  these  cases  the  language  used 
by  the  court  in  declaring  that  the 
supply  of  water  is  public  in  charac- 
ter is  particularly  significant: 

United  States. — S  p  r  i  n  g  Valley 
Water  Works  v.  Schottler,  110  U.  S. 
347,  28  L.  ed.  173,  4  Sup.  Ct.  48 
(1884);  Long  Island  Water  Supp. 
Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  166  U.  S.  685,  41 
L.  ed.  1165,  17  Sup.  Ct.  718  (1897); 
Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v.  San 
Francisco,  124  Fed.  574  (1903). 

Alabama. — Mobile  v.  Bienville 
Water  Supply  Co.,  130  Ala.  379,  30 
So.  445,  B.  &  W.  417  (1900). 

California. — Spring  Valley  W.  W. 
v.  San  Francisco,  82  Cal.  286,  16 
Am.  St.  Rep.  116  (1890). 

Florida. — City  of  Tampa  v.  Tam- 
pa Water  Works  Co.,  45  Fla.  600,  34 
So.  631  (1903). 

[72] 


Georgia. — Freeman  v.  Macon  G. 
&  W.  Co.,  126  Ga.  843,  56  S.  E.  61 
7L.R.A.  (N.S.)  917  (1906). 

Illinois. — C  a  r  1  y  1  e  v.  Carlyle 
Water  L.  &  P.  Co.,  52  111.  App.  577 
(1893). 

Iowa. — D es  Moines  v.  Des 
Moines  Water  Works  Co.,  95  Iowa, 
348,  64  N.  W.  269  (1895). 

Kansas. — Asher  v.  Hutchinson 
Water  L.  &  P.  Co.,  66  Kans.  496,  71 
Pac.  813,  61  L.  R.  A.  52  (1903). 

Kentucky. — Franke  v.  Paducah 
Water  Supply  Co.,  88  Ky.  467,  11 
S.  W.  432,  718, 4  L.  R.  A.  265  (1889). 

Maine. — Kennebec  Water  Dis- 
trict v.  Waterville,  97  Me.  185,  54 
Atl.  6,  60  L.  R.  A.  856  (1902); 
Brunswick  &  T.  Water  District  v. 
Maine  Water  Co.,  99  Me.  371,  59 
Atl.  537  (1904). 

Massachusetts. — L  u  m  b  a  r  d  v. 
Stearns,  4  Cush.  60  (1849). 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY 


93 


§  93.  Irrigation  systems. 

That  irrigation  is  a  service  which  is  public  in  character 
is  well  established.1  The  obvious  explanation  of  this 
would  seem  to  be  the  natural  limitation  of  the  water 
supply  in  those  regions  where  irrigation  systems  must  be 
constructed.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  some  of 
the  courts  in  those  States  in  their  desire  to  put  irrigation 
canals  under  public  obligation,  at  first  analogized  them  to 
common  carriers.  What  led  them  to  this  comparison  was 
the  idea  that  the  users  of  water  were  in  effect  appropriators, 
and  the  canal  companies  were  carrying  the  appropriated 
water  to  its  owners.  But  the  forced  character  of  this 
analogy  to  common  carriage  is  now  recognized.  The  most 
accurate  statement  of  the  actual  situation  is  to  be  found 
in  the  leading  case  of  Slosser  v.  Salt  River  Valley  Canal 


Missouri. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Joplin 
Water  Works  Co.,  52  Mo.  App.  312 
(1893). 

Montana. — State  v.  Butte  City 
Water  Co.,  18  Mont.  199,  44  Pac. 
966,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  574  (1896). 

Nebraska. — A  m  e  r  i  c  a  n  Water 
Works  v.  State,  46  Neb.  194,  64 
N.  W.  711,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  610,  30 
L.  R.  A.  447  (1895). 

New  Jersey. — Long  Branch  Com. 
v.  Tintern  Manor  Water  Co.,  71 
N.  J.  Eq.  790,  62  Atl.  474  (1906). 

New  York. — Rochester  v.  Roches- 
ter &  Lake  Ontario  Water  Co.,  189 
N.  Y.  323,  82  N.  E.  154  (1907). 

North  Carolina. — Griffin  v.  Golds- 
boro  Water  Co.,  122  N.  C.  206,  30 
S.  E.  319,  41  L.  R.  A.  240  (1898). 

Pennsylvania. — Brymer  v.  Butler 
Water  Co.,  179  Pa.  St.  231,  36  Atl. 
249,  36  L.  R.  A.  260  (1897). 

Tennessee. — Watauga  Water  Co. 
v.  Wolfe,  99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W. 


1060,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841,  B.  &  W. 
468  (1897). 

Texas. — City  Water  Co.  v.  State 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  33  S.  W.  259 
(1895). 

Vermont. — Re  Barre  Water  Co., 
62  Vt.  27,  20  Atl.  107,  9  L.  R.  A. 
195  (1889). 

Washington. — Tacoma  Hotel  Co. 
v.  Tacoma  L.  &  Water  Co.,  3  Wash. 
316,  28  Pac.  516,  14  L.  R.  A.  669,  28 
Am.  St.  Rep.  35  (1891). 

1  United  States. — Fallbrook  Irri- 
gation Dist.  v.  Bradley,  164  U.  S. 
112,  41  L.  ed.  369,  17  Sup.  Ct.  56 
(1896);  San  Diego  Land  &  Town 
Co.  v.  National  City,  174  U.  S.  739, 
43  L.  ed.  1154,  19  Sup.  Ct.  804 
(1899);  Souther  v.  San  Diego  Flume 
Co.,  121  Fed.  347,  57  C.  C.  A.  561 
(1903);  Boise  City  Irrigation  Co.  v. 
Clark,  131  Fed.  415,  65  C.  C.  A.  399 
(1904). 

Arizona. — Gould  v.  Maricopa  Ca- 

[73] 


§  94  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Company  !  where  Mr.  Justice  Sloan  said:  "Some  of  the 
courts  in  the  arid  States  have  chosen  to  regard  such 
corporations  as,  in  a  sense,  public  carriers.  Inasmuch  as, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  their  ability  to  supply  the  public 
with  water  must  be  limited,  and  as  the  consumers  under 
the  law  of  prior  appropriation  are  not  and  cannot  be  upon 
the  same  footing  as  to  their  rights  to  the  use  of  such  water, 
the  statutory  term  'public  acequia'  much  more  accurately 
describes  their  character  and  status." 

§  94.  Natural  gas. 

The  conditions  surrounding  the  supply  of  natural  gas 
present  natural  monopoly  in  its  most  extreme  form.  The 
fields  from  which  such  gas  can  be  drawn  are  extremely 
limited,  so  much  so  that  in  the  case  of  any  particular 
community  there  will  not  usually  be  many  sources  avail- 
able for  its  supply.  This  is  true  although  there  may  be 
other  fields  in  the  surrounding  territory  which  are  not 
beyond  the  possibility  of  piping,  since  the  product  has 
such  a  high  value  in  any  community  that  it  would  not 
usually  be  commercially  advisable  to  construct  expensive 
lines  to  convey  it  to  distant  communities  instead  of  selling 

nal  Co.,  8  Ariz.  429,  76  Pac.  598  Montana.— Ellinghouse  v.  Taylor, 

( 1904) ;  Salt  River  Valley  Canal  Co.,  19  Mont.  462,  48  Pac.  755  (1897) . 

v.  Nelssen,  10  Ariz.  9,  85  Pac.  117,  Nebraska. — Paxton  &  H.  Irriga- 

12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  711  (1906).  tion  Co.  v.  Farmers'  &  M.  Irr.  Co., 

California.— Price    v.    Riverside  45  Neb.  884,  64  N.  W.  343,  29  L.  R. 

Canal    &    Irr.  Co.,   56    Cal.   431  A.  853,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  585  (1895). 

(1880).  Oregon. — Umatilla  Irrigation  Co. 

Colorado.— Wheeler  v.  No.  Colo.  v.  Barnhart,  22  Oreg.  389,  30  Pac. 

Irr.  Co.,  10  Colo.  582,  17  Pac.  487,  37  (1892). 

3  Am.  St.  Rep.  603  (1887).  Texas.— Moore-Cortes  Canal  Co. 

Idaho.— Wilterding  v.   Green,   4  v.  Gyle,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  442,  82 

Ida.  773,  45  Pac.  134  (1896).  S.  W.  350  (1904). 

Kansas. — Western    Irrigation    &  Washington. — Prescott  Irrigation 

L.  Co.  v.  Chapman  (Kan.),  59  Pac.  Co.  v.  Flathers,  20  Wash.  454,  55 

1098  (1899).  Pac.  635  (1899). 

1 7  Ariz.  376,  65  Pac.  332  (1901). 

[741 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  95 

it  in  the  most  accessible  market.  These  conditions  in 
themselves  make  the  inclusion  of  this  service  within  the 
class  of  public  services  certain;  indeed  in  relation  to  such 
companies  the  law  of  public  services  has  been  pressed  to 
the  furthest  extremes,  as  will  be  seen.  In  one  such  case, 
State  ex  rel.  Wood  v.  Consumers'  Gas  Company  J  in  brush- 
ing aside  the  excuses  of  the  company,  Mr.  Justice  Hadley 
insisted  upon  unquestioning  obedience  to  the  whole  pub- 
lic service  law.  "The  principle  here  announced  is  not  new. 
It  is  as  old  as  the  common  law  itself.  It  has  arisen  in  a 
multitude  of  cases  affecting  railroad,  navigation,  telegraph, 
telephone,  water,  gas,  and  other  like  companies,  and  has 
been  many  times  discussed  and  decided  by  the  courts, 
and  no  statute  has  been  deemed  necessary  to  aid  the  courts 
in  holding  that  when  a  person  or  company  undertakes  to 
supply  a  demand  which  is  affected  with  a  public  interest, 
it  must  supply  all  alike,  who  are  like  situated,  and  not 
discriminate  in  favor  of,  nor  against  any."  2 

§  95.  Water  powers. 

It  would  seem  that  a  power  company  organized  to 
impound  water  and  dispose  of  its, flow  is  in  practically  the 
same  position  as  an  irrigation  company,  so  far  at  least  as 
this  factor  of  natural  monopoly  is  concerned.  Indeed  the 

1  157  Ind.  345,  61  N.  E.  674,  55  ship  G.  L.  F.  &  P.  Co.,  69  Kans.  97, 
L.  R.  A.  245  (1901).  76  Pac.  448  (1904). 

2  From  the  list  of  cases  which  New  York. — Bloomfield  &  R.  N. 
recognize    that    the    purveying    of  G.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  63  Barb.  437 
natural  gas  is  affected  with  a  public  (1872). 

interest  a  few  are  selected  for  in-  Ohio. — Toledo    v.    Northwestern 

sertion  here  because  their  language  Ohio  Natural  Gas  Co.,  5  Oh.  C.  C. 

is  significant:  577  (1890). 

Indiana. — Rushville  v.  Rushville  Pennsylvania. — Johnson's    Ap- 

Natural   Gas    Co.,   132   Ind.    575,  peal,  115  Pa.  St.   129,  7  Atl.   167 

28  N.  E.    853,  15    L.    R.   A.   321  (1886). 

(1892).  West  Virginia.— Charleston  Nat. 

Kansas.— La  Harpe  v.  Elm  Town-  Gas  Co.  v.  Lowe,  52  W.  Va.  662,  44 

S.  E.  410  (1901). 

[751 


§  95  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

limitation  is  even  more  marked,  since  not  only  must  there 
be  an  ample  supply  from  the  stream  impounded  but  a 
considerable  fall  within  a  short  distance.  Thus  the  pos- 
session of  water  power  is  perhaps  the  clearest  example  of 
natural  monopoly,  as  people  in  general  are  just  beginning 
to  realize  now  that  the  most  advantageous  powers  have 
been  pre-empted  by  the  farseeing  few.  All  that  remains 
that  can  be  done  is  to  protect  the  public  from  the  abuse 
of  this  monopoly  when  the  power  is  offered  to  the  public 
for  resale  by  those  who  have  acquired  it.  The  law  reg- 
ulating the  service  of  the  public  by  those  who  are  engaged 
in  a  business  so  circumstanced  as  to  be  public  in  character 
seems  peculiarly  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  in- 
terests of  the  future  against  the  abuse  of  the  grants  of  the 
past.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  law  ought  to  be 
in  readiness  to  deal  with  the  disposition  of  water  with  the 
potentiality  of  power.  In  Sammons  v.  Kearney  Power  & 
Irrigation  Company,1  indeed,  we  have  a  case  where  a 
development  company  had  entered  into  a  contract  with 
one  taker  of  power,  agreeing  not  to  sell  power  to  any  other 
taker  intending  to  compete  with  the  original  taker  in 
the  generation  of  electricity  for  sale.  This  contract  was 
unanimously  held  void  as  inconsistent  with  the  public 
duty,  Commissioner  Albert  saying:  "In  the  case  at  bar  we 
are  dealing  with  an  irrigation  company — a  quasi-public 
corporation.  It  is  also  a  governmental  utility.  To  the 
extent  of  its  capacity  it  is  bound  to  furnish  water  from  its 
canal  to  persons  desiring  to  use  it  on  equal  terms  and 
without  discrimination."  But  in  the  only  other  recent 
case  squarely  on  the  point  a  contrary  view  is  taken  as  to 
the  direct  supply  of  water  power.  In  Minnesota  Canal  & 
Power  Company  v.  Koochching  Company2  the  court  held 

1  77  Neb.  580,  110  N.  W.  308,  8         2  97  Minn.  429,  107  N.  W.  405, 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  404  (1906).  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  638  (1906). 

The  most  of  these  modern  au- 

[76] 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY 


that  the  creation  of  a  water  power  for  sale  to  mills  located 
on  the  premises  was  not  a  public  use,  as  a  hydro-electric 
development  is.  "  Water  power  from  the  wheels  must  be 


thorities  are  concerned  with  hydro- 
electric power  development,  but  it 
is  not  perceived  by  the  writer  that 
these  differ  fundamentally  in  prin- 
ciple from  the  direct  sale  of  water 
from  the  power  canal.  Massing 
these  cases  together  to  emphasize 
the  point,  the  following  cases  hold 
water  power  distribution  to  be 
public  in  character  provided  that 
the  proprietors  profess  as  their 
principal  business  the  sale  of  power 
to  others,  not  the  utilization  of  it 
in  their  own  industries. 

United  Stales. — Walker  v.  Shasta 
Power  Co.,  160  Fed.  856,  87  C.C.  A. 
660  (1908). 

Georgia. — Jones  v.  No.  Georgia 
Electric  Co.,  125  Ga.  618,  54  S.  E. 
85,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  122  (1906). 

Idaho. — Hollister  v.  State,  9  Ida. 
8,  71  Pac.  541  (1903). 

Indiana. — Stoy  v.  Indiana  Hy- 
draulic Power  Co.,  166  Ind.  316,  76 
N.  E.  1057  (1906). 

Montana. — Helena  Power  Trans- 
mission Co.  v.  Spratt,  35  Mont. 
108,  88  Pac.  773,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
567  (1907). 

New  Hampshire. — Rockingham  L. 
&  Power  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H. 
531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.  R.  A.  581 
(1904). 

New  York. — Re  East  Canada  Cr. 
Electric  L.  &  Power  Co.,  49  N.  Y. 
Misc.  565,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  109 
(1905). 

Oregon. — Grande  Ronde  Electric 
Co.  v.  Drake,  46  Greg.  243,  78  Pac. 
1031  (1905). 

See  contra,  holding  such  power  de- 


velopment not,  even  public  in  char- 
acter: 

Maine. — Brown  v.  Gerald,  100 
Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A. 
472,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  526  (1905). 

Washington. — State  ex  rel.  v. 
Superior  Court,  42  Wash.  660,  85 
Pac.  666,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  672 
(1906),  and  cases  cited. 

The  cases  holding  that  those  who 
utilize  their  own  water  power  in 
their  own  private  business  have  no 
right  to  enjoy  eminent  domain,  are 
plainly  distinguishable  as  there  is 
no  public  profession. 

Illinois. — Gaylord  v.  Sanitary 
Dist.,  204  111.  576,  68  N.  E.  522,  63 
L.  R.  A.  582,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  235 
(1903). 

Michigan. — Berrien  Springs  Wa- 
ter Power  Co.  v.  Berrien  Circuit 
Judge,  133  Mich.  48,  94  N.  W.  379, 
103  Am.  St.  Rep.  438  (1903). 

The  same  is  true  in  dealing  with 
the  remaining  cases  relating  to 
hydro-electric  power  development; 
it  should  be  recognized  that  the 
cases  are  entirely  correct  which  hold 
invalid  the  grant  of  legal  privileges 
to  the  proprietors  of  those  power 
developments  which  do  not  profess 
to  sell  to  the  public  indiscriminately. 
See: 

Vermont. — Avery  v.  Vermont 
Electric  Co.,  75  Vt,  235,  54  Atl.  179, 
59  L.  R.  A.  817,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  818 
(1902). 

Virginia. — Fallsburg  Power  & 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Alexander,  101  Va.  98, 
43  S.  E.  194,  61  L.  R.  A.  129,  99  Am. 
St.  Rep.  855  (1903). 

[77] 


§§  96,  97  ]      PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

used  at  the  wheels,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Elliot  for  a  bare 
majority,  "  and  the  actual  result  necessarily  is  that  a  very 
few  individuals  will  use  the  power  for  manufacturing  pur- 
poses to  the  exclusion  of  all  others." 

Topic  B.  Scarcity  of  Sites 

§  96.  Scarcity  of  advantageous  sites. 

It  has  already  been  remarked  that  the  sites  upon  which 
certain  services  can  be  conducted  to  best  advantage  are 
few  in  number.  The  necessity  of  these  locations  to  proper 
conduct  of  the  business  may  be  so  great  that  those  who 
are  possessed  of  these  sites  may  well  be  said  to  enjoy  a  nat- 
ural monopoly,  since  if  others  venture  to  establish  them- 
selves at  all  at  such  disadvantage,  their  competition  will 
be  comparatively  ineffectual.  At  all  events  those  in  the 
favorable  locations  could  exact  higher  prices  than  would 
be  fair,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  the  law  intervened. 
Of  course  the  importance  of  the  site  depends  upon  the 
character  of  the  business.  Terminal  facilities  operated  in 
connection  with  railway  systems  furnish  the  most  strik- 
ing examples  of  this  importance  of  particular  sites.  To  a 
lesser  extent  this  is  true  of  those  services  which  although 
not  dependent  upon  an  exact  location  are  operated  with 
peculiar  advantage  in  particular  areas,  such  as  ware- 
houses in  business  districts. 

§  97.  Grain  elevators. 

The  grain  elevator  furnishes  the  principal  case  upon 
the  subject  of  the  legal  regulation  of  established  monopoly. 
Any  discussion  of  the  foundations  of  our  industrial  rela- 
tions must  give  chief  place  to  the  case  of  Munn  v.  Illinois  l 

'94U.  S.  113,  24  L.  ed.  77  (1876).  cited   with   approval   hundreds   of 

Munn  v.  Illinois  is  undoubtedly  times,  both  in  the  Federal  and  the 

one  of  the  leading  cases  in  American  State  courts.    See  Rose's  Notes  on 

constitutional    law.      It   has   been  U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep.,  vol.  9,  pp.  21-55. 

[781 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  97 

since  it  is  recognized  that  this  case  has  within  its  view  all 
public  duties  and  all  private  rights  which  are  established 
and  respected  under  our  system  of  government.  Upon 
the  right  understanding  of  this  case  depends  the  true 
conception  of  our  general  theory  of  the  function  of  State 
regulation. 

The  facts  of  the  case  are  worth  careful  examination. 
The  General  Assembly  of  Illinois  in  1871  had  passed  a 
statute  which  provided  a  maximum  rate  beyond  which  no 
person  should  charge  for  the  storage  of  grain  in  public 
elevators.  The  firm  of  Munn  &  Scott  refused  to  obey  the 
act,  and  accordingly  were  fined.  They  appealed  the  case 
from  court  to  court  until  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  was  reached.  The  Supreme  Court  confirmed  all  the 
decisions  which  had  been  given  below  and  decided  against 
the  defendant.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  proprietors  of 
this  elevator  had  no  legal  privileges  whatsoever.  The 
elevator  of  Munn  &  Scott  stood  upon  land  bought  by 
them  by  private  treaty;  they  had  no  rights  in  the  public 
streets;  they  had  no  aid  from  the  public  treasury;  they 
were  not  even  incorporated.  Here,  then,  is  a  case  that 
raises  the  question  of  virtual  monopoly  without  the  com- 
plication of  legal  monopoly. 

And  as  a  general  problem,  Mr.  Justice  Waite  discusses 
it:  "This  brings  us  to  inquire  as  to  the  principles  upon 
which  this  power  of  regulation  rests,  in  order  that  we  may 
determine  what  is  within  and  what  without  its  operative 
effect.  Looking,  then,  to  the  common  law,  from  whence 
came  the  right  which  the  constitution  protects,  we  find 
that  when  private  property  is  'affected  with  a  public 
interest,  it  ceases  to  be  juris  privati  only.'  This  was  said 
by  Lord  Chief  Justice  Hale  more  than  two  hundred  years 
ago  in  his  treatise  De  Portibus  Maris,  and  has  been  ac- 
cepted without  objection  as  an  essential  element  in  the 
law  of  property  ever  since.  Property  does  become  clothed 

[791 


§  98  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

with  a  public  interest  when  used  in  a  manner  to  make  it 
of  public  consequence,  and  affect  the  community  at  large. 
When,  therefore,  one  devotes  his  property  to  a  use  in 
which  the  public  has  an  interest,  he,  in  effect,  grants  to  the 
public  an  interest  in  that  use,  and  must  submit  to  be  con- 
trolled by  the  public  for  the  common  good  to  the  extent 
of  the  interest  he  has  thus  created.  He  may  withdraw  his 
grant  by  discontinuing  the  use;  but  so  long  as  he  main- 
tains the  use,  he  must  submit  to  the  control."  l 

Why  is  it  true  that  in  the  elevation  of  grain,  monopo- 
listic conditions  generally  prevail?  Not  by  accidental  co- 
incidence, but  by  natural  limitation.  The  facts  are  that 
in  any  given  community  the  plots  of  ground  upon  which 
this  business  may  be  conducted  with  convenience  and 
efficiency  are  few  and  concentrated.  In  this  case  of  the 
Chicago  elevator  those  are  the  lots  which  both  border 
upon  the  river  and  are  adjacent  to  the  terminals  of  the 
railroads  entering  the  city.  Thus  grain  elevators  because 
of  the  nature  of  the  traffic  must  be  placed  within  a  limited 
area,  and  thereby  they  have  a  virtual  monopoly  over  their 
business.  Their  number  cannot  be  indefinitely  multiplied, 
and  competition  cannot  effectively  regulate  their  business. 
And  where  the  regulation  of  competition  ceases  to  work 
efficiently  the  law  must  step  in. 

§  98.  Mechanical  conveyors. 

It  would  seem  that  the  same  law  would  apply  to  any 
mechanical  conveyor  for  transferring  bulk  freight  in 
transit.  In  one  case  of  this  sort 2  a  mechanical  conveyor 
was  operated  upon  a  railroad  wharf  by  a  separate  com- 
pany called  the  Erie  Coal  Transfer  Company.  This  was 

1  Munn   v.    Illinois,   supra,   was  N.  E.  670.    For  further  discussion 

elaborately  reaffirmed  in  Budd  v.  see  §  141,  infra. 

New  York,  143  U.  S.  517,  36  L.  ed.  2  Youghiogheny  &  Ohio  Coal  Co. 

247,  12  Sup.  Ct.  468,  affirming  a  v.  Erie  Ry.  et  al.,  24  Oh.  Cir.  Ct. 

notable  opinion  in  117  N.  Y.  1,  22  289  (1902). 

[80] 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  99 

constructed  upon  railway  property  under  a  special  con- 
tract with  restrictive  conditions.  It  was  held  that  it 
was  in  itself  a  public  service.  As  a  necessary  consequence 
a  grant  to  one  shipper  of  coal  of  the  exclusive  use  of  the 
conveyor  was  held  illegal  as  an  unlawful  discrimination. 
Judge  Hall  had  this  to  say  about  the  conveyor:  "It  was 
the  means  designed  by  both  parties  to  be  open  to  all 
shippers  of  that  class  of  freight  without  discrimination; 
and  it  seems  clear  that  while  this  arrangement  remained 
in  force,  the  whole  plant,  the  tracks,  the  trestles  and 
foundation  which  the  railroad  was  bound  to  furnish, 
and  the  machine  to  be  used  and  operated  by  the  trans- 
fer company  under  the  restrictions  and  conditions  named 
in  said  contract  were  intended  to  be  and  were  in  fact 
devoted  to  a  public  use."  1 

§  99.  Cotton  presses. 

It  would  seem  that  the  case  of  the  cotton  press  would 
be  quite  analogous  to  the  case  of  the  grain  elevator;  for 
the  service  is  almost  as  closely  connected  with  transporta- 
tion, and  is  dependent  for  successful  operation  upon  the 
proper  location  to  almost  the  same  extent.  However,  the 
conservative  attitude  hi  dealing  with  this  service  ap- 
parently still  prevails.  Some  twenty-five  years  ago  in 
Ladd  v.  Cotton  Press  Company,2  it  was  held  that  the 
proprietors  of  a  cotton  press  could  discriminate  in  their 
charges  between  their  patrons  if  they  pleased.  The  court 
which  decided  this,  however,  recognized  that  it  was  deal- 
ing with  a  doubtful  case,  near  to  the  line  separating  public 
employment  from  private  business.  But  in  the  absence 
of  legislation  making  it  such,  this  court  would  not  hold  it 
to  be  a  case  of  public  calling.  This  conservative  attitude 

1  Compare     Commonwealth     v.      a   conveyor  not  put  at  their  dis- 
Corey  &  Co.,  2  Pittsburg,  444  ( 1863),      posal  by  its  owners, 
denying  the  public  the  right  to  use         2  53  Tex.  172  (1880). 

6  [81] 


§  100  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

toward  this  whole  problem  is  well  presented  in  the  opinion 
of  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Moore:  "The  business  of  warehousing 
and  compressing  cotton  is  free  to  every  one  who  wishes  to 
engage  in  it.  No  grant  or  franchise  need  be  ob tamed  from 
the  State  to  authorize  those  desiring  to  do  so  to  embark 
in  this  character  of  business.  It  is  not  one  of  the  em- 
ployments which  the  common  law  declares  public.  Nor 
is  it  claimed  to  have  been  made  so  by  statute.  And  we 
know  of  no  authority,  and  none  has  been  shown  us,  for 
saying  that  a  business  strictly  juris  privati  will  become 
juris  publici  merely  by  reason  of  its  extent.  If  the  mag- 
nitude of  a  particular  business  is  such,  and  the  persons 
affected  by  it  so  numerous,  that  the  interest  of  society 
demands  that  the  rules  and  principles  applicable  to  public 
employments  should  be  applied  to  it,  this  would  have  to 
be  done  by  the  legislature  if  not  restrained  from  doing  so 
by  the  constitution  before  the  demand  for  such  an  use 
could  be  enforced  by  the  courts." 

§  100.  Stock  yards. 

That  the  public  stock  yards  are  to  be  classed  as  public 
services  must  now  be  regarded  as  settled.  In  the  most 
recent  case  l  the  modern  argument  is  put  in  most  excellent 
form.  In  holding  the  Wichita  Union  Stock  Yards  Com- 
pany subject  to  State  regulation  as  a  public  service, 
Chief  Justice  Johnson  emphasized  the  fact  that  a  business 
may  often  be  affected  with  a  public  interest  although  it 
has  no  special  franchises;  for,  as  he  points  out,  where 
monopolistic  conditions  prevail,  public  necessity  usually 
justifies  State  control.  And  in  the  case  of  stock  yards  this 
monopoly  is  largely  due  to  position.  "Because  of  the 
nature  of  the  business  and  the  railroad  facilities,  the  es- 
tablishment of  other  markets  at  or  near  Wichita  is 

1  Ratcliff  v.  Wichita  Union  Stock-  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  834,  118  Am.  St. 
yards  Co.,  74  Kans.  1,  86  Pac.  150,  Rep.  298  (1906). 

[82] 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY         [  §§  101,  102 

impracticable,  and  hence  these  stock  yards  are,  and 
of  necessity  will  be,  the  only  available  place  where  the 
breeders,  feeders  and  dealers  of  a  great  scope  of  country 
can  conveniently  market  their  live  stock.  The  company 
has  therefore  a  practical  monopoly  of  a  vast  business 
affecting  thousands  of  people  who  are  almost  obliged  to 
deal  at  that  market  and  at  the  rates  which  the  company 
may  choose  to  charge."  l 

§  101.  Freight  sheds. 

For  ordinary  freight  not  requiring  special  facilities  for 
its  handling,  the  railroad  almost  always  maintains  suffi- 
cient terminals.  However,  there  are  cases  where  the 
provision  of  freight  terminals  has  been  undertaken  by 
outside  parties.  Such  freight  houses  like  other  ware- 
houses 2  would  seem  to  be  public  or  private  in  character 
according  to  whether  their  proprietors  undertake  a  general 
service  for  all  consignees  or  confine  the  use  of  their  fa- 
cilities to  themselves  and  persons  allied  with  them.  Of 
this  latter  sort  is  the  case  usually  cited  to  show  that  this 
business  is  not  so  public  as  to  justify  the  grant  of  eminent 
domain  to  it.3 

§  102.  Docks. 

It  has  been  established  from  the  earliest  times  that 
docks  are  at  least  public  in  character.  Vessels  calling 
at  a  port  are  forced  to  use  the  docks  that  are  maintained 
there.  And  there  will  necessarily  be  few  such  docks  since 

1  In    Getting    v.    Kansas    City  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Central  Stock- 
Stockyards  Co.,   183  U.  S.  79,  46  yards  Co.,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  280,  19  All. 
L.  ed.  92,  22  Sup.  Ct.  30  (1901),  185  (1889),  it  was  intimated  that  a 
the  United  State  Supreme  Court  court  would  not  of  its  own  motion 
held  that  stock  yards  were  doing  a  feel  justified  in  holding  the  stock 
work  in  which  the  public  had  a  yards  in  public  service, 
modified  interest,  and  must  there-         2  See  §  145,  infra. 
fore  be   considered   as  subject   to         3  See   Memphis   Freight   Co.    v. 
legislative  regulation.    In  Delaware,  Mayor,  4  Cold.  419  (1867). 

[83] 


§  102  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  locations  which  are  both  upon  deep  water  and  near  to 
the  commercial  centers  will  always  be  limited.  All  this 
necessarily  calls  for  the  law  requiring  public  service  from 
those  proprietors  who  have  given  it  out  that  their  docks 
are  public.  A  modern  instance  of  this  is  Barrington  v. 
Commercial  Dock  Company.1  In  that  case  Mr.  Justice 
Gordon  founded  his  opinion  that  this  dock  was  public  upon 
certain  fundamental  propositions:  "When  wharves  belong- 
ing to  individuals  are  legally  thrown  open  to  the  use  of  the 
public,  they  become  affected  with  a  public  interest.  We 
think  that  in  determining  the  character  of  the  appellant's 
wharf,  regard  should  be  had  to  the  use  to  which  it  has 
been  devoted  rather  than  its  private  ownership,  and  that 
upon  the  facts  found  the  position  of  the  appellant  cannot 
be  maintained.  As  well  might  the  proprietor  of  a  stage 
coach  claim  the  right  to  discriminate  upon  the  ground  that 
the  property  employed  in  his  business  was  private  prop- 
erty. The  doctrine,  if  maintained,  would  tend  to  promote 
and  further  monopolies  which  it  is  not  the  policy  of  our  law 
to  favor."  2 

1  15  Wash.  170,  45  Pac.  748,  33  v.  Graham  &  Ward,  117  Ga.  555,  43 
L.  R.  A.  116  (1896).  S.  E.  1000  (1903). 

2  Of   the   various   cases   showing          Louisiana. — Aiken  v.   Eager,  35 
that  the  business  of  the  wharfinger  La.  Ann.  567  (1883). 

is  public  in  character  the  following  New  York. — Buffalo  v.  Delaware, 

are  selected  because  of  the  fullness  L.   &  W.  Ry.,  39   N.   Y.  Supp.   4 

of  their  reasoning:  (1895). 

United  States. — See   Transporta-  Pennsylvania. — Rogers     v.     Sto- 

tion  Co.  v.  Parkersburg,  107  U.  S.  phel,  32  Pa.  St.  Ill,  72  Am.  Dec. 

691,  27  L.  ed.  584,  2  S.  Ct.  732  111  (1858). 

(1882).  The  cases  which  decide  that  a 

District  of  Columbia. — District  of  wharf  is  not  public  unless  the  pro- 
Columbia  v.  Johnson,  1  Mackey,  51  prietors  have  in  some  way  under- 
(1881).  taken  to  permit  the  public  in  gen- 

Florida. — Indian  River  Stb.   Co.  eral  to  utilize  their  facilities  are  not 

v.  East  Coast  Transportation  Co.,  inconsistent    with    the    cases    just 

28  Fla.  387,  10  So.  480,  29  Am.  St.  cited.    See: 

Rep.  258  (1891).  United   States.— Louisville  &  N. 

Georgia.— Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  R.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  West    Coast  Naval 

[841 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  103,  104 

§  103.  Basins. 

As  to  artificial  basins  the  case  would  seem  still  clearer. 
These  will  be  few  since  they  are  constructed  at  great  cost; 
and  in  ports  where  tidal  conditions  require  them  the 
proprietors  have  shipmasters  at  their  mercy.  Every  ele- 
ment in  the  situation  conspires  to  make  it  a  case  of  virtual 
monopoly  which  must  be  under  State  control.  Indeed 
these  basins  are  usually  constructed  by  the  public  au- 
thorities and  opened  to  all  at  reasonable  rates.  What  is 
said  here  again  applies  only  to  those  proprietors  who  have 
opened  their  basins  to  many  ships  and  are  now  refusing 
particular  ones;  for  it  is  admitted  that  even  in  a  business 
which  is  public  in  character,  the  obligation  to  serve  the 
public  rests  only  upon  those  who  have  professed  to  serve 
the  public.  Thus  a  New  York  decision  l  is  to  be  sup- 
ported which  holds  that  a  basin  to  be  used  principally 
by  its  owners  in  their  private  business  is  not  a  public 
service;  and  that  they  consequently  cannot  properly 
exercise  the  right  of  eminent  domain. 

§  104.  Dry  docks. 

As  there  is  practically  no  authority  as  to  the  nature 
of  dry  docks,  it  is  impossible  to  say  with  any  confidence 
whether  they  are  public  or  private  in  character.2  Those 
constructed  by  governments  very  commonly  are  open 
under  various  regulations  for  commercial  use,  and  are 
conducted  as  public  services  therefore  to  a  considerable 
extent.  As  to  those  docks  maintained  by  private  owners, 

Stores  Co.,  198  U.  S.  483,  49  L.  ed.  Island  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Visger,  86  N.  Y. 

1135,  25  Sup.  Ct.  745  (1905);  Weems  App.  Div.  129,  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  325 

Stb.  Co.  v.  People's  Stb.  Co.,  214  (1903). 

U.  S.  345,  53  L.  ed.  1024,  29  Sup.  l  Matter    of    Eureka    Basin,    96 

Ct.  661  (1909).  N.  Y.  42  (1884). 

New  York.— Alexandria  Bay  Stb.  2  In  the  Vidal  Sala,  12  Fed.  207, 
Co.  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  the  conduct  of  a  dry  dock  is  ex- 
Co.,  18  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  527,  45  plained  (1882). 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1091  (1897);  Thousand 

[85] 


§  105  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

these  are  not  generally  opened  to  the  public  indiscrimi- 
nately, but  are  used  in  connection  with  the  private  busi- 
ness of  the  proprietors.  These  may  only  be  used  by 
special  arrangement  by  owners  in  general  who  wish  to 
do  their  own  work  with  their  own  force  upon  the  vessel 
when  the  dock  is  dry;  in  such  cases  there  is  lacking  the 
element  of  public  profession.  However,  when  the  use 
of  a  dry  dock  may  be  had  in  regular  course  by  those  who 
apply,  it  should  be  decided  that  it  is  a  public  service. 
There  is  an  obvious  necessity  for  an  accessible  location 
upon  deep  water  within  city  limits  where  the  work  may 
be  done  with  the  greatest  facility.  The  need  of  the  ship- 
owner is  usually  so  pressing  that  he  cannot  make  terms. 
Usually  the  cost  of  such  docks  is  so  great  that  even  a  very 
large  port  can  support  but  few  while  very  often  there  will 
be  but  one.  All  these  factors  in  the  situation  give  to  the 
established  dock  that  virtual  monopoly  which  is  charac- 
teristic of  public  employment.  Although  the  dry  dock 
has  been  used  as  the  illustration  what  has  been  said 
would  be  equally  true  of  other  costly  mechanisms  for 
performing  much  the  same  service,  such  as  marine  rail- 
ways.1 

Topic  C.  Limitation  of  Time 

§  105.  Instant  need  creates  monopoly. 

Another  obvious  restriction  upon  effective  competition 
results  from  limitation  of  time.  When  the  need  of  the 
applicant  is  immediate  the  person  from  whom  he  asks 
service  has  the  upper  hand.  This  monopoly  may  only 
be  temporary;  but  it  is  none  the  less  real.  This  insistent 
need  for  present  service  largely  explains  why  the  inn- 
keeper dealing  with  the  wayfarer  and  the  carrier  bargain- 
ing with  the  shipper  have  always  been  held  subject  to 

1  As  to  a  floating  dry  dock,  see      Walsh  v.  New  York  Floating  Dry 

Dock  Co.,  77  N.  Y.  448  (1879). 

(861 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  106 

special  law  governing  their  dealings.  It  is  the  instant 
need  also  which  gives  to  those  agencies  established  for 
the  rapid  transmission  of  intelligence  the  virtual  mo- 
nopoly which  the  telegraph  and  telephone  obviously  have. 
Here  again  this  classification  of  the  authorities  cannot  as 
yet  be  safely  taken  as  a  generalization  as  two  recent  cases 
will  show.  In  one  of  these  a  physician  1  was  held  not 
liable  for  refusing  service  to  a  patient  in  a  desperate  con- 
dition; in  the  other  an  undertaker  was  held  not  bound  to 
take  charge  of  a  corpse.2  In  both  cases  the  need  was  ur- 
gent, and  in  the  nature  of  things  must  always  be.  But 
perhaps  in  the  community  at  present  there  are  enough 
of  such  men  always  at  hand  to  preclude  the  probability 
of  injury  by  delay  in  the  average  case.  Or  perhaps  the 
modern  law  balks  at  requiring  personal  service. 

§  106.  Innkeepers. 

Innkeeping  as  has  already  been  shown,  has  been  re- 
garded as  a  public  calling  from  the  earliest  times.  The 
same  law  continues  to  the  present  day,  even  when  hotels 
are  many;  for  it  is  still  the  truth  that  competition  cannot 
be  relied  upon  for  the  protection  of  the  traveler.  The 
need  of  the  weary  wayfarer  will  always  be  so  immediate 
that  did  the  law  not  interfere  in  his  favor,  he  would  pay 
often  an  exorbitant  price  rather  than  be  turned  back  into 
the  night  to  seek  other  accommodations.  He  has  no  time 
to  choose,  no  opportunity  to  bargain.  The  innkeeper 
would  almost  invariably  have  the  upper  hand,  the  trav- 
eler for  the  moment  be  at  the  chance  of  his  caprice,  prej- 
udice, hatred,  or  greed,  did  not  the  law  interpose  itself. 
But  the  law  has  interfered  from  time  immemorial.3  The 

1  Hurley  v.  Eddingfield,  156  Ind.      101  Ky.  368,  41  S.  W.  301,  38  L.  R. 
416,  59  N.  E.   1058,  83  Am.   St.      A.  505  (1897). 

Rep.  198  (1901).  s  Lane  v.  Cotton,  12  Mod.  472 

2  Brewster  v.  Miller's  Sons  Co.,      (1701),  and  see  cases  cited  in  §  12, 

supra. 

[871 


§  107  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

public  house  where  food  is  dispensed  and  lodging  is  pro- 
vided has  always  been  beyond  dispute  one  of  the  public 


services. 


§  107.  Hackmen. 

The  hackmen  who  ply  for  hire  have  always  been  re- 
garded as  in  the  employment  of  the  public.  Theirs  is 
really  one  of  the  most  striking  cases  of  temporary  monop- 
oly. In  the  case  of  any  hackman  his  rival  may  be  around 
the  corner  prepared  to  make  a  fair  price;  and  yet  as  the 
traveler  cannot  bide  his  time  he  will  often  submit  to  an 
extortionate  price  rather  than  let  a  moment  pass.  For 
the  time  being  the  monopoly  is  effective;  and,  therefore, 
the  necessity  of  regulating  the  business  of  hackmen  upon 
the  principles  of  public  service  law  has  long  been  appar- 
ent. At  times  hackmen  who  are  hampered  by  the  en- 
forcement of  such  regulations  complain  that  they  are 
unreasonable.  In  Fonsler  v.  Atlantic  City,2  for  instance, 
it  was  contended  that  the  ordinance  of  the  city  that  re- 

1  The  following  cases  bring  out  L.  R.  A.  516,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  573 

the  many  factors  which  have  caused  (1890). 

the  innkeeper  to  be  held  at  the  serv-  Pennsylvania. — Com.  v.  Mitchell, 

ice  of  the  public  in  all  ages:  2  Parsons,  431,  1  Phila.  63  (1850). 

California. — Willis  v.  McMahan,  Tennessee. — Dickerson  v.  Rogers, 

89  Cal.  156,  26  Pac.  649  (1891).  4  Humph.  179,  40  Am.  Dec.  642 

Kentucky.— Kesten      v.      Hilde-  (1843). 

brand,  9  B.  Mon.  72,  48  Am.  Dec.  Vermont.— State  v.  Stone,  6  Vt. 

416  (1848).  295  (1834). 

Maine. — Atwater  v.  Sawyer,  76  England. — Thompson    v.    Lacy, 

Me.  539,  49  Am.  Rep.  634  (1884).  3  B.  &  Aid.  283   (1820);   Rex  v. 

New  Hampshire. — Markham  v.  Ivens,  7  Car.  &  P.  213  (1835);  Haw- 
Brown,  8  N.  H.  523,  31  Am.  Dec.  thorn  v.  Hammond,  1  Car.  &  K. 
209  (1837).  404  (1844);  Rex  v.  Collins,  Palmer, 

New  York.— Adams  v.  Freeman,  367,  373,  2  Rolle,  345  (1623);  Rex 

12   Johns.   408,   7   Am.    Dec.   327  v.    Smith,    65   J.    P.    521    (1901); 

(1815).  Lamond  v.  Richard,   1  Q.  B.  541 

North  Carolina.— State  v.  Steele,  (1897). 

106  N.  C.  766,   11    S.  E.  478,  8  2  70  N.  J.  L.   125,  56  Atl.   119 

(1903). 

[88] 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  108 

quired  every  hackman  to  take  anyone  who  applied  at  the 
established  rates  unless  the  sign  ''engaged"  was  dis- 
played in  good  faith  was  unjustifiable.  But  Mr.  Justice 
Garretson  said,  upon  certiorari  to  dispose  of  a  conviction 
under  this  ordinance:  "We  are  unable  to  see  that  any  of 
the  regulations  imposed  by  this  ordinance  are  unreason- 
able. There  is  nothing  unreasonable  in  requiring  the 
driver  of  an  omnibus,  permitted  by  the  city's  license  to 
run  his  vehicle  on  the  public  street,  to  carry  all  persons 
applying  to  him  for  passage  and  legally  tendering  the 
fare,  as  common  carriers  are  required  to  do."  l 

§  108.  Messenger  service. 

It  is  a  disputed  question  whether  the  city  companies 
which  furnish  messenger  boys  on  call  are  engaged  in 
common  carriage,  but  the  cases  seem  to  show  that  they 
are  at  least  engaged  in  public  employment.  The  need 
of  those  who  employ  messengers  is  generally  immediate 
and  the  established  company  has  usually  virtual  monop- 
oly. This  business  of  furnishing  boys  is  publicly  solicited 
by  them;  and  the  company  have  a  regular  basis  for  in- 
stalling call  boxes  in  congested  districts.  All  that  can  be 
said  with  certainty  as  to  the  profession  of  such  companies 
is  that  they  undertake  to  provide  their  public  with  mes- 
sengers. It  seems  to  be  the  better  opinion  that  this  reg- 

1  That  hackmen  are  at  the  service  Iowa. — Burlington  v.  Unterkir- 

of  the  public  is  generally  recognized,  cher,  99  Iowa,  401,  68  N.  W.  795 

see:  (1896). 

Iowa. — Bonce  v.  Dubuque  St.  Massachusetts. — Copeland  v.  Dra- 

Ry.  Co.,  53  Iowa,  278  (1880),  5  per,  157  Mass.  558,  32  N.  E.  944 

N.  W.  177,  36  Am.  Rep.  221  (1880).  (1893). 

New  York. — Brown  v.  New  York  Missouri. — Trout  v.  Watkins  L. 

Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun,  &  V.  Co.  (Mo.  App.)  130  S.  W.  136 

355  (1894),  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  69.  (1910). 

On  the  other  hand,  liverymen  who  New  Jersey. — Atlantic  City  v. 

make  no  pretense  of  serving  the  pub-  Dehn,  69  N.  J.  L.  233,  54  Atl.  220 

lie  can  bargain  as  they  please.  See:  (1903). 

[89] 


§§109,110)   PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

ular  service  is  not  common  carriage.1  But  it  is  not  al- 
together impossible  that  in  particular  instances  messenger 
companies  might  specially  undertake  as  common  car- 
riers.2 

§  109.  Call  boxes. 

In  connection  with  messenger  service  it  is  common  for 
the  corporation  conducting  the  business  to  install  call 
boxes  upon  the  premises  of  their  patrons.  If  this  is  done 
as  a  special  favor  for  particular  patrons  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  show  that  this  is  a  part  of  the  regular  service  pro- 
fessed. But  if  it  is  generally  done  for  all  customers  in 
the  same  classification,  the  company  could  not  refuse  to 
install  these  boxes  for  an  applicant  of  the  same  sort  unless 
it  had  some  personal  defense.  One  other  possible  case  of 
this  class  is  that  of  the  alarm  service  which  for  many  years 
now  has  been  maintained  in  large  cities.  The  need  of  this 
protection  by  those  engaged  in  certain  lines  of  business  is 
obvious.  Moreover,  the  companies  who  install  the  call 
boxes  must  ask  special  privileges  from  the  community  to 
install  its  wiring  system.3  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that 
this  service  came  within  cases  as  to  messenger  call  just 
discussed. 

Topic  D.  Difficulty  of  Distribution 

§  110.  Inherent  limitations  upon  competition. 

Another  natural  limitation  upon  competition  results 
from  the  character  of  the  product.  If  the  physical  char- 

1  District  of  Columbia. — White  v.  2  Maryland. — American  Diet.  Tel. 

Postal  Telegraph  Co.,  25  App.  D.  C.  Co.  v.  Walker,  72  Md.  454,  20  Atl. 

364  (1905).  1,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  479  (1890). 

Massachusetts. — Haakell  v.   Bos-  New     York. — See     Sandford     v. 

ton  Dist.  Messenger  Co.,  190  Mass.  Am.  Dist.  Tel.  Co.,  13  Misc.  88,  34 

189,  76  N.  E.  215,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  N.  Y.  Supp.  144  (1895),  and  Oilman 

1091,  112  Am.  St.  Rep.  324(1906).  v.  Postal  Telegraph  Co.,  48  Misc. 

New  York—  Hirsch  v.  Am.  Dist.  372,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  564  (1905). 

Telegraph  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  371,  »  Holmes  v.  Union  Telegraph  & 

112  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  265  (1906).  T.  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  563  (1891). 

[901 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  111 

acteristics  of  the  product  are  such  that  it  can  only  have 
a  local  distribution  the  barrier  against  outside  competi- 
tion may  fairly  be  said  to  be  natural.  Thus  those  who 
supply  water  through  pipes  are  in  public  employment, 
while  those  who  bottle  water  are  not.  And  what  after 
all  is  that  element  in  the  situation  which  makes  the  sale 
of  gas  a  public  employment  while  the  vending  of  candles 
is  a  private  business?  Is  it  not  this — that  the  box  of 
candles  may  be  sent  from  any  factory  into  any  market, 
a  condition  which  preserves  virtual  competition  in  every 
market,  while  a  thousand  cubic  feet  of  gas  can  only  be 
got  from  the  pipes  of  the  local  company,  which  gives  it 
control  of  the  situation.  When  the  market  is  thus  lim- 
ited by  the  nature  of  the  product  it  may  fairly  be  said 
that  the  monopoly  of  the  local  company  is  natural. 

§  111.  Gas  works. 

When  the  first  works  were  constructed  to  furnish  gas 
through  mains  laid  in  the  public  streets  to  various  house- 
holders in  the  community  at  large,  new  conditions  in  the 
supply  of  illumination  were  created.  In  the  first  cases, 
as  has  been  noted,  the  change  in  the  conditions  of  supply 
whereby  the  local  company  had  gained  a  virtual  monop- 
oly was  not  appreciated,  and  it  was  said  in  the  earlier 
American  cases  l  that  the  proprietor  of  a  gas  works  was 
free  as  the  owner  of  any  factory  to  sell  his  product  as  it 
should  please  him  best.2  The  honor  of  being  the  first  to 

1  These  cases  still  have  an  histor-  Gas    Light    Co.,     12     Allen,     75 

ioal  interest  although  they  have  long  ( 1866) . 

since  become  obsolete  even  in  the  New  Jersey. — Paterson  Gas  Light 

jurisdictions  which  decided  them.  Co.  v.  Brady,  3  Dutch.  245,  72  Am. 

See   §  31,  supra,  for   discussion  of  Dec.  360  (1858). 

them.  New  York.— New  York  C.  &  H. 

Connecticut. — McCune    v.    Nor-  R.  R.  v.  Metropolitan  Gas  Light 

wich  Gas  Co.,  30  Conn.  521,  79  Am.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  326  (1875). 

Dec.  278  (1862).  2  This  evolution  in  England  is  to 

Massachusetts. — Com.   v.   Lowell  be  traced  in  legislation.    The  earlier 

[91] 


§111 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


point  out  the  essential  change  wrought  by  these  new 
conditions  belongs  to  Mr.  Justice  Smith  who  held  in 
Shepard  v.  Milwaukee  Gas  Light  Company,1  that  the 
gas  company  was  bound  to  sell  its  gas  to  every  citizen  of 
Milwaukee  upon  compliance  with  such  regulations  only 
as  the  company  might  rightfully  impose.  "Corporations 
of  this  kind,"  he  said,  "are  not  like  trading  or  manufac- 
turing corporations  whose  productions  may  be  transported 
from  market  to  market  throughout  the  world.  Its  manu- 
facture depends  upon  the  consumption  of  the  immediate 
neighborhood  for  its  profit  and  success,  and  upon  no  other 
place.  From  the  nature  of  the  article,  the  objects  of  the 
company,  their  relations  to  the  community,  and  from  all 
the  considerations  before  mentioned,  it  is  to  me  apparent 
that  the  company  is  not  at  all  analogous  to  an  ordinary 
manufacturing  or  trading  corporation."  2 


gas  companies  act  provided  simply 
that  these  companies  might  make 
such  arrangments  as  they  pleased 
for  the  sale  of  gas  to  consumers.  It 
was  not  until  comparatively  re- 
cently that  the  gas  legislation  was 
expanded  to  provide  that  these  com- 
panies must  serve  all  who  made 
proper  application. 

'6  Wis.  539,  70  Am.  Dec.  479 
(1858). 

2  From  the  great  number  of 
modern  decisions  which  hold  gas 
companies  subject  to  the  obligation 
of  the  public  service  law,  the  fol- 
lowing are  selected  in  which  the 
general  principle  is  well  discussed: 

United  States. — Gibbs  v.  Con- 
solidated Gas  Co.,  130  U.  S.  396,  32 
L.  ed.  979,  9  Sup.  Ct.  553  (1889). 

Illinois. — People's  Gas  Light  & 
C.  Co.  v.  Hale,  94  111.  App.  406 
(1900). 

Indiana. — Portland   Gas  Co.  v. 

[92] 


State  ex  rel.  Keen,  135  Ind.  54,  34 
N.  E.  818,  21  L.  R.  A.  639  (1893). 

Kansas. — In  re  Pryor,  55  Kan. 
724,  41  Pac.  958,  29  L.  R.  A.  398,  49 
Am.  St.  Rep.  280  (1895). 

Kentucky. — Owcnsboro  Gas  Light 
Co.  v.  Hildebrand,  19  Ky.  L.  R. 
983,  42  S.  W.  351  (1897). 

Louisiana. — New  Orleans  Gas 
Light  Co.  v.  Paulding,  12  Rob.  378 
(1845). 

Maine. — Brunswick  Gas  Light 
Co.  v.  United  Gas,  etc.,  Co.,  85  Me. 
532,  27  Atl.  525,  35  Am.  St.  Rep. 
385  (1893). 

Maryland. — Gas  Light  Co.  of 
Baltimore  v.  Colliday,  25  Md.  1 
(1866). 

Massachusetts. — Opinion  of  Jus- 
tices, 150  Mass.  592,  24  N.  E.  1084 
(1890). 

Michigan. — Williams  v.  Mut.  Gas 
Co.,  52  Mich.  499,  18  N.  W.  236, 
50  Am.  Rep.  266  (1884). 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  112 

§  112.  Fuel  gas. 

The  same  principles  apply  to  the  supply  of  gas  for 
fuel.  The  only  practical  question  seems  to  be  whether 
the  gas  company  has  generally  undertaken  the  supply 
of  gas  for  fuel;  it  being  apparently  universally  held  that 
such  supply  is  public  in  character.  In  a  recent  case  1 
where  the  public  character  of  this  supply  was  questioned, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  West  Virginia  in  an  elaborate 
opinion  pointed  out  the  fundamental  causes  which  make 
this  service  a  public  one,  Judge  Poffenbarger  saying: 
"  Heating  being  an  agent  or  principle  indispensable  to 
the  health,  comfort  and  convenience  of  every  inhabitant 
of  our  cities,  we  do  not  see  why,  through  the  medium  of 
natural  gas,  it  may  not  be  as  much  a  public  service  to 
furnish  it  to  the  citizens,  as  to  furnish  water.  It  is  in- 
quired, why  do  not  municipalities  also  purchase  coal 
mines  and  issue  their  bonds  therefor,  and  embark  in  the 
business  of  mining  and  selling  coal  to  private  consumers? 
An  obvious  reply  is  that  coal  and  other  fuel  may  be  carried 
to  the  consumer  by  the  ordinary  channels  of  transpor- 
tation, at  a  comparatively  moderate  expense,  while  in 
conveying  natural  gas,  streets  must  be  opened,  pipes 
laid,  works  erected,  fixtures  and  machinery  purchased, 
and  other  expenses  incurred,  beyond  the  enterprise  and 
capital  of  an  individual."  2 

Missouri. — Vanderberg   v.    Kan-  Wisconsin. — Madison    v.    Madi- 

sas  City  Gas  Co.,   126  Mo.  App.  son  Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  129  Wis. 

600,  105  S.  W.  17  (1907).  249,   108   N.   W.   65,   8  L.   R.  A. 

New   Jersey— Public    Service  (N.  S.)  529,  116  Am.  St.  Rep.  944 

Corp.  v.   American   Lighting   Co.,  (1906). 

67  N.  J.  Eq.  122,  57  Atl.  482  (1904).  >  Charleston  Natural  Gas  Co.  v. 

Ohio—  Zanesville   v.    Gas   Light  Lowe,  52  W.  Va.  662,  44  S.  E.  410 

Co.,  47  Ohio  St.  1,  23  N.   E.   55  (1901). 

(1889).  2  In  the  following  cases  also  the 

Oregon. — Mackin  v.  Portland  Gas  supply  of  gas  for  fuel  is  treated  as 

Co.,  38  Oreg.  120,  61  Pac.  134,  62  public  in  character. 

Pac.  20,  49  L.  R.  A.  596  (1900).  California.— People  ex  rel.  v.  Los 

[93] 


§113]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  113.  Electric  plants. 

In  the  present  generation  a  new  method  of  illumination 
by  electricity  was  devised  which  involved  distribution 
from  a  central  plant  by  a  system  of  wires  radiating 
through  the  localities  served — a  very  expensive  plant  to 
install.  The  essential  features  of  the  electric  business 
were  so  like  the  main  conditions  in  the  gas  business  with 
its  generating  plant  and  pipe  system  that  it  was  obvious 
from  the  outset  that  the  same  law  of  public  service  was  to 
be  enforced  in  this  instance.  Indeed,  it  is  striking  that  in 
no  adjudicated  case  has  an  electric  light  company  ever 
squarely  denied  that  there  rested  upon  it  the  primary 
obligation  to  serve  all.  All  this  is  most  significant;  for  it 
shows  that  the  law  of  public  service  has  now  such  general 
acceptation  that  in  any  new  instance  similar  in  character 
it  will  be  applied  by  the  courts  without  hesitation.  One 
of  the  latest  cases  as  to  electric  lighting  is  Snell  v.  Clin- 
ton Electric  Light  Company,1  where  the  company  refused 
to  furnish  electric  light  to  an  applicant  upon  the  same 
terms  as  to  others.  In  his  holding  for  this  applicant 
Mr.  Justice  Carter  stated  the  fundamental  propositions 
involved  in  this  way:  "There  is  no  statute  regulating  the 
manner  under  which  electric  light  companies  shall  do 
business  in  this  State.  They  are  therefore  subject  only 
to  the  common  law,  and  such  regulations  as  may  be  im- 

Angeles  Independent  Gas  Co.,  150  Gas  Co.,  108  La.  67,  32  So.  179 

Cal.  557,  89  Pac.  108  (1907).  (1902). 

Illinois. — People's  Gas  Light  &  Ohio. — Toledo  v.  North  Western 

Coke  Co.  v.  Hale,  94  111.  App.  406  Ohio  Natural  Gas  Co.,  6  Oh.  N.  P. 

(1900).  531  (1898). 

Indiana. — Rushville  v.  Rushville  Pennsylvania. — Hoehle  v.  Alle- 

Natural  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575,  28  gheny  Heating  Co.,  5  Pa.  Sup.  Ct. 

N.  E.  853,  15  L.  R.  A.  321  (1892).  21  (1897). 

Kentucky. — Nairin  v.  Kentucky  J  Snell  v.  Clinton  Electric  Light 

Heating  Co.,  27  Ky.  L.  R.  551,  86  Co.,  196  111.  626,  63  N.  E.  1082,  89 

S.  W.  676  (1900).  Am.  St.  Rep.  341,  58  L.  R.  A.  284 

Louisiana. — State  v.  New  Orleans  (1902). 

[941 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY 


§113 


posed  by  the  municipality  which  grants  them  privileges. 
Appellee,  being  organized  to  do  a  business  affected  with  a 
public  interest,  must  treat  all  customers  fairly  and  with- 
out unjust  discrimination.  Both  reason  and  authority 
deny  to  a  corporation  clothed  with  such  rights  and  powers 
and  bearing  such  a  relation  to  the  public  the  power  to 
arbitrarily  fix  the  price  at  which  it  will  furnish  light  to 
those  who  desire  to  use  it.  The  company  was  bound 
to  serve  all  its  patrons  alike;  it  could  impose  on  the 
plaintiff  in  error  no  greater  charge  than  it  exacted  of 
others."  : 


1  In  the  following  cases  the  recog- 
nized public  obligations  of  electric 
companies  are  discussed: 

United  Stales. — C  a  p  i  t  a  1  City 
Light  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Tallahasse,  186 
U,  S.  401,  46  L.  ed.  1219,  22  Sup. 
Ct.  866  (1902). 

Florida. — Jacksonville  Electric 
Light  Co.  v.  Jacksonville,  36  Fla. 
229,  18  So.  677,  30  L.  R.  A.  540.  51 
Am.  St.  Rep.  24  (1895). 

Georgia. — Jones  v.  North  Georgia 
Electric  Co.,  125  Ga.  618,  54  S.  E. 
85,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  122  (1906). 

Indiana. — Beck  v.  Indianapolis 
Light  &  P.  Co.,  36  Ind.  App.  600,  76 
N.E.  312(1905). 

Kentucky. — Owensboro  Gas  Light 
Co.  v.  Hildebrand,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
983,  42  S.  W.  351  (1897). 

Louisiana. — Strohmeyer  v.  Con- 
sumers' Electric  Co.,  Ill  La.  506, 
35  So.  723  (1904). 

Maine. — Edison  U.  M.  Co.  v. 
Farmington  Electric  L.  &  P.  Co., 
82  Me.  464,  19  Atl.  859  (1890). 

Massachusetts. — Weld  v.  Gas  & 
Electric  Light  Consumers,  197 
Mass.  556,  84  N.  E.  101  (1908). 

Minnesota. — Minnesota    Co.     & 


Power  Co.  v.  Koochiching,  97  Minn. 
429,  107  N.  W.  405,  5  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  638  (1906),  semble. 

Missouri. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Allen, 
178  Mo.  555,  77  S.  W.  868  (1903). 

New  Hampshire. — American  L.  & 
T.  Co.  v.  General  Electric  Co.,  71 
N.  H.  192,  51  Atl.  660  (1901). 

New  York. — Armour  Packing  Co. 
v.  Edison  El.  Co.,  115  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  51,  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  605 
(1906). 

Ohio. — Cincinnati  R.  R.  v.  Bowl- 
ing Green,  57  Ohio  St.  336,  49  N.  E. 
121,  41  L.  R.  A.  422  (1897). 

Pennsylvania. — Mercur  v.  Media 
Electric  Light  Co.,  19  Pa.  Sup.  Ct. 
519  (1902). 

Vermont. — Avery  v.  Vermont 
Electric  Co.,  75  Vt.  235,  54  Atl.  179, 
59  L.  R.  A.  817,  98  Am.  St.  Rep. 
818  (1903),  semble. 

Virginia. — Fallsburg  Power  & 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Alexander,  101  Va.  98, 
43  S.  E.  194,  61  L.  R.  A.  129,  99 
Am.  St.  Rep.  855  (1903),  semble. 

Wisconsin. — Madison  v.  Madi- 
son Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  129  Wis. 
249,  108  N.  W.  65,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
529,  116  Am.  St.  Rep.  944  (1906). 

[95] 


§  1 14  ]          PUBLIC  SERVTCE  CORPORATIONS 

§  114.  Electric  power. 

The  supply  of  electric  energy  for  power  purposes,  how- 
ever, has  not  yet  been  universally  recognized  as  a  public 
service,  although  it  seems  that  there  can  be  no  real  doubt 
as  to  the  final  outcome.  It  may  be  admitted  that  those 
cases  which  hold  that  electric  power  development  is  not 
a  public  employment  when  its  proprietors  do  not  under- 
take to  serve  the  public  indiscriminately  are  correct.1 
Distinguishing  these  cases  thus,  the  cases  which  deny 
that  the  supply  of  electricity  for  power  is  public  in  char- 
acter are  in  a  distinct  minority.2  Even  in  these  jurisdic- 
tions the  general  supply  of  electricity  for  illumination  is 
held  to  be  a  public  employment  as  a  matter  of  course. 
And  where  the  company  in  question  is  supplying  elec- 
tricity for  both  illumination  and  power  the  whole  enter- 
prise is  considered  of  a  public  nature.  It  is  indeed  diffi- 
cult to  find  any  really  essential  differences  between  the 
supply  of  electricity  for  power  and  its  sale  for  illumina- 
tion. Where,  therefore,  there  is  openly  made  a  sufficient 
profession  of  public  service,  the  supply  of  electricity  for 
power  would  seem  to  be  as  plain  a  case  of  public  employ- 
ment as  the  supply  of  electricity  for  illumination;  and  so 
the  majority  of  the  cases  dealing  with  the  problem  now 
hold.3  The  actual  point  upon  which  the  cases  are  di- 

1  Vermont. — A  very    v.     Vermont      perior  Court,  42  Wash.  660,  85  Pac. 
Electric  Co.,  75  Vt.  235,  54  Atl.      666,  and  cases  cited  (1906). 

179,  59  L.  R.  A.  817,  98  Am.  St.  3  United  States.— Walker  v.  Shasta 

Rep.  818  (1902).  Power  Co.,  160  Fed.  856,  87  C.  C. 

Virginia. — Fallsburg     Power    &  A.  660  (1908). 

Mfg.  Co.  v.  Alexander,  101  Va.  98,  Georgia. — Jones   v.   No.   Georgia 

43  S.  W.  194,  61  L.  R.  A.  129,  99  Electric   Co.,  125   Ga.   618,   54  S. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  855  (1903).  E.  85,  6  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  122  (1906). 

2  Maine. — Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Idaho. — Hollister  v.  State,  9  Ida. 
Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A.  8,  71  Pac.  541  (1903). 

472  (1905).  Indiana.— Stoy   v.   Indiana  Hy- 

Washington. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Su-     draulic  Power  Co.,  166  Ind.  316,  76 

N.  E.  1057  (1906). 

[96] 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY  (§115 

vided  just  at  present  is  whether  eminent  domain  is  jus- 
tified for  such  a  purpose;  but  this  really  involves  the 
character  of  the  business.  It  is  readily  seen  as  is  said  in 
several  of  these  cases  that  one  of  the  essential  and  con- 
stituent obligations  upon  the  part  of  the  individual  who 
attempts  to  exercise  the  power  of  eminent  domain  under 
these  acts  is  that  he  shall  serve  all  of  the  public  fairly  and 
without  discrimination.  Without  such  obligation  of  pub- 
lic service  the  legislation  granting  eminent  domain  would 
be  unconstitutional.1 

§  115.  Steam  heat. 

As  matters  now  stand  all  but  an  infinitesimal  per  cent 
of  steam  heating  is  done  by  private  plants,  almost  always 
by  the  owner  of  the  heated  premises.  There  are  some 
instances  where  steam  is  sold  for  heating  purposes  from 
near-by  boilers,  but  as  this  is  by  special  contract,  without 
any  holding  out  to  serve  the  public  in  general,  even  this  is 
not  an  instance  of  public  business.  There  remain  the 

Minnesota. — Minnesota    C.    &  Central    Carolina    Power    Co.,    80 

Power  Co.  v.  Koochching  Co.,  97  S.  C.  512,  61  S.  E.  1020  (1908). 

Minn.  429, 107  N.  W.  405,  5  L.  R.  A.  Utah.— Salt    Lake   City    v.    Salt 

(N.  S.)  638  (1906).  Lake  City  W.  &  E.  Power  Co.,  24 

Montana,.— Helena  Power  Trans-  Utah,  249,  67  Pac.  672,  61  L.  R.  A. 

mission    Co.  v.  Spratt,    35    Mont.  648  (1902),  semble. 

108,  88  Pac.  773,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  l  This  is  seen  to  be  the  issue  in  the 

567  (1907).  cases  on  both  sides  of  this  question. 

New    Hampshire.  —  Rockingham  See  particularly: 

County  L.,  H.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  72  Georgia. — Jones  v.  North  Georgia 

N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.  R.  A.  Electric  Co.,  125  Ga.  618,  54  S.  E. 

581  (1904).  85,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  122  (1906),  the 

New  York. — Re  East  Canada  court  being  convinced  of  this  pub- 
Creek  Electric  Light  &  Power  Co.,  lie  obligation. 

49  N.  Y.  Misc.  565,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  Maine.— Brown   v.    Gerald,    100 

109  (1905).  Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A. 

Oregon. — Grande  Ronde  El.  Co.  472  (1905),  the  court  believing  that 

v.  Drake,  46  Oreg.  243,  78  Pac.  1031  there    was    no    public    service   in- 

(1905).  volved. 

South    Carolina. — McKeekin    v. 

7  [97] 


§§116,  117]   PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

cases  (as  yet  very  few  for  with  present  methods  the  loss 
in  transmission  is  too  large)  of  companies  organized  to 
supply  steam  through  pipes  placed  in  the  public  streets 
with  the  design  of  selling  it  to  abutting  owners.  The  very 
fact  that  they  ask  the  use  of  the  streets  for  this  purpose 
is  announcement  enough  of  their  public  profession  pro- 
vided that  the  business  is  public  in  character  by  reason 
of  the  nature  of  the  service.  But  although  the  com- 
pany need  not  fear  outside  competition,1  the  consumer 
at  present  can  perhaps  better  supply  himself. 

§  116.  Refrigeration. 

Almost  exactly  the  same  argument  may  be  repeated  in 
regard  to  the  modern  method  of  supplying  refrigeration 
by  ice  machines  driving  refrigerating  fluids  through  pipes. 
Most  of  these  plants  are  wholly  devoted  to  the  private 
business  of  their  owners,  with  some  considerable  amount 
of  incidental  private  sale.2  However,  there  are  cases  of 
refrigeration  plants  in  market  districts  with  their  pipes 
laid  through  the  streets.  It  would  seem  that  with  the 
profession  thus  established,  the  business  becomes  public. 
It  seems  public  in  character  because  again  the  nature 
of  the  service  makes  outside  competition  practically  im- 
possible. And  the  small  dealer  who  finds  his  rivals  served 
by  such  a  company  while  he  is  himself  refused  may  not 
improbably  have  a  remedy  at  law. 

§  117.  Public  need  creates  public  interest. 

The  most  prominent  thing  in  this  chapter  is  perhaps 

'Just  what  the  status  of  these  2  In  Matter  of  Rhinehart,  93  N.  Y. 

companies  is,  it  is  difficult  to  affirm.  App.  Div.  410,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  789 

The  only  case  dealing  in  any  way  (1904),  it  was  held  indispensable  to 

with  the  matter  seems  to  be  Evans  the  legality  of  the  use  of  streets  for 

v.  Boston  Heating  Co.,  157  Mass,  refrigeration    pipes    that    the   pro- 

37,  31   N.   E.   698    (1892),  which  prietor  of  the  service  should  have 

really  leaves  their  position  undeter-  assumed  the  obligation  to  serve  all 

mined.  applicants  in  their  district. 

[98] 


NATURAL  MONOPOLY 


(§117 


the  attention  paid  to  the  public  need  in  determining 
whether  a  business  is  so  public  in  character  that  those 
who  undertake  it  must  serve  the  public  in  accordance 
with  their  profession.  Where  there  are  natural  restric- 
tions particularly  it  behooves  the  State  to  see  to  it  that 
those  who  are  exploiting  them  upon  a  public  basis  should 
live  up  to  their  public  profession,  so  that  each  member 
of  the  public  may  have  his  needs  supplied  in  accordance 
with  his  requirements,  so  far  as  may  be,  at  a  reasonable 
price.  This  extraordinary  activity  of  the  law  in  behalf 
of  the  individual  is,  however,  confined  to  necessary  serv- 
ices. The  law  has  little  concern  with  the  monopolization 
of  unessential  things.  It  subjects  a  "scenic  railway"  at 
an  amusement  park  to  no  exceptional  liabilities.1  It 
leaves  a  circular  railway  built  primarily  to  view  the  Niag- 
ara Gorge  2  outside  the  pale  of  State  aid.  And  it  leaves 
skating  rinks  3  and  theaters  4  to  deal  as  they  please  with 
their  public,  and  exclude  whomsoever  they  choose. 


1  In  Meisner  v.  Detroit,  B.  I.  & 
W.  Ferry  Co.,  154  Mich.  545,  118 
N.  W.  14  (1908),  it  was  said  in  pass- 
ing that  theaters,  circuses,  race 
tracks,  private  parks,  and  the  like 
are,  in  the  absence  of  statutes  regu- 
lating the  business,  private  enter- 
prises, under  the  control  of  private 
persons,  who  may  license  the  per- 
sons they  will  admit,  and  refuse  ad- 
mission to  others,  and  the  right 


given  to  enter  such  places  is  a  mere 
license  which  may  be  revoked. 

2  Matter  of  Niagara  Falls  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375,  15  N.  E. 
429  (1888). 

3Tombler  v.  Kcelling,  60  Ark. 
62,  28  S.  W.  795,  27  L.  R.  A.  502,  46 
Am.  St.  Rep.  146  (1894). 

4  Purcell  v.  Daly,  19  Abb.  N.  C. 
301  (1886). 


CHAPTER  IV 

VIRTUAL   MONOPOLY 

§  120.  Economic  limitations  create  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Cost  of  the  Plant 
§  121.  Financial  limitations  upon  potential  competition. 

122.  Canals. 

123.  Channels. 

124.  Railroads. 

125.  Railway  terminals. 

126.  Railway  bridges. 

127.  Car  ferries. 

128.  Railway  tunnels. 

129.  Union  railways. 

130.  Belt  lines. 

Topic  B.  Service  on  a  Large  Scale 

§  131.  Disadvantages  of  the  individual. 

132.  Signal  service. 

133.  Telegraph  lines. 

134.  Wireless  telegraph. 

135.  Submarine  cables. 

136.  Telephone  systems. 

137.  Ticker  service. 

138.  Associated  press. 

Topic  C.  Inadequacy  of  Available  Substitutes 
§  139.  Insufficient  substitutes  for  service. 

140.  Public  stores. 

141.  Grain  storage. 

142.  Tobacco  warehouses. 

143.  Cold  storage. 

144.  Safe  deposit  vaults. 

145.  Market  places. 

146.  Stock  exchanges. 

Topic  D.  Subordinate  Services 
§  147.  Dependent  position. 
148.  Port  lighters. 

[100] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  120,  121 

§  149.  Floating  elevators. 

150.  Tugboats. 

151.  Switching  engines. 

152.  Parlor  cars. 

153.  Sleeping  cars. 

154.  Refrigerator  cars. 

155.  Tank  cars. 

156.  Necessary  regulation  of  virtual  monoploy. 

§  120.  Economic  limitations  create  public  employment. 

The  common  fact  in  all  the  instances  of  public  employ- 
ment which  have  been  discussed  thus  far  is  virtual  monop- 
oly. It  matters  not  by  what  conditions  this  situation  is 
established.  The  conditions  which  may  produce  virtual 
monopoly  are  various;  and  some  of  them  will  suffice  alone. 
The  effect  of  various  natural  limitations,  such  as  available 
sources  of  supply,  restricted  opportunities  of  access,  lim- 
ited time  at  disposal  and  difficulties  in  distribution  have 
just  been  discussed.  But  of  almost  equal  importance  are 
other  factors  producing  true  economic  monopoly  by  de- 
terring effectual  competition,  such  as  the  cost  of  the  plant, 
the  large  scale  upon  which  the  business  is  done,  the  ab- 
sence of  effectual  substitutes  and  the  dependent  position 
of  the  particular  service.  These  elements  in  the  general 
situation  have  doubtless  already  been  taken  into  account 
unconsciously,  but  they  are  of  such  importance  that  they 
deserve  full  discussion.  With  all  the  factors  which  may 
produce  virtual  monopoly  in  mind  it  will  be  evident 
enough  that  in  this  general  situation  however  established 
there  is  real  danger  to  society  calling  for  regulation  by 
the  State. 

Topic  A.  Cost  of  the  Plant 

§  121.  Financial  limitations  upon  potential  competition. 

One  usual  characteristic  of  a  public  employment  is  the 
relatively  large  cost  of  the  plant.  In  very  many  instances 
this  runs  high  into  millions  which  must  be  invested  before 

[101] 


§  122  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  service  can  be  begun.  This  necessity  of  getting 
together  so  much  capital  limits  fundamentally  the  amount 
of  such  construction.  Canals  and  railroads  furnish  the 
chief  examples  of  this.  It  would  take  perhaps  twenty 
billion  dollars  to  duplicate  the  present  facilities  for  trans- 
portation; and  it  is,  therefore,  practically  inconceivable 
that  it  will  be  done.  Moreover,  in  most  public  services 
there  is  still  another  reason  why  capital  is  kept  from 
investment  in  a  competing  service.  As  has  been  seen 
these  are  mostly  local  services  and  the  capital  invested 
must  be  sunk  at  the  risk  of  failure  in  this  one  market. 
For  example,  an  investment  made  in  a  gas  works  or  an 
electric  plant  cannot  be  withdrawn;  nor  can  the  product  be 
sold  elsewhere.  Thus  to  the  enormous  cost  as  a  deterrent 
to  competition  is  added  the  imminent  risk  of  total  loss  in 
a  desperate  competition  in  which  one  must  perish. 

§  122.  Canals. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  great  cost  of  a  canal  system  as 
compared  with  the  infinitesimal  use  which  the  individual 
boatman  makes  of  the  system  puts  the  user  entirely  at  the 
mercy  of  the  company  operating  the  existing  canal.  This 
is  indeed  characteristic  of  all  highway  use  to  which  canal 
maintenance  is  most  closely  allied.  As  was  said  in  a 
leading  case1  of  a  Wisconsin  canal,  "The  canal  of  the 
defendant  is  a  public  highway,  which  all  persons  upon 
complying  with  all  lawful  requirements  may  navigate  and 
use  at  their  pleasure."2 

1  MoArthur  v.  Green  Bay  &  M.  Co.  v.  Shuman,  91  Ga.  400,  17  S.  E. 
Canal  Co.,  34  Wis.  139  (1874).  937,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  43  (1893). 

2  That  canals  are  subject  to  the  Louisiana. — Sheldon  v.  New  Or- 
law    governing    public    service    is  leans  Canal  Co.,  9  Rob.  (La.)  360 
shown  by  the  following  cases  among  (1844). 

others:  New  Jersey. — Stewart  v.  Lehigh 

United  States.— United  States  v.  Valley  R.  R.,  38  N.  J.  Law,  505 

Ormsbee,  74  Fed.  207  (1896).  (1875). 

Georgia. — Savannah  &  O.  Canal  New    York.  —Pennsylvania   Coal 

[102] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  123,  124 

§  123.  Channels. 

What  has  been  said  of  canals  is  even  more  true  of  chan- 
nels. Necessary  as  these  are  for  access  to  ports,  the  de- 
mands of  the  community  so  usually  anticipate  commercial 
practicability  that  the  government  is  usually  called  upon 
to  dredge  them;  and  when  completed  the  merchants  are 
unwilling  that  their  commerce  should  be  hampered  by 
the  imposition  of  any  considerable  dues  for  their  use. 
Hence  it  is  unusual  to  find  these  channels  constructed 
by  private  corporations.  But  whenever  they  are  so  con- 
structed there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  public  must 
be  given  passage  upon  reasonable  terms.  This  was 
squarely  decided  in  Buffalo  Bayou  Ship  Channel  v.  Milby 
&  Dow,1  where  it  was  held  that  the  channel  company 
could  not  turn  back  a  vessel  upon  the  ground  that  the 
tugboat  towing  her  owed  tolls,  Mr.  Justice  Walker  saying: 
"This  water  channel  or  cut,  owned  and  controlled  by  the 
defendant  under  its  charter  from  the  State  was  a  public 
highway  for  vessels  beyond  question;  and  as  such  the 
owners  of  all  vessels  had  a  right  to  regard  and  to  treat  it, 
using  it  at  their  pleasure,  subject  to  the  lawful  conditions 
imposed  upon  them  therefor.  A  toll  bridge,  built  in  pur- 
suance of  an  act  of  the  legislature,  is  a  public  highway; 
manifestly,  this  ship  channel  was  so  too."2 

§  124.  Railroads. 

The  common  example  of  the  cost  of  construction  as  the 
deterrent  influence  is  the  railway  system.  The  fact  must, 
however,  be  reckoned  with  that,  notwithstanding  this  great 

Co.  v.  Delaware  &  Hudson  Canal  » 63  Tex.  492,  51  Am.  Rep.  668 

Co.,  31  N.  Y.  91  (1865).  (1885). 

Pennsylvania. — Commonwealth  2  See   Manistee   River   Improve- 

v.  Delaware  Canal  Co.,  43  Pa.  St.  ment   Co.    v.    Lamport,    49   Mich. 

295  (1862).  442,  13  N.  W.  810  (1882). 

England. — Case  v.  Midland  Ry. 
Co.,  27  Beav.  247  (1859). 

[103] 


§  125  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

first  cost,  the  construction  of  competing  railroad  systems 
has  in  the  past  been  not  uncommon.  But  experience  has 
proved  the  folly  of  such  investments.  The  potential  ca- 
pacity of  an  existing  railroad  is  but  seldom  reached,  so 
that  the  new  railroad  must  fight  for  a  traffic  essential 
to  both  of  them.  There  follows  a  death  struggle,  as  the 
history  of  rate  wars  shows.  The  result  of  all  this  is  that 
to-day  even  if  the  bodies  granting  franchises  generally 
believed  still  that  such  duplication  of  plant  was  wise  under 
such  circumstances,  the  first  cost  accompanied  by  the 
recognized  risk  would  largely  prevent  competition  by 
parallel  lines  in  most  instances.  The  established  railroad 
along  its  own  route  has  therefore  a  virtual  monopoly  not 
sufficiently  restrained  even  by  potential  competition. 
In  this  situation  regulation  by  law  is  inevitable.  Since 
the  " Granger  Cases"1  at  all  events  it  has  been  accepted 
law  that,  without  any  of  those  charter  provisions  with 
which  the  public  was  wont  in  earlier  days  to  safeguard  it- 
self in  granting  franchises,  the  railroads  are  so  affected  by 
the  public  interest  that  they  are  subject  to  exacting  regu- 
lation of  their  service.2 

§  125.  Railway  terminals. 

In  many  of  the  larger  cities  there  are  union  stations 
owned  by  separate  terminal  corporations  which  are  used 
in  common  by  several  railway  companies  which  enter  the 
city.  These  stations  and  their  yards  are  constructed  at 
great  expense  upon  advantageous  sites,  almost  always  with 

1  Peik  v.  Chicago  N.  W.  Ry.,  94  Ct.   334,  348,  349,  388,  391,  1191 

U.  S.  164,  24  L.  ed.  97  (1876);  Chi-  (1886). 

cago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  94  2  It  is  needless  to  collect  at  this 

U.  S.  155,  24  L.  ed.  94  (1876);  Chi-  point    the    innumerable    decisions 

cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ack-  since  that  time  which  have  held  the 

ley,  94  U.  S.  179,  24  L.  ed.  99  (1876);  railway  systems  subject  to  public 

Railroad    Commission    Cases,    116  regulation,  as  this  forms  in  large 

U.   S.   307,    29   L.  ed.   636,    6   S.  part  the  subject-matter  of  this  book. 

[104] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  125 

the  aid  of  eminent  domain  and  very  often  with  other 
special  privileges.  Naturally  enough  the  question  has 
already  been  raised  whether  these  terminal  corporations 
can  refuse  to  admit  other  railroads  which  later  apply  for 
terminal  facilities.  There  are  already  a  few  cases  in  which 
that  issue  has  been  squarely  involved,  State  v.  Jackson- 
ville Terminal  Company  1  being  perhaps  the  most  promi- 
nent. In  that  case  a  mandamus  was  granted  to  enforce 
an  order  of  the  railroad  commissioners  of  Florida  directing 
the  terminal  company  to  permit  the  use  of  the  station  by 
the  applicant  railway  at  a  reasonable  compensation  to  be 
fixed  by  the  commission.  The  court  decided  that  the 
commission  had  constitutional  power  to  issue  this  order, 
Mr.  Justice  Carter  saying  of  the  position  of  such  a  ter- 
minal company:  "By  undertaking  to  permit  the  use  of 
this  property  by,  and  to  furnish  facilities  for,  one  or  more 
railroad  common  carriers  it  dedicates  it  to  a  use  that  is 
essentially  public;  and,  to  the  extent  that  the  public  has 
an  interest  in  that  use,  it  must  submit  to  be  controlled  by 
the  public  for  the  common  good.  The  legislature  may, 
therefore,  for  the  common  good,  require  it  to  admit  all 
railroad  common  carriers,  to  the  extent  of  its  capacity, 
which  the  public  interest  may  demand,  and  to  limit  the 
charges  for  the  uses  and  privileges  of  its  terminal  to 
reasonable  compensation."  2 

1  41  Fla.  363,  377,  27  So.  221,      Commrs.,  180  Mass.  274,  62  N.  E. 
225  (1899).  397,  62  L.  R.  A.  144  (1902). 

See  also  Union  Ry.  of  Bait.  v.  Michigan. — Fort     Street     Union 

Canton  R.   R.    Co.,   105  Md.   12,  Depot  Co.  v.  Morton,  83  Mich.  265, 

65  Atl.  409  (1907).  47  N.  W.  228  (1890). 

2  In  the  following  cases  the  public  Missouri. — Kansas  City  &  N.  C. 
character  of  railway  terminals  was  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baker,  183  Mo.  312, 
recognized:  82  S.  W.  85  (1904). 

Illinois. — Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  R.  New  Hampshire. — Concord  &  M. 

Co.  v.  Peoria  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  182  111.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

501,  55  N.  E.  377  (1899)  semble.  Co.,  67  N.  H.  464,  41  Atl.  263 

Massachusetts. — Sears    v.    Street  (1893). 

[105] 


§  126  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  126.  Railway  bridges. 

Railway  bridges  are  sometimes  constructed  by  inde- 
pendent companies  with  the  design  of  selling  running 
rights  to  various  railways.  Usually  in  the  charters  of 
such  bridge  companies  it  is  expressly  provided  that  they 
shall  grant  the  trains  of  all  railways  that  make  proper 
application  running  rights  over  the  bridge  upon  the  pay- 
ment of  reasonable  tolls.  But  whenever  a  bridge  company 
gains  legal  privileges  by  the  acceptance  of  such  a  charter 
as  it  generally  does,  it  should  be  clear  whether  its  charter 
is  mandatory  or  permissive  that  the  bridge  is  put  at  the 
service  of  railways  in  general.  As  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  l  recently  said  of  a  bridge  company  whose 
charter  was  explicit  (after  remarking  that  there  was  no 
question  in  the  particular  case  of  the  reasonableness  of  the 
compensation  tendered  by  the  railway  applying,  or  the 
capacity  of  the  bridge  for  the  service  asked).  "The  con- 
struction of  the  bridge,  doing  away  as  it  did  with  the 
delay  and  annoyance  of  transportation  across  the  river 
by  ferry,  added  largely  not  merely  to  the  value  of  the 
entire  property,  but  also  to  the  great  convenience  of  the 
traveling  and  shipping  public.  The  Act  giving  authority 
for  a  large  issue  of  bonds  thereby  insuring  the  immediate 
construction  of  the  bridge  was  accompanied  by  a  proviso 
that  upon  reasonable  compensation  the  use  of  the  bridge 
should  be  accorded  to  other  companies.  Availing  itself 
of  the  privileges  conferred,  the  company  accepted  the 

Tennessee. — Ryan    v.     Terminal          Virginia. — Commonwealth         v. 

Co.,  102  Tenn.  Ill,  50  S.  W.  744,  45  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.   (Va.),  68 

L.  R.  A.  303  (1899).  S.  E.  351  (1910). 

But  unless  the  proprietors  of  the          1  Union    Pacific    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

union  station  have  undertaken  gen-  Mason  City  &  F.   D.  R.  R.  Co., 

erally  to  admit  all  railroads  to  its  199  U.  S.  160,  50  L.  ed.  134,  26  Sup. 

use  they  cannot  be  compelled  to  do  so.  Ct.  19  (1905).    But  see  Evansville 

Illinois. — Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  R.  &  H.  Traction  Co.  v.  Henderson 

Co.  v.  Peoria  &  P.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  167  Bridge,  134  Fed.  973  (1904). 
111.  296,  47  N.  E.  513  (1897). 

[106] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  127 

amendment  in  its  entirety  and  is  bound  by  its  terms  as 
fully  as  though  it  had  embodied  them  in  a  contract."1 

§  127.  Car  ferries. 

Car  ferries  are  obviously  like  railway  bridges.  It  would 
not  be  impossible  to  have  such  a  ferry  operated  for  the 
transportation  of  the  cars  of  various  companies,  and  it 
would  then  undoubtedly  be  considered  a  public  service. 
But  as  a  practical  matter  the  investment  is  so  relatively 
small  for  a  railroad  company  that  it  would  almost  always 
operate  its  own  ferry  and  then  it  would  not  be  obliged  to 
take  the  cars  of  other  companies.  The  character  of  the 
business  of  these  car  ferries  has  been  the  subject  of  some 
litigation.  The  nature  of  this  service  was  fully  described 
in  one  of  the  earlier  cases  2  in  language  which  has  since 
been  quoted  with  approval  by  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court.3  "The  boat  of  the  defendants  is  provided  with 
two  railroad  tracks,  which  prevent  the  entrance  or  egress 
of  ordinary  vehicles,  and  also  of  foot  passengers,  except  as 
they  are  transported  in  cars  which  run  upon  the  railroad 
tracks.  The  boat  is  exclusively  used  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  railroad  cars,  in  connection  only  with  the  arrival 
of  trains.  It  is  impossible  to  transport  ordinary  vehicles 
upon  the  boat,  it  is  impracticable  to  transport  foot  pas- 
sengers, except  as  they  are  conveyed  to  the  boat  in  cars. 

1  In  the  following  cases,  bridges  bridge  companies  are  not  common 

which  have  offered  their  facilities  carriers. 

to  railways  in  general  were  properly  United   States. — Kentucky    &    I. 

considered  to  be  public  in  charac-  Bridge  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry., 

ter:  37  Fed.  567  (1889). 

United  States. — Canada  Southern  Texas. — Southern    Pacific    Rail- 

Ry.  v.  International  Bridge  Co.,  8  way  Co.  v.  Patterson,  7  Tex.  Civ. 

Fed.  190  (1881).  App.  451,  27  S.  W.  194  (1894). 

Missouri. — Southern  111.  &  Mo.  2  Mayor  v.  New  England  Trans- 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Stone,   174  Mo.  1,  fer  Co.,  14  Blatch.  159  (1887). 
73  S.  W.   453,    63  L.    R.   A.  301  3  St.  Clair  County  v.  Interstate 
(1902).  Transfer  Co.,  192  U.  S.  454,  48  L. 

Although  in  public  service  such  ed.  518,  24  Sup.  Ct.  300  (1904). 

[107] 


§§  128,  129  ]   PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

The  whole  arrangement  of  boat  and  docks  is  for  the 
ingress  and  egress  of  railroad  cars,  and  not  for  the  accom- 
modation of  anything  else." 

§  128.  Railway  tunnels. 

The  case  of  a  railway  tunnel  constructed  and  main- 
tained by  an  independent  company  through  which  the 
trains  of  various  railways  are  hauled  is  more  uncommon 
although  not  absolutely  unknown.  The  situation  is  en- 
tirely analogous  to  those  instances  which  have  just  been 
discussed,1  and  if  in  any  way  the  tunnel  company  has 
assumed  the  obligation  of  serving  various  railways  it 
should  not  be  allowed  upon  general  principles  to  dis- 
criminate between  them.  And  it  would  then  be  true  of 
such  tunnels  also  that  although  in  public  service  they 
would  not  be  common  carriers  of  the  contents  of  the 
trains  which  pass  through  even  if  the  trains  are  hauled 
by  peculiar  locomotives  furnished  by  the  tunnel  company, 
since  the  possession  of  the  goods  or  the  control  of  passen- 
gers within  the  trains  would  not  pass  from  the  railways.2 

§  129.  Union  railways. 

A  union  railway  constructed  to  enable  various  railways 
connecting  with  it  to  run  their  trains  (usually  solely 
freight  trains)  through  to  various  terminal  points,  is  prac- 
tically in  the  same  position  as  the  union  station.  In  a 
recent  case  3  the  Union  Railway  of  Baltimore  chartered 
to  provide  running  rights  to  the  railways  entering  the 
city  refused  to  make  connections  with  the  Canton  Rail- 

1  In  one  of  the  few  cases  which  main   for    tunnel    companies,    Mc- 

have    been    found    involving    such  Ewan    v.    Pennsylvania,    N.  J.  & 

tunnel  companies  they  are  treated  N.  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  419,  60 

as  being  subject  to  exactly  the  same  Atl.  1130  (1905). 

law  as  bridge  companies.    St.  Clair  3  Union  Railway  of  Baltimore  v. 

Tunnel  Co.  v.  Powers,  138  Fed.  262  Canton  R.  R.  Co.,  105  Md.  12,  65 

(1905).  Atl.  409  (1907). 

-  Soo  also  justifying  eminent  do- 

[108] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  130 

road.  But  the  court  held  that  such  service  was  exactly 
within  the  duties  resting  upon  the  Union  Railway  in 
accordance  with  its  charter.  And  as  to  the  validity  of  such 
charter  provisions,  even  in  the  form  of  subsequent  amend- 
ments, Mr.  Justice  Jones  said:  "The  grant  therein,  there- 
fore, to  other  corporations  of  the  right  to  use  its  railroad 
was  not  an  incongruous  provision,  but  one  similar  to,  and 
consistent  with,  the  object  of  the  incorporation.  It  can 
hardly  be  questioned  that  the  Legislature  could  incor- 
porate a  railroad  company  for  the  express  purpose  of 
building  a  railroad  for  the  use  of  other  railroads  in  getting 
their  freight  and  the  articles  of  traffic  to  tide  water  in 
conditions  that  would  make  it  expedient  or  desirable  to 
do  so.  There  can  be  no  difference  in  principle  between  a 
railroad  company  incorporated  solely  for  such  use  and  one 
incorporated  with  that  as  one  of  its  purposes."1 

§  130.  Belt  lines. 

It  is  also  not  uncommon  for  the  handling  of  traffic  at 
large  commercial  centers,  or  at  important  junction  points, 
to  find  a  short  line  of  railway  operated  by  a  company 
with  a  distinct  charter  connecting  the  various  lines  of 
railroad  converging  at  this  point.  These  are  variously 
named:  "Connecting  railways,"  "junction  railways," 
"belt  lines,"  or  "terminal  railways,"  all  denoting  the 
special  character  of  the  service  that  is  rendered.  These 
transfer  companies  very  commonly  conduct  the  trans- 
portation themselves,  furnishing  the  motive  power,  and 

1  In  the  following  cases  the  public  gins  Ferry  Co.,  208  Mo.  622,  106 

character  of  such  union  railways  is  S.  W.  1005  (1907). 

recognized:  New    Jersey. — Nat.    Docks    Ry. 

United  States.— Interstate  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  32  N.  J. 

Co.  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  99  Fed.  472  Eq.  755  (1880). 

( 1900) .  Pennsylvania . — Windsor    Glass 

Missouri. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Wig-  Co.  v.  Carnegie  Co.,  204  Pa.  St. 

459,  54  Atl.  329(1903). 

[109] 


§  130  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  train  crew  as  well;  and  therein  they  differ  from  the 
various  railways  just  discussed  which  generally  undertake 
no  more  than  to  provide  trackage  or  at  most  haulage. 
It  is  plainly  true  of  such  belt  lines  as  serve  their  public 
indiscriminately  in  accordance  with  their  profession  that 
they  are  in  a  public  employment  and  subject  to  public 
regulation.  Thus  in  Norfolk  &  Portsmouth  Belt  Line 
Railroad  v.  Commonwealth,1  upon  an  appeal  of  the  com- 
pany from  a  judgment  of  the  State  Corporation  Commis- 
sion reducing  the  price  for  an  incidental  switching  service 
to  twenty-five  cents  per  car,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ap- 
peals of  Virginia  held  this  switching  line  to  be  a  public 
service  corporation  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission.  "If  the  power  of  the  Commission  is  lim- 
ited merely  to  fixing  the  rate  for  carriage,  and  it  is  with- 
out authority  so  to  regulate  that  service  as  to  render  it 
effective,  it  is  obviously  wholly  inefficacious  with  respect 
to  this  large  class  of  consignees  and  shippers.  Upon  the 
first  assignment  of  error,  therefore,  the  court  is  of  opin- 
ion that  the  service  in  question  is  cognate  to  and  so  in- 
timately connected  with  the  public  service  involved  in  the 
carriage  and  delivery  of  freight  by  the  railroad  company 
to  patrons  along  its  route  as  to  constitute  a  part  of  such 
service,  and,  consequently,  is  subject  to  governmental 
control." 

1 103  Va.  289,  49  S.  E.  39  (1904).  Mississippi—  Yazoo    &    M.    V. 

2  The  following  cases  bring  out  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Searles,  85  Miss.  520, 

the  public  nature  of  belt  lines:  37  So.  939,  68  L.  R.  A.  715  (1904). 

United  States. — United  States  v.  Nebraska. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Union 

Sioux  City  Stockyards  Co.,  162  Stockyards  Co.,  81  Neb.  67,  115 

Fed.  556  (1908).  N.  W.  627  (1908). 

Georgia. — Dixon  v.  Cent,  of  Ga.  Whether  this  switching  service  is 

Ry.,  110  Ga.  173,  35  S.  E.  369  common  carriage  in  the  strict  sense 

(1900).  so  as  to  make  the  transfering  com- 

Kansas. — Larabee  Flour  Mills  v.  pany  liable  as  an  insurer  of  all  the 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  74  Kans.  property  or  persons  within  its  con- 

808,  88  Pac.  72  (1906).  trol  or  disposition  would  seem  to  be 

[HO] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  131,  132 

Topic  B.  Service  on  a  Large  Scale 

§  131.  Disadvantages  of  the  individual. 

Another  characteristic  of  public  employment  is  that 
the  applicant  who  wishes  an  individual  service  of  the 
kind  rendered  by  the  established  company  is  almost 
always  at  great  disadvantage  relatively  in  supplying  him- 
self. This  is  due  largely  to  the  obvious  economies  of  op- 
eration upon  a  large  scale.  Two  leading  cases  in  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  bring  this  out.  A  grain 
elevator  can  handle  grain  at  a  fraction  of  what  manual 
transfer  would  cost.  Again  a  stock  yard  can  care  for  a 
cow  at  a  fraction  of  what  a  shipper  would  have  to  pay 
for  the  keep  of  a  single  cow  elsewhere.  Were  it  not  for 
the  coercive  law  of  public  service  it  is  only  too  probable 
that  these  economies  from  service  on  a  large  scale  would 
be  largely  retained  by  the  serving  company  and  not  given 
to  the  public  served. 

§  132.  Signal  service. 

Many  examples  might  be  put  of  the  disadvantages  to 
which  an  individual  would  be  put  if  he  were  refused  serv- 
ice, by  reason  of  the  .much  greater  cost  to  him  of  making 
arrangements  to  serve  himself,  for  this  is  an  element  in 
the  situation  creating  public  employment  which  is  very 
generally  present.  But  it  is  proposed  in  this  topic  to 
confine  the  discussion  to  one  class  of  callings  where  this 
factor  is  peculiarly  prominent  in  modern  times.  For 

a  question  of  fact.  It  is  probable  facts  and  the  decisions  of  the  two 
that  more  often  than  not  such  following  cases,  both  of  which  seem 
switching  is  conducted  without  that  to  be  correct  on  their  facts,  although 
assumption  of  actual  possession  apparently  oppositely  decided:  Swift 
which  is  necessary  to  make  out  &  Co.  v.  Ronan,  103  111.  App. 
carriage  strictly,  but  certainly  where  475  (1902) — common  carriage  not 
the  connecting  railway  enters  into  found — with  Fleming  v.  Kansas 
the  transportation  scheme  as  a  con-  City  Suburban  Belt  R.  Co.,  89  Mo. 
necting  carrier  it  must  be  held  liable  App.  129  (1901) — common  ear- 
as  such.  On  this  point  compare  the  riage  held  established. 

[HI] 


§  133  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  rapid  intercommunication  of  intelligence  there  are 
widespread  systems  now  established  which  it  would  be 
beyond  the  power  of  any  individual  to  duplicate  if  he 
would ;  while  for  a  small  fee  a  message  can  be  sent  to  any 
part  of  the  world.  These  transmission  systems  had  their 
beginnings  about  a  century  ago  in  the  semaphore  lines 
established  across  the  country  between  certain  important 
European  cities.  These  continued  to  grow  until  they  were 
altogether  displaced  by  the  discovery  of  the  telegraph. 
There  do  not  appear  to  have  been  any  common-law  de- 
cisions as  to  the  character  of  this  business  as  far  as  its 
commercial  side  had  been  developed.  It  is  quite  con- 
ceivable that  a  similar  problem  may  arise  in  connection 
with  submarine  signaling,  now  hi  its  experimental  stage. 

§  133.  Telegraph  lines. 

The  telegraph  by  the  middle  of  the  last  century  was 
rapidly  becoming  a  commonplace  of  everyday  commerce. 
That  without  regulation  by  law  the  telegraph  companies 
could  dictate  their  own  terms  was  obvious  from  the  first 
in  view  of  the  general  situation.  And  casting  about 
for  law  to  control  them  an  analogy  was  forced  between 
the  transmission  of  a  message  and  the  carriage  of  a  pack- 
age, because  it  was  well  recognized  that  in  common  car- 
riage reasonable  service  was  obligatory.  Almost  from 
the  earliest  times,  therefore,  the  telegraph  service  has 
been  held  to  be  a  public  employment.  It  is  difficult  to 
select  one  case  for  quotation  among  so  many  at  one's 
disposal,  but  perhaps  the  various  elements  combining  to 
make  the  telegraph  service  public  in  character  are  best 
set  forth  in  short  compass  in  a  recent  North  Carolina 
case  1  where  Mr.  Justice  Douglass  said:  "A  telegraph  com- 
pany is  a  quasi-public  corporation — private  in  the  owner- 

1  Green  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  136  R.  A,  985,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  955 
N.  C.  489,  49  S.  E.  165,  67  L.  (1904). 

[112] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  133 

ship  of  its  stock,  but  public  in  the  nature  of  its  duties. 
It  has  all  the  powers  of  a  private  corporation,  such  as  a 
separate  legal  existence,  perpetual  succession  and  free- 
dom from  individual  liability;  and  possesses  also  in  addi- 
tion thereto  the  extraordinary  privileges  which  under 
our  Constitution  can  be  exercised  only  by  such  corpora- 
tions as  are  organized  for  a  public  purpose,  and  then  only 
when  necessary  for  the  proper  fulfillment  of  such  purpose. 
Among  the  extraordinary  privileges  enjoyed  by  such  cor- 
porations is  the  condemnation  of  private  property,  which 
can  never  be  taken  for  a  private  purpose.  The  accept- 
ance of  such  privileges  at  once  fixes  upon  the  corpora- 
tion the  indelible  impress  of  a  public  use.  A  telegraph 
company  is  essentially  public  in  its  duties.  Without 
such  public  duties  there  would  be  neither  reason  for  its 
creation  nor  excuse  for  its  continued  existence.  In  fact, 
being  the  complement  of  the  postal  service,  it  is  one  of 
those  great  public  agencies  so  important  in  its  nature  and 
far  reaching  in  its  application  that  some  of  our  wisest 
statesmen  have  deemed  its  continued  ownership  in  pri- 
vate hands  a  menace  to  public  interests."  l 

1  The  cases  involving   the   prop-  graph  Co.  v.  Hyer  Bros.,  22  Fla. 

osition    that   telegraph    companies  637,  1  So.  129,  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  222 

are  in  public  service  are  practically  (1886). 

innumerable;  from  this  mass  a  se-  Georgia. — Dunn     v.    Western 

lection  is  made  in  which  the  gen-  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  2  Ga.  App. 

eral  principle  is  stated  particularly  845  (1907). 

well:  Illinois. — Tyler  &  Co.  v.  Western 

United    States. —Western    Union  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  60  111.  421, 

Telegraph  Co.  v.   Call  Publishing  14  Am.  Rep.  38  (1871). 

Co.,  181  U.  S.  92,  45  L.  ed.  765,  21  Indiana.— Western   Union   Tele- 

S.  Ct.  561  (1901).  graph  Co.  v.  Harding,  103  Ind.  505, 

Alabama— New  Orleans,  M.  &  T.  3  N.  E.  172  (1885). 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Southern  &  A.  Tele-  Maine.— Bartlett  v.  Western 

graph  Co.,  53  Ala.  211  (1875).  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  62  Me.  209, 

Arkansas.— Western  Union  Tele-  16  Am.  Rep.  437  (1873). 

^raph  Co.  v.  Short,  53  Ark.  434,  14  Massachusetts. — Pierce  v.  Drew, 

S.  W.  649  (1890).  136  Mass.  75,  49  Am.  Rep.  7  (1883). 

Florida. — Western    Union    Tele-  Michigan. — Western  Union  Tele- 

8  [  113  ] 


§134 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  134.  Wireless  telegraph. 

Within  the  last  few  years  the  transmission  of  electrical 
signals  between  distant  points  without  the  use  of  wire 
has  become  practicable  by  the  use  of  a  powerful  appara- 
tus for  sending  and  a  delicate  mechanism  for  receiving. 
Although  the  construction  of  a  wireless  telegraph  system 
will  be  much  less  expensive  than  the  usual  plant  required, 
still  the  fact  will  remain  that  when  a  sender  brings  a 
message  to  a  wireless  company,  the  service  he  asks  is 
infinitesimal  in  comparison  with  the  whole  business  of  the 
company.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that 
whole  law  of  ordinary  telegraphing  will  be  applied  to 
wireless  telegraphy.1  "This  action  against  a  wireless  tel- 
egraph company  which  first  makes  its  appearance  in  this 


graph  Co.  v.  Carew,  15  Mich.  525 
(1867). 

Mississippi.  — Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Allen,  66  Miss. 
549,  6  So.  461  (1889). 

Missouri. — Reed  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  135  Mo.  661, 
37  S.  W.  904,  34  L.  R.  A.  492,  58 
Am.  St.  Rep.  609  (1896). 

Nebraska. — Pacific  Telegraph  Co. 
v.  Underwood,  37  Neb.  315,  55 
N.  W.  1057,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  490 
(1893). 

New  Jersey. — State  v.  American 
Com.  News  Co.,  43  N.  J.  L.  381 
(1881). 

New  York. — De  Rutte  v.  New 
York,  A.  &  B.  Electric  Magnetic 
Telegraph  Co.,  1  Daly,  547  (1866). 

Pennsylvania. — New  York  &  W. 
Printing  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Dryburg, 
35  Pa.  St.  298,  78  Am.  Dec.  338 
(1860). 

South  Carolina. — Pinckney  Bros, 
v.  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co., 

[1141 


19  S.  C.  71,  45  Am.  Rep.  765 
(1882). 

South  Dakota. — Kirby  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  4  So.  Dak. 
439,  57  N.  W.  199  (1892). 

Texas. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Hamilton,  36  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  300,  81  S.  W.  1052  (1904). 

Utah. — Wertz  v.  Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.,  7  Utah,  446,  27  Pac. 

172,  13  L.  R.  A.  510  (1891). 
Vermont . — Gillis    v.    Western 

Union  Telegraph  Co.,  61  Vt.  461,  17 
Atl.  736,  4  L.  R.  A.  611,  15  Am.  St. 
Rep.  917  (1889). 

Virginia. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Reynolds  Bros.,  77  Va. 

173,  46  Am.  Rep.  715  (1883). 

1  There  is  already  a  case  in  the 
books  against  one  such  wireless  tele- 
graph company,  not  involving,  how- 
ever, its  duties  to  one  wishing  to 
send  a  message.  Copland  v.  Amer- 
ican DeForest  Wireless  Telegraph 
Co.,  136  N.  C.  11,  48  S.  E.  501 
(1904). 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  135,  136 

court  proves  the  oft  repeated  observation  that  every 
phase  of  life,  the  customs,  pursuits  and  progress  of  a 
people,  soon  or  late,  are  photographed  in  the  records  of 
its  courts  as  flies  are  preserved  in  amber  and  as  the  rays 
of  the  sun  are  imprisoned  in  the  diamond." 

§  135.  Submarine  cables. 

The  argument  of  the  necessary  dependence  of  the  per- 
son served  upon  getting  the  service  asked  is  far  greater 
in  respect  to  the  submarine  cable;  for  alternative  methods 
of  transmitting  intelligence  are  disproportionately  dis- 
advantageous across  the  sea  than  across  the  land.  As 
the  first  cable  was  laid  many  years  after  the  first  tele- 
graph was  established  the  law  was  prepared  to  treat  the 
cable  like  the  telegraph,  as  indeed  it  is  in  the  essential 
respect  of  the  transmission  of  symbols  to  a  distance  by 
means  of  electricity.  This  unity  of  the  problem  under 
discussion  is  thus  set  forth  by  Mr.  Justice  Henshaw 
in  Davis  v.  Pacific  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Company1 
where  the  general  rule  of  considering  telegraphs  and 
telephones  as  interchangeable  terms  in  statutory  provi- 
sions was  followed.  "In  the  very  early  history  of  the 
telegraph  it  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  there 
was  an  actual  recordation  of  letters  under  the  Morse 
code;  that  soon  passed  away  and  the  telegraph  operator 
of  to-day  receives  by  sound  upon  a  principle  no  different 
from  that  which  obtains  in  the  telephone.  Again  in  the 
case  of  submarine  cables  neither  sound  nor  writing  is 
always  employed,  but  the  varied  deflections  of  an  in- 
dicator within  sight  of  the  receiver  serve  the  like  purpose. 
The  words,  therefore,  cannot  be  limited  to  their  etymo- 
logical meaning." 

§  136.  Telephone  systems. 
The  best  example  of  public  duty  based  upon  the  virtual 

1 127  Cal.  312,  59  Pac.  698  (1899). 

[115] 


§  136  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

monopoly  of  the  established  plant  is  the  telephone  com- 
pany. In  the  case  of  the  telephone,  duplicate  services 
must  be  provided.  From  an  economic  point  of  view  the 
duplication  of  plant  that  is  necessary  to  make  competi- 
tion possible  in  this  public  utility  is  sheer  waste,  with- 
out compensating  advantages.  From  a  business  point  of 
view  this  fact  is  a  most  effective  deterrent;  when  one  of 
these  public  services  is  established  in  a  neighborhood,  it  is 
infrequent  that  men  will  be  found  to  invest  their  money 
in  the  construction  of  another  plant.  Therefore,  the  best 
discussion  of  the  nature  of  public  calling  is  to  be  found 
in  the  cases  concerning  the  telephone.  And  since  almost 
all  of  these  are  common-law  decisions,  they  disclose  the 
essential  tests  by  which  public  calling  is  established. 
From  the  many  excellent  decisions  discussing  the  pub- 
lic nature  of  the  telephone  system,  State  v.  Nebraska  Tele- 
phone Company  x  is  selected  because  of  its  full  working 
out  of  the  problem.  In  that  case  the  company  refused  to 
comply  with  the  relator's  request  for  a  telephone,  giving 
various  excuses  which  the  court  held  invalid;  and  there- 
upon a  mandamus  was  granted  ordering  the  telephone 
company  to  fulfill  its  public  duty  to  the  applicant.  Upon 
the  general  issue  Mr.  Justice  Reese  said:  "While  it  is 
true,  as  claimed  by  respondent,  that  it  has  been  organized 
under  the  general  corporation  laws  of  the  State,  and  in 
some  matters  has  no  higher  or  greater  right  than  an  ordi- 
nary corporation,  yet  it  is  also  true  that  it  has  assumed  to 
act  in  a  capacity  which  is  to  a  great  extent  public,  and 
has,  hi  the  large  territory  covered  by  it,  undertaken  to 
satisfy  a  public  want  or  necessity.  This  public  demand 
can  only  be  supplied  by  complying  with  the  necessity 
which  has  sprung  into  existence  by  the  introduction  of  the 
instrument  known  as  the  telephone,  and  which  new  de- 
mand or  necessity  in  commerce  the  respondent  proposes 

1 17  Neb.  126,  22  N.  W.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  404  (1885). 
[116] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  136 

Satisfying.  It  is  also  true  that  the  respondent  is  not  pos- 
sessed of  any  special  privileges  under  the  statutes  of  the 
State,  and  that  it  is  not  under  quite  so  heavy  obligations, 
legally,  to  the  public  as  it  would  be,  had  it  been  favored 
in  that  way,  but  we  fail  to  see  just  how  that  fact  relieves 
it.  While  there  is  no  law  giving  it  a  monopoly  of  the  bus- 
iness in  the  territory  covered  by  its  wires,  yet  it  must  be 
apparent  to  all  that  the  mere  fact  of  this  territory  being 
covered  by  the  'plant'  of  respondent,  from  the  very  na- 
ture and  character  of  its  business  gives  it  a  monopoly  of 
the  business  which  it  transacts.  No  two  companies  will 
try  to  cover  this  same  territory.  The  demands  of  the  com- 
merce of  the  present  day  makes  the  telephone  a  necessity. 
All  the  people  upon  complying  with  the  reasonable  rules 
and  demands  of  the  owners  of  the  commodity — patented 
as  it  is — should  have  the  benefits  of  this  new  commerce. 
The  wires  of  respondent  pass  the  office  of  the  relator. 
Its  posts  are  planted  in  the  street  in  front  of  his  door. 
In  the  very  nature  of  things  no  other  wires  or  posts  will 
be  placed  there  while  those  of  respondent  remain.  The 
relator  never  can  be  supplied  with  this  new  element  of 
commerce  so  necessary  in  the  prosecution  of  all  kinds  of 
business,  unless  supplied  by  the  respondent."  1 

1  The  language  used  in  the  tele-  T.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  160  Fed.  316,  87 

phone  cases  gives  the  best  idea  of  C.  C.  A.  268  (1908). 

the  prevailing  conditions  which  de-  Illinois. — Chicago  Telephone  Co. 

termine  public  employment  at  com-  v.  Illinois  Mfgrs.  Assn.,  106  111.  App. 

mon  law.  54  (1903). 

United    States. — Chesapeake     &  Indiana. — Central    Union    Tele- 
Potomac   Telephone   Co.  v.  Man-  phone  Co.  v.  State  ex  rel.  Falley, 
ning,  186  U.  S.  238,  46  L.  ed.  1144,  118  Ind.  194,  19  N.  E.  604,  10  Am. 
22  Sup.  Ct.  881    (1902);  State   v.  St.  Rep.  114  (1888). 
Bell  Telephone  Co.,  23   Fed.  539  Kentucky.— Louisville      Transfer 
(1885);  Delaware  &  A.  Telegraph  Co.  v.  American  District  Telegraph 
&  Telephone  Co.  v.  State  of  Dela-  Co.,  1  Ky.  L.  J.  144  (1881). 
ware,  50  Fed.  677,  2  C.  C.  A.  1  Maryland. — Chesapeake    &    Po- 
(1892);  Cumberland  Telephone  &  tomac  Telephone  Co.  v.  Baltimore 

[117] 


§137] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  137.  Ticker  service. 

The  ticker  service  by  which  corporations  organized  for 
the  purpose  distribute  by  electrical  devices  quotations 
gathered  at  the  exchanges  is  a  striking  example  of  a  busi- 
ness given  its  public  character  by  reason  of  its  virtual 
monopoly.  In  an  early  New  York  case, l  it  was  held  that 
defendants  are  a  public  corporation  under  obligation  to 
render  their  services  impartially  and  without  discrimi- 
nation to  all  persons  who  comply  with  their  reasonable 
rules.  And  as  has  recently  been  held  in  an  Indiana  case,2 
when  a  general  telegraph  company  buys  the  continuous 
quotations  of  a  board  of  trade,  and  supplies  them  at  a 
fixed  price  to  such  persons  as  desire  them  for  such  a 


6  Ohio  Telegraph  Co.,  66  Md.  399, 

7  Atl.  809,  59  Am.  Rep.  167,  B.  & 
W.  183  (1886). 

Missouri. — State  v.  Kinlock  Tele- 
phone Co.,  93  Mo.  App.  349,  67  S. 
W.  684  (1902). 

Nebraska. — Nebraska  Telephone 
Co.  v.  State,  55  Neb.  627,  76  N.  W. 
171,  45  L.  R.  A.  113  (1898). 

New  Jersey. — Duke  v.  Central 
N.  J.  Telephone  Co.,  53  N.  J.  L.  341, 
21  Atl.  460  (1891). 

New  York. — People  v.  Hudson 
R.  Telephone  Co.,  19  Abb.  N.  C. 
466  (1887). 

Ohio.— State  v.  Bell  Telephone 
Co.,  36  Oh.  St.  296,  38  Am.  Rep. 
583  (1880). 

North  Carolina. — Godwin  v.  Caro- 
lina Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  136  N.  C.  158, 
48S.E.  636(1904). 

Pennsylvania. — B  e  1 1  Telephone 
Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Atl.  825 
(1886). 

South  Carolina. — State  v.  Citi- 
zens' Telephone  Co.,  61  S.  C.  83,  39 
S.  E.  257,  85  Am.  St.  Rep.  870 
(1901). 

[118] 


Rhode  Island. — Gardner  v.  Provi- 
dence Telephone  Co.,  23  R.  I.  312, 
49  Atl.  1004,  50  Atl.  1014,  55  L.  R. 
A.  113  (1901). 

Vermont. — Commercial  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  New  Eng.  Tele- 
phone Co.,  61  Vt.  241,  17  Atl.  1071, 
5  L.  R.  A.  161,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  893 
(1888). 

But  see  American  Rapid  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Connecticut  Telephone 
Co.,  49  Conn.  352  (1881),  which, 
however,  must  now  be  regarded  aa 
obsolete. 

1  Shepard  v.  Gold  &  Stock  Tele- 
graph Co.,  38  Hun,  338  (1885). 

See  Smith  v.  Gold  &  S.  Tel.  Co., 
42  Hun,  454  (1886). 

See  also  Davis  v.  Electric  Report- 
ing Co.,  19  Weekly  N.  C.567  (1887). 

2  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co. 
v.  State  ex  rel.  Hammond  Elevator 
Co.,  165  Ind.  492,  76  N.  E.  100,  3 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  153  (1905). 

See  also  Board  of  Trade  v. 
Christie  Grain  &  Stock  Co.,  198 
U.  S.  236,  49  L.  ed.  1031,  25  Sup. 
Ct.  637  (1905). 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  138 

length  of  time  that  they  become  necessary  to  the  success- 
ful conduct  of  business  in  the  products  covered  by  the 
quotations,  it  cannot,  while  continuing  this  business,  re- 
fuse to  supply  them  to  anyone  able  to  pay  for  them  and 
willing  to  be  governed  by  its  reasonable  rules  and  regu- 
lations in  reference  thereto. 

§  138.  Associated  press. 

Whether  an  established  monopoly  is  real  or  fictitious, 
natural  or  accidental,  is  the  principal  question.  A  funda- 
mental case  that  comes  to  mind  at  this  point  is  Inter- 
Ocean  Publishing  Company  v.  Associated  Press.1  The 
plaintiff  newspaper  had  regularly  taken  the  news  of  the 
defendant  bureau.  One  of  the  by-laws  of  the  Associated 
Press  forbade  members  from  buying  news  of  any  other 
agency,  notwithstanding  which  the  plaintiff  took  specials 
of  the  Sun  Publishing  Association.  Thereupon  the  As- 
sociated Press  enforced  its  by-law  against  the  plaintiff, 
which  was  the  basis  of  the  suit.  In  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Illinois  Mr.  Justice  Phillips  held  the  by-law  bad  upon  gen- 
eral principles.  "The  organization  of  such  a  method  of 
gathering  information  and  news  from  so  wide  an  extent  of 
territory  as  is  done  by  the  appellee  corporation,  and  the  dis- 
semination of  that  news,  requires  the  expenditure  of  vast 
sums  of  money.  It  reaches  out  to  the  various  parts  of  the 
United  States,  where  its  agents  gather  news  which  is  wired 
to  it,  and  through  it  such  news  is  received  by  the  various 
important  newspapers  of  the  country.  Scarcely  any  news- 
paper could  organize  and  conduct  the  means  of  gathering 
the  information  that  is  centered  in  an  association  of  the 
character  of  the  appellee  because  of  the  enormous  expense, 
and  no  paper  could  be  regarded  as  a  newspaper  of  the 
day  unless  it  had  access  to  and  published  the  reports  from 

1 184  111.  438,  56  N.  E.  822,  48      L.  R.  A.  568,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  184 

(1900). 

[119] 


§  139  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

such  an  association  as  appellee.  For  news  gathered  from 
all  parts  of  the  country  the  various  newspapers  are  almost 
solely  dependent  on  such  an  association,  and  if  they  are 
prohibited  from  publishing  it  or  its  use  is  refused  to  them, 
their  character  as  newspapers  is  destroyed  and  they  would 
soon  become  practically  worthless  publications.  The 
Associated  Press,  from  the  time  of  its  organization  and 
establishment  in  business,  sold  its  news  reports  to  various 
newspapers  who  became  members,  and  the  publication 
of  that  news  became  of  vast  importance  to  the  public, 
so  that  public  interest  is  attached  to  the  dissemination 
of  that  news.  The  manner  in  which  that  corporation 
has  used  its  franchise  has  charged  its  business  with  a  pub- 
lic interest.  It  has  devoted  its  property  to  a  public 
use,  and  has,  in  effect,  granted  to  the  public  such  an  in- 
terest in  its  use  that  it  must  submit  to  be  controlled  by 
the  public  for  the  common  good,  to  the  extent  of  the  in- 
terest it  has  thus  created  in  the  public  in  its  private 
property."  l 

Topic  C.  Inadequacy  of  Availabk  Substitutes 

§  139.  Insufficient  substitutes  for  service. 

It  is  of  course  rare  that  the  possibilities  in  any  given 
case  will  be  so  restricted  that  if  the  applicant  is  refused 
service  by  the  particular  company  no  alternative  is  open 

1  The  following  cases  seem  to  be  On  the  other  hand,  the  following 

in  accord  with  the  principal  case  on  cases  seem  to  hold  the  news  business 

general  principles:  as  a  private  enterprise,  at  least  un- 

United  States. — Board  of  Trade  v.  less  it  has  professed  general  service. 

Christie  Grain  &  S.  Co.,  198  U.  S.  Missouri. — State    v.    Associated 

236,  49  L.  ed.  1031,  25  Sup.  Ct.  637  Press,  159  Mo.  410,  60  S.  W.  91,  51 

(1905).  L.  R.  A.  151,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  368 

Indiana.— Western   Union   Tele-  (1900). 

graph  Co.  v.  State  ex  rel.  Hammond  New   York. — Matthews  v.  Asso- 

Elevator  Co.,  165  Ind.  492,  76  N.  E.  ciated  Press,  136  N.  Y.  333,  32  N.  E. 

100,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  153  (1905).  981,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  741  (1893). 

[1201 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  140 

to  him;  usually  in  some  way  or  other  he  could  hit  upon 
some  way  out  in  such  a  case.  But  the  alternative  of- 
fered will  often  be  an  inadequate  substitute,  disadvan- 
tageous to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree.  In  such  a  situation 
there  is  no  effectual  competition  to  regulate  the  action 
of  the  original  company,  and  without  the  interposition 
of  the  law  there  might  be  great  oppression.  A  house- 
holder refused  water  by  the  established  company  might 
haul  water  from  the  river  in  hogsheads,  but  this  method 
is  obviously  no  real  substitute.  A  traveler  refused  food 
and  shelter  might  purchase  provisions  and  tenting,  yet 
he  will  pay  an  extortionate  price  rather  than  be  put  to 
that.  Indeed  the  mere  fact  that  there  are  two  gas  com- 
panies in  a  town  is  not  enough  to  alter  the  fact  that  the 
situation  is  essentially  monopolistic,  for  if  one  may  re- 
fuse service,  the  other  may  also;  and  obviously  where 
there  are  competing  telephone  systems  the  service  of  one 
is  not  a  substitute  for  the  other. 

§  140.  Public  stores. 

The  warehousing  of  staple  commodities  in  the  course 
of  commercial  transactions  is  to  a  certain  extent  uni- 
versally regarded  as  affected  with  a  public  interest. 
Where  there  is  some  legal  privilege  connected  with  the 
service,  as  in  the  case  of  the  bonded  warehouse,1  or  some 
special  circumstances  creating  a  monopoly  as  in  the  case 
of  the  wharfinger,2  the  courts  hold  the  business  public. 
And  in  the  case  of  the  storage  of  certain  staples  there  are 
decisions  that  the  warehouses  in  question  are  public, 
such  as  grain  elevators,3  tobacco  warehouses.4  In  view 
of  these  particular  examples  just  mentioned  it  would 
seem  that  generalization  is  justifiable,  that  those  who 
conduct  the  business  of  warehousing  staples  upon  a  pub- 

1  See  §  54,  supra.  s  See  §  141,  infra. 

2  See  §  102,  supra.  *  See  §  142,  infra. 

[121] 


§  141 J          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

lie  basis  owe  peculiar  duties  to  the  public.  And  indeed 
that  public  warehousmen  constitute  at  least  a  peculiar 
class  is  recognized  in  recent  statutes  1  and  to  some  extent 
in  the  current  decisions  concerning  them.2 

§  141.  Grain  storage. 

That  warehousing  in  general  is  public  in  character 
would  seem  to  be  proved  by  the  later  cases  involving 
grain  elevators.  In  Munn  v.  Illinois  3  it  will  be  remem- 
bered the  virtual  monopoly  of  the  Chicago  elevators  by 
reason  of  the  scarcity  of  proper  sites  for  conducting  the 
business  of  transferring  grain  from  railroads  to  lake  boats 
was  much  insisted  upon.  But  in  a  later  case,  Brass  v. 
North  Dakota,4  where  the  validity  of  a  statute  applying 
generally  in  all  circumstances  throughout  an  entire  State 
was  questioned,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  held 
the  business  of  grain  storage  public  in  character,  Mr. 
Justice  Shiras  saying,  "When  it  is  once  admitted  as  it 
must  be  admitted  here  that  it  is  competent  for  the  legis- 

1  In  contemplation  of  such  stat-         4 153  U.  S.  391,  38  L.  ed.  757,  14 
utes  a  warehouseman  is  defined  to      Sup.  Ct.  857  (1894). 

be  the  owner  of  a  warehouse;  one  That  the  business  of  grain  storage 
who,  as  a  business,  and  for  hire,  may  be  regarded  as  public  in  char- 
keeps  and  stores  the  goods  of  others,  acter  is  shown  by  the  following 
a  person  who  receives  goods  and  cases: 

merchandise    to   be    stored    in   his  Illinois. — Hannah  v.  People,  198 

warehouse    for    hire.     Butcher    v.  111.  77,  64  N.  E.  776  (1902). 

Commonwealth,    103    Pa.    St.    528  Minnesota.—  Vega  S.   S.   Co.   v. 

(1883).  Consolidated     Elevator     Co.,     75 

2  Only  such  corporations  as  are  Minn.  308,  77  N.  W.  973,  43  L.  R.  A. 
authorized  by  the  law  under  which  843,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  484  (1899), 
they  are  organized  to  carry  on  the  and  cases  cited. 

business  of  warehousemen  can  avail          Missouri. — Belcher  Sugar  Refin- 

themselves  of  the  provision  of  said  ing  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Grain  Elevator 

act.     Franklin   National   Bank   v.  Co.,  101  Mo.  192,  13  S.  W.  822,  8 

Whitehead,  149  Ind.  560,  49  N.  E.  L.  R.  A.  801  (1890). 
592,  39  L.  R.  A.  725,  63  Am.  St.         New  York.— People  v.  Budd,  117 

Rep.  302  (1898).  N.  Y.  1, 22  N.  E.  670,  682,  5  L.  R.  A. 

s  94  U.  S.  113,  24  L.  ed.  77  (1876).  559,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  460  (1889). 

[1221 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  t  §  142 

lative  power  to  control  the  business  of  elevating  and 
storing  grain  whether  carried  on  by  individuals  or  by  as- 
sociations in  cities  of  one  size  and  in  some  circumstances, 
it  follows  that  such  power  may  be  legally  exerted  over 
the  same  business  when  carried  on  in  smaller  cities  and 
under  other  circumstances." 

§  142.  Tobacco  warehouses. 

This  commanding  position,  however  established,  is 
the  persistent  factor  in  the  establishment  of  public  em- 
ployment. The  most  extreme  case  of  this  sort  is  Nash  v. 
Page,1  involving  the  position  of  tobacco  warehouses. 
That  case  was  a  controversy  between  the  proprietors  of 
ten  of  the  tobacco  warehouses  in  the  city  of  Louisville, 
and  the  appellants,  twenty-seven  in  number,  who  were 
dealers  in  tobacco.  It  appeared  that  the  appellants  had 
been  denied  the  right  to  make  purchases  of  tobacco  at 
the  warehouses  of  which  the  defendants  were  the  pro- 
prietors, upon  the  basis  of  a  general  restriction  which  had 
been  lately  attempted  to  members  of  the  Board  of  Trade. 
The  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Pryor  is  one  of  the  most 
significant  on  this  subject:  " Since  the  formation  of  the 
State  government,  the  sale  of  this  great  staple  has  been 
fostered  and  protected  by  legislation.  Such  warehouses 
have  always  been  regulated  by  law  for  the  benefit  of  the 
producer  as  well  as  those  who  are  proprietors  of  these 
warehouses,  and  the  latter  have  assumed  an  obligation 
to  the  public  which  exists  as  long  as  they  continue  public 
warehousemen.  It  is  a  conceded  fact  that  more  than  five 
millions  in  value  of  tobacco  annually  find  its  way  from 
the  producer  to  the  warehouses  in  that  city.  The  greater 
part  of  this  product  is  grown  within  the  State,  and  the 
producer  has  almost  of  necessity  to  place  his  tobacco 
under  the  control  of  and  for  sale  by  these  several  ware- 

1  80  Ky.  539,  44  Am.  Rep.  490  (1882). 

[123] 


§  143  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

housemen  at  public  auction.  All  this  tobacco  must  nec- 
essarily pass  through  these  warehouses,  subject  to  such 
charges  as  are  reasonable  and  proper.  Such  a  public 
duty  may  be  imposed  on  these  warehousemen  in  express 
terms  or  by  implication,  but  whether  so  imposed  or  not, 
it  arises  from  the  facts  of  the  case.  In  this  great  tobacco 
center  the  producer  is  restricted  to  these  public  ware- 
houses, or  rather  these  public  warehouses  have  a  mutual 
monopoly  of  the  sales  of  tobacco  at  auction,  and  the  fact 
that  there  is  more  than  one  or  a  dozen  such  warehouses 
cannot  affect  the  question."  l 

§  143.  Cold  storage. 

It  would  seem  that  in  view  of  the  usual  situation  the 
law  requiring  public  service  might  well  be  applied  to  the 
cold  storage  warehouses,  so  necessary  are  they  hi  the 
provision  business;  especially  as  the  small  dealer  who  is 
refused  storage  is  at  great  disadvantage  in  many  market 
contingencies.  The  few  cases  that  relate  to  the  obliga- 
tions of  those  conducting  cold  storage  warehouses  have 
already  gone  so  far  as  to  question  the  right  of  the  pro- 
prietors to  exempt  themselves  from  neglect  of  their  un- 
dertaking to  maintain  proper  refrigeration.2  At  the  same 
time  it  is,  of  course,  clear  that  they  are  not  like  common 
carriers  liable  as  insurers  of  the  provisions  stored  with 
them.3 

1  Pannell  v.   Louisville  Tobacco  Minnesota. — Minnesota  B.  &  C. 
Warehouse  Co.,   113  Ky.  630,  68  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  Cold-Storage  Ware- 
S.  W.  662,  23  Ky.  Law.  Rep.  2423,  house  Co.,  75  Minn.  445,  77  N.  W. 
82  S.  W.  1141    (1902);  Louisville  977,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  515  (1899). 
Tobacco  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Com-  3  Connecticut. — Allen  v.   Somers, 
monwealth,   106  Ky.   165,  20  Ky.  73  Conn.  355,  47  Atl.  653,  52  L.  R. 
Law  Rep.  1747,  49  S.  W.  1069,  57  A.   106  n.,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.   158 
L.  R.  A.  33  (1899)— accord.  (1900). 

2  Michigan. — Rudell     v.     Grand  New  Zealand. — Canterbury  Meat 
Rapids  Cold  Storage  Co.,  136  Mich.  Co.  v.  Shaw  &  Co.,  7  L.  R.  (N.  Z.) 
528,  99  N.  W.  756  (1904).  708  (1889). 

[124] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  144,  145 

§  144.  Safe  deposit  vaults. 

The  question  may  arise  in  the  near  future  whether 
the  safe  deposit  vaults  as  at  present  conducted  should 
not  be  obliged  to  serve  all  that  apply  in  accordance  with 
their  undertaking.  It  would  seem  that  many  of  the  ele- 
ments that  create  public  employment  are  present  in  their 
business.  Their  vaults  are  constructed  at  great  cost, 
while  the  individual  charge  is  relatively  small;  and  they 
are  not  in  fact  numerous,  although  their  service  meets 
a  real  necessity  in  modern  life.  And  particularly  there  is 
no  sufficient  substitute  for  the  service  they  render  in  the 
use  of  a  private  safe,  so  that  the  person  whom  they  might 
capriciously  refuse  would  be  at  a  real  disadvantage. 
These  elements  taken  together  are  by  other  analogies 
sufficient  to  put  the  business  within  the  class  of  public 
services.1 

§  145.  Market  places. 

In  accordance  with  the  principles  which  have  been 
brought  out  in  this  topic,  it  would  seem  probable  that 
market  places  provided  for  the  sale  of  necessary  commod- 
ities are  public  in  character.2  The  few  modern  cases  that 
deal  with  this  subject  deal  mostly  with  the  provision  of 
such  market  places  by  public  authorities.  That  public 
powers  may  be  exercised  in  the  construction  of  such 
market  places  is  indeed  proof  enough  that  their  main- 
tenance is  a  public  purpose.  In  justifying  the  taking  of 
land  by  eminent  domain  for  such  a  produce  market  for 
market  gardeners,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York 
said:  "It  is  a  public  market  for  the  benefit  of  the  public 
where  the  sale  of  certain  commodities  takes  place  and 
where  therefore  they  can  be  found  and  the  erection  of 

1  See  Safe  Deposit  Co.  of  Pitta-         2  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y. 
burg  v.  Pollock,  85  Pa.  St.  391,  27      356  (1856). 
Am.  Rep.  660  (1877). 

[125] 


§§  146,  147  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

which  must  consequently  be  regarded  as  a  public  con- 


venience. 


§  146.  Stock  exchanges. 

It  is  an  interesting  question  how  far  the  law  that  has 
been  developed  in  this  chapter  would  go  in  justifying 
public  regulation  of  the  stock  exchanges,  which  many 
people  now  demand.2  The  stock  exchanges  stood  out 
against  public  opinion  not  long  since,  asserting  their 
private  right  to  make  such  arrangements  as  they  pleased 
in  making  public  their  current  quotations.  But  the 
law  generally  was  found  to  be  able  to  deal  with  this 
public  demand  for  indiscriminate  publication  upon  the 
common-law  principles  of  public  service,  holding  that  the 
property  right  of  the  stock  exchange  in  their  current 
quotations  had  been  impressed  with  a  public  use,  and 
that  they  must  see  to  it  that  all  proper  persons  who  ap- 
plied for  such  quotations  were  served  indiscriminately. 
This  general  demand  for  the  enforcement  of  obligations 
to  the  public  upon  exchanges  by  reason  of  their  virtual 
monopoly  is  comparatively  recent  and  its  further  develop- 
ment can  hardly  be  predicted.3 

Topic  D.  Subordinate  Services 

§  147.  Dependent  position. 

For  the  conduct  of  certain  public  businesses  connection 
with  the  facilities  of  another  public  service  is  necessary. 

1  Matter  of  Cooper,  28  Hun,  515  pears  to  be  American  L.  S.  Com- 
(1883).  mission  Co.  v.  Chicago  L.  S.  Ex- 

2  As  has  been  noted,  the  public  change,  143  111.  210,  32  N.  E.  274, 
necessity  of  maintaining  an  open  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  385,  10  L.  R.  A. 
market  led  the  Kentucky  court  to  190  (1892),  in  which  the  court  de- 
hold  that  all  proper  brokers  must  clined  to  decide  upon  common  prin- 
be  admitted  to  the  privileges  of  the  ciples  that  the  exchanges  were  nee- 
tobacco    auction    rooms.    Nash    v.  essarily   public  in   character   upon 
Page,  80  Ky.  539,  44  Am.  Rep.  490  the   ground    that    the    case    being 
(1882),  discussed  in  §  126,  supra.  doubtful,  legislative  declaration  of 

3  The  ruling  case  at  present  ap-  this  was  desirable. 

[126] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  148,  149 

The  opportunity  to  carry  on  such  dependent  services  at 
all  is  necessarily  limited;  and  the  dependent  service  is 
usually  without  competition.  Thus  the  companies  that 
furnish  special  passenger  car  service,  as  parlor  cars  and 
sleeping  cars,  are  few  in  number;  and  so  are  the  com- 
panies which  provide  special  freight  car  service,  as  ex- 
press cars  and  refrigerator  cars.  This  would  be  so  by 
the  nature  of  the  case  in  any  event;  but  since  by  the 
weight  of  authority  it  is  permissible  to  make  an  exclusive 
contract  with  one  subordinate  company  the  situation  is 
most  usually  one  of  complete  monopoly.  The  same  sit- 
uation leads  to  the  same  results  in  various  terminal 
services  also,  such  as  those  of  hackmen  and  baggage 
transfer  men,  teamsters  and  truckmen.  Most  of  these 
services  which  have  just  been  listed  are  elaborately  dis- 
cussed elsewhere. 

§  148.  Port  lighters. 

In  all  ports  there  are  lightermen  ready  for  employment 
by  the  shipping  public.1  So  important  are  these  to  casual 
shippers  that  there  is  high  probability  of  serious  abuse 
of  their  practical  monopoly  which  they  have  for  the  time 
being.  By  the  situation  itself  they  seem  to  be  affected 
with  a  public  interest  and,  therefore,  subject  to  public 
regulation.  The  public  character  of  their  business  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  if  such  lightermen  take  actual 
possession  of  the  goods  they  are  handling  they  are  held 
to  be  common  carriers;  but  if  the  owner  retains  control 
they  are  of  course  not  carriers  at  all 2  within  this  rule. 

§  149.  Floating  elevators. 

In  large  ports  where  grain  is  commonly  transshipped, 

1  The  most  of  the  law  as  to  light-          2  Boyes.v.  Moss  &  Co.,  18  Viet, 
erage  is  to  be  found  in  the  early      L.  R.  225  (1892). 
case  of  Liver  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
L.  Rep.  9  Exch.  338  (1874). 

[127] 


§  150  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

floating  elevators  will  usually  be  found  which  are  at  the 
disposal  of  shipping  interests  in  general.  These  elevators 
in  the  port  of  New  York,  for  example,  proceed  under  their 
own  power  to  the  dock  or  anchorage  indicated  upon  order 
and  charge  fixed  rates  for  elevating  grain  from  canal 
boats  to  ocean  steamships.  These  elevators  in  New  York 
are  subject  to  the  same  regulation  as  other  grain  eleva- 
tors. In  the  leading  case  l  this  regulation  is  justified 
squarely  upon  the  existence  of  virtual  monopoly  in  all 
kinds  of  grain  elevating.  "In  the  harbor  of  New  York 
the  evidence  informs  us  at  least  five  different  business 
firms  operate  and  control  floating  elevators  and  that 
charges  are  fixed  by  a  committee  of  the  Produce  Exchange, 
of  which  body  some  or  all  of  these  firms  are  members. 
It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  the  opportunity  for  vir- 
tual monopoly  is  the  same  in  each  case." 

§  160.  Tugboats. 

Tugboats  play  an  indispensable  part  in  the  commerce 
of  a  port,  principally  towing  sailing  vessels,  helping 
steamships,  and  incidentally  moving  about  barges  and 
lighters,  floats  and  scows.  In  performing  these  services 
which  have  been  described  it  is  obvious  that  the  tugboat 
does  not  act  as  a  carrier,  as  the  possession  of  the  goods 
remains  with  the  vessel.  And  therefore  the  many  cases 
holding  that  such  incidental  towage  is  not  common  car- 
riage and  not  subject  to  the  extreme  liabilities  which  the 
common  law  lays  upon  common  carriers  are  undoubtedly 
correct  as  towage  is  usually  conducted.2  On  the  other 
hand,  it  would  seem  to  be  true  that  as  conducted  in  most 

1  Matter  of  Annon,  50  Hun,  413  Mississippi  Valley  Transp.  Co.,  24 
(1888),  affirmed  in  117  N.  Y.  621.  La.   Ann.    165,   13   Am.   Rep.  120 

2  Compare  Alexander  v.  Greene,  3  (1872),    holding    a  towing    line  a 
Hill,  9,  7  ibid.  533  (1842)  and  cases  common  carrier.    For  full  citation 
cited,  §  173,  infra,  holding  towage  on  these  points  see  §  173,  infra. 
not  carriage  with  Bussey  &  Co.  v. 

[1281 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY          [  §§  151,  152 

ports,  tugboat  service  is  so  affected  with  a  public  interest 
as  to  be  subject  to  public  regulation.  It  is  with  this 
impelling  them  that  some  cases  have  gone  so  far  as  to 
hold  this  service  to  be  common  carriage;  but  as  will  be 
seen  later,  these  cases  upon  examination  will  usually 
prove  to  involve  more  than  mere  towage. 

§  151.  Switching  engines. 

The  switching  engines  perform  a  similar  service  for 
freight  cars  that  towboats  do  for  freight  barges.  Such 
haulage  is  not  usually  common  carriage  1  any  more  than 
towage  is;  for  in  neither  case  is  possession  assumed  in  con- 
ducting the  transportation.  The  position  of  these  belt 
lines  has  already  been  considered.  It  is  enough  at  this 
point  to  refer  again  to  these  decisions  in  which  such 
transfer  service  is  held  to  be  common  carriage  and  sub- 
ject to  that  law  but  under  circumstances  essentially  dif- 
ferent from  the  mere  switching  here  described.2 

§  152.  Parlor  cars. 

There  is  an  obvious  public  demand  for  car  service 
different  from  the  ordinary  coach  provided  by  the  rail- 
roads generally.  Upon  long  runs  a  sleeping  car  is  an 
absolute  necessity  and  so  is  a  dining  car,  unless  as  rarely 
happens  the  journey  is  broken  by  the  train  stopping  for  the 
night  at  a  convenient  town  where  hotel  accommodation 
may  be  had,  or  as  often  happens  the  train  is  scheduled 
to  stop  at  eating  houses.  Moreover,  although  there  is 
not  the  actual  necessity,  perhaps,  there  is  a  public  demand 

'See:  2See: 

United  States. — Kentucky   &   I.  Nebraska. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Union 

Bridge  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry.,  Stockyards  Co.,  81   Neb.  67,   115 

37  Fed.  567  (1889).  N.  W.  627  (1908). 

Illinois. — Swift  &  Co.  v.  Ronan,  Virginia. — Norfolk    &    P.    Belt 

103  111.  App.  475  (1902).  Line  v.  Commonwealth,    103  Va. 

And  see  §  150,  supra.  289,  49  S.  E.  39  (1904). 

See  §  181,  following. 

9  [  129  1 


§  153  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

for  parlor  cars  for  day  travel,  and  this  is  within  the  public 
service  professed  when  such  facilities  are  offered.  It  is 
much  the  same  here  as  with  smoking  cars.  It  is  doubtful 
if  there  is  any  obligation  to  provide  them,  but  if  they 
are  offered  they  are  open  to  all  desirous  of  using  them  for 
smoking.  At  all  events  "the  business  of  running  drawing- 
room  cars  in  connection  with  ordinary  passenger  cars  has 
become  one  of  the  common  incidents  of  passenger  traffic 
on  the  leading  railroads  of  the  country."1 

§  153.  Sleeping  cars. 

It  is  as  to  sleeping  cars  particularly  that  the  most  of 
litigation  has  taken  place,  and  the  part  played  by  these 
car  companies  has  been  worked  out.  In  the  insistent  de- 
sire to  put  these  companies  under  public  obligations,  the 
contention  has  sometimes  been  made  that  the  sleeping  car 
was  a  sort  of  public  inn,  as  one  exceptional  case  2  held,  or 
a  common  carrier,  as  another  exceptional  case  decided.3 
A  sleeping  car  is  not  an  inn;4  in  reality  it  is  a  facility  for 

1  Quoted   from   Thorpe  v.   New     Smith,  73  111.  360,  24  Am.  Rep.  258 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.,  76  N.  Y.      (1874). 

at  p.  407  (1879).  Indiana—  Woodruff  S.  &  P.  C. 

2  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Lowe,  28     Co.  v.  Diehl,  84  Ind.  474,  43  Am. 
Neb.  239,  44  N.  W.  226,  6  L.  R.  A.      Rep.  102  (1882). 

809,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  325  (1889).  Massachusetts—  Whicher  v.  Bos- 

3  Pullman  P.  C.  v.  Lawrence,  74  ton  &  A.  R.  R.,  176  Mass.  275,  57 
Miss.  782,  22  So.  53  (1897).  N.  E.  601,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  314 

4  United  States.— Blum  v.  South-  (1900). 

era  P.  P.  C.  Co.,  1  Flip.  500,  Fed.  Mississippi.— Illinois   C.   R.   R. 

Cas.  No.  1,574  (1876).  v.  Handy,  63  Miss.  609,  56  Am. 

Alabama.— Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Rep.  846  (1886). 

Adams,  120  Ala.  581,  24  So.  921,  74  New  York— Welch  v.  Pullman  P. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  53,  45  L.  R.  A.  767  C.  Co.,  16   Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)   352 

(1898).  (1874). 

Georgia. — Pullman's  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Tennessee. — Pullman   P.   C.   Co. 

Hall,  106  Ga.  765,  32  S.  E.  923,  44  v.  Gavin,  93  Term.  53,  23  S.  W. 

L.  R.  A.  790,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  293  70,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  902,  21  L.  R.  A. 

(1899).  298  (1893). 

Illinois.— Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v. 

[130] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  153 

a  traveling  passenger.  Nor  is  it  a  carrier,1  for  the  rail- 
road is  that.  Though  neither  an  innkeeper  nor  a  carrier, 
the  sleeping-car  company  is  engaged  in  an  analogous 
public  employment,  and  must  serve  such  members  of  the 
public  as  are  within  the  class  which  it  undertakes  to 
serve.2  As  Mr.  Justice  Mulkey  said  in  Nevin  v.  Pullman 
Palace  Car  Company:3  "The  running  of  these  sleepers  has 
become  a  business  and  social  necessity.  Such  being  the 
case,  can  it  be  maintained  the  law  imposes  no  obligations 
or  restrictions  on  this  company  in  the  discharge  of  its 
duties  to  the  public?  Or,  more  accurately  put,  is  it  true 
that  this  company  owes  no  duties  to  the  public  except 
such  are  due  from  one  mere  private  person  to  another? 
Can  it  be  possible  that  the  common  carrier,  the  ferryman, 
the  innkeeper,  and  even  the  blacksmith  on  the  roadside, 
are  all,  by  mere  force  of  law,  placed  under  special  obliga- 
tions and  duties  to  the  public  which  they  are  bound  to 
observe  in  the  exercise  of  their  respective  callings,  while, 
at  the  same  tune,  this  company  is  entirely  relieved  from 

1  United  States. — Lemon  v.  Pull-  Massachusetts. — Dawley  v.  Wag- 
man  P.  C.  Co.,  52  Fed.  262  (1887).  ner  P.  C.  Co.,  169  Mass.  315,  47 

Alabama—  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  N.  E.  1024  (1897). 

Adams,  120  Ala.  581,  24  So.  921,  New    York.—Tr&cy   v.   Pullman 

74  Am.  St.  Rep.  53,  45  L.  R.  A.  P.  C.  Co.,  67  How.  Pr.  154  (1884). 

767  ( 1898) .  2  See  especially : 

Colorado. — Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  United  States. — Searles  v.  Mann 

Freudenstein,  3  Col.  App.  540,  34  Co.,  45  Fed.  330  (1891). 

Pac.  578  (1893).  Illinois.— Nevin  v.   Pullman   P. 

Georgia.— Pullman's  P.  C.  Co.  v.  C.  Co.,  106  111.  222,  46  Am.  Rep. 

Hall,   106  Ga.  765,  32  S.  E.  923,  688  (1883). 

71  Am.  St.  Rep.  293  (1899).  Massachusetts.— L  a  w  r  e  n  c  e  v. 

Illinois.— Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.,  144  Mass.  1, 

Smith,  73  111.  360,  24  Am.  Rep.  258  10   N.   E.    723    '59   Am.  Rep.  58 

(1874).  (1887). 

Indiana.— Woodruff  S.  &  P.  C.  Texas.— Pullman   P.   C.   Co.   v. 

Co.  v.  Diehl,  84  Ind.  474,  43  Am.  Booth  (Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  719 

Rep.  102  (1882).  (1894). 

Kentucky—  Pullman   P.    C.   Co.  « 106  111.  222,  46  Am.  Rep.  688 

v.  Gaylord,  9  Ky.  L.  Rep.  58  (1887).  (1883). 

[131] 


§§  154,  155  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  observance  of  all  such  duties  and  obligations  which 
are  not  expressly  contracted  for?  We  think  not.  To  so 
hold  would  be  to  unjustly  discriminate  between  parties 
similarly  situated,  and  make  the  law  inconsistent  with 
itself,  to  the  great  detriment  of  the  public." 

§  154.  Refrigerator  cars. 

Similar  in  character  is  the  special  freight  car  service 
now  so  prevalent  in  railroad  operation.  To  meet  certain 
needs  of  certain  classes  of  shippers  car  companies  are  or- 
ganized which  provide  the  appropriate  equipment.  Thus 
there  are  companies  providing  refrigerator  cars  and  venti- 
lator cars  for  special  uses,  and  tank  cars  and  stock  cars 
for  certain  traffic.  The  position  of  these  private  freight 
car  services  is  substantially  similar  to  that  of  the  private 
passenger  car  services  just  discussed;  it  is  again  not  a 
case  of  common  carriage,  the  railway  company  performs 
the  carriage,  the  car  company  furnishing  merely  addi- 
tional conveniences.  Thus,  to  take  as  one  prominent 
example,  the  refrigerator  car  line.  Although  not  tech- 
nically a  carrier,  the  refrigerator  car  line  is  carrying  on  a 
business  which  is  of  public  importance  in  connection  with 
the  railway,  and  like  the  sleeping-car  company,  it  is  there- 
fore engaged  in  a  public  employment  which,  though  not 
identical  with  that  of  a  common  carrier,  is  analogous  to 
it,  and  imposes  similar  legal  obligations  upon  the  corpo- 
ration. l 

§  155.  Tank  cars. 

To  take  another  illustration,  the  same  thing  would  be 
true  of  a  tank  car  line.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  tank  car 
lines  seem  usually  to  have  been  owned  or  controlled  by 
private  shippers  and  used  by  them  for  their  own  ship- 

1  See  the  discussion  of  this  prob-      lem  in  Re  Transportation  of  Fruit, 

10  Int.  Com.  Rep.  360  (1904). 

[132] 


VIRTUAL  MONOPOLY  [  §  150 

ments  only.  In  such  a  case  there  seems  to  be  no  question 
of  public  employment  since  there  is  no  undertaking  to 
serve  people  generally.1  But  although  not  technically 
carriers,  the  conductors  of  the  private  car  business  as  a 
class,  when  upon  .a  public  basis,  are  necessarily  in  the 
public  employment  and  engaged  in  a  calling  analogous  to 
that  of  the  common  carrier;  and  statutory  regulations 
adopted  for  the  control  of  common  carriers  often  apply  to 
them. 

§  156.  Necessary  regulation  of  virtual  monopoly. 

A  review  of  all  of  the  instances  which  have  been  cited 
in  the  course  of  this  whole  discussion  will  show  that  this 
conception  of  virtual  monopoly  will  cover  everything. 
Nothing  narrower  will  do,  as  for  example  the  difference 
sometimes  put  forward  between  the  undertaking  of  a 
public  service  in  contradistinction  to  the  furnishing  of  a 
public  supply.  Now,  it  is  true  that  most  of  the  cases  are 
cases  of  service — the  railway  and  the  warehouse,  for 
example;  but  other  of  the  cases  are  of  supply, — the  water- 
works and  gas  works,  for  instance.  Indeed,  there  is 
nothing  in  this  distinction,  either  in  economics  or  in  law. 
It  is  submitted  that  any  business  is  made  out  to  be  public 
in  character  where  there  is  a  virtual  monopoly  inherent 
in  the  nature  of  things.  If  virtual  monopoly  is  made 
out  as  the  permanent  condition  of  affairs  in  a  given 
business,  then  the  law,  it  seems,  will  consider  that  calling* 
public  in  its  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  if  effective  com- 
petition is  proved  as  the  regular  course  of  things  in  a 
given  industry,  the  law  will  hold  all  businesses  within  it 
as  private  in  their  character.  Under  our  constitutional 
system  a  distinction  is  made  upon  this  line.  In  the  pub- 
lic calling,  regulation  of  service,  facilities,  prices  and  dis- 

1  See  the  discussion  of  this  prob-  &  T.  P.  Ry.,  47  Oh.  St.  130,  23 
lem  in  State  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  N.  E.  928,  7  L.  R.  A.  319  (1890). 

[133] 


§  156  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

criminations  is  possible  to  any  extent.  Monopolistic  con- 
ditions demand  such  policy;  and  at  no  period  in  history 
has  this  been  more  apparent  than  now.  In  the  private 
callings  no  such  legislation  should  be  permitted.  Where 
competitive  conditions  prevail  there  should  be  freedom; 
and  at  no  epoch  in  our  industries  has  it  been  more  im- 
portant to  insist  upon  this. 


[134] 


CHAPTER  V 

COMMON   CARRIAGE   AS   A   PUBLIC   EMPLOYMENT 

§  160.  Who  are  common  carriers. 

Topic  A.  Carriers  of  Goods 

§  161.  Pack  carriers. 

162.  Wagoners. 

163.  Porters. 

164.  Hoymen. 

165.  Shipmasters. 

166.  Canal  boats. 

167.  River  craft. 

168.  Draymen. 

169.  Truckmen. 

170.  Furniture  movers. 

171.  Baggage  transfer. 

172.  Steamboats. 

173.  Towing  lines. 

174.  Wagon  trains. 

175.  Automobile  lines. 

176.  Railways. 

177.  Industrial  railways. 

178.  Express  companies. 

179.  Pneumatic  tubes. 

180.  Dispatch  companies. 

181.  Fast  freight  lines. 

Topic  B.  Carriers  of  Passengers 

§  182.  Ferries. 

183.  Ships. 

184.  Stagecoaches. 

185.  Omnibus  lines. 

186.  Hacks. 

187.  Taxicabs. 

188.  Passenger  railways. 

189.  Street  railways. 

190.  Elevated  railways. 

[  135  ] 


§160 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  191.  Underground  railways. 

192.  Interurban  railways. 

193.  Passenger  elevators. 

194.  Moving  platforms. 

195.  Pleasure  railways. 

196.  Common  carriage  as  a  public  employment. 

§  160.  Who  are  common  carriers. 

As  will  be  seen  later  in  more  detail,  common  carriage 
involves  a  particular  kind  of  service. !  The  conception  of 
carriage  itself  involves  not  only  transportation  but  control 
during  the  transit.  To  be  common  carriage  this  partic- 
ular business  must  be  upon  the  basis  of  public  service. 
In  this  view  of  it  there  are  various  callings  which  although 
upon  a  public  basis  are  not  common  carriage,  although 
once  analogized  to  it  to  bring  them  within  the  law  govern- 
ing public  service  at  a  time  when  the  extent  of  that  law 


1  Good  definitions  of  common  car- 
riage abound.  See  the  following 
cases  among  others: 

United  States. — United  States  v. 
Sioux  City  Stockyards  Co.,  162  Fed. 
556  (1908). 

Alabama. — Babcock  v.  Herbert, 
3  Ala.  392,  37  Am.  Dec.  695 
(1842) 

Georgia. — Fish  v.  Chapman,  2 
Ga.  349,  46  Am.  Dec.  393  (1847). 

Illinois. — Illinois  Central  R.  R. 
v.  Frankenberg,  54  111.  88,  5  Am. 
Rep.  92  (1870). 

Kentucky. — Robertson  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 2  Dana,  430,  26  Am.  Dec.  466 
(1834). 

Maryland. — Carpenter  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.  (Md.),  64  Atl. 
252  (1906). 

Massachusetts. — Dwight  v.  Brew- 
ster,  1  Pick.  50,  11  Am.  Dec.  133 
(1822). 

Nebraska. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Union 

[136] 


Stockyards  Co.,  81  Neb.  67,  115 
N.  W.  627  (1908). 

New  Hampshire. — S  h  e  1  d  e  n  v. 
Robinson,  7  N.  H.  157,  26  Am. 
Dec.  726  (1834). 

New  Jersey. — Mershon  v.  Hoben- 
sack,  22  N.  J.  L.  372  (1850). 

New  York. — Alexander  v.  Greene, 
7  Hill,  533  (1844). 

Oregon. — Honeyman  v.  Oregon, 
etc.,  R.  Co.,  13  Oreg.  352,  10  Pac. 
628,  57  Am.  Rep.  20  (1886). 

Pennsylvania. — Gordon  v.  Hutch- 
inson,  1  W.  &  S.  285,  B.  &  W.  3,  37 
Am.  Dec.  464  (1841). 

South  Carolina. — Bamberg  v.  So. 
Carolina  R.  Co.,  9  S.  C.  61,  30  Am. 
Rep.  13  (1877). 

West  Virginia. — Maslin  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  W.  Va.  180, 
35  Am.  Rep.  748  (1878). 

Wisconsin. — Doty  v.  Strong,  1 
Pinn.  313,  40  Am.  Dec.  773  (1843). 

England. — Gisbourn  v.  Hurst,  1 
Salk.  249  (1710). 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  161 

was  not  appreciated.  Thus  even  irrigation  and  telegraph- 
ing were  once  said  in  argument  to  be  similar  to  common 
carriage  in  order  to  bring  them  within  the  obligations  of 
public  service.  And  it  took  decisions  to  show  for  example 
that  towboat  men  and  wharfingers  were  not  liable  as  com- 
mon carriers;  and  yet  clearly  enough  in  the  first  no 
possession  is  taken  although  transportation  is  undertaken, 
and  in  the  second  there  is  no  moving  but  merely  pos- 
session. The  traditional  division  of  common  carriers 
is  into  carriers  of  goods  and  carriers  of  passengers.  In 
strictness  only  carriage  of  goods  presents  true  bailment; 
and  although  to  a  certain  extent  the  control  which  the 
carrier  of  passengers  exercises  is  sufficiently  analogous, 
yet  the  distinction  between  them  is  strong  enough  to  make 
one  measure  of  liability  for  the  common  carrier  of  goods 
and  another  for  the  carrier  of  passengers.  There  are  some 
problems  as  to  this  division,  but  mostly  these  are  diffi- 
culties in  application.  Thus  after  some  litigation,  the 
carriage  of  slaves  was  held  to  be  passenger  carriage,  while 
the  carriage  of  cattle  was  held  to  be  freight  carriage. 
Moreover,  many  carriers  transport  both  passengers  and 
freight,  although  some  confine  their  business  to  one  or  the 
other.  Still  the  established  division  is  too  settled  to 
ignore. 

Topic  A.  Carriers  of  Goods 

§  161.  Pack  carriers. 

The  earliest  form  of  common  carriage  in  England  was 
by  means  of  pack  horses.  The  country  roads  were  not 
adapted  for  wheeled  vehicles,  and  the  carrier  was  obliged 
to  carry  his  goods  on  the  horses'  backs  in  panniers.  Such 
were  the  two  carriers  who  appear  in  the  first  part  of 
Shakespeare's  Henry  IV.1  One  of  them  had  "a  gammon 
of  bacon  and  two  razes  of  ginger  to  be  delivered  as  far  as 

1  Act  II,  scene  1. 

[137] 


§§  162,  163  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Charing-cross,"  while  the  other  had  turkeys  in  his  pannier. 
Such  also  was  the  carrier  who  took  certain  bales  to  carry  to 
Southampton,  and  by  breaking  open  the  bales  and  steal- 
ing the  contents  provided  a  leading  case  in  the  law  of 
larceny.1 

§  162.  Wagoners. 

As  the  roads  grew  better  and  traffic  between  different 
parts  of  the  country  consequently  increased,  goods  began 
to  be  carried  in  wagons;  and  the  common  carrier  by  land 
was  a  wagoner  or  carter.  This  continued  to  be  the  com- 
mon method  of  land  carriage  of  goods  down  to  the  inven- 
tion of  railroads,  and  such  carriers  might  unquestionably 
be  common  carriers.  The  many  cases  involving  wagoners 
are  concerned  with  the  question  of  fact,  often  difficult 
to  determine,  whether  in  the  particular  case  the  carriage 
was  undertaken  as  common  carriage  or  whether  it  was  a 
case  of  special  arrangement  upon  a  private  basis.2 

§  163.  Porters. 

It  is  said  in  many  cases,  early  and  recent,  that  porters 
who  undertake  as  a  regular  business  to  carry  packages 
from  point  to  point  or  to  aid  in  loading  or  unloading  goods 
are  engaged  in  a  public  employment  and  are  accordingly 
subject  to  public  regulation  as  to  the  conduct  of  their 
business.3 

1  Y.  B.  13  Ed.  IV,  9,  pi.  5  (1473).  Ohio.— Samms    v.    Stewart,    20 

2  At  this  descriptive  stage  it  is  Ohio,  70,  55  Am.  Dec.  445  (1851). 
sufficient  to  cite  the  leading  cases  Pennsylvania. — Gordon  v.  Hutch- 
which  are  discussed  later.  inson,  1  W.  &  S.  285,  37  Am.  Dec. 

Delaware.— Tunnel  v.  Pettijohn,  464,  B.  &  W.  3  (1841). 

2  Harr.  48  (1836).  Texas.— Chevallier  v.  Straham,  2 

Georgia.— Fish   v.    Chapman,    2  Tex.  115,  47  Am.  Dec.  639  n.  (1847). 

Ga.  349,  46  Am.  Dec.  393  (1847).  England.— Gisbourn  v.  Hurst,  1 

Kentucky.— Robertson    v.    Ken-  Salk.  249  (1710). 

nedy,  2  Dana,  430,  26  Am.  Dec.  $See  Robertson  v.  Kennedy,  2 

466  (1834).  Dana  (Ky.),  430,  26  Am.  Dec.  466. 

Mississippi. — Harrison   v.   Roy,  And  see  Jackson  Architectural  I. 

39  Miss.  396  (1860).  Wks.  Co.  v.  Hurlbut,  158  N.  Y.  34, 

[138] 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  164,  165 

§  164.  Hoymen. 

As  in  the  case  of  land  carriage,  so  in  the  case  of  water 
carriage,  there  are  carriers  who  do  not  ply  regularly  be- 
tween fixed  termini,  but  carry  for  those  who  employ  them 
anywhere  on  a  certain  river  or  within  a  certain  harbor. 
There  are  several  early  cases  concerning  the  Thames 
watermen  1  who  transfer  goods  from  vessel  to  shore  or 
from  vessel  to  vessel.  Such  hoymen  are  ordinary  carriers, 
at  least,  though  whether  they  are  common  carriers  or  not 
may  depend  upon  the  nature  of  their  profession.  If,  how- 
ever, the  lighterman  does  not  take  the  goods,  but  they 
remain  in  the  control  and  possession  of  the  owner,  the 
lighterman  is  to  be  regarded  as  merely  furnishing  the 
motive  power:  not  taking  possession  he  cannot  be  tech- 
nically a  carrier. 

§  165.  Shipmasters. 

At  the  very  first  there  seem  to  have  been  doubts  as  to 
whether  carriers  by  sea  who  went  beyond  the  realm  were 
within  the  common-law  rules  as  to  the  liability  of  common 
carriers.  But  that  there  was  no  essential  difference  between 
carriage  by  land  and  carriage  by  sea  was  established  at 
a  comparatively  early  day.  In  this  country  there  was 
never  any  doubts  of  this  as  the  following  summary  taken 
from  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Williams  in  an  early 
Connecticut  case  2  will  show:  "It  was  long  since  settled 
that  any  man  undertaking  for  hire  to  carry  the  goods  of  all 
persons  indifferently,  from  place  to  place,  is  a  common 
carrier.  Common  carriers,  says  Judge  Kent,  consist  of 

52  N.  E.  665,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  432  1  Wils.  Reports,  281  (1750);  Trent., 

(1899).  etc.,  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wood,  4  Dougl. 

1  Liver  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson,  L.  287,  3  Esp.  127  (1785). 

R.  9  Exch.  338  (1874);  Ingate  v.  2  Hale  v.  New  Jersey  Nav.  Co., 

Christie,  3  C.  &  K.  61  (1850);  Mav-  15  Conn.   539,   39  Am.   Dec.  398 

ing    v.    Todd,  4   Campb.   225,    1  (1843). 
Starkie,  72  (1815);  Dale  v.  Hall, 

[139] 


§  166  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

two  distinct  classes  of  men,  viz.,  inland  carriers  by  land 
or  water,  and  carriers  by  sea;  and  in  the  aggregate  body 
are  included  the  owners  of  stage-coaches,  who  carry  goods, 
as  well  as  passengers  for  hire, — wagoners,  teamsters,  cart- 
men,  the  masters  and  owners  of  ships,  vessels  and  all 
water-craft,  including  steam  vessels  and  steam  towboats 
belonging  to  internal  as  well  as  coasting  and  foreign 
navigation,  lightermen  and  ferrymen.  And  there  is  no 
difference  between  a  land  and  a  water  carrier."  l 

§  166.  Canal  boats. 

Transportation  over  most  canals  has  been  largely  car- 
ried on  from  the  time  of  their  first  construction  to  the 
present  day  by  canal  boatmen  who  take  possession  of  the 
goods  to  be  forwarded,  store  them  in  their  canal  boats, 
keep  charge  over  them  during  the  transit,  and  make 
provision  for  the  beasts  by  which  the  boats  are  usually 
hauled  from  point  to  point.  Obviously  this  business  is 
carriage,  and  if  it  is  professed  for  all  that  apply  it  is 
common  carriage,  and  subject  to  all  the  liabilities  of  com- 
mon carriage.  As  is  said  in  one  of  the  early  cases,2  "The 
counsel  have  not  contended  but  that  the  defendant's 

1  See  for  other  examples:  12  Conn.  410,   31   Am.   Dec.   745 

United  States.— Propeller  Niagara  ( 1838) . 

v.  Cordes,  21  How.  7,  16  L.  ed.  41  Georgia. — Brown  v.  Clayton,  12 

(1858);  Clark  v.  Barnwell,  12  How.  Ga.  564  (1853). 

272,  13  L.  ed.  985  (1851);  The  Dela-  Massachusetts.— Gage  v.   Tirrell, 

ware,  14  Wall.  579,  20  L.  ed.  779  9  Allen.  299  (1864). 

(1871);  The  Maggie  Hammond,  9  New  York.— Elliott  v.  Rossell,  10 

Wall.  435,   19   L.  ed.  772   (1869);  Johns.  1,  6  Am.  Dec.  306  (1813). 

The  Gold  Hunter,  1  Blatchf.  &  H.  South  Carolina.— Swindler  v.  Hil- 

300,    10    Fed.   Cas.   5,513   (1832);  liard,  2  Rich.  286,  45  Am.  Dec.  732 

The  Phenix  Insurance  Co.  v.  Liver-  (1845). 

pool  &  G.  W.  Steamship  Co.,  22  England. — Laveroni  v.  Drury,  8 

Blatchf.  372,  sub  nom.  The  Mon-  Exch.  166,   16  Eng.  L.  &  E.  510 

tana,  22  Fed.  715  (1884).  (1852). 

Connecticut. — Crosby    v.    Fitch,  2  Spencer  v.  Daggett,  2  Vt.  92 

(1829). 

[140] 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  167 

liability  stood  upon  the  principles  of  a  common  carrier. 
It  should  so  stand.  He  carries  for  hire.  The  plaintiffs 
could  not  control  him  in  the  manner  of  lading  and  navi- 
gating his  boat."1 

§  167.  River  craft. 

Upon  similar  principles  the  cases  generally  have  held 
the  owners  of  river  craft  transporting  goods  to  the  strict 
liability  of  common  carriers.2  This  has  been  so  whether 
these  were  flatboats  carried  down  the  river  by  the  current 
guided  by  their  steersmen,  or  whether  they  were  boats 
proceeding  along  the  river  by  their  own  motive  power. 
In  some  jurisdictions  the  necessity  of  this  law  was  felt  so 
strongly  that  the  courts  were  much  too  easily  satisfied  as  to 
the  public  character  of  a  particular  undertaking.  But  as  is 
said  in  the  leading  case 3  of  this  sort :  "  One  who  undertakes 
for  a  reward,  to  convey  produce  or  goods  of  any  sort, 
from  one  place  upon  the  river  to  another,  becomes  thereby 
liable  as  a  common  carrier;  having  to  transact  the  business 
entrusted  to  his  care,  at  places  distant  from  the  residence 
of  the  plaintiff,  it  is  always  difficult,  and  frequently  im- 
possible for  the  plaintiff  to  obtain  the  evidence  necessary 
to  fix  fraud  or  negligence  on  the  defendant;  and  to  super- 

1  See  for  other  examples:  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Fost. 
New    York.— Fish    v.    Clark,    49      275  (1851). 

N.  Y.  122  (1872).  Pennsylvania. — Nicolette      Lum- 

North  Carolina. — W  i  1 1  i  a  m  s  v.  her  Co.  v.  People's  Coal  Co.,  26  Pa. 

Branson,   1   Murphy,   417,   4  Am.  Sup.  Ct.  575  (1904). 

Dec.  562  (1810).  South     Carolina.— M'Clures     v. 

Pennsylvania. — Humphreys     v.  Hammond,  1  Bay,  99,  1  Am.  Dec. 

Reed,  6  Whart.  435  (1841).  598  (1790). 

South    Carolina. — Harrington    v.  West     Virginia. — Gillingham     v. 

Lyles,  2  Nott  &  McCord,  88  (1819).  Ohio  River  R.  R.,  35  W.  Va.  588, 14 

Vermont.— Spencer  v.  Daggett,  2  S.  E.  243,  14  L.  R.  A.  798,  29  Am. 

Vt.  92  (1829).  St.  Rep.  827  (1891). 

England.— Hyde  v.  Trenton  Nav.  3  Moss  v.   Bettis,  4  Heisk.  661. 

Co.,  5  T.  R.  389  (1793).  (1871). 

2  New  Hampshire. — E 1  k  i  n  s    v. 

f  141  i 


§§  168,  169  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

sede  this  difficulty,  the  law  throws  the  burthen  of  proof 
upon  the  defendant,  to  exempt  himself  from  the  plain- 
tiff's action,  and  makes  him  liable  for  all  accidents  but 
those  which  are  occasioned  by  the  acts  of  God  or  of  a 
public  enemy." 

§  168.  Draymen. 

Draymen  of  all  sorts  may  be  common  carriers  if  they 
have  generally  undertaken  to  transport  the  goods  of  all 
who  apply,  for  a  reasonable  compensation.  The  vehicle 
employed  is  immaterial.  In  one  early  case,1  the  question 
was  whether  a  proprietor  of  an  ox  team  dragging  a  sled 
laden  with  general  merchandise  was  a  common  carrier, 
and  the  court  held  that  he  was.  "Every  one  who  pursues 
the  business  of  transporting  goods  for  hire,  for  the  public 
generally,  is  a  common  carrier.  According  to  the  most 
approved  definition,  a  common  carrier  is  one,  who  under- 
takes, for  hire  or  reward,  to  transport  the  goods  of  all 
such  as  choose  to  employ  him,  from  place  to  place.  Dray- 
men, cartmen,  and  porters,  who  undertake  to  carry  goods 
for  hire,  as  a  common  employment,  from  one  part  of  a 
town  to  another,  come  within  the  definition.  So  also  does 
the  driver  of  a  slide  with  an  ox  team.  The  mode  of 
transporting  is  immaterial."2 

§  169.  Truckmen. 

The  case  of  the  truckman  also  well  illustrates  the  gen- 
eral principles.  Even  where  a  truckman  is  professing 
publicly  the  business  of  carrying  goods  from  one  part  of  a 
town  to  another,  a  few  authorities  discussed  in  the  next 
section  have  held  that  he  is  not  a  common  carrier.  But 
there  should  be,  of  course,  no  doubt  that  he  is  a  carrier 
essentially  as  he  both  takes  possession  of  the  goods  of  his 

1  Robinson  &  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  2  z  See  also  Robinson  v.  Cornish, 
Dana,  430  (1834),  26  Am.  Dec.  466.  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  577  (1890). 

[142] 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  170 

patrons  and  transports  them.1  The  law  is  summarized 
succinctly  in  the  leading  case  of  Jackson  Architectural 
Iron  Works  v.  Hurlbut 2  by  Mr.  Justice  O'Brien  thus: 
"Truckmen,  wagoners,  cartmen  and  porters  who  under- 
take to  carry  goods  for  hire  as  a  common  employment  in 
a  city,  or  from  one  town  to  another,  are  common  carriers." 

§  170.  Furniture  movers. 

But  mere  movers,  such  as  furniture  movers,  will  seldom 
be  found  to  have  undertaken  as  common  carriers.  Their 
business  is  generally  conducted  upon  the  basis  of  special 
contract;  and  they  do  not  undertake,  upon  any  general 
schedule  of  prices,  to  serve  all  that  apply.  Moreover, 
there  are  usually  numerous  carters  with  whom  the  person 
who  wishes  the  service  might  deal,  and  as  it  is  a  matter 
arranged  for  in  advance  there  is  ample  opportunity  of- 
fered for  access  to  these  competitors.  Naturally  enough, 
therefore,  the  few  cases  that  deal  with  this  matter  hold 
that  the  furniture  movers  are  liable  only  as  private  car- 
riers. It  is  of  course  a  question  of  fact,  in  last  analysis, 
and  it  may  be  shown,  always,  just  what  the  facts  are  as 

1  Illinois. — Hastings  Express  Co.          Washington. — Gates    v.    Bekins, 

v.  Chicago,  135  111.  App.  268  (1907);  44  Wash.  422,  87  Pac.  505  (1906). 
See  also  Johnson  Exp.  Co.  v.  Chi-         England. — Scaife  v.  Farrant,  L. 

cago,  136  111.  App.  368  (1907).  R.  10  Ex.  358  (1875). 

Indiana. — Frank   Bird   Transfer         Canada. — Culvar   v.    Lester,   37 

Co.  v.  Krug,  30  Ind.  App.  602,  65  Can.  L.  J.  421  (1901). 
N.  E.  309  (1902).  2 158  N.  Y.  34,  52  N.  E.  665,  70 

Kentucky.— Farley  v.  Lavary,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  432  (1899). 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1252,  54  S.  W.  840,  47         But  in  several  cases  of  trucking 

L.  R.  A.  383  (1900).  the  courts  have  not  found  common 

Pennsylvania. — Lloyd  v.    Ha  ugh  carriage.    See: 

&  K.  Storage  &  Transfer  Co.,  223         New  Hampshire. — F  a  u  c  h  e  r  v. 

Pa.  St.  148,  72  Atl.  576,  21  L.  R.  A.  Wilson,  68  N.  H.  338,  38  Atl.  1002, 

(N.  S.)  188  (1909).  39  L.  R.  A.  431  (1895). 

Utah. — Benson  v.  Oregon  S.  L.          Wisconsin. — Hooper  v.   Chicago 

Ry.  Co.,  99  Pac.  1072  (1909).  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  27  Wis.  81,  9  Am. 

Rep.  439  (1870). 

[143] 


§  171  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

to  the  business  in  question.  As  is  said  in  one  case: l 
"Whether  a  person  was  a  common  carrier  bound  by  all 
the  extraordinary  responsibility  and  entitled  to  the  priv- 
ilege of  that  class  of  bailees  can  sometimes  be  known  only 
by  particular  proof  of  how  his  business  was  conducted 
and  what  profession  he  made  to  the  public  regard- 
ing it."2 

§  171.  Baggage  transfer. 

On  the  other  hand,  omnibus  lines  that  transfer  passen- 
gers and  their  baggage  across  cities  to  their  destinations 
are  obviously  within  the  conception  of  common  carriers. 
A  square  case  in  point  is  Parmelee  v.  McNulty,3  where 
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Caton  said:  "It  is  further  objected  that 
the  court  assumed  that  Parmelee  was  a  common  carrier, 
without  proof  of  that  fact.  The  proof  showed  that  he 
was  the  owner  of  an  omnibus  line,  to  the  agents  of  which 
the  proof  tended  to  show  the  trunk  was  delivered.  The 
court  was  authorized  to  take  notice  that  the  owner  of  an 
omnibus  line  is  a  common  carrier,  just  as  much  as  the 
owner  of  a  railroad  or  of  a  line  of  steamboats.  The  court 

1  Thompson  v.  New  York  Storage      Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  19  So.  Car.  353 
Co.,  97  Mo.  App.  135,  70  S.  W.  938      (1882). 

(1902).  Cases  finding  common   carriage 

2  Cases  finding  no  common  car-  in  the  moving  in  question  are: 
riage  in  the  arrangement  in  ques-  New   York. — Snelling  v.   Yetter, 
tion  are:  25  App.  Div.  590,  49  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Illinois— Armfield  v.  Humphrey,  917  (1898). 

12  111.  App.  90  (1882).  Pennsylvania.— Lloyd  v.   Haugh 

Missouri. — Jamiet    v.    American  &  K.  Transfer  Co.,  223  Pa.  St.  148, 

Storage  Co.,  109  Mo.  App.  257,  84  72  Atl.  516,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  188 

S.  W.  128  (1904).     But  see  Collier  (1909). 

v.  Langan  T.  S.  &  M.   Co.   (Mo.  Utah. — Benson  v.  Oregon  S.  L. 

App.),  127  S.  W.  435  (1910).  Ry.  Co.  99  Pac.  1072   (1909). 

New     Hampshire. — Faucher     v.  Washington. — Gates  v.  Bekins,  44 

Wilson,  68  N.  H.  338,  38  Atl.  1002,  Wash.  422,  87  Pac.  505  (1906). 

39  L.  R.  A.  431  (1895).  »  19  111.  556  (1858). 

Smith  Carolina.— Piedmont  Mfg. 

[144] 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  172 

will  take  notice  of  the  general  meaning  of  words;  and  we 
know  that  an  omnibus  line  means  a  line  of  coaches  for  the 
carriage  of  passengers  and  their  baggage."1 

§  172.  Steamboats. 

The  invention  of  the  application  of  steam  propulsion 
to  vessels  did  not  alter  the  rule  already  established  that 
those  who  carry  goods  and  passengers  as  a  general  busi- 
ness by  any  vehicles  or  vessels  are  common  carriers.  The 
business  is  therefore  public  in  character,  provided  that 
those  who  conduct  it  profess  to  serve  all  that  apply,  which 
may  be  established  by  the  usual  tests  already  discussed. 
A  few  representative  cases  are  collected  in  the  footnote; 
In  one  of  the  earliest  of  these,  Bennett  v.  Filyard  2  the 
instances  of  common  carriage  by  water  are  thus  enu- 
merated: "A  common  carrier  in  law  has  been  defined  to 
be  one  who  undertakes  for  hire  or  reward  to  transport  the 
goods  of  such  as  choose  to  employ  him  from  place  to 
place  as  a  business  and  not  as  a  casual  occupation  pro  hoc 
vice.  Common  carriers  by  water  are  the  masters  and 
owners  of  ships,  and  all  water  crafts  including  steam 
vessels,  towboats,  and  other  steamboats,  belonging  to 
internal  as  well  as  coasting  and  foreign  navigation,  light- 
men,  hoymen,  ferrymen,  canal  boatmen,  and  others  en- 


1  To  the  same  effect  are:  New  York. — Richards  v.  Wescott, 

Georgia. — Atlanta  Baggage,  etc.,  2  Bosw.  589. 

Co.  v.  Mizo,  4  Ga.  App.  407,  61  S.  North  Carolina. — Herring  v.  Ut- 

E.  844  (1908).  ley,  8  Jones,  L.  270  (1860). 

Illinois. — Parmelee  v.  Lowitz,  74  Pennsylvania. — B  e  c  k  m  a  n      v. 

111.  116,  24  Am.  Rep.  276  (1874).  Shouse,  5  Rawle,  179,  28  Am.  Dec. 

Louisiana. — Da    Ponte    v.    New  653  (1835). 

Orleans  Transfer  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  Virginia. — Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co. 

696,  7  So.  608  (1890).  v.  Old  Dominion  Baggage  Co.,  99 

New     Hampshire.— Redding     v.  Va.  Ill,  37  S.  E.  784,  50  L.  R.  A. 

Gallagher,  72  N.  H.  377,  57  Atl.  722  (1901). 

225,  64  L.  R.  A.  811  (1903).  2 1  Fla.  403  (1847). 

10  [  145  ] 


173 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


gaged  in  the  transportation  of  goods  by  water  for  per- 
sons generally  for  hire."1 

§  173.  Towing  lines. 

To  what  extent  towboats  are  engaged  in  a  public  em- 
ployment is  a  vexed  question;  but  the  difficulty  seems  to 
lie  more  in  the  determination  of  the  question  of  fact  in 
the  cases  that  have  arisen  than  in  any  difference  as  to 
legal  possibilities.  One  of  the  principal  cases  is  Bussey 
&  Co.  v.  Mississippi  Valley  Transportation  Co.2  The 
regular  business  of  the  defendants  in  that  case  was  proved 
to  be  the  towing  of  barges  upon  the  route  between  St. 
Louis  and  New  Orleans.  The  court  reviewed  fully  the 
various  authorities  apparently  bearing  upon  the  point; 
the  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Howe  concluding  much  as 
follows:  ''Such  conflict  of  authority  might  be  very  dis- 
tressing to  the  student,  but  for  the  fact  that  when  these 


1  United  States. — The  Commander 
in  Chief,  1  Wall.  43,  17  L.  ed.  609 
(1863);  Jencks  v.  Coleman,  2  Sum- 
ner,  221,  Fed.  Gas.  7,258  (1835); 
Citizens'  Bl.  v.  Nantucket  Steam- 
boat Co.,  2  Story,  16,  B.  &  W.  8, 
Fed.  Cas.  2,730  (1841). 

Alabama. — Jones  v.  Pitcher,  3 
Stew.  &  P.  136  (1833). 

Connecticut. — Crosby  v.  Fitch, 
12  Conn.  410  (1838). 

Georgia. — Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Sa- 
vannah L.  W.  &  S.  Co.  (Ga.)  63 
S.  E.  577,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  867 
(1909). 

Illinois. — Dunseth  v.  Wade,  2 
Scam.  285  (1840). 

Kansas. — The  Emily,  5  Kans. 
645  (1864). 

Louisiana. — Oakey  v.  Russell,  6 
Martin  (N.  S.),  58  (1827). 

Maine. — Parker  v.  Flagg,  26 
Me.  181  (1846). 

[146] 


Massachusetts. — Hastings  v.  Pep- 
per, 11  Pick.  41  (1838). 

Mississippi. — Gilmore  v.  Car- 
man, 1  Sm.  &  M.  279  (1843). 

New  York. — Hollister  v.  Nowlen, 
19  Wend.  234  (1838);  Cole  v.  Good- 
win, 19  Wend.  251  (1838);  McAr- 
thur  v.  Sears,  21  Wend.  190  (1839); 
Pardee  v.  Drew,  25  Wend.  459 
(1841). 

Ohio. — McGregor  v.  Kilgore,  6 
Ohio,  359  (1834). 

Pennsylvania. — Harrington  v. 
McShane,  2  Watts,  443  (1834). 

South  Carolina. — F  a  u  1  k  n  e  r  v. 
Wright,  Rice  (Law),  107  (1838); 
McClures  v.  Hammond,  1  Bay,  99, 
1  Am.  Dec.  598  (1790). 

Tennessee. — Kirkland  v.  Mont- 
gomery, 1  Swan,  452  (1852). 

2  24  La.  Ann.  165,  13  Am.  Rep. 
120  (1872). 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  173 

writers  and  cases  cited  by  them  are  examined  the  dis- 
crepancy is  more  imaginary  than  real.  There  are  two  very 
different  ways  in  which  a  steam  towboat  may  be  employed, 
and  it  is  likely  that  Mr.  Story  was  contemplating  one 
method  and  Mr.  Kent  the  other.  In  the  first  place  it  may 
be  employed  as  a  mere  means  of  locomotion  under  the  en- 
tire control  of  the  towed  vessel;  or  the  owner  of  the  towed 
vessel  and  goods  therein  may  remain  in  possession  and 
control  of  the  property  thus  transported  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  bailee;  or  the  towing  may  be  casual  merely,  and  not 
as  a  regular  business  between  fixed  termini.  It  might  well 
be  said  that  under  such  circumstances  the  towboat  or  tug 
is  not  a  common  carrier.  But  a  second  and  quite  different 
method  of  employing  a  towboat  is  where  she  plies  reg- 
ularly between  fixed  termini,  towing  for  hire  and  for  all 
persons,  barges  laden  with  goods,  and  taking  into  her  full 
possession  and  control,  and  out  of  the  control  of  the 
bailor  the  property  thus  transported.  Such  is  the  case  at 
bar."  If  therefore  the  towing  line  is  really  making  a  bus- 
iness of  carrying,  that  is,  if  it  actually  takes  control  of 
the  barges  towed  and  itself  transports  them,  the  towboat 
proprietors  are  common  carriers.1  But  if  we  have  the  case 
of  the  harbor  tug  which  is  engaged  in  towing  along  vessels 
which  remain  in  the  control  of  their  masters  we  do  not  have 
common  carriage  as  the  most  of  cases  hold  2  although  very 
likely  we  have  a  case  of  public  employment.3 

1  United  States. — See  Vanderslice  North  Carolina. — W  a  1  s  t  o  n   v. 

v.    The    Superior,    28    Fed.    Gas.  Myers,  5  Jones,  174  (1857). 

16,843  (1850).  New  Jersey. — Ashmore  v.  Penn. 

California. — White  v.  Mary  Ann,  St.  Towing,  etc.,  Co.,  28  N.  J.  L. 

6    Cal.    462,    65    Am.    Dec.    523  180  (1860). 

(1856).  2  United    States.— Steamer    New 

Louisiana. — Clapp    v.    Stanton,  Philadelphia,  1  Black,  62,  17  L.  ed. 

20  La.  Ann.  495,  96  Am.  Dec.  417  84  (1861);  The  Quickstep,  9  Wall. 

(1868).  665,  19  L.  ed.  767  (1869);  Steamer 

*  See  §  150,  supra. 

[147] 


§174 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  174.  Wagon  trains. 

At  one  stage  of  the  development  of  a  country,  the  wagon 
train  often  appears  after  the  single  wagon  and  before  the 
railroad  construction.  One  interesting  case  from  the 
American  frontier  is  Seligman  v.  Armijo.1  In  that  case 
settling  the  preliminary  point  of  whether  it  was  a  case  of 
common  carriage  the  court  said:  "The  plaintiff  having 
sent  his  train  to  Junction  City  without  any  special  agree- 
ment for  freight  to  transport  for  reward  the  goods  of  such 
as  might  employ  him,  and  having  undertaken  to  carry 
goods  for  the  defendants  and  others,  thereby  assumed  the 
duties,  obligations  and  liabilities  of  a  common  carrier  in 
respect  to  the  goods  carried  by  him." 


Webb,  14  Wall.  406,  20  L.  ed.  774 
(1871);  The  Margaret,  94  U.  S.  494, 
24  L.  ed.  146  (1876);  Transporta- 
tion Line  v.  Hope,  95  U.  S.  297,  24 
L.  ed.  477;  (1877)  The  Princeton,  3 
Blatch.  54,  Fed.  Gas.  11,434  (1853); 
The  Lyon,  1  Brown's  Adm.  59,  15 
Fed.  Gas.  8,645  (1861);  Steamboat 
Angelina  Corning,  1  Ben.  109,  Fed. 
Gas.  384  (1867);  The  Stranger,  1 
Brown's  Adm.  281,  Fed.  Gas.  13,525 
(1871);  The  Oconto,  5  Biss.  460, 
Fed.  Gas.  10,421  (1873);  The  Mer- 
rimac,  2  Sawyer,  586,  Fed.  Gas. 
9,478  (1874). 

Illinois. — Knapp  v.  McCaffrey, 
178  111.  107,  52  N.  E.  898,  69  Am. 
St.  Rep.  290  (1899). 

Kentucky. — Varble  v.  Bigley,  14 
Bush,  698,  29  Am.  Rep.  435 
(1879). 

Maryland. — Penn.,  etc.,  Steam 
Nav.  Co.  v.  Dandridge,  8  Gill  &  J. 
248,  29  Am.  Dec.  543  (1836). 

Massachusetts. — Sproul  v.  Hem- 
mingway,  14  Pick.  1,  25  Am.  Dec. 
350  (1833). 

[148] 


New  York. — Caton  v.  Rumney, 
13  Wend.  387  (1835);  Alexander  v. 
Greene,  3  Hill,  9,  7  ibid.  533  (1842); 
Wells  v.  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  2  N.  Y. 
204  (1849);  Wells  v.  Steam  Naviga- 
tion Company,  2  Com.  204,  4  Seld. 
375  (1853);  Merrich  v.  Brainard,  38 
Barb.  574  (1860);  Arctic  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Austin,  54  Barb.  559  (1869); 
Abbey  v.  Steamboat  Stevens,  22 
How.  Pr.  78  (1861);  Emiliusen 
v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  30  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  203,  51  N.  Y.  Suppl.  606 
(1898). 

Pennsylvania. — Leonard  v.  Hen- 
rickson,  18  Pa.  St.  40,  55  Am.  Dec. 
587  (1851);  Hays  v.  Paul,  51  Pa. 
St.  134  (1865);  Brown  v.  Clegg,  63 
Pa.  St.  51  (1869);  Hays  v.  Millar, 
77  Pa.  St.  238,  18  Am.  Rep.  445 
(1874). 

England. — The  Julia,  14  Moore 
P.  C.  210  (I860)';  Symonds  v.  Pain, 
6  Hurl  &  N.  709  (1861) ;  The  Minne- 
haha,  1  Lush,  335  (1861). 

1 1  N.  Mex.  459  (1870). 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  175,  176 

§  175.  Automobile  lines. 

In  modern  times  in  new  districts  the  automobile  line 
often  supplants  the  wagon  train  in  the  later  development 
of  the  frontier.  These  lines  of  cars  cross  long  stretches  of 
country  at  high  speed  crossing  frail-appearing  bridges 
specially  constructed  to  fit  their  wheels.  As  this  is  now 
becoming  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  transportation  in 
these  regions,  cases  dealing  with  their  relations  with  the 
public  may  soon  be  expected.  In  the  cities  as  well  the 
automobile  truck  is  supplanting  the  horse  drawn  wagon 
for  express  service.  It  may  take  the  law  some  little  time 
to 'adjust  itself  to  these  new  conditions,  simply  because 
in  restrictive  statutes  one  is  permitted  to  quibble.1 

§  176.  Railways. 

It  is  a  matter  of  history  that  where  the  first  railways 
were  laid  down  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  theory  upon  which  they  were  constructed  was  that 
they  would  be  public  highways,  for  the  use  of  which  those 
that  drove  their  vehicles  over  them  should  pay  toll  as  for 
the  use  of  a  turnpike  or  a  canal.  The  introduction  of  the 
steam  locomotive  brought  about  the  end  of  that  theory 
almost  before  it  was  put  into  practice.  A  train  drawn  by 
a  locomotive  was  too  expensive,  the  operation  was  too 
costly,  and  its  management  too  intricate  for  any  shipper, 
or  even  for  any  private  carrier.  Almost  from  the  outset, 
therefore,  the  railway  company  provided  and  operated  the 
engines  and  cars  themselves,  and  accepted  for  trans- 
portation such  goods  as  were  offered.  They  thus  became 
common  carriers.  The  cases  that  hold  this  form  so  enor- 
mous a  list  that  it  is  difficult  to  select  any  one  in  particular 

1  See  Fousler  v.  Atlantic  City,  70  this   constitutes   common   carriage 

N.  J.  L.  125,  56  Atl.  119  (1905),  whatever  be  the  power  utilized  for 

permitting  general  regulation  of  au-  locomotion, 
tomobile  service  upon  the  basis  that 

[149] 


§  177  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

as  an  illustration.1  Indeed  all  courts  will  take  judicial 
knowledge  that  public  railways  are  common  carriers. 
In  one  of  the  earlier  cases,  Chicago  &  Aurora  Railroad  v. 
Thompson,2  the  appellant  railroad  denied  that  it  was  a 
common  carrier  because  the  charter  of  the  corporation  did 
not  declare  it  to  be  so,  but  Mr.  Justice  Breese  said:  "We 
suppose  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  charter  should  provide 
in  so  many  words  that  the  railroad  companies  created  by 
them  shall  be  common  carriers.  The  authorities  are  nu- 
merous to  the  point  that  such  companies  using  cars  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  goods  for  all  persons  indifferently, 
for  hire,  and  whose  custom  and  uniform  practice  it  is  to 
do  so  are  common  carriers  and  liable  as  such.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  on  this  point.  There  needs  no  legislative 
declaration  to  make  them  such." 

§  177.  Industrial  railways. 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out,  however,  that  it  will 
not  do  to  say  even  to-day  that  all  those  who  maintain 

1  United  States.— Railroad  Co.  v.  ton  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Mete.  472, 

Lockwood,  17  Wall.  357,  21  L.  ed.  43  Am.  Dec.  444  (1845). 

627  (1873).  Nebraska— St.  Joseph  &  G.  I.  R. 

Alabama.— South  Western  R.  Co.  Co.  v.  Palmer,  38  Neb.  463,  56  N. 

v.  Webb,  48  Ala.  585  (1872).  W.  957,  22  L.  R.  A.  335  (1893). 

California. — Contra,  Costa  R.  R.  New  Hampshire. — Elkins  v.  Bos- 
Co,  v.  Moss,  23  Cal.  323  (1863).  ton  &   M.   R.   R.,  23  N.  H.  275 

Connecticut. — Fuller    v.    Nauga-  (1851). 

tuck  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Conn.  557  (1852).  New  Jersey. — Rogers  Locomotive 

Georgia. — East    Tenn.,    etc.,    R.  Works  v.  Erie  Railway  Co.,  5  C.  E. 

Co.  v.  Whittle,  27  Ga.  535,  73  Am.  Green,  379  (1869). 

Dec.  741  (1859).  Vermont.— State  v.  Boston,  C.  & 

Illinois.— Illinois  Railroad  Co.  v.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Vt.  433  (1853). 

Frankenberg,  54  111.  88,  5  Am.  Rep.  Washington. — Boyle    v.   Great 

92  (1870).  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  13  Wash.  383,  43 

Indiana.— McCleary  v.  Babcock,  Pac.  344  (1896). 

169  Ind.  228,  82  N.  E.  453  (1907).  West  Virginia.— Laurel  Fork  & 

Maine. — New  England  Exp.  Co.  S.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  West  Virginia  T. 

v.  Maine  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Me.  188,  Co.,  25  W.  Va.  324  (1884). 

2  Am.  Rep.  31  (1869).  «  19  111.  578  (1858). 

Massachusetts. — Thomas  v.  Bos- 

[1501 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  178 

railway  trackage  even  if  they  have  devoted  it  to  public 
service  are  engaged  in  common  carriage.  They  may  only 
furnish  facilities  over  which  other  carriers  may  run  their 
trains  as  do  bridge  companies  1  and  terminal  companies,2 
or  they  may  undertake  to  furnish  the  motive  power  to 
switch  the  trains  of  others  about  and  yet  not  so  take 
possession  as  to  be  carriers  which  is  often  the  case  of 
union  railways  3  and  belt  lines.4  But  in  dealing  with  these 
services  we  may  often  come  upon  common  carriage  in 
fact  where  the  connecting  railway  both  takes  possession 
and  furnishes  the  motive  power,  in  which  case  they  would 
be  common  carriers.5  An  added  importance  has  accrued 
to  this  subject  because  of  the  recent  invention  of  a  kind 
of  railway  known  as  the  " industrial"  railway.  This  is  a 
short  line  of  railway,  owned  by  an  industrial  corporation 
or  by  the  owners  of  some  business  enterprise,  and  connect- 
ing the  factory  or  the  place  of  business  with  the  main 
line  of  some  railway.6  When  such  a  road,  however  short 
it  may  be,  is  actually  operated  independently  with  its 
own  locomotives  and  cars,  it  would  seem  to  be  an  in- 
dependent carrier,  though  it  is  operated  for  the  exclusive 
benefit  of  the  industrial  enterprise  which  owns  it  provided 
it  would  accept  such  general  traffic  along  its  line  as  might 
be  offered  to  it. 

§  178.  Express  companies. 

The  business  of  transporting  small  or  valuable  goods 
has  come  largely  into  the  hands  of  express  companies. 
So  far  as  such  companies  merely  transmit  parcels  locally 
in  their  own  teams,  they  are  evidently  carriers.  The  more 
important  work  of  the  companies,  however,  is  done  in 

1  See  §  126,  supra.  ban  Belt  R.  R.,  89  Mo.  App.  129 

2  See  §  125,  supra.  (1901). 

3  See  §  129,  supra.  6  See  United  States  v.  Atchison, 

4  See  §  130,  supra.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  142  Fed.  176 

5  Fleming  v.  Kansas  City  Subur-  (1905). 

[151] 


§178] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


connection  with  the  carriage  of  parcels  over  a  long  dis- 
tance over  the  lines  of  railways  or  steamboats.  The 
express  company  has  at  the  place  of  departure  a  local 
agent  who  receives  the  parcel  for  transmission;  it  is  then 
transported  over  the  line  of  a  railway  or  steamboat,  but 
always  in  a  part  of  the  train  or  boat  set  aside  for  the  ex- 
press company,  and  at  all  times  in  the  control  and  care  of 
an  agent  of  the  company;  .and  upon  the  arrival  of  the 
train  or  boat  at  the  place  of  destination  the  parcel  is  taken 
by  a  local  agent  and  by  him  delivered  to  the  consignee. 
At  first  the  express  companies  attempted  to  maintain  that 
they  were  only  forwarders  under  such  circumstances — 
not  carriers,  properly  speaking.  But  it  is  now  well  rec- 
ognized that  their  service  constitutes  carriage  since  they 
retain  possession  throughout.1  And  as  they  exercise  this 


1  United  States.— Bank  of  Ken- 
tucky v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  93  U.  S. 
174,  23  L.  ed.  872;  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  Ry.  v.  Dinsmore,  108  U.  S.  30,  27 
L.  ed.  640,  2  Sup.  Ct.  9  (1883). 

Alabama. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Crook,  44  Ala.  468,  4  Am.  Rep. 
140  (1870). 

Colorado. — Overland  Express  Co. 
v.  Carroll,  7  Col.  43,  1  Pac.  682 
(1883). 

District  of  Columbia. — Gait  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  MacArthur 
and  M.  124,  48  Am.  Rep.  742 
(1879). 

Florida. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Van  Meter,  17  Fla.  783,  35  Am. 
Rep.  107  (1880). 

Georgia. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Newby,  36  Ga.  635,  91  Am.  Dec. 
783  (1867). 

Illinois. — Boscowitz  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  93  111.  523,  34  Am. 
Rep.  191  (1879). 

Indiana. — United  States  Express 

[152] 


Co.  v.  State,  164  Ind.  196,  73  N.  E. 
101  (1905). 

Kansas. — Adams  Exp.  Co.  v. 
McConnell,  27  Kans.  238  (1882). 

Massachusetts. — Buckland  v.  Ad- 
ams Express  Co.,  97  Mass.  124,  93 
Am.  Dec.  68  (1867). 

Michigan. — United  States  Exp. 
Co.  v.  Root,  47  Mich.  231, 10  N.  W. 
351  (1881). 

Minnesota. — C hristenson  v. 
American  Express  Co.,  15  Minn. 
270,  2  Am.  Rep.  122  (1870). 

Missouri. — Kirby  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  369  (1876). 

New  York. — Belger  v.  Dinsmore, 
51  N.  Y.  166,  10  Am.  Rep.  575 
(1872). 

Ohio. — American  Express  Co.  v. 
Smith,  33  Ohio  St.  511,  31  Am.  Rep. 
561  (1878). 

Oregon. — Bennett  v.  Northern 
Exp.  Co.,  12  Oreg.  49,  6  Pac.  160 
(1885). 

Pennsylvania. — Grogan  v.  Adams 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  179 


employment  of  receiving,  carrying,  and  delivering  goods, 
wares,  and  merchandise  for  hire  on  behalf  of  all  persons 
who  may  see  fit  to  require  their  services,  there  has  never 
been  any  doubt  that  their  employment  was  sufficiently 
public  to  make  it  a  case  of  common  carriage.  Their 
service  is  therefore  at  the  disposal  of  the  public  in  gen- 
eral.1 

§  179.  Pneumatic  tubes. 

A  company  operating  lines  of  pneumatic  tubes  under 
the  streets  of  a  city  for  the  transportation  of  small  parcels 
for  the  general  public  would  undoubtedly  be  a  public 
service  corporation  and  obliged,  therefore,  to  transport  for 
all  suitable  parcels  at  reasonable  rates  without  discrim- 
ination.2 Some  few  examples  of  this  sort  of  service  are 
known,  but  just  at  present  the  use  of  this  system  of  trans- 
portation seems  to  be  confined  to  the  government  which 
contracts  for  their  exclusive  service  in  handling  the  mails. 


Exp.  Co.,  114  Pa.  St.  523,  7  Atl. 
134,  60  Am.  Rep.  360  (1886). 

South  Carolina. — Stadhecker  v. 
Combs,  9  Rich.  Law,  193  (1856). 

Tennessee. — Southern  Exp.  Co. 
v.  Womack,  1  Heisk.  256  (1870). 

Texas. — Pacific  Exp.  Co.  v.  Dar- 
nell, 62  Texas,  639  (1884). 

Vermont. — Hadd  v.  United  States 
Exp.  Co.,  52  Vt.  335,  36  Am.  Rep. 
757  (1880). 

Wisconsin. — Wells  v.  American 
Exp.  Co.,  55  Wis.  23,  11  N.  W.  537, 
12  N.  W.  441,  42  Am.  Rep.  695 
(1882). 

1  In  the  following  cases  particu- 
larly the  public  duty  of  the  express 
companies  is  emphasized: 

United  States. — Platt  v.  Le  Cocq, 
150  Fed.  391  (1906). 

Georgia. — Southern   Express  Co. 


v.  Rose  Co.,  124  Ga.  581,  53  S.  E. 
185  (1905). 

Indiana. — Adams  Express  Co.  v. 
State,  161  Ind.  328,  67  N.  E.  1033 
(1903). 

Mississippi. — Southern  Express 
Co.  v.  Moon,  39  Miss.  822  (1863). 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Pacific  Ex- 
press Co.,  80  Neb.  823,  115  N.  W. 
619,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  664  (1908). 

North  Carolina. — Alsop  v.  South- 
ern Express  Co.,  104  N.  C.  278,  10 
S.  E.  297,  6  L.  R.  A.  271  (1889). 

Canada. — Johnson  v.  Dominion 
Exp.  Co.,  28  Ont.  Rep.  203  (1896). 

2  This  was  assumed  in  Astor  v. 
Arcade  Ry.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  93,  20 
N.  E.  594,  2  L.  R.  A.  789  n.  aff.  48 
Hun,  562,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  174 
(1888). 

[153] 


§  180  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

As  these  contracts  are  the  basis  upon  which  these  lines  are 
constructed  and  operated  they  show  that  there  is  no 
general  profession  to  serve  the  public  contemplated,  and 
therefore  the  business  is  not  as  yet  upon  a  public  basis. 

§  180.  Dispatch  companies. 

The  same  question  came  up  several  times  for  decision 
in  regard  to  the  dispatch  companies.  These  freight  lines 
again  claimed  that  they  were  forwarders  only  and  not 
carriers  at  all;  but  the  courts  held  consistently  that  as 
they  took  possession  they  were  carriers,  and  that  as  they 
professed  a  common  calling  they  were  common  carriers. 
One  representative  case  where  these  companies  were 
charged  as  common  carriers  will  do  for  all — Merchants' 
Transportation  Company  v.  Bloch  Brothers,1 — in  which 
it  was  said:  "This  instruction  properly  treats  the  defend- 
ant as  a  common  carrier.  The  duties  which  it  undertakes, 
and  which  it  holds  itself  out  to  the  public  as  willing  to 
undertake  and  perform,  give  it  that  character.  In  very 
many  cases  it  has  been  expressly  adjudged  to  be  a  common 
carrier,  and  in  others  such  has  been  assumed  to  be  its 
character  without  a  discussion  of  the  question.  The  text- 
writers  say  that  dispatch  companies  are  common  carriers, 
and  class  them  with  express  companies  because  of  the 
many  points  of  similarity  in  their  business,  and  the  fact 
that  they  alike  generally  use  the  vehicles  of  others  in  the 
transportation  of  freight.2 

1 86  Tenn.  392,  6  S.  W.  881,  6  Iowa.— Cownie  Glove  Co.  v. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  847  (1888).  Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.,  130  Iowa, 

2  Colorado.— Merchants'  Dispatch  327,  106  N.  W.  749,  4  L.  R.  A. 

Co.  v.  Cornforth,  3  Colo.  280,  25  (N.  S.)  1060  (1906);  Robinson  v. 

Am.  Rep.  757  (1877).  Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.,  45  Iowa, 

Illinois. — Merchants'  Dispatch  470  (1877);  Stewart  v.  Merchants' 

Co.  v.  Bolles,  80  111.  473  (1875);  Dispatch  Co.,  47  Iowa,  229  (1877); 

Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Leysor,  Wilde  v.  Merchants'  Dispatch  Co., 

89  111.  43  (1878);  Merchants'  Dis-  47  Iowa,  247  (1877);  Bancroft  v. 

patch  Co.  v.  Joesting,  89  111.  153  Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.,  47  Iowa, 

(1878).  262  (1877). 

[1541 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  181,  182 

§  181.  Fast  freight  lines. 

The  nature  of  the  fast  freight  lines  which  so  often  are 
advertised  is  always  a  question  of  fact.  Sometimes  these 
will  be  found  to  be  dispatch  companies,  such  as  have 
just  been  described,1  operating  under  this  name.  As 
usually  distinguished  from  dispatch  companies,  however, 
these  fast  freight  lines  will  generally  be  found  to  be  main- 
tained directly  by  the  railways  concerned  themselves.  As, 
however,  this  service  is  offered  to  the  public  as  through 
carriage,  shippers  are  led  to  deal  with  the  line  itself  in 
this  matter;  and  the  railways  concerned  in  establishing 
these  fast  freight  lines  are  generally  held  to  be  liable 
practically  as  partners  pro  hac  vice.2 

Topic  B.  Carriers  of  Passengers 

§  182.  Ferries. 

The  ferryman,  as  has  been  seen,  has  been  in  public 
employment  from  time  immemorial.  Obviously  a  ferry- 
man is  a  common  carrier  of  goods  if  it  is  shown  that  he  has 
taken  the  goods  into  his  control;  but  he  does  not  usually 
do  so.  He  more  commonly  takes  passengers  only,  and  if 
the  passengers  have  goods  they  commonly  keep  possession 
of  their  property.3  But  whether  he  usually  carries  passen- 

New    York. — Mercantile    M.    &  3  Alabama. — Babcock  v.  Herbert, 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Chase,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  3  Ala.  392,  37  Am.  Dec.  695  (1842); 

115  (1850).  Frierson  v.  Frazier,  142  Ala.  232, 

1  See     particularly     Merchants'  37  So.  825  (1904). 

Transportation  Co.  v.  Bloch  Bros.,  Arkansas. — Harvey  v.  Rose,  26 

86  Tenn.  392,  6  S.  W.  881,  6  Am.  Ark.  3,  7  Am.  Rep.  595  (1870). 

St.  Rep.  847  (1888).    See  also  Bax-  California. — May   v.   Hanson,   5 

ter  &  Co.  v.  Wheeler  et  al,  49  N.  H.  Cal.  360,  63  Am.  Dec.  135  (1855). 

9  (1869).  Illinois. — Claypool  v.  McAllister, 

1  See,   for   one   example,    Rocky  20  111.  504  (1858). 

Mount  Mills  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  Iowa. — Whitmore  v.  Bowman,  4 

R.  Co.,  119  N.  C.  693,  56  Am.  St.  Green,  148  (1853). 

Rep.  682,  25  S.E.  854  (1896).     And  Kentucky.— Hall  v.  Renfo,  3  Met. 

for  another  Wyman  v.  Chicago  &  51  (1860). 

A.  R.  R.  Co.,  14Mo.App.  35  (1877).  Massachusetts. — Le     Barren     v. 

[155] 


§183] 


gers  only  or  goods  only  he  may  obviously  be  shown  to  be 
a  common  carrier.1  The  law  then  imposes  upon  him  the 
duties  and  liabilities  of  a  common  carrier  of  passengers  or 
of  goods  or  of  both  as  the  case  may  be. 

§  183.  Ships. 

That  vessels  of  all  kinds  may  be  common  carriers  of 
goods  has  already  been  pointed  out.  It  is  also  obvious 
that  if  their  proprietors  have  also  undertaken  the  carriage 
of  passengers  they  will  be  liable  as  public  carriers.  In 
summing  up  to  the  jury  in  the  leading  case  -  dealing  with 
carriers  of  passengers  by  water,  Judge  Story  said,  "  There 
is  no  doubt  that  this  steamboat  is  a  common  carrier  of 
passengers  for  hire;  and  therefore  the  defendant  as  com- 
mander was  bound  to  take  the  plaintiff  as  a  passenger 
on  board  if  he  had  suitable  accommodations  and  there 
was  no  reasonable  objection  to  the  character  or  conduct 
of  the  plaintiff."3 


East  B.  Ferry  Co.,  11  Allen,  312,  87 
Am.  Dec.  717  (1865). 

Mississippi. — Powell  v.  Mills,  37 
Miss.  691  (1859). 

Missouri. — Pomeroy  v.  Donald- 
son, 5  Mo.  36  (1837). 

New  York. — Wyckoff  v.  Queen's 
County  Ferry  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  32,  11 
Am.  Rep.  650  (1873). 

North  Carolina. — Spivy  v.  Fann- 
er. 2  Hawy.  339  (1805). 

Ohio. — Wilson  v.  Hamilton,  4 
Ohio  St.  722  (1855). 

Pennsyh'ania. — Smith  v.  Seward, 
3  Pa.  St.  342  (1846). 

Tennessee. — Sanders  v.  Young,  1 
Head,  219,  73  Am.  Dec.  175  (1858). 

Texas.— Albright  v.  Penn,  14  Tex. 
290  (1855). 

1  In  the  following  cases  among 
many  others  the  public  duties  of 
ferrymen  are  discussed: 

[156] 


Alabama. — Pate  v.  Henry,  3 
Stew.  &  P.  101  (1833). 

.Vetc  York. — Mayor,  etc.,  of  New 
York  v.  Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1,  12 
X.  E.  631.  (1887). 

Virginia. — Carter  v.  Common- 
wealth, 2  Va.  Cas.  354  (1823). 

Washington. — Stevenson  v.  West 
Seattle  L.  &  Imp.  Co.,  22  Wash.  84, 
60  Pac.  51  (1900). 

*  Jenks  v.  Coleman,  2  Sumn.  225 
(1835). 

*  See  the  following  cases  among 
many  others: 

United  States.— The  Pacific,  1 
Blatchf.  569  (1850);  The  Zenobia,  1 
Abb.  Adm.  48  (1847). 

South  Carolina. — McCleneghan  v. 
Brock,  5  Rich.  L.  17  (1851). 

West  Virginia. — GiUingham  v. 
Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va.  588, 14 
S.  E.  243, 29  Am.  St.  Rep.  827(1891). 


COMMON  CAKRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  184,  185 

§  184.  Stagecoaches. 

The  common  method  of  carrying  passengers  before  the 
invention  of  railways  was  by  stagecoach;  and  there  can, 
of  course,  be  no  doubt  that  public  coaches  are  common 
carriers.  In  the  leading  American  case,  Bennett  v.  But- 
ton,1 Chief  Justice  Parker  said:  "We  are  of  opinion  that 
the  proprietors  of  a  stagecoach  for  the  regular  transpor- 
tation of  passengers  for  hire  from  place  to  place,  are,  as 
in  the  case  of  common  carriers  of  goods,  bound  to  take  all 
passengers  who  come  so  long  as  they  have  convenient 
accommodation  for  their  safe  carriage  unless  there  is 
a  sufficient  excuse  for  a  refusal."2 

§  185.  Omnibus  lines. 

Omnibus  lines  which  transport  passengers  and  their 
baggage  across  cities  between  railroad  terminals  are  obvi- 
ously carriers  of  passengers  and  their  baggage.  In  some 
few  cases  this  has  been  contested,  but  it  has  been  uni- 
formly held  that  these  lines  are  not  only  common  car- 
riers of  their  passengers,  but  also  common  carriers, 
strictly,  of  their  baggage,  liable  for  its  loss  at  all  events. 
As  is  said  in  one  case,3  "The  court  will  take  notice  of  the 

England. — Benett   v.   Peninsular  ter,  1  Pick.  50,  11  Am.  Dec.  133 

Steamboat  Co.,  6  C.  B.  775  (1848).  (1822). 

1  10  N.  H.  481  (1839).  New  Hampshire.— S  h  e  1  d  e  n  v. 

2  As  to  the  public  liabilities  of  Robinson,  7  N.  H.  157,  26  Am.  Dec. 
proprietors  of  stagecoaches,  see:  726  (1834). 

United     States. — Saltonstall      v.  Pennsylvania. — B  e  c  k  m  a  n      v. 

Stockton,  Taney,  11  (1838).  Shouse,  5  Rawle,  179,  28  Am.  Dec. 

Connecticut. — Merwin  v.  Butler,  653  (1835). 

17  Conn.  138  (1845).  South  Carolina.— Peixotti  v.  Mc- 

lowa. — Frink  v.   Coe,   4  Green,  Laughlin,  1  Strob.  L.  468,  47  Am. 

555,  61  Am.  Dec.  141  (1854).  Dec.  563  (1847). 

Kentucky. — Robertson    v.    Ken-  Tennessee. — Walker  v.  Skipwith, 

nedy,  2  Dana,  430,  26  Am.  Dec.  466  Meigs,  502,  33  Am.  Dec.  161  (1838). 

(1834).  England.— Lovett    v.    Hobbs,    2 

Maryland.— Stockton  v.  Frey,  4  Show.  127  (1680). 

Gill,  406  (1846).  3  Illinois.— Parmelee  v.  McNulty, 

Massachusetts.— Dwight  v.  Brews-  19  111.  556  (1858). 

[1571 


§§  186,  187  ]   PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

general  meaning  of  words,  and  we  know  that  an  omnibus 
line  means  a  line  of  coaches  for  the  carriage  of  passengers 
and  their  baggage.  If  this  line  was  established  for  other 
purposes,  that  should  have  been  shown  in  the  defence."  1 

§  186.  Hacks. 

From  time  immemorial  hackmen  have  been  subject  to 
regulation  as  to  the  terms  which  they  shall  make  in 
rendering  their  services.  As  is  said  in  Munn  v.  Illinois  2 
in  reviewing  the  public  callings  universally  recognized: 
"The  hackney  coachman  pursues  a  public  employment 
and  exercises  a  sort  of  public  office."  As  has  been  seen, 
at  the  foundation  of  this  law  lie  the  monopolistic  condi- 
tions, temporary  though  they  may  be,  which  circumscribe 
the  dealings  between  the  hackman  and  his  passenger, 
making  the  situation  such  that  the  law  must  intervene  to 
save  him  from  extortion.3 

§  187.  Taxicabs. 

The  latest  development  in  urban  service  of  this  sort 
is  the  taxicab.  These  being  automobiles  are  subject  to 

1  The  following  cases  deal  with  wand,  3  Barr,  451,  45  Am.  Dec.  654 

this  service:  (1846). 

Georgia. — Dibble   v.    Brown,    12  Tennessee. — Bomar  v.  Maxwell,  9 

Ga.  217,  56  Am.  Dec.  460  (1852).  Humph.    620,    51    Am.    Dec.    682 

Illinois. — Parmelee  v.  Lowitz,  74  (1849). 

111.  116,  24  Am.  Rep.  276  (1874).  England.— Brooke  v.  Pickwick,  4 

Indiana. — Frank    Bird    Transfer  Bing.  218  (1827). 

Co.   v.    Krug,    30   Ind.   App.  602  2  94  U.  S.  113,  24  L.  ed.  77  (1876). 

(1902).  3  In  the  following  cases  among 

Missouri. — Lemon    v.    Chanslor,  others  the  propriety  of  the  regula- 

68  Mo.  340,  30  Am.  Rep.  799  (1878).  tion  of  the  services  of  hackmen  is 

New  Jersey. — See  Atlantic  City  v.  recognized: 

Dehn,  69  N.  J.  L.  233,  54  Atl.  220  Iowa.— Bonce    v.    Dubuque    St. 

(1903).  Ry.  Co.,  53  Iowa,  278,  5  N.  W.  177, 

New  York.— Powell  v.  Myers,  26  36  Am.  Rep.  221  (1880). 

Wend.  591  (1841).  New   Jersey.— Combs    v.    Lake- 

Ohio— Jones    v.     Voorhees,     10  wood,  68  N.  J.  L.  582,  53  Atl.  697 

Ohio,  145  (1840).  (1902). 

Pennsylvania. — M  c  G  i  1 1  v.  Ro- 

[158] 


COMMON  CAKRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  188 

peculiar  regulation  in  their  use  of  the  highways.  All  the 
general  law  governing  the  operation  of  automobiles  relate 
to  them,  and  a  special  license  is  often  necessary  for  those 
who  engage  in  the  business  for  hire.  If  they  ply  the 
streets  for  hire  they  are  undoubtedly  holding  themselves 
out  as  common  carriers  of  passengers.  Strictly  speaking 
they  are  not  so  identified  with  ordinary  hackney  carriages 
as  to  be  within  statutes  applying  to  them.  "The  Legisla- 
ture, in  using  the  word  carriage  had  no  thought  of  a  ve- 
hicle made  up  in  large  part  of  complicated  machinery  and 
propelled  by  a  powerful  engine  whose  operation  is  sim- 
ilar to  that  of  locomotive  engines  on  railroads."  1 

§  188.  Passenger  railways. 

It  is  needless  to  state  that  railways  in  general  are  public 
carriers  of  passengers  as  well  as  common  carriers  of  goods. 
Examples  will  occur  where  a  railway  has  confined  its 
carriage  to  the  carriage  of  goods  only,2  and  in  such  case  it 
cannot  be  called  upon  to  take  passengers.  But  the  usual 
fact  is  that  it  has  undertaken  to  carry  passengers  3  as 
well  as  goods,  and  then  the  railway  company  is  bound  as 

1 A  public  taxicab  was  thus  held  that  hold  that  a  passenger  railroad 

not  to  be  a  public  carriage  within  is  a  common  carrier  bound  to  ac- 

the  meaning  of  a  penal  statute  pun-  cept  all  proper  passengers  who  ap- 

ishing  those  who  evade  the  estab-  ply,  are  subjoined: 
lished  carriage  fares   in  Common-          United  States. — Thurston  v.  Union 

wealth  v.  Goldman,  205  Mass.  400,  Pacific  R.  R.   Co.,  4  Dillon,  321 

91  N.  E.  392  (1910)— quoted  in  the  (1877). 

text.     But  in  Gassenheimer  v.  Dis-         Georgia. — Caldwell  v.  Richmond 

trict,  26  D.  C.  App.  Gas.  557  (1906)  &  D.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  550,  15  S.  E. 

holding  a  taxicab  a  vehicle  within  a  678  (1892). 
statute  against  loitering.  Illinois. — Galena  &  C.  U.  R.  R. 

2  Illinois.— Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  Co.  v.  Yarwood,  15  111.  468  (1854). 
East  St.  Louis  V.  Ry.  Co.,  107  111.         Indiana.— Erie  Lake  &  W.  Ry. 

450  (1883).  Co.  v.  Acres,  108  Ind.  548,  9  N.  E. 

Massachusetts.  —  Commonwealth  453  (1886). 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Gray,         North  Carolina. — Story  v.   Nor- 

180  (1858).  folk  &  S.  R.  Co.,  133  N.  C.  59,  45 

1  A  very  few  of  the  many  cases  S.  E.  349  (1903). 

[159] 


§  189  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

a  common  carrier,  when  not  overcrowded,  to  take  all 
proper  persons  who  may  apply  for  transportation  over  its 
line  on  their  complying  with  reasonable  rules  of  the  com- 
pany. 

§  189.  Street  railways. 

Considered  merely  as  an  improved  omnibus  line  a  street 
railway  is  obviously  a  common  carrier  of  passengers. 
So  clearly  is  this  service  public  in  character  that  the 
cases  all  deal  with  the  extent  of  their  obligations,  the 
primary  obligation  of  public  service  being  assumed.  For 
as  was  said  in  a  leading  case  in  Washington  J  by  Mr. 
Justice  Reeves:  "Its  franchise  was  granted  to  appellant 
by  the  State,  not  for  its  own  profit  alone  or  that  of  its 
stockholders,  but  in  a  large  measure  for  the  public  bene- 
fit. Peculiar  privileges  were  conferred  upon  it  in  con- 
sideration that  it  would  provide  facilities  for  communi- 
cation and  for  intercourse  for  the  public.  It  is  a  common 
carrier.  It  was  granted  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  a 
part  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  and,  with  the  consent 
of  the  municipalities  it  may  lay  its  tracks  over  the  public 
streets  or  highways."2 

1  State  v.  Spokane  St.  Ry.,   19  Indiana. — Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wash.  518,  53  Pac.  719,  41  L.  R.  A.  Twiname,  111  Ind.  587,  13  N.  E.  55 
515,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  739  (1898).  (1887). 

2  The  following  are  selected  al-  Kansas. — Topeka  City  Ry.  Co.  v. 
most    at    random    from    the    in-  Higgs,  38  Kan.  375,.  16  Pac.  667,  5 
numerable  cases  which  define  the  Am.  St.  Rep.  754  (1888). 

public  duties  of  street  railways  as  Massachusetts.  —  Commonwealth 

common  carriers  of  passengers:  v.  Interstate  Consolidated  Ry.,  187 

United  States.— Milwaukee  Elec.  Mass.  436,  73  N.  E.  530,  11  L.  A.  R. 

Ry.    v.    Milwaukee,    87   Fed.   577  (N.  S.)  973  (1905). 

(1898).  Minnesota.— State    v.    St.    Paul 

California.— Barrett    v.    Market  City  Ry.  Co.,  78  Minn.  331,  81  N. 

St.  Ry.,  81  Cal.  296,  22  Pac.  859,  W.  200  (1899). 

15  Am.  St.  Rep.  61,  B.  &  W.  297  Missouri.— J  a  c  k  s  o  n  v.  Grand 

(1889).  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo.  199,  24  S.  W. 

Illinois.— Dean  v.  Chicago  Gen-  192  (1893). 

eral  Ry.,  64  111.  App.  165  (1896).  Montana.— State  v.  Helena  P.  & 

[160] 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  190, 191 

§  190.  Elevated  railways. 

The  successive  changes  in  street  railways  came  about  by 
such  imperceptible  degrees  that  it  was  not  held  that  there 
was  in  these  gradual  developments  any  change  in  the 
situation.  The  motive  power  utilized  was  successively 
horse,1  cable,2  steam,3  and  electricity;4  but  still  the  law 
regarded  street  railways  as  ordinary  carriers  over  the 
highways.  Thus  the  occupation  of  the  surface  of  streets 
for  tramways,  whatever  motive  power  may  be  used,  has 
been  held  not  only  a  public  use  but  so  within  the  original 
uses  as  a  highway  as  not  to  constitute  an  additional  serv- 
itude. The  construction  of  elevated  railways,  however, 
although  admittedly  a  public  use,  was  held  to  create  an 
additional  servitude  by  reason  of  their  extensive  and 
permanent  occupation  of  location,  and  their  interference 
with  the  light  and  air  of  the  abutters.  This,  however, 
was  a  close  question  as  a  comparison  of  the  majority  and 
minority  opinions  in  the  leading  case,5  will  show. 

§  191.  Underground  railways. 

Underground  railways  have  the  same  status  of  common 
carriers  that  all  public  urban  passenger  services  have. 

L.  Co.,  32  Mont.  391,  56  Pac.  685  sylvania  R.  Co.,  64  Pa.  St.  225,  3 

(1899).  Am.  Rep.  581  (1870). 

Nebraska. — Pray   v.   Omaha   St.  1  See  Holly  v.   Atlanta  St.  Ry. 

Ry.  Co.,  44  Neb.  167,  62  N.  W.  447,  Co.,  61  Ga.  215,  34  Am.  Rep.  97 

48  Am.  St.  Rep.  717  (1895).  (1878) 

New  Jersey. — State  ex  rel.  City  of  2  See   Watson  v.    St.  Paul    City 

Bridgeton    v.    Bridgeton    Traction  Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn.  46, 43  N.  W.  904 

Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  592,  43  Atl.  715,  45  (1889). 

L.  R.  A.  837  (1898).  3  See  Spellman  v.  Lincoln  Rapid 

New  York.— Loader  v.  Brooklyn  Transit  Co.,  36  Neb.  890,  55  N.  W. 

Heights  R.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  270,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  753  (1893). 

996,  14  Misc.  208  (1895).  4  See    Thompson-Houston    Elec- 

Oregon. — T  h  o  m  p  s  o  n-Houston  trie  Co.  v.  Simon,  20  Oreg.  60,  25 

Elec.  Co.  v.  Simon,  20  Oreg.  60,  25  Pac.  147,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  86,  10 

Pac.  147, 10  L.  R.  A.  251,  23  Am.  St.  L.  R.  A.  251  (1890). 

Rep.  86  ( 1890) .  5  See  Story  v.  New  York  Elevated 

Pennsylvania—  Meier    v.    Perm-  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  122  (1882). 

11  [  161  ] 


§  192  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

This  underground  railway  may  be  arranged  for  as  has  been 
seen  1  by  the  construction  of  subways  by  public  author- 
ities in  analogy  to  highways  for  the  use  of  which  the 
railway  company  pays  a  specified  compensation.  Or  these 
underground  railways  may  construct  their  own  tunnels 
under  statutes  similar  to  those  authorizing  the  construc- 
tion of  any  railroad  in  which  tunneling  is  incidental 
merely.  In  a  recent  case  2  the  Pennsylvania  court  in 
deciding  such  railways  to  be  like  other  railroads  held  that 
such  property  rights  as  they  invade  in  such  construc- 
tion they  might  condemn  by  eminent  domain,  paying 
proper  compensation,  and  thus  acquire  a  permanent  right 
of  way  underground. 

§  192.  Interurban  railways. 

As  has  been  seen,  sO  long  as  the  street  railway  might  be 
regarded  as  a  development  of  transportation  by  such 
vehicles  as  omnibuses  over  highways,  it  was  properly 
held  that  its  construction  involved  no  additional  servi- 
tudes upon  abutters  but  that  they  were  in  fact  an  actual 
relief  from  congested  traffic.  The  modern  interurban 
railway  with  its  heavy  trains  operated  at  high  speed  over 
country  roads  as  through  traffic  is  very  different  as  the 
cases  now  generally  hold.  In  Zehren  v.  Milwaukee  Elec- 
tric Railway,3  to  quote  one  case  as  an  example,  Judge 
Jordan  said:  "The  urban  railway  has  developed  into  the 
interurban  railway,  and  threatens  soon  to  develop  into  the 
interstate  railway.  The  small  car  which  took  up  passen- 
gers at  one  corner,  and  dropped  them  at  another,  has 
become  a  large  coach,  approximating  the  ordinary  railway 
coach  in  size,  and  has  become  a  part,  perhaps,  of  a  train 

1  Prince  v.   Crocker,   166  Mass.      Ry.,  212  Pa.  St.   105,  61  Atl.  881 
347,  44  N.  E.  446,  32  L.  R.  A.  610      (1905) 

(1896),  discussed  in  §  77,  supra.  *  99  Wis.  83,  74  N.  W.  538,  41  L. 

2  Sparks    v.    Philadelphia,    etc.,      R.  A.  575,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  844 

(1898). 

[162] 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §  193 

which  sweeps  across  the  country  from  one  city  to  another, 
bearing  its  load  of  passengers  ticketed  through,  with  an 
occasional  local  passenger  picked  up  on  the  highway. 
The  purely  city  purpose  which  the  urban  railway  sub- 
served has  developed  into  or  been  supplanted  by  an 
entirely  different  purpose,  namely,  the  transportation  of 
passengers  from  city  to  city  over  long  stretches  of  inter- 
vening country."  1 

§  193.  Passenger  elevators. 

In  maintaining  and  operating  an  elevator  for  passengers, 
the  owner  is,  according  to  the  majority  of  the  cases,  under 
a  duty  to  exercise  the  same  measure  of  care  as  is  required 
of  a  public  carrier  of  passengers,  the  highest  degree  of 
care  which  human  foresight  can  suggest.2  But  certain 
other  cases  refuse  to  go  to  this  extent,  holding  that  as  the 
owner  of  the  elevator  is  not  engaged  in  a  public  calling, 
there  is  no  occasion  for  imposing  the  extraordinary  lia- 
bility.3 In  the  matter  of  exercising  care,  it  may  be  con- 

1  See  also  Aurora  v.  Elgin  Trac-     65  N.  W.   136,  30  L.  R.  A.  534 
tion  Co.,  227  111.  485,  81  N.  E.  544,      (1895). 

118  Am.  St.  Rep.  284  (1907).  Missouri. — Goldsmith  v.  Holland 

2  United  States—  M  i  t  c  h  e  1 1  v.      Bldg.  Co.,  182  Mo.  597,  81  S.  W. 
Marker,  62  Fed.  139,  22  U.  S.  App.      1112  (1904). 

325,  10  C.  C.  A.  306,  25  L.  R.  A.  33         Pennsylvania. — Fox  v.  Philadel- 

(1894).  phia,  208  Pa.  St.  127,  57  Atl.  356 

Alabama—  Morgan  v.  Saks,  143  (1904). 
Ala.  139,  38  So.  848  (1904).  Tennessee.— Southern     B.   &   L. 

California.— Treadwell  v.  Whit-  Assn.  v.  Lawson,  97  Tenn.  367,  37 

tier,  80  Cal.  574,  22  Pac.  266,  5  L.  S.  W.   86,   56  Am.   St.   Rep.  804 

R.  A.  498,   13  Am.  St.  Rep.   175  (1896). 
(1889).  Washington. — Edwards  v.  Burke, 

Illinois.— C  h  i  c  a  g  o     Exchange  36  Wash.  107,  78  Pac.  610  (1904). 
Bldg.  Co.  v.  Nelson,  197  111.  334,          Wisconsin. — Oberndorfer  v. 

64  N.  E.  369  (1902).  Pabst,  100  Wis.  505,  76  N.  W.  338 

Maryland. — Wise   v.    Ackerman,  (1898). 
76  Md.  375,  25  Atl.  424  (1892).  3  Kentucky— P  h  i  1 1  i  p  s   Co.   v. 

Minnesota. — Gurney  v.  Minneap-  Pruitt,  26  Ky.  Law  Rep.  831,  82 

olis  Union  Elev.  Co.,  63  Minn.  70,  S.  W.  628  (1904). 

[163] 


§  194  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

ceded,  his  position  is  fairly  analogous  to  that  of  the  com- 
mon carrier  of  passengers,  but  beyond  .this  the  analogy 
ceases.  No  court,  indeed,  would  regard  the  owner  of  the 
elevator  as  a  common  carrier  for  all  purposes  in  the  sense 
that  he  is  engaged  in  a  public  calling  and  obliged  to  serve 
all  without  discrimination.  "Carriers  not  exercising  a 
common  calling  as  such  are  not  common  carriers  whatever 
their  liabilities  may  be.  But  the  defendant  did  not  exer- 
cise the  common  calling  of  a  carrier,  as  sufficiently  appears 
from  the  fact  that  he  might  have  shut  the  elevator  door 
in  the  plaintiff's  face  and  arbitrarily  have  refused  to  carry 
him  without  incurring  any  liability  to  him." 

§  194.  Moving  platforms. 

A  company  operating  a  moving  platform  by  which 
passengers  might  be  regularly  transported  from  place  to 
place  for  an  established  fare  would  undoubtedly  be  held 
a  common  carrier.  Such  a  method  of  transportation  has 
been  seriously  proposed  as  a  method  of  relief  from  the  con- 
gestion of  passenger  transportation  in  the  city  of  New 
York.  Just  at  present  this  sort  of  carriage  is  practically 
confined  to  moving  stairways.  In  so  far  as  these  are  part 
of  the  facilities  provided  by  railway  companies  at  their 
terminals  the  cases  would  undoubtedly  hold  the  company 
liable  as  a  carrier  of  passengers  for  any  injuries  caused  in 
the  course  of  their  operation.  Such  stairways  in  business 
buildings  would  by  many  cases  be  held  to  be  covered  by 
the  law  governing  the  carriage  of  passengers  in  analogy 
to  elevators. 

Massachusetts.— Seaver  v.  Brad-  166  N.  Y.  188,  59  N.  E.  925,  52  L. 

ley,  179  Mass.  329,  60  N.  E.  795,  88  R.  A.  922,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  630 

Am.  St.  Rep.  384  (1901),  quoted  (1901). 

above.  Rhode  Island. — Edwards  v.  Mfrs. 

Michigan.— Hall     v.     Murdock,  Building  Co.,  27  R.  I.  248,  61  Atl. 

114  Mich.  233,  72  N.  W.  150  (1897).  646,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  744, 114  Am. 

New   York— Griffen   v.   Munice,  St.  Rep.  37  (1905). 

[164] 


COMMON  CARRIAGE  AS  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  195,  196 

§  195.  Pleasure  railways. 

Where  any  railway  is  being  actually  used  in  regular 
travel  for  the  use  of  which  a  regular  fare  is  paid,  it  would 
seem  to  be  a  common  carrier  of  passengers.  Mountain 
railways  in  general,  however  devised,  would  seem  to  come 
within  these  conditions.  One  must  be  cautious  in  stating 
this,  however,  as  there  is  a  decision  in  the  highest  court 
of  New  York  1  to  the  effect  that  eminent  domain  could 
not  be  granted  to  the  Niagara  Gorge  trolley  line,  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Andrews  saying:  "The  case  does  not,  we  think,  differ 
in  principle  from  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  a  private 
corporation,  under  color  of  an  Act  of  the  Legislature, 
to  condemn  lands  for  an  inclined  railway,  or  for  a  circular 
railway,  or  for  an  observatory,  to  promote  the  enjoyment 
or  convenience  of  those  who  may  visit  the  Falls."  And  it 
is  of  course  true  that  there  are  certain  enterprises  whereby 
people  are  moved  about,  such  as  " merry-go-rounds," 
" scenic  railways,"  " shooting- the-chutes,"  "ferris  wheels," 
and  " roller  coasters,"  which  are  obviously  not  common 
carriage,  however  willing  their  proprietors  may  be  to  take 
all  who  will  pay.  We  are  certainly  outside  the  range  of 
real  travel  now,  which  alone  is  properly  within  the  coercive 
law  of  public  carriage.2 

§  196.  Common  carriage  as  a  public  employment. 
As  has  been  seen,  common  carriage  has  for  a  long  time 

1  Matter  of  the  Niagara  Falls  &  North  Park  Street  R.  Co.,  93  Mich. 
W.  Railway,  108  N.  Y.  375,  15  N.  348,  17  L.  R.  A.  726,  53  N.  W.  529 
E.  429  (1888).  (1892),  not  liable  as  insurer. 

2  As  to  the  liability  of  the  pro-  New   York. — Lumsden  v.    L.    A. 
prietors  of  such  pleasure  railways,  Thompson  Scenic  R.  Co.,  130  App. 
see:  Div.   209,    114   N.   Y.  Supp.   421 

Illinois. — O'Callaghan    v.    Dell-  (1909),  not  obliged  to  explain, 

wood  Park  Co.,  242  111.  336,  89  N.  E.  Virginia.  —  Washington    Luna 

1005,   26   L.   R.   A.   (N.  S.)   1054  Park  Co.  v.  Goodrich,  110  Va.  692, 

(1909),  all  the  care  practicable.  66  S.  E.  977  (1910),  liable  for  real 

Michigan. — In     Knottnerus     v.  negligence. 

[165] 


§  196  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

been  regarded  as  the  typical  and  indeed  almost  the  only 
public  employment;  and  though  the  number  of  public 
service  companies  has  been  greatly  increased  of  late  years, 
it  still  remains  the  most  important.  Upon  what  grounds 
is  the  regulation  of  common  carriers  to  be  justified. 
Legal  privileges  are  often  found,  to  be  sure.  Thus  emi- 
nent domain  is  granted,  the  steam  roads  facilitate  their 
construction,  and  the  use  of  the  streets  is  given  to  street 
railways  to  conduct  their  business.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  are  many  sorts  of  common  carriers  which  have 
no  special  privileges  as,  for  instance,  steamship  lines  and 
city  truckmen.  There  must  be  some  wider  principle, 
therefore,  which  operates  in  establishing  the  public  duties 
of  common  carriers  as  a  class.  And  this  is  not  to  be 
found  in  natural  monopoly,  for  there  is  no  reason  in 
nature  why  there  should  not  be  as  many  carriers  as  any- 
one might  wish  for,  but  in  the  virtual  monopoly  of  the 
established  service.  In  the  case  of  the  important  carriers 
to-day — the  railway,  the  street  railway,  the  express  com- 
pany, the  steamship  line — the  enormous  amount  of  money 
invested  discourages  and  prevents  competition.  The 
amount  of  money  necessary  to  be  raised  and  put  at  risk 
in  order  to  enter  upon  the  business  of  carriage  is  too 
great  to  subject  it  to  competition  with  an  already  estab- 
lished and  successful  enterprise.  Even  when  an  invest- 
ment is  made,  a  competing  line  of  railroad  built  or  a  new 
express  company  organized,  it  soon  becomes  apparent 
that  competition  is  ruinous  to  one  if  not  to  both  of  the 
enterprises,  and  consolidation  results,  bringing  monopoly 
again.  The  business  of  carriage  is  essentially  monopo- 
listic in  character,  and  therefore  the  situation  calls  for 
the  special  law  regulating  established  monopoly  which  it 
has  always  received. 


[166] 


PART  II.    PUBLIC  PROFESSION 
CHAPTER  VI 

EXPRESS   UNDERTAKING   OF   PUBLIC   EMPLOYMENT 

§  200.  Public  profession  an  essential  element. 

Topic  A.  Explicit  Profession  of  Public  Service 

§  201.  Early  assumpsit  associated  with  public  calling. 

202.  Express  assumption  of  a  public  trust. 

203.  Displaying  signs. 

204.  Public  advertisement. 

205.  General  solicitation. 

206.  Express  disclaimer. 

207.  Service  before  business  begun. 

208.  Profession  made  without  authority. 

209.  Service  undertaken  beyond  obligation. 

210.  Service  undertaken  in  unusual  manner. 

Topic  B.  Implicit  Undertaking  of  Public  Employment 

§  211.  Charter  stipulation. 

212.  Permissive  charter. 

213.  Taking  out  public  license. 

214.  Exercise  of  eminent  domain. 

215.  Acceptance  of  municipal  franchises. 

216.  Entering  into  municipal  contract. 

217.  Aid  from  taxation. 

218.  Governmental  participation. 

§  200.  Public  profession  an  essential  element. 

It  should  be  remembered,  in  justification  of  the  impo- 
sition of  the  extraordinary  law  which  requires  those  who 
are  engaged  in  public  callings  to  serve  all  that  apply,  that 
the  service  is  voluntarily  assumed.  Even  one  who  has 
acquired  a  virtual  monopoly  is  not  forced  into  public 

[167] 


§  201  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

service  against  his  will;  it  is  only  when  he  has  held  him- 
self out  in  some  way  as  ready  to  serve  that  he  is  bound 
thereafter  to  deal  with  all  indiscriminately.  There  is  no 
complete  case  of  public  employment  made  out  when  the 
business  is  public  in  character  if  there  has  been  in  the 
particular  case  no  profession  to  serve  the  public.  The 
converse  of  this  is  also  true,  that  there  is  no  case  of  pub- 
lic employment  if  the  business  is  private  in  character, 
however  much  eagerness  to  deal  with  the  public  may 
have  been  evinced.  That  is,  the  rule  is  fundamental 
that  in  any  case  of  public  employment  the  evidence  of 
profession  to  serve  the  public  and  the  proof  that  the  bus- 
iness is  public  in  character  must  both  be  sufficient  to 
carry  conviction.  For  whether  there  has  been  profes- 
sion enough  in  the  particular  instance  and  whether  the 
business  is  sufficiently  public  in  its  general  character  is 
in  each  instance  in  last  analysis  a  question  of  fact,  al- 
though rules  of  law  may  aid  in  dealing  with  these  facts. 
And  since  this  is  a  question  of  fact  rather  than  a  question 
of  law  in  most  cases,  the  discussion  of  it  requires  the 
statement  of  many  cases  involving  many  close  issues  of 
fact.  For  although  the  public  profession  is  often  enough 
made  in  express  terms,  it  is  also  not  infrequently  left  to 
implication  from  the  general  course  of  the  business  in 
question. 

Topic  A.  Explicit  Profession  of  Public  Service 

§  201.  Early  assumpsit  associated  with  public  calling. 

It  has  been  seen  1  that  in  the  course  of  the  development 
of  our  law  the  obligation  resting  upon  one  who  had  made 
a  general  assumption  of  public  service  preceded  the  obli- 
gation of  one  who  had  made  a  special  promise  in  a  par- 
ticular case.  It  has  been  remarked  2  that  the  earliest  cases 

1  See  §  4,  infra.  tory  of  Assumpsit  in  2   Harvard 

1  See  Professor  Ames  on  the  His-      Law   Review,   pp.  2-4,    citing   es- 

[1681 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  202 

in  which  an  assumpsit  was  laid  in  the  declaration  were 
cases  against  a  ferryman  who  undertook  to  carry  the  plain- 
tiff's horse  over  the  river  but  who  overloaded  the  boat, 
whereby  the  horse  was  drowned,  against  surgeons  who 
undertook  to  cure  the  plaintiff  or  his  animals  but  who  ad- 
ministered bad  medicines  or  otherwise  unskillfully  treated 
their  patients,  against  a  barber  who  negligently  injured 
the  plaintiff's  face,  and  against  a  smith  for  laming  a  horse 
while  shoeing  it.  The  general  assumption  to  the  whole 
public  which  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  public  employ- 
ment was  the  very  basis  of  these  actions,  for  the  public 
profession  of  a  common  calling  was  held  to  oblige  one  to 
act  with  proper  skill  in  his  business  relations  with  each 
patron. 

§  202.  Express  assumption  of  a  public  trust. 

In  the  earlier  cases  of  public  employment  the  profession 
to  serve  all  that  apply  was  spoken  of  as  the  assumption  of 
a  public  trust  in  undertaking  the  business  or  as  the  grant 
to  the  public  of  an  interest  in  that  business.  The  original 
rule  was  clearly  expressed  over  two  centuries  ago  by 
Lord  Holt.1  "Wherever  any  subject  takes  upon  himself 
a  public  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  rest  of  his  fellow- 
subjects  he  is  eo  ipso  bound  to  serve  the  subject  in  all  the 
things  that  are  within  the  reach  and  comprehension  of 
such  an  office,  under  pain  of  an  action  against  him;  and 
for  that  see  Keilway,  50.  If  on  the  road  a  shoe  falls  off 
my  horse,  and  I  come  to  a  smith  to  have  one  put  on,  and 
the  smith  refuses  to  do  it,  an  action  will  lie  against  him, 
because  he  has  made  profession  of  a  trade  which  is  for  the 
public  good,  and  has  thereby  exposed  and  vested  an  in- 
terest of  himself  in  all  the  king's  subjects  that  will  employ 

pecially  as  to  the  ferryman,  Y.  B.  Rast.  Ent.  2,  6,  1;  as  to  the  smith, 

22  Lib.  Ass.  94,  pi.  41;  as  to  the  Y.  B.  46  Ed.  Ill,  19,  pi.  19. 

surgeon,  Y.  B.  19  Hen.  VI,  49,  pi.  '  In  Lane   v.   Cotton,    12   Mod. 

5;  as  to  the  barber,  14  Hen.  VII,  472  (1701). 

[1691 


§§  203,  204  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

him  in  the  way  of  his  trade."    And  in  many  later  cases 
this  rather  figurative  language  is  used.1 

§  203.  Displaying  signs. 

It  has  been  usual  from  time  immemorial  for  an  innkeeper 
to  advertise  his  business  by  hanging  out  a  sign.  "The 
person  who  erects  the  sign,"  as  it  is  said  quaintly  in  one 
old  case,2  "charges  himself  to  the  commonwealth."  But 
it  should  be  noted  that  as  public  profession  is  a  question 
to  be  determined  upon  all  the  facts,  it  is  not  essential 
that  he  should  do  so.3  If  he  in  fact  carries  on  business  as 
an  innkeeper  on  a  public  basis  he  will  be  held  to  be  such 
although  he  is  not  displaying  a  sign. 4  One  leading  case  5  on 
this  matter  dealt  with  a  lighterman  who  had  his  sign  over 
his  door.  Baron  Alderson  had  no  hesitation  in  holding 
him  liable  as  a  common  carrier.  "Here,  we  have  a  per- 
son with  a  counting-house,  'lighterman'  painted  at  his 
door,  and  he  offers  to  carry  for  everyone." 

§  204.  Public  advertisement. 

The  most  obvious  method  of  professing  public  employ- 
ment is  by  general  advertisement,  particularly  in  news- 
papers. Such  newspaper  advertisement  has  always  been 
common,  for  railroads  particularly  as  they  generally  pub- 
lish their  time-tables.  Where  a  carrier  was  soliciting  bus- 
iness publicly  in  various  ways,  by  signs  upon  its  wagons 
and  upon  fences,  by  its  cards  and  its  tags,  a  court  said 
lately:  "These  advertisements  speak  for  themselves,  and 
unquestionably  establish  the  fact,  independent  of  every- 

1  See  for  examples  of  this:  *  Anonymous,  Godbolt,  345,  pi. 
United  States. — Munn  v.  Illinois,      440  (1623). 

94  U.  S.  113,  24  L.  ed.  77  (1876).  4  Iowa.— Lyon  v.  Smith,  Morris, 

New  York.— People  v.  New  York  184  (1843). 

C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.,  28  Hun,  543  Tennessee. — Dickerson  v.  Rogers, 

(1883).  4  Humph.  179  (1843). 

2  Quoted   from   Rex   v.    Collins,  6  Ingate  v.  Christie,  3  C.  &  K. 
Palmer,  372  (1623).  61  (1850). 

[1701 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  205 

thing  else  in  the  case,  that  the  defendant  does  hold  itself 
out  to  the  public."1  This  is  equally  established  as  to  inn- 
keepers who  employ  similar  methods  of  publicity.  One 
is  held  liable  as  a  public  innkeeper  "who  by  his  agents, 
cards,  bills,  advertisements,  signs,  and  all  the  means  by 
which  publicity  and  notoriety  can  be  given  to  his  bus- 
iness, represents  himself  as  an  innkeeper."  2  Of  late 
years  also  advertising  campaigns  have  been  a  feature 
of  the  competition  between  gas  companies  and  electric 
companies,  while  even  telephone  and  telegraph  companies 
have  solicited  public  patronage  through  newspaper  ad- 
vertisements. 

§  205.  General  solicitation. 

The  profession  of  willingness  to  serve  the  public  need 
not  be  made  by  the  proprietor  in  any  particular  way;  it 
is  enough  if  his  intention  is  made  public  in  any  way  that 
will  give  the  community  to  understand  that  he  wishes  to 
do  business  with  all  comers.  "  Whether  a  person  is  a 
common  carrier  depends  wholly  upon  whether  he  holds 
himself  out  to  the  world  as  such,  and  he  can  hold  himself 
out  as  a  common  carrier  by  engaging  in  the  business 
generally,  or  by  announcing  or  proclaiming  it  by  cards, 

1  Quoted  from  Lloyd  v.  Haugh  Shouse,  5  Rawle,  179,  28  Am.  Dec. 

&  K.  Storage  &  Transfer  Co.,  223  653  (1835). 

Pa.  St.  148,  72  Atl.  516,  21  L.  R.  A.  Tennessee. — Memphis  News  Pub- 

(N.  S.)  188  (1909).  lishing  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

See  also  similar  language  in:  110  Tenn.  684,  75  S.  W.  941,  63 

Colorado—  Schloss  v.  Wood,   11  L.  R.  A.  150  (1903). 

Colo.  287,  17  Pac.  910  (1888).  Wisconsin.— Doty   v.   Strong,    1 

Kansas— Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  Finn.  (Wis.)  313,  40  Am.  Dec.  773 

v.  Nichols,  Kennedy  &  Co.,  9  Kans.  (1843). 

235,  12  Am.  Rep.  494  (1872).  2  Quoted  from  Pinkerton   v. 

Massachusetts. — Sears  v.  Eastern  Woodward,   33    Gal.  557,    91   Am. 

R.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen,  433,  92  Am.  Dec.  657  (1867). 

Dec.  780  (1867).  But  see  Oxlade  v.  North  Eastern 

Pennsylvania.— B  e  c  k  m  a  n      v.  R.  R.  Co.,   1  C.   B.   (N.  S.)  454 

(1857). 

[171] 


§  206  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

advertisements,  or  by  any  other  means  that  would  let 
the  public  know  that  he  intended  to  be  a  common  or 
general  carrier  for  the  public."1  The  employment  of 
agents  to  solicit  business,  usually  makes  a  plain  case. 
The  court  had  in  one  leading  case  but  little  doubt  as  to 
the  status  of  a  keeper  of  a  hotel  who  not  only  kept  a  public 
register  but  also  "  ran  a  coach  to  the  railroad  station  to 
induce  guests  to  come  to  his  house."2  So,  a  hackman  who 
stations  himself  behind  a  rail  at  a  station  and  gesticulates 
to  incoming  passengers  indicates  his  character,3  as  does  a 
wagoner  who  takes  his  stand  in  a  public  square.4 

§  206.  Express  disclaimer. 

The  opposite  case  where  there  is  at  the  outset  an  express 
disclaimer  of  public  service  is  equally  plain.  According 
to  the  general  theory  here  developed,  one  gets  into  public 
service  only  by  undertaking  it  voluntarily,  and  conversely 
one  may  keep  himself  out  of  it  altogether  by  express 
disavowal  of  public  employment.  This  point  came  up 
recently  in  North  Carolina,5  where  the  question  involved 
was  whether  a  railway  projected  by  a  lumber  corporation 
could  have  the  right  of  eminent  domain  under  a  general 
statute.  The  company  openly  declared  that  it  did  not 
propose  to  transport  timber  for  other  parties  over  the 
projected  road,  but  intended  to  construct  and  operate  the 
road  for  its  sole  and  exclusive  use  in  removing  its  timber 
and  lumber  from  its  lands.  This  attitude,  the  court  held, 

1  Schloss  v.  Wood,  11  Colo.  287,  W.  &  S.  (Pa.)  285,  37  Am.  Dec.  464 
17  Pac.  910  (1888).  (1841). 

2  Fay  v.  Pacific  Improvement  Co.,  6  Cozard  v.  Kanawha  Hardwood 
93  Cal.  253,  26  Pac.  1029,  28  Pac.  Co.,  139  N.  C.  283,  51  S.  E.  932,  1 
943,  16  L.  R.  A.  188,  27  Am.  St.  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  969,  111  Am.  St. 
Rep.  198  (1892).  Rep.  779  (1905). 

3  See  Atlantic  City  v.   Fansler,  Compare  Connolly  v.  Woods,  13 
70  N.  J.  L.  491,  56  Atl.  119  (1904).  Idaho,  591,  92  Pac.  573  (1907). 

4  See  Gordon  v.  Hutchinson,   1 

[1721 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  207 

put  the  company  outside  the  general  statute.  "They  say 
that  it  is  their  purpose  to  construct  the  railway  for  their 
exclusive  use.  This  concession  deprives  them  of  the  bene- 
fits of  the  statute."  But  when  the  matter  comes  up  in 
another  way,  when  duties  not  rights  are  involved,  such 
declarations  that  the  business  is  private  will  not  prevail 
if  the  other  evidence  is  to  the  contrary.  Thus  in  a  recent 1 
case  where  a  trucking  company  which  had  solicited  busi- 
ness by  public  advertisements  sought  to  show  when  sued 
for  a  loss  that  they  had  often  refused  to  serve  particular 
applicants  and  were  therefore  not  common  carriers,  the 
court  said  sharply:  "To  claim  that  one  is  not  a  common 
carrier,  because  he  has  persistently  disregarded  his  duty 
and  has  arbitrarily  chosen  whom  he  would  serve  notwith- 
standing that  he  has  invited  the  public  generally  to  apply 
is  to  make  a  public  duty  determinable  by  the  pleasure  of 
the  individual,  and  not  by  principle  or  law." 

§  207.  Service  before  business  begun. 

While  preparations  for  establishing  the  service  are 
going  on  the  business  should  not  be  regarded  as  yet  upon 
a  public  basis.  Thus  where  a  railroad  is  under  construc- 
tion and  is  not  yet  publicly  opened  for  passengers,  it  is 
not  a  common  carrier  of  passengers.  This  is  true  though 
persons  have  occasionally  been  carried  over  the  road  in 
construction  trains  at  their  own  solicitation.2  In  McRae 

1  Lloyd  v.  Haugh  &  K.  Storage  L.  R.  A.  255  (1896);  Albion  Lumber 
&  Transfer  Co.,  223  Pa.  St.  148,  Co.  v.  De  Nobra,  72  Fed.  739,  44 
72  Atl.  516,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  188  U.  S.  App.  347,   19  C.  C.  A.  168 
(1909).  (1896). 

See  also  Bare  v.  American  For-  Indiana. — Menaugh   v.   Bedford 

warding  Co.,  242  111.  298,  89  N.  E.  Belt  Ry.  Co.,  157  Ind.  20,  60  N.  E. 

1021  (1909).  694  (1901);  Evansville  &  R.  R.  R. 

2  United    States.— Shoemaker    v.  Co.  v.  Barnes,   137  Ind.   306,  36 
Kingsbury,  12  Wall.  369,  20  L.  ed.  N.  E.  1092  (1893). 

432  (1870);  Wade  v.  Lutcher  Cy-  Kansas.— Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R. 
press  Lumber  Co.,  74  Fed.  517,  41  Co.  v.  Frazer,  55  Kans.  582,  40  Pac. 
U.  S.  App.  45,  20  C.  C.  A.  515,  33  923  (1895). 

[1731 


§  208  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

v.  Canada  Pacific  Railway, l  Mr.  Justice  Johnson  charging 
the  jury,  said:  "  A  railway  which  occasionally  carries  goods 
or  freight  in  passenger  trains  is  not  a  common  carrier  of 
goods  on  such  trains;  and  the  same  rule  applies  to  a  rail- 
way which  occasionally  carries  passengers  in  its  freight  or 
construction  trains,  though  when  persons  got  on  to  ride, 
the  defendants  did  not  put  them  off.  If  you  find  the  de- 
fendants did  not  solicit  passengers,  or  publicly  announce 
they  would  be  carried,  even,  if  in  some  or  many  instances, 
they  have  carried  passengers  for  hire  at  the  request  and  for 
the  special  accommodation  of  applicants,  it  is  clear  you 
have  no  right  to  impose  upon  the  defendants  the  severe 
obligations  which  attach  to  common  carriers."  Where, 
however,  notwithstanding  the  road  has  not  been  completed 
the  railroad  has  made  a  practice  of  receiving  for  hire  goods 
and  passengers  for  carriage  on  its  construction  trams  it  will 
be  held  to  be  a  common  carrier.2 

§  208.  Profession  made  without  authority. 

The  public  profession  to  carry  must  be  made  by  the 
carrier  himself,  or  some  one  duly  authorized  by  him  to 
do  it.  A  particularly  clear  case  is  an  early  one  hi  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  New  York.3  There  the  defendant  who 

Texas.— San.  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  S.  E.  853,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.   169 

v.  Robinson,  79  Tex.  608,  15  S.  W.  (1890). 
584  (1891).  Iowa.— Spence  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 

1  Tennessee.— Nashville,   etc.,   R.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  117  la.  1,  90  N.  W. 

R.  Co.  v.   Messino,   1  Sneed,  220  346  (1902). 
(1853).  Canada. — Graham    v.    Toronto, 

Washington.—  Cogswell   v.   West  etc.,  R.  Co.,  23  U.  C.  C.  P.  541 

St.  &  N.  E.  Elec.  R.  Co.,  5  Wash.  (1874);  Sheerman  v.  Toronto,  etc., 

46,  31  Pac.  411  (1892);  Co.,  34  U.  C.  Q.  B.  451  (1874). 

1  Mont.  L.  R.  4  S.  Ct.  186  (1888).          3  Satterlee  v.  Groat,  1  Wend.  272 

2  Arkansas.— Little  Rock,  M.  R.  (1828). 

&  T.   Ry.   v.   Glidewell,   39    Ark.  See  also: 

487  (1882).  Tennessee. — Jenkins  v.  Picket,  9 

Georgia.— Chattanooga  R.  &  C.  Yerg.  480  (1836). 
R.  Co.  v.  Liddell,  85  Ga.  482,  11 

[174] 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  209 

had  abandoned  the  occupation  of  a  common  carrier  was 
engaged  by  a  certain  person  to  bring  some  goods  for  him. 
A  servant  was  sent  by  the  defendant  to  take  the  goods, 
but  the  goods  not  being  ready  the  servant  against  ex- 
press orders  solicited  and  obtained  an  order  from  the  plain- 
tiff and  then  stole  some  of  the  goods.  It  was  properly 
held  that  the  defendant  was  not  liable  as  common  carrier. 
In  a  closer  case  where  a  person  had  been  accepted  as 
passenger  on  construction  train  of  an  incomplete  railroad 
by  the  man  in  charge  of  the  work,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Indiana  well  said:1  " Allen  was  a  superintendent  of  con- 
struction and  a  civil  engineer,  and  it  is  not  shown  that 
he  had  authority  to  receive  the  appellee  as  a  passenger 
upon  a  road  that  had  never  been  opened  to  the  traveling 
public.  The  board  of  directors  and  the  established  rules 
of  the  company  alone  could  make  the  appellant  a  common 
carrier  for  hire  and  the  appellee  a  passenger.  The  power 
was  not  delegated  to  Allen,  and  it  was  beyond  the  scope 
of  his  authority  to  convert  a  construction  train  into  a 
passenger  train.  He  could  not  open  an  imperfect  and 
incomplete  road  into  one  for  passenger  traffic  without  the 
consent  of  his  superior  officers." 

§  209.  Service  undertaken  beyond  obligation. 

Another  point  as  to  the  making  of  the  profession  should 
be  referred  to  here  although  it  is  more  fully  discussed 
later  on.  There  are  many  instances  where  service  is 
undertaken  not  within  the  general  obligation  resulting 

Texas. — Haynie  v.  Baylor,  18  company  have  no  authority  but  by 

Tex.  498  (1857).  virtue  of  their  employment  alone, 

1  Evansville  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  to  carry  passengers  on  the  train, 

Barnes,  137  Ind.  306  (1893).  still  where  for  a  period  of  years  the 

In  Harvey  v.  Deep  River  Log-  manager  of  a  logging  company  per- 

ging  Co.,  49  Oreg.  583,  90  Pac.  501,  mits  the  carriage  of  passengers  on 

12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  131  (1907),  it  its  trains,  the  corporation  owes  per- 

was  held  that  although  those  in  sons  so  carried  the  duty  of  not  in- 

charge  of  the  train  of  a  logging  juring  them  bv  its  negligence. 

[175] 


§  210  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

from  the  usual  profession,  but  by  special  undertaking  in 
the  particular  case  outside  of  the  usual  limitations.  The 
difficult  problem  in  these  cases  is  to  determine  whether 
the  special  acceptance  is  upon  a  public  basis  or  upon  a 
private  basis,  for  since  it  is  outside  his  obligation  it  is 
open  to  the  proprietor  of  the  service  to  extend  specially 
his  public  profession  to  the  particular  case  so  that  the  pub- 
lic law  will  apply  it,  or  to  undertake  the  service  within  the 
private  law  of  ordinary  contract.  For  example,  a  carrier 
who  does  not  generally  undertake  service  beyond  certain 
limits  might  in  a  particular  case  undertake  service  beyond 
these  limits.  "It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  while  a 
railroad  cannot  be  compelled  to  accept  and  agree  to  carry 
goods  to  points  beyond  its  line,  yet  it  might  do  so.  If 
the  carrier  contracts  to  convey  beyond  its  line  it  would  be 
liable  as  a  common  carrier  for  the  whole  distance."  l  This, 
however,  will  only  be  true  where  the  railroad  leaves  it  to 
be  understood  that  it  is  acting  as  a  common  carrier.  It 
may  in  unusual  circumstances  by  special  acceptance  in 
the  particular  case  exempt  itself  from  the  usual  liabilities 
of  common  carriers.2 

§  210.  Service  undertaken  in  unusual  manner. 

Another  instance  of  this  general  problem  of  particular 
undertakings  outside  usual  profession  may  be  seen  in  a 
recent  case  dealing  with  the  public  liabilities  of  telephone 
companies.  The  usual  business  of  the  telephone  com- 
panies is  to  put  those  who  wish  to  converse  in  communi- 
cation with  each  other,  the  company  never  accepting  a 
message  or  delivering  it.  But  it  will  sometimes  be  found 
that  the  telephone  companies  have  gotten  in  the  way  of 
accepting  messages  for  transmission  and  delivering  them 

1  Farley  v.  Lavary,  107  Ky.  523,  this  general  problem  in  Santa  Fe 
45  S.   W.   840,   47  L.   R.   A.   383  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  C. 
(1900).    See  Chapter  XV.  Co.   (Ariz.),   108  Pac.  467  (1910). 

2  See  the  excellent  discussion  of  See  Chapter  XXII. 

[176] 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  211 

to  the  people  to  whom  they  are  addressed.  Of  course  if 
no  more  can  be  shown  in  a  particular  instance  than  that 
employe's  have  undertaken  this  at  the  instance  of  some 
patrons,  the  company  will  not  be  held  responsible  in  the 
matter;  but  sometimes  the  facts  will  be  stronger,  show- 
ing that  this  has  been  so  largely  practiced  as  to  hold 
the  telephone  companies  responsible  during  its  contin- 
uance. In  the  case  in  mind  *  it  was  held  that  although 
"a  telephone  company  instructed  its  operator  not  to  re- 
ceive messages  to  be  by  any  agent  of  the  company  de- 
livered to  the  sendee,  yet  if  it  knowingly  permitted  its 
employes,  over  its  wires,  to  make  arrangements  for  such 
delivery,  and  collected  from  the  customer  the  full  charge, 
including  that  for  delivery,  it  is  liable  for  the  nondelivery, 
notwithstanding  that  under  its  arrangement  with  its  dis- 
tant operators  they  were  to  receive  the  pay  for  the  de- 
livery." 2 

Topic  B.  Implicit  Undertaking  of  Public  Employment 
§  211.  Charter  stipulation. 

In  the  chartering  of  the  early  public  service  companies, 
as  has  been  seen,  the  cautious  policy  was  followed  of  ex- 
pressly settling  in  the  very  charter  the  public  duties  of 
the  chartered  company;  and  mandatory  provisions  of  this 
sort  are  not  unknown  at  the  present  day.  Such  a  charter 
provision  expressly  requiring  public  service  of  the  gran- 
tee corporation  makes  a  plain  case  of  public  obligation 
by  voluntary  assumption.  The  acceptance  of  such  a 
charter  is  the  voluntary  undertaking  of  the  particular 
corporation  by  which  it  is  irrevocably  bound  to  perform 
the  service  expressly  required  by  the  terms  of  the  charter 
in  consideration  of  the  accompanying  privileges.3  This 

1  Cumberland  Telephone  Co.  v.  3  Of  course  the  grantee  in  charter 
Brown,  104  Tenn.  56,  55  S.  W.  155,  offering  franchises  is   only   bound 
50  L.  R.  A.  277  (1900).  upon  its  acceptance  of  them.    See: 

2  See  §  765,  infra.  Illinois. — Chicago  Telephone  Co. 

12  [  177  ] 


§212 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


point  is  really  too  plain  for  argument,  and  so  the  Con- 
necticut court  regarded  it  when  a  railroad  attempted 
to  withdraw  a  service  which  was  plainly  enough  com- 
manded by  its  charter:  "We  hardly  know  what  doubtful 
principles  of  law  are  thought  to  be  involved  in  this  case. 
The  respondents  were  certainly  bound  to  make  their 
road  (if  at  all)  prescribed  by  their  charter,  and  having 
made  it  to  put  it  into  use — every  material  part  of  it— 
and  keep  it  in  use  until  discharged  by  the  legislature."  * 

§  212.  Permissive  charter. 

The  beginnings  of  the  modern  law  of  public  service  are 


v.  Northwestern  Telephone  Co., 
199  111.  324,  65  N.  E.  329  (1902). 

New  York. — People  v.  Albany  & 
Vt.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  261,  82  Am. 
Dec.  295  (1862). 

1  An  explicit  charter  provision  re- 
quiring service  must  be  obeyed. 
See: 

United  States. — Union  Pacific  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  91  U.  S.  343,  23  L. 
ed.  428  (1875);  Atlantic  Coast  Line 
Ry.  Co.  v.  North  Carolina  Corp. 
Comm.,  206  U.  S.  1,  51  L.  ed.  933 
(1906);  United  States  v.  Union  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  160  U.  S.  1,  40  L.  ed.  319, 
16  Sup.  Ct.  190  (1895);  Talcott  v. 
Pine  Grove,  1  Flipp.  120,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  13,735  (1872);  Farmers'  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Henning,  8  Fed.  Cas. 
4,666  (1878). 

Florida. — State  v.  Jacksonville 
Terminal  Co.,  41  Fla.  377,  27  So. 
225  (1899). 

Illinois. — People  v.  St.  L.,  A.  & 
T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  111.  512,  52  N. 
E.  292  (1898). 

Indiana. — Lake  Erie,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  The  State  ex  rel.  Mushlitz, 
139  Ind.  158,  38  N.  E.  596  (1894). 

Iowa. — The     State     v.     Central 

[178] 


Iowa  Ry.  Co.  et  al.,  71  Iowa,  410,  32 
N.  W.  409,  60  Am.  Rep.  806  (1887). 

Kansas. — City  of  Potwin  Place  v. 
Topeka  Ry.  Co.,  51  Kans.  609,  33 
Pac.  309,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  312 
(1893). 

Maine. — Weymouth  v.  Penob- 
scot  Log  Driving  Co.,  71  Me.  29 
(1880). 

Massachusetts. — Brownell  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  164  Mass.  29,  41 
N.  E.  107,  29  L.  R.  A.  169,  49  Am. 
St.  Rep.  442  (1895). 

Nebraska. — State  of  Nebraska  v. 
Sioux  City,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Neb. 
357  (1878). 

New  Jersey. — Bridgeton  v.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  592,  43  Atl.  715 
(1898). 

Oklahoma. — U  n  i  t  e  d  States  v. 
Choctaw,  O.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Okla. 
404,  41  Pac.  729  (1895). 

Virginia. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Franklin,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Va. 
693,  32  S.  E.  485  (1899). 

England. — Reg.  v.  Bristol,  etc., 
Ry.  Co.,  4  Q.  B.  162  (1843). 

New  Brunswick. — Attorney  Gen- 
eral of  New  Brunswick,  Ex  parte,  1 
Pug.  &  Bur.  667 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  212 


to  be  found  in  those  cases  just  before  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  in  which  it  was  held  that  although 
there  was  no  express  provision  in  chartering  a  supply 
company  compelling  it  to  serve  the  public,  the  situation 
was  such  that  even  where  its  character  was  permissive, 
the  obligation  was  assumed.  In  the  leading  case  of  Lum- 
bard  v.  Stearns,1  Chief  Justice  Shaw  with  characteristic 
insight  held  that  a  water  company  enjoying  privileges 
under  a  permissive  charter  must  give  public  service. 
"By  accepting  the  act  of  incorporation,"  he  said,  "  they 
undertake  to  do  all  the  public  duties  required  by  it." 
And  indeed  it  is  now  well-accepted  doctrine  that  the  very 
acceptance  of  a  charter  providing  for  the  carrying  on  of 
a  business  public  in  character  is  a  sufficient  profession  in 
the  particular  case.2 


MCush.  61  (1849). 

2  United  States. — People  v.  Col- 
orado Central  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed. 
638  (1890);  Laighton  v.  Carthage, 
175  Fed.  145  (1909). 

Connecticut. — State  v.  Hartford 
&  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Conn.  538 
(1861). 

Georgia. — Savannah  Canal  Co. 
v.  Shuman,  91  Ga.  400,  17  S.  E. 
937,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  43  (1892). 

Kansas. — Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Nichols  &  Co.,  9  Kans.  235,  12 
Am.  Rep.  494  (1872). 

Kentucky. — Board  of  Trustees  of 
Elizabethtown  v.  Chesapeake,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  94  Ky.  377,  22  S.  W.  609 
(1893). 

Minnesota. — State  ex  rel.  City  of 
St.  Paul  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry. 
Co.,  78  Minn.  331,  81  N.  W.  200 
(1899). 

Montana. — State  v.  Helena  P.  & 
L.  Co.,  22  Mont.  391,  56  Pac.  685 
(1899). 


New  York. — Root  v.  Great  West- 
ern R.  R.  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  524  (1871). 

Ohio. — East  Ohio  Gas  Co.  v. 
Akron,  81  Oh.  St.  33,  90  N.  E.  40 
(1909). 

Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 
&  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 
244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

Pennsylvania. — Erie  &  North- 
East  R.  R.  v.  Casey,  26  Pa.  St.  287 
(1856). 

Tennessee. — Watauga  Water  Co. 
v.  Wolfe,  99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W. 
1060,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841  (1897). 

Texas. — San  Antonio  St.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  State,  90  Tex.  520,  39  S.  W.  926, 
35  L.  R.  A.  662,  59  Am.  St.  Rep. 
834  (1897). 

Virginia. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Franklin,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  96  Va.  693,  32 
S.  E.  485,  44  L.  R.  A.  297  (1899). 

Washington. — State  v.  Spokane 
St.  Ry.  Co.,  19  Wash.  518,  53  Pac. 
719,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  739  (1898). 

Wisconsin. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Frost, 

[179] 


§213 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  213.  Taking  out  public  license. 

When  it  is  a  question  whether  a  person  who  is  engaged 
in  a  business  that  is  public  in  character  l  has  undertaken 
it  upon  a  public  basis,  the  fact  that  the  proprietor  of  the 
enterprise  has  taken  out  the  license  required  by  public 
authority  of  all  who  are  engaged  in  that  business  is  highly 
probative.  Thus  is  one  case  2  where  the  evidence  was 
conflicting  as  to  whether  the  particular  carriage  was  com- 
mon carriage,  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Kentucky  said: 
"We  are  of  opinion  that  by  the  evidence  of  appellant 
himself  it  is  shown  that  he  was  a  common  carrier  within 
the  limits  of  the  City  of  Lexington.  He  admits  that  he 
hauled  for  all  or  any  persons,  and  had  obtained  a  license 


113  Wis.  623, 88  N.  W.  912,  89  N.  W. 
915  (1902). 

It  should  be  added  that  there  are 
even  cases  where  a  company  which 
has  undertaken  a  service  upon  a 
public  basis  has  been  held  to  the 
liabilities  of  that  position  although 
such  service  is  ultra  vires. 

United  Slates. — Wade  v.  Lutcher 
&  Moore  Cypress  Lumber  Co.,  74 
Fed.  517,  41  U.  S.  App.  45,  33  L.  R. 
A.  255,  20  C.  C.  A.  515  (1896). 

Georgia. — Caldwell  v.  Richmond, 
etc.,  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  550,  15  S.  E. 
678  (1892). 

1  The  mere  fact  that  a  license  is 
required  for  the  conduct  of  a  certain 
business  has  no  conclusive  weight  in 
determining  the  other  question  as  to 
whether  the  business  is  public  in 
character;  for  although  such  licens- 
ing shows  that  the  business  is  one 
over  which  some  degree  of  State 
control  is  necessary,  it  does  not 
prove  that  the  extreme  regulation  of 
the  extraordinary  law  relating  to 
public  services  is  demanded.  Thus 
lawyers,  doctors,  dentists  and  drug- 

[180] 


gists  cannot  usually  to-day  practice 
their  callings  without  State  license 
based  upon  special  examinations; 
nor  for  that  matter  can  electricians, 
plumbers,  engineers  and  firemen  act 
as  such  without  a  license.  And  yet 
although  such  licensing  is  proper, 
the  law  is  plain  that  these  callings 
are  not  public  services  in  conse- 
quence. See  Hurley  v.  Edding- 
field,  156  Ind.  416,  59  N.  E.  1058,  53 
L.  R.  A.  135,  83  Am.  St.  Rep.  198 
(1901). 

2  Farley  v.  Lavary,  107  Ky.  523, 
54  S.  W.  840,  47  L.  R.  A.  383  (1900). 

See  also: 

Alabama. — Babcock  v.  Herbert,  3 
Ala.  392,  37  Am.  Dec.  695  (1842). 

Illinois. — Hastings  Express  Co. 
v.  Chicago,  135  111.  App.  268 
(1907). 

Indiana. — Fargo  v.  Ledger  Stand- 
ard Co.,  59  Ind.  496  (1877). 

New  Jersey. — Atlantic  City  v. 
Fonsler,  70  N.  J.  L.  125,  56  Atl.  119 
(1903). 

New  York. — Robinson  v.  Corn- 
ish, 13  N.  Y.  Supp.  577  (1890). 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  214 

so  to  do."  But  a  failure  to  take  out  a  license  although 
such  license  is  required  of  those  who  are  engaged  in  the 
employment  in  question,  is  not  conclusive  against  public 
employment  if  public  profession  is  otherwise  evidenced 
by  usual  conduct.  As  was  said  in  such  a  case  by  a 
California  court:1  "It  was  proven,  that  defendants  held 
themselves  out  as  public  ferrymen,  and  were  accustomed 
to  convey  persons  and  property  across  the  straits,  for  hire; 
and,  so  far  as  the  rights  of  plaintiffs  were  concerned,  it  was 
immaterial  whether  or  not  they  were  duly  authorized  to 
run  such  a  ferry.  If  they  were  assuming  to  act  as  ferry- 
men, without  license,  they  could  not  take  advantage  of 
their  own  wrong  to  avoid  the  responsibility  which  at- 
tached to  their  calling."  2 

§  214.  Exercise  of  eminent  domain. 

A  factor  which  if  present  is  always  seized  upon  first 
to  show  that  the  service  in  question  is  necessarily  con- 
ducted upon  a  public  basis,  is  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
eminent  domain  by  the  proprietors  of  the  enterprise. 
This  has  always  been  considered  as  conclusive  evidence 
of  irrevocable  profession  of  public  employment  in  the  ab- 

1  Polk  v.  Coffin,  9  Cal.  56  (1858).  4  Humph.  179,  40  Am.  Dec.  642 

Thus  the  failure  of  an  innkeeper  (1843). 

to  procure  a  license  as  required  by          2  Even  as  to  those  callings  which 

law,  does  not  prevent  him  from  be-  may  be  public  in  character,  a  license 

ing  held  liable  as  an  innkeeper.  is  sometimes  required  of  those  who 

Alabama.. — Lanier    v.   Young-  are  carrying  on  that  business  upon  a 

blood,  73  Ala.  587  (1883).  private  basis;  so  that  merely  taking 

Iowa. — Lyon   v.   Smith,    Morris,  out  a  license  even  in  such  businesses 

184  (1843).  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of  public 

Maine. — Norcross  v.  Norcross,  53  employment.     See: 
Me.   163  (1865);  Atwater  v.  Saw-         Minnesota. — State  ex  rel.  v.  W. 

yer,  76  Me.  539,  49  Am.  Rep.  634  W.  Cargill  Co.,  77  Minn.  223,  79 

(1884).  N.  W.  962  (1899). 

North  Carolina. — State  v.  Wynne,          New    Jersey. — Atlantic    City    v. 

1  Hawks,  451  (1821).  Dehn,  69  N.  J.  L.  233,  54  Atl.  220 

Tennessee. — Dickerson  v.  Rogers,  (1903). 

[181] 


§214 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


sence  of  an  express  disclaimer  at  the  time  of  acceptance.1 
It  is  difficult  to  select  one  quotation  to  this  effect  from 
the  almost  innumerable  decisions  in  which  this  point  is 
made;  but  in  one  New  Jersey  case  it  is  put  most  suc- 
cinctly: "The  fact  that  the  legislature  has  granted  the 
right  to  take  private  property  clearly  evinced  the  legis- 
lative intent  to  lay  such  companies  under  obligations  to 
the  public  to  permit  the  use  of  their  lines  by  all  persons 
under  reasonable  regulations;  and,  in  accepting  the  bene- 
fits of  this  law,  the  recipient  of  them  assumes  the  per- 
formance of  this  duty  to  the  public."  2 


1  An    express    disclaimer,    when 
claiming  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main, of  all  intention  to  serve  the 
public,  would,  of  course,  show  that 
the  company  could  not  legally  exer- 
cise   that    right.      See    Cozard    v. 
Kanawha  Hardwood  Co.,  139  N.  C. 
283,  51  S.  E.  932,  1  L.  R.  A.  969, 
111  Am.  St.  Rep.  779  (1905),  dis- 
cussed in  §  206,  supra. 

2  Quoted  from  State  ex  rel.   v. 
American  &  E.  News  Co.,  43  N.  J. 
L.  381. 

The  following  cases  in  which  the 
language  is  to  the  same  effect,  are 
selected  almost  at  random: 

United  States. — Chicago,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ackley,  94  U.  S.  179,  24 
L.  ed.  99  (1876). 

Georgia. — Caldwell  v.  Richmond, 
etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  550,  15  S.  E. 
678  (1892). 

Indiana. — Cincinnati,  I.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of  Connersville,  170 
Ind.  316,  83  N.  E.  503  (1908); 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Consumers'  Gas  Co., 
157  Ind.  345,  61  N.  E.  674  (1901). 

Iowa. — Jones  &  Price  v.  The 
Mahaska  County  Coal  Co.,  47 
Iowa,  35  (1877). 

[1821 


Kentucky. — Owensboro  Gaslight 
Co.  v.  Hildebrand,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
983  (1897). 

Maine. — New  England  Express 
Co.  v.  Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co., 
57  Me.  188,  2  Am.  Rep.  31  (1869). 

Montana. — State  v.  Butte  Water 
Co.,  18  Mont.  199,  44  Pac.  966,  56 
Am.  St.  Rep.  574  (1896). 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  81  Neb.  174,  115  N. 
W.  757  (1908). 

Nevada. — Gibson  v.  Mason,  5 
Nev.  283  (1869). 

New  Jersey. — Rogers  Locomotive 
&  M.  Works  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  20 
N.  J.  Eq.  379  (1869). 

New  York. — Armour  Packing  Co. 
v.  Edison  Electric  Illuminating  Co., 
115  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  51,  100  N.  Y. 
Supp.  605  (1906). 

North  Carolina. — Green  v.  Tele- 
graph Co.,  136  N.  C.  489,  49  S.  E. 
165  (1904). 

Ohio. — Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Village  of  Bowling  Green, 
57  Oh.  St.  336,  49  N.  E.  121  (1897). 

Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 
&  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 
244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  215 

§  215.  Acceptance  of  municipal  franchises. 

The  household  service  which  constitutes  the  character- 
istic type  of  modern  employments  which  are  public  in 
character  cannot  be  carried  on  without  local  franchises, 
as  the  use  of  the  streets  is  almost  always  indispensable. 
Since  this  is  true  of  surface  railroads  and  other  methods 
of  urban  transportation,  of  gas  supply  and  electricity, 
of  water  and  sewerage,  the  argument  has  often  been  made 
that  the  public  character  of  these  services  is  the  result 
of  the  municipal  franchises  which  they  have  received  for 
the  use  of  the  public  streets.  But  as  has  been  seen  ear- 
lier, this  view  of  the  matter  mistakes  consequence  for 
cause;  since,  unless  these  services  were  public  in  char- 
acter, these  franchises  could  not  be  constitutionally 
granted.  And  yet  there  is  a  certain  truth  in  these  state- 
ments, for  granted  that  the  service  is  of  public  necessity, 
the  acceptance  of  such  a  franchise  is  certainly  almost 
conclusive  evidence  of  public  profession,  and  the  lan- 
guage referred  to  is  usually  consistent  with  this  explana- 
tion. As  was  well  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana  1 
in  one  of  the  many  cases  dealing  with  gas  supply:  "These 
rights  which  evoke  an  element  of  sovereignty  and  which 
can  only  exist  by  grant  from  the  public  rest  upon  the 
principle  that  their  existence  will  bestow  a  benefit  upon 
that  part  of  the  public  in  whose  behalf  the  grant  is  made 
and  the  benefit  received  by  the  citizen  is  adequate  con- 
sideration for  the  right  of  convenience  surrendered  by 
him;  the  grant  thus  resting  upon  a  public  and  reciprocal 
arrangement  imposes  upon  the  appellee  a  legal  obliga- 
tion to  serve  all  the  members  of  the  public  contributing 
to  its  asserted  right  impartially."  2 

Tennessee. — Watauga  Water  Co.         2  From  the  almost  innumerable 
v.  Wolfe,  99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W.      cases  in  which  this  point  has  been 
1060,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841  (1897).        made  the  following  rather  wide  se- 
ptate v.  Consumers'  Gas  Co.,      lection  has  been  made: 
157  Ind.  345,  61  N.  E.  674  (1901).  F lorida— City    of    Tampa    v. 

[1831 


§216] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  216.  Entering  into  municipal  contract. 

The  obligations  of  public  service  consequent  upon  the 
acceptance  of  a  municipal  franchise  are  more  plain  of 
course  where  the  service  company  in  obtaining  its  privi- 
leges is  obliged  to  enter  into  a  formal  contract  with  the 
governmental  body  unequivocally  undertaking  general 
service  for  all  who  apply  upon  the  favorable  conditions 
therein  promised.  Nevertheless,  it  is  somewhat  difficult 
to  explain  how  the  private  citizen  gains  individual  rights 
under  such  a  contract.  Various  theories  have  been  ad- 
vanced to  give  citizens  individually  the  right  to  enforce 
the  contract.  None  of  these,  as  will  be  seen,  really  explain 
the  situation.  The  truth  of  this  matter,  as  is  pointed 
out  in  a  late  case,1  is  probably,  that  the  entering  into  this 


Tampa  Water  Works  Co.,  45  Fla. 
600,  34  So.  631  (1903). 

Georgia. — F  r  e  e  m  a  n  v.  Macon 
Gaslight  &  Water  Co.,  126  Ga.  843, 
56  S.  E.  61  (1906). 

Indiana. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Con- 
sumers' Gas  Trust  Co.,  157  Ind. 
345,  61  N.  E.  674  (1901). 

Kentucky. — Owensboro  Gaslight 
Co.  v.  Hildebrand,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
983  (1897). 

Maine. — Brunswick  Gas  Light 
Co.  v.  United  Gas,  Fuel  &  Light 
Co.,  85  Me.  532,  27  Atl.  525,  35  Am. 
St.  Rep.  385  (1893). 

Michigan. — Mahan  v.  Michigan 
Telephone  Co.,  132  Mich.  242,  93 
N.  W.  629  (1903). 

Missouri. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Joplin 
Water  Works,  52  Mo.  App.  312 
(1893). 

Montana. — State  v.  Butte  Water 
Co.,  18  Mont.  199,  44  Pac.  966,  56 
Am.  St.  R.  574  (1896). 

Nebraska. — A  m  e  r  i  c  a  n  Water 
Works  v.  Nebraska,  46  Neb.  194, 

[1841 


64  N.  W.  711,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  610 
(1895). 

New  York. — Armour  Packing  Co. 
v.  Edison  Electric  Illuminating  Co., 
115  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  51,  100  N.  Y. 
Supp.  605  (1906). 

Ohio. — Cincinnati,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Village  of  Bowling  Green,  57 
Ohio  St.  336,  49  N.  E.  121  (1897). 

Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 
&  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 
244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

Tennessee. — Watauga  Water  Co. 
v.  Wolfe,  99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W. 
1060,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841  (1897). 

Washington. — State  v.  Spokane 
St.  Ry.  Co.,  19  Wash.  518,  53  Pac. 
719,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  739  (1898). 

Wisconsin. — City  of  Madison  v. 
Madison  Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  129 
Wis.  249,  108  N.  W.  65  (1906). 

1  The  quotation  which  follows  is 
from  the  opinion  of  Evans,  J.,  in 
Freeman  v.  Macon  Gaslight  & 
Water  Co.,  126  Ga.  843,  56  S.  E. 
61  (1906). 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  217 

formal  contract  with  the  governmental  authorities  is  a 
plain  commitment  to  public  service.  "The  water  com- 
pany by  entering  into  the  contract  which  the  General 
Assembly  authorized  the  city  to  make  with  that  company, 
accepted  the  privilege  of  supplying  the  citizens  of  that 
city,  as  such,  upon  certain  terms,  and  became  a  public 
service  corporation  with  an  express  statutory  duty  to 
perform.  This  duty  the  company  owed  to  every  private 
consumer  of  water,  independently  of  any  contract  duty 
it  owed  the  municipality  itself,  considered  as  a  munici- 
pal corporation  engaged  in  the  discharge  of  governmen- 
tal functions."  l 

§  217.  Aid  from  taxation. 

Especially  is  this  assumption  of  profession  to  serve  the 
public  justifiable  in  the  case  of  the  proprietor  of  any 
business  public  in  character  who  accepts  aid  from  the 
public  treasury,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  grant  or  guar- 
anty. As  public  funds  under  our  constitutional  law  can 
only  be  used  for  a  public  purpose,  it  should  always  be 
assumed  that,  in  taking  such  aid,  the  recipient  is  not  par- 
ticipating in  any  illegality.  On  the  other  hand,  that  pub- 
lic grants  may  be  made  to  private  corporations  which 

1  The  following  cases  also  consider  102  Mo.  472,  14  S.  W.  974,  15  S.  W. 

a  municipal  contract  as  conclusive  383  (1890). 

evidence  of  public  obligation:  Montana. — State  v.  Butte  Water 

United   States.— Los   Angeles   v.  Co.,  18  Mont.  199,  44  Pac.  966,  56 

Los  Angeles  City  Water  Co.,  177  Am.  St.  Rep.  574  (1896). 

U.  S.  558,  43  L.  ed.  886,  20  Sup.  Ct.  New  Jersey.— Mayor  of  Boonton 

736  (1900).  v.  Boonton  Water  Co.  (N.  J.),  61 

Alabama.— Smith  v.  Birmingham  Atl.  390  (1904). 

Water  Co.,  104  Ala.  315,  16  So.  123  Pennsylvania..— School  District  v. 

(1893).  Enterprise  Nat.  Gas  Co.,   18  Pa. 

Michigan—  Mahan  &  Michigan  Sup.  Ct.  73  (1901). 

Telephone  Co.,  132  Mich.  242,  93  Tennessee. — Watauga  Water  Co. 

N.  W.  629  (1903).  v.  Wolfe,  99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W. 

Missouri—  State  ex  rel.  City  of  1060,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841  (1897). 
St.  Louis  v.  Laclede  Gaslight  Co., 

[185] 


§218]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

have  openly  undertaken  public  service  is  well  established. 
"  That  a  railroad  is  a  work  hi  which  the  public  are  inter- 
ested to  the  extent  that  a  tax  imposed  in  aid  of  it  must  be 
upheld,  is  a  proposition  upon  which  there  is  no  diversity 
of  authority  whatever."  1  And  when  a  railway  enjoys  the 
privilege  of  having  its  property  exempt  from  the  general 
burden  of  taxation,  there  cannot  be  a  clearer  case  of  pri- 
vate property  devoted  for  a  valuable  consideration  to 
public  use;  and  consequently  subject  to  public  regulation.2 

§  218.  Governmental  participation. 

One  other  situation  at  least  justifies  the  natural  in- 
ference that  the  business  undertaken  is  upon  a  public 
basis.  Where  the  State  itself  participates  in  the  enter- 
prise whether  in  the  ownership  of  the  property  merely  or 
in  the  conduct  of  the  enterprise  it  must  again  be  true  that 
service  is  to  be  rendered  to  the  public  indiscriminately 
or  else  participation  of  the  State  will  be  unjustifiable.  As 
was  said  by  the  judges  of  the  Massachusetts  Supreme 
Judicial  Court  in  advising  the  legislature  that  munici- 
palities might  constitutionally  be  given  the  power  to  en- 
gage in  the  production  and  sale  of  gas  and  electricity: 
"In  general  it  may  be  said  that  matters  which  concern 
the  welfare  and  convenience  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  a 
city  or  town,  and  cannot  be  successfully  dealt  with  with- 

1  See  Gibson  v.  Mason,  5  Nev.  Ohio. — Cincinnati,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

283  (1869),  citing  among  others,  the  v.  Commissioners  of  Clinton  County, 

following  cases:  1  Oh.  St.  77  (1852). 

Connecticut. — City  of  Bridgeport  2  The  leading  case  is  probably 

v.  Housatonic  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Conn,  township  of  Pine  Grove  v.  Talcott, 

475  (1843).  19  Wall.  666,  22  L.  ed.  227  (1873), 

Indiana. — City  of  Aurora  v.  where  bonds  issued  to  aid  in  the 

West,  9  Ind.  74  (1857).  construction  of  a  railroad  were  held 

Kentucky. — Talbot  v.  Dent,  9  valid,  the  court  saying:  "Though 

B.  Mon.  526  (1849).  the  corporation  was  private  its 

New  York. — Buffalo  &  New  York  work  was  public,  as  much  so  as 

R.  R.  v.  Brainard,  9  N.  Y.  100  if  it  were  constructed  by  the 

(1853).  State." 

[1861 


UNDERTAKING  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  218 


out  the  aid  of  powers  derived  from  the  legislature,  may 
be  subjected  to  municipal  control  when  the  benefits  re- 
ceived are  such  that  each  inhabitant  needs  them  and  may 
participate  in  them,  and  it  is  for  the  interest  of  each  in- 
habitant that  others  as  well  as  himself  should  possess  and 
enjoy  them."  l  The  justification  for  the  devotion  of 
funds  raised  from  taxation  to  the  conduct  of  these  busi- 
nesses is  that  the  public  may  demand  service  under  lim- 
itations set  by  law.  Notwithstanding  occasional  attempts 
by  municipal  authorities  to  escape  from  their  public 
duties  it  is  recognized  in  all  the  cases  that  when  a  business 
of  this  sort  is  carried  on  by  governmental  bodies  they  are 
necessarily  subjected  to  the  whole  law  governing  public 
service  by  private  corporations.  The  entrance  of  a  pub- 
lic body  into  these  businesses  is  therefore  a  plain  an- 
nouncement that  it  is  prepared  to  serve  all  upon  proper 
conditions.2 


1  Opinion  of  the  Justices,  150 
Mass.  592,  24  N.  E.  1084,  8  L.  R.  A. 
487  (1890). 

This  represents  the  rule  now  gen- 
erally accepted  that  governmental 
bodies  may  be  constitutionally  em- 
powered to  participate  in,  or  take 
control  of,  the  ownership  or  manage- 
ment of  public  services.  See  for 
examples  of  this: 

United  States. — Thompson-Hous- 
ton Electric  Co.  v.  Newton,  42  Fed. 
723  (1890),  (electric  supply). 

Indiana. — Crawfordsville  v.  Bra- 
den,  130  Ind.  149,  28  N.  E.  849, 
14  L.  R.  A.  268,  30  Am.  St.  Rep. 
214  (1891). 

Michigan. — Mitchell  v.  Negaunee, 
113  Mich.  359,  71  N.  W.  646,  38 
L.  R.  A.  157,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  468 
(1897),  (electric  supply). 


Ohio.— State  v.  Toledo,  48  Oh. 
St.  112,  26  N.  E.  1061  (1891),  (gas 
supply). 

Pennsylvania. — Linn  v.  Cham- 
bersburg  Borough,  160  Pa.  St. 
511,  28  Atl.  842  (1894),  (electric 
supply). 

Tennessee. — Smith  v.  Nashville, 
88  Tenn.  464,  12  S.  W.  924  (1890), 
(water  supply). 

But  see:  Mauldin  v.  City  Coun- 
cil of  Greenville,  33  S.  C.  1,  11  S.  E. 
434,  8  L.  R.  A.  291  (1889). 

2  See  these  prominent  cases  sup- 
porting the  text: 

Alabama. — Mobile  v.  Bienville 
Water  Supply  Co.,  130  Ala.  379,  30 
So.  445  (1900). 

New  York. — Silkman  v.  Water 
Commissioners,  152  N.  Y.  327,  46 
N.  E.  612,  37  L.  R.  A.  827  (1897). 


[187] 


CHAPTER  VH 

IMPLIED   PROFESSION   OF   PUBLIC   EMPLOYMENT 

§  220.  Conduct  evidencing  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Public  Employments  and  Private  Enterprises 

§  221.  Potential  use  by  the  public. 

222.  Public  access  held  indispensable. 

223.  Industrial  railroads. 

224.  Lateral  branches. 

225.  Public  spur. 

226.  Private  siding. 

Topic  B.  Characteristics  of  Public  Business 
§  227.  Public  service  in  regular  course. 

228.  Public  employment — carter. 

229.  Regular  service — shipmaster. 

230.  Established  charge — expressmen. 

231.  Indiscriminate  service — irrigation. 

232.  Public  profession — warehousing. 

Topic  C.  Characteristics  of  Private  Business 

§  233.  Private  contract  as  the  basis. 

234.  Occasional  business — householders. 

235.  Casual  employment — shipowners. 

236.  Intermittent  employment — teamsters. 

237.  Limited  undertaking — ferries. 

238.  Incidental  service — merchants. 

Topic  D.  Particular  Illustrations  of  the  Distinction 

§  239.  Public  and  private  carriers  in  general. 

240.  Public  inn  and  private  house. 

241.  Public  and  private  highways  of  every  sort. 

242.  Public  and  private  waterworks. 

243.  Public  and  private  gas  and  electricity. 

244.  Public  and  private  telephone  and  telegraph. 

§  220.  Conduct  evidencing  public  employment. 

That  public  profession  in  last  analysis  is  always  a 
[188] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  221 

question  of  fact,  although  governed  by  principles  of  law, 
must  now  be  obvious.  When  there  is  an  express  declara- 
tion, or  such  undertaking  as  is  equivalent  to  it,  that 
question,  as  has  just  been  seen,  is  comparatively  simple. 
But  the  undertaking  to  serve  the  public  may  be  evidenced 
by  conduct  as  well  as  declaration;  and  this  will  often  be  a 
very  puzzling  problem  of  the  preponderance  of  evidence, 
which  may  establish  a  case  of  public  profession,  notwith- 
standing certain  facts  usually  showing  private  employ- 
ment. Probably  the  best  that  can  be  done  in  this  chap- 
ter with  a  subject  of  such  importance  is  to  collect  the 
principal  cases  distinguishing  public  profession  and  pri- 
vate undertaking,  and  point  out  what  situations  are  char- 
acteristic of  each  type.  It  should  be  said  at  the  outset, 
however,  that  it  is  always  a  question  upon  the  whole 
proof  in  the  particular  case  whether  the  proprietors  of  the 
business  have  done  enough  to  give  people  generally  the 
impression  that  they  are  at  the  disposal  of  the  public. 
Thus  an  innkeeper  who  declared  that  her  house  was  not 
a  public  one  was  refuted  by  her  own  admission  that  she 
took  in  almost  everybody  who  would  pay  her  prices.1  So 
a  carrier  did  not  escape  the  liability  of  an  insurer  by  show- 
ing that  he  often  refused  people  whom  he  did  not  think 
it  advantageous  to  serve,  as  this  would  simply  show  that 
he  had  sometimes  failed  to  fulfill  his  obligations.2 

Topic   A.  Public  Employments  and  Private  Enterprises 

§  221.  Potential  use  by  the  public. 

Public  service  is  the  fundamental  thing;  but  wherever 
there  is  the  real  possibility  of  use  as  a  matter  of  right  by 
all  within  the  sphere  of  the  service,  the  mere  fact  that 
the  service  will  in  all  probability  be  available  to  a  lim- 

1  Jaquet  v.  Edwards,  1  Jamaica,      &  Tr.    Co.,   223    Pa.   St.   148,   72 
4  (1867).  Atl.  516,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  188 

2  Lloyd  v.  Haugh  &  K.  Storage      (1909). 

[189] 


§  222  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  COBPOKATIONS 

ited  number  of  persons  should  not  be  sufficient  to  pre- 
vent it  from  being  considered  as  sufficiently  public.  As 
the  New  York  court  x  put  it,  in  holding  public  a  water- 
works serving  a  few  persons:  "Public  use  may  be  lim- 
ited to  the  inhabitants  of  a  small  or  restricted  locality, 
but  the  use  must  be  in  common  and  not  for  a  particular 
individual."  There  is,  however,  a  California  irrigation 
case  which  held  that  the  mere  possibility  of  public  use  to 
a  limited  neighborhood  is  too  illusory  to  justify  the  grant 
of  special  privileges.2  There  is  also  a  case  in  Maine 
which  held  hydro-electric  power  development  not  a  pub- 
lic service  because  after  the  water  power  was  exhausted 
no  more  of  the  public  could  be  supplied.3  And  in  a  recent 
Minnesota  case  4  although  the  distribution  of  electrical 
power  was  said  to  be  sufficiently  general  to  be  public  in 
character  it  was  held  that  the  sale  of  water  power  direct 
from  the  wheels  to  adjoining  factories  was  not.  "A  public 
use,"  said  the  court,  "does  not  require  that  the  property 
be  capable  of  being  used  by  the  entire  public,  or  any  por- 
tion thereof;  but  a  use  which  by  physical  conditions  is 
restricted  to  a  very  few  persons  who  must  use  it  within  a 
very  restricted  area,  is  not  a  public  use." 

§  222.  Public  access  held  indispensable. 

It  seems  to  be  established  that  public  access  to  the 

1  Pocantico  Water  Works  Co.  v.  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A.  472  (1905). 
Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249,  29  N.  E.  246  By  the  great  weight  of  authority 
(1891).     But  most  courts  hold  in-  hydro-electric   power   development 
discriminate  water  supply  public  in  is    a    public    service.     See    §  114, 
character.      See   citations   in    §  92,  supra. 

supra.  *  Minnesota  Canal  &  Power  Co. 

2  Aliso  Water  Co.  v.  Baker,  95  v.  Koochiching  Co.,  97  Minn.  429, 
Cal.  268,  30  Pac.  537  (1892).    Irri-  107  N.  W.  405,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
gation  on  a  public  basis  is  public  638    (1906).      Whether   the   direct 
in  character  even  if  there  be  few  sale  of  water  power  is  public  in 
takers.    See  §  93,  supra.  character  is  doubtful  as  the  author- 

3  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me.  351,  ities.    See  §  95,  supra. 

[190] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  222 

service  offered  is  indispensable.  This  is  well  illustrated 
by  a  peculiar  case  in  New  York  l  where  both  ends  of  a 
cable  tramway  were  upon  the  private  land  of  its  proprie- 
tors; and  in  view  of  that  fact  alone,  the  Court  of  Appeals 
held  that  it  was  necessarily  a  private  enterprise.  "A 
contemplated  possible  limited  use  by  a  few,  and  then  not 
as  a  right,  but  by  way  of  permission  or  favor,  is  not  a 
public  use."  Another  case  2  outside  the  beaten  track  is 
that  of  a  certain  lumber  skid-road  for  which,  it  was  held, 
eminent  domain  could  not  be  granted,  as  both  termini  of 
the  proposed  road  were  entirely  surrounded  by  the  prop- 
erty of  the  proprietors  so  that  the  public  had  no  access 
thereto.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  special  railway  is  being 
built  to  serve  particular  mines  it  will  be  public  in  char- 
acter if  the  owners  of  other  properties  through  which  it 
passes  are  to  be  free  to  use  it.  As  the  Superior  Court  of 
New  Jersey  3  well  said  of  such  a  railway:  "This  enterprise 
does  not  lose  the  character  of  a  public  use  because  of  the 
fact  that  the  projected  railroad  is  not  a  thoroughfare,  and 
that  its  use  may  be  limited  by  circumstances  to  a  com- 
paratively small  part  of  the  public.  Every  one  of  the 
public  having  occasion  to  send  materials,  implements  or 
machinery  for  mining  purposes  into,  or  to  obtain  ores 
from  the  several  mining  tracts  adjacent  to  the  location 
of  this  road  may  use  this  railroad  for  that  purpose,  and 
of  right  may  require  the  company  to  serve  him  in  that 
respect;  and  that  is  the  test  which  determines  whether 
the  use  is  public."  There  are  other  cases  of  indus- 
trial development  to  the  same  effect — mining  tunnels, 

1  Matter  of  Split  Rock  Cable  Rd.,      54  Pac.  367,  882  (1898).     But  see 
128  N.  Y.  408,  28  N.  E.  506  (1891).      Bridal  Veil  Lumbering  Co.  v.  John- 
See  also  Re  Niagara  Falls  &  W.      son,  30  Oreg.  205,  46  Pac.  790,  34 

Ry.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375,  15  N.  E.  L.  R.  A.  368,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  818 

429  (1888).  (1896). 

2  Apex    Transportation    Co.    v.  3  De  Camp  v.  Hibernia  R.  R.  Co., 
Garbade,  32  Oreg.  582,  52  Pac.  573,  47  N.  J.  L.  43  (1885). 

[191] 


§223 


for  example  l — which  have  been  held  to  be  public  in 
character. 

§  223.  Industrial  railroads. 

Of  course  railroad  operation  is,  generally  speaking, 
common  carriage  as  appears  in  countless  cases.  But 
private  railways  are  not  unknown;  and  it  is  often  dim- 
cult  to  determine  whether  a  certain  railway  is  public  or 
private.  The  difficult  case  is  that  of  a  railway  constructed 
largely  in  the  interest  of  the  owners  of  a  particular  in- 
dustrial enterprise  to  give  them  necessary  service.  Even 
such  a  railway  may  be  a  public  one,  as  a  Minnesota  case 
holds.  "If  all  the  people  have  the  right  to  use  the  road 
it  is  a  public  use  or  interest  although  the  number  who  have 
business  requiring  its  use  may  be  small."  2  On  the  other 


1  In  accord  with  the  text  are  the 
following  cases  among  others: 

United  States. — Baillie  v.  Larson, 
138  Fed.  177  (1905). 

Colorado. — Tanner  v.  Tr.  Tun- 
nel, Mining  &  Reduction  Co.,  35 
Colo.  593,  83  Pac.  464,  4  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  464  (1906). 

2  Quoted  from  Kettle  River  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  41  Minn. 
461,  43  N.  W.  469,  6  L.  R.  L.  Ill 
(1889). 

Other  important  cases  to  the  same 
effect  are: 

Georgia. — Butler  v.  Tifton  Ry. 
Co.,  121  Ga.  817,  49  S.  E.  763 
(1904). 

Iowa. — Phillips  v.  Watson,  63  la. 
28,  18  N.  W.  659  (1884). 

Kentucky. — Louisville,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Pittsburg  &  K.  Coal  Co.,  Ill 
Ky.  960,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1318,  64 
S.  W.  969,  55  L.  R.  A.  601,  98  Am. 
St.  Rep.  447  (1901). 

Maine. — Ulmer  v.  Lime  Rock  R. 

[1921 


R.  Co.,  98  Me.  579,  57  Atl.  100,  66 
L.  R.  A.  387  (1904). 

Maryland. — New  Central  Coal 
Co.  v.  George's  Creek  C.  &  I.  Co., 
37  Md.  537  (1872). 

Missouri. — Dietrich  v.  Murdock, 
42  Mo.  279  (1868). 

Montana. — Butte,  A.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Montana  Union  Ry.  Co.,  16 
Mont.  504,  41  Pac.  232,  31  L.  R.  A. 
298,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  508  (1895). 

Oregon. — Bridal  Veil  Lumbering 
Co.  v.  Johnson,  30  Oreg.  205,  46 
Pac.  790,  34  L.  R.  A.  368,  60  Am. 
St.  Rep.  818  (1896). 

Wisconsin. — Maginnis  v.  Knick- 
erbocker Ice  Co.,  112  Wis.  385, 
88  N.  W.  300,  69  L.  R.  A.  833 
(1901). 

A  private  lumber  railway  by  run- 
ning a  motor  car  for  passenger  serv- 
ice does  not  become  a  common  car- 
rier of  freight.  Edgar  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Comic  Stave  Co.  (Ark.),  130  S. 
W.  452  (1910). 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  223 

hand,  a  railroad  constructed  and  used  merely  in  connec- 
tion with  the  conduct  of  a  private  business  is  not  a  com- 
mon carrier.  So,  where  a  railroad  is  built  to  haul  logs 
from  the  forests  to  the  sawmill  of  the  owner,  it  is  not  a 
common  carrier.  It  cannot  be  seriously  contended,  said 
the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  that  an  article  of  the  State 
Constitution  which  dealt  with  corporations  of  public 
improvement  and  utility,1  "was  intended  to,  or  could  be 
so  construed  as  to  make  out,  of  a  logging  railroad  ap- 
purtenant to  a  sawmill,  constructed  wholly  on  private 
grounds,  and  operated  for  a  private  purpose,  a  common 
carrier  charged  with  all  the  duties  and  responsibilities  in- 
cumbent by  the  laws  of  the  land  upon  common  carriers, 
and  simply  because  it  is  a  railroad  and  the  owners  are 
incorporated  as  a  business  corporation.  It  seems  to  us, 
we  might  as  well  hold  that  a  railroad  on  a  sugar  planta- 
tion appurtenant  to  the  sugar  mill  and  used  for  carrying 
cane  thereto,  should  be  declared  a  common  carrier." 

1  Quoted  from  Wade  v.  Lutcher  &  burg  Mfg.  Co.,  132  N.  C.  167,  43 

Moore  Lumber  Co.,  74  Fed.  517,  20  S.  E.  632  (1903);  Cozard  v.  Kana- 

C.  C.  A.  515,  33  L.  R.  A.  255  (1896).  wha  Hardwood  Co.,  139  N.  C.  283, 

Other    important    cases    to    the  51  S.  E.  932,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  969, 

same  effect  are:  111  Am.  St.  Rep.  779  (1905). 

United   States. — Weidenfeld      v.  It  is  perhaps  not  quite  accurate 

Sugar  Run  Ry.,  48  Fed.  615  (1892);  to  divide  the  cases  as  they  are  be- 

Albion  Lumber  Co.  v.  De  Nobra,  72  tween  the  two  notes  above.    Some 

Fed.  739,  19  C.  C.  A.  168  (1896).  few  of   them   hold   that   although 

California. — Contra,  Costa  R.  R.  never  committed  to  full  service  as 

Co.  v.  Moss,  23  Cal.  323  (1863).  passenger  carriers,  such  industrial 

Georgia. — White  v.  Kennon  &  railways  may  become  by  long  con- 
Co.,  83  Ga.  343,  9  S.  E.  1082  (1889);  tinued  action,  if  acquiesced  in  by 
Normandale  Lumber  Co.  v.  Knight,  their  proprietors,  liable  for  not  using 
89  Ga.  Ill,  14  S.  E.  882  (1892).  what  care  it  was  fair  for  a  passenger 

Illinois. — Litchfield    &    M.    Ry.  to  expect  under  the  circumstances. 

Co.  v.  The  People,  222  111.  242,  78  Minnesota.— Campbell  v.  Duluth 

N.  E.  589  (1906).  &   Northeastern    R.   R.   Co.,    107 

Louisiana.— Williams    et    al.    v.  Minn.  358,  120  N.  W.  375  (1909). 

Judge,  45  La.  Ann.  1295,  14  So.  57  Oregon. — Harvey  v.  Deep  River 

(1893).  Logging  Co.,  49  Oreg.  583,  90  Pac. 

North  Carolina—Leigh  v.  Garys-  501,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  131  (1907). 

13  [  193  ] 


§224 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  224.  Lateral  branches. 

When  a  public  railroad  builds  a  branch  line  from  its 
road,  primarily  to  accommodate  some  individual  busi- 
ness, it  is  nevertheless  a  common  carrier  over  the  branch, 
and  the  use  of  the  track  is  open  to  all  who  have  occasion 
to  use  it  as  well  as  to  the  particular  individual  for  whose 
benefit  it  was  built.1  The  general  question  is  perhaps 
more  often  raised  by  a  petition  to  take  land  for  this  pur- 
pose by  eminent  domain.  This  is  universally  decided  to 
be  permissible,  for  the  operation  of  such  a  branch  is  a 
public  use.  As  the  court  said  in  one  of  these  cases,  Chi- 
cago &  Northwestern  Railway  v.  Morehouse,2  "The  tak- 


1  United  States. — Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  v.  Delaware,  L. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  U.  S.  531,  30 
Sup.  Ct.  415  (1910). 

Alabama. — Agee  &  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.,  142  Ala.  344,  37 
So.  680  (1904). 

Georgia— Butler  v.  Tifton,  T.  & 
G.  R.  R.,  121  Ga.  817,  49  S.  E.  763 
(1904). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Suffern,  129  111.  274,  21  N.  E.  824 
(1889). 

Kentucky. — Louisville,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Pittsburg  &  K.  Coal  Co.,  Ill 
Ky.  960,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1318,  64 
S.  W.  969,  55  L.  R.  A.  601  (1901); 
Bedford-Bowling  Green  Co.  v. 
Oman,  115  Ky.  369,  73  S.  W.  1039 
(1903). 

Louisiana. — Kansas  City  S.  &  G. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Louisiana,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
116  La.  178,  40  So.  627,  5  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  512  (1905). 

Minnesota. — State  ex  rel.  R.  & 
W.  Com.  v.  Willmar  &  S.  F.  R.  Ry. 
Co.,  88  Minn.  448,  93  N.  W.  112 
(1903). 

Nebraska. — Roby  v.  State  ex  rel. 

[194] 


Farmers'  G.  &  L.  S.  Co.,  76  Neb. 
450,  107  N.  W.  766  (1906). 

New  York. — Kellogg  v.  Sowerby, 
87  N.  Y.  Supp.  412,  93  App.  Div. 
124  (1904). 

South  Carolina. — A  v  i  n  g  e  r  v. 
South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  265, 
7  S.  E.  493,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  716 
(1888). 

Texas. — Railroad  Comm'rs  v.  St. 
Louis  &  S.  W.  Ry.  (Tex.),  80  S.  W. 
102  (1904) .  Compare  Kyle  v.  Texas 
&  N.  O.  R.  R.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  4 
L.  R.  A.  275  (1889). 

2 112  Wis.  1,  87  N.  W.  849,  56 
L.  R.  A.  240,  88  Am.  St.  Rep.  918 
(1901). 

To  the  same  effect  are: 

Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  v.  Petty,  57  Ark.  359,  21  S.  W. 
884,  20  L.  R.  A.  434  (1893). 

Maine. — Ulmer  v.  Lime  Rock 
R.  R.,  98  Me.  579,  57  Atl.  1001 
(1904). 

M ichigan  —  Toledo  S.  &  M.  R.  R. 
v.  East  S.  &  S.  C.  R.  R.,  72  Mich. 
206,  40  N.  W.  436  (1888). 

Montana. — Butte  A.  &  P.  Ry.  v. 
Montana  U.  Ry.,  16  Mont.  504,  41 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  225 

ing  of  land  for  a  spur  track  to  connect  with  a  single  in- 
dustry is  a  taking  for  public  use,  if  the  purpose  of  the 
company  is  to  maintain  and  operate  such  track  as  an  in- 
tegral part  of  its  railway  system,  so  as  to  serve  all  who 
may  desire  it,  and  all  can  demand,  as  a  right,  to  be  served 
without  discrimination." 

§  225.  Public  spur. 

The  distinction  between  a  public  spur  and  a  private 
siding  necessarily  involves  similar  considerations.  If  the 
track  runs  for  any  considerable  distance  so  that  by  possi- 
bility the  road  may  be  of  use  to  several  persons,  its  con- 
struction is  a  public  purpose,  even  though  the  immediate 
use  of  the  spur  is  to  be  made  by  one  concern  which  is  the 
moving  party  in  its  construction.  As  the  court  said 
in  one  leading  case  in  Illinois: *  "We  have  not  regarded 
the  circumstances  that  they  were  laid  with  private  funds, 
and  that  they  terminated  opposite  or  within  convenient 
contiguity  of  a  private  manufacturing  establishment,  as 
materially  affecting  them  and  giving  a  private  character 
to  their  use.  All  termini  of  tracks  and  switches  are  more 
or  less  beneficial  to  private  parties,  but  the  public  char- 
acter of  the  use  of  the  tracks  is  never  affected  by  this. 
If  they  are  open  to  public  control  to  the  extent  that  rail- 
road tracks  generally  are,  they  are  tracks  for  public 
use."  It  may  be  in  such  cases  that  it  is  expected  or  even 
that  it  is  intended  that  such  tracks  will  be  used  al- 
most entirely  by  the  manufacturing  establishment,  yet 
if  there  is  no  exclusion  of  the  equal  rights  of  use  by 
others,  and  this  singleness  of  use  is  simply  the  result  of 

Pac.  232,  31  L.  R.  A.  298,  50  Am.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  30  Oreg.  205,  46 

St.  Rep.  508  (1895).  Pac.  790,  34  L.  R.  A.  368,  60  Am. 

New  Jersey.— De  Camp  v.   Hi-  St.  Rep.  818  (1896). 

hernia    R.    R.,    47    N.    J.    L.    43  Chicago    Dock,    etc.,    Co.    v. 

(1885).  Garrity,  115  111.  155,  3  N.  E.  448 

Oregon. — Bridal  Veil  Lumbering  (1885). 

[195] 


§226] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


location  and  convenience  of  access,  it  cannot  affect  the 
question. 1 

§  226.  Private  siding. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  private  siding  leading  merely 
from  private  property  to  the  line  of  a  public  railroad  over 
which  the  public  can  have  no  rights  is  not  a  public  util- 
ity. This  is  plainly  true  where  the  premises  of  the  in- 
dividual benefited  either  directly  adjoin  the  railroad  or 
are  separated  only  by  a  few  feet,  so  that  the  intervening 
land  can  be  accommodated  from  the  main  track.  Thus 
in  another  Illinois  case  2  where  it  appeared  that  a  coal 
company  desired  to  condemn  by  right  of  eminent  domain 
a  strip  of  private  land  in  order  to  connect  its  private 
tramway  with  a  railroad  the  court  held  that  this  could 


1  In  the  following  cases  a  railroad 
spur  was  held  to  be  public  in  char- 
acter although  constructed  prima- 
rily for  the  benefit  of  particular  con- 
cerns: 

Alabama. — Agee  &  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.,  142  Ala.  344,  37 
So.  680  (1904). 

Georgia. — Jones  &  Co.  v.  Ven- 
able,  120  Ga.  1,  47  S.  E.  549  (1904). 

Iowa. — Morrison  v.  Thistle  Coal 
Co.,  119  Iowa,  705,  94  N.  W.  507 
(1903). 

Kentucky. — Straight  Creek  Coal 
Mining  Co.  v.  Straight  Creek  Coal  & 
C.  Co.  (Ky.),  122  S.  W.  842  (1909). 

Louisiana. — Kansas  City,  S.  &  G. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Louisiana  W.  Ry.  Co., 
116  La.  178,  40  So.  627,  5  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  512  (1905). 

Maine. — Ulmer  v.  Lime  Rock 
Ry.,  98  Me.  579, 57  Atl.  1001  (1904). 

Maryland. — Dulaney  v.  United 
Ry.  &  Electric  Co.,  104  Md.  423,  65 
Atl.  45  (1906). 

Michigan.— Toledo, S.  &  M.  R.  R. 

[196] 


v.  East  Saginaw,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  72 
Mich.  206,  40  N.  W.  436  (1888). 

Minnesota. — Chicago,  B.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter,  43  Minn.  527, 

46  N.  W.  75  (1890). 

Missouri. — Brown  v.  Chicago  G. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  137  Mo.  529,  38  S.  W. 
1099  (1897). 

Montana. — Butte,  A.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Montana  Union  Ry.  Co.,  16 
Mont.  504,  41  Pac.  232,  50  Am.  St. 
Rep.  508,  31  L.  R.  A.  298  (1895). 

New  York. — Clarke  v.  Blackmar, 

47  N.  Y.  150  (1871). 
Pennsylvania. — Hays   v.    Risher, 

32  Pa.  St.  169(1858). 

South  Carolina. — Avinger  v.  South 
Carolina  Ry.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  265,  7 
S.  E.  493,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  716 
(1888). 

Virginia. — Zircle  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,  102  Va.  17,  45  S.  E.  802,  102 
Am.  St.  Rep.  805  (1903). 

2  Sholl  v.  German  Coal  Co.,  118 
III.  427,  10  N.  E.  199,  59  Am.  Rep. 
379  (1887). 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  227 

not  be  done.  "  It  is  clear  that  the  use  for  which  the  lands 
proposed  to  be  taken  in  this  case  is  not  a  public  one. 
The  coal,  the  coal  works  and  the  present  tramway  are  in 
the  strictest  sense  private  property,  and  the  public  gen- 
erally have  no  more  interest  in  them  or  in  the  operation 
of  the  works  including  the  tramway  than  they  have  in 
any  other  strictly  private  business.  The  same  would  be 
equally  true  after  the  proposed  extension  of  the  tramway. 
The  extending  of  it  to  the  railroad  would  not  change  its 
character  or  the  obligations  of  the  company  or  the  pub- 
lic in  the  slightest  degree.  Without  the  consent  of  the 
owners  of  it,  there  is  not  a  person  in  the  State,  outside  of 
themselves,  who  would  have  the  right  to  ride  upon  it  on 
any  terms  that  might  be  proposed,  or  to  have  carried 
upon  it  a  single  pound  of  freight."  * 

Topic  B.  Characteristics  of  Public  Business 

§  227.  Public  service  in  regular  course. 

The  fundamental  characteristic  of  a  public  calh'ng  is 

1  In  the  following  cases  the  con-  28  S.  W.  627  (1894);  Sherlock  v.  K. 

struction  of  such  sidings  were  held  C.  Belt  Ry.  Co.,  142  Mo.  172,  43 

to  be  a  private  purpose:  S.  W.  629  (1897). 

United  States. — Chattanooga  Ter-          Pennsylvania. — Rochester  &  P.  C. 

minal  Ry.  v.  Felton,  69  Fed.  273  &  I.  Co.  v.  Berwind- White  C.  M. 

(1895).  Co.,   24   Pa.   Co.   Ct.    104   (1900); 

Arkansas. — Edgar  Lumber  Co.  v.  Robbins    v.    Western    Washington 

Cornie  Stave  Co.  (Ark.),  130  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Pitts.  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  181 

452  (1910).  (1900). 

Illinois. — Koelle   v.    Knecht,    99          Utah. — Cereghino  v.  Oregon  S.  L. 

111.  396  (1881).  Ry.  Co.,  26  Utah,  467,  73  Pac.  634, 

Maine.— Green   v.   Portland,   32  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  843  (1903). 
Me.  431  (1851).  Washington. — Schwede  v.   Hem- 

Minnesota. — Gustafson  v.  Hamm,  rich  Bros.  Brewing  Co.,  29  Wash. 

56  Minn.  334,  57  N.  W.  1054,  22  L.  21,  69  Pac.  362  (1902). 
R.  A.  565  (1894).  West  Virginia. — Pittsburgh  W.  & 

Missouri. — Glaessner  v.  Anheuser  K.   R.   R.   Co.   v.    Benwood   Iron 

Busch  Brewing  Assn.,  100  Mo.  508,  Works,  31  W.  Va.  710,  8  S.  E.  453,  2 

13  S.  W.  707  (1890);  Knapp,  Stout  L.  R.  A.  680  (1888). 
&  Co.  v.  Transfer  Co.,  126  Mo.  26, 

[197] 


§  228  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

indiscriminate  dealing  with  the  general  public.  As  Baron 
Alderson  said  in  the  leading  case:  "Everybody  who  un- 
dertakes to  carry  for  anyone  who  asks  him  is  a  common 
carrier.  The  criterion  is  whether  he  carries  for  particular 
persons  only,  or  whether  he  carries  for  everyone.  If  a 
man  holds  himself  out  to  do  it  for  everyone  who  asks 
him,  he  is  a  common  carrier;  but  if  he  does  not  do  it  for 
everyone,  but  carries  for  you  and  me  only,  that  is  a  mat- 
ter of  special  contract."  l  This  regular  course  of  public 
service  without  respect  of  persons  makes  out  a  plain  case 
of  public  profession  by  reason  of  the  inevitable  inference 
which  the  general  public  will  put  upon  it.  "One  trans- 
porting goods  from  place  to  place  for  hire,  for  such  as 
see  fit  to  employ  him,  whether  usually  or  occasionally, 
whether  as  a  principal  or  an  incidental  occupation,  is  a 
common  carrier."  2 

§  228.  Public  employment — carter. 

It  sometimes  happens,  especially  in  a  new  country, 
that  a  farmer  or  other  person  who  is  driving  a  wagon  to 
town  on  his  own  business  may  agree  to  carry  goods  for  his 
neighbors  for  hire.  Where  he  consents  to  carry  for  all  per- 
sons indifferently,  the  prevailing  view  is  that  he  becomes 
a  common  carrier,  at  least  as  to  the  particular  trip  in  con- 
nection with  which  he  makes  the  offer,  though  he  might 
not  be  compelled  to  undertake  the  duty  on  any  other 
occasion.  In  the  earliest  case  3  the  plaintiff  claimed  ex- 

1  Quoted  from  Ingate  v.  Christie,  Kentucky. — Robertson    v.    Ken- 
3  Car.  &  K.  61  (1850).    See  defini-  nedy,  2  Dana,  430,  26  Am.  Dec.  466 
tions  in  cases  cited  under  §  160,  supra.  ( 1834) . 

2  Quoted    from    Hahl    v.    Laux  Mississippi. — Harrison    v.    Roy, 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  93  S.  W.   1080  39  Miss.  396  (1860). 

(1906).  See  definitions  in  cases  Pennsylvania. — Gordon  v.  Hutch- 
cited  in  §  238,  infra.  inson,  1  W.  &  S.  285,  37  Am.  Dec. 

3  Gisborn  v.  Hurst,  1  Salk.  249     464  (1841). 

(1710).  Tennessee. — Moss    v.    Bettis,    4 

See  also:  Heisk.  661,  13  Am.  Rep.  1  (1871). 

[198] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  229 

emption  from  distress  upon  his  goods  upon  the  ground 
that  they  were  in  the  possession  of  a  common  carrier. 
The  plaintiff  had  delivered  them  in  London  to  one  Rich- 
ardson to  carry,  who  was  not  a  regular  carrier,  but  for 
some  small  time  last  past,  brought  cheese  to  London  and 
in  his  return  took  such  goods  as  he  could  carry  back  in 
his  wagon  into  the  country  for  a  reasonable  price  and  the 
goods  were  distrained  in  his  possession  by  his  landlord. 
The  court  held  the  goods  exempt,  for  the  reason  that 
"any  man  undertaking  for  hire  to  carry  the  goods  of  all 
persons  indifferently,  as  in  this  case,  is,  as  to  this  privi- 
lege, a  common  carrier."  But  in  at  least  one  case  l  it  has 
been  held  that  in  such  a  case  the  farmer  is  not  a  common 
carrier,  nor,  the  court  added,  would  it  "make  any  differ- 
ence how  many  applications  of  this  kind  had  been  made 
by  the  party  thus  carrying,  or  to  how  many  different 
persons  they  may  have  been  made,  they  would  still  re- 
main so  many  special  and  individual  transactions."  The 
view  usually  taken,  however,  is  that  the  farmer  under 
such  circumstances  is  a  common  carrier  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  occupation  is  merely  incidental,  provided  the 
carriage  is  really  a  business  with  him. 

§  229.  Regular  service — shipmaster. 

It  has  already  been  seen  that  the  transportation  by 
water  of  passengers  or  goods,  or  both,  is  public  in  char- 
acter. Ships,  steamboats,  river  craft  and  canal  boats, 
even  lighters  and  barges, — it  makes  no  difference  what 
sort  of  vessel  may  be  used  in  conducting  the  transpor- 

Texas—  Hahl  v.  Laux  (Tex.  Civ.  New  York.— Fish  v.  Clark,  49  N. 

App.),  93  S.  W.  1080  (1906).  Y.  122  (1872). 

^amms   v.    Stewart,    20   Ohio,  Texas. — Haynie    v.    Baylor,    18 

*69,  55  Am.  Dec.  445  (1851).  Tex.  498  (question  for  jury),  (1857). 

See  also:  England. — Brind  v.  Dale,  8  C.  & 

Delaware.— Pennewill  v.  Cullen,  P.  207  (1837). 
5  Harr.  238  (1849). 

[199] 


§  229  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tation,  it  will  be  a  case  of  common  carriage  if  there  is 
sufficient  evidence  of  the  general  undertaking  to  serve 
the  public  indifferently.1  The  clearest  proof  of  this  pub- 
lic profession  is  regular  service.  A  vessel  plying  regu- 
larly between  two  ports  is  almost  certainly  engaged  in 
general  service;  and  the  proprietors  conducting  the  busi- 
ness are  almost  always  held  liable  as  common  carriers. 
This  was  said  most  positively  in  the  latest  case  2  in- 
volving steamship  service,  "It  was  admitted  in  the  an- 
swer of  the  defendant  that  it  was  a  common  carrier  by 
sea,  operating  a  certain  number  of  vessels  between  the 
port  of  Savannah,  Georgia,  and  the  ports  of  Boston, 
Massachusetts,  and  New  York  city,  and  accustomed  to 
carry  the  particular  commodity  offered  it  by  the  plain- 
tiff, and  against  which  it  is  alleged  to  have  discriminated. 
From  the  earliest  tunes  it  has  been  considered  that  a 
common  carrier  exercises  a  public  employment,  with  pub- 
lic duties  to  perform.  He  cannot,  like  a  merchant  receive 
or  reject  a  customer  at  pleasure.  He  is  bound  to  serve 
the  public  indifferently  and  this  duty  with  respect  to  the 
commonness  of  service  was  regarded  as  the  distinguish- 
ing trait  of  a  common  carrier." 

1  See  particularly:  South  Carolina. — Swindler  v.  Hil- 

United  States.— Liverpool  &   G.  liard,  2  Rich.  L.  286,  45  Am.  Dec. 

W.  Steam  Co.  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  732  (1846). 

129  U.  S.  397,  32  L.  ed.  788  (1889) ;  Tennessee.  —  Porterfield    v. 

The  Huntress,  2  Ware,  89  (1840).  Humphreys,  8  Humph.  497  (1847). 

Connecticut. — Crosby    v.    Fitch,  Vermont. — Spencer  v.  Daggett,  2 

12  Conn.   410,   31   Am.    Dec.   745  Vt.  92  (1829). 

(1838).  England.— Richardson  v.  Sewell, 

Florida—  Bennett   v.   Filyaw,    1  2  Smith,  205  (1805). 

Fla.  403  (1847).  2  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Savannah  L. 

Georgia.— Brown  v.  Clayton,  12  W.  &  S.  Co.,  131  Ga.  831,  63  S.  E. 

Ga.  564  (1853).  577,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  867  (1909). 

New  Jersey. — Mersbon  v.  Hoben-  See  also  Bassett  &  S.  v.  Aberdeen 

sack,  22  N.  J.  L.  372  (1850).  Coal  &  M.  Co.,  120  Ky.  728,  88 

New  York.— Elliott  v.  Rossell,  10  S.  W.  318,  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1122 

Johns.  1,  6  Am.  Dec.  306  (1813).  (1905). 

[200] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  230 


§  230.  Established  charge — expressmen. 

The  establishment  by  a  carrier  of  a  regular  tariff  charge 
for  the  carriage  of  a  certain  article  is  also  evidence  that 
the  carrier  is  a  common  carrier  of  that  article.  So  where 
an  express  company  received  a  dog  to  be  shipped  to  a 
certain  place  for  three  dollars,  which  was  found  to  be  the 
regular  charge,  the  court  remarked  that  the  fact  that 
the  company  had  established  regular  charges  for  such 
freight,  tends  to  show  that  they  were  in  the  transporta- 
tion business.1  The  case  of  the  city  truckmen  is  made 
difficult  by  the  usual  absence  of  this  circumstance.  Some 
cases  hold  that  they  are  not  common  carriers,  the  chief 
reason  being  that  such  truckmen  do  not  carry  goods  with- 
out special  agreement  as  to  terms  of  carriage.2  Other  au- 
thorities, however,3  hold  that  the  truckman  who  holds 
himself  out  as  a  public  truckman  is  a  common  carrier, 
recognizing  that  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  fix  in  advance 
a  tariff  of  charges  for  all  services  that  may  be  asked  of 


1  Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Ash- 
ford,  126    Ala.    591,    28    So.    732 
(1899). 

This  point  is  emphasized  also  in 
Santa  Fe  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grant 
Bros.  C.  Co.  (Ariz.),  108  Pac.  467 
(1910). 

2  Missouri. — Jaminet  v.  American 
S.  &  M.  Co.,  109  Mo.  App.  257,  84 
S.  W.  128  (1904). 

New  Hampshire. — Faucher  v.  Wil- 
son, 68  N.  H.  338,  38  Atl.  1002,  39 
L.  R.  A.  431  (1895). 

South  Carolina. — Piedmont  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
S.  C.  353  (1882). 

England. — Scarfe  v.  Farrant,  L. 
R.  10  Exch.  358  (1875). 

3  Kentucky. — Cayo  v.    Pool,   108 
Ky.    124,   21    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1600, 
55   S.   W.  '887,    49  L.    R.    A.   251 


(1900);  Farley  v.  Lavary,  107  Ky. 
523,  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1252,  54  S.  W. 
840,  47  L.  R.  A.  383  (1900). 

Missouri. — Collier  v.  Langan  T. 
S.  &  M.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  127  S.  W. 
435  (1910). 

New  York. — Jackson  Architec- 
tural Works  v.  Hurlbut,  158  N.  Y. 
34,  52  N.  E.  665,  70  Am.  St.  Rep. 
432  (1899). 

Pennsylvania. — Lloyd  v.  Haugh 
&  K.  Transfer  Co.,  223  Pa.  St.  148, 
72  Atl.  516,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  188 
(1909). 

Utah. — Benson  v.  Oregon  S.  L. 
Ry.  Co.  (Utah),  99  Pac.  1072 
(1909). 

Washington. — Gates  v.  Bekins,  44 
Wash.  422,  87  Pac.  505  (1906). 

Canada. — Culver  v.  Lester,  37 
Can.  L.  J.  421  (1901). 

[201] 


§§231,232]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

him  and  that  he  must  therefore  make  a  separate  agree- 
ment as  to  his  charges  in  each  case. 

§  231.  Indiscriminate  service — irrigation. 

The  test,  as  will  have  been  seen,  is  whether  service  is 
rendered  upon  special  contract  to  certain  persons  selected 
by  the  owners  or  whether  all  applicants  are  served  with- 
out discrimination.  The  irrigation  cases  1  which  at  first 
seem  bothersome  turn  upon  this  point.  In  a  recent  case  2 
this  distinction  was  made  plain.  "Its  status  is  that  of 
either  a  private  or  public  agency,  depending  upon  whether 
its  diversion  is  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  owners  or 
possessors  of  arable  and  irrigable  land  with  whom  it  has 
fixed  contractual  relations,  binding  it  to  perform  such 
service,  or  whether  its  purpose  or  practice  be  to  supply 
owners  or  possessors  of  such  land  who  are  not  its  water 
right  holders,  or  with  whom  it  has  not  bound  itself  by 
contract  to  permanently  render  such  service.  If  it  con- 
fines its  service  as  the  private  agent  of  certain  appropria- 
tors,  it  cannot  be  compelled  to  render  service  to  others. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  it  undertakes  to  and  does  divert 
and  carry  water  for  the  use  of  consumers  with  whom  it  is 
not  bound  by  such  contracts,  and  hence  becomes  a  pub- 
lic agency,  it  cannot,  under  the  law,  discriminate  by 
giving  preference  otherwise  than  with  due  regard  to 
priority  of  appropriation." 

§  232.  Public  profession — warehousing. 

In  the  same  way,  the  proprietors  of  some  warehouses 
will  be  found  to  be  carrying  on  a  public  business  while 
the  owners  of  other  warehouses  will  be  seen  to  be  engaged 

1  Such  as  Wheeler  v.   Northern         2  Slosser  v.  Salt  River  Valley  Co., 

Colorado  Irr.  Co.,  10  Colo.  582,  17  7  Ariz.  376,   65  Pac.  332  (1901). 

Pac.  487,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  603  (1887).  See  §  242  as  to  public  profession  in 

See   §  93,   supra,   as   to   irrigation  irrigation  service, 
service  in  general. 

[202] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  232 

in  no  public  business  whatever;  which  of  these  cases  we 
have  is  again  a  question  of  fact,  whether  upon  the  whole 
proof  it  is  shown  that  there  has  been  a  profession  to  serve 
the  public  in  general  or  whether  the  owner  has  been  using 
his  warehouse  simply  in  his  private  business.  It  is,  con- 
sequently, constitutional  •  for  the  State  to  regulate  the 
charges  of  public  warehousemen  as  was  held  in  the  leading 
case  of  Munn  v.  Illinois.1  But  it  is  obviously  unconstitu- 
tional for  the  State  to  attempt  to  regulate  the  services  of 
a  person  who  simply  owns  a  warehouse  that  he  uses  for 
himself,  as  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  said  in  the 
later  case  of  Brass  ex  rel.  v.  Stoesser.2  Wharfs  stand  upon 
the  same  basis  as  warehouses.  Such  wharfage  facilities 
are  only  public  in  character  when  proprietors  have  un- 
dertaken to  accommodate  shipping  in  general.3  Such 
wharfingers  can  only  charge  reasonable  rates  as  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  pointed  out  in  the  early  case 
of  Transportation  Company  v.  Parkersburg.  The  more 
common  case  probably  is  that  of  private  wharves  where 
the  owners  transact  their  own  business  and  where  they 

1 94  U.  S.  113,  24  L.  ed.  77  (1876).          3  United   States.— Transportation 

See  also:  Co.  v.  Parkersburg,  107  U.  S.  691, 

United    States.— Budd    v.    New  27  L.  ed.  584,  2  S.  Ct.  732  (1882). 
York,  143  U.  S.  517,  36  L.  ed.  247,          District  of  Columbia.— District  v. 

12  S.  Ct.  468  (1891).  Johnson,  1  Mackey,  51  (1881). 

Illinois. — Hannah  v.  The  People,          Florida. — Indian    River    Steam- 

198  111.  77,  64  N.  E.  776  (1902).  boat  Co.  v.  East  Coast  Transporta- 

2 153  U.  S.  391,  38  L.  ed.  757,  14  tion  Co.,  28  Fla.  387,  10  So.  480,  29 

Sup.  Ct.  857  (1894).  Am.  St.  Rep.  258  (1891). 

See  also:  Georgia.— Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  R. 

Minnesota— State  v.  W.  W.  Car-  Co.  v.  Graham,  117  Ga.  555,  43  S. 

gill  Co.,  77  Minn.  223,  79  N.  W.  E.  1000  (1903). 
962  (1899),  affirmed  in  180  U.  S.          Louisiana— Aiken  &  Co.  v.  Eager 

452,  45  L.  ed.  619,  21  Sup.  Ct.  423  &  Co.,  35  La.  Ann.  567  (1883). 
( 1900).  Washington. — Barrington  v.  Com- 

Pennsylvania. — G  i  r  a  r  d  Storage  mercial  Dock  Co.,  15  Wash.  170,  45 

Co.  v.  Southwark  Co.,  105  Pa.  St.  Pac.  748,  33  L.  R.  A.  116  (1896). 
248  (1884). 

[203] 


§  233  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

occasionally  by  special  contract  permit  the  vessels  of 
others  to  moor.1  Such  wharves  are  private  in  character, 
as  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  held  in  the  recent 
case  of  Weems  Steamboat  Company  v.  People's  Steam- 
boat Company. 

Topic  C.  Characteristics  of  Private  Business 

§  233.  Private  contract  as  the  basis. 

To  make  the  contrast,  the  chief  characteristic  of  pri- 
vate dealing  is  .the  usual  necessity  for  special  agreement 
with  the  proprietor,  there  being  no  regular  course  in  such 
special  services.  "The  person  who  occasionally  enter- 
tains others  for  a  reasonable  compensation  is  no  more 
subject  to  the  extraordinary  responsibility  of  an  inn- 
keeper than  he  is  liable  as  a  common  carrier  who  in  cer- 
tain special  cases  carries  the  property  of  others  from  one 
place  to  another  for  hire."  2  Especially  where  the  busi- 
ness is  incidental,  the  employment  being  intermittent, 
it  will  usually  be  obvious  that  the  business  is  being  con- 
ducted upon  a  private  basis;  or,  as  the  test  is  put  in  one 
of  the  early  leading  English  cases:  "The  test  is  not 
whether  he  is  carrying  on  a  public  employment,  or  whether 
he  carries  to  a  fixed  place;  but  whether  he  holds  out,  either 
expressly  or  by  a  course  of  conduct,  that  he  will  carry 

1  United  States.— Louisville  &  N.  v.  Visger,  86  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  126, 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  West  Coast  Naval  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  325  (1903). 

Stores  Co.,  198  U.  S.  483,  49  L.  ed.  Pennsylvania.— Audenreid   v.    P. 

1135,  25  S.  Ct.  745  (1905);  Weems  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  Pa.  St.  370,  8 

Steamboat  Co.  v.  People's  Steam-  Am.  Rep.  195  (1871). 

boat  Co.,  214  U.  S.  345,  53  L.  ed.  Tennessee.— Memphis        Freight 

1024,    29    Sup.    Ct.    661    (1909);  Co.  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Memphis,  4 

Leverich  v.   City  of  Mobile,    110  Cold.  419  (1867). 

Fed.  170  (1867).  2  Quoted  from   Lyon   v.   Smith, 

New  York.— Woodruff  v.  Have-  Morris    (Iowa),    184    (1843).     See 

meyer,  106  N.  Y.  129,  12  N.  E.  628  §  106,  supra,  §  239,  infra. 
(1887);  Thousand  Island  S.  S.  Co. 

[204] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  234,  235 

for  hire,  so  long  as  he  has  room,  the  goods  of  all  persons 
indifferently  who  send  him  goods  to  be  carried."  1 

§  234.  Occasional  business — householders. 

One  of  the  principal  characteristics  of  a  public  service 
is  that  it  is  almost  always  well  established  as  a  permanent 
business  and  not  regarded  as  an  incidental  employment. 
Thus  it  ought  not  to  be  difficult  to  distinguish  between 
innkeepers  2  who  openly  carry  on  that  business  and  house- 
holders 3  who  occasionally  entertain  guests.  "To  ren- 
der a  person  liable,  as  a  common  innkeeper,  it  is  not  suf- 
ficient to  show  that  he  occasionally  entertains  travelers. 
Most  of  the  farmers  in  a  new  country  do  this,  without 
supposing  themselves  answerable  for  the  horses  or  other 
property  of  their  guests  which  may  be  stolen,  or  other- 
wise lost,  without  any  fault  of  their  own.  Nor  is  such  the 
rule  in  older  countries,  where  it  would  operate  with  far 
less  injustice,  and  be  less  opposed  to  good  policy  than  with 
us.  To  be  subjected  to  the  same  responsibilities  attach- 
ing to  innkeepers,  a  person  must  make  tavern  keeping, 
to  some  extent,  a  regular  business,  a  means  of  livelihood. 
He  should  hold  himself  out  to  the  world  as  an  innkeeper."  4 

§  235.  Casual  employment — shipowners. 

The  principle  that  casual  employment  is  not  common 

1  Quoted  from  Nugent  v.  Smith,  1  Tennessee. — Dickerson  v.  Rogers, 
C.   P.   D.    19   (1875).     See   §  160,  4  Humph.   179,  40  Am.  Dec.  642 
supra,  §  238,  infra.  (1843). 

2  California. — Pinkerton  v.  Wood-  3  Kentucky. — Southwood  v.  My- 
ward,  33  Cal.  557,  91  Am.  Dec.  657  ers,  3  Bush,  681  (1868). 

(1867).  New  York. — People  v.  Jones,  54 

Connecticut.— Walling  v.  Potter,  Barb.  311  (1863). 

35  Conn.  183  (1868).  Texas.— Howth  v.   Franklin,  20 

Iowa.— Lyon  v.   Smith,   Morris,  Tex.  798,  73  Am.  Dec.  218  (1858). 

184  (1843).  Vermont.— Clary    v.    Willey,    49 

Kentucky.— K  i  s  t  e  n    v.   Hilde-  Vt.  55  (1876). 

brand,  9  B.  Mon.  72,  48  Am.  Dec.  *  Lyon  v.  Smith,  supra. 

416  (1848). 

[205] 


§  236  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

carriage  is  well  illustrated  by  the  case  of  the  charter  of 
vessels.  If  the  vessel  is  casually  employed  it  is  not  a 
common  carrier.  The  leading  case  on  this  point  is  Allen  v. 
Sackrider  l  where  Mr.  Justice  Parker  said  in  part:  "The 
only  question  in  the  case  is,  were  the  defendants  common 
carriers?  The  facts  found  by  the  referee  do  not,  I  think, 
make  the  defendants  common  carriers.  They  owned  a 
sloop;  but  it  does  not  appear  that  it  was  ever  offered  to 
the  public  or  to  individuals  for  use,  or  ever  put  to  any  use, 
except  in  the  two  trips  which  it  made  for  the  plaintiffs, 
at  their  special  request.  Nor  does  it  appear  that  the 
defendants  were  engaged  in  the  business  of  carrying  goods, 
or  that  they  held  themselves  out  to  the  world  as  carriers, 
or  had  ever  offered  their  services  as  such.  This  casual 
use  of  their  sloop  in  transporting  plaintiffs'  property  falls 
short  of  proof  sufficient  to  show  them  common  car- 
riers." And  generally  where  a  vessel  is  chartered  by 
the  owner,  the  charter  being  necessarily  an  isolated 
transaction,  the  owner  does  not  thereby  become  a  common 
carrier.2 

§  236.  Intermittent  employment — teamsters. 

Where  the  employment  is  intermittent  and  not  a  regular 
matter  of  business,  the  carrier  is  not  a  common  carrier. 
It  is  a  rule  which  will  generally  hold  good,  that  one  em- 
ployed for  hire  pro  hoc  vice  only,  who  on  the  evidence  does 
not  make  the  carriage  of  goods  his  constant  occupation, 
is  not  liable  as  a  common  carrier.  There  are  a  few  cases 
which  seem  to  hold  that  even  in  such  casual  employment 

1  37  N.  Y.  341  (1867).  United  States.— Lamb   v.    Park- 
See  also:                                              man,  1  Sprague,  343  (1857);  Sum- 
Delaware—  Pennewill  v.  Cullen,      ner  v.  Caswell,  20  Fed.  249  (1884); 

5  Harr.  (Del.)  238  (1849).  The  Dan,  40  Fed.  691  (1889). 

New  York. — Aymar  v.  Astor,  6         Kentucky. — Bassett   &   Stone   v. 

Cow.  266  (1826).  Aberdeen  Coal  &  Mining  Co.,  120 

2  Cases  of  this  sort  are:  Ky,  728,  88  S.  W.  318  (1905). 

[206] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  236 


the  carrier  may  be  held  liable  as  an  insurer.1  But  upon 
examination  these  will  be  found  to  be  cases  of  a  tem- 
porary undertaking  upon  a  public  basis.2  A  wagoner  is 
not  often  a  common  carrier  when  he  carries  goods  of  an- 
other along  with  his  own.3  And  the  owner  of  a  cart  who 
makes  contracts  for  special  jobs  is  plainly  carrying  on  a 
private  business.4  Furniture  movers  are  generally  held 
to  be  private  carriers  because  of  the  intermittent  nature 
of  their  employment.5  But  there  are  cases  of  teaming 
which  seem  to  be  upon  such  a  regular  basis  as  to  be  com- 
mon carriage.6 


1  Pennsylvania.  —  Gordon    v. 
Hutchinson,  1  W.  &  S.  285,  37  Am. 
Dec.  464  (1841). 

Tennessee. — Moss  v.  Bettis,  4 
Heisk.  661,  13  Am.  Rep.  1  (1871). 

2  Mississippi. — Harrison  v.  Roy, 
39  Miss.  396  (1860). 

Texas. — Chevallier  v.  Straham,  2 
Tex.  115  (1847). 

3  Louisiana. — Flautt  v.  Lashley, 
36  La.  Ann.  106  (1884). 

Vermont. — Beckwith  v.  Frisbie, 
32  Vt.  559  (1860). 

4  Canada. — Roussel    v.    Aumais, 
Rap.  Jud.  Quebec,   18  C.  S.  474 
(1900). 

Ceylon. — Gibson  v.  Silva,  Rama- 
Nathan,  105  (1848). 

5  Illinois. — Annfield  v.   Humph- 
rey, 12  111.  App.  90  (1882). 

Missouri. — Jamiet  v.  American 
Storage  Co.,  109  Mo.  App.  257,  84 
S.  W.  128  (1904). 

New  Hampshire. — Faucher  v.  Wil- 
son, 68  N.  H.  338,  38  Atl.  1002,  39 
L.  R.  A.  431  (1895). 

South  Carolina. — Piedmont  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
S.  C.  353  (1882). 

6  New  York.— Snelling  v,  Yetter, 


25  App.  Div.  590,  49  N.  Y.  Supp. 
917  (1898). 

Pennsylvania. — Lloyd  v.  Haugh 
&  K.  Transfer  Co.,  223  Pa.  St.  148, 
72  Atl.  516,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  188 
(1909). 

Utah. — Benson  v.  Oregon  S.  L. 
Ry.  Co.  (Utah),  99  Pac.  1072 
(1909). 

Washington. — Gates  v.  Bekins,  44 
Wash.  422,  87  Pac.  505  (1906). 

Notwithstanding  the  language  of 
the  earlier  cases  in  Missouri  it  is 
now  held  that  a  company  which 
holds  itself  out  as  ready  to  move 
furniture  for  all  comers  is  a  com- 
mon carrier  pro  hoc  vice.  Collier  v. 
Langan,  T.  S.  &  M.  Co.  (Mo.  App.), 
127  S.  W.  435  (1910). 

Reference  might  here  be  made  to 
the  Massachusetts  cases  under  the 
statute  providing  that  liquors  can- 
not be  delivered  in  a  no-license 
town  except  by  regular  expressmen. 
Under  this  statute  a  carter  who 
professed  a  willingness  to  carry  ex- 
press matter  in  general  but  who,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  is  carrying  only 
liquors,  is  held  not  to  be  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute  as  it  is  held 

[2071 


§  237  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  237.  Limited  undertakings— ferries. 

The  salient  characteristics  of  a  private  business  is  that 
there  is  no  solicitation  of  the  custom  of  the  general  public. 
The  many  cases  dealing  with  private  ferries  well  illustrate 
this.  Where  a  private  ferry  is  established  to  convey  per- 
sons to  and  from  the  premises  of  a  private  individual,  who 
may  refuse  to  receive  any  person  upon  his  premises,  the 
ferry  is  not  operated  as  a  public  employment.  A  ferry  es- 
tablished to  convey  persons  to  a  picnic  ground  l  is  private. 
So  is  a  boat  operated  when  employes  engaged  in  other  work 
are  at  leisure.2  A  wherry  regularly  conveying  the  laborers 
of  its  owner  to  their  work  is  a  private  ferry.3  So  is  a 
skiff  which  is  offered  as  a  free  conveyance  to  persons  who 
will  come  to  the  store  of  its  owner  for  trade.4  A  miller 
who  maintains  a  ferry  to  convey  customers  to  his  mill,5 
is  not  a  common  carrier,  even  where  other  persons  are 
sometimes  transported  as  a  matter  of  accommodation  who 
give  a  gratuity  to  the  servant  managing  the  boat.6  And 
where  several  parties  joined  to  maintain  a  boat  for  the 
purpose  of  conveying  their  cattle  across  a  river  to  a 
slaughter  house  the  conveyance  was  not  common  car- 
riage.7 In  all  of  these  cases  the  service  maintained  was 


to  call  for  "fixedness  and  perma-  3  Tadhunter  v.  Buckley,  7  L.  T. 

nenoe"  in  the  character  of  the  busi-  (N.  S.)  273  (1862). 

ness  and  probably  also  for  stated  4  Shinn  v.  Cotton,  52  Ark.  90,  12 

times  and  established  routes.     See  S.  W.  157  (1889).    But  see  Hatten 

Commonwealth    v.    People's    Exp.  v.  Turman,  123  Ky.  844,  97  S.  W. 

Co.,  201  Mass.  564,  88  N.  E.  420  770  (1906). 

(1909).  5  Self  v.  Dunn,  42  Ga.  528,  5  Am. 

People  v.  Mago,  69  Hun,  559,  Rep.  544  (1871). 

23  N.  Y.  Supp.  938  (1893).     And  6  Littlejohn  y.  Jones,  2  McMull. 

see  Meisner  v.  Detroit,  B.  &  I.  W.  L.  (S.  C.)  366,  39  Am.  Dec.  132 

Ferry  Co.,  154  Mich.  545, 118  N.  W.  (1842). 

14  (1908),  accord.  7  Flautt  v.  Lashley,  36  La.  Ann. 

2Roussel  v.  Aumais,  Rap.  Jud.  106(1884). 

Quebec,  18  C.  S.  474  (1900).  And  see  Blanchard  v.  Abraham, 

115  La.  989,  40  So.  379  (1906). 

[208] 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  238,  239 

held  private  because  of  the  limitations  put  upon  its  con- 
duct by  its  proprietors. 

§  238.  Incidental  service — merchants. 

One  who  is  engaged  carrying  on  transportation  primarily 
for  his  own  purposes  is  not  engaged  in  common  carriage. 
Thus  one  who  is  delivering  property  which  is  the  sub- 
ject of  a  contract  between  himself  and  its  owner,  is 
at  most  a  private  carrier  in  view  of  his  relations  with 
his  contracting  party.  So  one  who  contracts  to  cut  tim- 
ber, and  transport  it  to  the  place  where  it  is  to  be  de- 
livered and  used,  was  held  not  to  incur  the  responsibility 
of  a  common  carrier. 1  And,  similarly,  a  manufacturer  who 
purchased  a  machine  and  contracted  with  the  seller  to 
cart  it  was  held  not  to  be  a  common  carrier.2  In  another 
case  of  this  sort 3  a  warehouseman  delivering  goods  from 
storage  was  held  not  to  be  liable  as  a  common  carrier. 
Similarly  an  omnibus  employed  by  the  proprietor  of  a 
hotel  in  taking  guests  free  to  and  from  a  railroad  station 
is  not  a  public  conveyance.4 

Topic  D.  Particular  Illustrations  of  the  Distinction 

§  239.  Public  and  private  carriers  in  general. 

Naturally  enough  there  are  more  cases  upon  the  dis- 
tinction between  public  and  private  carriers  than  upon 
any  other  calling.  Many  illustrations  of  this  distinction 
have  already  been  given  in  this  and  a  preceding  chap- 
ter. It  will  be  sufficient,  therefore,  to  give  but  a  brief 

1  New    York. — Pike   v.    Nash,    3         3  Armfield  v.  Humphrey,  12  111. 
Abb.  App.  Dec.  610  (1864).  App.  90  (1882). 

Canada. — Benedict  v.  Arthur,  6  But  see   Snelling  v.   Yetter,   25 

Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  204  (1849).  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  590,  49  N.  Y.  Supp. 

2  Michigan. — Allis    v.    Voigt,    90  917  (1898),  apparently,  contra. 
Mich.  125,  51  N.  W.  190  (1892).  4  City  of  Oswego  v.  Collins,  38 

England.— Chattock  v.  Bellamy,      Hun,  171  (1885). 
64  L.  J.  Q.  B.  250  (1895). 

14  [  209  ] 


§239] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


summary.  If  the  carrier  is  commonly  serving  all  who 
intrust  him  with  goods  to  be  taken  over  his  route,  he  is 
in  public  employment.1  It  is  the  willingness  to  serve  all 
that  makes  the  employment  a  public  one.  And  therefore 
the  carrier  who  holds  himself  out  as  ready  to  carry  for 
all  on  a  particular  journey  or  voyage  is  at  that  moment 
a  common  carrier,  though  this  is  his  first  journey  and  he 
has  never  yet  carried;  and  this  may  be  equally  the  case 
though  he  does  not  intend  to  continue  the  profession  and 
makes  the  offer  for  a  single  journey  only.  If  on  the  other 
hand  the  carrier  does  not  deal  with  the  public  indiscrimi- 
nately as  a  matter  of  routine  but  in  effect  makes  an  indi- 
vidual bargain  in  each  case,  this  course  of  business  shows 
that  the  service  is  upon  a  private  basis.2 


1  The  following  are  regarded  as 
particularly  good  cases  on  public 
carriage : 

United  States. — Propeller  Niagara 
v.  Cordes,  21  How.  7,  16  L.  ed.  41 
(1858). 

Alabama. — Babcock  v.  Herbert, 
3  Ala.  392,  37  Am.  Dec.  695  (1842). 

Arizona. — Santa  Fe  P.  &  P.  Co. 
v.  Grant  Bros.  C.  Co.  (Ariz.),  108 
Pac.  467  (1910). 

California. — Pfister  v.  Central 
Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Cal.  169,  11 
Pac.  686,  59  Am.  Rep.  404  (1886). 

Connecticut.- — Crosby  v.  Fitch,  12 
Conn.  410,  31  Am.  Dec.  745  (1838). 

Florida. — Bennett  v.  Filyaw,  1 
Fla.  403  (1847). 

Georgia. — Fish  v.  Chapman,  2 
Ga.  349,  46  Am.  Dec.  393  (1847). 

Kentucky. — Robertson  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 2  Dana,  430,  26  Am.  Dec.  466 
(1834). 

Mississippi. — Harrison  v.  Roy, 
39  Miss.  396  (1860). 

Missouri. — Collier  v.  Langan  T. 

[210] 


S.  &  M.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  127  S.  W. 
435  (1910). 

New  Hampshire. — Elkins  v.  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  H. 
275  (1851). 

New  York. — Jackson  A.  Iron 
Works  v.  Hurlbut,  158  N.  Y.  34, 
52  N.  E.  665,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  432 
(1899). 

Texas. — Chevallier  v.  Straham, 
2  Tex.  115,  47  Am.  Dec.  639 
(1849). 

West  Virginia. — Gillingham  v. 
Ohio  River  R.  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va. 
588,  14  S.  E.  243,  14  L.  R.  A.  798, 
29  Am.  St.  Rep.  827  (1891). 

Wisconsin. — Doty  v.  Strong,  1 
Pin.  313,  40  Am.  Dec.  773  (1843). 

2  The  following  are  regarded  as 
good  cases  on  private  carriage: 

United  States. — Lamb  v.  Park- 
man,  1  Sprague,  343,  40  Fed.  691 
(1857);  The  Wildenfels,  161  Fed. 
864  (1908). 

Arkansas. — Shinn  v.  Cotton,  52 
Ark.  90,  12  S.  W.  157  (1889). 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  240 

§  240.  Public  inn  and  private  house. 

The  distinction  between  the  public  innkeeper  and  the 
ordinary  householder  turns  upon  the  presence  of  public 
profession  or  its  absence.  The  question  whether  a  house 
where  a  guest  is  entertained  is  a  public  inn  or  a  private 
house  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  like  any  other 
fact  upon  all  the  evidence.  An  innkeeper,  as  has  been 
seen,  undertakes  the  entertainment  of  guests  as  a  regular 
business,  taking  usually  all  who  apply;  and  he  is  held 
answerable  to  the  extent  of  his  profession.1  On  the  other 
hand  it  often  happens,  particularly  in  new  countries 
where  inns  are  not  yet  numerous,  that  householders  occa- 
sionally, or  even  frequently,  accommodate  travelers,  unless 
it  is  inconvenient  to  do  so.  This  is  not  conducting  a  regular 
business  upon  a  public  basis,  and  such  practice  is  wholly 
consistent  with  private  action.2 


Georgia. — Self  v.  Dunn,  42  Ga. 
528,  5  Am.  Rep.  544  (1871). 

Michigan. — Allis  v.  Voigt,  90 
Mich.  125,  51  N.  W.  190  (1892). 

New  Hampshire. — Faucher  v. 
Wilson,  68  N.  H.  338,  38  Atl.  1002, 
39  L.  R.  A.  431  (1895). 

New  York. — Allen  v.  Sackrider, 
37  N.  Y.  341  (1867). 

Ohio.— Weaver  v.  Wible,  20  Ohio, 
270  (1855). 

Vermont. — Spencer  v.  Daggett,  2 
Vt.  92  (1829). 

1  California. — Pinkerton  v.  Wood- 
ward, 33  Cal.  557,  91  Am.  Dec.  657 
(1867). 

Connecticut. — Walling  v.  Potter, 
35  Conn.  183  (1868). 

Illinois. — Bullock  v.  Adair,  63 
111.  App.  30  (1895). 

Iowa. — Lyon  v.  Smith,  Morris, 
184  (1843). 

Kentucky. — Kisten  v.  Hildebrand, 


9  B.  Mon.  72,  48  Am.  Dec.  416 
(1848). 

Minnesota. — Johnson  v.  Chad- 
bourn  Furnace  Co.,  89  Minn.  310, 
94  N.  W.  874,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  571 
(1903). 

New  York. — W intermute  v. 
Clarke,  5  Sandf.  242  (1851). 

North  Carolina. — State  v.  Mat- 
thews, 2  Dev.  &  B.  424  (1837). 

England. — Thompson  v.  Lacy,  3 
B.  &  Aid.  283  (1820). 

2  United  States. — Beall  v.  Beck, 
Fed.  Cas.  1,161  (1829). 

Georgia. — Bonner  v.  Welborn,  7 
Ga.  296  (1849). 

Kentucky. — Southward  v.  Myers, 
3  Bush,  681  (1868). 

North  Carolina. — H  o  1  s  t  e  i  n  v 
Phillips,  146  N.  C.  366,  59  S.  E 
1037,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  475  (1907). 

Pennsylvania.  —  Commonwealth 
v.  Cuncannon,  3  Brewst.  344  (1869). 

[2111 


§241] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  241.  Public  and  private  highways  of  every  sort. 

Even  as  to  highways  when  constructed  by  private  cap- 
ital there  are  the  two  possibilities.  Ferries  1  and  bridges  2 
will  be  public  or  private  according  to  whether  the  pro- 


Texas.—  Howth  v.  Franklin,  20 
Tex.  798,  73  Am.  Dec.  218  (1858). 

Vermont. — Clary  v.  Willey,  49 
Vt.  55  (1876). 

1  As  to  public  ferries,  see: 

Alabama. — Frierson  v.  Frazier, 
142  Ala.  232,  37  So.  825  (1904). 

Arkansas. — Harvey  v.  Rose,  26 
Ark.  3,  7  Am.  Rep.  595  (1870). 

Illinois. — Claypool  v.  McAllister, 
20  111.  504  (1858). 

Iowa. — Whitmore  v.  Bowman,  4 
Green,  148  (1853). 

Kentucky. — Hall  v.  Renfro,  3 
Met.  51  (1860). 

Mississippi. — Powell  v.  Mills,  37 
Miss.  691  (1859). 

New  York. — Wyckoff  v.  Queen's 
County  Ferry  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  32,  11 
Am.  Rep.  650  (1873). 

North  Carolina. — Spivy  v.  Farm- 
er, 2  Hawy.  339  (1805). 

Ohio. — Wilson  v.  Hamilton,  4  Oh. 
St.  722  (1855). 

Tennessee. — Sanders  v.  Young,  1 
Head,  219,  73  Am.  Dec.  175  (1858). 

As  to  private  ferries,  see: 

Arkansas. — Shinn  v.  Cotton,  52 
Ark.  90,  12  S.  W.  157  (1889). 

Georgia. — Self  v.  Dunn,  42  Ga. 
528,  5  Am.  Rep.  544  (1871). 

Louisiana. — Flautt  v.  Lashley,  36 
La.  Ann.  106  (1884). 

Michigan. — Meisner  v.  B.  I.  &  W. 
Ferry  Co.,  154  Mich.  545, 118  N.  W. 
14  (1908). 

New  York. — People  v.  Mago,  69 
Hun,  559,23  N.  Y.  Supp.  938  (1893). 

South     Carolina. — Littlejohn     v. 

[2121 


Jones,  2  McMull.  366,  39  Am.  Dec. 
132  (1842). 

England. — Tadhunter  v.  Buck- 
ley, 7  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  273  (1862). 

Canada. — R  o  u  s  s  e  1  v.  Aumais, 
Rap.  Jud.  Quebec,  •  18  C.  S.  474 
(1900). 

2  As  to  public  bridges,  see: 

United  States. — Covington,  etc., 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Sandford,  164  U.  S. 
578,  41  L.  ed.  560,  17  S.  Ct.  198 
(1896). 

California. — People  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Cal.  606 
(1868). 

Georgia. — McLeod  v.  Savannah, 
Albany  &  Gulf  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Ga. 
445  (1858). 

Kentucky. — Arnold  v.  Cov.  & 
Cin.  Bridge  Co.,  1  Duval,  372 
(1864). 

Maine. — Bussey  v.  Gilmore,  3 
Me.  191  (1824). 

Massachusetts. — Central  Bridge 
Corporation  v.  Sleeper,  8  Cush.  324 
(1851). 

New  York. — Thompson  v.  Mat- 
thews, 2  Ed.  Ch.  212  (1834). 

Ohio. — Young  v.  Buckingham,  5 
Ohio,  485  (1832). 

Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg  &  W. 
E.  Passenger  Ry.  v.  Point  Bridge 
Co.,  165  Pa,  St.  37,  30  Atl.  511,  26 
L.  R.  A.  323  (1894). 

As  to  private  bridges  the  same 
principles  prevail : 

See  Manning  v.  City  of  Devils 
Lake,  13  N.  D.  47,  99  N.  W.  51,  65 
L.  R.  A.  187  (1904). 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  242 


prietors  have  manifested  their  intention  to  serve  the  pub- 
lic or  not.  Such  of  these  as  have  accepted  some  special 
public  franchise  in  aid  of  their  construction  cannot  be 
heard  to  say  that  they  have  not  undertaken  public  serv- 
ice. And  those  which  are  claiming  such  rights  must  be 
certain  that  they  have  never  acted  so  as  to  make  mani- 
fest any  disclaimer  of  public  employment.  All  this  is  true 
of  canals  1  and  turnpikes.2 

§  242.  Public  and  private  water  supply  and  irrigation. 

Waterworks  and  irrigation  systems  will  be  public  or 
private  according  to  whether  there  is  public  profession 
or  private  dealing  in  the  particular  case.  The  supply  of 
water  to  a  city  for  domestic  purposes  will  almost  always 
be  found  to  have  been  undertaken  upon  a  public  basis  3 


1  As  to  public  canals,  see: 
Georgia. — Savannah  Canal  Co.  v. 

Shuman,  91  Ga.  400,  17  S.  E.  937 
(1893). 

Illinois. — People  v.  Improvement 
Co.,  103  111.  491  (1882). 

New  York. — Pennsylvania  Coal 
Co.  v.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  31  Nv 
Y.  91  (1865). 

Pennsylvania.  —  Commonwealth 
v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  43  Pa. 
St.  295  (1862). 

As  to  private  canals,  see: 

Louisiana. — Harvey  v.  Potter,  19 
La.  Ann.  264, 92  Am.  Dec.  532(1867). 

Michigan. — Potter  v.  Railway 
Co.,  95  Mich.  389,  54  N.  W.  956 
(1893). 

2  As  to  public  roads,  see: 
United  States. — Covington  &  L. 

Turnpike  Co.  v.  Sandford,  164  U.  S. 
578,  41  L.  ed.  560,  17  S.  Ct.  198 
(1896). 

Kentucky. — W inchester,  etc., 
Turnpike  Road  Co.  v.  Croxton,  98 
Ky.  739,  34  S.  W.  518  (1896). 


Michigan. — Attorney  General  v. 
Detroit  &  Erie  Plank  Road  Co.,  2 
Mich.  138  (1851). 

OMo.—Chagrin  Falls  &  Cleve- 
land Plank  Road  Co.  v.  Cane,  2 
Ohio  St.  419  (1853). 

As  to  private  roads,  see: 

Alabama. — Sadler  v.  Langham, 
34  Ala.  311  (1859). 

West  Virginia. — Varner  v.  Mar- 
tin, 21  W.  Va.  534  (1883). 

3  In  the  following  cases  dealing 
with  water  supply  a  special  point  is 
made  of  the  public  profession  of  the 
company: 

United  States. — Long  Island 
Water  Supply  Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  166 
U.  S.  685,  41  L.  ed.  1165,  17  S.  Ct. 
718  (1897). 

Alabama. — City  of  Mobile  v. 
Bienville  Water  Co.,  130  Ala.  379, 
30  So.  445  (1900). 

California. — McCrary  v.  Beau- 
dry,  67  Cal.  120,  7  Pac.  264 
(1885). 

Georgia. — Freeman  v.  Macon  Gas 

[2131 


§242 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


but  there  are  cases  where  it  has  been  pointed  out  that 
the  works  must  be  conducted  for  the  use  of  the  inhabit- 
ants in  common  and  not  for  a  particular  individual.1 
There  are  special  complications  with  regard  to  irrigation; 
but  without  going  into  the  technical  law  applying  to  the 
question  of  water  rights  in  those  States  where  irrigation 
systems  are  usual,  it  may  be  pointed  out  here  that  these 
systems  are  of  two  sorts — the  one  public,  where  the  irri- 
gation company  is  engaged  in  selling  water  to  others  than 
its  water  right  holders; 2  the  other  private,  where  no  more 
is  undertaken  than  the  supply  of  water  to  those  who  have 
associated  to  construct  the  system.3 


&  Water  Co.,  126  Ga.  843,  56 
S.  E.  61,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  917 
(1906). 

Kansas. — Asher  v.  Water,  Light, 
&  Power  Co.,  66  Kan.  496,  71  Pac. 
813,  61  L.  R.  A.  52  (1903). 

Maine. — Rockland  Water  Co.  v. 
Adams,  84  Me.  472,  24  Atl.  840,  30 
Am.  St.  Rep.  368  (1892). 

Massachusetts. — L  u  m  b  a  r  d  v. 
Stearns,  4  Gush.  60  (1849). 

Montana. — State  v.  Butte  Water 
Co.,  18  Mont.  199,  44  Pac.  966,  56 
Am.  St.  Rep.  574  (1896). 

New  Jersey. — Olmstead  v.  Pro- 
prietors of  the  Morris  Aqueduct,  47 
N.  J.  L.  311  (1885). 

North  Carolina. — Griffin  v.  Water 
Co.,  122  N.  C.  206,  30  S.  E.  319,  41 
L.  R.  A.  240  (1898). 

Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 
&  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 
244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

Tennessee. — Watauga  Water  Co. 
v.  Wolfe,  99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W. 
1060,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841  (1897). 

1  See  as  to  the  possibility  of 
private  water  supply: 

[214] 


California.  —  McFadden  v. 
County  of  Los  Angeles,  74  Gal.  571, 
16  Pac.  397  (1888). 

New  York. — Pocantico  Water  Co. 
v.  Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249,  29  N.  E.  246 
(1891). 

2  In  the  following  cases,  dealing 
with  irrigation,  the  necessary  con- 
sequences of  public  profession  are 
discussed: 

United  States. — Fallbrook  Irriga- 
tion District  v.  Bradley,  164  U.  S. 
112, 41  L.  ed.  369, 17  S.  Ct.  56  (1896). 

Arizona. — Slosser  v.  Salt  River 
Canal  Co.,  7  Ariz.  376,  65  Pac.  332 
(1901). 

California. — Price  v.  Riverside  L. 
&  Irrigating  Co.,  56  Gal.  431  (1880). 

Colorado. — Wheeler  v.  Northern 
Colorado  Irrigation  Co.,  10  Col. 
582,  17  Pac.  487,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  603 
(1887). 

Nebraska. — Paxton  &  H.  Irrigat- 
ing C.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Farmers'  &  M. 
Irrigation  Co.,  45  Neb.  884,  64  N. 
W.  343,  29  L.  R.  A.  853,  50  Am.  St. 
Rep.  585  (1895). 

s  See  as  to  private  irrigation: 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  243 

§  243.  Public  and  private  gas  and  electricity. 

That  the  business  of  supplying  gas  is  public  in  char- 
acter is  now  universally  recognized,  provided  that  the 
company  supplying  is  committed  to  supplying  gas  to  the 
community  in  general.1  But  the  case  can  be  imagined  of 
an  institution  with  a  generating  plant  for  its  own  supply, 
which  might  even  supply  one  neighbor  without  being 
obliged  to  sell  to  all  others.2  In  the  same  way  the  busi- 
ness of  supplying  electrical  energy  has  generally  been 
recognized  as  public  in  character.3  There  are,  however, 


United  States.— Bradley  v.  Fall- 
brook  Irrigation  Co.,  68  Fed.  948 
(1895). 

Arizona. — Gould  v.  Maricopa 
Canal  Co.,  8  Ariz.  429,  76  Pac.  598 
(1904). 

California. — Aliso  Water  Co.  v. 
Baker,  95  Cal.  268,  30  Pac.  537 
(1892). 

Colorado. — Rocky  Ford  Canal, 
etc.,  Co.  v.  Simpson,  5  Colo.  App. 
30,  36  Pac.  638  (1894). 

Montana. — Ellinghouse  v.  Tay- 
lor, 19  Mont.  462,  48  Pac.  757 
(1897). 

Washington. — Prescott  Irrigation 
Co.  v.  Flathers,  20  Wash.  454,  55 
Pac.  635  (1899). 

1  The  following  cases  among 
others  discuss  incidentally  the  pub- 
lic undertaking  of  gas  companies: 

United  Stales. — Gibbs  v.  Con- 
solidated Gas  Co.,  130  U.  S.  396,  32 
L.  ed.  979,  9  S.  Ct.  553  (1888). 

Indiana. — Portland  Gas  &  Oil 
Co.  v.  State,  135  Ind.  54,  34  N.  E. 
818,  21  L.  R.  A.  639  (1893). 

Massachusetts. — Opinion  of  Jus- 
tices, 150  Mass.  592,  24  N.  E.  1084, 
8  L.  R.  A.  487  (1890). 

New  Jersey. — Public  Service  Cor- 


poration v.  American  Lighting  Co., 
67  N.  J.  Eq.  122,  57  Atl.  482  (1904). 
West  Virginia. — Charleston  Gas 
Co.  v.  Lowe,  52  W.  Va.  662,  44  S.  E. 
410  (1901). 

2  As  to  the  possibility  of  private 
gas  supply,  see  Redkey,  etc.,  Natu- 
ral Gas  v.  Orr  (Ind.),  60  N.  E.  716 
(1901). 

3  In    the    following    cases    as    to 
electric  supply  a  point  is  made  of 
public  profession: 

United  States. — Walker  v.  Shasta 
Power  Co.,  160  Fed.  856,  87  C.  C.  A. 
660  (1908). 

Georgia. — Jones  v.  North  Georgia 
Electric  Co.,  125  Ga.  618,  54  S.  E. 
85,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  122  (1906). 

Illinois. — Snell  v.  Clinton  Elec- 
tric Light  Co.,  196  111.  626,  63  N.  E. 
1082,  58  L.  R.  A.  284,  89  Am.  St. 
Rep.  341  (1902). 

New  Hampshire.  —  Rockingham 
Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  72 
N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.  R.  A. 
581  (1904). 

New  York. — Armour  Packing  Co. 
v.  Edison  Electric  Co.,  100  N,  Y. 
Supp.  605,  115  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  51 
(1906). 

Ohio.— Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  R. 

[215] 


§244] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


several  cases  where  the  company  supplying  electricity 
has  not  professed  to  sell  to  the  public  indiscriminately 
at  regular  rates,  but  has  from  the  beginning  adopted  the 
policy  of  entering  into  special  contracts  upon  its  own 
terms;  such  companies  are  plainly  engaged  in  private 
business.1 


§  244.  Public  and  private  telephone  and  telegraph. 

The  public  status  of  a  telephone  system  which  is  at 
the  disposal  of  the  whole  community  has  already  been 
elaborately  discussed; 2  but  a  telephone  system  of  a  pri- 
vate character  is  not  unknown,  as  a  line  run  between 
various  farms  in  the  country  might  often  be  so  conducted 
as  to  show  no  intention  to  receive  other  persons  into  the 
association.3  So  too  although  the  public  character  of  the 


Co.  v.  Bowling  Green,  57  Oh.  St. 
336,  49  N.  E.  121,  41  L.  R.  A.  422 
(1897). 

Oregon.  —  Grande  Ronde  Elec- 
trical Co.  v.  Drake,  46  Oreg.  243, 
78  Pac.  1031  (1905). 

1  The  following  are  cases  of  elec- 
tric supply  upon  a  private  basis: 

Vermont. — A  very  v.  Vermont 
Electric  Co.,  75  Vt.  235,  54  Atl.  179, 
59  L.  R.  A.  817,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  818 
(1902). 

Virginia. — Fallsburg  Co.  v.  Alex- 
ander, 101  Va.  98,  43  S.  E.  194,  61 
L.  R.  A.  129,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  855 
(1903). 

2  In  most  of  the  leading  telephone 
cases  the  essential  quality  of  public 
profession  is  emphasized;  see: 

United  States. — Cumberland  Tel. 
&  Tel.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  160  Fed.  316, 
87  C.  C.  A.  268  (1908). 

Indiana. — Hockett  v.  State,  105 
Ind.  250,  5  N.  E.  178,  55  Am.  Rep. 
201  (1885). 

[2161 


Maryland. — Chesapeake  &  P. 
Telephone  Co.  v.  Baltimore  &  O. 
Telegraph  Co.,  66  Md.  399,  7  Atl. 
809,  59  Am.  Rep.  167  (1886). 

Nebraska. — State  ex  rel.  Webster 
v.  Nebraska  Telephone  Co.,  17  Neb. 
126,  22  N.  W.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  404 
(1885). 

North  Carolina. — -People  ex  rel. 
Telegraph  Cable  Co.  v.  Hudson 
Riv.  Telegraph  Co.,  19  Abb.  N.  C. 
466  (1887). 

Pennsylvania. — B  ell  Telephone 
Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Atl.  825 
(1886). 

South  Carolina. — State  v.  Tele- 
phone Co.,  61  S.  C.  83,  39  S.  E.  257, 
85  Am.  St.  Rep.  870  (1901)1 

Vermont. — Commercial  Telegraph 
Co.  v.  Telephone  Co.,  61  Vt.  241, 
17  Atl.  1071,  5  L.  R.  A.  161 
(1888). 

1  As  to  the  possibility  of  private 
telephone  lines,  see  Cumberland 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Cartwright  Tel. 


PROFESSION  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT      [  §  244 

established  telegraph  lines  cannot  be  doubted  1  there  are 
private  wires  connecting  offices  which  are  not  operated 
for  general  business.2 


Co.,  128  Ky.  395,  108  S.  W.  875 
(1908). 

1  The  following  citations  are  se- 
lected from  the  many  cases  estab- 
lishing the  public  character  of 
telegraph  companies  because  the 
essential  characteristic  of  public 
profession  is  mentioned: 

United  Stales. — Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Call  Pub.  Co.,  181  U.  S. 
92,  45  L.  ed.  765,  21  S.  Ct.  561 
(1900). 

Maine. — Ayer  v.  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.,  79  Me.  493,  10  Atl.  495,  1 
Am.  St.  Rep.  353  (1887). 


Mississippi. — Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Mississippi  R.  R. 
Commission,  74  Miss.  80,  21  So.  15 
(1896). 

Nebraska. — Western  Union  Tel. 
Co.  v.  Call  Pub.  Co.,  44  Neb.  326, 
62  N.  W.  506,  27  L.  R.  A.  622,  48 
Am.  St.  Rep.  729  (1895). 

North  Carolina. — Green  v.  Tele- 
graph Co.,  136  N.  C.  489,  49  S.  E. 
165,  67  L.  R.  A.  985  (1904). 

2  As  to  the  possibility  of  a  private 
telegraph  service  see  Renville,  Mat- 
ter of,  46  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  37,  61  N. 
Y.  Supp.  549  (1899). 


[217] 


CHAPTER  VIII 

EXTENT   OF   SERVICE    PROFESSED 

§  250.  Limitations  upon  the  profession. 

Topic  A.  Kinds  of  Service  Undertaken 

§  251.  Extent  to  which  limitations  may  be  imposed. 

252.  Businesses  of  limited  scope. 

253.  Obligation  in  respect  to  the  usual  class. 

254.  No  obligation  to  undertake  different  services. 

255.  Carriage  of  valuables  separable. 

256.  Carriage  of  live  stock. 

257.  Carriage  of  rolling  stock. 

258.  Profession  limited  to  car  service. 

259.  Extraordinary  service  in  transporting  freight. 

260.  Extraordinary  service  in  delivering  freight. 

Topic  B.  Separable  Services  for  Different  Purposes 
§  261.  Separable  services  in  general. 

262.  Carriers  of  passengers  and  goods. 

263.  Divisibility  of  the  innkeeper's  undertaking. 

264.  Purposes  for  which  water  is  supplied. 

265.  Gas  for  illuminating  and  for  fuel. 

266.  Distinct  kinds  of  telephone  service. 

Topic  C.  Profession  Defined  by  its  Physical  Limitations 

§  267.  Profession  to  devote  facilities. 

268.  Profession  to  render  service. 

269.  Obligation  limited  to  existing  premises. 

270.  Profession  limited  to  original  plant. 

271.  Profession  limited  to  natural  supply. 

272.  Carriage  confined  to  established  route. 

Topic  D.  Territorial  Limits  upon  the  Service  Professed 
§  273.  General  problem  of  community  service. 

274.  Territorial  limits  fixed  by  franchise. 

275.  Change  in  municipal  boundaries. 

276.  Obligation  beyond  the  profession. 

[218] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  250 

§  277.  Establishment  of  delivery  limits. 

278.  What  limits  are  reasonable. 

279.  Individual  installation  within  the  territory. 

280.  Rights  of  abutting  owners. 

281.  Obligation  to  the  community. 

282.  Reasonable  limitation  upon  expansion. 

§  250.  Limitations  upon  the  profession. 

Public  profession  not  only  establishes  public  obligation, 
but  it  largely  determines  the  extent  of  the  public  duty. 
Just  as  people  cannot  be  forced  to  serve  unless  they  have 
made  public  profession,  so  they  cannot  be  forced  to  serve 
beyond  what  their  profession  covers.  The  primary  ques- 
tion is,  therefore,  what  their  profession  fairly  covers; 
and  this  is  again  a  question  of  fact  rather  than  of  law.  In 
determining  this  fact,  there  is  in  many  cases  direct  evi- 
dence, but  in  most  cases  it  is  again  circumstantial ;  so  that 
all  that  can  be  promised  by  way  of  general  principle  is 
that  those  in  public  service  are  bound  to  do  for  any  new 
applicant  the  sort  of  thing  in  general  that  they  have  been 
doing  for  others.  For  it  is  plain  that  one  by  entering  a 
public  employment  does  not  thereby  undertake  to  per- 
form any  kind  of  service  that  may  be  asked  of  him.  His 
obligation  only  extends  to  the  sort  of  service  that  he  has 
undertaken. 1  Considered  in  the  large  this  is  obvious  and 

1  This  is  brought  out,  although  in  tomers?  Who  shall  say  what  the 
too  extreme  a  form,  by  the  way  in  means  and  methods  of  transporta- 
which  the  question  was  introduced  tion  shall  be, — the  company  or  its 
to  the  jury  by  a  Federal  judge,  in  a  customers?  In  short,  who  shall  de- 
recent  case:  "The  questions  put,  termine  what  the  business  of  the 
therefore,  resolve  themselves  into  company  shall  be  and  how  it  shall 
this:  Who  shall  have  control  of  the  be  carried  on?  Solved  by  the  prin- 
operation  of  the  road, — the  com-  ciple  of  the  common  law  and  com- 
pany or  its  customers?  Who  shall  mon  sense,  it  must  be  the  company, 
determine  what  the  railroad  will  as  all  will  agree  that  no  railroad 
transport, — the  company  or  the  could  be  operated  at  all  by  those 
shippers?  Who  shall  say  to  what  who  patronize  it."  Harp  v.  Choc- 
points  the  company  will  transport  taw,  O.  &  G.  Ry.,  118  Fed.  169 
goods, — the  company  or  its  cus-  (1902). 

[219] 


§  251  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

in  many  cases  too  plain  for  argument.  In  some  busi- 
nesses the  narrow  limitations  upon  the  employment  un- 
dertaken are  obvious  enough.  One  by  entering  a  given 
public  calling  only  commits  himself  to  render  the  sort  of 
service  which  is  normally  offered  by  those  who  follow  this 
particular  employment.1  What  in  general  is  the  nature 
of  the  service  performed  in  each  particular  calling  is  a 
matter  which  was  discussed  as  to  each  employment  in  turn 
in  enumerating  them  in  the  first  chapters  of  this  treaties. 

Topic  A.  Kind  of  Service  Undertaken 

§  251.  Extent  to  which  limitations  may  be  imposed. 

This  doctrine  that  the  obligation  may  be  limited  by 
defining  the  service  undertaken  is  pressed  to  extremes 
in  the  English  decisions.  In  the  leading  case  2  it  was  held 
that  a  railroad  which  had  not  undertaken  the  carriage  of 
coal  between  certain  stations  could  not  be  required  to  do 
so  although  it  was  carrying  coal  between  other  stations. 
"A  person  may  profess  to  carry  a  particular  description 
of  goods  only,  in  which  case  he  could  not  be  compelled 
to  carry  other  kind  of  goods,"  said  the  Exchequer  Court, 
"or  he  may  limit  his  obligation  to  carrying  from  one  place 
to  another,  as  from  Manchester  to  London,  and  then  he 
would  not  be  bound  to  carry  to  and  from  intermediate 
points."  And  in  the  Canadian  cases  the  rule  is  made 
even  more  precise  still,  if  that  be  possible.  In  them  it  is 

1  It  follows  as  is  brought  out  elab-  carry."     Santa  Fe  P.  &  P.  R.  R. 

orately  in  a  recent  case  in  perform-  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  C.  Co.  (Ariz.), 

ing  service  which  is  not  within  the  108  Pac.  467  (1910). 

usual  profession  the  service  is  gen-  2  Johnson  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  4 

erally   private   in    character.      "A  Exch.  367  (1849).     See  also  In  re 

common  carrier  may  become  a  pri-  Oxlade  &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  15  C.  B. 

vate  carrier  when  as  a  matter  of  ac-  (N.   S.)   680   (1864).     See  further 

commodation  or  special  agreement  Pitlock  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  109 

it  undertakes  to  carry  something  Mass.  452  (1872). 
which    it    is    not    its    business    to 

[220] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED  [  §§  252,  253 

held  that  any  limitation  publicly  announced  will  govern. 
And  according  to  the  most  extreme  decision  l  a  railway 
carrying  timber  of  all  kinds  may  announce  that  thence- 
forth it  will  carry  no  more  cedar  lumber;  and  thereafter 
it  will  be  under  no  obligation  to  take  cedar  lumber,  even 
although  still  carrying  other  timber. 

§  252.  This  doctrine  once  pressed  to  extremes. 

This  was  clearly  the  original  logic  of  the  law,  "At 
common  law  no  person  was  a  common  carrier  of  any  ar- 
ticle unless  he  chose  to  be,  and  unless  he  held  himself 
out  as  such;  and  he  was  a  common  carrier  of  just  such 
articles  as  he  chose  to  be,  and  no  others.  If  he  held  him- 
self out  as  a  common  carrier  of  silks  and  laces,  the  com- 
mon law  would  not  compel  him  to  be  a  common  carrier 
of  agricultural  implements  such  as  plows,  harrows,  etc.; 
if  he  held  himself  out  as  a  common  carrier  of  confectionery 
and  spices,  the  common  law  would  not  compel  him  to  be 
a  common  carrier  of  bacon,  lard,  and  molasses."  2  The 
American  cases  from  the  first  were  less  extreme.  In  one 
of  the  earliest  it  was  said  that  "a  common  carrier  is 
bound  to  convey  the  goods  of  any  person  offering  to  pay 
his  hire,  unless  his  carriage  be  already  full,  or  the  risk 
sought  to  be  imposed  upon  him  extraordinary,  or  unless 
the  goods  be  of  a  sort  which  he  cannot  convey  or  is  not 
in  the  habit  of  conveying."  3 

§  253.  Obligation  in  respect  to  the  usual  class. 

Whatever  may  be  the  rule  still  in  England,  it  is  clear 
that  in  America  a  carrier  who  undertakes  to  carry  cer- 

1  Rutherford   v.     Grand    Trunk      Co.  v.  Nichols  &  Co.,  9  Kans.  235, 
Ry.  Co.,  5  Rev.   Leg.  (Can.)  483      12  Am.  Rep.  494  (1872). 

(1873).  3  Fish  v.  Chapman,  2  Ga.  349,  46 

See   Leonard  v.  American  Exp.  Am.  Dec.  343  (1847). 

Co.,  26  U.  C.  Q.  B.  533  (1867).  See  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 

2  Quoted  from  Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Hams,  1  W.  &  W.  (Tex.  Ct.  App.) 

Dec.,  §  1263. 

[2211 


§  254  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tain  goods  of  a  certain  sort  must  carry  all  of  the  same 
general  nature.1  A  wagoner  who  had  professed  to  carry 
fruit  could  not  refuse  to  carry  vegetables.  A  steamboat 
which  had  received  boxes,  could  not  refuse  casks.  Where 
express  matter  is  taken,  packages  of  newspapers  cannot 
be  refused,  and  where  general  freight  is  taken,  lumber 
cannot  be  refused.2  That  is,  everything  of  the  same 
general  nature  with  the  things  carried,  and  readily  trans- 
ported in  the  same  way  and  by  the  same  means,  must  be 
taken.3  "When  a  carrier  has  a  regularly  established  busi- 
ness for  carrying  all  or  certain  articles,  and  especially 
if  that  carrier  be  a  corporation  created  for  the  purpose  of 
the  carrying  trade,  and  the  carrying  of  the  articles  is  em- 
braced within  the  scope  of  its  chartered  powers,  it  is  a 
common  carrier  of  them."  4 

§  254.  No  obligation  to  undertake  different  services. 

Even  if  the  goods  are  similar  in  bulk  to  goods  actu- 
ally carried,  if  they  require  special  treatment,  a  carrier 
who  has  never  professed  to  carry  them  may  refuse  to  ac- 
cept them  as  a  common  carrier.  So  where  an  express 
company  had  never  professed  to  carry  glass  as  a  common 
carrier,  and  on  the  terms  required  of  a  common  carrier  a 
writ  of  mandamus  to  compel  the  company  to  receive  and 
carry  glass  on  such  terms  was  refused.5  And  so  where 
the  goods  are  of  a  dangerous  nature,  it  seems  clear  that 
the  carrier  may  refuse  to  receive  them  on  the  ground  that 

1  A  railroad  company  is  "bound  undertaking  must  be  to  carry  goods 
to    transport    within    the    class    of  of  the  kind  which  it  has  been  pro- 
goods  it  carries."    Mclntosh  v.  Or-  fessed   will  be  carried.     Santa  Fe 
egon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  17  Idaho,  100,  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  C. 
105  Pac.  66  (1909).  Co.  (Ariz.),  108  Pac.  467  (1910). 

2  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Savannah  L.          4  Quoted  from  Memphis  News  Co. 
W.  &  S.  Co.  (Ga.),  63  S.  E.  577,  20  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  110  Tenn.  684, 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  867  (1909).  75  S.  W.  941,  63  L.  R.  A.  150  (1903). 

*  To    be    common    carriage    the         5  People  v.  Babcock,  16  Hun,  313 

(1878). 

[222] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  255 

he  has  never  professed  to  carry  goods  of  that  kind.1 
Again,  perishable  goods  such  as  fish,  might  perhaps  be 
ruled  out.2  And  even  freight  like  molasses  which  may 
burst  its  barrels  may  be  refused.3  For  as  will  be  seen 
many  times  in  the  course  of  this  discussion,  there  are 
for  various  natural  reasons  different  classes  of  goods,  and 
a  practice  of  taking  goods  of  one  class  does  not  establish 
any  profession  to  take  goods  of  another  class.  Thus  a 
trucking  company  may  make  a  specialty  of  handling  heavy 
iron  products.4  Or  van  owners  may  confine  their  profes- 
sion to  moving  household  goods.5 

§  255.  Carriage  of  valuables  separable. 

The  distinction  just  drawn  between  what  service  is 
within  the  usual  profession  and  what  is  outside  the  pub- 
lic obligation  is  one  of  much  importance  in  the  business 
of  carriage  since  in  a  case  of  common  carriage  the  liability 
for  loss  is  greater  than  in  a  case  of  private  carriage.  As 
to  certain  things  often  carried  there  are,  therefore,  a  sur- 
prising number  of  cases  in  which  the  rules  relating  to  this 
problem  are  worked  out.  Thus  the  cases  are  numerous 
in  which  it  is  pointed  out  that  an  ordinary  carrier  of 
goods  is  seldom  a  carrier  of  valuables,  especially  currency.6 

1  California  Powder  Works  v.  A.  Story,  16  (1841);  Kuter  v.  Michigan 
&  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Cal.  329,  45  Cent.  R.  R.,  1  Bias.  35,  14  Fed.  Gas. 
Pac.  691,  36  L.  R.  A.  648  (1896).  No.  7,955  (1853). 

2  Leonard  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  California. — Fay  v.  Steamer  New 
26  Up.  Can.  (Q.  B.)  533  (1867).  World,  1  Cal.  348  (1850). 

3  Tunnel  v.   Pettijohn,   2   Harr.  District  of  Columbia. — White  v. 
(Del.)  48  (1835).  Postal  Tel.  &  Cable  Co.,  25  App. 

4  Jackson  A.  Iron  Wks.  v.  Hurl-  Div.  D.  C.  364  (1905). 

but,  158  N.  Y.  34,  52  N.  E.  665,  70  Illinois—  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  432  (1899).  v.  Thompson,  19  111.  578  (1858). 

'Collier  v.  Langan  T.  S.  &  M.  Kentucky. — Lee    v.    Burgess,    9 

Co.    (Mo.   App.),    127   S.   W.   453  Bush,  652  (1873). 

(1910).  Louisiana. — Mechanics'  &  T.  Bk. 

•  United  States.— Citizens'  Bank  v.  Gordon,  5  La.  Ann.  604  (1850). 

v.    Nantucket    Steamboat    Co.,    2  Missouri. — Choteau    v.    Steam- 

[223] 


§255 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


But  if  it  be  shown  in  any  case  that  the  particular  carrier  is 
carrying  the  money  as  part  of  his  regular  business  he  will 
be  held  to  be  a  common  carrier.1  The  charge  of  Mr. 
Justice  Story  2  to  a  Federal  jury  is  always  referred  to  in 
this  connection,  for  the  distinctions  which  are  drawn. 
"  The  question,  therefore,  in  all  cases  of  this  sort  is,  what 
are  the  true  nature  and  x  extent  of  the  employment  and 
business,  in  which  the  owners  hold  themselves  out  to  the 
public  as  engaged?  They  may  undertake  to  be  common 
carriers  of  passengers,  and  of  goods  and  merchandise,  and 
of  money;  or,  they  may  limit  their  employment  and  busi- 
ness to  the  carriage  of  any  one  or  more  of  these  partic- 
ular matters."  To  apply  this  early  rule  to  modern  con- 
ditions, the  express  company  is  almost  always  a  common 
carrier  of  money  by  its  general  practice.3  Thus  an  ex- 
press company  would  be  held  a  common  carrier  of  the 
money  it  is  bringing  back  as  the  result  of  the  sale  of  a 
shipment  sent  C.  0.  D.4 


boat  St.  Anthony,  16  Mo.  216 
(1852). 

New  York. — Sewall  v.  Allen,  6 
Wend.  335  (1830);  Kemp  v.  Cough- 
try,  11  Johns.  107  (1814). 

North  Carolina. — Fender  v.  Rob- 
bins,  6  Jones,  207  (1858). 

1  United  Stales. — Hellman  v.  Hol- 
laday,  1  Woolw.  365  (1868). 

Alabama. — Hosea  v.  M'Crory,  12 
Ala.  349  (1847). 

Massachusetts.  —  Dwight  v. 
Brewster,  1  Pick.  50,  11  Am.  Dec. 
133  (1822). 

New  York. — Allen  v.  Sewell,  2 
Wend.  327  (1829). 

Tennessee. — ^Kirtland  v.  Mont- 
gomery, 1  Swan,  452  (1852). 

Vermont. — Farmers'  &  M.  Bank 
v.  Champlain  Tr.  Co.,  23  Vt.  186, 
56  Am.  Dec.  68  (1851). 

[224] 


England. — Anonymous,  12  Mod. 
*3  (1702). 

2  Citizens'    Bank    v.    Nantucket 
Steamboat  Co.,  2  Story  (U.  S.),  16 
(1841). 

3  United  States. — Kuter  v.  Michi- 
gan Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  35,  14 
Fed.   Gas.,  No.  7,955   (1853);   St. 
John  v.  Express  Co.,  1  Woods,  612 
(1871). 

California. — Pfister  v.  Central 
Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Cal.  169, 
11  Pac.  686,  59  Am.  Rep.  404 
(1886). 

4  Fitzgerald    v.    Adams    Express 
Co.,   24    Ind.   447,    87    Am.   Dec. 
341  (1865). 

But  an  express  company  need 
not  engage  in  C.  O.  D.  business. 

Burke  v.  Platt,  172  Fed.  777 
(1909). 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED 


[§256 


§  256.  Carriage  of  live  stock. 

Another  prominent  matter  in  the  topic  under  discus- 
sion is  the  carriage  of  live  stock.  The  carriage  of  live 
stock  was  not  ordinarily  within  the  profession  of  the  early 
carriers  as  they  had  no  vehicles  large  enough  for  such 
carriage.  Therefore  when  the  railways  came  in,  it  was 
doubted  in  England  *  whether  their  carriage  could  be  ob- 
ligatory unless  express  undertaking  with  respect  to  them 
could  be  found;  and  in  one  American  jurisdiction,  Michi- 
gan,2 it  was  decided  that  this  special  profession  was  nec- 
essary. But  this  is  not  the  sort  of  reasoning  that  appeals 
to  American  courts,  and  it  is  now  almost  universally 
agreed  that  live  stock  constitutes  one  of  the  many  classes 
of  goods  which  the  modern  railway  undertakes  to  carry 
for  the  public  generally  and  that  the  railway  is  therefore 
a  common  carrier  of  live  stock  in  its  freight  trains.3  This 


1  Blower  v.  Gt.  Western  Ry.  Co., 
L.  R.  7  C.  P.  655,  and  cases  cited 
(1872). 

2  Such  carriage  is,  therefore,  not 
common  carriage  usually  in  Michi- 
gan.    Michigan  S.  R.   R.  v.   Mc- 
Donough,  21  Mich.  165,  4  Am.  Rep. 
466  (1870);  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
R.  v.  Perkins,  25  Mich.  329,  12  Am. 
Rep.  275  (1872);  American  Merch. 
Union  Exp.  Co.  v.  Phillips,  29  Mich. 
515,  58  N.  W.  651  (1874);  Smith  v. 
Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  100  Mich. 
148,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  440  (1894). 

3  United  Slates. — Myrick  v.  Mich- 
igan Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  107  U.  S.  102, 
27  L.  ed.  325  (1882).    See  Interstate 
Stockyards  Co.  v.  Indianapolis  Ry. 
Co.,  99  Fed.  472  (1900). 

Alabama.— South  &  N.  A.  R.  R. 
v.  Henlein,  52  Ala.  606,  23  Am.  Rep. 
578  (1875). 

Arkansas. — Fordyce  v.  McFlynn, 
56  Ark.  424,  19  S.  W.  961  (1892). 

15 


Florida. — Summerlin  v.  Seaboard 
Air  L.  Ry.  Co.,  56  Fla.  687,  47  So. 
557,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  191  (1908). 

Georgia. — Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Hall,  124  Ga.  322,  52  S.  E.  679,  4 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  898,  110  Am.  St. 
Rep.  170  (1905). 

Illinois. — Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  v. 
Hall,  58  111.  409  (1871). 

Indiana. — Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
v.  Woodward,  164  Ind.  360,  72  N.  E. 
558  (1904). 

Iowa. — McCoy  v.  Railroad,  44 
Iowa,  424  (1876). 

Kansas. — Kansas,  etc.,  R.  R.  v. 
Reynolds,  8  Kan.  623  (1871). 

Kentucky. — Hall  v.  Renfro,  3 
Met.  51  (1860). 

Maine. — Sager  v.  Portsmouth, 
etc.,  Railroad,  31  Me.  228,  50  Am. 
Dec.  659  (1850). 

Massachusetts. — Evans  v.  Fitch- 
burg  R.  R.,  Ill  Mass.  142,  15  Am. 
Rep.  19  (1872). 

[225] 


§257 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


was  strongly  stated  in  an  early  Kansas  case, l  in  which  the 
usual  functions  of  the  modern  railway  are  thus  described : 
"It  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  they  were  created  for 
the  mere  purpose  of  taking  the  place  of  pack-horses,  or 
clumsy  wagons,  often  drawn  by  oxen  or  such  other  prim- 
itive means  of  carriage  and  transportation  as  were  used 
in  England  prior  to  1607.  Railroads  are  undoubtedly 
created  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  all  kinds  of  property 
which  the  common  law  would  have  permitted  to  be  car- 
ried by  common  carriers  in  any  mode,  either  by  land  or 
water,  which  probably  includes  all  kinds  of  personal 
property." 

§  257.  Carriage  of  rolling  stock. 

This  general  principle  that  the  railways  generally  must 


Minnesota. — Moulton  v.  St.  Paul, 
M.  &  N.  Railroad  Co.,  31  Minn.  85, 
16  N.W.  497, 47  Am.  Rep.  781  (1883). 

Mississippi. — Chicago,  St.  L.,  & 
N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Abels,  60  Miss. 
1017  (1883). 

Missouri. — Ballentine  v.  North. 
Mo.  Railroad,  40  Mo.  491,  93  Am. 
Dec.  315  (1867). 

Nebraska. — Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R. 
v.  Williams,  61  Neb.  608,  85  N.  W. 
832  (1901);  Atchison,  etc.,  R.  v. 
Washburn,  5  Neb.  117  (1876). 

New  Hampshire. — R  i  x  f  o  r  d  v. 
Smith,  52  N.  H.  355,  13  Am.  Rep. 
42  (1872). 

New  York. — Clarke  v.  Rochester 
&  S.  R.  R.,  14  N.  Y.  570,  67  Am. 
Dec.  205  (1856). 

North  Carolina. — Lee  v.  Raleigh 
&  G.  R.  R.,  72  N.  C.  236  (1875). 

Ohio—  Welsh  v.  Pittsburg,  Ft.  W. 
&  C.  R.  R.,  10  Oh.  St.  65,  75  Am. 
Dec.  490  (1859). 

Pennsylvania. — Ritz  v.  Penna.  R. 

[226] 


Co.,  3  Phila.  82,  15  Leg.  Int.  75 
(1858). 

South  Carolina. — Bamberg  v.  So. 
Carolina  R.,  9  S.  C.  61,  30  Am.  Rep. 
13  (1877). 

Tennessee. — Nashville  &  C.  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Jackson,  6  Heisk.  271 
(1871). 

Texas. — Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Harris,  67  Texas,  166  (1886). 

Vermont. — Kimball  v.  Rutland, 
etc.,  R.  Co.,  26  Vt.  247,  62  Am.  Dec. 
567  (1854). 

Wisconsin. — Betts  v.  Farmers' 
Loan  Co.,  21  Wis.  80  (1866);  Ayres 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  71  Wis.  372,  5  Am. 
Rep.  226  (1888). 

England. — H  o  d  g  m  a  n  v.  West 
Midland  R.  Co.,  5  B.  &  S.  173,  117 
E.  C.  L.  173,  13  W.  R.  758,  35  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  85  (1865). 

1  The  quotation  which  follows  is 
from  Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Nichols,  9  Kans.  235,  12  Am.  Rep. 
494  (1872). 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  258 

accept  for  transportation  every  kind  of  freight  in  every 
form  that  is  appropriate  for  transportation  is  well  brought 
out  by  the  case  of  rolling  stock  offered  for  transportation 
as  freight.  As  is  said  by  a  Canadian  court *  such  transpor- 
tation comes  within  the  general  profession  of  the  railroads 
which  "hold  themselves  out  as  carriers  of  all  descriptions 
of  property  capable  of  being  reasonably  and  conven- 
iently transported  over  rails  by  a  locomotive  engine,  to 
the  extent  to  which  they  have  the  means  and  accommo- 
dations." These  cases  only  decide  that  cars  must  be 
received  as  freight,  being  charged  for  as  such.2  They 
do  not  go  so  far  as  to  decide  whether  freight  offered  in 
freight  cars  must  be  so  received  and  transported  without 
charge  for  the  weight  of  the  car,  a  question  much  dis- 
cussed later. 

§  268.  Profession  limited  to  car  service. 

To  go  to  the  other  extreme  of  this  problem,  there  is 
the  railway  service  which  the  terminal  railway  provides. 
These  railways  not  only  undertake  the  carriage  of  freight 
exclusively,  but  often  will  only  take  that  when  offered 
in  loaded  cars.  The  profession  of  such  a  road,  indeed,  is 
exclusively  to  transfer  loaded  cars  to  and  from  railway 
systems.  In  recognizing  this  situation  the  Illinois  court 3 
said:  "Nor  do  we  see  anything  in  the  objection  that  the 
business  of  the  company  is  to  be  limited  to  the  carrying 
of  freight  offered  in  cars  only.  Every  common  carrier 
has  the  right  to  determine  what  particular  line  of  busi- 
ness he  will  follow.  If  he  elects  to  carry  freight  only,  he 
will  be  under  no  obligations  to  carry  passengers,  and  vice 

1  Greene  v.  St.  John  &  M.  Ry.  3  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  East  St. 
Co.,  22  N.  B.  (P.  &  T.)  252  (1882).  Louis  Union  Ry.  Co.,  107  111.  450, 

2  See  further  Rogers  Locomotive  458  (1883). 
&  M.  Wks.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

N.  J.  Eq.  379  (1869). 

[227] 


§  259  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

versa.  So  if  he  holds  himself  out  as  a  carrier  of  a  partic- 
ular kind  of  freight,  or  of  freight  generally,  prepared  for 
carriage  in  a  particular  way,  he  will  only  be  bound  to 
carry  to  the  extent  and  in  the  manner  proposed.  He  will 
nevertheless  be  a  common  carrier."  l 

§  259.  Extraordinary  service  in  transporting  freight. 

In  another  interesting  set  of  modern  cases  the  recur- 
ring contention  that  in  hauling  circus  trains  the  rail- 
roads should  be  held  liable  as  common  carriers,  has 
always  been  denied  by  the  courts.  The  usual  facts,  how- 
ever, really  negative  carriage,  the  arrangement  commonly 
made  leaving  the  real  control  of  the  contents  of  the  cir- 
cus cars  with  the  circus  men,  the  railroad  simply  furnish- 
ing haulage.2  As  the  Michigan  court  said  of  such  an 
arrangement  in  the  leading  case: 3  "The  contract  before 
us  involves  very  few  things  ordinarily  undertaken  by 
carriers.  The  trains  were  to  be  made  up  entirely  of  cars 
which  belonged  to  plaintiff  and  which  the  defendant 

1  See  further  as  to  such  exclusive  Massachusetts. — R obertson   v. 
service:  Interstate  Stockyards  Co.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass, 
v.  Indianapolis  Ry.  Co.,  99  Fed.  525,  31  N.  E.  650,  32  Am.  St.  Rep. 
472,  481  (1900);  United  States  v.  482  (1892). 

Sioux  City  Stockyards  Co.,  162  Michigan. — Coup  v.  Wabash,  St. 
Fed.  556  (1908).  L.  &  P.  Ry.,  56  Mich.  Ill,  22  N.  W. 

2  United  States— Chicago,  M.  &      215,  56  Am.  Rep.  374  (1885). 

St.  P.  R.  R.  v.  Wallace,  66  Fed.  506,  Pennsylvania. — F orepaugh   v. 

14  C.  C.  A.  257,  30  L.  R.  A.  161  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  128 

(1895);  Wilson  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Pa.  St.  217,  18  Atl.  503,  15  Am.  St. 

Co.,  129  Fed.  774,  aff'd  in  133  Fed.  Rep.  672,  5  L.  R.  A.  508  (1889). 

1022,    66    C.    C.    A.    486    (1904);  But  see  Fordyce  v.  McFlynn,  56 

Clough  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  Ark.  424, 19  S.  W.  961  (1892),  which 

155  Fed.  81,  85  C.  C.  A.  1,  11  L.  R.  is  really  contra.     And  see  Santa  Fe 

A.    (N.   S.)   446   (1907);   Sager  v.  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  C. 

Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  166  Fed.  Co.   (Ariz.),   108  Pac.  467   (1910), 

526  (1908).  which  is  plainly  distinguishable. 

Indiana.— Cleveland,    C.,    C.    &  3  Coup  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 

St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henry,  170  Ind,  Ry.  Co.,  supra. 
94,  83  N.  E.  710  (1908). 

[2281 


[§260 

neither  loaded  nor  prepared,  and  into  the  arrangement  of 
which,  and  the  stowing  and  placing  of  their  contents  de- 
fendant had  no  power  to  meddle.  The  cars  contained 
horses  which  were  entirely  under  control  of  plaintiff,  and 
which  under  any  circumstances  may  involve  special  risks. 
They  contained  an  elephant,  which  might  very  easily  in- 
volve difficulty,  especially  in  case  of  accident.  They 
contained  wild  animals  which  defendant's  men  could  not 
handle,  and  which  might  also  become  troublesome  and 
dangerous.  It'  has  always  been  held  that  it  is  not  in- 
cumbent on  carriers  to  assume  the  burden  and  risks  of 
such  carriage." 

§  260.  Extraordinary  service  in  delivering  freight. 

The  decisions  generally  impose  upon  the  railroad  com- 
panies an  almost  universal  duty  to  perform  as  common 
carriage  every  transportation  service  which  may  fairly  be 
demanded  by  the  commercial  community.  Thus,  in  one 
interesting  class  of  cases  of  recent  instance  it  was  held 
that  a  railroad  to  meet  the  needs  of  those  constructing 
telegraph  lines  was  compelled  to  run  with  frequent  stops 
freight  trains  of  flat  cars  carrying  telegraph  poles  and  other 
equipment,  delivering  them  along  the  right  of  way  at  the 
regular  intervals  for  setting  the  poles.  In  supporting  an 
order  of  a  railroad  commission  of  this  tenor,  the  Florida 
court *  said  that  it  would  be  discrimination  for  the  rail- 
road to  perform  such  a  service  for  the  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Company,  and  refuse  the  same  service  to  the  Postal 
Telegraph-Cable  Company:  "We  think  it  is  clear  that 
a  railroad  company  where  it  acts  as  a  common  carrier  is 
bound  to  serve  all  the  members  of  the  public  alike,  who 
apply  for  service,  under  like  conditions.  The  contention 
that  the  general  order  of  the  Railroad  Commissioners  is 
unauthorized  by  law  inasmuch  as  it  applies  only  to  the  re- 

1  State  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Fla.  543,  41  So.  529,  (1906). 

[229] 


§  261  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

spondent,  we  think  is  unfounded.  In  the  very  nature  of 
things  such  an  order  could  not  be  made  to  apply  to  an- 
other railroad  company  which  had  not  voluntarily  per- 
formed for  some  patron  the  service  described  in  these 
proceedings,  which  is  in  some  respects  peculiar,  in  that 
it  involves  the  delivery  of  poles,  wires,  etc.,  between 
stations.  But  the  respondent  having  voluntarily  per- 
formed this  service  for  the  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Company  may  not  deny  it  to  another  company  apply- 
ing for  similar  service  under  like  conditions."  1 

Topic  B.  Separable  Services  for  Different  Purposes 

§  261.  Separable  services  in  general. 

Even  if  one  is  not  committed  in  public  employment  to 
going  beyond  the  general  class  within  which  his  usual  serv- 
ices fall,  there  is,  of  course,  no  reason  why  one  engaged 
in  one  class  of  service  may  not  engage  himself  in  various 
other  classes  of  service  by  making  express  or  implied  pro- 
fession of  them.  It  rests  with  the  management  to  decide 
whether  to  engage  in  two  separable  services,  as  a  railroad 
carrier  may  take  passengers  or  freight.  This  is  particularly 
plain  where  the  services  are  plainly  diverse,  as  in  one  case 
where  a  municipality  was  operating  a  waterworks  and 
maintaining  a  sewerage  system.  Again,  it  may  engage  in 
one  upon  a  public  basis  while  dealing  in  the  other  upon  a 
private  basis,  as  a  gas  company  may  supply  generally  for 
illumination,  while  making  in  a  few  cases  special  bargains 
for  their  surplus  as  fuel.  Or  it  may  undertake  one  branch 
solely,  as  an  electric  company  may  refuse  to  supply  cur- 
rent for  power.  But  in  all  cases,  if  two  separable  services 
are  generally  offered  to  the  public  the  applicant  must  be 
free  to  demand  either  at  his  election. 

1  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.      Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  51  La. 

Ann.  29,  24  So.  803  (1899). 

[230] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  262 

§  262.  Carriers  of  passengers  and  goods. 

A  carrier  of  passengers  is  not  necessarily  also  a  carrier 
of  goods.  His  vehicles  may  not  be  adapted  for  that  pur- 
pose, or  he  may  not  desire  to  carry  on  both  lines  of  busi- 
ness. Even  if  he  does  occasionally  carry  goods  for  hire 
on  his  vehicles,  he  is  not  necessarily  a  common  carrier 
of  goods.  This  distinction  was  recognized  many  times 
with  respect  to  stagecoaches  l  in  the  earlier  cases.  Sim- 
ilarly, one  may  undertake  publicly  as  a  carrier,  of  freight 
solely.2  In  this  branch  he  is  plainly  engaged  in  a  public 
employment,  and  even  if  such  a  freight  carrier  does 
occasionally  take  passengers,  that  does  not  make  him  a 
common  carrier  of  them.  And  conversely  if  a  railway 
carries  passengers  regularly  but  takes  freight  only  for 
one  party  it  is  not  a  common  carrier  of  freight.3  So  if  a 
street  railway  company  has  never  made  profession  to 
carry  anything  except  passengers,  it  may  not  be  held 
liable  for  goods.4  Cases  may  be  found,  however,  where 
the  practice  of  the  railway  has  been  to  accept  large  pack- 
ages brought  by  passengers  for  which  they  receive  addi- 

1  Connecticut. — Merwin    v.    But-  South  Carolina. — Peixotti  v.  Me- 
ier, 17  Conn.  138  (1845).  Laughlin,  1  Strob.  468,  47  Am.  Dec. 

Iowa.— Sales    v.    Western    Stage  563  (1847). 

Co.,  4  Iowa,  547  (1857).  Tennessee. — Walker  v.  Skipwith, 

Kentucky. — Robertson    v.     Ken-  Meigs,  502  (1838). 

nedy,  2  Dana,  430,  26  Am.  Dec.  466  England. — Butler    v.    Basing,    2 

(1834).  Car.  &  P.  613  (1827). 

Massachusetts.  —  D  w  i  g  h  t      v.  2  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  East  St. 

Brewster,  1  Pick.  50,  11  Am.  Dec.  Louis    V.   Ry.   Co.,    107    111.    450 

133  (1822).  (1883). 

New  York. — Hollister  v.  Nowlen,  3  Edgar  Lumber  Co.   v.   Cornie 

19  Wend.  234,   32  Am.  Dec.   455  Stave  Co.   (Ark.),   130  S.  W.  452 

(1838);  Cole  v.  Goodwin,  19  Wend.  (1910). 

251,  32  Am.  Dec.  470  (1838).  4  California.— Davis    v.    Button, 

Ohio—  Jones    v.     Voorhees,     10  78  Cal.  247,  20  Pac.  545  (1889). 

Oh.  St.  145  (1840).  Oregon.— T  h  o  m  p  s  o  n-Houston 

Pennsylvania. — B  e  c  k  m  a  n      v.  Electric  Co.  v.  Simon,  20  Oreg.  60, 

Shouse,  5  Rawle,  179,  28  Am.  Dec.  25  Pac.  147,  10  L.  R.  A.  251,  23  Am. 

653  (1835).  St.  Rep.  86  (1890). 

[231] 


§  263  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tional  compensation.  In  such  cases  l  the  courts  properly 
hold  that  if  it  has  been  shown  sufficiently  that  the  defend- 
ants had  assumed  the  business  of  common  carriers  of  mer- 
chandise upon  their  cars  they  would  be  held  liable  as  such. 
Of  late  years  the  interurban  railways  have  made  the  car- 
riage of  express  matter  a  distinct  branch  of  their  busi- 
ness a  feature.  This  is  probably  the  underlying  reason 
for  treating  them  on  a  different  basis  from  street  railways 
in  general. 

§  263.  Divisibility  of  the  innkeeper's  undertaking. 

The  innkeeper  must,  as  such,  supply  all  the  entertain- 
ment which  the  weary  traveler  actually  needs  on  his 
journey;  which  at  least  is  food  and  shelter,2  and  the 
innkeeper  is  bound  to  supply  the  traveler  with  either  or 
both  as  he  may  require.  The  consequence  of  this  dual 
requirement  is  curious.  If  the  keeper  of  a  house  of 
entertainment  does  not  undertake  to  furnish  both  of  these 
necessities  he  is  not  a  common  innkeeper;  and  this  require- 
ment distinguishes  inns  from  many  similar  houses  of 
public  entertainment.  Thus  a  house  which  does  not 
supply  lodging  is  not  an  inn;  and  this  rule  excludes  from 
among  inns  a  restaurant  or  eating  house,  a  coffeehouse  or 
a  drinking  saloon.3  And  for  the  same  reason  a  house  that 

1  Illinois. — Spalding  v.  Macomb          Tennessee. — Dickerson  v.  Rogers, 
&  W.  I.  Ry.  Co.,  225  111.  585,  80     4  Humph.  179,  40  Am.  Dec.  642 
N.  E.  327  (1907).  (1843). 

Massachusetts. — Levi  v.  Lynn  &  England. — Thompson    v.     Lacy, 

Boston  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Allen,  300,  87  3  B.  &  Aid.  283  (1820). 

Am.  Dec.  713  ( 1865) .  3  Illinois— Sheffer  v.  WiUoughby, 

2  California.— Pinkerton  v.  Wood-  163  111.  518,  45  N.  E.  253,  34  L.  R. 
ward,  33  Cal.  557,  91   Am.   Dec.  A.  464,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  483,  aff'd  61 
657  (1867).  111.  App.  263  (1896). 

Connecticut. — Walling  v.  Potter,  New  York. — Block  v.  Sherry,  43 

35  Conn.  183  (1868).  N.  Y.  Misc.  342,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  160 

New  York.— W  i  n  t  e  r  m  u  t  e  v.  (1904). 

Clark,  5  Sandf.  242  (1851);  Crom-  Ohio.— Pabe  v.  Myers,  5  Ohio  S. 

well  v.  Stephens,  2  Daly,  15  (1867).  &  C.  P.  Dec.  578  (1895). 

[  232  1 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED 


(§264 


furnishes  only  lodging  without  food,  like  a  lodging  house, 
or  an  apartment  hotel,1  is  not  an  inn.  However,  if  all 
elements  of  entertainment  required  by  a  traveler  are 
furnished  him  by  the  host  the  house  may  be  an  inn, 
notwithstanding  they  are  independently  furnished  and 
separately  offered.  Thus,  a  hotel  is  no  less  an  inn  though 
it  is  conducted  on  the  European  plan,  so  called;  the  fact 
that  food  is  separately  obtained  and  paid  for,  and  the 
guest  may  procure  his  food  elsewhere  if  he  chooses,  does 
not  alter  the  legal  character  of  the  house.2 

§  264.  Purposes  for  which  water  is  supplied. 

A  company  engaged  in  the  supplying  of  water  through 
pipes  to  the  community  is  not  obliged  to  supply  water  for 
all  purposes  to  which  the  applicant  may  wish  to  devote  it. 

England. — Reg.  v.  Rymer,  2 
Q.  B.  D.  136,  46  L.  I.  M.  C.  (N.  S.) 
108  (1877). 

1  Massachusetts. — Davis  v.  Gay, 
141  Mass.  531,  6  N.  E.  549  (1886). 

New  York. — Kelly  v.  New  York 
Excise  Comrs.,  54  How.  Pr.  327 
(1877);  Cromwell  v.  Stephens,  2 
Daly,  15  (1867). 

1  Illinois. — Bullock  v.  Adair,  63 
111.  App.  30  (1895). 

Minnesota. — Johnson  v.  Chad- 
bourn  Furnace  Co.,  89  Minn.  310, 
94  N.  W.  874,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  571 
(1903). 

But  see  Nelson  v.  Johnson,  104 
Minn.  440,  116  N.  W.  828,  17  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  1259  (1908). 

New  York. — Krohn  v.  Sweeney, 
2  Daly,  200  (1867). 

Pennsylvania.  —  M  c  C  1  u  r  e  v. 
Krumbholz,  9  Pa.  Dist.  R.  544,  31 
Pitts.  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  3  (1900). 

There  may  be  restaurants  no  part 
of  the  inn: 

Kentucky. — Kisten      v.      Hilde- 


brand,  9  B.  Mon.  72,  48  Am.  Dec. 
416  (1848). 

Massachusetts.  —  Commonwealth 
v.  Wetherbee,  101  Mass.  214  (1869). 

Minnesota. — Johnson  v.  Chad- 
bourn  Furnace  Co.,  89  Minn.  310, 
94  N.  W.  874,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  571 
(1903). 

New  York. — Kelly  v.  New  York 
Excise  Comrs.,  54  How.  Pr.  327 
(1877). 

People  resorting  to  such  restau- 
rants are  not  guests: 

Massachusetts.  —  Mason  v. 
Thompson,  9  Pick.  280,  20  Am. 
Dec.  471  (1830). 

New  York. — Krohn  v.  Sweeney, 
2  Daly,  200  (1867). 

Vermont. — State  v.  Stone,  6  Vt. 
295  (1834). 

England. — Reg.  v.  Rymer,  2 
Q.  B.  D.  136,  46  L.  J.  M.  C.  108 
(1877). 

Australia. — Miller  v.  Federal 
Coffee  Palace,  15  Victorian  Law  R. 
30  (1889). 

[  233  ] 


§264 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


This  is  the  explanation  of  the  Vermont  case  in  which  it 
was  held  that  a  water  company  authorized  by  its  charter 
to  take  water  from  a  stream  to  supply  a  town  with  water 
for  domestic  purposes  had  no  right  to  conduct  water  from 
the  stream  for  the  use  of  a  private  corporation  in  polishing 
granite.1  It  should  be  added,  however,  that  a  water 
company  enabled  under  its  charter,  might  supply  upon 
a  public  basis  for  extraordinary  purposes  such  as  to 
steam  plants  and  manufacturing  purposes.2  What  con- 
stitutes the  domestic  service  which  a  community  may  at 
least  require  from  the  waterworks  is  not  altogether  clear, 
although  it  has  been  discussed  in  certain  cases.3  Aside 


1  Re  Barre  Water  Co.,  62  Vt.  27, 
20  Atl.  109,  9  L.  R.  A.  195  (1889); 
and  Smith  v.  Barre  Water  Co.,  73 
Vt.  310,  50  Atl.  1055  (1901).  See 
also  Jordan  v.  Indianapolis  Water 
Co.  (Ind.  App.),  61  N.  E.  12  (1901), 
and  Boonton  v.  United  Water 
Supply  Co.,  70  N.  J.  Eq.  692,  64 
Atl.  1064  (1906). 

8  New  Jersey. — Coe  v.  N.  J.  Mid- 
land Ry.  Co.,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  440 
(1879). 

Ohio. — M.  E.  Church  v.  Ashta- 
bula  Water  Co.,  20  Oh.  C.  C.  578 
(1900). 

Washington. — Jenkins  v.  Colum- 
bia Land  Co.,  13  Wash.  502,  43  Pac. 
328  (1896). 

1  In  the  interesting  case  of  Bar- 
nard Castle  Urban  Dist.  v.  Wilson, 
2  Ch.  813  (1901),  the  court  say: 

"It  is  a  serious  question  whether 
in  every  case  in  which  an  occupier 
desires  to  have  a  supply  of  water 
for  his  enjoyment  and  pleasure  the 
water  company  or  authority  are 
bound  to  supply  him  without  re- 
gard to  the  ordinary  requirements 
of  their  district  for  the  purposes  of 

[2341 


drinking,  washing,  and  sanitation. 
Let  me  give  an  example  of  what  I 
mean.  I  agree  that  a  householder 
might  allow  his  dog  or  cat  to  drink 
the  water  supplied  for  domestic 
purposes  and  might  use  the  water 
for  washing  them.  So  again,  as  has 
been  decided,  he  might  use  the 
water  for  washing  his  horse  and 
carriage  and  for  watering  the  horse. 
There  must,  however,  be  some 
limitation.  Suppose  a  wealthy  pro- 
prietor chose  to  keep  other  tame 
animals — for  instance,  a  tame  ele- 
phant— would  it  be  reasonable  for 
him  to  call  upon  a  water  company 
to  supply  him  with  water  to  fill  a 
special  bath  for  the  elephant?  In 
my  opinion  that  would  not  be  a 
supply  for  domestic  purposes.  So 
again,  it  might  be  reasonable  to  Use 
the  water  to  fill  a  small  tank  for 
gold-fish.  But  suppose  an  occupier 
desired  to  keep  a  private  aquarium, 
I  should  not  be  inclined  to  hold  that 
he  could  require  a  water  company  to 
furnish  him  with  a  supply  of  running 
water  for  it.  In  my  opinion  you 
must  approach  the  consideration  of 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  265 

from  these  duties  which  it  owes  to  the  inhabitants  as 
individuals  it  would  seem  that  the  local  works  are  under 
certain  obligations  to  the  community  itself,  such  as  to 
supply  water  for  the  extinguishment  of  fires  and  the 
sprinkling  of  streets.1 

§  265.  Gas  for  illumination  and  for  fuel. 

A  gas  company  within  the  principles  under  discussion 
if  authorized  by  its  charter  may  offer  to  the  public  a  gas 
supply  for  both  illumination  or  fuel,  or  it  may  confine 
its  profession  or  be  limited  by  its  charter  to  the  supply  of 
gas  for  either  illumination  or  fuel.2  Where  the  company 
offers  both  services  it  must  be  in  the  alternative,  the 
consumer  having  the  right  to  demand  either  service  which 
he  wishes  without  obligation  to  take  the  other.3  The 
whole  problem  was  gone  over  in  a  recent  case  where  it 
was  proved  that  the  gas  company  was  engaged  under  its 
charter  in  supplying  gas  both  for  illumination  and  fuel 
with  the  arrangement  that  the  illuminating  gas  and  the 

each  case  with  some  regard  to  what         As  to  the  duty  to  the  community 
is  reasonable,  and  see  in  each  case  for  sprinkling  service,  see: 
whether  the  supply  of  water  which          United  States. — Wiemer  v.  Louis- 
is  wanted  is  reasonably  a  supply  for  ville  Water  Co.,  130  Fed.  Rep.  251 
domestic  purposes."  (1903). 

1  As  to   the    duty  to  the  com-         Louisiana. — C  a  1 1  e  r  y  v.  Water 

munity  in  relation  to  hydrant  serv-  Works  Co.,  35  La.  Ann.  798  (1883). 
ice,  see:  Similarly  as  to  private  supply  to 

Iowa. — McAllan  v.  Hamblin,  129  sprinkling,  see: 

Iowa,  329,  105  N.  W.  593,  5  L.  R.  A.         Alabama. — City  of  Birmingham 

(N.  S.)  434  (1906).  v.    Birmingham   Waterworks   Co., 

Texas.— House  v.  Houston  Water  42  So.  10  (1906). 
Works  Co.,  88  Tex.  233,  31  S.  W.          Tennessee.— W  a  u  t  a  u  g  a  Co.  v. 

179,  28  L.  R.  A.  532  (1895).  Wolfe,  99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W.  1060, 

Moreover,    there   is  a  particular  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841  (1897). 
duty  to  individual  owners  to  supply         2  The   cases   have   already  been 

water   for   their   extinguishing   ar-  cited  that  relate  to  the  supply  of 

rangements  at  a  proper  rate  there-  gas  for  illumination  (see  §  111)  and 

for.     Gordon  &  Ferguson  v.  Doran,  for  fuel  (see  §  112). 
100  Minn.  343,  111  N.  W.  272,  8         "See  Baily  v.  Fayette  Gas  Co., 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1049  (1907).  193  Pa.  St.  175,  44  Atl.  251  (1899). 

[235] 


§  266  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

fuel  gas  should  be  taken  through  a  separate  meter  as 
different  charges  were  made.  In  this  particular  case  the 
applicant  who  had  a  single  meter  through  which  he  had 
formerly  taken  illuminating  gas  now  wished  to  take  fuel 
gas  exclusively,  which  the  Louisiana  court  l  held  he  could 
do.  "No  good  reason  suggests  itself  why  mandamus 
should  not  go  to  the  company,  when  it  is  evident  that  the 
one  who  desires  to  use  gas  is  entitled  to  the  light  for  which 
he  seeks,  or  to  the  heat  he  needs  for  cooking  and  other 
purposes  for  which  gas  is  utilized."  2 

§  266.  Distinct  kinds  of  telephone  service. 

As  the  modern  telephone  system  is  managed,  two  serv- 
ices are  generally  offered,  a  special  service  to  occupiers 
at  their  buildings  and  a  general  service  at  pay  stations. 
In  some  few  cases  the  telephone  companies  have  attempted 
to  say  that  if  they  furnish  the  pay  stations  to  the  public 
in  general,  they  should  not  be  bound  to  furnish  a  residence 
service  to  particular  persons  unless  they  chose.  In  the 
important  case  of  State  v.  Nebraska  Telephone  Company  3 
this  was  one  excuse  urged  by  the  company  when  a  man- 
damus was  sought  against  it  to  compel  it  to  put  a  tele- 

1  Quoted  from  State  v.  New  Or-     service.    One  recent  case  holds  that 
leans  Gaslight  Co.,  108  La.  67,  32      an    illuminating    company    is    not 
So.  179  (1901-1902).  to  blame  if  consumers  use  its  gas 

Whether  such  lower  rates  for  fuel  for  fuel : 

gas    are    justifiable    is    a   debated  People  v.  Los  Angeles  Independ- 

question   discussed  later   on.    But  ent  Gas  Co.,  150  Cal.  557,  89  Pac. 

certainly  People's  Gaslight  Co.  v.  108  (1907). 

Hale,  94  111.  App.  406  (1900),  is  Another  holds  that  a  fuel  corn- 
correct  in  holding  that  a  gas  com-  pany  can  be  prevented  from  selling 
pany  is  not  bound  to  continue  to  gas  which  its  customers  use  for 
furnish  gas,  for  fuel,  cheaper.  lighting: 

2  One  point  not  covered  by  these  Nairin  v.  Ky.  Heating  Co.,  27 
cases,  and,  indeed,  not  settled  as  Ky.   L.   Rep.   551,   86  S.   W.  676 
yet,  is  whether  a  company  which  is  (1900). 

limited  to  one  service  can  be  pre-  3 17  Neb.  126,  22  N.  W.  237,  52 
vented  from  bringing  about  another  Am.  Rep.  404  (1885). 

[236] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  267 

phone  into  the  relator's  office,  but  the  court  held  that  as 
the  special  service  was  generally  offered,  this  particular 
applicant  must  be  given  it,  Mr.  Justice  Reese  saying: 
"It  is  said  by  respondent  that  it  has  public  telephone 
stations  in  Lincoln,  some  of  which  are  near  relator's 
office,  and  that  he  is  entitled  to  and  may  use  such  telephone 
to  its  full  extent  by  coming  there.  That,  like  the  tele- 
graph, it  is  bound  to  send  the  messages  of  relator,  but  it 
can  as  well  do  it  from  these  public  stations,  that  it  is 
willing  to  do  so,  and  that  is  all  that  can  be  required  of  it. 
Were  it  true  that  respondent  had  not  undertaken  to 
supply  a  public  demand  beyond  that  undertaken  by  the 
telegraph,  then  its  obligations  would  extend  no  further. 
But  as  the  telegraph  has  undertaken  to  the  public  to  send 
despatches  from  its  offices,  so  the  telephone  has  under- 
taken with  the  public  to  send  messages  from  its  instru- 
ments, one  of  which  it  proposes  to  supply  to  each  person 
or  interest  requiring  it,  if  conditions  are  reasonably  favor- 
able. This  is  the  basis  upon  which  it  proposes  to  operate 
the  demand  which  it  proposes  to  supply.  It  has  so  as- 
sumed and  undertaken  to  the  public."  * 

Topic  C.  Profession  Defined  by  its  Physical  Limitations 

§  267.  Profession  to  devote  facilities. 

The  limits  one  may  impose  upon  the  profession  he  makes 
in  undertaking  the  employment  are  far  easier  to  indicate 
in  general  terms  than  to  apply  in  particular  cases.  One 
way  of  putting  it  is  to  say  that  one  may  set  the  exterior 
limits,  but  one  may  make  no  interior  limits;  or  in  other 

'Other  important  cases  to  the  N.   E.  64    (1896);   Central   Union 

same  effect  should  be  noted:  Telephone   Co.  v.  State,   123   Ind. 

Indiana.— Central    Union    Tele-  113,  24  N.  E.  215  (1889). 

phone  Co.  v.  State,  118  Ind.  194,  Missouri. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Kin- 

19  N.  E.  604,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  114  loch  Telephone  Co.,  93  Mo.  App. 

(1888);  Central  Union  Telephone  349,  67  S.  W.  684  (1902). 
Co.  v.  Fehring,   146  Ind.  189,  45 

[237] 


§  268  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

words,  one  is  not  bound  to  service  outside  of  the  profes- 
sion which  has  been  made,  while  one  is  bound  to  serve 
within  the  profession.  This  distinction  may  be  illustrated 
by  pointing  out  that  a  railroad  is  not  bound  to  carry 
beyond  the  route  which  it  has  established;  but  it  cannot 
limit  its  service  to  white  men  by  expressly  advertising 
that  it  will  not  take  colored  persons.  And  similarly  a 
water  company  need  not  supply  applicants  outside  the  city 
even  if  its  aqueducts  pass  their  premises,  but  certainly  it 
could  not  within  the  city  refuse  to  supply  applicants  in  a 
district  through  which  its  pipes  run.  This  is  perhaps 
sufficiently  plain  in  both  illustrations  given;  but  other 
cases  are  more  difficult  to  bring  within  these  principles. 
An  innkeeper  is  not  bound  to  serve  beyond  the  capacity 
of  his  house,  but  up  to  this  capacity  he  ought  to  receive 
all  without  discrimination;  an  irrigation  company  is  not 
liable  for  not  supplying  new  applicants  after  the  flow  of 
the  stream  is  exhausted,  although  bound  to  accept  appli- 
cants in  proper  order  up  to  its  capacity.  Perhaps  in  these 
cases  also  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  the  extent  of  the  inn- 
keeper's profession  is  the  dedication  of  his  actual  house 
to  public  service,  and  the  whole  profession  of  the  irrigation 
company  is  to  divert  the  particular  stream;  so  that  neither 
can  be  called  upon  to  serve  beyond  its  profession,  while 
within  its  profession  its  public  duty  is  plain.  This  con- 
ception, however,  must  not  be  pressed  too  far,  as  other 
cases  will  show. 

§  268.  Profession  to  render  service. 

It  is  apparently  equally  well  established  that  a  railroad 
company  which  finds  itself  unable  to  handle  its  business 
with  its  original  equipment  must  provide  additional  equip- 
ment to  meet  existing  demands;  indeed  it  must  be  pre- 
pared with  better  equipment  to  meet  modern  needs.  So 
too,  a  gas  works  cannot  confine  its  service  to  its  orig- 
f  238  ] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  269 

inal  works;  it  will  be  obliged  to  increase  its  plant  to  meet 
the  increasing  demands  of  its  public.  This  difference  in 
obligation  can  only  be  explained  by  a  difference  in  the  pro- 
fession, for  the  circumstances  are  otherwise  much  the 
same.  The  extent  of  the  profession  depends  on  the  inten- 
tion of  the  proprietors  or,  rather,  upon  the  impression 
which  they  give  their  community.  In  the  case  of  the  rail- 
road it  is  obvious  that  they  intend  to  give  general  service, 
not  to  simply  devote  certain  cars  to  that  service.  They 
expect  to  carry  goods  long  after  these  particular  cars  have 
worn  out,  and  their  right  of  way  being  capable  of  han- 
dling far  more  business  than  the  original  equipment,  they 
expect  to  add  to  this  as  their  business  grows.  The  same 
argument  will  explain  the  obvious  obligation  of  the  pro- 
prietors of  a  gas  plant.  Their  original  franchise  is  taken 
upon  the  basis  of  a  general  obligation  to  serve  the  com- 
munity. Their  present  plant  is  for  present  needs;  but 
they  really  undertake  to  provide  a  larger  one  if  the  com- 
munity demands  it. 

§  269.  Obligation  limited  to  existing  premises. 

Although  it  is  well  settled  that  an  innkeeper,  a  ware- 
houseman, an  elevator  man,  and  a  wharfinger — to  cite 
prominent  examples — are  by  entering  upon  indiscriminate 
dealings  bound  to  serve  all  to  the  extent  of  their  capacity, 
it  seems  to  be  equally  well  established  that  they  have  an 
excuse  for  refusing  further  service  after  then-  capacity  is 
exhausted.  "No  doubt  an  innkeeper  is  bound  to  provide 
accommodation  for  travellers,  but  he  is  not  to  do  so  at  all 
risks  and  all  costs.  He  is  only  bound  to  provide  accommo- 
dation so  long  as  his  house  is  not  full;  when  it  is  full  he 
has  no  duty  in  that  respect."1  Nor  is  there  any  intimation 
in  any  case  that  such  owners  are  obliged  to  build  larger 

1  Per  Darling,  J.,  in  Brown  v.  367,  86  L.  T.  625,  50  W.  R.  654. 
Brandt,  1  K.  B.  696,  71  L.  J.  K.  B.  (1902). 

[239] 


§  270  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

structures  so  as  to  have  greater  capacity,  even  where 
repeated  experience  has  shown  the  existing  buildings  to 
be  entirely  inadequate  to  existing  demands  upon  them. 
These  instances  constitute  too  large  a  class  to  be  dis- 
missed as  exceptional.  The  truth  of  the  matter  seems  to 
be  that  in  these  cases  it  is  the  existing  structure  which 
is  devoted  to  public  service  and  that  is  all  that  is  under- 
stood as  offered  to  the  public. 

§  270.  Profession  limited  to  original  plant. 

In  some  services  the  profession  made  is  limited  to  the 
original  equipment.  This,  as  has  been  seen,  was  cer- 
tainly the  old  law,  when  modern  conditions  were  not  an- 
ticipated. Thus  a  carter  is  held  to  put  his  wagon  at  the 
disposal  of  the  public  for  what  it  will  take.  In  the  lead- 
ing case,1  a  carter  who  usually  carried  parcels  of  mod- 
erate size,  but  who  had  taken  a  hogshead  of  molasses 
after  first  refusing  it  because  of  its  size,  was  held  not 
responsible  for  it  as  a  common  carrier.  "There  seems 
to  be  good  reason,"  said  the  court,  "for  distinguishing 
between  this  and  other  kind  of  goods,  on  account  of  its 
bulk  and  weight,  and  it  also  appears  that  the  defendant's 
cart  is  too  small  for  such  freight."  In  a  modern  case  of 
this  sort  it  was  pointed  out  that  a  steamship  owner  is  not 
liable  for  refusing  to  take  freight  when  the  vessel  which 
he  had  devoted  to  this  service  was  loaded  to  its  full 
capacity.2  "At  common  law,  a  carrier's  duty  to  receive 
goods  was  limited  to  his  facilities  for  transportation," 
said  the  court.  In  the  same  way  a  bridge  company 
cannot  be  called  upon  to  receive  loads  too  heavy  for  its 
structure.3  And  a  company  which  held  itself  out  as  ready 

1  Tunnel    v.   Pettijohn,   2  Ham  831,  63  S.  E.  577,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
(Del.)  48  (1836).  867  (1909). 

2  Ocean    Steamship    Co.    v.    Sa-  s  Thompson  v.  Matthews,  2  Edw. 
vannah,  L.  W.  &  S.  Co.,  131  Ga.  Ch.  212  (1834). 

[240] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED     [  §§  271,  272 

to  carry  anything  its  barges  were  suited  for  was  thought 
to  be  a  common  carrier.1 

§  271.  Profession  limited  to  natural  supply. 

Where  the  supply  that  is  offered  has  a  natural  limita- 
tion, it  will  usually  be  found  that  the  profession  is  limited 
to  the  exploitation  of  that  supply.  Thus  a  company  which 
undertakes  the  supply  of  natural  gas  from  a  given  field 
cannot  be  held  liable  for  the  failure  of  the  supply  to  meet 
the  demands  of  the  community;  for  to  require  such  a 
company  to  manufacture  gas  to  meet  the  deficiency  would 
call  upon  it  to  go  into  a  very  different  business.2  And  so 
apparently  a  hydro-electric  development  company  which 
professes  no  more  than  the  transformation  of  a  certain 
water  power  into  electric  energy  could  not  be  compelled 
to  put  in  an  auxiliary  steam  plant.3 

§  272.  Carriage  confined  to  established  route. 

The  obligation  of  a  common  carrier  is  no  wider  than 
his  undertaking  indicates  to  the  public.  Thus  it  has 
always  been  recognized  that  a  carrier's  obligation  was 
confined  to  the  route  which  he  had  established.  This  is 
not  only  true  of  carters  who  have  an  established  route, 
but  of  teamsters  who  have  an  established  territory.4 
There  is  no  danger  if  a  wagoner  is  held  to  be  a  common 
carrier,  as  one  early  American  case  feared,  that  he 
could  be  compelled  to  load  for  any  part  of  the  continent.5 
A  line  of  steamboats  is  not  obliged  at  request  to  deviate 
to  deliver  cargo  elsewhere  than  its  usual  ports  of  call. 

'Nicolette  Lumber  Co.  v.  People's  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A.  472 

Coal  Co.,  26   Pa.  Super.  Ct.   575  (1905). 

(1904).  4  Farley  v.  Lavary,  107  Ky.  523, 

2  Indiana  Nat.  Gas  &  O.  Co.  v.  54  S.  W.  840,  47  L.  R.  A.  383  (1900). 

State,  162  Ind.  690,  71  N.  E.  133  6  Gordon  v.  Hutchinson,  1  W.  & 

(1904).       .  S.    (Pa.)    285,  37    Am.   Dec.  464 

» See  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me.  (1841). 

16  [  241  ] 


§  273  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

If  this  is  true  of  those  carriers  which  may  roam  at  will, 
how  much  more  must  it  be  true  of  those  carriers  whose 
route  is  fixed,  such  as  railway  companies  and  canal  boat- 
men. Upon  this  general  theory  a  railroad's  obligation 
to  receive  freight  is  for  transportation  over  its  own  route 
only.  The  fact  that  it  has  connections  with  other  routes 
makes  no  difference;  it  is  not  bound  to  provide  any  other 
mode  of  transportation  than  its  own.  Therefore  it  need 
not  furnish  means  to  carry  merchandise  over  other  routes.1 
And  certainly  it  need  not  send  cars  to  fetch  freight  from 
other  routes.  Thus  it  need  not  even  provide  equipment 
for  taking  freight  from  the  sidings  of  other  railways  very 
near  to  its  route  but  not  really  upon  it.2 

Topic  D.   Territorial  Limits  upon  the  Service  Professed 

§  273.  General  problem  of  community  service. 

In  various  important  public  services  the  obligation 
undertaken  is  to  serve  the  community  in  general.  It  is 
obvious  that  this  problem  may  be  dealt  with  from  two 
general  points  of  view.  One  side  is  the  exterior  limita- 
tions beyond  which  the  service  need  not  be  rendered; 
the  other  regards  the  obligation  to  render  service  within 
these  limits.  Thus,  a  gas  company  may  not  be  called 
upon  to  serve  beyond  the  municipality  for  which  it  has 
been  chartered;  but  must  it  lay  its  pipes  through  every 
street  in  that  city?  So  a  water  supply  cannot  be  demanded 
by  a  farmer  in  an  outlying  community  although  the  aque- 
duct passes  his  door,  but  the  moment  the  city  limits  are 
reached  must  not  any  abutting  owner  be  supplied?  There 

1  Indiana.— Pittsburg,   C.  &   St.          2  Hoyt  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

L.  Ry.  v.  Morton,  61  Ind.  539,  28  Co.,  93  111.  601  (1879);   People  v. 

Am.  Repr.  682  (1878).  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  111.  95,  8 

Kentucky.— Pittsburg,    C.,  C.   &  Am.  Rep.  631  (1870). 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Viera,  113  Ky.  526, 
68S.W.  469(1902). 

[242] 


[§273 


are  cases  on  these  points  as  will  be  seen  presently;  and 
yet  as  to  the  full  extent  of  this  obligation,  the  law  is  still 
in  the  making.  When  the  particular  services  are  sepa- 
rately considered  the  law  will  seem  too  indefinite  to  be 
practicable;  but  when  all  the  cases  are  taken  together  and 
all  are  considered  as  one  problem  of  public  service,  working 
rules  may  be  attained,  even  in  the  present  stage  of  develop- 
ment of  the  law.  As  the  law  now  stands  there  are  various 
cases  as  to  the  supply  of  water  l  and  gas,2  and  the  installa- 
tion of  electricity  3  and  telephone,4  but  hardly  enough  as 


1  The  principal  cases  as  to  the 
district  within  which  water  supply 
must  be  extended  are: 

Connecticut. — T own  of  West 
Hartford  v.  Board  of  Water  Com- 
missioners, 68  Conn.  323,  36  Atl. 
786  (1896). 

Idaho. — Pocatello  Water  Co.  v. 
Standley,  7  Idaho,  155,  61  Pac.  518 
(1900). 

Illinois. — Rogers  Park  Water  Co. 
v.  Chicago,  131  111.  App.  35  (1907). 

Iowa. — Independent  Sch.  Dist. 
v.  Le  Mars  Water  &  Light  Co.,  131 
Iowa,  14, 107  N.  W.  944,  10  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  859  (1906). 

Kansas. — City,  of  Topeka  v.  To- 
peka  Water  Co.,  58  Kans.  349,  49 
Pac.  79  (1897). 

Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 
&  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 
244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

Pennsylvania. — Hyndman  Water 
Co.  v.  Borough  of  Hyndman,  7  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  191  (1898). 

2  The  principal  cases  as  to  the 
district  to  which  gas  supply  must 
be  extended  are: 

Indiana. — Rushville  v.  Rushville 
Natural  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575,  28 
N.  E.  853,  15  L.  R.  A.  321  (1892). 


New  Jersey. — Borough  of  Madi- 
son v.  Morristown  Gaslight  Co.,  65 
N.  J.  Eq.  356,  54  Atl.  439  (1903). 

New  York. — Jones  v.  Rochester 
Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  465,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  1105 
(1896). 

Pennsylvania. — C  o  r  b  e  t  v.  Oil 
City  Fuel  Supply  Co.,  21  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  80  (1902). 

West  Virginia. — Charleston  Nat. 
Gas  Co.  v.  Lowe  &  B.,  52  W.  Va. 
662,  44  S.  E.  410  (1901). 

Wisconsin. — S  h  e  p  a  r  d  v.  Mil- 
waukee Gas  Light  Co.,  6  Wis.  539, 
70  Am.  Dec.  479(1858). 

3  The  principal  cases  as  to  the 
district    within    which    electricity 
must  be  supplied  are: 

Illinois. — City  of  Chicago  v.  Mu- 
tual Electric  Light  &  Power  Co.,  55 
111.  App.  429  (1894). 

Massachusetts. — Weld  v.  Gas  & 
Electric  Light  Commissioners,  197 
Mass.  556,  84  N.  E.  101  (1908). 

New  York. — Moore  v.  Champlain 
Electric  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
289,  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  37  (1903). 

4  The  principal  cases  as  to   the 
district  within  which  telephone  in- 
stallation is  obligatory  are: 

[2431 


§  274  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

to  any  one  as  to  make  workable  law,  while  there  are  cer- 
tain similar  community  services  such  as  sewerage  and 
irrigation  as  to  which  there  are  hardly  any  cases  at  all, 
to  say  nothing  of  ticker  service  and  messenger  calls,  steam 
heat  and  refrigeration.  In  this  situation  the  peculiar 
advantages  of  treating  the  public  services  as  one  class 
governed  by  a  general  law  is  manifest. 

§  274.  Territorial  limits  fixed  by  franchise. 

In  the  first  place  it  is  necessary  to  determine  the  exterior 
limits  of  the  territory  served.  Usually  this  will  be  settled 
either  by  the  extent  of  the  powers  of  the  company  given 
in  its  charter  or  by  the  limits  of  the  franchise  granted. 
For  a  public  service  company  cannot  be  required  to  act 
ultra  vires  by  serving  outside  the  territory  described  in 
its  charter,  nor  can  it  be  asked  to  act  illegally  by  going 
into  territory  to  which  its  franchise  does  not  extend. 
This  problem  almost  invariably  reduces  itself  to  a  question 
of  construction.  Thus,  to  compare  two  recent  New  Jersey 
cases,1  a  charter  to  supply  a  certain  municipality  and  its 
"vicinity"  does  not  include  an  independent  municipality 
several  miles  distant;  but  a  charter  to  extend  the  service 
to  any  " neighboring  city"  authorizes  a  supply  at  a  con- 
siderable distance.  It  should  be  added  that  in  the  case  of 
a  service  conducted  by  a  municipality  the  inclination  is 
to  be  peculiarly  strict,  as  the  taxpayer's  money  ought  not 
to  be  risked  in  the  service  of  people  outside;  but  this  is  also 
in  the  hands  of  the  legislature,  the  question  being  as  to  its 

United  States. — Cumberland  Tele-  Pennsylvania. — Central  D.  &  P. 

phone  Co.  v.  Kelly,  160  Fed.  316,  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Commonwealth, 

87  C.  C.  A.  268  (1908).  114  Pa.  St.  592,  7  Atl.  926  (1886). 

Kansas. — Crouch  v.   Arnett,   71  1  Madison    v.    Morristown    Gas- 

Kans.  49,  79  Pac.  1086  (1905).  light  Co.,  65  N.  J.  Eq.  356,  54  Atl. 

Nebraska. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Ne-  439  (1903),  and  Millville  Improve- 

braska  Telephone  Co.,  17  Neb.  126,  ment  Co.  v.  Pitman  G.  &  C.  Gas 

22  N.  W.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  404  Co.,  75  N.  J.  L.  410,  67  Atl.  1005 

(1885).  (1907). 
[244] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  275 

intention.1  All  this  will  be  true  no  matter  how  small  the 
distance  outside  the  designated  limits  may  be;  the  appli- 
cant cannot  demand  that  the  service  company  shall  cross 
its  boundaries.  And  the  limitation  holds  unless  exception 
is  made  even  if  the  company's  mains  pass  the  applicant's 
premises  in  outlying  territory  on  their  way  to  the  com- 
munity served.2  This  will  of  course  be  otherwise  if  in 
accepting  the  franchise  granted  the  particular  company 
makes  profession  to  supply  along  the  mains  in  territory 
outside,  expressly  or  impliedly.3 

§  275.  Change  in  municipal  boundaries. 

Various  problems  of  practical  importance  arise  when 
there  is  a  subsequent  change  in  the  boundaries  of  the 
municipalities  to  which  the  original  grants  apply.  It  is 
properly  held  that  the  franchises  applying  to  territory  an- 
nexed remain  in  force;  and  the  existing  companies  should 
lose  no  rights  by  such  changes.  In  accordance  with  this 
principle  it  was  held  in  New  York  4  that  the  incorpo- 
ration of  part  of  a  town  in  which  a  franchise  had  been 
granted  in  another  village  did  not  affect  the  franchises 
of  the  company  in  the  territory  annexed;  and  the  village 
government  must  therefore  respect  them.  Nor  should 
the  company  in  the  annexed  territory  be  involved  in 
service  outside  the  former  limits.  But  as  to  the  company 
generally  empowered  to  serve  the  annexing  city  the  case 

1  Massachusetts. — Inhabitants    of          3  Connecticut. — Town     of      West 
Quincy  v.  Boston,  148  Mass.  389,      Hartford  v.  Board  of  Water  Com- 
19  N.  E.  519  (1889).  missioners,  68  Conn.  323,  36  Atl. 

England.— Pudsey  Coal  Gas  Co.  786  (1896). 

v.  Bradford,  L.R.  15  Eq.  167(1873).  Maine.— Mayo    v.    Village    Fire 

2  New  York.— City  of  Rochester  Co.,    96    Me.    539,    53    Atl.    62 
v.  Rochester  &  L.  O.  Water  Co.,  189  (1902). 

N.  Y.  323,  82  N.  E.  154  (1907).  «  People  ex  rel.  Woodhaven  Gas 

West  Virginia. — Gas  Co.  v.  Lowe  Co.  v.  Deehan,  153  N.  Y.  528,  47 

&  Bulter,  52  W.  Va.  662,  44  S.  E.  N.  E.  787  (1897). 
410  (1901). 

[245] 


§  276  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

may  be  different  by  proper  construction.  If  outlying 
districts  are  subsequently  incorporated  into  the  munici- 
pality within  which  the  franchise  runs  it  will  generally 
be  held  to  be  now  included  for  this  purpose.  Thus  it  is 
held  in  an  Alabama  case  1  that  persons  who  resided  be- 
yond the  city  limits  when  the  contract  was  made  but  who 
were  subsequently  brought  in  by  an  extension  of  the  cor- 
porate limits,  are  entitled  to  the  franchise  rates.  But  if 
the  incorporated  territory  constitutes  a  distinct  com- 
munity no  obligation  to  serve  should  result. 

§  276.  Obligation  beyond  the  profession. 

In  most  of  the  cases  under  this  topic  a  general  profes- 
sion to  serve  the  whole  community  will  be  found  either 
expressly  or  by  implication.  Where,  however,  no  such 
profession  can  be  found  for  defining  the  territory  served, 
the  company  cannot  upon  general  principles  be  held  to 
do  more  than  serve  the  district  which  their  present  serv- 
ice shows  them  to  be  engaged  in  serving  upon  a  public 
basis.  A  late  Kansas  case  2  so  involves  this  side  of  the 
problem  with  the  other  that  it  is  worth  full  discussion. 
The  decision  was  that  the  telephone  company  was  not 
obliged  to  continue  to  serve  a  householder  who  was  just 
outside  the  municipal  limits  and  but  a  few  feet  from  its 
pole  line,  although  he  had  been  given  service  and  others 
at  certain  points  outside  were  still  given  service.  The 
reasons  for  this  decision  are  thus  stated  by  Mr.  Justice 
Smith:  "  If  Mr.  Crouch  had  resided  in  the  city,  his  rights 
would  have  been  clear.  Being  outside,  a  question  of  fact 
was  presented  whether  in  removing  his  instrument  a  dis- 
crimination was  practiced  on  him — a  right  infringed  which 
he  enjoyed  in  common  with  others  situated  similarly. 

1  Mayor,  etc.,  City  of  Binning-         *  Crouch  v.  Arnett,  71  Kan.  49, 
ham    v.    Birmingham    Water    Co.      79  Pac.  1086  (1905). 
(Ala.),  42  So.  10  (1906). 

[246] 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  277 

A  telephone  company  operating  wholly  within  the  cor- 
porate limits  of  a  city  could  not  be  compelled  to  supply 
instruments  to  residents  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the 
town,  and  make  connections  therewith.  In  this  instance 
it  did  serve  patrons  outside  of  lola,  but  the  disputed 
question  was  whether  Mr.  Crouch,  by  reason  of  proximity 
and  other  conditions,  was  entitled  to  equal  rights  with 
them.  This  was  to  be  determined  from  the  testimony  of 
witnesses,  and  was  peculiarly  within  the  province  of  the 
trial  court."1 

§  277.  Establishment  of  delivery  limits. 

There  are  certain  services  in  which  the  company  under- 
takes delivery  within  a  community, — express  matter  and 
telegraph  messages  are  prominent  examples  of  this.  An 
express  company  2  by  its  general  profession  makes  it 
part  of  its  business  to  get  parcels  from  the  sender's  prem- 
ises and  to  deliver  these  parcels  to  the  person  addressed. 
Without  this  wider  profession,  the  express  company 
could  not  be  called  upon  to  perform  this  service  any  more 
than  any  other  carrier.  Whatever  limits  they  may  es- 
tablish within  which  they  will  call  for  and  deliver  parcels 
will  be  the  measure  of  their  undertaking  in  this  respect. 
In  the  same  way  telegraph  companies  3  undertake  some- 

1  Consistent  with  this  is  a  recent         As  is  intimated  in  the  text  the 
Massachusetts  case  that  where  an  common-law  duty  of  express  corn- 
electric     company     formally     an-  panics  to  make  free  delivery  of  par- 
nounces    its    withdrawal    from    an  eels  committed  to  their  care  is  not 
outlying  district  it  is  not  thereafter  such  as  to  preclude  them  from  fixing 
bound  to  supply  people  within  it.  charges  when   they   do   not   make 
Weld  v.  Gas  &  Electric  Commis-  such  deliveries,  and  requiring  con- 
sioners,  197  Mass.  556,  84  N.  E.  101  signees  to  pay  for  making  a  personal 
(1908).  delivery  to  them.    See  State  ex  rel. 

2  The  leading  case  on  this  point  Railroad    Commission    v.    Adams 
is  Bullard  v.  American  Express  Co.,  Exp.  Co.,  171  Ind.  138,  85  N.  E. 
107  Mich.  695,  65  N.  W.  551,  33  337, 19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  93  (1908). 
L.  R.  A.  66,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  358.         3  The  leading  case  on  this  point  is 

[2471 


§  278  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

times  to  go  for  messages  upon  call,  and  almost  always  to 
make  personal  delivery  of  messages  to  the  addressees. 
Even  this  would  not  be  so  without  this  general  profession. 
Telephone  companies  compel  casual  patrons  to  come  to 
the  pay  stations  themselves.  Here  again  the  company 
may  establish  limits  within  which  they  will  go  and  de- 
liver, and  this  undertaking  of  the  company  will  govern 
unless  they  make  some  special  limitation  of  an  outra- 
geous nature.  In  both  services  to  a  very  considerable  ex- 
tent all  this  is  a  question  of  the  practice  of  the  company 
in  the  localities  in  question  which  may  be  shown  either 
by  their  express  regulations  or  by  their  usual  custom. 

§  278.  What  limits  are  reasonable. 

The  delivery  limits  must  be  reasonably  large,  which 
means  that  all  the  surrounding  circumstances  must  be 
taken  into  account.  This  problem,  like  most  other  ques- 
tions of  public  service  can  come  up  in  one  of  two  ways. 
If  it  is  a  question  of  the  validity  of  the  legislation  fixing 
the  delivery  limits,  the  question  will  be  whether  the  re- 
quirement is  so  beyond  existing  demand  as  to  be  really 
outrageous.  Thus,  in  one  leading  case  l  of  this  sort  it  is 
held  that  a  statute  of  Indiana  requiring  personal  delivery 
of  express  matter  to  all  persons  to  whom  the  same  should 
be  addressed  living  within  the  corporation  limits  of  cities 
within  the  State  having  a  population  of  twenty-five  hun- 
dred or  more  inhabitants  does  not  work  unconstitutional 

Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  delivery,  unless  he  arranges  for  de- 
Trotter,  55  111.  App.  659  (1894).  livery  at  a  greater  distance.  See 
According  to  the  weight  of  au-  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hen- 
thority  of  where  a  telegraph  com-  derson,  89  Ala.  510,  7  So.  419,  18 
pany  has  established  free-delivery  Am.  St.  Rep.  148  (1889). 
limits,  notice  of  which  is  given  on  *  United  States  Express  Co.  v. 
its  blanks,  and  a  message  is  handed  State,  164  Ind.  196,  73  N.  E.  101 
in  for  transmission  without  explana-  (1905). 

tion,   the   presumption   is   the   re-  Kentucky. — See    Western    Union 

ceiver  lives  within  the  free-delivery  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Scott,  27  Ky.  L. 

limits,  and  the  sender  takes  risk  of  Rep.  975,  87  S.  W.  289  (1903). 
[2481 


EXTENT  OF  SERVICE  PROFESSED          [  §  279 

deprivation  of  liberty  or  property.  But  if  it  is  a  question 
whether  the  delivery  limits  which  the  company  has  fixed 
are  too  restricted,  then  the  court  will  hold  that  this  regu- 
lation of  the  company  should  not  be  overruled  unless  it 
is  shown  to  be  really  unreasonable.  Thus  a  rule  of  a 
telegraph  company  making  the  delivery  limit  for  a  town 
of  less  than  five  thousand  inhabitants  one  half  a  mile 
from  the  office  was  held  reasonable.1  Of  course  there 
may  be  particular  instances  where  the  company  cannot 
insist  upon  its  established  limits,  as  where  it  does  not 
generally  observe  them.2  And  there  may  be  towns  with 
so  small  a  population  as  to  not  support  any  delivery 
service  from  the  office.3  But  these  are  questions  to  be 
discussed  later. 

§  279.  Individual  installation  within  the  territory. 

These  are  largely  negative  principles  which  have  just 
been  stated;  and  although  service  is  not  required  outside 
the  territorial  limits  thus  defined,  it  does  not  follow  that 
service  is  owed  to  all  applicants  within  those  territorial 
limits.  Where  no  individual  installation  is  requisite  there 
is  naturally  no  special  problem,  for  it  is  practically  as 
easy  to  deliver  express  packages  or  telegraph  messages 
at  one  house  as  at  another  within  the  territory  served; 
but  where  special  installation  is  necessary,  as  laying  gas 
pipes  or  stringing  electric  wires,  a  very  difficult  problem 
arises  not  as  yet  solved.  If  one  could  believe  a  recent 
Idaho  case 4  the  problem  would  be  settled.  That  case  held 

1  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.          Texas. — Western     Union     Tele- 
Trotter,  55  111.  App.  659  (1894).  graph  Co.  v.  Swearingen,  95  Tex. 

See  also :  420,  67  S.  W.  767  (1902) . 

Georgia. — Moore  v.  Western  *  North  Carolina. — Gainey  v.  Tel- 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  87  Ga.  613,  egraph  Co.,  136  N.  C.  261,  48  S.  E. 
13  S.  E.  639  (1891).  653  (1904). 

2  South    Carolina. — Hellams      v.  4  Bothwell  v.  Consumers'  Co.,  13 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  70  Idaho,  568,  92  Pac.  533,  24  L.  R.  A. 
S.  C.  83,  49  S.  E.  12(1904).  (N.   S.)   485   (1907).     See  further 

[249] 


§  280  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

that  such  a  company  as  a  water  company  with  a  special 
franchise  to  supply  a  given  community  is  "under  a  public 
duty  to  supply  water  to  all  living  within  the  franchise  limits 
on  payment  of  the  established  rates.  It  owes  this  duty  to 
every  one  so  long  as  it  has  water  to  sell,  whether  he  be 
on  its  main  or  at  a  great  distance  therefrom."  l 

§  280.  Rights  of  abutting  owners. 

On  the  contrary  all  that  can  be  stated  with  entire  cer- 
tainty is  that  service  may  be  demanded  at  all  premises 
within  the  territorial  limits  that  are  adjacent  to  the  lines 
of  supply  established  for  that  purpose.2  Almost  all  the 
cases  in  the  books  in  which  this  problem  of  individual 
service  is  involved  thus  far  are  cases  of  refusal  to  supply 
those  who  have  premises  abutting  upon  the  street  through 
which  the  main  lines  of  supply  run;  and  although  this 
fact  is  adverted  to  in  many  of  them  the  obligation  to 
serve  the  community  usually  appears  as  the  basal  argu- 
ment without  regard  to  that  accidental  fact.  This  rule 
that  all  those  occupying  premises  upon  the  existing  mains 
must  be  served  should  not  be  taken  too  literally,  for  it 
does  not  follow  that  a  great  aqueduct  entering  the  city 
must  be  tapped  for  a  single  applicant  in  the  outskirts  of 

Pocatello  Water  Co.  v.  Standley,  7  trict  v.   Le   Mars   City   Water  & 

Ida.  155,  61  Pac.  518  (1900).  Light  Co.,  131  Iowa,  14,  107  N.  W. 

1  Going  too  far  to  the  opposite  944,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  859  (1906). 
extreme  is  the  case  which  suggests  North  Carolina. — Griffin  v.  Golds- 
that  a  telephone  company  is  never  boro  Water  Co.,  122  N.  C.  206,  30 
bound    to    construct    a    new    line  S.  E.  319,  41  L.  R.  A.  240  (1898). 
against  its  will.     Hockett  v.  State,  Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 
105  Ind.  250,  599,  5  N.  E.  202,  250  &  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 
(1885).  244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

2  In  the  following  cases  this  point  Pennsylvania.  —  Commonwealth 
is  emphasized :  v.  Wilkes-Barre  Gas  Co.,  2  Kulp, 

Indiana.— Portland  Nat.  Gas  &  499  (1883). 

Oil  Co.  v.  State,   135  Ind.  54,  34         Wisconsin. — Shepard  v.  Milwau- 

N.  E.  818,  21  L.  R.  A.  639  (1893).  kee  Gas  Light  Co.,  6  Wis.  539,  70 

Iowa. — Independent  School  Dis-  Am.  Dec.  479  (1858). 

[250] 


[§281 

the  community,  or  a  high  current  for  street  lighting  trans- 
formed for  domestic  purposes.1  Even  at  those  premises 
abutting  upon  supply  lines  extraordinary  service  may  not 
be  demanded ;  very  probably  a  waterworks  need  not  pro- 
vide sufficient  pressure  to  serve  an  abnormally  high  build- 
ing, nor  a  gas  works  lay  its  service  pipes  to  abutting  prem- 
ises through  a  solid  ledge. 

§  281.  Obligation  to  the  community. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  problems  raised  in  this  topic 
have  not  been  disposed  of  as  yet.  It  is  plain  that  the 
existing  facilities  must  in  many  instances  be  further  de- 
veloped in  readiness  to  give  service  to  those  beyond  the 
present  lines,  since  what  has  really  been  undertaken  is 
the  proper  service  of  the  whole  community  dependent 
upon  the  established  company.  This  at  least  involves 
the  well-settled  central  territory  within  which  service  is 
plainly  demanded,  whether  mains  have  been  laid  in  all 
the  streets  or  not.  Certainly  all  premises  situated  within 
the  network  of  the  existing  mains  and  within  conven- 
ient connecting  distance  of  their  lines  should  be  served.2 
All  of  these  premises  come  within  the  sphere  of  influ- 
ence, already  established,  differing  slightly  from  premises 
abutting.  But  the  law  will  soon  require,  if  it  does  not 
already,  that  the  existing  mains  must  be  gradually  ex- 
tended as  the  growth  of  population  in  the  community 
which  the  corporation  has  undertaken  to  serve  demands 
the  expansion.3 

1  See  Moore  v.  Champlain  Elec-     Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App. 
trie  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  289,  85      Div.    465,   39   N.   Y.    Supp.    1105 
N.  Y.  Supp.  37  (1903).  (1896). 

But   see   Whitehouse   v.    Staten  Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 

Island  Water  Co.,  91  N.  Y.  Supp.  &  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 

544, 101  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  112  (1905).  244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

2  See  on  this  branch  of  the  prob-  3  See  on  this  branch  of  the  prob- 
lem: lem: 

New  York. — Jones  v.  Rochester         Kansas. — City  of  Topeka  v.  To- 

[251] 


§  282  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  282.  Reasonable  limitations  upon  expansion. 

All  that  has  been  laid  down  here  must  be  qualified 
as  in  a  recent  New  Jersey  case  z  dealing  with  gas  sup- 
ply where  it  is  said,  "In  short,  is  not  the  obligation  to 
supply  a  dwelling  or  tenement  with  gas,  and  for  that 
purpose  to  lay  down  a  supply  pipe  and  set  a  meter  sub- 
ject to  the  limitation,  that  there  shall  exist  a  reasonable 
expectation  that  the  consumption  of  gas  shall  be  sufficient 
to  warrant  the  necessary  preliminary  expenditure?  "  As 
this  is  a  relative  test  it  will  be  seen  why  comparatively 
little  has  to  be  assured  when  it  is  the  question  of  going  a 
few  feet  off  the  established  mains;  the  usual  consumption 
of  the  average  customer  would  secure  that.  But  in- 
stallation for  a  single  person  at  some  distance  from  the 
established  mains  would  not  be  obligatory  in  ordinary 
conditions.2  Following  out  the  general  principle  still 
further,  the  building  of  a  few  houses  would  call  for  the 
extension  of  a  main  a  little  further  along  a  street.  But 
a  great  deal  of  business  must  be  shown  in  order  to  es- 
tablish certainly  the  present  obligation  to  construct  new 
lines  into  outlying  territory.  The  undertaking  to  serve 
a  community  does  not,  therefore,  lay  the  company  open 
to  outrageous  demands  in  individual  cases,  but  to  such 
service  as  the  community  considered  as  a  whole  may  de- 
mand. 


peka  Water  Co.,  58  Kans.  349,  49  can  Lighting  Co.,  67  N.  J.  Eq.  122, 

Pac.  79  (1897).  57  Atl.  482  (1904). 

Pennsylvania. — Hyndman  Water  2  See,  further,  Inhabitants  of 

Co.  v.  Borough  of  Hyndman,  7  Pa.  Quincy  v.  Boston,  148  Mass.  389, 

Super.  Ct.  (1898).  19  N.  E.  519  (1889). 

1  Public  Service  Corp.  v.  Ameri- 


252 


CHAPTER  IX 

WITHDRAWAL   FROM   PUBLIC    EMPLOYMENT 

§  290.  Elements  of  the  problem. 

Topic  A.  Possibility  of  Total  Withdrawal 
§291.  Closing  an  inn. 

292.  Discontinuing  a  ferry. 

293.  Making  a  warehouse  private. 

294.  Withdrawing  a  wharf  from  public  use. 

295.  Giving  up  common  carriage. 

296.  Taking  up  a  railway. 

297.  Shutting  off  water  supply. 

298.  Discontinuing  further  gas  supply. 

299.  Duty  devolved  upon  municipality. 

300.  No  excuse  for  default  in  charter  obligation. 

301.  Effect  of  absolute  insolvency. 

302.  Obligation  persists  so  long  as  franchise  retained. 

Topic  B.  Abandonment  of  a  Certain  District 

§  303.  Right  to  withdraw  from  particular  district. 

304.  Doctrine  applies  only  to  constructed  portions. 

305.  Discontinuance  by  public  permission. 

306.  System  constructed  under  permissive  charter. 

307.  Cases  permitting  partial  withdrawal. 

308.  Abandoned  service  must  be  separable. 

Topic  C.  Abandonment  of  a  particular  service 
§  309.  Right  to  withdraw  from  a  particular  service. 

310.  Service  demanded  by  charter. 

311.  Partial  withdrawal  generally  permitted. 

312.  Temporary  withdrawal  not  permissible. 

313.  Service  abandoned  must  be  separable. 

Topic  D.  Reasonable  Notice  of  Withdrawal 
§  314.  Notice  of  withdrawal  necessary. 

315.  Colorable  withdrawal. 

316.  Situation  requires  reasonable  notice. 

[2531 


§§  290,  291  ]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  317.  What  constitutes  reasonable  notice. 

318.  Substituting  one  service  for  another. 

319.  Results  of  consolidating  services. 

320.  Division  of  territory  served. 

§  290.  Elements  of  the  problem. 

It  has  been  seen  that  one  comes  into  public  service 
only  by  voluntarily  engaging  in  the  particular  business 
upon  a  public  basis;  and  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  one 
could  get  out  of  public  employment  simply  by  publicly 
withdrawing  his  original  profession.  It  would  seem  to 
us  to  be  intolerable  if  a  man  who  happened  to  possess 
convenient  facilities  were  obliged  to  serve  the  public  if 
he  had  never  undertaken  to  do  so;  and  it  would  be  equally 
oppressive  if  a  man  were  obliged  to  continue  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  public  after  he  had  announced  his  permanent 
withdrawal  from  the  employment.  And  yet  the  problem  is 
not  altogether  as  simple  as  it  seems.  What  has  been  said 
may  satisfactorily  dispose  of  the  ultimate  right  to  aban- 
don the  whole  undertaking;  but  may  this  be  done  with- 
out reasonable  notice  to  the  trusting  public?  Moreover, 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  total  abandonment  does 
not  settle  the  case  of  partial  withdrawal  by  one  remain- 
ing otherwise  in  public  employment  from  a  part  of  the 
territory  served  or  from  a  branch  of  the  service  offered. 
It  may  be  this  can  be  done  under  proper  conditions,  but 
certainly  it  is  a  matter  which  requires  serious  considera- 
tion. As  the  authorities  on  this  most  important  question 
are  few,  full  discussion  of  the  cases  seems  necessary. 

Topic  A.  Possibility  of  Total  Withdrawal 

§  291.  Closing  an  inn. 

It  has  been  agreed  from  ancient  tunes  that  an  inn- 
keeper may  withdraw  from  his  business  whenever  he 
feels  so  inclined.  In  one  early  case  *  it  is  said  that  "an 

1  Rex  v.  Collins,  Palmer,  373  (1623). 
[254] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBL!C  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  292,  293 

innkeeper  may  at  his  pleasure  demolish  his  sign  and  leave 
off  innkeeping."  And  in  a  modern  case  1  it  was  intimated 
that  after  a  sale  of  his  business  the  former  innkeeper 
would  not  be  under  any  further  duty.  "True,  the  hotel 
went  by  the  same  name;  but  it  is  common  to  keep  the 
same  name  even  though  the  proprietors  change." 

§  292.  Discontinuing  a  ferry. 

Similar  in  character  are  the  decisions  recognizing  the 
right  of  a  ferryman  to  abandon  his  profession.  In  one 
extraordinary  case  2  a  ferryman  was  at  first  convicted  for 
"wholly  discontinuing  the  public  ferry  he  had  previously 
kept  for  the  convenience  of  setting  over  from  Shirley  to 
City  Point  persons,  carriages,  chairs  and  horses."  But 
by  the  upper  court  the  judgment  was  reversed  upon  the 
ground  that:  "The  discontinuance  is  the  penalty  which 
the  law  attaches  to  the  failure  of  the  ferryman  to  exercise 
his  privilege  of  keeping  the  ferry;  and  there  is  no  law 
which  makes  the  discontinuance  an  offence." 

§  293.  Making  a  warehouse  private. 

In  the  leading  case  as  to  the  public  duties  of  elevator 
men,  Munn  v.  Illinois,3  it  is  recognized  in  the  paragraph 
most  often  quoted  that  just  as  one  gets  himself  into  pub- 
lic business  by  devoting  his  property  to  public  service, 
so  he  may  withdraw  himself  from  public  service  by  vol- 
untary retraction.  "When,  therefore,  one  devotes  his 
property  to  a  use  in  which  the  public  has  an  interest,  he, 
in  effect,  grants  to  the  public  an  interest  in  that  use,  and 
must  be  subject  to  be  controlled  by  the  public  for  the 
common  good  to  the  extent  of  the  interest  he  has  thus 
created.  He  may  withdraw  his  grant  by  discontinuing 

1  Conklin  v.  Prospect  Park  Hotel         2  Carter  v.  The  Commonwealth, 
Co.,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  406,  48  Hun,  619     2  Va.  Gas.  354  (1823). 
(1888).  » Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113, 

24  L.  ed.  77  (1876). 

[255] 


§§  294,  295  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  use,  but  so  long  as  he  maintains  the  use,  he  must 
submit  to  the  control."  l 

§  294.  Withdrawing  a  wharf  from  public  use. 

In  a  late  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  this  distinction  in  Munn  v.  Illinois  2  was  empha- 
sized further.  Certain  parties  were  endeavoring  to  make 
perpetual  the  use  of  the  wharves  in  question  which  they 
had  formerly  enjoyed  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the 
public.  They  relied  upon  the  doctrine  of  Munn  v.  Illi- 
nois, to  show  that  the  public  had  acquired  an  interest 
in  that  use.  But  the  Court  said: 3  "  The  right  to  use  the 
property  has  been  withdrawn  by  the  owner  as  to  the  pub- 
lic in  general,  including  defendant.  The  only  question  is 
whether  a  third  person  has  the  right  to  use  a  private 
wharf  on  tendering  reasonable  compensation  therefor,  be- 
cause there  is  no  other  wharf  at  the  place,  or  because  it 
would  be  more  convenient  to  such  third  person  to  so  use 
it  or  because  the  former  owner  of  the  wharf  had  per- 
mitted the  public  to  use  it,  although  the  present  owner 
refused  to  consent  to  such  use.  There  is  no  more  reason 
why  such  property  should  be  held  subject  to  the  right  of 
others  to  use  it  against  the  will  of  its  owner  than  there  is 
for  any  other  kind  of  property  to  be  so  held." 

§  295.  Giving  up  common  carriage. 

It  is  also  clear  from  early  authorities  that  a  person  who 
has  once  engaged  in  common  carriage  may  withdraw 
from  that  public  employment  and  may  thereafter  engage 

1  See  also  the  language  in  the  fol-  2  94    U.    S.   113,   24    L.    ed.    77 

lowing    cases   dealing   with    ware-  (1876). 

houses:  *  Weems  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Peo- 

Kentucky—  Nash  v.  Page,  80  Ky.  pie's  Steamboat  Co.,  214  U.  S.  345, 

539,  44  Am.  Rep.  490  (1882).  53  L.   ed.    1024,   29  Sup.  Ct.  661 

Virginia.— Glass    v.    Davis,    23  (1909). 
Gratt.  184  (1873). 

[256] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT    [  §  296 

in  private  carriage  without  being  held  liable  as  a  common 
carrier.  In  the  leading  case  of  this  sort  the  New  York 
Superior  Court  1  said:  "The  defendant  stood  upon  the 
same  footing  as  though  he  had  never  been  engaged  in  the 
forwarding  business.  He  had  abandoned  it  entirely  cer- 
tainly one  year,  and,  according  to  the  weight  of  evidence, 
four  years  previous  to  this  transaction.  He  makes  a 
special  contract  with  Dows  to  bring  goods  for  him  from 
Albany,  and  gives  his  teamster  express  instruction  to 
bring  goods  for  no  one  else.  He  was  acting  under  a 
special  contract  and  not  in  the  capacity  of  a  common 
carrier."  2 

§  296.  Taking  up  a  railway. 

It  will  have  been  noted  that  in  the  case  of  the  busi- 
nesses thus  far  discussed,  there  has  been  no  question  of 
special  obligations  by  reason  of  the  acceptance  from  the 
State  of  special  privileges.  In  most  modern  cases  it  will 
usually  be  found  that  the  company  in  question  has  some 
charter  obligations  to  reckon  with.  It  is  conceded  that 
so  long  as  any  public  franchises  are  exercised  public 
service  must  be  rendered.  But  even  in  the  case  of  a  rail- 
road company  which  has  accepted  extraordinary  privi- 
leges it  would  seem  that  if  it  is  ready  to  give  up  its  char- 
ter it  may  withdraw  from  its  entire  undertaking.  In  all 
the  cases  on  this  point  mandamus  to  compel  the  company 
to  resume  operations  has  been  refused.  It  is  true  that  in 
the  actual  cases  the  railroad  thus  totally  abandoned  has 
almost  invariably  been  operated  at  heavy  loss.  But  then, 
as  several  cases  point  out,  their  owners  do  not  as  a  prac- 
tical matter  abandon  a  profitable  railroad;  even  if.  those 
who  are  conducting  it  tire  of  operating  it  they  can  sell 
a  profitable  railroad  to  those  who  will  maintain  it.  "If 

1  Satterlee  v.  Groat,  1  Wend.  272,  2  See  also  Johnson  v.  Midland 
(1828).  Ry.  Co.,  4  Exch.  at  p.  373  (1849). 

17  [  257  1 


§  297  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

we  are  at  liberty  to  suggest  on  what  the  legislature  very 
probably  relied  for  the  continued  operation  of  a  railroad, 
once  constructed,  we  should  say  it  was  the  interest  of  the 
owners.  If  it  can  be  operated  profitably,  the  interest  of 
those  concerned  will  rarely,  if  ever,  fail  to  keep  it  in  op- 
eration so  as  to  subserve  the  public  use.  If  it  cannot,  we 
know  of  no  mode  by  which  the  State  can  compel  those 
by  whom  it  was  constructed  to  operate  it  at  a  loss,  and 
certainly  there  is  no  mode  provided  by  which  it  can  be 
operated  at  the  risk  of  the  State."  1  In  some  cases  this  is 
developed  into  a  legal  explanation.  As  is  said  inciden- 
tally by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court:  "The  ques- 
tion is  not  as  to  the  existence  of  the  duty,  but  as  to  its 
extent  and  qualifications.  The  duty  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany is  not  more  than  to  meet  the  public  wants.  If 
trains  are  run  at  reasonable  and  moderate  fares,  and  can- 
not be  supported,  it  is  because  they  are  not  needed."  2 

§  297.  Shutting  off  water  supply. 

There  are  sufficient  dicta  hi  the  books  to  the  effect 
that  a  chartered  company  even  if  possessing  special  priv- 
ileges may  withdraw  from  its  enterprise  altogether.  The 
strongest  language  of  this  sort  is  in  a  recent  California 
case  3  which  decides,  not  inconsistently,  that  so  long  as 
water  service  is  maintained  under  the  franchises  held,  the 
whole  system  must  be  kept  in  operation.  "We  do  not 
mean  to  say  that  a  corporation  engaged  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  water  to  public  uses  may  not  abandon  its  property 

1  Quoted  from  Coe  v.  Columbus,      Co.  v.  Dustin,  142  U.  S.  492,  499, 
P.  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Ohio  St.  372,      35  L.  ed.  1092,  1095,  12  Sup.  Ct. 
75  Am.  Dec.  518  (1859).  283,  285  (1891). 

See  also  State  v.  Dodge  City,  M.  And  see  Jack  v.  Williams,   113 

&  T.   Ry.  Co.,  53  Kans.  329,  36  Fed.  823  (1902). 

Pac.  755,  24  L.  R.  A.   564,  note  3  Quoted   from    Fellows    v.    Los 

(1894).  Angeles,  151  Cal.  52,  90  Pac.  137 

2  Quoted  from   No.   Pacific  Ry.  (1907). 

[258] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  298,  299 

and  quit  the  business,  without  being  subject  to  manda- 
tory proceedings  to  compel  it  to  continue  to  carry  it  on. 
It  may  find  it  impossible  to  go  on.  Its  supply  may  be- 
come exhausted  or  be  insufficient  for  paramount  needs; 
the  rates  fixed  by  law  may  be  too  small  to  enable  it  to 
operate  at  a  profit,  or  without  substantial  loss;  or,  it  may 
conclude,  without  any  reason  which  the  law  would  con- 
sider sufficient,  that  it  will  not  continue.  In  case  of  a 
natural  person  it  might  become  physically  impossible. 
We  do  not  intend  to  declare  that  in  any  such  case  man- 
datory process  would  be  issued  to  compel  the  personal 
performance  of  the  duty."  1 

§  298.  Discontinuing  further  gas  supply. 

In  another  late  case  2  where  the  charter  of  the  gas  com- 
pany in  question  was  plainly  permissive,  and  where 
moreover  the  contract  with  the  municipality  in  question 
which  constituted  its  franchise  had  expired,  it  was  held 
that  this  company  could  not  be  stayed  from  discontin- 
uing the  supply  of  gas  in  the  municipality.  "It  comes 
then  to  this,"  said  the  Ohio  court,  "if  the  refusal  to  com- 
ply is  final,  the  company  necessarily  incurs  the  penalty 
of  forfeiture  of  its  franchise  to  serve  the  people  of  the 
city;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  there  being  no  provision  to 
that  effect  in  the  original  contract,  the  city  cannot  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  deprive  the  gas  company  of  its  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law  when  the  latter  with- 
draws from  the  further  exercise  of  its  franchise."  3 

§  299.  Duty  devolved  upon  municipality. 
Where  the  duty  of  operating  a  service  is  devolved  upon 

1  See  also  Asher  v.   Hutchinson          3  Citing  for  this  paragraph,  Cleve- 
Water,  L.  &  P.  Co.,  66  Kan.  496,  71  land  Electric  Co.  v.  Cleveland,  204 
Pac.  813,  61  L.  R.  A.  52  (1903).  U.  S.  116,  27  Sup.  Ct.  202,  51  L.  ed. 

2  East  Ohio  Gas  Co.  v.  Akron,  81  399  (1906). 
Oh.  St.  33,  90  N.  E.  40  (1909). 

[259] 


§  299  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

a  municipality,  mandamus  will  always  be  granted  when 
by  proper  construction  of  its  charter  the  duty  is  man- 
datory, for  it  is  clear  that  the  legislature  may  direct  the 
action  of  a  municipality  even  to  the  extent  of  imposing 
pecuniary  burdens.  Thus  in  a  recent  decision  *  the  city 
of  New  York  was  ordered  to  continue  the  operation  of 
the  Brooklyn  ferries;  Mr.  Justice  Blackmar  saying:  "One 
reason  why  the  broad  powers  conferred  by  section  fifteen 
were  given  to  a  municipal  instead  of  a  private  corpora- 
tion was  that  a  municipal  corporation  would  in  estab- 
lishing the  ferries  be  moved  rather  by  considerations  of 
public  good  than  of  profit.  Discretion  as  to  the  location 
of  new  ferries  was  therefore  wisely  vested  in  the  city. 
But  as  to  ferries  already  established,  a  different  condi- 
tion is  presented.  The  growth  and  development  of  the 
city  and  of  the  connected  territory  on  the  opposite  shores 
are  largely  influenced  by  the  existence  of  the  ferries. 
They  are  continuations  of  highways.  Their  cessation  or 
re-location  would  seriously  injure  that  portion  of  the  com- 
munity which  had  established  its  business  and  located 
its  residences  relying  on  these  means  of  transportation."  2 

1  Matter  of  Wheeler,  62   N.  Y.      Bridgeton  &  M.  Traction  Co.,  62 
Misc.    37,   115    N.    Y.  Supp.   605      N.  J.  L.  592, 43  Atl.  715,  45  L.  R.  A. 
(1908).  837  (1899). 

2  Citing  among  other  cases:  New  York. — People  v.  Rome,  W. 
United  States—  Union  Pac.  R.  R.      &  O.  R.  R.,  103  N.  Y.  95,  8  N.  E. 

v.  Hall,  91  U.  S.  343,  23  L.  ed.  428  369  (1886);  Mayor,   etc.,  of   New 

(1875).  York  v.  Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1, 12  N.  E. 

Connecticut. — State  v.  Hartford  &  631  (1887);  Baird    v.  Supervisors, 

New  Haven  R.  R.,  29  Conn.  538  138  N.  Y.  95,  33  N.  E.  827  (1893); 

(1861).  People  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  142 

Georgia.— Savannah,  etc.,  Canal  N.  Y.  271,  36  N.  E.  1062  (1894); 

Co.  v.  Shuman,  91  Ga.  400,  17  S.  E.  People   v.    Northern    Central  Ry. 

937,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  43  (1893).  Co.,  164  N.  Y.  289,  58  N.  E.  138 

Massachusetts. — Attorney      Gen-  (1900). 

eral  v.  City  of  Boston,  123  Mass.  England. — The  King  v.  Severn  & 

460  (1877).  Wye   Ry.   Co.,    2    B.   &  Aid.   646 

New   Jersey. — State     ex   rel.    v.  (1819). 

[260] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT     [  §  300 

§  300.  No  excuse  for  default  in  charter  obligation. 

Where  there  is  such  an  explicit  provision  in  the  char- 
ter accepted  making  full  operation  obligatory,  the  char- 
tered company  cannot  interpose  in  any  proceedings  to 
compel  it  to  act  in  accordance  with  its  charter  obligations 
any  such  excuse  as  that  the  abandoned  service  is  un- 
profitable. As  it  is  said  tersely  in  one  early  case  l  where 
the  railroad  had  received  public  lands  in  consideration  for 
the  construction  of  its  line:  "The  fact  that  the  opera- 
tion of  the  road  is  unprofitable  furnishes  no  excuse  what- 
ever for  the  failure  to  comply  with  the  conditions  of  the 
grant,  and  the  State  may  compel  a  compliance  with  the 
terms  of  the  contract  by  mandamus  or  other  appropriate 
remedy."  'Nor  do  the  more  extreme  facts  that  whole 
service  is  made  unprofitable  furnish  any  excuse  for  aban- 
doning the  unprofitable  part;  for  the  services  required 
must  be  performed  while  the  franchise  is  retained.  "It 
is  a  continuing  condition  co-extensive  with  the  grant  it- 
self which  applies  so  long  as  the  company  have  the  right 
to  use  and  enjoy  the  franchise."  2 

1  Quoted    from    State    v.    Sioux  Co.,  71  la.  410,  32  N.  W.  409,  60 

City  &  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Neb.  357  Am.  Rep.  806  (1887). 

(1878).  Massachusetts. — Brownell  v.  Old 

The  following  cases  are  founded  Colony  R.R.,  164  Mass.  29,  41  N.  E. 

on  the  principle  that  an  explicit  107,  29  L.  R.  A.  169,  49  Am.  St. 

charter  provision  requiring  opera-  Rep.  442  (1895). 

tion   of   a   public   system   will   be  Michigan. — People   v.   Plainfield 

enforced:  Ave.  Gravel  Road  Co.,  105  Mich.  9, 

United  States.— United  States  v.  62  N.  W.  998  (1895). 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  160  U.  S.  1,  Nebraska. — State  v.  Sioux  City  & 

40    L.  ed.  319,    16    Sup.   Ct.   190  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Neb.  357  (1878). 

(1895).  New   York.— People  v.   The  Al- 

Illinois.— Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  bany  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  261, 

Co.  v.  Suffern,  129  111.  274,  21  N.  E.  82  Am.  Dec.  295  (1862). 

824  (1889).  England.— Regina    v.    Bristol    & 

Indiana.— Lake  Erie  &  Western  Exeter  Ry.  Co.,  4  Q.  B.  162  (1843). 

H.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  139  Ind.  158,  2  Quoted  from  People  v.  Troy  & 

38  N.  E.  596  (1894).  B.   R.   R.   Co.,   37   How.   Pr.   427 

loioa. — State  v.  Central  Iowa  Ry.  (1869). 

[2611 


§§301,302]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  301.  Effect  of  absolute  insolvency. 

But  if  a  public  service  corporation  begins  operations 
under  a  charter  in  which  it  bargains  in  return  for  its 
franchises  to  render  regular  service  over  its  whole  system 
at  all  times,  it  would  seem  that  there  can  be  no  excuse 
from  this  obligation  in  whole  or  in  part.  Indeed,  default 
therein  will  be  a  sufficient  ground  for  forfeiture  of  its 
charter.  No  matter  how  good  its  excuses  may  be,  the  un- 
profitable character  of  the  business  does  not  absolve  the 
company  from  full  performance.  It  is  true  that  where 
actual  insolvency  plainly  appears  mandamus  should  not 
issue.  "  The  court  will  not  make  a  useless  or  futile  order — 
it  will  not  do  a  vain  thing."  l  But  the  very  fact  of  de- 
fault in  the  obligation  is  sufficient  ground  for  forfeiture. 
"Inability  to  perform  its  functions,  no  matter  what  the 
reason,  is  one  of  the  most  potent  grounds  for  forfeiture."  2 

§  302.  Obligation  persists  so  long  as  franchise  is  retained. 
If  the  franchise  accepted  by  the  particular  public  serv- 
ice company  is  mandatory  in  terms  it  would  seem  that 
this  constituted  an  irrevocable  obligation  voluntarily  as- 
sumed at  the  outset  from  which  the  company  could  not 
withdraw  at  its  pleasure.3  That  Georgia  case  4  is  cer- 

1  Quoted  from  State  v.   Dodge,  seems  that  the  railroad  company 
City,  M.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Kana.  must    continue  in    full    operation. 
329,  36  Pac.  755  (1894).  See: 

2  Quoted  from  People  v.  Plain-  United  States. — People  v.   Colo- 
field  Ave.  Gravel  Road  Company,  rado  Central  Ry.,  42  Fed.  638  (1890). 
105     Mich.     9,     62     N.    W.     998  Minnesota.— State    v.    Southern 
(1895).  Minnesota  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn.  40 

See    also    Mobile,  J.  &    Kansas  (1871). 

City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mississippi,  210  Nebraska. — State  v.  Sioux  City  & 

U.  S.  187,  52  L.  ed.  1016,  28  Sup.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Neb.  357  (1878). 

Ct.  650  (1908).     And  see  further  New  York.— People  v.  Albany  & 

Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  91  Vermont  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  261, 

U.  S.  343,  23.  L.  ed.  428  (1875).  82  Am.  Dec.  295  (1862). 

3  Where    there  is  a  mandatory  4  Savannah  &  O.  Canal  Co.  v. 
provision  in  the  charter  accepted  Shuman,  91  Ga.  400,  17  S.  E.  937, 
requiring    permanent    service,     it  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  43  (1893). 

[2621 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT    [  §  303 

tainly  conservative  which  holds  that  a  canal  company 
having  accepted  a  mandatory  charter  making  it  its  duty 
to  keep  its  whole  system  in  navigable  condition  should 
be  ordered  to  conform  to  its  charter.  "So  long  as  the 
corporation  retains  its  franchise,  it  will  not  be  allowed 
to  urge  as  an  excuse  for  failing  to  perform  any  duty  re- 
quired of  it  by  its  charter,  that  the  same  would  be  un- 
profitable. It  cannot  consistently  keep  the  franchise  and 
refuse  to  perform  the  duties  incident  thereto  for  the  mere 
reason  that  such  performance  would  be  unremunerative. 
If  the  rights,  privileges  and  franchises  granted  by  the 
charter  are  in  connection  with  the  corresponding  duties 
imposed  no  longer  desirable,  the  company  should  simply 
surrender  the  charter."  Moreover,  so  long  as  the  com- 
pany assumes  to  remain  in  enjoyment  of  a  permissive 
charter  it  is  held  to  its  public  obligations.1  But  if  its 
franchise  has  expired  it  should  be  obvious  that  whether 
the  charter  be  mandatory  or  permissive  the  company 
cannot  be  forced  to  perform  services  when  it  has  no  legal 
right  to  act.2 

Topic  B.  Abandonment  of  a  Certain  District 

§  303.  Right  to  withdraw  from  particular  district. 

As  an  abstract  matter  the  rule  as  to  partial  withdrawal 
from  the  territory  served  might  seem  to  be  that  the  pub- 
lic servant  may  withdraw  from  any  severable  part.  This 
is  as  before  undoubted  where  the  service  has  received 
no  aid  from  the  State.  Thus  a  carrier  over  the  highways 
could  certainly  shorten  his  route  by  cutting  off  some  out- 

1  California. — Fellows  v.  Los  An-  2  United  States. — L aighton  v. 

geles,    151    Cal.   52,   90    Pac.   137  Carthage,  175  Fed.  145  (1909). 

(1907).  Ohio.— East    Ohio    Gas    Co.    v. 

Ohio.— Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Zanes-  Akron,  81  Oh.  St.  33,  90  N.  E.  40 

ville,  47  Oh.  St.  35,  23  N.  E.  60  (1909). 
(1889). 

[263] 


§  304  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

lying  road;  or  the  owner  of  several  hotels  could  convert 
one  into  a  boarding  house.  But  the  problem  is  much 
complicated  when  the  service  company  has  accepted  a 
charter  granting  it  special  privileges  under  which  it  still 
wishes  to  act.  In  such  a  case  it  is  plain,  at  least  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  just  discussed,  that  if  the 
charter  is  mandatory  in  requiring  full  service  through- 
out the  whole  territory  no  discontinuance  can  be  made. 
But,  as  will  be  seen  presently  there  is  conflict  of  au- 
thority as  to  whether  there  may  be  a  withdrawal  from  a 
part  of  the  service  where  the  charter  is  permissive. 

§  304.  Doctrine  applies  only  to  constructed  portions. 

The  doctrine  as  usually  stated  is  not  that  the  accept- 
ance of  a  charter  containing  permission  to  construct 
obliges  all  the  construction  described,  but  that  as  por- 
tions of  the  plant  are  constructed  in  accordance  with  the 
franchises  granted,  their  operation  becomes  obligatory. 
It  seems  to  have  once  been  held  in  England  that  a  railroad 
company  by  accepting  its  enabling  charter  became  bound 
to  build  the  line  described.1  But  this  was  early  over- 

1  "Now  the  objects  and  purposes  tage,'  would  result,  the  eastern  ter- 
for  which  this  company  has  been  in-  minus  being  a  sea  port  of  greater 
corporated  and  empowered,  or,  in  consequence  than  any  in  those  east- 
the  words  of  the  passage  cited,  what  ern  districts  together  with  a  minute 
the  legislature  has  empowered  and  description  of  the  whole  line,  and  a 
compelled  them  to  do  and  to  submit  particular  enumeration  of  all  the 
to,  are  too  clear  to  admit  of  any  places  through  which  it  is  to  pass, 
doubt.  The  title  of  the  act  itself  precludes  all  question  on  this  mat- 
'  for  making  a  railway  from  London  ter.  We  consider  it  to  be  equally 
to  Norwich  and  Yarmouth,'  the  undeniable  that  to  carry  the  rail- 
benefits  recited  in  the  preamble  as  road  through  a  portion  only  of  the 
likely  to  result  from  opening  a  com-  described  line,  such  as  a  third  or  a 
munication,  not  only  between  the  half,  is  a  nominal,  and  not  a  real, 
towns  there  more  particularly  enu-  compliance  with  the  meaning  of  the 
merated,  but  also  between  the  me-  act  of  Parliament."  Reg.  v.  East- 
tropolis  and  the  eastern  districts  of  ern  Counties  Ry.  Co.,  10  Ad.  &  El. 
the  kingdom,  from  which  it  is  al-  531  (1839). 
leged  that  'great  public  advan- 

[2641 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT    [  §  305 

ruled  and  the  general  doctrine  now  is  that  a  permissive 
charter  simply  enables  the  company  to  build  without 
making  construction  obligatory,  although  it  will  often  be 
provided  that  the  part  of  the  franchise  not  used  shall  be 
forfeited  for  nonuser.  In  establishing  the  present  rule 
the  leading  English  case  l  declared  that  to  say  that  there 
is  no  difference  between  words  of  requirement  and  words 
of  authority  when  found  in  such  acts  is  simply  to  affirm 
that  the  legislature  does  not  know  the  meaning  of  the 
commonest  expressions,  nor  appreciates  the  various  ways 
in  which  such  a  situation  may  be  treated  in  different 
cases.  The  case  concluded  thus:  "It  is  not  for  the  pub- 
lic interest  that  the  work  should  be  undertaken  by  an 
incompetent  company,  nor  that  it  should  be  begun,  if, 
when  made,  it  would  not  be  remunerative.  By  leaving 
the  exercise  of  the  powers  to  the  option  of  the  company, 
the  legislature  adopts  the  safest  check  upon  abuse  in 
either  of  these  respects, — self-interest." 

§  305.  System  constructed  under  permissive  charter. 

Where  the  charter  which  has  been  accepted  is  permis- 
sive merely,  permitting  the  chartered  company  to  con- 
struct the  system  as  it  has  done,  the  cases  are  in  irrecon- 
cilable conflict  as  to  whether  after  such  construction  the 
accepting  company  is  thereafter  bound  to  continue  the 
service  or  whether  it  may  withdraw  from  a  particular 
part  of  its  present  service.  It  is  now  probably  the  weight 
of  authority  that  a  company  which  has  accepted  public 
franchises  cannot  retain  such  of  these  rights  as  it  pleases 
it  to  exercise,  and  refuse  to  regard  the  public  interests  as 

1  York  &  N.  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Reg.,  &  Light  Co.,  22  Mont.  391,  56  Pac. 

1  El.  &  Bl.  858  (1853).  685,  44  L.  R.  A.  692  (1899). 

Forfeiture  of  the  part  not  sea-  New  York. — People  v.  Albany  & 

sonably  utilized  is  the  appropriate  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  261,  82  Am. 

remedy:  Dec.  295  (1862). 

Montana. — State  v.  Helena  Power 

[265] 


§  305  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

a  whole.  In  the  most  elaborate  case  to  this  effect — State 
ex  rel.  v.  Spokane  Street  Railway  Company  l — the  court 
ordered  a  resumption  of  service  upon  an  abandoned 
branch  line,  Mr.  Justice  Reaves  concluding  his  elaborate 
argument  thus:  "Such  corporations,  then,  may  not,  by 
their  own  acts,  disable  themselves  from  performing  the 
functions  which  were  the  consideration  for  the  public 
grant.  These  rights,  then,  are  held  by  the  grantee,  the 
holder  of  the  franchise,  as  the  agent  and  trustee  for  the 
sovereign  power,  and  are  in  no  sense  private,  but  continue 
after,  as  well  as  before,  the  grant  to  be  but  a  portion  of 
the  public  interests.  The  absolute  commercial  and  busi- 
ness necessity  for  permanence  when  established  forbade, 
from  the  earliest  years,  the  manifest  impolicy  of  leaving 
this  interest  to  the  laws  of  supply  and  demand,  which 
thus  far  have  sufficiently  supplied  the  community  with 
hotels,  mills,  etc.  And  it  is  not  in  degree  only  that  these 
franchises  differ  from  mills  and  inns.  The  one  is  private 
property,  the  other  is  a  public  function,  which  originally 
resided  in  the  government,  and,  when  delegated  to  either 
persons  or  corporations  still  retains  the  public  use.  Per- 
manency in  the  service  of  the  public  in  a  reasonable  man- 
ner is  an  essential  duty  in  all  such  avocations."  2 

1  State  v.  Spokane  Street  Ry.  Co.,      geles,    151    Cal.   52,   90    Pac.    137 
19  Wash.  518,  53  Pac.  719,  67  Am.      (1907). 

St.  Rep.  739,  41  L.  R.  A.  515  (1898).  Connecticut.— State  v.  Hartford  & 

2  In  the  following  cases  manda-  N.  H.  R.  R.,  29  Conn.  538  (1861). 
mus  was  held  proper  to  compel  oper-  Kansas. — City  of  Potwin  Place  v. 
ation  of  abandoned  portion  of  an  Topeka  Ry.  Co.,  51  Kans.  609,  33 
established    system    although    the  Pac.   309,    37   Am.   St.    Rep.    312 
charter    was    hardly    more    than  (1893). 

permissive:  Kentucky. — Board  of  Trustees  v. 

United  States. — Farmers'  Loan  &  Chesapeake,  O.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.,  94 

Trust  Co.  v.  Henning,  8  Fed.  Gas.  Ky.  377,  22  S.  W.  609  (i893). 

4,666  (1878);  San  Diego  L.&T.  Co.  Mississippi.— See  State  v.   Mo- 

v.  Sharp,  97  Fed.  394,  38  C.  C.  A.  bile,  J.  &  K.  C.  R.  R.,  86  Miss.  172, 

220  (1899).  38  So.  732  (1905). 

California. — Fellows  v.  Los  An-  Missouri. — Kansas  City  Interur- 

[2661 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT    [  §  306 

§  306.  Cases  permitting  partial  withdrawal. 

However,  there  are  almost  as  many  cases  permitting 
a  partial  withdrawal  where  there  is  no  charter  provision 
making  the  continuance  of  every  service  undertaken  req- 
uisite. This  was  the  prevailing  view  until  the  latter  part 
of  the  last  century;  the  usual  doctrine  being  simply  that 
when  the  charter  was  permissive  the  continuance  of  any 
service  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  company.  But 
of  late  years  the  cases  permitting  withdrawal  from  a 
part  of  the  service  undertaken  have  stated  considerable 
qualifications  upon  this  right.  This  modern  law  is  best 
summarized  in  a  recent  opinion  l  in  Virginia  by  Judge 
Keith,  holding  that  a  railroad  might  discontinue  service 
upon  an  unprofitable  branch.  "It  may  be  asked,  is  a 
corporation  having  constructed  a  road  to  be  permitted  to 
abandon  its  use  at  its  pleasure?  We  answer  that  it  is  not 
to  be  apprehended  that  the  corporation  will  abandon  any 
part  of  its  line,  the  operation  of  which  is  found  remuner- 
ative in  the  present,  or  that  is  likely  to  become  so  in  the 
future.  Where  the  line  of  railway,  taken  as  a  whole, 
cannot  be  profitably  maintained;  where  its  operation, 
when  discreetly  and  economically  managed,  is  attended 
with  loss,  it  is  difficult  to  perceive  how  a  court  can,  by 

ban  Ry.  v.  Davis,  197  Mo.  669,  95  Railroad  Co.  v.  Casey,  26  Pa.  St. 

S.  W.  881  (1906).  287  (1856). 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Sioux  City  &  Virginia. — See  Southern  Ry.  v. 

Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Neb.  357  (1878).  Franklin  Ry.,  96  Va.  693,  32  S.  E. 

New      Jersey.— State      ex     rel.  485,  44  L.  R.  A.  297  (1899). 

Bridgeton    v.    Bridgeton   Traction  Washington. — State    ex    rel.    v. 

Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  592,  43  Atl.  715,  45  Spokane  St.  Ry.,  19  Wash.  518,  53 

L.  R.  A.  837  (1899).  Pac.  719,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  739,  41 

New  York.— Brooklyn  &  R.  B.  L.  R.  A.  515  (1898). 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  Wisconsin. — See  In  re  Attorney 

72  App.  Div.  496,  76  N.  Y.  Supp.  General,  113  Wis.  623,  88  N.  W.  912 

777  (1902).  (1902). 

Ohio. — Akron  v.  East  Ohio  Gas  l  Sherwood  v.  Atlantic  &  D.  Ry. 

Co.,  53  Oh.  L.  Bull.  441  (1908).  Co.,    94    Va.    291,   26  S.    E.   943 

Pennsylvania.— Erie    &     N.    E.  (1897). 

[267] 


§  306  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

mandamus  or  otherwise,  compel  its  operation  to  be  con- 
tinued. If  the  loss  is  the  result  of  improvident  and  un- 
thrifty management,  the  court  may,  at  the  suit  of  those 
interested,  take  charge  of  it  for  the  benefit  of  all  concerned, 
and  run  it  through  the  instrumentality  of  a  receiver,  but 
if  the  traffic  of  the  road  is  really  insufficient  to  support  a 
wise  and  economical  administration  of  its  affairs  there 
would  seem  to  be  no  escape  from  its  ultimate  abandon- 
ment. Such  cases  are  possible,  though  rare.  It  more 
frequently  happens,  however,  that  a  part  of  the  line  be- 
comes unprofitable,  though  the  system  as  a  whole  may  be 
valuable.  In  such  an  event  the  court  will  inquire,  first,  as 
to  the  positive  duties  imposed  by  the  charter,  and  compel 
their  performance  by  appropriate  remedies,  while  with 
respect  to  those  duties  which  were  not  imposed  by  the 
charter,  but  which  have  been  assumed  by  the  corporation 
under  permissive  grants  of  power,  it  will  consider  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  and  if  upon  the  facts  it  shall 
appear  that  the  duty  unfulfilled  inflicts  no  particular 
injury  or  hardship  upon  those  who  make  the  complaint, 
and  that  the  service  which  they  receive  is  under  all  the 
conditions  reasonably  adapted  to  their  needs,  while  the 
performance  of  the  duty  would  entail  a  burden  and  loss 
upon  the  company  far  in  access  of  any  benefit  conferred, 
and  which  might  in  its  ultimate  effect  embarrass  or  pre- 
vent the  performance  of  other  duties  with  respect  to 
larger  interests,  and  affecting  a  far  greater  number  of 
citizens,  the  court  will  withhold  its  hands."1 

1  The  following  cases  hold  that  Illinois. — Linck  v.  City  of  Litch- 

a  public  service  company  may  be  field,  31  111.  App.  118  (1888). 

permitted  to  retire  from  any  sepa-  Indiana. — State  v.   Connersville 

rable  part  of  the  business:  Nat.  Gas.  Co.,  163  Ind.  563  (1904). 

United  States. — Northern  Pacific  Kansas. — Asher    v.    Hutchinson 

Railroad  v.  Dustin,  142  U.  S.  492,  W.,  L.  &  P.  Co.,  66  Kan.  496,  71 

35  L.  ed.   1092,   12  Sup.  Ct.  283  Pac.  813,  61  L.  R.  A.  52  (1903). 

(1891).  Maryland. — Whalen  v.  Baltimore 

[268] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [  §§  307,  308 

§  307.  Discontinuance  by  public  permission. 

The  general  contention  here  made  that  the  mere  fact 
of  actual  undertaking  without  mandatory  provision  should 
not  unvariably  create  an  irrevocable  obligation  to  con- 
tinue forever  that  particular  service,  is  borne  out  by  the 
cases  which  hold  that  where  there  is  a  franchise  obligation 
the  company  may  be  relieved  from  it  by  permission 
granted  by  the  public  authorities.  In  a  recent  case  1  of 
this  sort  a  water  company  which  had  laid  its  pipes  into  a 
district  under  agreement  with  the  city,  was  permitted  to 
take  up  its  mains  by  the  authorities .  Discussing  a  complaint 
of  an  individual  in  the  abandoned  district  Justice  Greene 
said :  "  An  individual  can  acquire  no  vested  right  as  against 
the  public  in  the  continued  service  of  a  public  utility. 
Such  a  doctrine  once  admitted  would  destroy  the  conven- 
ience as  a  public  utility;  it  would  then  become  hampered 
and  subject  to  the  control  of  the  individual  and  made  to 
subserve  such  interests,  to  the  detriment  of  the  public 
welfare." 

§  308.  Abandoned  service  must  be  separable. 

The  contention  here  adopted,  that  where  there  is  in- 
sufficient demand  for  the  particular  service  there  may  be 
withdrawal  from  an  existing  service,  should  contain  this 
qualification,  that  the  part  abandoned  must  be  truly 
separable.  A  company  may  not  abandon  an  intregal 

&  O.  R.  Co.,  108  Md.  11,  69  Atl.  Akron,  81  Oh.  St.  33,  90  N.  E.  40 

390,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  130  (1908).  (1909). 

Massachusetts.  —  Commonwealth  Pennsylvania. — Kearney  v.  Bor- 

v.  Fitchburg  Ry.  Co.,  12  Gray,  180  ough  of  West  Chester,  199  Pa.  St. 

(1858).  392,  49  Atl.  227  (1901). 

Montana. — State  v.  Helena  Power  Texas. — San  Antonio  Railway  v. 

&  Light  Co.,  22  Mont.  391,  56  Pac.  State,  90  Tex.  520,  39  S.  W.  926,  59 

685,  44  L.  R.  A.  692  (1899).  Am.  St.  Rep.  834,  35  L.  R.  A.  662 

New  York.— People  v.  Rome,  W.  (1897). 

&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  N.  Y.  95,  8  N.  E.  '  Asher  v.  Hutchinson  Water,  L. 

369  (1886).  &  P.  Co.,  66  Kan.  496,  71  Pac.  813, 

Ohio.— East   Ohio    Gas   Co.    v.  61  L.  R.  A.  52  (1903). 

[269] 


§  309  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

part  of  its  service  and  expect  to  remain  unmolested.  An 
interurban  railway,  for  example,  could  not  abandon  its 
main  line  between  two  cities  and  retain  its  local  rights  in 
the  respective  cities.  This  possibility  is  adverted  to  in 
the  leading  case  for  the  view  here  taken. — San  Antonio 
Street  Railway  Company  v.  State,1  where  Gaines,  C.  J., 
said:  "Under  the  grant  of  a  privilege  to  construct  and 
maintain,  if  after  acceptance  it  is  permissive  only  to  con- 
struct, it  is  not  obligatory  to  maintain.  But  we  do  not 
hold  that  the  company  can,  against  the  will  of  the  city, 
operate  a  part  of  its  line  and  not  the  whole.  A  privilege 
to  establish  an  entire  line  of  street  railway  may  be  granted 
when  the  privilege  of  constructing  and  operating  a  part 
only  would  not  be;  and  for  failure  to  operate  a  part,  it 
would  seem  that  the  whole  might  be  forfeited.  It  seems 
to  us  that  the  remedy  in  that  case  is  to  forfeit  the  franchise 
to  operate  the  branch  line  in  controversy."  2 

Topic  C.  Abandonment  of  a  Particular  Service 

§  309.  Right  to  withdraw  from  a  particular  service. 

The  problem  as  to  the  obligation  to  continue  to  render 
every  sort  of  service  that  has  been  undertaken  where 
various  services  have  been  offered  to  the  public  is  ob- 
viously much  the  same  as  the  obligation  to  continue 
service  in  every  district  hi  which  service  has  been  rendered. 
The  general  contention  is  repeated  here  that  unless  there 
is  a  mandatory  provision  in  the  franchise  requiring  the 
performance  of  the  services  hi  question  any  particular 
service  which  is  truly  separable  may  be  given  up  under 
certain  limitations  upon  due  notice.  And  upon  this  point 

1  90  Tex.  520,  39  S.  W.  926,  59      22  Mont.  391,  56  Pac.  685,  44  L.  R. 
Am.  St.  Rep.  834,  35  L.  R.  A.  662      A.  692  (1899). 
(1897).     Quoted  with  approval  in          *  See  also  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co. 
State  v.  Helena  Power  &  Light  Co.,      v.  Suffern,  129  111.  274,  21  N.  E. 

824  (1899). 
[270] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [§§310,311 

the  few  authorities  are  practically  unanimous  that  partial 
withdrawal  may  be  made  within  the  limitations  just  men- 
tioned. 

§  310.  Service  demanded  by  charter. 

Of  course  where  there  is  a  mandatory  provision  requir- 
ing certain  services  these  must  be  rendered.  Thus  in  Re 
New  Brunswick  and  Canada  Railway  Company  :  an  ap- 
plication on  behalf  of  the  town  of  St.  Andrews,  New 
Brunswick,  for  a  mandamus  against  the  railway  company 
to  compel  them  to  run  a  train  each  way  each  day.  The 
liability  of  the  company  to  perform  this  duty  was  estab- 
lished by  the  act  under  which  the  company  was  incor- 
porated, which  required  it  to  run  at  least  one  daily  train 
each  way  over  the  main  line  and  branches.  Mr.  Justice 
Allen  would  not  admit  any  excuses  to  this  obligation. 
"If  the  fact  that  this  portion  of  the  line  does  not  pay 
running  expenses  will  justify  the  company  in  disobeying 
the  direction  of  the  acts  in  running  daily  trains,  we 
cannot  see  what  there  is  to  prevent  them  from  abandoning 
that  part  of  it  altogether,  and  so  leaving,  as  a  matter  in 
their  discretion,  that  which  the  act  has  imperatively  im- 
posed on  them  as  an  absolute  duty."  2 

§  311.  Partial  withdrawal  generally  permitted. 

Where  there  is  no  mandatory  provision  it  would  seem 
that  there  might  be  withdrawal  from  any  portion  of  the 
service  which  is  truly  separable.  The  leading  case  for 
this  is  Commonwealth  v.  Fitchburg  Railroad  Company.3 
In  this  application  for  mandamus  it  was  shown  that  the 
railroad  at  some  time  after  construction  of  the  Watertown 

1  In  Re  New  Brunswick  &  Canada      Co.  v.  People,  222  111.  242,  78  N.  E. 
Ry.  Co.,   1   Pugsley  &   Burbridge      589  (1906). 

(N.  B.),'667  (1878).  3  Commonwealth  v.  Fitchburg  R. 

2  See  also  Litchfield  &  M.  R.  R.      R.  Co.,  12  Gray  (Mass.),  180(1858). 

[2711 


§  312  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

branch  had  discontinued  passenger  service  over  it  (after 
due  notice)  while  continuing  freight  service.  The  quo 
warranto  was  brought  against  the  corporation  to  forfeit 
its  franchises.  The  railroad  answered  that  since  the  con- 
struction of  a  competing  street  railway  the  passenger 
receipts  had  so  fallen  off  that  the  passenger  service  had 
been  operated  at  a  loss.  The  court  dismissed  the  informa- 
tion, Mr.  Justice  Thomas  discussing  the  matter  after  this 
fashion:  "The  precise  question  before  us  is,  whether  the 
running  of  regular  passenger  trains  was,  under  the  facts 
admitted  by  the  demurrer,  a  legal  duty?  Neither  the 
statutes  under  which  the  respondents  hold  their  franchises, 
nor  the  general  laws  regulating  railroad  companies,  in 
terms  impose  upon  the  respondents  such  duty.  If  it  had 
been  intended  that  the  duty  of  running  trains  should  be 
absolute,  it  would  have  been  made  definite.  If  the  duty 
is  to  be  held  absolute,  how  long,  for  what  period  of  time, 
is  it  to  be  performed?  It  is  during  the  lifetime  of  the 
charter,  and  this  though  the  expense  of  running  the  train 
is  daily  and  rapidly  using  up  the  capital  stock  of  the 
company."  l 

§  312.  Temporary  withdrawal  not  permissible. 

It  was  assumed  in  the  case  first  discussed  that  the 
company  might  temporarily  withdraw  its  service  and 
later,  when  the  occasion  demanded  it,  resume  service. 
In  the  particular  case  where  the  railroad  tracks  were  still 
used  for  freight  service,  this  is  probably  correct.  But 
certainly  a  railroad  which  abandons  service  altogether 
even  without  intention  to  do  so  permanently,  cannot  but 
subject  itself  to  liability.  Thus  where  a  street  railway 
virtually  abandoned  operation  until  it  could  bring  its 
striking  employes  to  terms,  the  New  York  Supreme  Court 

1  To  the  same  effect  is  Ohio  &      M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  People,  120  111.  200, 

11  N.  E.  347  (1887). 

[272] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT    [  §  313 

issued  mandamus,  Mr.  Justice  Gaynor  saying:1  "It  may 
not  lawfully  cease  to  perform  that  duty  even  for  one  hour." 
The  only  instance  that  occurs  to  the  writer  at  the  present 
moment  of  justifiable  withdrawal  for  a  temporary  period 
is  where  there  is  no  real  public  demand  for  the  service 
during  that  period.  Thus  a  mountain  railroad  at  a  sum- 
mer resort  might  cease  running  at  other  seasons.  This 
seems  to  be  borne  out  by  a  later  case  in  the  same  court 
involving  the  same  parties  where  it  was  held  that  service 
over  an  elevated  railway  might  be  withdrawn  except  at 
rush  hours,  there  being  other  traction  facilities  sufficient 
to  meet  the  local  demands  at  other  hours.  Judge  Kellogg 
saying  2  that  to  order  such  operation  would  involve  sheer 
"economic  waste." 

§  313.  Service  abandoned  must  be  separable. 

According  to  the  principles  already  discussed  the  serv- 
ice abandoned  must  be  separable.  It  cannot  be  law  that 
a  railroad  carrying  general  freight  including  lumber  can, 
by  giving  notice,  withdraw  from  the  carriage  of  cedar 
lumber,  nor  ought  a  railroad  for  policies  of  its  own  be 
permitted  to  refuse  to  accept  coal  in  the  future  except  in 
bulk  from  tipples.  From  the  authorities  in  general  the 
doctrine  is  plain  enough  that  there  can  only  be  withdrawal 
from  distinct  classes  of  business.  As  has  been  seen  there 
are  many  instances  where  a  public  service  company  is 
engaged  in  rendering  separate  services.  Thus  the  supply 
of  gas  for  fuel  and  for  illumination  are  distinct  service,  so 
that  a  gas  company  might  after  engaging  in  both  branches 
withdraw  from  the  other.  And,  similarly,  an  electric  com- 
pany supplying  energy  both  for  illumination  and  power 
may  decide  to  devote  itself  exclusively  to  one  or  the  other. 

1  Loader  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  Ry.  2  People    v.     Brooklyn    Heights 

Co.,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  996,  14  N.  Y.  Ry.  Co.,    75    N.    Y.    Supp.    202 

Misc.     208    (Matter    of    Loader)  (1902). 
(1895). 

18  [  273  ] 


§§314,315]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Topic  D.  Reasonable  Notice  of  Withdrawal 

§  314.  Notice  of  withdrawal  necessary. 

The  theory  of  public  profession  which  has  here  been 
developed  is  that  its  existence  depends  upon  the  public 
impression  which  is  the  result  of  either  an  express  pro- 
fession to  the  public  which  at  once  commits  one  to  pub- 
lic employment,  or  by  an  implied  profession  established 
by  a  continued  course  of  conduct  upon  which  the  pub- 
lic have  been  led  to  rely.  Theoretically,  therefore,  with- 
drawal from  public  employment  may  be  similarly  evi- 
denced, either  by  express  notice  or  by  continued  conduct. 
Thus  an  innkeeper,  as  the  early  cases  hold,  may  make 
public  his  withdrawal  from  public  calling  by  merely 
taking  down  his  sign.1  And  it  has  been  said  that  a  ware- 
houseman may  signify  his  withdrawal  from  public  em- 
ployment by  public  advertisement  that  his  premises  are 
no  longer  open  upon  a  public  basis.2  A  wharfinger  who 
has  once  refused  an  applicant  on  the  ground  that  he  has 
retired  from  public  service  need  not  repeat  it.3  But  it 
would  take  a  long  time  doubtless  to  convince  the  public 
by  circumstantial  evidence  that  a  common  carrier  who 
still  continued  his  trips  had  become  a  private  carrier.4 

§  315.  Colorable  withdrawal. 

There  should  perhaps  be  a  word  of  warning  as  to  color- 
able withdrawal.  Instances  are  not  unknown  where  to 
escape  the  troublesome  obligations  of  public  service,  the 
proprietors  of  the  enterprise  have  given  public  notice  that 
they  have  ceased  to  conduct  the  business  upon  a  public 
basis  while  all  the  time  dealing  with  the  most  of  the  pub- 

1  Rex   v.    Collins,    Palmer,    373      pie's  Steamboat  Co.,  214  U.  S.  345, 
(1623).  53  L.  ed.   1024,  29  Sup.  Ct.  661 

2  Glass  v.  Davis,  23  Gratt.  (Va.)      (1909). 

184  (1873).  *  Satterlee  v.  Groat,  1  Wend.  272 

3Weems  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Peo-     (1828). 

[2741 


WlTHDKAWAL    FROM    PUBLIC    EMPLOYMENT      [  §  316 

lie  as  before.  This  situation  was  provided  against  in 
one  of  the  very  early  cases  1  where  it  was  stated  that  the 
innkeeper's  giving  up  of  his  business  must  be  bona  fide; 
if  he  merely  pretends  to  give  up  the  business  while  really 
continuing  to  receive  guests,  he  will  remain  liable.  "If 
an  innkeeper  taketh  down  his  signe,  and  yet  keepeth  an 
hostelerie,  an  action  upon  the  case  will  lie  against  him,  if 
he  do  deny  lodging  unto  a  traveller  for  his  money."  A 
modern  instance  of  this  sort  may  be  seen  in  a  New  York 
case  2  where  it  appeared  that  the  Delaware  &  Hudson 
Canal  Company  had  sold  part  of  its  canal  property  to  a 
cement  company  which  still  kept  the  canal  open,  but, 
claiming  that  it  was  now  maintained  as  a  private  property, 
attempted  to  exclude  from  its  use  a  competing  cement 
company  located  upon  its  banks.  The  Court  of  Appeals 
held,  however,  that  under  the  circumstances  there  had 
not  been  a  real  withdrawal  from  the  business,  which  ap- 
parently could  only  be  by  an  abandonment  of  the  canal 
for  transportation  services. 

§  316.  Situation  requires  reasonable  notice. 

The  parallel  between  entering  public  service  and  quit- 
ting it  is  not  quite  perfect;  for  although  one  may  enter 
upon  public  service  on  public  notice  without  preparing 
the  public  for  his  advent,  one  may  not  it  seems  abandon 
public  service  without  notice  to  the  public.  The  new 
element  of  a  public  duty  now  existing  has  supervened, 
which  must  be  reckoned  with  when  one  who  has  assumed 
a  public  employment  would  lay  it  down.  Certainly  the 
service  in  hand  must  be  completed.  An  innkeeper  can- 
not turn  the  guests  he  has  accepted  out  into  the  night, 
nor  the  carrier  abandon  his  passengers  short  of  their  des- 

1  Anonymous,  Godbolt,  345,  pi.  178  N.  Y.  167,  70  N.  E.  451,  modi- 
440  (1623).  fying  84  App.  Div.  635,  81  N.  Y. 

2  New  York  Cement  Co.  v.  Con-  Supp.  1137,  modifying  76  App.  Div. 
solidated  Rosendale  Cement  Co.,  285,  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  531  (1904). 

[275] 


§  317  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tination.  One  may  go  further  with  confidence  and  say 
that  an  innkeeper  could  not  without  notice  take  down 
his  sign  at  nightfall,-  nor,  a  carrier  abandon  his  schedule 
without  warning  to  his  public.  This  means  that  there  is 
a  public  duty  in  the  matter  to  give  reasonable  notice  of 
the  intention  to  abandon,  which  they  owe  the  public; 
for  they  have  given  the  public  cause  to  rely  upon  the 
continuance  of  their  service,  although  they  may  by  reason- 
able notice  leave  their  public  to  get  service  elsewhere. 
These  general  principles  are  sufficiently  established  to 
justify  action;  there  are  already  several  instances  in  the 
books  of  the  granting  of  temporary  orders  to  prevent  a 
public  company  which  had  threatened  cutting  off  sud- 
denly an  established  service.1  And  upon  similar  princi- 
ples mandatory  processes  have  been  issued  to  compel  an 
electric  company  to  furnish  temporarily  a  service  from 
which  it  is  conceded, 2  it  might  ultimately  withdraw.  Where 
the  company  has  no  legal  right  to  continue  service  it  will 
not  be  ordered  to  go  on.  Thus  in  a  recent  case  3  a  gas 
company,  its  contract  with  the  municipality  having  ex- 
pired, was  permitted  to  withdraw  on  short  notice.  And 
in  another  4  a  water  company,  its  franchise  rights  having 
run  out,  was  held  justified  in  stopping  service  without 
notice. 

§  317.  What  constitutes  reasonable  notice. 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  little  law  as  yet 
exists  as  to  the  length  of  the  notice  that  must  be  given. 
But  it  may  be  asserted  with  confidence  that  what  is 
reasonable  notice  in  a  particular  case  depends  upon  the 

1  Bienville  Water  Supply  Co.  v.      82   Pac.  713,    1   L.   R.  A.    (N.  S.) 
Mobile,  112  Ala.  260,  20  So.  742,      1032  (1905). 

57  Am.  St.  Rep.  28,  33  L.  R.  A.          *  East  Ohio  Gas  Co.  v.  Akron, 

59  (1895).  81  Oh.  St.  33,  90  N.  E.  40  (1909). 

2  Seattle  Electric  Co.  v.  Snoqual-          4  Laighton  v.  Carthage,  175  Fed. 
mie  Falls  Power  Co.,  40  Wash.  380,  145  (1909). 

[276] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT    [  §  318 

character  of  the  business.  A  teamster  might  withdraw 
upon  a  day's  notice  doubtless,  as  his  patrons  may  quickly 
make  other  arrangements.  A  canal  boatman  might  tie 
up  at  the  end  of  any  trip,  for  the  other  opportunities  for 
shippers  over  the  canal  are  numerous.  But  a  railroad 
company  *  may  not  without  a  long  notice  abandon  its 
line.  And  a  gas  company  2  could  abandon  its  service 
only  after  a  long  enough  period  to  provide  a  new  supply. 
It  is  not  principally  the  special  privileges  which  these 
service  companies  have  received  that  makes  their  with- 
drawal difficult;  it  is  because  the  duplication  of  these  par- 
ticular services  takes  a  long  time,  and,  therefore,  the  pub- 
lic is  so  dependent  upon  the  established  service  that  it 
would  lead  to  intolerable  hardships  if  the  proprietors  were 
permitted  to  withdraw  without  long  notice.  A  rule  of 
law  to  meet  all  conditions  would  have  to  go  so  far  as  to 
say  that  one  cannot  withdraw  from  public  service  with- 
out notice  sufficiently  long  to  enable  those  deprived  of 
the  service  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the 
provision  of  other  service. 

§  318.  Substituting  one  service  for  another. 

Consistent  with  this  general  principle  is  the  recog- 
nized rule  that  when  a  company  withdraws  a  service  that 
has  been  rendered  and  at  the  same  time  offers  another 
that  is  a  reasonable  substitute,  only  a  brief  notice  to  ap- 
prise the  public  of  the  new  arrangement  need  be  given. 
There  are  several  important  cases  in  the  books  of  this 
sort.  The  most  obvious  is  the  recent  Maryland  case  3 

1  The  recent  Georgia  case  is  cer-  2  There  is   an    Indiana    case  in 

tainly  correct  which  holds  that  a  which  it  was  held  apparently  that 

railway  cannot  without  notice  re-  a  gas  company  could  not  discon- 

move  a  spur  track  upon  which  a  tinue  its  service  except  upon  rea- 

shipper  is  relying  to  complete  his  sonable    notice.      Indianapolis     v. 

shipments.      Durden    v.    Southern  Indianapolis    Gas    Co.    (Ind.    Cir. 

R.  R.  Co.,  2  Ga.  App.  66,  58  S.  E.  Ct.),  35  Ch.  Leg.  News,  165  (1902). 

299  (1907).  sWhalen  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  Ry. 

[277] 


§319]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

where  it  was  held  that  such  rectification  of  the  line  as  the 
public  interests  might  dictate  could  be  made  notwith- 
standing particular  disadvantage  to  private  business.  "A 
railroad  company  is  a  public  service  corporation,  and  is 
obliged  to  use  its  powers  and  privileges  for  the  benefit  of 
the  public,  and  in  aid  of  the  public  good.  It  must,  there- 
fore, from  time  to  time,  conform  to  the  requirements  of 
public  travel  and  commerce,  and  adjust  its  grades,  its 
route,  and  its  curvatures  to  these  needs.  No  contract  on 
its  face  can  interfere  with  these  public  duties.  To  com- 
pel a  railroad  company  to  maintain  its  main  stem  on  the 
old  location  forever  is  to  render  it  impossible  for  the  cor- 
poration to  ever  make  in  conformity  with  its  own  needs 
and  the  public's  interests  any  change  in  its  transporta- 
tion route."  l 

§  319.  Results  of  consolidating  services. 

In  other  cases  this  point  of  duplication  is  made.  In  a 
leading  case  in  New  York  2  it  was  held  that:  " Where  a 
railroad  company  owns  by  consolidation  two  lines  of 
road,  and  can  substantially  accommodate  the  people  of 
the  State  by  operating  one  line  between  the  same  points, 
and  can  abandon  the  other  line  without  any  serious  det- 
riment to  any  considerable  number  of  people,  we  do  not 
believe  it  should  be  compelled  by  mandamus  to  operate 
both  lines,  at  a  great  sacrifice  of  money,  upon  the  fanci- 
ful idea  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  is  wounded  by 
its  omission  to  operate  both  lines."  3 

Co.,  108  Md.  11,  69  Atl.  390,  17  2  People  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R. 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  130  (1908).  R.  Co.,  103  N.  Y.  95,  8  N.  E.  369 

1  Mandatory     provisions     might  (1886);  People  v.  Brooklyn  Heights 

prevent    relocation    of    this    sort.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  N.  Y.  Supp.  202,  65 

State     v.    Northern    Pacific    Ry.  App.  Div.  549  (1902),  accord. 

Co.,  89  Minn.  363,  95  N.  W.  297  3  See  People  v.  Colorado  Central 

(1903).  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed.  638  (1890). 

[278] 


WITHDRAWAL  FROM  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  [§320 

§  320.  Division  of  territory  served. 

The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massa- 
chusetts in  a  recent  case  x  is  of  considerable  importance  in 
this  connection.  There  were  two  electric  lighting  cor- 
porations holding  franchises  and  doing  business  in  Bos- 
ton where  complainant's  house  was.  He  was  formerly 
served  by  the  respondent  company,  but  the  two  corpora- 
tions entered  into  an  agreement,  for  division  of  territory 
by  drawing  a  line,  and  the  supply  of  the  complainant 
fell  to  the  other  company.  It  was  alleged  that  electric 
lighting  companies,  being  quasi-public  in  nature,  were 
bound  to  serve  all  persons  who  were  within  reach  of 
their  lines,  but  the  court  held  otherwise,  Chief  Justice 
Knowlton  saying:  "We  think  that  a  corporation  making 
such  an  arrangement  is  not  subject  to  prosecution  under 
a  writ  of  mandamus,  for  a  failure  properly  to  exercise  its 
corporate  franchise.  We  are  not  called  upon  to  deter- 
mine in  this  case  whether  such  an  arrangement  could  be 
availed  of  as  a  justification,  if,  unexpectedly,  it  should 
turn  out  that  the  public  interest  was  injuriously  affected. 
We  do  not  suggest  that  a  corporation  can  relieve  itself 
of  the  performance  of  its  duties  to  the  public  under  its 
franchise,  but  only  that  details  of  administration,  not 
inconsistent  with  the  legislative  policy  of  the  Common- 
wealth, may  be  left  to  the  corporation,  so  long  as  ade- 
quate provision  is  made  for  the  public.  We  go  no  further 
than  to  say  that,  under  conditions  like  the  present,  the 
public  has  no  grievance  which  the  court  will  recognize."  2 

1  Weld  v.  Gas  &  Electric  Light  serve  all  within  the  territory  it  still 
Commissioners,  197  Mass.  556,  84  professes   to   serve.     See,    for   ex- 
N.  E.  101  (1908).  ample,    Portland    Natural   Gas   & 

2  But  because   there  is  another  Oil    Co.    v.    State,     135    Ind.    54, 
service  in  the  territory  served  the  34  N.   E.   818,   21    L.   R.  A.  639 
original  company  cannot  refuse  to  (1893). 


[279] 


BOOK  II.  OBLIGATIONS  OF  PUBLIC  DUTY 


PART  III.    DUTY  TO  THE  PUBLIC 
CHAPTER  X 

NATURE   OF   PUBLIC   DUTY 

§  330.  Public  obligation  the  fundamental  principle. 

Topic  A.  Essential  Character  of  the  Obligation 

§  331.  Nature  of  the  public  duty. 

332.  Obligations  of  the  subsequent  relationship. 

333.  The  original  obligation  is  sui  generis. 

334.  Nature  of  the  obligation  after  acceptance. 

335.  Chief  reliance  upon  tort. 

336.  No  dependence  upon  contract. 

337.  Essential  elements  in  contract  not  necessary. 

338.  Contract  cannot  be  required. 

339.  Applicant  need  not  have  the  capacity  to  contract. 

340.  Incapacity  of  the  proprietor  to  contract  no  excuse. 

341.  Relationship  established  although  another  pays. 

342.  Statutory  provisions  for  public  service. 

343.  Franchise  provisions  for  public  service. 

Topic  B.  To  Whom  the  Obligation  Is  Owed 
§  344.  The  duty  is  owed  to  a  particular  public. 
345    What  constitutes  a  default  to  an  individual. 

346.  Applicants  must  be  desirous  of  service. 

347.  Application  to  test  rights. 

348.  Liability  to  sendee  of  telegram. 

349.  Discussion  of  the  conflicting  theories. 

350.  Individual  rights  to  fire  protection. 

351.  Common  law  basis  for  individual  rights. 

352.  Extent  of  public  interest. 

353.  Personal  character  of  the  individual  right. 

354.  Statutory  requirements  for  service. 

355.  Statutory  penalties  for  default. 

§  330.  Public  obligation  the  fundamental  principle. 
From  the  very  beginning  of  our  law,  as  has  been  seen, 

[283] 


§  331  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

it  has  been  recognized  that  some  kinds  of  business  were 
of  special  importance  to  the  public,  and  that  all  persons 
engaged  in  such  business  owed  the  public  peculiar  duties. 
No  one  could  be  compelled  to  enter  upon  the  employ- 
ment; but  if  he  chose  to  do  so,  he  thereby  undertook  the 
performance  of  the  public  duties  connected  with  it.  The 
property  which  he  devoted  to  the  public  employment 
was  held  to  be  affected  with  a  public  interest,  ceasing  to  be 
juris  privati  only,  as  Lord  Hale  said  so  long  ago.  Plainly 
this  is  more  true  to-day  than  ever  before;  for  the  over- 
shadowing importance  of  the  public  services  in  our  modern 
life  must  be  obvious  to  all.  But  the  extent  to  which  the 
primary  duty  of  public  service  may  go  is  just  beginning 
to  be  appreciated.  The  duty  placed  upon  every  one 
exercising  a  public  calling  is  primarily  a  duty  to  serve 
every  man  who  is  a  member  of  his  public.  Implicit  in 
this  primary  duty,  necessarily  involved  in  its  full  per- 
formance are  various  requirements.  Not  only  must  all  be 
served,  they  must  have  adequate  service;  not  only  must 
they  not  be  charged  extortionate  rates,  but  there  must 
be  no  discrimination  practiced.  In  such  an  elaborated 
statement  there  is  no  more  than  the  plain  recital  of  the 
present  recognition  of  different  aspects  of  public  duty. 
The  duty  to  serve  the  public  is  the  fundamental  principle 
from  which  all  the  rules  of  public  service  may  be  derived. 
In  a  true  sense  therefore,  the  law  governing  public  service 
is  an  entirety. 

Topic.  A.    Essential  Character  of  the  Obligation 

§  331.  Nature  of  the  public  duty. 

The  fundamental  fact  in  public  employment  is  the  pub- 
lic duty  which  results  in  all  cases  from  public  profession 
of  a  public  calling.  It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  place  this 
exceptional  duty  in  our  legal  system.  It  is  like  the  con- 

[284] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [  §  332 

tractual  obligation  in  that  it  is  an  affirmative  duty  to  act 
for  a  certain  person;  but  it  is  different  in  that  it  does  not 
depend  upon  assent  of  the  party  charged.  It  is  like  the 
obligation  in  tort  in  that  it  is  imposed  by  law;  but  it  is 
not  imposed  upon  anyone  against  his  will  as  is  the  obliga- 
tion in  tort.  In  one  sense  the  obligation  to  serve  the 
public  is  voluntarily  assumed;  and  therein  the  public 
duty  to  act  differs  from  the  typical  duty  not  to  commit  a 
tort,  which  each  person  without  his  ever  being  consulted 
owes  to  all  the  world.  And  yet  once  this  obligation  is 
established  by  his  undertaking,  his  duty  extends  to  all 
within  the  profession,  however  unwilling  he  may  be  in  a 
particular  case  to  render  service.  Public  duty  is  in  this 
sense  imposed  by  law  upon  those  who  put  themselves 
into  public  service;  and  therein  very  plainly  the  situation 
differs  from  the  typical  contractual  duty  which  one  owes 
only  in  particular  cases  to  the  persons  with  whom  he  has 
voluntarily  negotiated  a  previous  agreement.  If  one  may 
thus  employ  the  two  traditional  phrases,  the  duty  is  ab- 
solute rather  than  relative.  For  it  is  a  duty  imposed 
by  law  regardless  of  dissent  in  particular  instances,  not 
one  for  which  the  actual  assent  of  the  person  obliged  is 
necessary  in  every  case.  And  yet  it  must  be  obvious 
that  in  public  obligation  we  have  an  intermediate  case 
in  many  respects.  It  is  like  a  status  which  one  is  under 
no  obligation  to  enter  except  by  his  own  free  will;  but, 
once  having  committed  himself  to  it,  the  duties  pertaining 
to  that  status  are  devolved  upon  him  by  operation  of  law 
regardless  of  his  own  wishes.  However,  he  is  committed 
to  it  no  further  than  the  peculiar  law  governing  the  situa- 
tion requires. 

§  332.  Obligations  of  the  subsequent  relationship. 

This  argument  may  be  carried  still  further.    Even 'after 
a  relationship  has  been  established  between  the  proprietor 

[2851 


§  333  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

and  the  patron  by  application  and  acceptance,  it  still 
remains  generally  true  that  the  resulting  obligations  are 
imposed  by  law  as  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  under- 
taking.1 There  is  no  actual  contract  involved,  although 
there  is  a  consensual  arrangement  in  the  sense  that  the 
consent  of  the  proprietor  as  well  as  that  of  the  patron  is 
needed  to  create  it.  In  this  view  of  the  duty  it  is  difficult 
to  place  it  in  our  law.  It  is  not  exactly  absolute,  because 
it  does  not  exist  unless  it  is  assumed;  but  certainly  it  is 
not  relative  after  it  is  once  assumed.  This  situation  is 
not  without  analogies  in  our  law.  If  a  common  carrier 
is  under  special  obligation  because  he  assumes  as  such,  so 
is  a  private  bailee  governed  by  the  law  appertaining  to  his 
position  as  such.  If  a  public  servant  is  bound  to  peculiar 
responsibilities  by  reason  of  his  status,  a  private  agent  is 
similarly  bound  by  special  law.  In  all  cases  of  this  sort 
the  action  against  the  person  who  has  not  acted  toward 
the  person  entitled  to  his  regard  in  accordance  with  the 
obligation  of  his  status  is  really  ex  delicto  rather  than  ex 
contractu.2 

§  333.  The  original  obligation  is  sui  generis. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  the  obligation  resting 
upon  one  who  has  undertaken  the  performance  of  a  pub- 
lic duty  is  sui  generis.  It  cannot  be  forced  into  the  typ- 
ical forms  of  action  without  artificiality,  as  experience 
has  shown.  When  the  wrong  complained  of  is  the  refusal 

1  The  duties  of  a  carrier  may  arise  a  common  carrier  alleging  that  he 

out  of  usage  as  well  as  from  statu-  being  a  common  carrier  for  hire 

tory  enactments,  and  when  once  es-  failed  to  furnish  promptly  facili- 

tablished  the  obligation  of  the  car-  ties  for  transporting  freight  which 

rier  to  perform  them  is  as  binding  in  had  been  tendered  to  him,  the 

the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  State  common  law  duty  being  apparent, 

v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ry.  Co.  it  is  not  subject  to  demurrer. 

(Fla.),  52  So.  4  (1910).  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Moore  (Ga.), 

J  Where  a  suit  is  brought  against  67  S.  E.  85  (1910). 

[286] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [§334 

of  the  proprietor  of  the  business  to  render  the  service 
requested,  the  applicant  may  indeed  frame  a  proper  ac- 
tion on  the  case  setting  forth  the  nature  of  the  defend- 
ant's business  and  his  profession  of  it,  and  showing  how 
he  himself  is  entitled  to  demand  the  service,  having  com- 
plied with  all  conditions  predecent.  The  character  of 
this  action  is  well  described  by  Chief  Justice  Biddle  in  the 
leading  American  case.1  "  This  action  is  brought  against 
a  railroad  company  that  has  become  a  common  carrier, 
as  is  alleged,  by  holding  itself  before  the  public  as  such, 
and  thus  has  undertaken  the  general  public  duty  of  carry- 
ing goods  for  all  persons  who  may  apply,  and  necessarily 
thereby  has  incurred  the  liability  incident  to  a  breach 
of  such  general  public  duty,  to  all  persons  injured  thereby, 
without  any  special  contract  in  the  given  case.  The 
case,  therefore,  must  be  governed  by  the  general  law 
regulating  the  remedy  for  a  breach  of  a  public  duty."  2 

§  334.  Nature  of  the  obligation  after  acceptance. 

When  however,  the  wrong  complained  of  is  some  de- 
fault of  the  proprietor  of  the  business  in  the  performance 
of  a  service  which  is  being  rendered  by  virtue  of  his  accept- 
ance of  the  application  of  the  patron,  the  situation  is 
made  difficult  by  the  common  practice  of  permitting  the 
customer  in  such  a  case  to  make  this  breach  the  basis  of 
either  an  action  on  the  case  for  tort  or  an  action  in  assump- 
sit  apparently  like  that  for  breach  of  contract.  Even  in 
this  case  it  is  probable  that  the  contract  form  dates  back 
to  that  early  assumpsit  against  those  who  undertake  the 
performance  of  a  public  duty,  which  long  antedates  the 

1  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  relationship  of  host  and  guest  be- 
v.  Morton,  61  Ind.  539,  28  Am.  Rep.  tween  an  innkeeper  and  a  traveler 
682  (1878).  whom  he  has  refused  to  take  in. 

2  There  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  Bennett  v.  Mellor,  5  T.  R.  (Eng.) 
a  contractual  obligation  creating  the  273  (1793). 

[287] 


§  335  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

action  of  assumpsit  for  the  e.nforcement  of  a  private  bar- 
gain. In  one  of  the  leading  English  cases  1  where  the 
action  was  for  default  in  service  already  begun  Chief 
Justice  Dalles  said: — "The  action  is  on  the  case,  against 
a  common  carrier,  upon  whom  a  duty  is  imposed  by  the 
custom  of  the  realm,  or  in  other  words,  by  the  common 
law,  to  convey  and  carry  their  goods  and  passengers  safely 
and  securely,  so  that  by  their  negligence  or  fault  no  in- 
jury happens.  A  breach  of  this  duty  is  a  breach  of  the 
law,  and  for  this  breach  an  action  lies,  founded  on  the 
common  law,  which  action  wants  not  the  aid  of  a  contract 
to  support  it."  2 

§  335.  Chief  reliance  upon  tort. 

There  are  various  classes  of  cases  which  make  it  neces- 
sary to  decide  whether  the  action  by  an  injured  party 
against  one  who  has  committed  some  default  in  the  per- 
formance of  his  duty  is  contractual  or  delictual  in  nature. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  in  recovering  damages  in 
contractual  actions  one  is  limited  to  what  was  contem- 
plated by  the  parties  while  in  tort  actions  all  proximate 
consequences  are  admitted.  It  is  in  such  cases  that  this 
fundamental  problem  becomes  so  vital  an  issue  that  it 
receives  elaborate  discussion.  No  one  has  put  this  better 
than  Chief  Justice  Taney  in  Saltonstall  v.  Stockton,3 
before  him  on  circuit,  where  an  action  on  the  case  was 
brought  against  the  proprietors  of  a  stagecoach  for  in- 
jury to  passengers  who  alleged  that  by  the  misconduct 

1  Bretherton  v.  Wood,  3  Brod.  &  place  of  reception  determines  the 
Bing.  (Eng.)  54  (1821).  extent  of  the  obligations  resulting 

2  That  the  obligations  of  the  rela-  therefrom.     It  was  so  held  of  the 
tionship  between  the  public  servant  relationship  between  innkeeper  and 
and  his  patron  are  created  by  law  guest   in   Holland   v.    Pack,    Peck, 
and  not  by  the  will  of  the  parties  (Tenn.)  151  (1823). 

appears  from  the  fact  that  it  is  uni-          » Taney,  11  (1838). 
versally  agreed  that  the  law  of  the 

[288] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [  §  335 

of  the  driver  they  were  compelled  to  leap  from  the  coach 
to  save  themselves,  which  resulted  in  their  injuries.  The 
Chief  Justice  held  that  the  law  of  torts  was  more  appli- 
cable to  this  situation  than  the  law  of  contracts:  "  Injuries 
received  in  cases  of  this  description  are  not  violations  of 
a  contract  between  the  parties,  but  are  breaches  of  the 
duty  imposed  by  law  upon  the  carrier;  they  are  torts. 
The  plaintiff  might,  without  doubt,  have  sued  in  assump- 
sit;  but  there  are  many  cases  where  the  law  implies  a 
contract,  where  there  was,  in  fact,  no  agreement  between 
the  parties;  this  is  done  in  order  to  give  the  plaintiff  a 
more  convenient  remedy  for  his  right,  by  enabling  him 
to  sue  in  assumpsit.  And  there  are  cases  where  an  indi- 
vidual who  has  sustained  an  injury  from  the  breach  of  a 
legal  duty,  may  waive  the  tort  and  sue  as  upon  a  contract ; 
this  is  the  case  with  innkeepers  and  their  guests,  where 
property  intrusted  to  the  care  of  the  innkeeper  has  been 
lost  by  his  breach  of  duty;  yet  the  obligations  of  inn- 
keepers in  that  respect  are  prescribed  by  law,  and  their 
neglect  is  not  a  violation  of  contract,  but  a  breach  of 
the  duty  which  the  law  imposes.;  and  it  is  always  so  de- 
scribed in  the  ancient  writs.  And  if  the  relation  in  which 
the  carrier  and  passenger  stand  to  one  another — to  wit, 
that  of  bailor  and  bailee — can  be  said  to  be  created  by 
contract,  yet,  as  soon  as  that  relation  subsists,  the  law 
interposes  and  prescribes  the  rights  and  duties,  and  lia- 
bilities of  both  parties;  it  regulates  the  degree  of  skill 
and  care  with  which  the  passenger  is  to  be  carried,  and 
any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  carrier,  is  an  unlawful 
act,  is  a  breach  of  legal  duty.  Indeed,  even  the  relation 
of  bailor  and  bailee  is  not  created  by  contract;  for  those 
who  undertake  the  business  of  carrying  persons  are  re- 
garded by  law  as  if  they  were  in  the  public  service,  and 
the  carrier  cannot  refuse  to  take  anyone  of  good  character 
who  conducts  himself  properly  and  pays  the  usual  fare 
19  [  289  1 


§  336  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

(provided  he  has  room  for  him),  and  if  he  refuses,  he  is 
uable  to  an  action;  so  that  the  passenger  takes  his  seat 
upon  paying  the  usual  fare,  not  by  force  of  a  right  ac- 
quired by  contract  with  the  carrier,  but  in  the  exercise 
of  a  right  secured  to  him  by  law;  a  right  which  the  carrier 
cannot  resist  without  committing  a  breach  of  a  legal 
duty."  * 

§  336.  No  dependence  upon  contract. 

It  is  significant  also  that  one  who  has  entered  into  re- 
lations with  the  proprietor  of  a  public  service,  his  request 
for  the  service  having  been  accepted,  is  not  dependent 
upon  contract  to  get  compensation  if  wrongs  are  done  him. 
This  becomes  a  vital  issue  in  one  class  of  cases  where 
as  the  service  is  arranged  it  comes  within  the  statute 
forbidding  Sunday  work.  If  for  instance  a  passenger 
who  has  been  accepted  by  a  common  carrier  on  Sunday 
for  a  trip  which  has  no  excuse  in  necessity  or  charity 
suffers  damage  by  reason  of  any  default  of  the  carrier 
in  the  performance  of  his  obligations,  it  is  well  established 
that  the  passenger  is  not  driven  to  the  hopeless  course  of 
working  out  his  rights  through  the  illegal  contract,  but 
he  may  bring  an  action  in  the  nature  of  tort  for  the  breach 
of  the  duty  which  a  carrier  owes  his  passengers.  In  the 
leading  case  2  to  this  effect  Mr.  Justice  Andrews  said  :— 
"We  deem  it  unnecessary  to  decide  the  question,  which 
was  argued  with  great  ability  by  counsel,  touching  the 
liability  of  the  defendant  in  the  action,  treating  it  as 
founded  upon  the  contract  between  the  parties.  The 
gravamen  of  the  action  is,  the  breach  of  the  duty  imposed 

1  By  these  principles  a  gas  com-  out  heat.    Coy  v.  Indianapolis  Gas 

pany  which  negligently  allowed  its  Co.,   146  Ind.  655,  46  N.  E.   171 

pressure  to  fall  off  has  been  held  lia-  (1897). 

ble  for  causing  the  death  of  a  sick  2  Carroll  v.  Staten  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 

child  due  to  its  room  being  left  with-  N.  Y.  126  (1874). 

[290] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [§337 

by  law  upon  the  carrier  of  passengers  to  carry  safely,  so 
far  as  human  skill  and  foresight  can  go,  the  person  it 
undertakes  to  carry.  This  duty  exists  independently  of 
contract,  and  although  there  is  no  contract  in  a  legal 
sense  between  the  parties.  Whether  there  is  a  contract 
to  carry,  or  the  service  undertaken  is  gratuitous  an  action 
on  the  case  lies  against  the  carrier  for  a  negligent  injury 
to  a  passenger.  The  law  raises  the  duty  out  of  regard 
for  human  life,  and  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  utmost 
vigilance  by  carriers  in  protecting  those  who  have  com- 
mitted themselves  to  their  hands."  * 

§  337.  Essential  elements  in  contract  not  necessary. 

To  some  extent  the  process  by  which  the  proprietor  of 
a  business  which  is  public  in  character  undertakes  for  a 
particular  applicant  the  performance  of  a  definite  service 
is  similar  to  that  by  which  a  contract  is  formed.  There 
is  proposal  and  acceptance  in  both  cases ;  and  the  relation- 
ship resulting  in  both  cases  may  be  described  as  consensual. 
But  there  are  also  fundamental  differences.  The  request 
of  the  applicant  is  one  to  which  the  proprietor  is  bound 
to  accede;  and  moreover,  the  obligations  resulting  from 
the  acceptance  are  far  more  extensive  than  anything  that 
could  be  worked  out  of  the  actual  negotiation  which  takes 
place.  It  is  therefore  doubtful  whether  there  can  be  said 
to  be  in  the  normal  case  mutual  assent  to  a  contractual 
obligation.  Moreover  an  arrangement  in  which  one  of 
the  parties  does  no  more  for  the  other  than  he  is  bound 
by  law  to  do  would  generally  be  held  not  to  show  the 
necessary  elements  of  valid  consideration.  It  is  difficult 
therefore  to  find  an  enforceable  contract  in  the  normal 
relationship  between  the  proprietor  and  his  patron.  Never- 

1  Upon  the  same  principle  a  tele-  Sunday.    Western  Union  Telegraph 

graph  company  is  liable  for  any  de-  Co.  v.  McLaurin,  70  Miss.  26,  13 

fault    in    transmitting    a    business  So.  36  (1892) 
message  which  it  has  accepted  on 

[291] 


§  338  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

theless  the  law  has  no  difficulty  in  enforcing  against  each 
his  respective  duties.  That  consideration  is  unnecessary 
is  brought  out  by  that  striking  class  of  cases  where  the 
proprietor  undertakes  the  particular  service  gratuitously. 
It  is  agreed  that  where  there  is  no  understanding  to  the  con- 
trary the  proprietor  may  well  owe  to  the  person  receiving 
the  service  the  same  duty  that  he  owes  to  a  paying  cus- 
tomer. This  was  explained  by  Mr.  Justice  Grier  1  in  hold- 
ing a  carrier  liable.  "This  duty  does  not  result  alone  from 
the  consideration  paid  for  the  service.  It  is  imposed  by 
law  even  when  the  service  is  gratuitous."  2 

§  338.  Contract  cannot  be  required. 

It  is  not  however  impossible  for  special  contracts  to 
be  formed  between  the  proprietor  and  his  customer,  pro- 
vided the  parties  to  the  service  voluntarily  enter  into  an 
arrangement  different  from  what  their  respective  rights 
and  duties  would  be  at  common  law.  But  the  customer 
must  not  be  coerced  into  giving  his  assent,  and  valid 
consideration  must  be  found  in  some  variation  from  the 
common  law  obligation.  The  special  contract  is  particu- 
larly common  in  railroad  transportation,  the  railroads 
making  a  much  lower  rate  to  those  who  will  ship  upon 
special  contract  waiving  the  common  law  liability  of  the 
carrier  as  an  insurer  of  the  goods  carried.  But  if  such  con- 
tracts are  to  stand,  the  common  law  basis  must  be  avail- 
able upon  reasonable  terms,3  or  else  there  will  be  a  failure 

1  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.          3  The  quotation  which  follows  is 
Derby,  14  How.  (U.  S.)  468,  14  L.      by  Cooley,  J.,  in  McMillan  v.  Mich- 
ed.  291  (1852).  igan  S.  &  N.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Mich. 

See  generally  Chapter  XXII.  79,  111  (1867). 

2  Upon    this    principle    an    inn-  See  also  Southern  Exp.   Co.   v. 
keeper  is  liable  as  an  insurer  of  the  Meyer  Co.  (Ark.),  125  S.  W.  642 
goods  of  a  person  lodging  with  him  (1910). 

as  a  guest  although  he  is  making  no          See  generally  Chapter  XXIX. 
charge  against  him.    See  Walling  v. 
Potter,  35  Conn.  183  (1868). 

[292] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [  §  339 

to  perform  the  public  duty  in  evidence.  "  A  common 
carrier  has  no  right  to  refuse  goods  offered  for  carriage 
at  the  proper  time  and  place,  on  tender  of  the  usual  and 
reasonable  compensation,  unless  the  owner  will  consent 
to  his  receiving  them  under  a  reduced  liability;  and  the 
owner  can  insist  on  his  receiving  the  goods  under  all  the 
risks  and  responsibilities  which  the  law  annexes  to  his 
employment."  And  this  is  generally  true  in  public  service 
that  the  proprietor  may  not  attempt  to  impose  upon  a 
patron  the  condition  that  he  must  enter  into  a  special 
contract  for  the  service  required.  An  applicant  for  water 
is  entitled  to  have  service  upon  the  common  law  basis 
without  contracting  away  any  of  his  rights,  although  as 
will  be  seen  later,  he  may  be  required  to  subscribe  to  a 
formal  application.1  This  was  well  brought  out  in  a  recent 
case  where  an  irrigation  company  which  had  formerly 
been  supplying  a  patron  upon  a  basis  very  advantageous 
to  it,  refused  when  the  contract  ran  out  to  accept  his 
application  for  service  upon  the  usual  terms  now  granted 
others,  and  insisted  upon  his  renewing  his  expiring  con- 
tract. It  was  of  course  decided  that  this  could  not  be 
justified.2  In  the  best  reasoned  telegraph  cases  it  is  said 
that  if  the  company  forces  a  patron  to  sign  away  his 
rights  by  refusing  to  take  his  message  in  any  other  way 
than  upon  their  blank  which  contains  this  special  contract, 
the  company  cannot  hold  him  to  his  promises.3 

§  339.  Applicant  need  not  have  the  capacity  to  contract. 
For  these  reasons  it  is  not  necessary  to  find  in  a  patron 
the  capacity  to  make  a  contract.    The  relationship  may 

1  See  Dittman  v.  New  Braunfels,  Telegraph  Co.,  94  Ga.  338,  47  Am. 
20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  293  (1899).  St.  Rep.  167  (1894). 

2  San  Diego  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Sharp,  See  also  Kevoy  v.  Western  Union 
38  C.  C.  A.  220,  97  Fed.  394  (1899).  Telegraph  Co.,  4  So.  Dak.  105,  46 

'See  Mathis  v.  Western  Union      Am.  St.  Rep.  765  (1893). 

[293] 


§  340  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

be  as  well  established  with  a  person  under  incapacity, 
with  an  infant  or  a  married  woman,  as  with  a  person 
entirely  sui  juris.  Thus  in  a  Kentucky  case,1  where  an 
infant  was  entertained  at  an  inn  it  was  held  that  the  inn- 
keeper might  charge  him  his  usual  rates  and  hold  his 
baggage  for  his  bill.  "Appellant  being  an  innkeeper,  was 
bound  legally  to  receive  and  entertain  all  guests  appar- 
ently responsible  and  of  good  conduct,  who  might  come 
to  his  house,  and  if  he  refused  to  do  so,  he  was  liable  alike 
to  all;  and  the  mere  fact  of  infancy  alone  in  the  applicant 
would  not  justify  him  in  any  such  refusal,"  said  the  court; 
and  it  added  that  an  infant  could  not  avoid  his  consequent 
obligations,  "it  would  be  a  legal  absurdity  to  compel  a 
man  to  make  a  contract,  and  at  the  same  time  permit 
the  other  party,  who  is  the  instrument  of  compulsion  to 
avoid  such  a  contract."  This  is  assumed  to  be  the  law 
in  a  late  Missouri  case  2  where  a  married  woman  applied 
for  a  supply  of  gas,  although  it  should  be  said  that  there 
were  at  that  time  such  statutes  hi  force  as  to  make  her 
practically  capable. 

§  340.  Incapacity  of  the  proprietor  to  contract  no  excuse. 

This  rule  works  both  ways.  Thus  when  a  man  has 
become  and  remains  an  innkeeper,  a  supervening  inca- 
pacity on  his  own  part  will  not  protect  him  from  respon- 
sibility; the  obligation  of  the  status  remains  so  long  as  he 
keeps  in  the  position.  In  an  old  English  case  3  where  an 
innkeeper  was  sued  for  failure  to  keep  safely  the  goods  of 
his  guest,  he  pleaded  that  at  the  time  the  guest  lodged  with 
him  he  was  sick  and  of  non  sane  memory.  On  demurrer, 
this  was  held  not  to  be  a  good  plea.  "For  the  defendant, 

1  Watson  v.  Cross,  2  Duv.  (Ky.)      Mo.    App.    600,     105    S.    W.   17 
147  (1865).  1907). 

2  Vanderberg    v.    Gas    Co.,   126          *  Cross  v.  Andrews,  Cro.  Eliz.  622 

(1598). 

[294] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [§341 

if  he  will  keep  an  inn,  ought  at  his  peril  to  keep  safely  his 
guest's  goods;  and  although  he  be  sick,  his  servants  then 
ought  carefully  to  look  to  them.  And  to  say  he  is  of  non 
sane  memory  it  lieth  not  in  him  to  disable  himself."  A 
modern  form  of  this  problem  is  presented  when  a  corpora- 
tion undertakes  a  service  which  is  ultra  vires.  It  is  law 
for  instance  that  although  the  corporation  operating  the 
railroad  is  in  reality  a  private  corporation  with  no  author- 
ity to  act  as  a  common  carrier,  still  it  may  be  liable  as  a 
common  carrier  for  injury  to  a  passenger  which  it  has 
assumed  to  carry.1 

§  341.  Relationship  established  although  another  pays. 

Another  proof  of  this  theory  is  that  the  relationship 
with  its  concomitant  obligations  may  be  established  with 
one  person  although  another  be  bound  to  pay.  Thus  in 
order  that  a  person  may  be  a  passenger  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  relation  of  passenger  and  carrier  be  established 
through  an  agreement  and  payment  of  fare  made  by 
himself.  The  agreement  may  be  made  and  the  fare  paid 
by  a  third  person.  Such  was  the  case  where  the  owners 
of  slaves  paid  their  passage  and  shipped  them  on  steam- 
boats to  a  certain  destination — these  slaves  were  held  to 
be  passengers.2  So  in  the  case  of  a  young  child  traveling 
free  with  its  parent,  under  a  statute  or  a  rule  of  the  com- 
pany, which  permits  such  a  child  to  travel  without  pay- 
ment of  fare,  the  agreement  in  this  case,  if  any,  is  made 
by  the  person  with  whom  the  child  is  traveling;  but  the 
child  occupies  towards  the  carrier  the  position  of  a  pas- 
senger from  the  time  it  is  received  with  the  adult  passen- 
ger.3 And  so  a  servant  is  a  passenger  whose  fare  is  paid 

1  Albion     Lumber    Co.     v.     De          *  Alabama,. — Ball  v.  Mobile  Light 
Nobra's  Adm.,  44  U.  S.  App.  347,  &  R.  R.  Co.,  146  Ala.  309,  39  So. 
72  Fed.  739,  19  C.  C.  A.  168  (1896).  584,  119  Am.  St.  Rep.  32  (1905). 

2  Boyce  v.  Anderson,  2  Pet.  (U.          Kentucky. — Southern  R.  R.  Co. 
S.)  150,  7  L.  ed.  379  (1829).  v.  Lee  (Ky.),  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1360, 

[  295  1 


§341 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


by  his  master.1  In  short,  the  relation  of  passenger  and 
carrier  does  not  arise  out  of  a  contract  obligation,  the 
relation  comes  into  existence  whenever  the  person  ac- 
cepted is  rightfully  carried.  Similarly  if  a  man  goes  with 
his  family  to  a  hotel  each  member  of  the  family  is  a  guest, 
though  the  head  of  the  family  is  alone  responsible  for 
payment  of  the  innkeeper's  charges.2  A  most  important 
consequence  of  this  general  principle  is  that  a  person 
must  be  served  when  the  compensation  is  tendered  by 
another.3  But  although  not  truly  contractual  the  initia- 

Vermoni. — Read  v.  Amidon,  41 
Vt.  15,  98  Am.  Dec.  560  (1868). 

The  dependent  person  may  be 
ejected  along  with  the  person  who 
has  him  in  charge. 

Minnesota. — Braun  v.  Northern 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Minn.  404,  82 
N.  W.  675,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  497 
(1900). 

Ohio.— Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Orndorff,  55  Oh.  St.  716,  45 
N.  E.  477,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  716 
(1897). 

Beneficiaries  designated  in  a  con- 
tract made  with  another  to  trans- 
port them  have  full  rights. 

United  States. — Motley  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.,  150  Fed.  406 
(1907). 

Kansas.— Curry  v.  The  K.  &  C. 
P.  R.  Co.,  58  Kans.  6,  48  Pac.  579 
(1897). 

3  United  States. — Missouri  R.  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  152  Fed.  608 
(1907). 

Indiana. — Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Norris,  17  Ind.  App.  189,  46 
N.  E.  554  (1896). 

Indian  Territory. — Missouri,  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  6  Ind.  Terr. 
99,  89  S.W.  668(1905). 

Missouri. — Randall    v.    Chicago, 


101  S.  W.  307,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
837. 

Massachusetts. — Littlejohn  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  R.,  148  Mass.  478,  20 
N.  E.  103,  2  L.  R.  A.  502  (1889). 

Michigan. — Withey  v.  Pere  Mar- 
quette  R.  R.,  141  Mich.  412,  104 
N.  W.  773,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  352, 
113  Am.  St.  Rep.  533  (1905). 

Missouri. — Rawlins  v.  Wabash 
Ry.  Co.,  97  Mo.  App.  515,  71  S.  W. 
534,  97  Mo.  App.  511,  71  S.  W.  535 
(1903). 

England. — Austin  v.  Great  W. 
Ry.,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  442  (1867). 

A  child  traveling  with  an  older 
person  who  refuses  to  pay  his  fare  is 
not  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  a 
passenger.  Beckwith  v.  Cheshire 
R.  R.  Co.,  143  Mass.  68,  8  N.  E.  875 
(1886). 

If  enough  is  not  tendered  for 
both,  both  may  be  expelled.  Eddy 
v.  Elliot,  4  Tex.  Ct.  of  App.  248,  15 
S.  W.  41  (1890). 

1  South  Carolina. — Mims  v.  Sea- 
board Air  Line  Ry.,  69  S.  C.  338,  48 
S.  E.  269  (1904). 

England. — Marshall  v.  York  N. 
&  B.  Ry.,  11  C.  B.  655  (1851). 

2  New  York. — Kopper  v.   Willis, 
9  Daly,  460  (1881). 

[296] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [  §  342 

tion  of  the  relationship  is  at  least  consensual;  it  follows 
that  an  intending  passenger  may  refuse  to  have  the  offi- 
cious tender  of  a  bystander  attributed  to  him.1 

§  342.  Statutory  provisions  for  public  service. 

It  will  often  happen  that  the  duty  to  serve  in  a  given 
calling  will  be  found  to  be  enacted  in  a  particular  statute. 
In  early  times  such  statutes  may  have  been  thought 
necessary.  Thus  there  are  many  statutes  from  an  earlier 
day  setting  forth  the  duty  of  innkeepers  and  millers.  In 
later  times  such  statutes  may  be  laid  to  the  codifying 
theory,  the  desire  to  have  these  duties  settled  in  detail 
beyond  question.  Thus  there  have  been  elaborate  stat- 
utes relating  to  railroad  service  and  irrigation  supply. 
These  statutes  will  stand  unless  they  are  so  unduly  regu- 
lative or  so  obviously  confiscatory  as  to  deprive  those 
engaged  in  this  business  of  their  liberty  or  property. 
But  aside  from  these  statutes  defining  the  duties  of  those 
engaged  in  these  businesses  which  are  recognized  as  pub- 
lic callings,  are  other  statutes  imposing  upon  certain 
businesses  the  obligations  of  public  service  where  this  has 
either  been  doubtful  at  common  law  or  denied.  Such 
statutes  have  their  office  in  hastening  the  development 
of  the  law  when  the  courts  are  over  cautious  in  taking 
the  responsibility  or  lacking  in  appreciation  of  new  condi- 
tions. But  the  legislation  cannot  under  our  American 
system  go  much  further,  for  if  it  proposes  to  subject  to 
public  service  any  businesses  which  it  would  be  beyond 
reason  to  consider  affected  with  a  public  interest,  the  leg- 
islation would  be  unconstitutional.  .- 

R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  76  S.  W.  493,  &  H.  C.  Co.,  142  Pa.  St.  617,  21  Atl. 

102  Mo.  App.  342  (1903).  1012  (1891). 

New  York. — O'Brien  v.  New  Tennessee. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  N.  Y.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  8  Lea,  438,  41  Am. 

236  (1880).  Rep.  640  (1881). 

Pennsylvania. — Ham  v.  Delaware  l  Birmingham  Ry.,  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

Lee,  153  Ala.  386,  45  So.  164  (1907). 

[297] 


§§  343,  344]   PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  343.  Franchise  provisions  for  public  service. 

It  was  once  common,  before  the  time  when  the  obliga- 
tions put  upon  those  who  undertake  a  public  service  were 
appreciated,  to  include  in  the  charter  of  a  public  service 
company  a  free  statement  of  its  obligations  to  the  public. 
The  binding  force  of  such  stipulations  upon  the  company 
which  accepts  such  a  charter  is  not  to  be  denied,  and  the 
public  nature  of  such  duties  is  disclosed  by  the  fact  that 
mandamus  will  be  granted  to  enforce  them  as  a  matter 
of  course.  Examples  of  this  policy  are  to  be  found  through- 
out this  treatise.  Such  charters  to-day  generally  go  no 
further  than  to  require  the  company  to  maintain  its  serv- 
ice in  general  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  public.  More- 
over in  the  granting  of  other  franchises  the  same  course  has 
been  followed.  Once  it  was  common  for  the  locality  in 
granting  a  franchise  to  a  public  service  to  stipulate  anx- 
iously for  the  right  of  its  citizens  to  have  service-tout  it 
has  long  since  been  recognized  that  these  obligations  may 
safely  be  left  to  the  common  law.  The  only  occasion  for 
such  stipulation  is  where  the  municipality  is  able  to  bar- 
gain with  the  company  for  something  more  than  the  com- 
mon law  might  require,  as  for  a  schedule  of  rates  lower 
than  it  would  be  certain  that  the  company  could  be  com- 
pelled to  make. 

Topic  B.  To  Whom  the  Obligation  is  Owed. 

§  344.  The  duty  is  owed  to  a  particular  public. 

To  generalize  from  all  cases  that  have  been  discussed 
it  would  seem  to  be  proper  to  say  that  one  who  under- 
takes a  public  service  owes  a  duty  to  serve  every  member 
of  the  public  within  his  profession.  That  which  in  the 
quaint  language  of  the  early  cases  may  seem  a  mere  con- 
ceit really  is  practically  the  truth  of  the  matter.  One  who 
undertakes  public  employment  has,  in  effect,  thereby  ex- 
[298] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [§345 

posed  and  vested  an  interest  of  himself  in  all  the  king's 
subjects  that  will  employ  him  in  the  way  of  his  trade. 
But  the  duty  as  thus  defined  is  not  to  all  men  but  to  a 
certain  public  limited  in  various  ways  according  to  the 
usual  profession.  Thus  a  gas  company  owes  its  duty 
only  to  those  who  occupy  premises  within  the  territory 
covered  by  the  service.  And  an  innkeeper  does  not  owe 
his  duty  to  all  who  apply  to  him,  but  only  to  travelers. 
These  two  examples  selected  from  the  next  chapter  in 
which  this  matter  is  fully  discussed  show  that  the  duty 
itself  has  its  limitations. 

§  345.  What  constitutes  a  default  to  an  individual. 

As  this  duty  is  to  a  particular  public,  it  follows  that 
no  member  of  the  public  as  such  has  a  right  of  action  for 
the  breach  of  it.  On  the  contrary  an  individual  can  only 
make  out  a  breach  to  him  of  the  duty  owed  to  him  by 
showing  that  being  one  within  the  profession  to  whom 
the  general  duty  was  owed  and  having  conformed  with 
all  the  prerequisite  conditions  properly  imposed,  the  serv- 
ice he  thus  requested  was  thereupon  refused  him.  That 
makes  out  the  prima  facie  case;  if  there  is  general  justifi- 
cation or  particular  excuse,  it  rests  upon  the  company  to 
set  up  such  affirmatively.  As  usually  happens,  the  deci- 
sions as  to  the  proper  pleadings  against  a  public  company 
show  exactly  the  real  duty.  Thus  in  a  declaration  against 
one  engaged  in  public  employment  it  is  only  necessary 
to  set  forth  the  facts;  the  public  duty  to  act  is  a  matter 
of  law  and  need  not  be  averred.  So  a  recent  Connecticut 
case  l  holds  of  a  declaration  against  a  common  carrier. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  declaration  by  the  applicant  stat- 
ing that  the  defendant  refused  to  act,  although  he  had  ap- 
plied to  it  to  act  for  him  within  the  scope  of  the  business, 
is  held  fatally  defective  for  not  stating  the  essential  facts, 

1  Lang  v.  Brady,  73  Conn.  707,  49  Atl.  199  (1901). 

[299] 


§  346  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

but  dealing  simply  with  a  conclusion  of  law.  So  a  recent 
Florida  case  l  holds  of  a  declaration  against  a  telegraph 
company.  Once  the  essential  fact  of  established  employ- 
ment and  proper  application  are  stated,  however,  a  prima 
fade  case  is  made  out.2  It  is  therefore  upon  the  defendant 
to  meet  that  by  setting  up  his  excuses  whatever  they 
may  be.3 

§  346.  Applicants  must  be  desirous  of  service. 

The  public  duty  that  is  being  denned  is  necessarily 
limited  to  responding  to  the  proper  applications  of  those 
who  are  desirous  of  the  sort  of  service  which  has  been 
professed;  there  is  no  duty  to  do  anything  different,  and 
no  breach  by  refusal.  That  there  is  no  breach  of  duty 
in  refusing  to  serve  an  applicant  who  is  not  desirous  of 
present  service  should  be  plain  upon  the  general  prin- 
ciple of  public  necessity  which  underlies  the  law  of  pub- 
lic service.  In  one  case  in  mind  4  a  householder  who  was 
using  electricity  for  lighting  his  house  sought  to  have 
the  gas  company  compelled  to  continue  to  maintain  its 
service  pipe  and  keep  connections  for  his  benefit,  so  that 
in  case  of  failure  of  the  electric  supply  the  gas  service  would 
be  immediately  available.  But  the  court  was  plainly  of 
opinion  that  to  such  an  applicant,  not  desirous  of  present 
service,  no  attention  need  be  paid.  "A  statement  of  the 
proposition  suggests  its  answer,"  it  said:  " there  is  no 
equality  or  equity  in  such  a  proposition."  5 

1  South  Florida  Telegraph  Co.  v.  4  Fleming  v.  Montgomery  Light 
Maloney,  34  Fla.  338,  16  So.  280  Co.,  100  Ala.  657,  13  So.  618  (1892). 
(1894).  "So  it  is  generally  held  that  a 

2  Ayres  v.  Chicago  &  Northwest-  man  who  has  no  goods  requiring 
ern  Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372,  37  N.  W.  transportation  cannot  complain  of  a 
432,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  226  (1888).  failure  to  furnish  him   with  cars. 

'Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  R.  v.      Wilder  v.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L.  C. 
Wolcott,  141  Ind.  267,  39  N.  E.  451,      Ry.,  66  Vt.  636,  30  Atl.  41  (1891). 
50  Am.  St.  Rep.  320  (1984). 

[  300  ] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [  §§  347,  348 

§  347.  Application  to  test  rights. 

A  difficult  problem  is  presented  when  the  person  pre- 
senting himself  is  making  his  application  in  order  to  test 
his  rights.  It  may  be  granted  that  if  he  is  in  truth  de- 
sirous of  the  service  he  asks,  the  traveler  may  demand  his 
rights,  even  if  as  in  some  cases  one  of  the  objects  of  the 
traveler  in  taking  the  trip  was  to  recover  a  penalty  for  a 
wrongful  refusal  of  a  tender,  which  it  was  believed  would 
occur.1  But  if  one  is  applying  for  service  with  no  de- 
sire to  obtain  it,  but  with  the  sole  intention  of  qualifying 
himself  for  bringing  suit,  he  is  not  really  applying  for  serv- 
ice in  the  sense  of  the  law.  This  was  well  brought  out  in 
one  case  2  wherein  certain  parties  who  had  got  themselves 
refused  two  or  three  thousand  times  in  order  to  bring 
suits  for  the  penalties  were  enjoined.  The  railroad  com- 
pany, it  was  said,  owes  no  duty  to  furnish  a  ticket  to  any- 
one unless  that  person  desired  to  put  it  to  the  use  for 
which  it  was  made  and  issued.  Such  desire  is  absolutely 
inconsistent  with  a  desire  to  have  it  refused,  in  order  to 
lay  the  foundation  for  a  cause  of  action  by  securing  such 
refusal.3  A  demand  made  in  bad  faith,  and  with  a  desire 
for  a  refusal,  is  wholly  ineffective.4 

§  348.  Liability  to  sendee  of  telegram. 
A  prominent  class  of  cases  are  those  telegraph  cases 

1  Adams   v.   Union  Ry.   Co.,   21  E.    385    (1908).      Supporting    ex- 
it. I.  134,  42  Atl.  515  (1899).  pressly:  Myers  v.  Brooklyn  Heights 

2  Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Robin-  R.  R.  Co.,  10  App.  Div.  335,  41  N. 
son,    132    Cal.    408,    64    Pac.    572  Y.  Supp.  798  (1896);  Nicholson  v. 
(1901).  New  York  City  Ry.  Co.,  118  App. 

3  Georgia.— Southern  Ry.  Co.    v.  Div.    858,    103    N.    Y.    Supp.    695 
Barlow,  104  Ga.  213,  30  S.  E.  732  (1907);    and    therefore   necessarily 
(1898).  overruling:  Fitzmartin  v.  New  York 

Iowa.— Jolley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  City  Ry.,  51  N.  Y.  Misc.  36,  99  N. 

St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  119  Iowa,  491,  93  Y.  Supp.  765  (1906);  McLean  v. 

N.  W.  555  (1903).  Interurban    St.    Ry.,    102    N.    Y. 

4  See  further:  Bull  v.  New  York  App.  Div.  18,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  77 
City  Ry.  Co.,  192  N.  Y.  361,  85  N.  (1905). 

[301] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


which  allow  the  sendee,  as  he  is  called,  to  recover  for  fault 
of  the  company  in  the  transmission  of  the  message.  Al- 
though such  an  action  fails  in  England,1,  it  is  almost  uni- 
versally successful  in  the  United  States  on  one  theory  or 
another.  As  summarized  in  one  of  the  American  cases  2 
there  are  certainly  four  principal  theories:  (1)  That,  as 
a  telegraph  company  is  in  the  exercise  of  a  public,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  private,  calling,  it  is  the  common  agent 
of  both  parties  to  a  telegraph  message,  or  a  public  agent 
liable  to  anyone  injured  by  its  negligence; 3  (2)  That 
the  person  addressed  is  the  beneficiary  of  a  contract ; 4 


1  Playford    v.    United    Kingdom 
Electric  Telegraph  Co.,  L.  R.  4  Q. 
B.  706  (1869). 

See  further  Feaver  v.  Montreal 
Telegraph  Co.,  23  Upp.  Can.  C.  P. 
150  (1873). 

2  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
Allen,  66  Miss.  549,  6  So.  461  (1889). 
This  paragraph  and  the  next  are 
largely  written  from  this  case. 

See  also  the  general  language  in 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
Woodward,  84  Ark.  323,  105  S.  W. 
579  (1907). 

3  See  the  language  in  these  cases 
particularly. — 

California. — Coit  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  130  Cal.  657, 
63  Pac.  83,  53  L.  R.  A.  678,  80  Am. 
St.  Rep.  153  (1900). 

Illinois. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Dubois,  128  111.  248, 
(1889),  21  N.  E.  4,  15  Am.  St.  Rep. 
109,  29  111.  App.  219,  (1888). 

Indiana. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Fenton,  52  Ind.  1 
(1875). 

Louisiana. — De  La  Grange  v. 
Southwestern  Telegraph  Co.,  25 
La.  Ann.  383  (1873). 

[302] 


Massachusetts. — Ellis  v.  American 
Telegraph  Co.,  13  Allen,  226  (1866). 

Mississippi. — Shingleur  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  72  Miss. 
1030,  18  So.  425,  30  L.  R.  A.  444,  48 
Am.  St.  Rep.  604  (1895). 

Missouri. — Lee  v.  Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.,  51  Mo.  App.  375 
(1892). 

4  See  the  language  in  these  cases 
particularly. — 

Alabama. — Kennon  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  92  Ala.  399, 
9  So.  200  (1890). 

Kansas. — R  u  s  s  e  1 1  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  57  Kans.  230, 
45  Pac.  598  (1896). 

North  Carolina. — Sherrill  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  109  N.  C. 
527,  14  S.  E.  94  (1891). 

Oklahoma. — Butner  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  2  Okla.  234, 
37  Pac.  1087  (1894). 

Oregon. — Frazier  v.  Western  Tele- 
graph Co.,  45  Oreg.  414,  78  Pac. 
330,  67  L.  R.  A.  319  (1904). 

South  Carolina. — Aiken  v.  Tele- 
graph Co.,  5  S.  C.  358,  371 
(1874). 

Texas. — Western     Union     Tele- 


PUBLIC  DUTY 


(3)  That  the  message  is  the  property  of  the  person  ad- 
dressed, the  position  of  such  person  being  analogous  to 
that  of  a  consignee  of  goods,1  and  (4)  That  the  sendee 
is  the  principal  of  the  telegraph  company  in  those  cases 
where  he  originally  employed  the  company.2  But  after 
considering  each  of  them  carefully  this  court  gave  up  in 
despair.  "  The  fundamental  principle  is  that  there  is  some 
breach  of  duty,  and  whether  this  duty  is  logically  deduced 
from  any  well-recognized  rules  applicable  to  other  rela- 
tions becomes  immaterial  when  there  is  consensus  of 
judicial  opinion  as  to  its  existence." 

§  349.  Discussion  of  the  conflicting  theories. 

Objections  can  be  made  to  the  application  of  each  and 
every  principle,  in  analogy  to  which  the  courts  act.  To 
those  decisions  in  which  the  telegraph  company  is  treated 


graph  Co.  v.  Adams,  75  Tex.  531,  12 
S.  W.  857,  6  L.  R.  A.  844,  16  Am. 
St.  Rep.  920  (1889). 

1  See  the  language  in  these  cases 
particularly. — 

United  Stales. — Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Lawson,  182  Fed. 
369  (1910). 

Georgia. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  James,  90  Ga.  254, 
16  S.  E.  83  (1892). 

Pennsylvania. — New  York  & 
Washington  Printing  Telegraph  Co. 
v.  Dryburg,  35  Pa.  St.  298,  78  Am. 
Dec.  338  (1860). 

Virginia. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Reynolds,  77  Va.  173, 
46  Am.  Rep.  715  (1883). 

2  See  the  language  in  these  cases 
particularly. — 

Iowa. — Harkness  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  73  Iowa,  190, 
34  N.  W.  811,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  672 
(1887). 


Kentucky. — Chapman  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  90  Ky.  265, 
13  S.  W.  880  (1890). 

Maryland. — United  States  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Gildersleve,  29  Md. 
232,  96  Am.  Dec.  519  (1868). 

New  York. — Milliken  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  110  N.  Y. 
403,  18  N.  E.  251  (1888). 

Where  the  law  assumes  that  the 
sender  is  the  party  in  interest,  the 
interest  of  the  sendee  must  affirma- 
tively appear.  See  Anniston  Cord- 
age Co.  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.,  161  Ala.  216,  49  So.  770 
(1909). 

Where  the  law  assumes  that  the 
sendee  is  the  party  in  interest,  the 
interest  of  the  sender  must  affirma- 
tively appear.  See  Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Bell  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  90  S.  W.  714  (1905) 


[303 


§  350  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

as  bailee,  it  may  be  objected  that  a  bailee  is  one  who 
receives  property  and  that  intelligence  is  not  property 
subject  to  bailment.  To  those  which  deduce  the  liability 
from  the  principles  of  agency,  that  the  company  is  agent 
only  for  him  who  employs  it.  To  those  which  hold  that 
the  sendee  may  sue  upon  the  contract,  as  one  made  for 
his  benefit,  that  one  not  a  party  to  an  executory  contract 
has  no  right  of  action  on  it.  To  those  which  declare  that 
the  telegraph  company  is  in  the  exercise  of  a  public  em- 
ployment, and  is  responsible  for  any  breach  of  duty,  that 
it  owes  no  duty  to  the  public  as  individuals  except  to 
contract  with  each  on  his  demand,  and  that  there  is  no 
contract  save  with  the  sender  of  the  message.  It  yet 
remains  true  that  the  courts  on  some  one  or  the  other  of 
these  grounds,  have  steadily  adhered  to  the  rule  of  lia- 
bility; and  this  must  have  its  reason.  Difficult  this  mat- 
ter may  be,  but  the  writer  feels  that  in  almost  all  the 
cases  where  the  sendee  has  been  allowed  to  recover,  the 
arrangement  may  be  said  to  be  made  without  violence 
to  the  real  facts  in  behalf  of  the  sendee  by  the  sender 
acting  for  him.  Thus  the  consignor  very  often  acts  for 
the  consignee;  and  on  such  facts  there  has  never  been 
any  dispute  as  to  the  right  of  the  consignee  to  sue  the 
carrier.  This  explains  why  when  the  sendee  has  no  real 
interest  he  cannot  recover.  Neither  can  the  addressee 
when  the  consignor  retains  the  ownership. 

§  350.  Individual  rights  to  fire  protection. 

A  similar  problem  arises  in  relation  to  hydrant  supply 
to  a  city  for  extinguishment  of  fires.  The  usual  form  in 
which  this  comes  up  is  a  suit  by  a  householder  in  a  mu- 
nicipality against  the  water  company  supplying  the  dis- 
trict seeking  to  recover  damages  in  his  own  right  for  the 
failure  to  supply  sufficient  water  to  extinguish  the  fire 
which  destroyed  his  premises.  In  most  jurisdictions  he 
[304] 


PUBLIC  DUTY 


§350 


fails; 1  in  several  jurisdictions,  however,  he  succeeds.2    It 
will  be  noticed  in  analyzing  these  cases  that  in  all  of  them 


1  Alabama. — Lovejoy  v.  Besse- 
mer Water  Works  Co.,  146  Ala.  374, 
41  So.  76,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  429 
(1906). 

California. — Ukiah  City  v.  Ukiah 
Water  &  Imp.  Co.,  142  Cal.  173,  75 
Pac.  773,  64  L.  R.  A.  231,  100  Am. 
St.  Rep.  107  (1904). 

Connecticut. — Nickerson  v.  Bridg- 
port  Hydraulic  Co.,  46  Conn.  24,  33 
Am.  Rep.  1  (1878). 

Georgia. — Fowler  v.  City  Water- 
works Co.,  83  Ga.  219,  9  S.  E.  673, 

20  Am.  St.  Rep.  313  (1889). 
Idaho. — Bush  v.  Artesian  Hot  & 

Cold  Water  Co.,  4  Idaho,  618,  43 
Pac.  69,  95  Am.  St.  Rep.  161  (1895). 

Indiana. — Fitch  v.  Seymour 
Water  Co.,  139  Ind.  214,  37  N.  E. 
982,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  258  (1894). 

Iowa. — Davis  v.  Clinton  Water- 
works Co.,  54  Iowa,  59,  6  N.  W.  126, 
37  Am.  Rep.  185  (1880). 

Kansas. — Mott  v.  Cherryvale 
Water  Co.,  48  Kans.  12,  28  Pac. 
989,  15  L.  R.  A.  375,  30  Am.  St. 
Rep.  267  (1892). 

Maine. — Hone  v.  Presque  Isle 
Water  Co.,  104  Me.  217,  71  Atl.  769, 

21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1021  (1908). 
Mississippi. — Wilkinson  v.  Light, 

Heat  &  Water  Co.,  78  Miss.  389,  28 
So.  877  (1900). 

Missouri. — Metz  v.  Cape  Girar- 
deau  Water  Works  Co.,  202  Mo. 
324,  100  S.  W.  621  (1907). 

Nevada. — Ferris  v.  Carson  Water 
Co.,  16  Nev.  44,  40  Am.  Rep.  485 
(1881). 

New  York. — Wainwright  v. 
Queens  County  Water  Co.,  78  Hun, 
146,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  987  (1894). 

20 


Ohio. — Blunk  v.  Dennison  Water 
Co.,  71  Ohio,  250,  73  N.  E.  210 
(1905). 

Pennsylvania. — Beck  v.  Kittan- 
ning  Water  Co.  11  Atl.  300  (1887). 

Tennessee. — Foster  v.  Lookout 
Water  Co.,  3  Lea,  42  (1879). 

Texas. — House  v.  Houston  Water- 
works Co.,  88  Tex.  233,  31  S.  W.  179, 
28  L.  R.  A.  532  (1895). 

West  Virginia. — Nichol  v.  Hunt- 
ington  Water  Co.,  53  W.  Va.  348, 
44  S.  E.  290  (1903). 

Wisconsin. — Britton  v.  Green  Bay 

6  Ft.  H.  Waterworks  Co.,  81  Wis. 
48,  51  N.  W.  84,  29  Am.  St.  Rep. 
856  (1892). 

2  United  States. — Guardian  Trust 
Co.  v.  Fisher,  200  U.  S.  57,  50  L.  ed. 
367,  26  Sup.  Ct.  186  (1906). 

Florida. — Mugge  v.  Tampa 
Water-works  Co.,  52  Fla.  371,  42 
So.  8  (1906). 

Kentucky. — Paducah  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Paducah  Water  Supply  Co.,  89 
Ky.  340,  12  S.  W.  554,  13  S.  W.  249, 

7  L.  R.  A.  77,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  536 
(1889). 

North  Carolina. — Gorrell  v. 
Greensboro  Water  Supply  Co.,  124 
N.  C.  328,  32  S.  E.  720,  46  L.  R.  A. 
513,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  598  (1899). 

See  also  these  cases,  somewhat 
doubtful: 

Louisiana. — Allen,  etc.,  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Shreveport  Waterworks  Co.,  113 
La.  1091,  37  So.  1980,  68  L.  R.  A. 
650,  104  Am.  St.  Rep.  525  (1905). 

South  Carolina. — Ancrum  v. 
Camden  Water,  L.  &  I.  Co.,  82  S. 
C.  284,  64  S.  E.  151,  21  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1029  (1909). 

[305] 


§  351  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

there  is  a  contract  between  the  waterworks  and  the  mu- 
nicipality in  which  it  is  provided  that  a  certain  pressure 
shall  be  maintained.  If  this  contract  is  broken  it  would 
seem  to  give  an  individual  citizen  no  right  to  sue  for  the 
breach  of  that  promise  made  to  the  municipality.  So  the 
cases  generally  hold.  Some  few  cases  seem  to  maintain 
that  the  citizens  should  be  regarded  as  the  sole  benefi- 
ciaries of  that  contract;  but  the  difficulty  with  that  view 
is  that  the  performance  was  promised  the  municipality 
and  was  not  by  its  terms  to  be  made  to  citizens  individu- 
ally. It  would  be  a  convenient  way  out  of  the  difficulty, 
as  some  hopeful  persons  now  assert,  if  it  could  be  said 
that  by  so  contracting  the  company  has  undertaken  the 
supply  of  water  for  the  extinguishment  of  fires.  But  has 
the  individual  citizen  entered  into  any  relation  with  the 
company  in  this  respect  by  making  an  application  which 
has  been  accepted?  If  the  applicant,  as  in  one  case,  had 
been  refused  water  for  his  sprinkler  system,  he  would 
make  out  a  breach  to  him;  but  the  cases  discussed  are 
obviously  different.  The  only  way  in  which  a  default 
to  the  citizen  could  be  worked  out,  would  be  to  show  that 
the  obligation  created  really  runs  to  the  citizens  indi- 
vidually; but  it  is  more  obviously  made  to  the  munici- 
pality as  an  entity. 

§  351.  Common  law  basis  for  individual  rights. 

The  difficulty  of  this  problem  makes  necessary  further 
consideration  of  the  conflicting  cases.  The  argument  for 
the  citizen  is  succinctly  put  in  the  latest  North  Carolina 
case  summarizing  the  others.1  "  There  can  be  no  real  con- 
tention that  the  plaintiff,  a  citizen  and  taxpayer,  and  one 
of  the  beneficiaries  in  the  purview  of  this  contract  cannot 
prosecute  this  action.  He  is  the  real  party  in  interest. 
He  is  taxed  with  payment  of  his  pro  rata  of  the  annual 

1  Jones  v.   Durham   Water  Co.,  135  N.  C.  553,  47  S.  E.  615  (1904). 
[306] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [  §  352 

rental.  The  town  cannot  maintain  this  action  for  the  loss 
sustained  by  him  by  reason  of  the  defendant's  failure  to 
perform  the  provisions  of  the  contract  above  recited.  For 
this  injury  the  plaintiff  alone  can  sue.  The  same  principle 
has  been  often  affirmed;  to  wit,  that  the  beneficiary  of  a 
contract,  though  not  a  party  to  it,  nor  expressly  named 
therein,  can  maintain  an  action  for  a  breach  of  such  con- 
tract, causing  injury  to  him,  if  the  contract  was  made  for 
his  benefit."  One  of  the  most  telling  arguments  to  the 
contrary  is  contained  in  the  leading  Texas  case:  *  "It  is 
not  true,  that  for  every  failure  to  perform  a  public  duty 
an  action  will  lie  in  favor  of  any  person  who  may  suffer 
injury  by  reason  of  such  failure.  If  the  duty  is  purely  a 
public  duty,  then  the  individual  will  have  no  right  of 
action;  but  it  must  appear  that  the  object  and  purpose  of 
imposing  the  duty  was  to  confer  a  benefit  upon  the  indi- 
viduals composing  the  public."  The  writer  is  inclined  to 
follow  this  last  opinion.  The  only  possibility  by  which 
the  inhabitants  could  gain  individual  rights  under  this 
contract  arrangement  would  be  if  the  arrangement  was 
made  for  their  exclusive  benefit  as  individuals.  ,  This  does 
not  seem  to  be  the  case. 

§  352.  Extent  of  public  interests. 

It  is  commonly  said  of  public  employments  that  the 
whole  public  is  peculiarly  interested  in  having  them  car- 
ried on.  And  it  has  been  noticeable  in  the  judicial  opin- 
ions of  late  that  this  general  interest  of  the  whole  public 
is  often  made  the  basis  of  peculiar  rules  which  can  only 
be  explained  upon  this  public  policy.  Thus  in  granting 
receiverships  to  bondholders  of  public  service  companies 
it  is  generally  stipulated  that  those  who  have  kept  up 
the  public  service  without  being  paid  while  it  was  on  the 

1  House  v.  Houston  Waterworks      Co.,  88  Tex.  233,  31  S.  W.  179,  28 

L.  R.  A.  532  (1895). 

[307] 


§  353  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

verge  of  insolvency  shall  be  paid  even  ahead  of  the  mort- 
gages out  of  the  sale  of  mortgaged  property.1  This  is 
altogether  abnormal  in  mortgage  law;  and  it  seems  that 
it  is  only  to  be  explained  by  this  public  interest  in  the  con- 
tinued performance  of  the  public  services.  To  put  an- 
other example,  courts  will  sometimes  grant  specific  per- 
formance, for  a  time  at  least,  of  arrangements  necessary 
for  the  performance  of  a  public  service,  although  if  only 
private  interests  were  involved  no  such  relief  would  ever 
be  given.  In  one  case  2  the  court  went  so  far  as  to  grant 
specific  performance  for  the  time  being  of  an  agreement 
to  supply  electric  power  to  a  street  railway  which  was 
admittedly  without  obligation. 

§  353.  Personal  character  of  the  individual  right. 

The  legal  right  which  the  customer  of  a  public  service 
company  acquires  by  being  accepted  seems  to  be  pecul- 
iarly a  personal  one.  There  is  no  necessary  obligation  by 
a  particular  acceptance  except  to  give  service  to  the  par- 
ticular customer.  If  another  wishes  service  he  must 
himself  apply  for  the  service  he  wishes.  If  one  is  traveling 
with  a  ticket  from  A  to  C  (intending  to  go  no  further 
than  B)  he  cannot  assign  to  another  the  right  to  continue 
the  journey  from  B  to  C,  even  by  the  same  train.3  And 
a  railroad  may  make  its  tickets  transferable  or  non- 

1  This  doctrine  has  been  devel-  lime  Falls  Power  Co.,  40  Wash.  380, 

oped  by  the  United  States  Supreme  82  Pac.  713  (1905). 

Court  in  many  cases  since  the  origi-  It  should  be  noted  that  the  em- 

nal  dictum  in  Fosdick  v.  Schall,  99  ployds  of  public  service  companies 

U.  S.  235,  25  L.  ed.  339  (1878).  are  often  held  for  a  time  to  the  per- 

And  so  the  bankruptcy  laws  are  formance  of  their  duties  in  case  of 

held  not  applicable  to  public  service  threatened  strike.    Toledo  A.  A.  & 

companies  lest  the  public  service  be  P.  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 

interrupted  or  the  public  duty  dis-  R.  Co.,  54  Fed.  746  (1893). 

charged.    In  re  Bay  City  Irrigation  *  See     particularly     Roberts     v. 

Co.,  135  Fed.  850  (1905).  Koehler,  30  Fed.  94  (1887). 

*  Seattle  Electric  Co.  v.  Snoqua- 

[308] 


PUBLIC  DUTY  [  §§  354,  355 

transferable  as  it  wishes.1  If  one  who  is  receiving  serv- 
ice at  certain  premises  goes  out  of  business  the  company 
may  consider  itself  under  no  further  obligation  in  respect 
to  those  premises  by  virtue  of  the  former  arrangement.2 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  one  is  under  no  obligation  to  pay 
the  charges  for  service  accruing  against  his  predecessor.3 

§  354.  Statutory  requirements  for  service. 

It  is  not  uncommon  even  at  this  day  for  the  legislature 
to  define  certain  of  the  duties  of  those  engaged  in  certain 
callings  where  the  legislature  believes  the  common  law 
to  be  doubtful  or  inadequate.  Thus  there  are  statutes  in 
several  States  providing  that  upon  due  demand  a  railroad 
must  furnish  cars  within  a  certain  time  definitely  fixed, 
whereas  at  common  law  the  obligation  would  be  to  furnish 
cars  within  a  reasonable  time.  Upon  the  same  basis  are 
statutes  requiring  gas  companies  to  furnish  gas  to  all 
applicants  within  a  certain  number  of  feet  of  the  estab- 
lished mains,  while  at  common  law  the  test  would  be  a 
reasonable  distance. 

§  355.  Statutory  penalties  for  default. 

At  some  times  in  respect  to  some  callings,  statutes 
have  been  passed  giving  special  remedies  when  there  has 
been  a  refusal  to  serve.  There  is  no  uniformity  in  this 
legislation;  but  in  certain  States  some  services  are  singled 
out.  The  moving  force  back  of  the  statutes  which  provide 
for  the  recovery  of  a  penalty  is  the  idea  that  where  the 
actual  damages  that  the  applicant  refused  could  probably 
recover  are  so  small  that  they  would  not  deter  the  pro- 
prietor of  a  service  from  capricious  refusal  some  addi- 

1  See  Hudson  v.  Kansas  Pacific      Chicago  Board  of  Trade,   111  111. 
Ry.  Co.,  3  McCrary   (U.  S.)  249      App.  492  (1903). 

(1882).  s  See  particularly  Gaslight  Co.  v. 

2  See    particularly    Sullivan     v.      Colliday,  25  Md.  1  (1866). 

[309] 


§  355  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tional  penalty  would  be  necessary.  Doubtless  this  is 
one  explanation  of  the  fact  that  from  ancient  times  the 
refusal  of  an  innkeeper  to  take  in  a  traveler  has  been 
punished  as  a  crime.  Certainly  this  is  the  explanation 
of  the  statutes  giving  those  who  are  refused  service  by  a 
telegraph  company  the  right  to  recover  a  penalty  of  a 
round  sum. 


[310] 


CHAPTER  XI 

OBLIGATION  LIMITED  TO  CEKTAIN  CLASSES 

§  360.  Inherent  limitation  of  the  public  service  duty. 

Topic  A.  Duty  Limited  to  Travelers 
§  361.  Special  need  of  travelers. 

362.  Carriers'  obligation  limited  to  travelers. 

363.  Innkeepers'  duty  owed  only  to  travelers. 

364.  Who  is  a  traveler? 

365.  How  long  one  remains  a  traveler. 

366.  When  one  ceases  to  be  a  traveler. 

Topic  B.  Obligations  Incidental  to  the  Service 
§  367.  Persons  properly  upon  the  premises. 

368.  Persons  desiring  shelter  merely. 

369.  Persons  assisting  or  meeting  passengers. 

370.  Convenience  of  the  patron  the  test. 

371.  Right  involved  is  that  of  the  person  served. 

372.  Extent  of  the  duty  to  such  persons. 

Topic  C.  Duty  Limited  to  Occupiers 
§  373.  Special  need  of  occupiers. 

374.  Obligation  limited  to  supply  at  premises. 

375.  Necessity  of  telephone  service  at  residence. 

376.  Duty  owed  to  occupiers. 

377.  Certain  consequences  of  this  doctrine 

378.  Supply  to  incumbered  premises. 

379.  Services  to  separate  premises. 

380.  Supply  to  buildings  divided  into  tenements. 

Topic  D.  Other  Limitations  to  Particular  Classes 
§  381.  When  special  limitations  are  justifiable. 

382.  Sleeping  and  parlor  car  service. 

383.  Rights  in  a  public  conduit. 

384.  Irrigation  in  accordance  with  water  rights. 

385.  Basis  of  the  public  duty. 

[311] 


§§  360,  361  ]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  360.  Inherent  limitation  of  the  public  service  duty. 

It  is  ordinarily  said  that  those  who  have  undertaken  a 
public  service  owe  a  duty  to  the  public  in  general,  what- 
ever may  be  their  inclinations.  But  it  will  be  found  upon 
inquiry  that  in  the  case  of  every  public  calling  service  is 
legally  due  to  persons  belonging  to  a  special  class  and 
not  to  every  member  of  the  public,  as  such.  This  is  the 
inevitable  consequence  of  the  elementary  principles  as 
to  the  essential  nature  of  public  employment  and  the 
necessary  scope  of  public  profession.  By  these  fundamen- 
tal rules  an  employment  is  held  public  in  its  nature  only 
in  so  far  as  it  is  affected  with  a  public  interest  and  only 
to  the  extent  that  it  has  been  undertaken.  Both  that 
public  interest  and  that  public  profession  must  coexist 
in  order  that  there  may  be  a  public  duty  in  particular 
cases.  That  being  so,  it  is  natural  to  find  that  in  most 
public  callings  either  the  real  necessity  is  confined  to  a 
certain  class  or  the  undertaking  assumed  has  been  solely 
toward  a  special  class.  It  is  to  that  extent  and  to  them 
that  the  public  duty  is  therefore  established.  There  have 
already  been  examples  enough  of  limitations  of  this  sort 
in  adjudicated  cases  to  make  this  matter  sufficiently  plain. 

Topic  A.  Duty  Limited  to  Travelers 

§  361.  Special  need  of  travelers. 

From  ancient  times  it  has  been  recognized  that  in  certain 
public  employments  the  public  duty  is  owed  only  to  travel- 
ers. It  is  only  as  to  dealings  with  travelers  that  these  call- 
ings are  affected  with  a  public  interest.  Those  who  offer 
necessary  services,  protection  or  transportation,  to  way- 
farers and  travelers,  always  have  the  upper  hand;  their 
monopoly  is  temporary,  but  it  is  effectual,  while  these  very 
same  persons,  in  offering  their  services  to  the  local  popula- 
tion under  other  circumstances,  have  no  monopoly  at  all. 
There  is  every  reason,  therefore,  why  innkeepers  should  be 
[312] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §  362 

bound  to  entertain  weary  wayfarers,  and  why  carriers  of 
passengers  must  take  up  travelers  bound  their  way.  And 
as  all  within  the  class  being  similarly  circumstanced  have 
practically  the  same  need,  it  should  not  be  open  to  those 
who  are  conducting  these  services  to  discriminate  within 
this  particular  public.  Thus  the  suggestion  in  one  case 
that  an  innkeeper  might  confine  his  obligation  to  those 
who  might  come  in  their  carriages, l  or  in  another  that  trav- 
elers belonging  to  an  unpopular  race  might  be  excluded,2 
are  both  inconsistent  with  the  public  duty  which  is  owed 
to  all  travelers  without  regard  to  station  or  condition. 

§  362.  Carriers'  obligation  limited  to  travelers. 

That  the  business  which  the  carrier  of  passengers  under- 
takes is  the  transportation  of  travelers  is  so  obvious  that 
there  are  but  a  few  cases  which  state  it.3  The  necessary 
thing  is  that  those  upon  a  journey  should  be  speeded  on 
their  way.  The  carrier  of  passengers  does  not  undertake 
any  other  service  than  the  transportation  of  passengers. 
Nor  is  he  bound  to  furnish  the  use  of  his  facilities  to  carry 
one  for  any  purpose  save  his  transportation.  Thus  in 
order  to  demand  carriage  one  must  be  desirous  of  reaching 
his  destination.  Therefore,  as  will  be  seen  later,  one  has 
no  right  to  demand  carriage  for  the  purpose  of  selling 
goods.  "A  steamboat  company  or  a  railroad  company  is 
not  bound  to  furnish  traveling  conveniences  for  those  who 
wish  to  engage,  on  their  vehicles,  in  the  business  of  selling 
books,  papers,  or  articles  of  food,  or  in  the  business  of 
receiving  and  distributing  parcels  or  baggage,  nor  to  per- 
mit the  transaction  of  this  business  in  their  vehicles, 
when  it  interferes  with  their  own  interests."  4 

1  Johnson  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  4  s  Jencks  v.  Coleman,  2  Sumn.  221 
Exch.  (Eng.)  367,  371  (1849).  (1835). 

2  State  v.  Steele,  106  N.  C.  766,  «  Quoted  from  The  D.  R.  Martin, 
11  S.  E.  478,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  573,  8  11  Blatch.  233  (1873). 

L.  R.  A.  516  (1890). 

[313] 


§§  363,  364  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  363    Innkeepers'  duty  owed  only  to  travelers. 

The  inn  is  established  for  travelers,  and  it  is  such  per- 
sons only  who  are  the  necessary  objects  of  the  public 
solicitude.  One  who  is  not  a  traveler  does  not  need  the 
inn  to  protect  him,  for  he  can  provide  a  home  for  that 
purpose.  The  public  duty  of  the  innkeeper  is  therefore 
owed  to  travelers  only,  and  no  one  who  is  not  a  traveler 
can  demand  to  be  received  at  an  inn.1  Thus  in  the  lead- 
ing case  on  the  law  of  innkeepers  2  the  court  said:  " Com- 
mon inns  are  instituted  for  passengers  and  wayfaring  men; 
for  the  Latin  word  for  an  inn  is  diversorium,  because  he  who 
lodges  there  is  quasi  divertens  se  a  via;  and  so  diversoriolum. 
And  therefore  if  a  neighbor,  who  is  no  traveler,  as  a 
friend,  at  the  request  of  the  innholder  lodges  there,  and 
his  goods  be  stolen,  etc.,  he  shall  not  have  an  action;  for 
the  writ  is  ad  hospitandos  homines,  etc.,  transeuntes  in 
eisdem  hospitantes." 

§  364.  Who  is  a  traveler? 

One  who  is  making  a  very  short  journey  may  demand 
transportation  as  a  traveler;  however  short  the  distance 
the  passenger  may  be  going,  the  carrier  is  liable  as  such.3 
Certainly  under  the  modern  decisions  a  man  need  not  be 
at  the  time  engaged  upon  a  journey  of  any  considerable 
length  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  demand  admission  to 
an  inn  as  a  traveler.4  Notwithstanding  some  dicta  5  it  is 
entirely  possible  for  a  resident  of  the  same  locality  to  be 
considered  a  traveler.  Where,  for  instance,  a  man  on  his 
way  from  his  city  office  to  his  suburban  home  stopped  at 

!Rex  v.   Luellin,   12  Mod.   445  68    Mo.    340,  30    Am.    Rep.    799 

(1700).  (1878). 

'Calye's  Case,  8  Coke,  202  (1584).  •'Atkinson  v.    Sellers,    5    C.    B. 

1  Illinois.— Parmelee  v.  McNulty,  (N.  S.)  (Eng.)  442  (1858). 

19  111.  556  (1858).  •  Carr's  Case,  1  Roll.  Abr.  3,  pi. 

Missouri. — Lemon   v.    Chanslor,  4  (1583). 

[314] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §  365 

an  inn  to  get  dinner,  he  was  held  to  be  a  traveler.1  Jus- 
tice Kennedy  said  in  that  case:  "It  does  not  seem  to  me 
to  make  any  difference  whether  his  journey  be  a  long  or  a 
short  one."  But  a  man  who  takes  a  walk  and  just  before 
reaching  home  goes  into  an  inn  to  get  a  drink  is  not  a 
traveler,  and  cannot  demand  the  accommodation  he  seeks;2 
while  if  in  course  of  a  long  walk  for  pleasure  he  stops  on 
his  way  for  refreshment  at  an  inn,  he  is  entitled  to  be 
entertained.  For  if  he  is  bona  fide  in  the  course  of  traveling 
from  one  place  to  another  he  is  none  the  less  a  traveler 
because  the  purpose  of  his  journey  is  merely  pleasure.3 
In  short,  anyone  away  from  home  receiving  accommo- 
dations at  an  inn  as  a  traveler  is  a  guest.4 

§  365.  How  long  one  remains  a  traveler. 

The  determination  of  the  question  whether  one  who  is 
staying  at  an  inn  is  a  guest  or  a  boarder  may  depend  upon 
whether  the  person  is  a  resident  of  the  town  or  a  stranger. 
So  a  foreigner  visiting  the  country  and  staying  for  a  con- 
siderable time  at  a  hotel  was  held  a  guest,5  and  a  resident 
of  another  town,  visiting  the  town  where  the  inn  was 
situated  for  business  purposes  merely,  was  held  to  be  a 
guest.6  On  the  other  hand,  an  employe  of  a  railroad, 
making  his  regular  trips,  and  stopping  over  at  each  end 
of  his  route  at  the  hotel,  where  he  rents  a  room  by  the 
month,  is  not  a  guest.  He  is,  as  the  court  said,  "a  citizen 
of  the  community  at  both  ends  of  the  route."  7  So  where 
a  man  breaks  up  his  home  and  goes  to  a  hotel  in  the  same 

1  Orchard  v.  Bush,  2  Q.  B.  (Eng.)  4,  22  N.  W.  825,  53  Am.  Rep.  242 
284,  289  (1898).  (1885). 

2  Murphy  v.  limes,  11  So.  Aus-  B  Metzger  v.  Schnabel,  23  N.  Y. 
tralia,  56  (1877).  Misc.   698,    52   N.   Y.   Supp.    105 

3  Taylor  v.  Humphreys,  30  L.  J.  (1898). 

M.  C.  242  (Eng.)  (1861).  «Beale   v.    Posey,    72   Ala.    323 

4  Walling  v.  Potter,  35  Conn.  183       (1882). 

(1868);  Curtis  v.  Murphy,  63  Wis.          7  Homer  v.  Harvey,  3  N.  Mex. 

197,  5  Pac.  329  (1885). 

[315] 


§  366  1  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

town,  he  is  a  boarder. 1  And  where  a  man  sent  his  family 
to  an  inn  in  a  distant  city  and  they  remained  there  for 
several  months,  while  he  made  them  an  occasional  short 
visit,  his  family  were  boarders  and  he  was  a  guest.2  But  in 
a  leading  New  York  case  3  the  family  of  an  army  officer 
stationed  at  a  near  by  post  were  held  to  be  guests  of  the 
hotel  at  which  they  remained  for  several  months,  on  the 
ground  that  they  would  follow  him  whenever  he  might  be 
ordered  elsewhere. 

§  366.  When  one  ceases  to  be  a  traveler. 

One  may  thus  remain  a  traveler  for  a  long  time.  Thus 
in  one  year  book  case  the  weary  suitor  who  follows  the 
royal  court  from  sitting  to  sitting,  his  hopes  long  deferred, 
is  still  a  traveler.  But  after  a  considerable  lapse  of  time 
one  almost  inevitably  becomes  a  resident,  and  as  he  has 
no  longer  a  right  to  demand  entertainment  the  innkeeper 
may  exclude  him.4  In  a  recent  English  case  of  this  sort 
where  a  woman  had  remained  at  a  hotel  at  a  resort  for 
about  ten  months,  it  was  held  that  she  could  be  ejected. 
Lord  Esher  said  that:  "The  question  whether  a  person 
has  ceased  to  be  a  traveler  was  to  be  a  question  of  fact, 
and  mere  length  of  residence  was  not  decisive  of  the  mat- 
ter, because  there  might  be  circumstances  which  would 
show  that  the  length  of  stay  does  not  prevent  the  guest  be- 
ing a  traveler,  as,  for  instance,  where  it  arises  from  illness." 
An  American  case  5  should  be  cited  in  qualification  of  the 
situation  supposed  in  this  quotation.  In  this  case  it  was 

1  Meacham     v.     Galloway,     102      S.)  141,  45  W.  R.  289,  61  J.  P.  260 
Tenn.  415,  52  S.  W.  859,  46  L.  R.  A.       (1897). 

319  (1899).  See  also  Clifford  v.  Stafford,  145 

2  Lusk  v.  Belote,  22  Minn.  468      111.  App.  247  (1908). 

(1876).  '  Haff  v.  Adams,  6  Ariz.  395,  59 

3  Hancock  v.  Rand,  94  N.  Y.  1,      Pac.  Ill  (1899). 

46  Am.  Rep.  112  (1883).  See  also  Gray  v.   Drexel  Arms 

4  Lamond  v.  Richard,  1  Q.  B.  541,      Hotel,  145  111.  App.  604  (1909). 
66  L.  J.  Q.  B.  D.  315,  76  L.  T.  (N. 

[316] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §§  367,  368 

properly  said  that  one  who  will  in  all  probability  be  com- 
pelled by  the  condition  of  his  health  to  remain  indefi- 
nitely ceases  to  be  a  traveler. 

Topic  B.  Obligations  Incidental  to  the  Service 

§  367.  Persons  properly  upon  the  premises. 

Moreover,  there  are  certain  incidental  duties  pertaining 
to  such  employments.  While  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to 
receive  passengers  for  carriage  extends  only  to  travelers, 
he  owes  an  incidental  duty  to  certain  other  persons  whose 
purpose  in  coming  to  the  carrier  is  connected  with  the 
transportation  of  passengers  or  goods  though  they  are  not 
themselves  travelers.  Thus  a  carrier  must,  it  would  seem, 
admit  a  person  who  comes  to  make  an  inquiry  about 
trains  or  to  ask  for  a  time-table.1  So  he  must  admit  to  his 
premises  a  person  coming  to  a  train  to  mail  a  letter.2 
And  so  one  is  entitled  to  admission  to  the  premises  of  a 
carrier  who  comes  to  look  for  freight  which  is  expected  to 
arrive,3  or  to  help  unload  freight  which  has  arrived.4 
Upon  similar  principles  one  may  properly  enter  an  inn  to 
inquire  its  terms  or  to  ask  for  mail  addressed  to  him.5 
And  one  may  even  enter  a  palace  car  to  ask  a  favor.6 

§  368.  Persons  desiring  shelter  merely 

A  person  who  desires  shelter  merely  is  not  one  whom  the 
carrier  of  passengers  is  bound  to  serve;  and  he  may,  there- 

1  Bradford  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.,          4  Holmes  v.  North  Eastern  Ry., 
160  Mass.  392,  35  N.  E.  1131,  B.  &      L.  R.  4  Ex.  254  (1869). 

W.  124  (1894).  s  Strauss  v.  County  Hotel  &  W. 

2  Hale  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.,  60  Co.,  12  Q.  B.  D.  27,  53  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
Vt.  605,  15  Atl.  300,  1  L.  R.  A.  187  25,    49    L.    T.    (N.    S.)    601,  32 
(1888).    See  also  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  W.  Rep.  170,  48  J.  P.  69  (Eng., 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Jandera,  24  Okla.  106,  1883). 

104  Pac.  339,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  « Williams  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car 

535  (1909).  Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  417,  4  So.  85,  8 

3  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  Ry.  v.  Crush,  Am.  St.  Rep.  538  (1888). 
67  111.  262,  16  Am.  Rep.  618  (1873). 

[317] 


§  369  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

fore,  decline  to  receive  such  a  person  on  his  premises. 
Loafers  have  no  rights  upon  a  carrier's  premises.  Thus 
a  railroad  company  is  not  bound  to  keep  open  its  station 
after  the  last  train  has  left  in  order  to  shelter  an  intend- 
ing passenger  who,  having  missed  his  train,  is  now  wait- 
ing for  a  street  car.1  As  Mr.  Justice  Devens  said:  "This 
room  was  not  a  place  where  every  one  might  resort  and 
use  it  for  his  own  business,  and  he  could  not  expect  that 
it,  or  the  way  out  of  it,  would  be  kept  lighted  until  the 
arrival  of  the  horse  car  for  which,  as  he  stated,  he  waited." 
Similarly  one  who  is  not  a  guest,  or  intending  immedi- 
ately to  become  a  guest,  has,  generally  speaking,  no  right 
to  enter  or  remain  in  the  inn  against  the  objection  of  the 
innkeeper.2 

§  369.  Persons  assisting  or  meeting  passengers. 

It  is  well  agreed  that  the  carrier  of  passengers  is  under 
a  duty  to  receive  persons  who  come  to  help  passengers  in 
some  way.  Thus  a  hackman  who  comes  to  a  station  to 
bring  a  passenger  is  entitled  to  the  carrier's  services.3 
A  common  case  of  this  sort  is  that  of  a  person  who  comes 
to  the  carrier's  premises  in  order  to  be  of  assistance  to 
the  departing  passenger.4  Such  a  person,5  though  not  a 

1  Heinlein  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  R.,      v.  Crunk,  119  Ind.  542,  21  N.  E.  31, 
147  Mass.  136,  16  N.  E.  698,  9  Am.      12  Am.  St.  Rep.  443  (1889). 

St.  Rep.  676  (1888).  Iowa.— Galloway  v.  Chicago,  etc., 

2  Commonwealth   v.    Mitchel,   2  R.  Co.,  87  Iowa,  458,  54  N.  W.  447 
Parsons  (Pa.),  431  (1850).  (1893). 

3  Tobin  v.  Portland,  S.  &  P.  R.  Kentucky. — Berry  v.  Louisville  & 
R.,  59  Me.  183,  8  Am.  Rep.  415  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  109  Ky.  727,  60  S.  W. 
(1871).  699  (1901). 

4  Railway  Co.  v.  Lawton,  55  Ark.  Massachusetts. — Lucas  v.   Taun- 
428,  18  S.  W.  543,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  ton  &  N.  B.  R.  R.,  6  Gray,  64 
48,  15  L.  R.  A.  434  (1892).  (1856). 

6  Georgia. — Hill  v.  Louisville  &  Missouri. — Doss  v.  Missouri,  K. 

N.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Ga.  243,  52  S.  E.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Mo.  27,  21  Am. 

651,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  432  (1905).  Rep.  371  (1875). 

Indiana. — Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  New  York. — Rott  v.  Forty-second 

[318] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §  370 

passenger,  is  entitled  to  be  admitted  to  the  station;  and 
he  may  even,  in  order  to  assist  a  passenger,  demand 
admittance  to  a  train.  Similarly  the  carrier  is  bound  to 
admit  to  his  premises  one  who  comes  to  meet  an  arriving 
passenger.  Thus  where  a  man  who  had  come  to  a  railway 
station  to  meet  his  wife  was  injured  by  a  defect  in  the 
premises,  he  was  held  entitled  to  compensation.1  As  Mr. 
Chief  Justice  Graves  said:  "It  is  admitted  in  argument 
that  had  his  presence  at  the  station  been  in  the  character 
of  a  hackman  engaged  in  running  for  passengers  his 
stepping  aside  would  not  have  been  wrongful,  and  the  duty 
of  the  company  would  have  extended  to  him.  We  think 
it  would  be  straining  common  sense  to  make  such  a  dis- 
tinction as  is  implied  here.  He  was  a  customer  within 
the  essence  of  the  rule  just  mentioned.  The  company  was 
bringing  his  wife  to  him,  and  he  went  to  receive  and  pro- 
tect her.  Had  his  errand  been  to  receive  a  bale  of  goods  or 
a  horse,  no  one  would  doubt  that  he  had  all  the  rights  of  a 
customer;  and  it  seems  little  less  than  preposterous  to 
contend  that  the  right  was  not  simply  different  or  inferior, 
but  absolutely  wanting,  because  it  was  his  wife  that  he 
went  for." 

§  370.  Convenience  of  the  patron  the  test. 

Similar  in  principle  are  those  cases  where  a  stranger 

St.  Ferry  R.  Co.,  56  N.Y.  Super.  Ct.  994,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  868,  59  L.  R. 

151,    1   N.   Y.   Supp.   518   (1888);  A.  392  (1902). 

Dunne  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Wisconsin. — Dowd    v.    Chicago, 

Co.,  99  App.  Div.  571,  91  N.  Y.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Wis.  105,  54 

Supp.  145  (1904).  N.  W.  24,  20  L.  R.  A.  527,  and  note, 

North  Carolina.— Morrow  v.  At-  36     Am.     St.     Rep.     917     (1893), 

lanta  &  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  134  N.  C.  92,  serrible. 

46  S.  E.  12  (1903).  »  McKone  v.  Michigan  C.  R.  R., 

South   Carolina.— Mar  v.    Man-  51  Mich.  601,  17  N.  W.  74,  47  Am. 

Chester  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  S.  C.  332,  Rep.  596  (1883).    See  also  Missouri, 

35  S.  E.  583  (1889).  K.  &  T.  Ry.  v.  Miller,  8  Tex.  Civ. 

Texas.— Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  App.  241,  27  S.  W.  905  (1894). 
Co.  v.  Phillis,  96  Tex.  18,  69  S.  W. 

[319] 


§  371 J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

may  desire  to  enter  the  inn,  not  merely  for  his  own  pleas- 
ure but  because  the  convenience  of  a  guest  of  the  inn  calls 
him  there.  While  no  right  to  enter  the  inn  can  be  based  on 
his  own  claim,  he  can  under  certain  circumstances  claim  to 
be  exercising  a  right  of  the  guest.  Where  such  is  the  case 
it  would  seem  that  his  right  to  admittance  is  as  clear  as 
the  right  of  a  guest.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however, 
that  in  order  to  show  a  right  of  admittance  he  must  base 
his  claim  on  a  right  of  the  guest  whom  he  comes  to  see. 
Although  there  is  no  direct  authority  in  favor  of  such  a 
right,  it  seems  that  a  stranger  coming  to  make  a  call  upon 
the  guest  at  the  guest's  request  would  have  a  right  to  be 
admitted  for  that  purpose.  Any  other  rule  would  deprive 
the  guest  of  one  privilege  necessary  for  his  comfort  while 
at  the  inn.  If,  however,  the  guest  has  not  previously 
requested  the  stranger  to  call,  it  seems  clear  that  the 
stranger  cannot  object  if  he  is  denied  admittance  to  the 
inn  and  the  guest  is  not  informed  of  his  presence. 1  So  one 
who  comes  by  appointment  to  do  business  with  a  guest 
has  a  right  to  be  admitted.  "  It  is  conceded,"  said  Parker, 
J.,  in  Markham  v.  Brown,2  that  he  may  be  bound  to 
permit  the  entry  of  persons  who  have  been  sent  for  by  the 
guest."  And  even  those  courts  which  are  most  reluctant 
to  permit  the  entrance  of  a  stranger,  do  in  fact  concede 
the  right  to  such  persons. 

§  371.  Right  involved  is  that  of  the  person  served. 

The  same  argument  applies  to  the  right  of  the  person 

1  Commonwealth    v.    Mitchel,   2  Minnesota. — Klugherz     v.     Chi- 
Parsons    (Pa.),    431,    1    Phila.    63  cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Minn. 
(1850).  17,  95  N.  W.  586,  101  Am.  St.  Rep. 

2  8  N.  H.  523,  31  Am.  Dec.  209  384  (1903). 

(1837).  Oklahoma. — Cogswell    v.    Atchi- 

So  one  who  comes  to  a  railway  son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Okla. 

station    by    appointment    with    a  181,  99  Pac.  923,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

passenger  to  transact  business  with  837  (1909). 
him  must  be  treated  properly. 

[320] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §  372 

who  is  not  a  passenger  or  an  intending  passenger,  to  be 
received  by  the  carrier  in  order  to  accompany  or  to  meet 
a  passenger.  This  is  a  right  primarily  due  to  the  passenger 
only;  and  it  is  only  so  far  as  the  interest  of  the  passenger 
requires  it  that  the  service  can  be  demanded  of  the  car- 
rier. Thus  when  a  person  came  to  a  station  out  of  curi- 
osity, in  order  to  see  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
who  was  a  passenger  on  a  passing  train,  it  was  held  that 
the  carrier  owed  him  no  duty.1  A  similar  case  was  one 
where  one  boarded  a  train  to  speak  with  an  acquaintance 
and  was  injured  under  circumstances  which  would  have 
shown  liability  if  the  plaintiff  had  been  a  passenger.  But 
it  was  held  that  the  defendant  company  owed  such  a  person 
no  duty  of  that  sort  since  he  was  not  upon  the  train  in  con- 
nection with  any  duty  which  the  carrier  owed  the  passenger. 2 

§  372.  Extent  of  the  duty  to  such  persons. 

Even  those  persons  to  whom  a  duty  is  owed  are  not 
passengers.  They  are,  in  the  language  of  the  cases,  "cus- 
tomers," and  are  entitled  to  safe  and  properly  lighted 
premises.3  But  they  are  not  entitled  to  the  active  pro- 

1  Gillis  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  59  is  under  no  duty  to  him  to  keep  the 
Pa.  St.  129,  98  Am.  Dec.  317  (1868).  premises  safe.     Galveston,  H.  &  S. 

2  Bullock  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Matzdorf,  102  Tex. 
(Tex.   Civ.   App.),   55   S.   W.    184  42,  112  S.  W.  1036,  20  L.  R.  A. 
(1900).    See  also  Arkansas  &  L.  R.  (N.  S.)  833  (1908). 

R.  Co.  v.  Sain,  90  Ark.  278, 1 19  S.  W.  *  United  States.— Illinois  Central 

659,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  910  (1909).  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  80  Fed.  278,  53 

The  same  law  applies  if  one  hav-  U.  S.  App.  22,  25  C.  C.  A.  413 

ing  assisted  a  person  on  board  re-  (1897). 

turns  later  to  talk  with  him.     St.  Georgia. — Georgia  R.  R.  &  B.  Co. 

Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tom-  v.  Richmond,  98  Ga.  495,  25  S.  E. 

linson,  69  Ark.  489,  64  S.  W.  347  565  (1896). 

(1901).  Ittinois.— Toledo,  W.  &  W.  Ry. 

If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  person  v.  Grush,  67  111.  262,  16  Am.  Rep. 

suing  for  injuries  was  at  the  station  618  (1873). 

for  no  other  purpose  than  to  bid  Maine. — Tobin  v.  Portland,  S.  & 

the  passenger  good-by,  there  is  au-  P.  R.  R.,  59  Me.  183,  8  Am.  Rep. 

thority  for  holding  that  the  carrier  415  (1871). 

21  [321] 


§373] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


tection  which  is  due  to  passengers.  Thus,  while  waiting 
in  a  station  for  a  train,  in  order  to  meet  a  passenger,  such 
a  person  is  not  entitled  to  protection  against  the  assault 
of  a  stranger.1  Where  the  person  actually  gets  on  board 
the  train,  assisting  a  passenger,  and  the  train  starts  with- 
out giving  him  time  to  alight  safely,  the  question  whether 
the  carrier  has  been  guilty  of  a  breach  of  duty  is  a  difficult 
one.  One  or  two  cases  are  clear  enough.  If  the  con- 
ductor had  no  notice  that  the  assistant  was  on  the  train, 
and  the  train  stopped  the  usual  and  reasonable  tune,  the 
carrier  has  performed  its  duty.2  But  if  the  conductor  had 
notice  that  the  assistant  was  on  the  train,  the  carrier  must 
give  him  a  reasonable  time  to  alight.  3 

Topic  C.  Duty  Limited  to  Occupiers 

§  373.  Special  need  of  occupiers. 
In  several  of  the  public  services  the  undertaking  is 


Massachusetts. — Bradford  v.  Bos- 
ton &  M.  R.  R.,  160  Mass.  392,  35 
N.  E.  1131  (1894). 

Michigan. — McKone  v.  Michigan 
C.  R.  R.,  51  Mich.  601,  17  N.  W.  74, 
47  Am.  Rep.  596  (1883). 

Nebraska. — Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Evans,  52  Neb.  50,  71  N.  W.  1062 
(1897). 

New  York.— Hauk  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
434,  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  248  (1898). 

Texas. — Hamilton  v.  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.,  64  Tex.  251,  53  Am.  Rep.  756 
(1855);  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  v. 
Miller,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  241,  27 
S.  W.  905  (1894). 

Vermont. — Hale  v.  Grand  Trunk 
R.  R.,  60  Vt.  605,  15  Atl.  300,  B.  & 
W.  124,  1  L.  R.  A.  187  (1888). 

England. — Holmes  v.  North  East- 
ern Ry.,  L.  R.  4  Ex.  254  (1869). 

1  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
[322] 


Phillio,  98  Tex.  18,  69  S.  W.  994,  97 
Am.  St.  Rep.  868,  59  L.  R.  A.  392 
(1902). 

2  One  leading  case  is  Missouri,  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  v.  Miller,  8  Tex.  Civ.  241, 
27  S.  W.  905  (1894).    See  also  Cole- 
man  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  84  Ga.  1, 
10  S.  E.  498  (1889);  Hill  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Ga.  243, 
52  S.  W.  651  (1905);  Griswold  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  64  Wis.  652, 
26  N.  W.  101  (1885);  Lucas  v.  New 
Bedford  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Gray 
(Mass.),    64,     66    Am.    Dec.    406 
(1856). 

3  One   leading    case   is    Doss   v. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.,  59  Mo.  27, 
21  Am.  Rep.  371  (1875).    See  also 
Lousiville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crunk, 
119  Ind.  542,  21  N.  E.  31,  12  Am. 
St.  Rep.  443  (1889);  Johnson     v. 
Southern  Ry.,  53  S.  C.  203,  31  S.  E. 
212,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  849  (1898). 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §  374 

limited  to  the  occupiers  of  premises.  The  water  com- 
panies, the  gas  companies,  the  electric  companies  and  the 
telephone  companies  which  undertake  to  distribute  their 
product  or  perform  their  services  generally  throughout 
the  city,  do  not  undertake  to  serve  every  person  as  such. 
Their  services  are  peculiarly  necessary  in  connection  with 
the  use  of  buildings,  and  their  obligation  is  properly  held 
to  be  limited  to  the  occupiers  of  premises  by  the  general 
character  of  their  customary  undertaking. 

§  374.  Obligation  limited  to  supply  at  premises. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  of  the  comparatively  few 
cases  upon  the  question  of  the  classes  of  persons  who  can 
demand  supply  from  such  service  companies  as  gas  com- 
panies arose  recently  in  New  Jersey.1  This  was  a  dispute 
between  the  Public  Service  Corporation  which  was  en- 
gaged in  the  supply  of  gas  to  Jersey  City,  and  the  American 
Lighting  Company,  the  proprietor  of  peculiar  burners. 
At  the  bidding  for  the  lighting  of  the  streets,  1903,  the 
American  Lighting  Company  came  in  with  the  lowest 
bid;  and  the  lighting  was  accordingly  let  to  it.  Thereupon 
it  demanded  that  the  Public  Service  Corporation  should 
supply  to  it  at  the  end  of  the  pipe  at  the  top  of  every 
lamp-post  in  Jersey  City,  enough  gas  to  run  the  lamp  at 
the  regular  rate  for  measured  gas  as  supplied  to  house- 
holders generally  in  Jersey  City.  Vice-chancellor  Pitney 
disposed  of  this  case  upon  a  number  of  points,  one  of  them 
being  this:  "I  am  entirely  of  the  opinion  that  the  defend- 
ant, the  lighting  company,  has  no  standing  whatever,  in 
its  own  right,  to  demand  from  the  complainants  a  supply 
of  gas.  For  the  simple  reason,  above  stated,  that  it  is 
neither  a  householder  nor  a  resident  of  Jersey  City,  and 
the  obligation  which  is  imposed  upon  complainants  by 

1  Public  Service  Corporation  v.  also  American  Lighting  Co.  v.  Pub- 
American  Lighting  Co.,  67  N.  J.  lie  Service  Corporation,  132  Fed. 
Eq.  122,  57  Atl.  482  (1904).  See  794  (1904). 

[323] 


§  375  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

reason  of  their  enjoyment  of  a  public  franchise  of  laying 
mains  in  the  streets,  to  furnish  gas,  extends  only  to 
residential  citizens  of  the  city  and  to  the  municipality. 
It  is  quite  absurd  to  say  that  any  person  who  might 
happen  to  be  walking  along  the  street  and  yet  be  des- 
titute of  any  local  habitation  within  the  corporate  limits 
of  Jersey  City  has  the  least  right  to  demand  a  supply  of 
gas  from  the  complainants."  l 

§  376.  Necessity  of  telephone  service  at  residence. 

It  has  been  seen  that  as  the  modern  telephone  system 
is  managed,  one  of  the  services  offered  is  to  subscribers 
at  their  residence.  This  being  so,  a  telephone  company 
cannot  do  what  it  attempted  to  do  in  one  case,2  insist  that 
an  occupier  should  be  content  with  a  pay  station.  For  all 
occupiers  have  a  right  to  residence  service.  "To  conduct 
the  business  of  the  telephone  by  public  telephone  stations, 
and  sending  messengers  to  notify  persons  with  whom  a 
patron  of  the  company  desires  to  converse  in  other  parts 
of  the  city;  to  compel  the  persons  desiring  to  converse 
with  others  to  remain  at  the  public  telephone  station 
until  the  persons  with  whom  they  desire  to  converse  can 
be  notified,  and  so  arrange  their  business  as  to  leave  and 
go  to  another  telephone  station  and  hold  the  conversa- 
tion,— renders  the  use  of  the  telephone  almost  worthless. 
It  is  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  business  men  can  have 
them  in  their  offices  and  residences,  and,  without  leaving 
their  houses  or  their  places  of  business,  call  up  another  at 
a  great  distance,  with  whom  they  have  important  business, 
and  converse,  without  the  loss  of  valuable  time  on  the 
part  of  either,  that  the  telephone  is  particularly  valuable 
as  an  instrument  of  commerce."  3 

1  In  Provident  Inst.  for  Savings  2  Central  Union  Telephone  Co.  v. 

v.  Allen,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  36  (1883),  it  State,  118  Ind.  194,  19  N.  E.  604 

was  held  that  water  rates  cannot  be  (1888). 

assessed  against  vacant  lots.  *  Accord.,    Central    Union    Tele- 

[  324  1 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §§  376,  377 

§  376.  Duty  owed  to  occupiers. 

According  to  this  analysis  of  the  situation  the  occupiers 
of  every  house  within  the  territory  served  have  a  right  to 
be  supplied.  The  exact  nature  of  this  duty  is  well  set 
forth  in  a  leading  case  l  where  the  relator,  a  tenant  of  a 
building,  was  refused  service  by  the  water  company  upon 
the  ground  that  the  company  had  decided  that  it  would 
deal  only  with  the  owners  of  premises.  But  the  court, — 
Mr.  Justice  Hunt  writing  the  opinion, — held  that  the 
tenant  must  be  served:  "The  relator  is  an  inhabitant  of 
Butte,  occupying  premises  wholly  without  water  for  gen- 
eral use,  and  there  are  no  other  means  by  which  water  for 
his  house  may  be  secured,  except  from  the  appellant 
corporation.  Ought  the  appellant  to  be  allowed  to  refuse 
his  tender  for  water  in  advance,  and  to  refuse  him  water, 
upon  the  ground  that,  by  virtue  of  its  rules  and  regula- 
tions adopted,  it  can  deal  only  with  the  owners  of  the 
property  requiring  water  to  be  turned  on,  or  the  agents 
of  said  owners?  We  say  not.  It  has  no  power  to  abridge 
the  obligations,  assumed  by  it  in  accepting  its  franchise, 
to  supply  an  inhabitant  of  Butte  with  water,  if  he  pays 
them  for  it  in  advance,  and  is  a  tenant  in  the  possession 
and  occupancy  of  a  house,  in  need  of  water  for  general 
purposes."  2 

§  377.  Certain  consequences  of  this  doctrine. 

In  accordance  with  this  doctrine  the  owner  of  the 
premises  has  no  standing  to  complain  of  the  refusal  to 

phone  Co.  v.  State,  123  Ind.  113,  24  in  question  belongs  solely  to  the 

N.  E.  215  (1889).  legal  occupant  thereof,  the  tenant 

1  State  v.  Butte  City  Water  Co.,  strictly.  Thus  a  member  of  a 

18  Mont.  199,  44  Pac.  966,  32  L.  R.  family  resident  in  the  house  has  not 

A.  697,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  574  as  such  the  right  to  demand  the 

(1899).  continuance  of  gas  supply.  Vander- 

1  It  should  be  added  that  this  berg  v.  Gas  Co.,  126  Mo.  App.  600, 

right  to  have  service  at  the  premises  105  S.  W.  17  (1907). 

f325l 


§  378  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

supply  his  tenant.1  It  follows  that  the  owner  of  the 
premises  cannot  be  held  liable  for  the  bills  of  his  tenant.2 
And  therefore  his  premises  cannot  be  subjected  to  any 
lien  for  such  charges.3  Similarly  a  new  tenant  cannot  be 
affected  by  the  arrears  of  a  prior  tenant,4  for  the  new 
tenant  has  his  own  independent  right  to  be  served.  This 
is  all  good  common-law  doctrine,  but  it  may  be,  and  some- 
times is  altered  by  the  legislature  by  general  statute  or  by 
provision  in  particular  charters.  By  force  of  these  pro- 
visions the  company  is  permitted  to  look  to  the  owners 
of  the  premises  as  such;  and  it  is  often  provided  that  the 
arrearages  shall  constitute  a  lien  upon  the  property  it- 
self.5 Such  legislation  is  held  not  unconstitutional,  even 
if  it  goes  so  far  as  to  provide  for  the  eventual  sale  of  the 
property  in  the  hands  of  whomsoever  it  may  be.6 

§  378.  Supply  to  incumbered  premises. 

A  mortgagee  in  possession  has  of  course  the  same  rights 
as  an  occupier  to  complain  of  refusal  to  give  service;  and 
it  has  been  held  that  even  a  mortgagee  out  of  possession 

1  Brass  v.  Rathbone,  153  N.  Y.          Maryland.— Gaslight  Co.  v.  Colli- 
435,  47  N.  E.  905  (1897).    See  also      day,  25  Md.  1  (1866). 

Stein  v.  McArdle,  24  Ala.  344  (1854).  Mississippi. — Burke  v.   City   of 

2  McCarthy   v.   Humphrey,    105  Water  Valley,  87  Miss.  732,  40  So. 
Iowa,  535,  75  N.  W.  314  (1898).  820,  112  Am.  St.  Rep.  468  (1906). 

3  Turner  v.   Revere  Water  Co.,  South  Carolina. — Poole  v.   Paris 
171  Mass.  329,  50  N.  E.  634,  40  L.  Mt.  Water  Co.,  81  S.  C.  438,  62  S. 
R.  A.  657,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  432  E.    874,   128    Am.    St.    Rep.    923 
(1898).  (1908). 

4  Illinois. — City    of    Chicago    v.  Washington. — Linne  v.  Bredes,  43 
Northwestern  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Wash.  540,  86  Pac.  858,  6  L.  R.  A. 
218  111.  40,  75  N.  E.  803,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  707,  117  Am.  St.  Rep.  1068 
(N.  S.)  770  (1905).  (1906). 

Kentucky. — Covington  v.  Ratter-  8  See  Wagner  v.  City  of  Rock 

man,  128  Ky.  336,  108  S.  W.  297,  17  Island,  146  111.  139,  34  N.  E.  545,  21 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  923  (1908).  L.  R.  A.  519  (1893). 

Louisiana. — New  Orleans  G.  L.  6  See  East  Grand  Forks  v.  Luck, 

&  B.  Co.  v.  Paulding,  12  Rob.  97  Minn.  373,  107  N.  W.  393,  6  L. 

(La.)  378  (1845).  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  198  (1906). 

[326] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §  379 

may  maintain  an  action  for  depreciation  of  his  security  by 
a  refusal  of  service  to  his  mortgagor.1  Of  course  if  the 
mortgagor  is  in  possession  he  is  the  one  entitled  to  serv- 
ice.2 The  decision  that  a  tenant,  as  such,  is  entitled  to 
demand  service,  does  not  altogether  exclude  the  landlord 
from  consideration.3  He  has  such  interest  in  the  supply 
of  the  premises  that  it  would  seem  that  he  could  frame 
an  action  for  injury  to  his  interests  by  refusal  of  the  com- 
pany to  furnish  a  supply  to  them.  It  is  on  some  such 
ground  as  this  that  the  legislation  making  the  owner 
liable  for  supply  to  his  premises  may  better  be  justified 
than  in  any  other  way.4 

§  379.  Services  to  separate  premises. 

The  primary  duty  is  thus  to  the  occupier  of  premises  as 
such;  and  the  structure  therefore  would  seem  to  be  the 
unit.  The  company  may  insist  upon  this  as  well  as  the 
applicant.  Thus  in  one  leading  case  5  the  United  States 
as  owner  of  a  military  reservation  at  Fort  Omaha  de- 
manded that  all  the  water  supplied  should  be  sold  at 
wholesale  rates  through  one  meter.  But  the  court  held 
that  the  company  could  insist  upon  supplying  each  build- 
ing separately,  saying  that  this  supply  to  premises  was  the 
nature  of  their  obligation.  There  are,  however,  some 
instances  of  service  arranged  for  by  a  group  as  a  unit 
which,  it  is  held,  will  conclude  the  parties  to  the  arrange- 
ment if  any  of  them  are  later  dissatisfied.6 

Equitable     Securities     Co.     v.  5  United     States     v.     American 

Montrose  &  D.  Canal  Co.,  79  Pac.  Waterworks  Co.,  37  Fed.  747.  Com- 

747  (Col.,  1905).  pare  Haugen  v.  Albina  L.  &  Water 

2  Mabb  v.  Stewart,  133  Cal.  556,  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac.  244,  14 
65  Pac.  1085  (1901).  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

3  Dayton  v.  Quigley,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  6  Idaho. — Helphery   v.    Perrault, 
77  (1878).  12  Idaho,  451,  86  Pac.  417  (1906). 

4  See  Pallett  v.  Murphy,  131  Cal.  Missouri. — Mulrooney  v.  Obear, 
192,  63  Pac.  366  (1900).  171  Mo.  613,  71  S.  W.  1019  (1903). 

[327] 


§  380  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  380.  Supply  to  buildings  divided  into  tenements. 

It  is  of  interest  to  see  how  the  problem  is  handled  in 
accordance  with  these  principles  when  the  basis  of  supply 
to  a  building  occupied  by  several  groups  of  persons  is 
brought  in  question.  If  there  are  various  persons  occupy- 
ing the  premises,  but  no  separation  of  the  tenancy,  the 
premises  may  properly  be  considered  as  an  entirety.  A 
single  charge  may  then  be  made  for  all;  one  lodger  cannot 
demand  separate  rating  l  when  the  premises  are  used  in 
common  with  a  single  system  of  piping.  But  where  the 
building  is  divided  into  separate  tenements,  there  being 
separate  lessees  of  these  apartments,  a  different  situation 
is  presented.  Even  then  it  is  not  the  duty  of  the  supplying 
company  to  provide  rising  pipes  to  each  apartment  and 
a  meter  for  the  supply  at  each.  As  a  theoretical  matter 
the  profession  of  the  supplying  company,  a  gas  company 
or  a  water  company  for  example,  ends  at  the  cellar  wall  by 
its  usual  practice.  Moreover,  as  a  practical  matter,  the 
existence  of  public  pipes  within  the  house  structure  would 
give  too  great  an  opportunity  for  stealing  by  tapping  the 
pipes.2  The  proper  method  for  application  by  a  tenant 
who  desires  a  supply  at  his  apartment  is  by  bringing  his 
own  service  pipes  to  the  cellar  wall  and  there  requesting 
that  a  supply  be  handed  over  to  him.3  It  may  be  added 
that  where  the  statute  permits  the  charging  of  the  serv- 
ice against  the  owner  the  whole  may  be  billed  to  him, 
leaving  him  to  deal  with  his  tenants  as  he  sees  fit.4  These 

1  Birmingham     v.     Birmingham      see  Stein  v.  McArdle,  24  Ala.  344 
Waterworks   Co.,   42   So.    10,    152       (1854). 

Ala.  306,  44  So.  581,  11  L.  R:  A.          3  The  lessee  of  two  tenements  is 

(N.  S.)  613  (1906).    See  also  Froth-  not  liable  for  supply  to  his  sub- 

ingham  v.  Bensen,  20  N.  Y.  Misc.  lessee  in  one.    Young  v.  Boston,  104 

132  (1897).  Mass.  95  (1870). 

2  Ferguson  v.  Metropolitan  Gas          4  Kelsey    v.    Board    of    Fire    & 
Co.,  37  How.  Pr.  189  (1868).    And  Water   Commissioners,    113   Mich. 

215,  71  N.  W.  589  (1897). 

[328] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §§  381,  382 

difficulties  doubtless  do  not  apply  to  electric  supply  or 
telephone  service,  unless  perhaps  when  the  wires  are  under- 
ground; for  when  the  wires  are  overhead  they  may  be 
brought  directly  to  the  outer  wall  of  the  apartment. 

Topic  D.  Other  Limitations  to  Particular  Classes 

§  381.  When  special  limitations  are  justifiable. 

As  has  just  been  seen,  special  limitations  upon  the 
extent  of  the  employment  may  be  justified  by  the  partic- 
ular situation  with  regard  to  the  service  in  question.  This 
is  particularly  true  when  those  who  may  demand  service 
are  plainly  limited  by  external  conditions.  Where  it  is 
true  that  only  a  certain  class  are  in  a  position  to  demand 
service  the  propriety  of  confining  service  to  that  class  is 
obvious.  These  external  limitations  may  be  of  various 
sorts,  as  will  be  seen.  The  service  in  question  may  be  so 
dependent  upon  another  service  that  it  may  only  deal  with 
those  who  have  been  first  accepted  by  this  other  service. 
Or  the  service  in  question  may  be  available  by  necessary 
law  only  to  those  who  have  first  acquired  a  legal  right 
entitling  them  to  this  service.  Illustrations  of  these  two 
possibilities  are  included  in  this  topic. 

§  382.  Sleeping  and  parlor  car  service. 

The  public  profession  and  proper  obligation  of  a  sleep- 
ing car  or  parlor  car  company  is  subject  to  this  sort  of 
limitation.  Its  services  are  tendered,  not  to  all  persons 
who  may  desire  shelter  or  protection  but  only  to  passengers 
on  the  train  to  which  they  are  attached,  and  indeed  only 
to  such  passengers  as  the  carrier  permits  to  ride  in  the  cars 
of  the  company.  As  Mr.  Justice  Devens  said,  in  Law- 
rence v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Company:1  "The  defendant 
company  could  not  certainly  furnish  a  berth  in  its  cars 
until  the  person  requesting  it  had  become  entitled  to 

1  144  Mass.  1,  10  N.  E.  723,  59  Am.  Rep.  58  (1887). 

[329] 


§§  383,  384  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

transportation  by  the  railroad  company  as  a  passenger, 
and  he  must  also  be  entitled  to  the  transportation  for  such 
routes,  distances,  or  under  such  circumstances,  as  the 
railroad  company  should  determine  to  be  those  under 
which  the  defendant  company  would  be  authorized  to 
furnish  him  with  its  accommodations.  The  defendant 
company  could  only  contract  with  a  passenger  when  he 
was  of  such  a  class  that  the  railroad  company  permitted 
the  contract  to  be  made."  1 

§  383.  Right  in  a  public  conduit. 

Legal  limitation  is  the  true  explanation  of  the  restricted 
obligation  attributed  to  the  wire  conduit  companies  by 
the  few  cases  which  deal  with  this  modern  instance. 
It  is  held  as  to  them  that  they  are  only  bound  to  admit 
the  wires  of  such  companies  as  have  received  proper 
franchise  from  the  public  authorities  to  engage  in  their 
business  along  the  streets  in  which  the  conduit  is  run.2 
This  " lawful  power"  is  a  condition  prerequisite,  other- 
wise various  companies  might  foist  themselves  upon  the 
city  without  its  consent. 

§  384.  Irrigation  in  accordance  with  water  rights. 

The  situation  as  to  irrigation  companies  is  altogether 
peculiar.  As  has  been  seen,  they  are  only  in  public  serv- 
ice to  a  limited  extent,  but  in  so  far  as  they  are  professing 
to  serve  takers  in  general,  they  are  under  a  public  obliga- 
tion of  a  certain  sort.  This  obligation  is  always  in  con- 

1  Accord.,  United  States. — Lemon      tional  Subway  Co.,  145  Mo.  551,  46 
v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.,  52  Fed.  262      S.  W.  981  (1898). 

(1887).  New   York.— West  Side  Electric 

Illinois.— Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Co.  v.  Consol.  T.  &  E.  Co.,  110  N. 

Lee,  49  111.  App.  75  (1892).  Y.  App.  Div.  171,  96  N.  Y.  Supp. 

2  See  generally:  609  (1905);  Re  Long  Acre  Light  & 
Maryland.— Purnell  v.   McLane,  Power  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  Supp.  242, 

98  Md.  589,  56  Atl.  830  (1904).  117  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  80  (1907). 

Missouri. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Na- 

[330] 


LIMITED  OBLIGATION  [  §  385 

nection  with  landholding.  Only  those  who  are  in  pos- 
session of  irrigable  land  within  their  district  can  demand 
service,  but  more  than  this,  there  are  usually  to  be  found 
priorities  in  right  between  the  different  landowners  apply- 
ing for  service.  The  peculiar  rule  of  property  within  the 
States  where  irrigation  systems  are  common,  gives  a  pri- 
ority, in  accordance  with  the  time  of  appropriation,  to 
the  owner  of  the  irrigated  land.1 

§  385.  Basis  of  the  public  duty. 

Citations  might  have  been  multiplied  upon  the  topics 
here  discussed;  but  it  is  hoped  that  authority  enough  has 
been  adduced  to  support  the  contention  here  put  forward. 
It  is  but  a  half  truth  that  those  who  commit  themselves 
to  a  public  employment  are  bound  to  serve  the  whole 
public.  It  is  but  a  half  truth,  that  the  public  servant 
may  altogether  decide  as  to  the  extent  to  which  he  will 
commit  himself  to  public  service.  The  real  truth  in  this 
is,  that  by  entering  upon  the  service  one  comes  within  the 
law  requiring  him  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  situa- 
tion,— but  no  more.  The  obligations  are  thus  the  in- 
voluntary ones  of  a  legal  status, — not  the  defined  ones  of 
a  specific  assumption. 

1  A  few  examples  of  the  points  Colorado. — People  v.  Canal  Co., 

under  discussion  selected  almost  at  25  Colo.  202,  54  Pac.  626   (1898); 

random  are:  Wright  v.  Platte  Valley  Irr.  Co.,  27 

California.— Merrill  v.  Southside  Colo.    322,    61    Pac.    603    (1900); 

Irr.  Co.,  112  Cal.  426,  44  Pac.  720  Schneider  v.  People,  30  Colo.  493, 

(1896);  Pallett  v.  Murphy,  131  Cal.  71  Pac.  369  (1903). 

192,  63  Pac.  366  (1900);  Lowe  v.  Idaho.— Wilterding  v.   Green,   4 

Yolo  Co.  Consol.  Water  Co.,  6  Cal.  Idaho,  773,  45  Pac.  134  (1896). 
App.  646,  96  Pac.  379  (1908). 


[331] 


CHAPTER  XH 

CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  TO  SERVICE 

§  390.  Nature  of  the  conditions  precedent. 

Topic  A.  Service  Must  Be  Asked  at  Proper  Time 

§  391.  Whether  carrier  must  receive  goods  in  advance. 

392.  How  long  in  advance  goods  must  be  received. 

393.  Acceptance  long  in  advance. 

394.  Goods  tendered  too  late. 

395.  Passengers  must  come  at  proper  time. 

396.  Services  which  may  be  demanded  at  any  time. 

397.  Time-tables. 

398.  Office  hours. 

Topic  B.  Service  Must  Be  Demanded  at  Proper  Place 

§  399.  Tender  of  goods  to  the  carrier. 

400.  Placing  goods  in  proper  position  not  delivery. 

401.  Passengers  must  be  upon  the  premises. 

402.  When  passengers  are  accepted. 

403.  Establishment  of  regular  stations. 

404.  Service  at  private  sidings. 

405.  Service  only  obligatory  within  proper  territory 

406.  Services  to  abutting  owners. 

Topic  C.  There  Must  Be  Application  in  Proper  Form 

§  407.  Applicant  must  give  notice. 

408.  Requisitions  made  in  advance. 

409.  Effect  of  mere  notification. 

410.  Signal  to  passenger  carrier. 

411.  Formal  application  for  supply. 

412.  Use  of  telegraph  blanks. 

Topic  D.  Service  Must  Be  Demanded  in  Proper  Manner 

§  413.  Goods  must  be  tendered  properly  packed. 
414.  Freight  loaded  by  shipper. 

[332] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [§390 

§  415.  Special  freight  may  require  special  tender. 

416.  Service  upon  fungible  basis. 

417.  Proper  conditions  imposed  upon  installation. 

418.  Premises  must  be  properly  prepared. 

419.  Conditions  imposed  must  be  reasonable. 

420.  Improper  conditions  cannot  be  imposed. 

§  390.  Nature  of  the  conditions  precedent. 

When  it  is  said  that  it  is  the  duty  in  public  service  to 
serve  all  that  apply,  that  is  rather  the  statement  of  a  gen- 
eral principle  than  of  a  practicable  rule.  In  fact  there 
are  many  conditions  precedent  to  the  obligation  of  a  par- 
ticular public  service  company  to  serve  a  particular  ap- 
plicant.1 Those  who  wish  service  must  always  put  them- 
selves in  a  proper  position  to  demand  service;  and  until 
these  conditions  precedent  are  complied  with,  there  is 
no  present  obligation  to  serve  such  persons.2  Moreover, 
as  another  condition  precedent  there  must  be  tender  of 
the  regular  compensation,  so  important  a  condition  that 
it  is  discussed  separately  in  the  next  chapter.  Clearly 
no  public  service  company  is  bound  to  undertake  service 
except  upon  reasonable  conditions.  Indeed  in  most  serv- 
ices there  are  conditions  precedent  to  be  performed  by 

1  For  instance  the  duty  of  the  2  A  carrier  cannot  be  made  liable 
common  carrier  of  a  parcel  as  bag-  for  the  loss  or  destruction  of  goods, 
gage  is  incidental  to  and  grows  out  unless  they  have  been  tendered  to 
of  the  contract  for  the  transports-  and  accepted  by  it  for  transporta- 
tion of  one  as  a  passenger,  and  does  tion.  Thus  where  the  proprietor  of 
not  arise  until  the  person  tendering  a  tent  show  loaded  part  of  his  outfit 
such  parcel  for  carriage  has  pro-  in  the  afternoon  into  a  car  furnished 
cured  the  right  of  transportation  as  by  the  carrier,  retaining  the  balance 
a  passenger.  Until  such  right  has  for  use  the  following  night,  it  was 
been  procured,  a  common  carrier  is  held  that  there  had  been  no  tender 
under  no  duty  whatsoever  to  re-  to  and  acceptance  by  the  carrier  for 
ceive  a  parcel  from  anyone  to  be  transportation  so  as  to  make  it 
transported  as  baggage.  Atlanta  liable  as  a  carrier  for  its  loss  by  ac- 
Terminal  Co.  v.  American  Baggage  cidental  fire.  Burrowes  v.  Chicago, 
&  Transfer  Co.,  125  Ga.  677,  54  S.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  (Neb.),  126  N.  W. 
E.  711  (1906).  1084(1910). 

[  333  ] 


§  391  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  particular  applicant  before  a  present  duty  is  owed  to 
him,  even  though  he  wishes  a  service  in  respect  to  which 
there  has  been  public  profession. 

Topic  A.  Service  Must  Be  Asked  at  Proper  Time 

§  391.  Whether  carrier  must  receive  goods  in  advance. 

It  seems  to  have  been  the  rule  of  the  early  cases  that  a 
carrier,  whether  by  land  or  sea,  could  not  be  compelled 
to  receive  goods  or  freight  until  he  was  ready  to  set  out, 
even  if  it  happened  that  he  had  storage  facilities  or  his 
ship  was  moored  in  the  port. 1  In  modern  times,  however, 
it  is  usually  held  necessary  for  the  railroads  at  least,  to 
provide  facilities  for  receiving  goods  in  advance  of  the 
departure  of  their  freight  trains;  and  indeed  it  is  now 
usual  for  steamboats  to  have  their  special  wharf  prem- 
ises fitted  for  the  reception  of  freight;  and  the  carrier  in 
either  case  may  be  compelled  to  receive  freight  in  advance. 
This  is  said  directly  in  a  leading  case:  "It  is  the  duty  of 
a  public  carrier  to  provide  reasonable  facilities  for  the 
acceptance  of  property  for  transportation  and  to  trans- 
port the  same  with  due  diligence,  and  this  statute  pre- 
scribes the  penalty  for  failure  to  do  this.  The  carrier 
undoubtedly  has  the  right  to  prescribe  reasonable  rules 
and  regulations  for  the  delivery  to  its  agents  of  property 
for  transportation,  but  it  has  no  right  to  impose  unusual 
conditions  upon  a  shipper  or  to  require  him  to  undergo 
unusual  expense  or  trouble  in  delivering  his  goods  for 
transportation.  It  must  accept  goods  tendered  for  im- 
mediate transportation  and  provide  reasonable  facilities 

1  Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Ld.  Rey.  646,  request  that  it  shall  be  checked,  dis- 

652  (1701),  quoting  Morse  v.  Slue,  playing    proper    tickets.      Atlanta 

1  Ventr.  190.  Terminal  Co.  v.  American  Baggage 

No  facilities  provided  at  a  railway  &  T.  Co.,  125  Ga.  677,  54  S.  E.  711 

station  for  storing  baggage  before  (1906). 
the  passenger  (or  his  agent)  shall 

[334] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  392 

for  taking  care  of  the  same  during  temporary  delays  while 
awaiting  shipment."  * 

§  392.  How  long  in  advance  goods  must  be  received. 

This  obligation  to  receive  goods  in  advance  is  only  for 
a  reasonable  period.2  It  still  remains  true  that  the  car- 
rier is  not  a  warehouseman  but  a  carrier  by  profession. 
To  go  into  this  matter  in  more  detail,  there  are  conflicting 
decisions  as  to  whether  an  express  company  can  enforce 
a  rule  that  money  will  not  be  received  on  any  day  after 
the  departure  of  the  trains  carrying  express  matter,  the 
idea  being  that  currency  should  not  ever  be  kept  in  the 
local  office  overnight.  In  the  North  Carolina  case,3  the 
decision  was  against  this  regulation  of  the  company,  on 
the  general  principle  that  carriers  to-day  must  for  the 
convenience  of  their  patrons  accept  goods  in  advance. 
In  the  Federal  case  4  it  was  held  without  denying  the  gen- 
eral principle,  that  in  this  peculiar  situation  the  rule  was 
a  reasonable  one.  It  is  difficult  to  choose  between  these 
two  cases,  for  since  it  is  a  question  of  reasonableness  in 
a  particular  case,  it  is  a  matter  of  individual  judgment. 
But  the  later  case  is  scientific  in  making  the  inquiry  solely 
whether  the  rule  established  by  the  company  for  the  con- 
duct of  its  business  is  so  unreasonable  that  the  court  will 
feel  that  it  must  declare  it  outrageous;  and  judged  by 
this  standard  very  probably  the  rule  should  stand.5 

1  Quoted  from  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  2  Bouker  v.  Long  Island  Ry.  Co., 

So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  84  Ark.  150  89  Hun,  202,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  23 

(1907).  (1895). 

But  this  obligation  is  only  to  pro-  *  Alsop  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  104 

vide  requisite  facilities  for  perform-  N.  C.  278,  10  S.  E.  297,  6  L.  R.  A. 

ing  the  service  of  carriage.    It  is  no  271  (1889). 

part  of  the  business  of  a  railroad  4  Platt  v.  Lecocq,  158  Fed.  723, 

to  provide  a  grain  elevator  where  85  C.  C.  A.  621,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

grain  may  be  stored  in  large  quanti-  558  (1907). 

ties  until  the  owners  decide  to  ship.  B  See  also  Palmer  v.  London  & 

People  v.  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  233  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  588 

111.  378,  84  N.  E.  368  (1908).  (1866), 

[335J 


§  393  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  393.  Acceptance  long  in  advance. 

As  the  carrier  is  not  obliged  to  accept  goods  tendered 
to  him  upon  the  basis  that  they  are  to  be  held  by  him 
for  any  considerable  time  before  their  transportation  is 
begun,  he  may  make  his  own  stipulation  as  to  the.  basis 
upon  which  he  will  consent  to  receive  them.  His  duty  is 
to  take  and  carry,  not  to  receive  and  store.  If  he  is  not 
tendered  the  goods  for  immediate  transportation  he  does 
not  receive  them  in  his  capacity  as  a  common  carrier. 
He  is  in  such  cases  no  more  than  a  private  warehouseman 
liable  only  for  due  care,  not  as  a  carrier  liable  as  an  in- 
surer. When  therefore  goods  are  received  by  the  carrier, 
not  for  immediate  transportation  but  to  be  held  until 
further  orders  of  the  shipper,  the  carrier  holds  the  goods, 
pending  such  orders,  as  a  warehouseman,  not  as  a  carrier.1 
And  so  where  the  shipping  directions  are  that  the  goods 
shall  be  sent  at  a  later  tune  the  carrier  until  such  time 
holds  the  goods  as  a  mere  warehouseman.2  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  goods  have  been  taken  by  the  carrier  for  im- 

1  Arkansas. — Little  Rock  &  Fort          England. — White  v.  Humphery, 

Smith  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hunter,  42  Ark.  11  Q.  B.  43  (1847). 
200  (1883).  *  Massachusetts.— Fitchburg  &  W. 

Massachusetts, — Ban-on     v.     El-  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hanna,  6  Gray,  539,  66 

dredge,  100  Mass.  455,  1  Am.  Rep.  Am.  Dec.  427  (1856). 
126  (1868).  Michigan.— Michigan   So.  &  N. 

Michigan. — Michigan  Southern  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shurtz,  7  Mich.  515 

N.  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shurtz,  7  Mich.  (1859). 
515  (1859).  Mississippi. — Illinois  Cent.  R.  R. 

New  Hampshire. — Moses  v.  Bos-  Co.  v.  Troustine,  64  Miss.  834,  2  So. 

ton  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  H.  71,  255  (1887). 
55  Am.  Dec.  222  (1851).  Missouri. — Goodbar   v.   Wabash 

New  York.— Rogers  v.  Wheeler,  Ry.  Co.,  53  Mo.  App.  434  (1893). 
52  N.  Y.  262  (1873).  New  York.— Spade  v.  Hudson  R. 

Ohio.— Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Barb.  383  (1853). 
Co.   v.   Barrett,   36  Ohio  St.   448          North  Carolina.— Basnight  v.  At- 

(1881).  lantic  &  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C. 

Wisconsin.— Schmidt  v.  Chicago  592,  16  S.  E.  323  (1892). 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Wis.  504,  63          Canada.— Ham  v.  McPherson,  6 

N.  W.  1057  (1895).  Upp.  Can.  Q.  B.  (O.  S.)  360  (1871). 

[336] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT 


§394 


mediate  transportation  he  then  becomes  liable  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  although  transportation  has  not  begun.1  If 
the  carrier  delays  transportation  thereafter  to  suit  his 
own  convenience  that  is  no  affair  of  the  shipper.  But  if 
there  is  an  agreement  whereby  the  goods  placed  in  the 
carrier's  care  are  to  be  held  until  he  chooses  to  begin  trans- 
portation the  rule  is  otherwise.2 

§  394.  Goods  tendered  too  late. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  carrier  by  rail  may  require  that 
freight  be  delivered  to  it  at  a  time  sufficiently  prior  to  the 
departure  of  its  trains  to  enable  it  to  make  preparations 
for  shipment.  Thus,  in  Frazier  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  Joe 
&  Council  Bluffs  Railway,3  where  a  complaint  was  made 
against  a  railroad  for  not  forwarding  freight  offered,  it 
was  proved  that  the  cattle  in  question  had  not  arrived 
at  the  station  when  the  train  was  being  loaded,  but  that 

New  York. — Ames  v.  Fargo,  114 
App.  Div.  666,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  994 
(1906). 

Pennsylvania. — Clarke  v.  Needles, 
25  Pa.  St.  338  (1855). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Trawick,  80  Tex.  270,  15  S.  W. 
568,  18  S.  W.  948  (1891). 

"Fitchburg  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hanna,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  539,  66  Am. 
Dec.  427  (1856),  semble. 

See  also  Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Riley  (Tex.  App.),  1  S.  W. 
446  (1886). 

3  48  la.  571  (1878). 

Cronkite  v.  Wells,  32  N.  Y.  247 
(1865),  accord. 

But  see  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Ozier,  86  Ark.  179,  110  S.  W. 
593,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  327  (1908), 
where  the  cattle  were  held  near 
by  at  the  request  of  the  station 
agent. 

[337] 


1  This  general  principle  is  shown 
by  the  following  cases: 

United  States. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knight,  122  U.  S.  79, 
30  L.  ed.  1077,  7  S.  Ct.  1132  (1887). 

Connecticut. — Merriam  v.  Hart- 
ford &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Conn. 
354,  52  Am.  Dec.  344  (1850). 

Illinois. — Grand  Tower  M.  & 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Ullman,  89  111.  244 
(1878). 

Indiana. — Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Godman,  104  Ind.  490,  4 
N.  E.  163  (1885). 

Minnesota. — Shaw  v.  Northern 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  144,  41  N. 
W.  548  (1889). 

Missouri. — Mason  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  25  Mo.  App.  473 
(1887). 

New  Hampshire. — Moses  v.  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  H.  71, 
55  Am.  Dec.  222  (1851). 

22 


§  395  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  shipper  had  sent  ahead  and  requested  that  the  train 
be  held  until  he  could  get  his  cattle  to  the  station  and 
load  them;  it  was  decided  that  the  railroad  was  not  liable. 
Mr.  Justice  Day  said:  "A  delay  of  a  few  minutes  at  one 
station  might  occasion  a  corresponding  delay  of  every 
train  on  the  line  of  road;  and  even  result  in  accidents 
destructive  of  property  and  life.  No  person  desiring  to 
become  a  passenger  upon  a  train  could  rightfully  demand 
a  delay  of  one  minute  to  enable  him  to  reach  the  train 
and  get  on  board.  Upon  what  principle,  then,  can  these 
plaintiffs  demand  damages  because  the  defendant's  train 
did  not  wait  until  they  could  drive  their  hogs  into  defend- 
ant's yard,  load  four  cars,  count  them,  have  way-bill  made 
out,  shipping  contract  signed,  and  the  hogs  placed  in  the 
train?  "  l 

§  395.  Passengers  must  come  at  proper  time. 

A  passenger  also  must  present  himself  for  carriage  and 
enter  the  train  at  the  proper  tune,  neither  too  early  nor 
too  late.  He  cannot  force  himself  on  the  railroad  as  a 
passenger  by  entering  the  car  prematurely.  Thus,  he 
does  not  become  a  passenger  by  entering  the  car  before 
it  has  been  placed  in  a  position  in  which  passengers  are 
to  be  received,2  or  by  entering  the  car,  even  if  it  is  at  the 

1  In  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  See  Wilder  v.  St.  Johnsbury  & 
v.  Risley  Bros.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  L.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Vt.  636,  30  Atl. 
App.),  119  S.  W.  897  (1909),  it  was  41  (1891),  where  although  prepara- 
held  that  one  who  had  stone  which  tions  had  been  made  for  shipment 
he  wished  to  pass  through  his  there  had  not  been  any  tender  as  yet. 
crusher  into  cars  was  not  one  ten-  2  United  States. — Farley  v.  Cin- 
dering freight  for  shipment.  cinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  108  Fed. 

A  requirement  that  in  order  to  14,  47  C.  C.  A.  156  (1901). 

have  a  car-load  shipment  go  forward  Georgia. — Curry  v.  Georgia  M.  & 

the  same  day  the  goods  must  be  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Ga.  293,  18  S.  E. 

delivered  before  a  certain  hour  will  422  (1893). 

govern  unless  it  is  waived.    Central  Missouri. — Archer  v.  Union  Pa- 

of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Butler  Marble  &  cific  Ry.  Co.,    110  Mo.   App.  349 

G.  Co.  (Ga.),  68  S.  E.  775  (1910).  (1909). 

[338] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  396 

proper  position  at  the  station,  if  it  is  not  yet  ready  for 
passengers.1  Similarly,  a  person  who  reaches  a  train 
after  it  begins  to  move  has  no  right  to  be  received,  and 
if  he  attempts  to  board  he  is  not  a  passenger.2  In  passing 
upon  exceptions  in  a  case  of  this  sort  the  governing  prin- 
ciple was  stated  by  the  South  Carolina  court  thus:  "The 
railroad  company  owes  no  duty  to  a  belated  passenger 
to  stop  its  train  in  any  other  manner  than  that  required 
by  the  statute.  A  contrary  doctrine  would  tend  to  dis- 
arrange the  schedule  of  the  railroad  company,  and  thus 
enhance  the  danger  to  the  travelling  public."  3 

§  396.  Services  which  may  be  demanded  at  any  time. 

There  are  certain  services  which,  it  seems,  may  properly 
be  demanded  at  any  time  of  the  day  or  night.  The  inn- 
keeper particularly  cannot  refuse  to  receive  a  traveler 
because  he  comes  late  at  night — that  is  the  very  time 
when  the  weary  wayfayer  needs  the  protection  of  the 
inn.4  Similarly  it  is  generally  held  that  ferrymen  could 
not  refuse  to  take  travelers  over  after  nightfall.5  And 
this  would  doubtless  be  true  of  turnpikes  and  toll  bridges. 

1  Alabama. — Brown  v.  Scarboro,  3  South      Carolina. — Pickett      v. 
97  Ala.  316,  12  So.  289  (1893).                Southern  Ry.  Co.,  69  S.  C.  445,  48 

North  Carolina.— Hodges  v.  New  S.  E.  466  (1904),  citing  Creech  v. 

Hanover  Transit  Co.,  107  N.  C.  576,  Char.  &  West  Car.  Ry.  Co.,  66  S.  C. 

12   S.    E.    597    (1890);    Tillett   v.  528,  45  S.  E.  86  (1903). 
Lynchburg  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  115  N.          But  in  Hickinbottomv.  Delaware, 

C.  662,  20  S.  E.  480  (1894).  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  St. 

2  Illinois.— Illinois   Cent.    R.    R.  Rep.  11,  54  Sup.  Ct.  639  (1888),  it 
Co.  v.  O'Keefe,  168  111.  115,  48  N.  was  held  that  if  a  passenger  presents 
E.  294,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  68  «.,  39  himself  before  the  train  starts,  it  is 
L.  R.  A.  148  (1897).  the  duty  of  the  railroad  to  hold  the 

Massachusetts. — Merrill  v.  East-  train  until  he  gets  on. 

ern  R.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  238,  1  N.  4  Rex  v.  Ivens,  7  Car.  &  P.  213 

E.  548,  52  Am.  Rep.  705  (1885).  (1835). 

Mississippi. — Georgia   Pac.    Ry.  6  Pate  v.  Henry,  5  Stew.  &  P.  101 

Co.  v.  Robinson,  68  Miss.  643,  10  (1833). 
So.  60  (1891). 

[339] 


§  397  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

The  necessities  and  accidents  of  travel  are  such  that  those 
who  cater  to  travelers  must  expect  to  serve  at  unusual 
hours  at  times.  To  pursue  this  point  farther,  there  are 
various  other  services  than  those  just  mentioned  in  which 
those  who  conduct  them  must  be  ready  to  give  service 
at  all  tunes — day  and  night,  secular  days  and  holidays. 
Water  supply  and  sewerage  service  are  two  examples  as 
to  which  there  can  be  no  question.  But  even  as  to  mu- 
nicipal services  of  this  sort  there  may  be  communities 
where  the  business  is  so  small,  relatively,  that  the  public 
cannot  fairly  demand  continuous  service.  Thus  in  the 
smaller  towns  the  electric  station  is  sometimes  not  oper- 
ated in  the  daytime;  and  there  are  some  communities 
where  telephone  service  is  discontinued  at  night. 

§  397.  Time-tables. 

It  is  of  course  very  common  to  find  in  the  conduct  of 
a  public  service  regulations  made  which  will  govern  the 
times  at  which  service  will  be  rendered.  Thus  common 
carriers  of  passengers  very  generally  publish  their  tables 
setting  forth  the  intervals  at  which  they  will  perform 
their  service,  and  these  regulations  will  be  supported  un- 
less they  are  unreasonable.1  What  is  reasonable  in  this 
respect  is  much  discussed  later.  It  is  sufficient  at  this 
stage  to  point  out  that  such  regulations,  if  not  unreason- 
able, govern  the  situation,  and  excuse  the  proprietors 
from  performance  at  other  times.  As  this  matter  is  fully 

1  See  particularly:  New      Hampshire. — Gordon      v. 

Indiana.— Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Manchester  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N. 

Swarthout,   67   Ind.   567,   33  Am.  H.  596,  13  Am.  Rep.  97  (1873). 

Rep.  104  (1879).  Oklahoma.— Noble    v.    Atchison, 

Massachusetts.— Sears  v.  Eastern  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Okla.  534,  46 

R.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen,  433,  92  Am.  Pac.  483  (1896). 

Dec.  780  (1867).  Wisconsin.— Schiffler  v.  Chicago 

Michigan.— Van  Camp  v.  Michi-  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  96  Wis.  141,  71 

gan  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  137  Mich.  467,  N.   W.   97,   65   Am.   St.   Rep.   35 

100  N.  W.  771  (1904).  (1897). 

[340] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  398 

treated  in  another  connection  a  cross  reference  to  the 
discussion  will  be  sufficient  here.1 

§  398.  Office  hours. 

In  many  public  employments  office  hours  are  estab- 
lished to  which  the  public  profession  is  limited.  Whether 
these  regulations  are  reasonable  is  again  a  question  for 
discussion  later.  It  is  well  settled,  for  instance,  that  a 
telegraph  company  may  insist  upon  its  office  hours,  pro- 
vided the  time  within  which  messages  will  be  received 
is  not  made  unduly  short.2  If  it  appears  that  the  hours 
established  are  not  unreasonable,  the  companies  will  be 
excused  from  serving  at  other  times,  and  the  public  must 
confine  its  demands  to  the  established  hours  if  these  have 
been  made  known  with  proper  publicity.3  The  same  law 
prevails  in  common  carriage,  as  will  be  seen.  Thus  a  rail- 
road may  establish  reasonable  hours  for  having  its  wait- 
ing rooms  open.4  And  it  may  have  reasonable  rules  as  to 
when  its  ticket  offices  will  be  open.5 

1  See  generally  §  872,  infra.  *  See  generally  §  874,  infra. 

2  See  particularly:  4  See  particularly: 

Arkansas. — Western  Union  Tele-  United  States. — Grimes  v.  Penn- 

graph  Co.  v.  Love  Banks  Co.,  73  sylvania   R.    R.    Co.,    36   Fed.    72 

Ark.  205,  83  S.  W.  949  (1904).  (1888). 

Indiana. — Western   Union   Tele-  Alabama. — Alabama   G.   S.    Ry. 

graph  Co.  v.  Harding,  103  Ind.  505,  Co.  v.  Arnold,  84  Ala.  159,  4  So. 

3  N.  E.  172  (1885).  359,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  354  (1887). 

Kentucky. — Western  Union  Tele-  Indiana. — Draper   v.    Evansville 

graph  Co.  v.  Crider,  107  Ky.  600,  54  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  165  Ind.  117,  74 

S.  W.  963  (1900).  N.  E.  889  (1905). 

North  Carolina. — Carter  v.  Tele-  Illinois. — Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co. 

graph  Co.,  141  N.  C.  374,  54  S.  E.  v.  Walker,  118  111.  App.  397  (1905). 

274  (1906).  North    Carolina.— Phillips          v. 

South  Carolina.— Bonner  v.  West-  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  124  N.  C.  123, 

ern  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  71  S.  C.  32  S.  E.  388  (1899). 

303,  51  S.  E.  117  (1904).  Oregon— Abbot  v.  Oregon  Ry.  & 

West  Virginia.— Davis  v.  Western  Nav.  Co.,  46  Oreg.  549,  80  Pac.  1012 

Union  Telegraph  Co.,  46  W.  Va.  48,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  851  (1905). 

32  S.  E.  1026  (1899).  •  See  generally  §  873,  infra. 

[341] 


§  399  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Topic  B.  Service  Must  Be  Demanded  at  Proper  Place 

§  399.  Tender  of  goods  to  the  carrier. 

By  the  general  principle  under  discussion  a  carrier  is 
not  liable  for  refusing  to  take  goods  unless  they  have 
been  actually  tendered  1  or  at  least  unless  they  are  in  the 
process  of  being  tendered.2  But  the  tender  or  the  attempt 
to  tender  will  subject  the  carrier  to  no  liability  unless 
the  tender  is  made  at  a  proper  place.  Usually  the  place 
which  the  carrier  has  designated  in  the  particular  instance 
must  be  resorted  to,  as  where  a  carrier  gave  orders  that 
coal  should  only  be  received  at  a  certain  siding.3  It 
should  be  added  that  as  the  carrier  may  make  regula- 
tions with  regard  to  its  performance  of  its  obligations, 
it  may  refuse  to  take  goods  except  at  the  stations  which 
it  has  established.4  Tender  at  an  unusual  place  will 
not  be  sufficient,  as  where  goods  are  deposited  near  to 
the  right  of  way  of  the  railroad  and  demand  made  that 
the  goods  should  be  taken  up  where  they  he.5  But  a 
railroad  may  actually  consent  to  accept  the  goods,  thus 
in  one  case 6  where  the  shipper  in  accordance  with  an 

1  Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.      S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lee,  69  Ark.  584,  65 
Conatser,  61  Ark.  560,  33  S.  W.      S.  W.  99  (1901). 

1057  (1896).  Georgia.— Wilson    v.    Atlanta   & 

2  Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.      Charlotte    Ry.    Co.,    82    Ga.    386 
Campbell,  91  Tex.  551,  45  S.  W.  2,      (1889). 

43  L.  R.  A.  225  (1898).  Mississippi.— Tate   v.   Yazoo  & 

3  Robinson   v.    Baltimore   &   O.  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Miss.  842,  29 
R.  R.  Co.,  129  Fed.  753,  64  C.  C.  So.  392,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  649  (1901). 
A.  281   (1904).    See  also  Harp  v.  New  York.— Spade  v.  The  Hud- 
Choctaw,  O.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  son  River  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Barb.  383 
Fed.  445,  61  C.  C.  A.  405  (1903).  (1853). 

*  Weeks  v.  New  Orleans,  S.  F.  &          South   Carolina. — Brown   v.   At- 

L.  Ry.  Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  800,  5  So.  lanta  &  C.  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  S.  C.  39. 
72,   8  Am.   St.   Rep.   560    (1888).          Texas.— Yoakum  v.  Dryden  (Tex. 

See  also  Kellogg  v.  Suffolk  &  C.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  312  (1894). 
Ry.  Co.,  100  N.  C.  158,  5  S.  E.  379          •  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

(1888).  Wynne  H.  &  C.  Co.,  81  Ark.  373,  99 

1  Arkansas— St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  W.  375  (1907). 

[342] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  400 

arrangement  with  the  railroad,  had  wood  upon  a  siding 
ready  for  transportation,  some  of  which  was  already  in 
the  custody  of  the  railroad,  it  was  properly  held  that  the 
shipper  could  recover  for  the  damage  caused  by  the 
failure  to  take  the  remainder  of  the  shipment.1  And  in 
another  case  it  was  rightly  considered  that  a  sufficient 
tender  of  stock  to  a  carrier  for  shipment  had  been  made 
by  notifying  the  carrier  of  the  need  of  cars,  and  keeping 
the  stock  within  a  short  distance  of  the  station  in  obe- 
dience to  instructions  of  the  station  agent.2  After  a  car 
has  been  loaded  at  a  place  designated  by  the  railroad,  the 
shipper  having  done  everything  which  the  railroad  has  re- 
quired it  cannot  refuse  to  take  it,  because  it  would  not 
usually  be  compelled  to  take  freight  at  that  point  unless 
it  had  waived  the  condition.3  Moreover,  the  actual  tender 
of  the  freight  is  waived  altogether  where  the  railroad  has 
refused  to  enter  an  order  for  cars.4 

§  400.  Placing  goods  in  proper  position  not  delivery. 

Similarly  it  is  not  a  sufficient  delivery  to  the  carrier 
merely  to  place  the  goods  in  a  place  where  he  may  con- 
See  also  Georgia  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.  4  Atlantic    C.    L.    Ry.    Co.    v. 
v.  Marchman,  121  Ga.  235,  48  S.  E.  Geraty,  166  Fed.  10,  91  C.  C.  A.  602, 
961  (1904).  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  310  (1908). 

1  Burden  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  58  While    goods    are    being    loaded 
S.  E.  299  (Ga.  Ct.  App.,  1907).  upon  a  car  upon  a  siding  by  the 

See  also  Arthur  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  shipper  the  railroad  cannot  be  re- 
Co.,  204  U.  S.  505,  51  L.  ed.  590,  27  garded  as  having  assumed  the  lia- 
Sup.  Ct.  338  (1907).  bility  of  a  common  carrier  as  yet. 

2  See  also  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Burrowes  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Ozier,  86  Ark.  179,  110  Co.,  85  Neb.  497,  123  N.  W.  1028 
S.  W.  593,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  327  (1909). 

(1908).    But  see  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  But  after  a  railroad  has  actually 

C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Flanagan,  113  Ind.  taken  possession  of  goods  between 

488,  14  N.  E.  370,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  stations  and  transportation  has  be- 

674  (1887).  gun  it  is  of  course  liable  as  a  com- 

3  W.  B.  Garrison  Co.  v.  Southern  mon  carrier.    Santa  Fe,  P.  &  P.  Ry. 
Ry.  Co.,  150  N.  C.  575,  64  S.  E.  578  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  C.  Co.  (Ariz.), 
(1909).  108  Pac.  467  (1910). 

[343] 


§  401  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

veniently  get  them,1  as  at  the  wharf  from  which  he  sails,2 
or  the  inn  from  which  his  coach  starts,3  the  station  from 
which  his  train  starts,4  or  a  warehouse  on  the  premises.5 
There  must  be  notification  to  the  carriers  that  the  goods 
have  been  so  deposited,  and  following  that  something  by 
way  of  acceptance.6  Of  course  the  case  is  correct  which 
held  that  a  delivery  to  a  railroad  warehouse,  about  dark, 
and  after  it  was  closed  and  locked  for  the  night  by  plain- 
tiff's agent,  by  opening  the  upper  door  and  thereby 
putting  the  goods  in,  there  being  no  one  in  charge,  did 
not  show  such  delivery  as  would  charge  the  railroad.7 
One  of  the  leading  cases  on  this  subject  is  hardly  less 
plain.  A  cutter  was  placed  upon  a  platform  of  a  freight 
station  and  the  proper  agent  notified,  but  it  was  care- 
lessly placed  so  that  it  projected  over  the  tracks  and 
was  struck  and  injured  by  a  passing  train.  The  court 
held  that  the  delivery  was  not  as  perfect  and  complete  as 
it  should  have  been,  and  that  the  carrier  had  never  come 
into  possession  of  the  cutter.8 

§  401.  Passengers  must  be  upon  the  premises. 

A  carrier  of  passengers  owes  no  duty  to  persons,  what- 
ever their  intentions,  who  have  not  presented  themselves 
at  his  premises.9  Intending  passengers  cannot  force  a 
railroad  to  accept  them  except  at  the  place  which  the 

1  O'Bannon  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  7  Spofford  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
51  Ala.  481  (1874).  Co.,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  97  (1899). 

2  Buckman  v.  Levi,  3  Camp.  414  8  Grosvenor  v.  New  York  Cent. 
(1813).  R.  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  34  (1868). 

3  Selway    v.    Holloway,     1    Ld.  '  Nashville    Street    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Ray.  46  (1695).  Griffin,  104  Tenn.  81,  57  S.  W.  153, 

4  Slim   v.    Great    Northern    Ry.  49  L.  R.  A.  451  (1900). 

Co.,  14  C.  B.  647  (1854).  See  also  Kroeger  v.  Seattle  Elec- 

4  Spofford  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  trie  Co.,  37  Wash.  544,  79  Pac.  1115 

Co.,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  97  (1899).  (1905),  people  waiting  at  the  car 

•Bowie  v.  Bait.  &  Ohio  R.  R.  barn. 

Co.,  1  MacArthur.  609  (1874). 

[3441 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  402 

railroad  has  designated.1  One  walking  along  the  public 
street  toward  the  station  with  the  intention  of  taking 
the  train  is  certainly  not  yet  a  passenger.2  He  has  done 
nothing  to  notify  any  of  the  officers  or  agents  of  the 
company  that  he  was  even  a  prospective  passenger.  Nor 
is  one  a  passenger  who  is  proceeding  across  the  track 
directly  from  the  street  to  the  train.3  In  such  a  case  the 
intending  passenger  must  at  least  have  been  received 
on  the  premises  of  the  company  before  proceeding  upon 
the  tracks  if  he  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  passenger.  One 
who,  merely  in  order  to  reach  in  the  quickest  way  the 
platform  from  which  his  train  starts,  crosses  the  carrier's 
tracks  on  his  way  from  the  sidewalk  to  the  train,  cannot 
be  regarded  as  a  passenger.4  But  an  intending  passenger 
who  has  bought  a  ticket,  or  is  prepared  to  pay  fare,  and 
is  passing  over  tracks  of  the  company,  under  direction  of 
its  servants,  or  according  to  custom,  toward  the  train 
which  he  is  about  to  take,  has  been  held  to  be  a  passenger.5 
These  are  representative  cases;  no  attempt  is  made  to 
marshal  the  many  cases  upon  these  points. 

§  402.  When  passengers  are  accepted. 

The  relation  of  carrier  and  passenger  may  arise  before 
actual  transportation  has  begun.  A  person  who  has 
entered  a  vehicle  which  is  ready  to  start  becomes  a  pas- 

1  Spannagle  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,          4  Illinois.— Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  R. 
31  111.  App.  460  (1889).  Co.  v.  Jennings,  190  111.  478,  60  N. 

See  also  Smith  v.   Birmingham  E.  818,  54  L.  R.  A.  827  (1901). 

Ry.,  L.  &  P.  Co.,  147  Ala.  702,  41  Massachusetts.— Webster v.Fitch- 

So.  307   (1906),  boarding  car  be-  burg  R.  R.  Co.,  161  Mass.  298,  37 

tween  stations.  N.  E.  165,  24  L.  R.  A.  521  (1894). 

2  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  86  6  Iowa. — Allender  v.  Chicago,  R. 
Fed.  292,  30  C.  C.  A.  58,  40  L.  R.  A.  I.    &    P.   R.   R.   Co.,   37   la.   264 
746  (1898).  (1873). 

3  June  v.  Boston  &  Albany  R.  R.  Massachusetts. — Warren  v.  Fitch- 
Co.,  153  Mass.  79,  26  N.  E.  238  burg  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Allen,  227,  85  Am. 
(1891).  Dec.  700  (1864). 

[345] 


§  403  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

senger,  though  the  vehicle  has  not  yet  started.1  So  one 
who  is  on  a  steamboat  moored  to  a  wharf  is  a  passenger, 
though  the  boat  has  not  yet  started.2  Those  who  are 
in  the  waiting  room  of  a  railroad  station,  waiting  to  take 
the  carrier's  car,  are  usually  said  to  be  passengers.3 
The  essential  elements  are  summarized  thus  in  a  recent 
case.4  "A  person  intending  to  become  a  passenger  must 
go  to  the  station  at  a  reasonable  time  before  the  time 
fixed  for  the  departure  of  the  train  upon  which  he  intends 
to  take  passage  in  a  proper  manner,  and  there,  either  by 
the  purchase  of  a  ticket  or  in  some  other  manner,  indicate 
to  the  carrier  his  intention  to  take  it." 

§  403.  Establishment  of  regular  stations. 

In  the  absence  of  action  of  the  company  establishing 
stations,  and  making  it  a  condition  of  receiving  persons 
or  goods  that  they  should  present  themselves  or  be 
offered  at  a  station,  it  would  seem  clear  that  the  carrier 
could  not  refuse  a  tender  made  at  any  point  on  his  route. 
Such  was  undoubtedly  the  case  with  the  earlier  carriers, 
the  wagoners,  the  coachmen;  and  in  fact  it  remains  so 
as  to  such  carriers.  But  hi  the  operation  of  modern 
railroads  the  establishment  of  stations  was  found  neces- 
sary from  the  first.  And  indeed  regular  stopping  places 

1  New  York— Gyle  v.  Joline,  120      &  M.  V.  Ry.  Co.  (Miss.),  52  So.  355 
N.  Y.  Supp.  761  (1910).  (1910). 

England. — Massiter  v.  Cooper,  4  New  York. — Gordon  v.  Grand  St. 

Esp.  260  (1803).  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Barb.  546  (1863). 

2  United  States.— Hrebrik  v.  Carr,  Virginia.— Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R. 
29  Fed.  298  (1886).  Co.  v.  Galliher,  89  Va.  639,  16  S.  E. 

New  York.— Dougherty  v.  New  935  (1893). 

York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  4  Devens,  J.,  in  Heinlein  v.  Bos- 

N.  Y.  Supp.  746  (1904).  ton  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  147  Mass.  136, 

*  Indiana.— Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  16  N.  E.  698,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  676 

Co.  v.  Strange,  171  Ind.  160,  84  N.  (1888). 

E.  819,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1041  See  also  the  language  in  Riley  v. 

(1908).  Vallejo   Ferry   Co.,   173   Fed.  330 

Mississippi. — Metcalf   v.   Yazoo  (1909). 

[346] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT 


[§404 


after  some  experience  have  been  found  to  be  necessary 
in  the  case  of  street  railways.  These  stations  should  of 
course  be  established  at  reasonable  intervals  if  this 
regulation  is  to  stand;  whether  there  has  been  reason- 
able provision  in  this  respect  is  discussed  elsewhere.1 
But  granted  that  stations  have  been  properly  established, 
it  is  a  reasonable  regulation  that  passengers  shall  pre- 
sent themselves  and  freight  shall  be  tendered  at  such 
stations  and  nowhere  else.2 

§  404.  Service  at  private  sidings. 

Generally  speaking  one  who  has  freight  to  ship  must 
bring  it  to  the  established  freight  stations.  No  matter 
how  large  the  business  of  a  particular  shipper  may  be,  he 
cannot  insist  upon  having  cars  handled  from  his  private 
switch.3  And  certainly  in  any  particular  case  the  rights 
of  the  railroad  are  so  far  paramount  that  a  showing  that 

1  See  generally  §§804-814,  passim. 

2  See  particularly : 

United  States. — Louisville  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  212 
U.  S.  132,  53  L.  ed.  441,  29  Sup.  Ct. 
246  (1909). 

Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Lee,  69  Ark.  584, 65  S.  W. 
99  (1901). 

Indiana. — Louisville  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Flanagan,  113  Ind.  488,  14  N.  E. 
370,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  674  (1887). 

Iowa. — Frazier  &  Co.  v.  Kansas 
City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  Ry.  Co.,  48  la. 
571  (1878). 

Louisiana. — Weeks  v.  New  Or- 
leans, S.  F.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  40  La. 
800,  5  So.  72,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  560 
(1888). 

Mississippi. — Kansas  City,  M.  & 
B.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lilly  (Miss.),  8  So. 
644  (1891). 

North  Carolina. — Kellogg  v.  Suf- 


folk, etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  100  N.  C.  158, 
5  S.  E.  379  (1888),  semble. 

South  Carolina. — Brown  v.  At- 
lanta &  C.  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  S.  C. 
39  (1882). 

As  to  the  situation  in  regard  to 
street  railways  at  the  present  time, 
see: 

Massachusetts. — Lockwood  v. 
Boston  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  200  Mass. 
537,  86  N.  E.  934  (1909). 

Tennessee. — Nashville  Street  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Griffin,  104  Tenn.  81,  57  S. 
W.  153,  49  L.  R.  A.  451  (1900). 

»  United  States.— Bedford  B.  G.  S. 
Co.  v.  Oman,  134  Fed.  441  (1904). 

Georgia. — Darden  v.  Southern 
Ry.  Co.,  2  Ga.  App.  66,  58  S.  E.  299 
(1907). 

Michigan.-^Maim  v.  Pere  Mar- 
quette  R.  R.  Co.,  135  Mich.  210,  97 
N.  W.  721  (1903). 

South   Carolina. — Mays   v.    Sea- 

[347] 


§405 


the  operation  of  a  switch  connection  might  be  dangerous 
will  be  fatal  to  the  application. l  There  are  extreme  cases, 
as  will  be  seen  later,  where  it  would  be,  unreasonable  to  en- 
force this  usual  regulation  that  all  must  bring  their  freight 
to  the  stations.  For  peculiar  shipments,  such  as  coal  and 
ore,  grain  and  oil— to  give  four  examples  2 — special  accept- 
ance along  the  tracks  at  private  sidings  is  apparently  neces- 
sary. In  recent  times  the  attempt  is  being  made  to  extend 
the  obligation  to  permit  switch  connections  by  legislation, 
but  as  will  be  seen  later  much  of  this  is  unconstitutional.3 

§  405.  Service  only  obligatory  within  proper  territory. 
It  has  already  been  pointed  out  in  another  connection 


board  Air  L.  Ry.  Co.-,  75  S.  C.  455 
(1906). 
Discussed  generally  in  §  814. 

1  United  States. — Jones  v.   New- 
port N.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Fed. 
736,  31  U.  S.  App.  92,  13  C.  C.  A. 
95  (1895);  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v. 
Columbus  S.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  90 
Fed.    148    (1898). 

North  Carolina. — Industrial  Sid- 
ing Case,  140  N.  C.  239,  52  S.  E. 
941  (1905). 

2  United  States. — Harp  v.  Choc- 
taw,  O.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Fed. 
445,  61  C.  C.  A.  405  (1903),  col- 
lieries;   Olanta    Coal    M.    Co.    v. 
Beech  Creek  R.  R.  Co.,  144  Fed. 
150  (1906),  collieries. 

Illinois. — Vincent  v.  Chicago  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  111.  33  (1868),  grain 
elevators;  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  People,  56  111.  365  (1870),  grain 
elevators. 

Iowa. — Richmond  v.  Dubuque  & 
Sioux  City  R.  R.  Co.,  26  la.  191 
(1868),  grain  elevators. 

Kentucky. — Bedford  -Bowling 
Green  Stone  Co.  v.  Oman,  115  Ky. 

[348] 


369,  73  S.  W.  1038,  24  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
2274  (1903),  quarries. 

Nebraska. — Roby  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Farmers'  G.  &  L.  S.  Co.,  76  Neb. 
450,  107  N.  W.  766  (1906),  grain 
elevators. 

Pennsylvania. — Continental  Coal 
Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  702  (1904),  collieries. 

Discussed  generally  in  §  816. 

3  United  States. — Missouri  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Nebraska,  164  U.  S.  403, 
41  L.  ed.  489, 17  Sup.  Ct.  130  (1896). 

Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Wynne  H.  &  C.  Co.,  81 
Ark.  373,  99  S.  W.  375  (1907). 

Louisiana. — Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  La.  v.  Kansas  City  So.  Ry. 
Co.,  Ill  La.  133,  35  So.  487  (1903). 

North  Carolina. — Industrial  Sid- 
ing Case,  140  N.  C.  239,  52  S.  E.  941 
(1905). 

South  Carolina. — Mays  v.  Sea- 
board Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  75  S.  C. 
455  (1906). 

Washington. — Northwestern  W. 
Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  32 
Wash.  218,  73  Pac.  388  (1903). 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  406 

that  the  obligation  of  a  company  serving  a  community 
has  its  limitations.1  One  demanding  a  household  service, 
such  as  water,  gas,  electricity  or  telephone,  of  a  company 
must  show  that  his  premises  are  located  within  the  terri- 
tory which  the  company  has  professed  to  serve,  unless 
he  can  show  that  the  territorial  limits  fixed  by  the  com- 
pany in  question  are  unreasonable  in  view  of  all  the 
circumstances.  Here  again  the  company  may  waive  this 
condition  in  particular  cases  and  be  subject  in  that  serv- 
ice to  the  liabilities  resting  upon  those  engaged  in  pub- 
lic service  without,  however,  becoming  obliged  to  serve 
others.2 

§  406.  Services  to  abutting  owners. 

That  the  supplying  companies  are  under  a  general 
obligation  to  supply  all  householders  living  within  the 
district  which  the  company  has  professed  to  serve  is 
therefore  plain.  But  there  are  conditions  precedent  to 
these  services,  also,  which  it  will  be  reasonable  for  the 
company  to  impose,  under  the  circumstances.  The  serv- 
ice of  such  householders  is  undertaken  at  the  premises, 

Discussed    generally    in    §§  818,  Massachusetts. — Weld  v.   Gas  & 

819.  Electric  Light  Commissioners,  197 

'See  generally   §§373-380,    pas-  Mass.  556,  84  N.  E.  101  (1908). 

sim.  New   York. — Jones  v.   Rochester 

2  See  particularly:  Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App. 

United  States.— Cumberland  Tele-  Div.   465,   39   N.   Y.   Supp.    1105 

phone  Co.  v.  Kelly,  160  Fed.  316,  (1896). 

87  C.  C.  A.  268  (1908).  Oregon.— Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 

Connecticut.— Town  of  West  Hart-  &  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 

ford  v.  Board  of  Water  Commis-  244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

sioners,  68  Conn.  323,  36  Atl.  786  Pennsylvania.— Central  D.  &  P. 

(1896).  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Commonwealth, 

Idaho.— Pocatello  Water  Co.  v.  114    Pa.    St.     592,     7    Atl.    926 

Standley,  7  Idaho,  155,  61  Pac.  518  (1886). 

(1900).  West  Virginia. — Charleston  Nat. 

Kansas. — Crouch   v.    Arnett,   71  Gas  Co.  v.  Lowe  &  B.,  52  W.  Va. 

Kans.  49,  79  Pac.  1086  (1905).  662,  44  S.  E.  410  (1901). 

[349] 


§  407  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

and  the  applicant  must  be  ready  with  his  piping  or  his 
wiring,  as  the  case  may  be,  properly  arranged  to  receive 
the  supply  at  the  outer  wall.1  As  has  been  seen,  the  sup- 
ply companies  undertake  their  service  generally  only  to 
those  applicants  whose  premises  are  properly  equipped 
so  as  to  receive  the  service  in  question.2  It  seems  that 
the  supplying  company  should  provide  the  service  pipe 
as  part  of  the  facilities  for  rendering  service  which  it  is 
bound  to  supply; 3  but  there  are  cases  to  the  contrary.4 
It  seems  also  that  the  supply  company  ought  to  provide 
the  meter,5  but  there  are  cases  to  the  contrary.6 

Topic  C.  There  Must  Be  Application  in  Proper  Form 

§  407.  Applicant  must  give  notice. 

Those  who  have  goods  in  readiness  for  transportation 
must  notify  the  carrier  of  their  desire  to  have  their 
goods  transported  before  he  will  be  in  default  for  not 
taking  them.  It  has  indeed  been  asserted  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  New  York,7  that  a  delivery  in  accordance 
with  any  custom  must  always  be  accompanied  by  notice 
to  some  authorized  agent  of  the  company;  but  this,  as 
will  be  seen,  undoubtedly  goes  too  far.  This  elementary 
principle  is  further  elaborated  in  the  law  of  innkeeping. 
The  burden  appears  to  be  on  the  traveler  to  give  notice 

1  See    particularly    Ferguson    v.         Prindiville  v.  Jackson,  79  111.  337 
Metropolitan   Gas   Light   Co.,    37      (1875). 

How.  Pr.  189  (1868).  See  generally  §  824,  infra. 

See  generally  §  380,  infra.  *  See  particularly  Red  Star  Steam- 

2  See  particularly  Public  Service  ship  Co.  v.  Jersey  City,  45  N.  J.  L. 
Corp.  v.  American  Lighting  Co.,  67  246  (1883). 

N.  J.  Eq.  122,  57  Atl.  482  (1904).  See  generally  §  825. 

See  generally  §  823,  infra.  6  See  particularly  Cooper  v.  Good- 

*See    particularly    Bothwell    v.  land,  80  Kans.  121,  102  Pac.  244, 

Consumers'  Co.,  13  Idaho,  568,  92  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  410  (1909). 

Pac.  533  (1907).  See  generally  §  825. 

See  generally  §  824,  infra.  7  Packard   v.    Getman,    6    Cow. 

4  See  particularly :  (N.  Y.)  *757, 16  Am.  Dec.  475  (1827). 

[350] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  408 

to  the  innkeeper  that  he  desires  to  be  received  as  a  guest. 
Thus  where  a  person  was  traveling  at  night,  and  came  to 
an  inn  after  it  was  shut  up  for  the  night,  and  knocked, 
it  was  held  that  the  innkeeper  must,  in  order  to  be  liable 
for  not  admitting  the  guest,  have  heard  the  knocking.1 
Not  only  must  the  applicant  give  notice  that  he  desires 
service,  but  he  must  designate  what  service  he  desires. 
Thus  a  passenger  may  be  refused  transportation  who 
asked  to  pay  his  fare  says  he  has  not  decided  how  far  he 
will  go.2  And  so  a  carrier  of  goods  may  refuse  to  take 
parcels  not  properly  addressed.3 

§  408.  Requisitions  made  in  advance. 

Notification  may  properly  be  made  in  advance  so 
that  the  facilities  may  be  at  hand  at  the  time  desired. 
Thus  a  shipper  intending  a  considerable  shipment  in 
car  lots  may  apply  a  reasonable  time  in  advance  to  the 
railroad  particularly  requesting  a  certain  number  of  cars 
in  readiness  for  certain  freight  at  a  certain  day,  and  at  a 
certain  station.4  What  is  reasonable  by  way  of  notifica- 

1  Hawthorn  v.  Hammond,  1  C.  &      Ry.  Co.,  149  N.  C.  423,  63  S.  E.  112 
K.  (Eng.)  404  (1844).  (1908). 

2  Fulton  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,          4  See  on  the  general  principle: 

17  Upp.  Can.  Q.  B.  428  (1858).  Illinois—  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R. 

If  the  shipper's  misstatements  as  Co.  v.  Erickson,  91  111.  613,  33  Am. 

to  the  contents  of  a  box  caused  the  Rep.  70  (1879);  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R. 

carrier  to  omit  the  performance  of  Co.    v.    Bundy,    97   111.   App.   202 

some  attention  which  the  goods  re-  (1901). 

quired,  whereby  they  were  lost,  it  Indiana. — Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
would  not  be  responsible  for  such  Ry.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  39  Ind.  App. 
loss.  St.  Louis  Southwestern  Ry.  112,  79  N.  E.  381  (1906);  Pitts- 
Co,  of  Texas  v.  Ray  (Tex.  Civ.  burgh,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
App.),  127  S.  W.  281  (1910).  Wood  (Ind.  App.),  84  N.  E.  1009 

'Grocery   Co.   v.   Railroad   Co.,  (1908). 

136  N.  C.  396,  48  S.  E.  801  (1904).  New     York—  Tierney     v.     New 

No  excuse  for  refusal  to  receive  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y. 

freight  that  name  of  station  is  mis-  305  (1879). 

spelled.     Reid   &   B.   v.   Southern  Wisconsin. — Ayres  v.  Chicago  & 

[351] 


§  409  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tion  is  well  brought  out  by  a  recent  case,1  where  it  was 
held  that  a  carrier  is  not  required  to  hold  at  a  wharf 
station  for  a  whole  week  a  large  number  of  cars  awaiting 
the  arrival  of  a  steamship.  Indeed  it  is  generally  held 
as  to  car  shipments  that  when  a  shipper  requires  a  car 
at  a  railroad  station  for  his  exclusive  use,  he  must 
necessarily  give  notice  to  the  railroad  company,  after 
which  it  will  have  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to  furnish 
the  car.2  A  correlative  duty  rests  upon  the  railroad  to 
serve  all  applicants  making  proper  requisitions  for  serv- 
ice in  proper  order  without  discrimination.3 

§  409.  Effect  of  mere  notification. 

It  would  be  going  to  an  extreme  to  hold  as  some  cases 
do  that  a  deposit  in  the  regular  place  for  receiving  goods 
followed  by  notice  to  the  carrier  is  enough  to  make  the 
carrier  responsible  as  such,  even  without  proof  of  a 
special  custom  to  that  effect.4  But  generally  speaking 
for  a  proper  delivery  to  a  carrier  by  mere  deposit  of  the 

Northwestern  Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372,  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  145  N.  C.  397,  59 

37  N.  W.  432,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  226  S.  E.  122  (1908);  Griffith  v.  Texas 

(1888).  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

!Di  Giorgio  I.  &  S.  S.  Co.  v.  116  S.  W.  648  (1909).    But  it  must 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Md.  not  be  either   too   general  or  too 

693,  65  Atl.  425,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  specific.     Simmons  v.  Seaboard  A. 

108  (1906).  L.  Ry.  Co.,  133  Ga.  635,  66  S.  E. 

'Illinois    Cent.    R.    R.    Co.    v.  783  (1909);  Cox  v.  Missouri,  K.  & 

Bundy,  97  111.  App.  202  (1901).  T.  Ry.  Co.,  81  Kans.  186,  106  Pac. 

3  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Savannah  L.  41  (1909);  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

W.  &  S.  Co.,  131  Ga.  831,  63  S.  E.  Co.  v.  Risley  Bros.  &  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 

577  (1909);  Merchants'  &  M.  Tr.  App.),  119  S.  W.  897  (1909);  Texas 

Co.  v.  Granger  &  L.,  132  Ga.  167,  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  99  Tex. 

63  S.  E.  700  (1909).  533,  91  S.  W.  567  (1906). 

The  cases  are  very  exacting  as  *  Rogers  v.   Long  Island  R.  R. 

to   the   requisition   for  service   es-  Co.,  2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  269  (1869). 

'pecially  when  the  suit  is  for  a  stat-  Anderson  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  R. 

utory  penalty.     Not  only  must  the  Co.    (Miss.),   38    So.    661    (1905), 

application  be  within  the  terms  of  contra. 
the  statute.    McDuffie  v.  Seaboard 

[352] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [§  410 

goods  in  a  certain  place,  it  will  be  necessary  to  show  a 
custom  to  that  effect  and  the  giving  of  notice  following 
the  deposit  of  the  goods  will  usually  be  found  to  be  part 
of  that  custom.1  It  is,  however,  not  impossible  that  the 
custom  shown  may  go  so  far  as  to  show  acceptance  by 
the  mere  deposit  without  any  notification  at  all.2  But 
at  all  events  the  contention  sometimes  made  that  by  the 
deposit  the  carrier  becomes  liable  as  a  warehouseman 
from  the  outset  and  as  a  carrier  after  notification  would 
seem  to  be  untenable.3 

§  410.  Signal  to  passenger  carrier. 

In  the  case  of  passenger  carriers  it  is  not  uncommon 
to  provide  for  the  giving  of  a  signal  by  the  intending 
passenger.  Thus  the  smaller  stations  are  often  designated 
by  the  railroad  as  flag  stations  where  the  signal  must  be 
set  by  the  passenger.  The  law  is  positive  that  a  railroad 
company  is  bound  to  stop  its  trains  in  response  to  proper 
signals  at  a  flag  station  at  which  the  train  is  scheduled  to 
stop.4  As  street  railways  are  operated  they  owe  a  duty 

1  Alabama. — Green  v.  Louisville  &          Iowa. — Green  v.  Milwaukee  &  S. 
N.   R.   R.  Co.    (Ala.),  50  So.  937      P.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  la.  100  (1874). 
(1909).  3Yoakum  v.  Dryden  (Tex.  Civ. 

Connecticut.  —  Trowbridge  v.  App.),  26  S.  W.  312  (1894).  But 

Chapin,  23  Conn.  595  (1855).  see  Basnight  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C. 

Michigan.—  Wright  v.  Caldwell,  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  592,  16  S.  E. 

3  Mich.  51  (1853).  323  (1892). 

Missouri. — Holland  v.  Chicago,  4  Georgia. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 

R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  139  Mo.  App.  Wallis,  133  Ga.  553,  66  S.  E.  370 

702,  123  S.  W.  987  (1910).  (1909). 

2  Alabama. — Montgomery    &    E.  Michigan. — Freeman  v.  Detroit, 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Kolb,  73  Ala.  396,  49  M.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Mich.  577, 
Am.  Rep.  54  (1882).  32  N.  W.  833  (1887). 

Connecticut. — Merriam  v.  Hart-  Mississippi. — Yazoo  &  M.  V. 

ford  &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Conn.  Ry.  Co.  v.  White,  82  Miss.  120,  33 

354  (1850).  So.  970  (1903). 

Indiana. — Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Texas. — San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry. 

R.  Co.  v.  Keith,  8  Ind.  App.  57,  35  Co.  v.  Safford  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  48 

N.  E.  296  (1893).  S.  W.  1105  (1898). 

23  [  353  ] 


§  411  ]  PUBLIC  'SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

to  the  public  to  stop  at  their  regular  crossings  on  a  season- 
able signal,  given  in  any  intelligible  way,  to  receive  those 
desiring  passage.1  Consequently,  a  rule  of  a  street  rail- 
way company,  that  where  its  cars  stop  beyond  the  cross- 
ing they  will  not  be  backed  even  to  take  a  person  who 
has  properly  signaled,  will  not  protect  it  from  suit  by  an  in- 
tending passenger  who  is  left  behind.2  On  the  other  hand, 
in  accordance  with  all  general  principles  of  reponsibility 
which  prevail  generally  in  public  service  law  a  railroad 
company  is  not  liable  to  one  intending  to  become  a  pas- 
senger for  a  failure  to  stop  a  passenger  train  at  a  flag 
station  where  the  engineer  and  fireman  in  charge  of  the 
locomotive,  through  no  fault  of  their  own,  and  while  in 
the  exercise  of  due  care  on  their  part,  failed  to  see  and 
obey  the  signal  on  account  of  the  manner  in  which  it  was 
given,  or  by  reason  of  prevailing  atmospheric  conditions.3 

§  411.  Formal  application  for  supply. 

It  is  well  established  that  before  being  obliged  to  install 
its  service  a  supplying  company,  be  it  water,  irrigation, 

1  Some  cases  go  so  far  as  to  hold  2  Jackson  Electric  Ry.,  L.  &  P. 

that  from  the  moment  the  signal  of  Co.  v.  Lowry,  79  Miss.  431,  30  So. 

the  intending  passenger  has  been  634  (1901).    Accord.,  Christian  v. 

recognized  by  the  driver  the  carrier  Augusta  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  (S.  C.)  69 

becomes  liable  as  such.    See  Can-  v.  S.  E.  17  (1910). 

Milwaukee  L.,   H.  &  P.   Co.,  132  A  railroad  having  a  flag  station 

Wis.  662,  113  N.  W.  62  (1907);  and  with  a  station  agent  may  insist  that 

Brien  v.  Bennett,  8  Car.  &  P.  (Eng.)  the  station  agent  shall  set  the  sig- 

724  (1839).  nal.     St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.   Co. 

But    most    cases   hold   that    al-  v.   Garner     (Miss.),     51    So.    273 

though    liable    for    not    stopping  (1910). 

when  signaled,  the  street  car  com-  A  person  signaling  a  train  to  stop 

panies   do   not   accept   persons   as  between  stations  is  not  entitled  to 

passengers  while  in  the  street.    See  protection.     Georgia  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 

Donavan  v.  Hartford  St.  Ry.  Co.,  v.  Robinson,  68  Miss.  643,  10  So. 

65  Conn.  201,  32  Atl.  350  (1894),  60  (1891). 

and  Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.  v.  3  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lanning, 

O'Brien,  219  111.  303,  76  N.  E.  341  83  Miss.  161,  33  So.  970  (1903). 
(1906). 

[354] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  412 

gas  or  electricity,  may  require  the  applicant  to  make  a 
regular  application  in  such  form  as  the  company  may 
prescribe.1  This  will  be  required  to  be  in  writing  almost 
invariably  so  as  to  have  certainty  as  to  the  requirements; 
and  the  application  must  be  made  with  sufficient  par- 
ticularity.2 But  like  other  conditions,  this  may  be  found 
to  have  been  waived  in  particular  cases.  Thus  in  one  of 
the  leading  cases  it  was  held  that  in  an  action  for  dam- 
ages for  refusal  to  supply  the  plaintiff  with  gas,  the  com- 
pany could  not  set  up  as  a  defense  the  fact  that  such 
application  was  not  in  writing,  when  its  superintendent 
had,  by  agreeing  that  the  plaintiff  should  have  gas  after 
he  had  signed  the  rules  and  regulations,  waived  the 
regulation  that  the  application  should  be  in  writing.3 
The  company  cannot  require  the  applicant  to  subscribe 
to  unreasonable  regulations,  such  as  that  there  shall 
be  access  to  these  premises  at  all  hours,4  nor  to  illegal 
stipulations  such  as  that  the  company  shall  not  be  liable 
for  defects  in  the  service.5  Indeed  it  is  doubtful  whether 
they  can  require  the  applicant  to  enter  into  a  real  con- 
tract at  all,  the  applicant  having  the  inherent  right  to 
the  service  irrespective  of  contract.6 

§  412.  Use  of  telegraph  blanks. 
It  is  not  enough  to  tender  a  message  to  a  telegraph 

1  California. — Price  v.  Riverside  North  River  Electric  Co.,  53  N.  Y. 

L.  &  I.  Co.,  56  Cal.  431  (1880).  Supp.  810,  24  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  671 

Kansas.— Shiras    v.    Ewing,    48  (1898). 

Kans.  170,  29  Pac.  320  (1892).  3  Shephard    v.    Milwaukee    Gas- 

Louisiana.— -State    v.    New    Or-  light  Co.,  11  Wis.  234  (1860). 

leans  Gaslight  Co.,  108  La.  67,  32  4  Shepard  v.  Milwaukee  Gaslight 

So.  179  (1902).  Co.,  6  Wis.  539,  70  Am.  Dec.  479 

Tennessee.— Watauga  Water  Co.  (1858). 

v.  Wolfe,  99  Term.  429,  41  S.  W.  B  Dittmar  v.  City  of  New  Braun- 

1060,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  841  -(1897).  fels,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  293,  48  S.  W. 

"Bennett  v.  East  Chester  Gas-  1114(1899). 

light  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  74,  66  •  San  Diego  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Sharp, 

N.  Y.  Supp.  292  (1900);  Andrews  v.  97  Fed.  394,  38  C.  C.  A.  220  (1899). 

[355] 


§412] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


company  with  the  request  for  its  transmission,  although 
of  course  one  must  show  this  at  least.1  One  will  be  met 
by  the  usual  requirement  by  telegraph  companies  that 
all  messages  tendered  to  them  for  transmission  shall  be 
in  writing  upon  their  own  blanks  provided  for  the  pur- 
pose. 2  It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  companies  may  make 
the  use  of  this  blank  a  condition  precedent,3  provided, 
that  they  make  this  requirement  generally  known.4 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  plain,  upon  general  principles, 
that  the  company  may  waive  the  requirement.5  Thus, 
if  the  message  is  received  by  the  operator  on  an  ordinary 
piece  of  paper  from  a  person  not  knowing  of  this  rule, 
and  the  charges  for  transmission  are  paid,  the  company 
will  be  responsible  for  duly  transmitting  it; 6  but  it  may 


1  Georgia. — Planters'  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  v.  Western  Union  Teleg.  Co., 
126  Ga.  621,  55  S.  E.  495,  6  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1180  (1906). 

Mississippi. — Western  Union  Tel. 
Co.  v.  Dozier,  67  Miss.  288,  7  So. 
325  (1889);  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Liddell,  68  Miss.  1,  8 
So.  510  (1890). 

2 This  is  discussed  in: — 

Georgia. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Waxelbaum  Co.,  113 
Ga.  1017,  39  S.  E.  443,  56  L.  R.  A. 
741  (1901). 

Maryland. — United  States  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Gildersleve,  29  Md. 
232,  96  Am.  Dec.  519  (1868). 

3  United  States. — Primrose  v. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  154 
U.  S.  1,  38  L.  ed.  883,  14  S.  Ct.  1098 
(1893). 

Alabama. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Wilson,  93  Ala.  32,  9 
So.  414,  30  Am.  Rep.  23  (1891). 

Mississippi. — Western  Union  Tel- 
egraph Co.  v.  Dozier,  67  Miss.  288, 

[356] 


7  So.  325  (1889);  Cumberland  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Sanders, 
83  Miss.  357,  35  So.  653  (1904). 

4  Michigan. — Garland  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  118  Mich. 
369,  76  N.  W.  762,  14  L.  R.  A.  280, 
74  Am.  St.  Rep.  394  (1898). 

Texas. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Shumate,  2  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  429,  21  S.  W.  109  (1893). 

6  The  company  cannot  insist  upon 
subscription  to  an  improper  clause : — 

Georgia. — Mathis  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  94  Ga.  338, 
21  S.  E.  564,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  167 
(1894). 

South  Dakota. — Kirby  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  4  So.  Dak. 
105,  55  N.  W.  759,  30  L.  R.  A.  612, 
46  Am.  St.  Rep.  765  (1893). 

8  United  States. — Beasley  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  39  Fed. 
181  (1889). 

Alabama. — Harris  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  121  Ala.  519, 
25  So.  910, 77  Am.  St.  Rep.  70  (1889). 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  412 

be  otherwise  if  the  sender  knows  of  the  regulations  upon 
the  regular  blanks,  some  cases  holding  him  subject  to  the 
usual  stipulations  although  his  message  is  upon  plain 
paper.1  Particularly  difficult  to  deal  with  are  questions 
which  arise  when  the  message  is  given  to  the  operator 
orally.  If  the  sender  authorizes  the  agent  to  reduce  the 
message  to  writing  and  sign  it,  or  if  he  understood  that 
the  agent  would  do  so  and  then  transmit  it,  the  agent  is 
the  agent  of  the  sender  for  the  purpose  of  writing  and 
signing  the  message,2  but  if  the  agent  accepts  the  oral 
message  and  agrees  to  transmit  it  without  requiring 
that  it  shall  be  reduced  to  writing,  the  agent  is  defend- 
ant's agent.3  Very  recently  this  law  has  been  subject  to 
severe  test  by  the  custom  of  telephoning  messages  to  tele- 
graph offices.  And  although  it  is  still  held  that  the  com- 
pany may  theoretically  insist  upon  written  messages,4  still 
if  it  is  receiving  telephoned  messages  in  the  regular  course 
of  its  business  this  condition  will  be  held  to  be  waived.5 

Mississippi. — Western  Union  Tel-  Indiana. — Western   Union  Tele- 

egraph  Co.  v.  Jones,  69  Miss.  658,  graph  Co.  v.  Buchanan,  35  Ind.  429, 

13  So.  471,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  579  9  Am.  Rep.  744  (1871). 

(1892).  2  Compare  Western  Union  Tele- 

New  York.— Pearsall  v.  Western  graph  Co.  v.  Foster,  64  Tex.  220,  53 

Union  Telegraph  Co.,   124  N.  Y.  Am.  Rep.  754  (1885),  with  Gulf,  C. 

256,  26  N.  E.  534,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Geer,  5  Tex.  Civ. 

662  (1891).  App.  349,  24  S.  W.  86  (1893). 

Texas. — Anderson     v.     Western  'See  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  84  Tex.  17,  Co.  v.  Sanders  (Ind.),  79  N.  E.  406 
19S.W.  285  (1892);  Western  Union  (1906),  and  Western  Union  Tele- 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Broesche,  72  Tex.  graph  Co.  v.  Dozier,  67  Miss.  288,  7 
654,  10  S.  W.  734  (1889);  Western  So.  325  (1889). 
Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Arwine,  3  *  United  States. — Bank  of  Have- 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  156,  22  S.  W.  105  lock  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 
(1893);  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  141  Fed.  522,  72  C.  C.  A.  580, 
Co.  v.  Hinkle,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  518,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  181  (1905). 
22S.W.  1004  (1893).  Illinois—  People      v.      Western 

1  Alabama.— Western  Union  Tele-  Union  Tel.  Co.,  166  111.  15,  46  N.  E. 

graph  Co.  v.  Henderson,  89  Ala.  510,  731,  36  L.  R.  A.  637  (1897). 

7  So.  419  (1889).  6  Indiana.— Western  Union  Tele- 

[357] 


§413 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


Topic  D.  Service  Must  Be  Demanded  in  Proper  Manner 

§  413.  Goods  must  be  tendered  properly  packed. 

That  a  carrier  may  refuse  to  receive  goods  for  car- 
riage unless  they  are  properly  packed,  is  clear  enough.1 
Indeed  he  must  so  refuse  or  take  the  risk  from  the  im- 
proper packing.2  Thus  an  express  company  need  not 
receive  furniture  not  protected,3  chickens  not  crated,4 
jugs  not  boxed  5  or  money  not  sealed.6  But  the  require- 
ments of  the  carrier  as  to  packing  must  be  reasonable;  he 
cannot  reject  a  package  on  this  ground  if  it  is  in  fact 
reasonably  safe  for  shipment.7  These  principles  come  into 
play  when  one  carrier  tenders  goods  in  bad  condition  to 
another  carrier  for  further  transportation.  The  carrier 
to  whom  such  goods  are  tendered  may  refuse  them  alto- 


graph  Co.  v.  Todd,  22  Ind.  App. 
701,  54  N.  E.  446  (1899). 

Michigan. — Garland  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  118  Mich. 
369,  76  N.  W.  762,  14  L.  R.  A.  280, 
74  Am.  St.  Rep.  394  (1898). 

Pennsylvania. — Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Stevenson,  128  Pa. 
St.  442, 18  Atl.  441, 15  Am.  St.  Rep. 
687  (1889). 

Texas.— Texas  Telegraph  &  Tele- 
phone Co.  v.  Seiders,  9  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  431,  29  S.  W.  258  (1895). 

1  Alabama. — Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Rice  (Ala.),  52  So.  918 
(1910). 

Missouri. — Knight  v.  Quincy,  D. 
&  K.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  Mo.  App. 
311  (1906). 

1  United  States.— The  David  & 
C.,  5  Blatch.  266  (1865). 

Alabama. — Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Rice  (Ala.),  52  So.  918 
(1910). 

[358] 


Illinois.— Elgin,  J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Bates  Machine  Co.,  200  111.  636, 
66  N.  E.  326,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  218 
(1903). 

England. — Munster  v.  South 
Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 
676,  27  L.  J.  C.  P.  308  (1858). 

3  Union  Express  Co.  v.  Graham, 
26  Ohio  St.  595  (1875). 

4  Cohn  v.  Platt,  48  N.  Y.  Misc. 
378,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  535  (1906). 

6Vicksburg  L.  &  T.  Co.  v. 
United  States  Exp.  Co.,  68  Miss. 
149,  8  So.  332  (1890). 

6  Fitzgerald    v.    Adams    Express 
Co.,  24  Ind.  447,  87  Am.  Dec.  341 
(1865).     See  also  St.  John  v.  Ex- 
press Co.,  1  Woods,  612  (1871). 

7  Bluthenthal    v.    Southern    Ry. 
Co.,  84  Fed.  920  (1898).    See  gen- 
erally, Duncan  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.   Co.   (No.  Dak.),  118  N.  W. 
826  (1908). 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT 


§414 


gether  l  or  may  demand  an  indemnity  from  the  tendering 
carrier  before  accepting  them.2 

§  414.  Freight  loaded  by  shipper. 

The  same  thing  is  true  where  freight  is  improperly 
loaded  on  a  car  by  the  shipper.  In  general  the  loading 
and  unloading  of  goods  are  under  the  carrier's  control 
and  he  is  responsible  for  any  injury  incident  thereto. 
Primarily,  it  should  be  noted,  it  is  the  carrier's  business 
to  load  his  vehicles.  A  railroad  cannot  usually  require 
a  shipper  to  put  his  goods  upon  the  cars  himself.3  If  the 
shipper  assumes  the  responsibility  of  loading  and  unload- 
ing the  carrier  is  thereby  relieved  from  liability  for  loss 
in  that  connection.4  But  if  the  improper  loading  was 
apparent  to  the  carrier's  servant  from  ordinary  observa- 
tion the  carrier  will  be  liable.5  The  carrier  must  decline 


1  Buston    v.    Pennsylvania    Ry. 
Co.,  116  Fed.  235  (1902). 

2  Missouri    Pacific    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Weisman,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  86,  21 
S.  W.  426  (1893). 

3  London  &   L.   F.   Ins.   Co.   v. 
Rome,  W.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  144  N.  Y. 
200,  39  N.  E.  79  (1894). 

However  to  get  car  load  rates 
the  shipper  must  usually  load  the 
car  himself;  and  so  where  a  car 
packed  for  through  shipment  is 
condemned  in  transit  the  connect- 
ing carrier  may  refuse  to  take  the 
shipment.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Cook  &  L.,  4  Ga.  App.  698  (1908). 

4  Alabama. — McCarthy  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  ^  Co.,  102  Ala.  193, 
14  So.  370,  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  29 
,(1893). 

Illinois. — Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Kenwood  Bridge  Co.,  170  111.  645, 
49  N.  E.  215  (1897). 

Massachusetts. — Loveland          v. 


Burke,  120  Mass.  139,  21  Am.  Rep. 
507  (1876). 

New  York. — Jackson  Architec- 
tural Works  v.  Hurlbut,  158  N.  Y. 
34,  52  N.  E.  665,  70  Am.  St.  Rep. 
432  (1899). 

Texas.— Gulf,  W.  T.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Wittnebert,  101  Tex.  368, 
108  S.  W.  150,  130  Am.  St.  Rep. 
858  (1908). 

Vermont. — Ross  v.  Troy  &  B. 
R.  R.  Co.,  49  Vt.  364,  24  Am.  Rep. 
144  (1877). 

Wisconsin. — Miltimore  v.  Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Wis.  190 
(1875). 

England. — Richardson  v.  North 
Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  75 
(1872). 

5  Illinois.— Elgin,  J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Bates  Machine  Co.,  200  111.  636, 
66  N.  E.  326,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  218 
(1903). 

Minnesota. — Calender  v.  Vander- 

[359] 


§415] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


to  accept  it  or  else  he  will  be  responsible  for  its  safety 
if  he  takes  it  without  properly  protecting  it.1 

§  416.  Special  freight  may  require  special  tender. 

Although  in  general,  freight  of  all  kinds  may  be  for- 
warded from  the  regular  freight  stations,  still  there  are 
special  kinds  of  freight  that  require  special  handling.  A 
lucid  exposition  of  this  exception  may  be  found  in  Harp 
v.  Choctaw,  Oklahoma  &  Gulf  Railroad,2  these  reasons 
being  given  by  Thayer,  Circuit  Judge:  "It  is  manifest,  we 
think  (indeed,  so  manifest  that  we  might  almost  take 
judicial  notice  of  the  fact),  that  no  railroad  constructed 
through  extensive  coal  fields  and  engaged  in  transporting 
coal  to  market  could  for  any  considerable  period  follow 
the  practice  of  setting  out  cars  on  its  station  side  tracks, 
some  distance  from  the  place  where  coal  is  mined,  and 
permitting  coal  to  be  hauled  thence  by  wagons  and  loaded 


hoof  Co.,  99  Minn.  295,  109  N.  W. 
402  (1905). 

New  York. — Ames  v.  Fargo,  114 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  666,  99  N.  Y.  Supp. 
994  (1906). 

North  Dakota. — Duncan  v.  Gt. 
Northern  R.  R.  Co.  (N.  D.),  118 
N.  W.  826  (1908). 

Ohio. — Union  Express  Co.  v. 
Graham,  26  Ohio  St.  595  (1895). 

Texas. — International  &  Gt.  No. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Dwight  &  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  100  S.  W.  1011  (1907). 

1  United  States.— Hannibal  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Swift,  12  Wall.  262,  20  L.  ed. 
423  (1870). 

Alabama. — Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Rice  (Ala.),  52  So.  918 
(1910).  , 

Oregon. — Goodman  v.  Oregon 
Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  22  Oreg.  14,  28 
Pac.  894  (1892). 

Wisconsin. — Miltimore    v.    Chi- 

[360] 


cago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Wis. 
190  (1875). 

Where  shipper  loads  a  car  prop- 
erly upon  a  station  track  according 
to  directions  the  railroad  must  take 
the  car.  Currie  v.  Railroad  Co.,  135 
N.  C.  535,  47  S.  E.  654  (1904). 

Where  shipper  loads  goods  in  a 
different  car  from  the  one  desig- 
nated he  cannot  require  that  the  car 
shall  go  forward.  Weisinger  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  129  Ky.  592,  112 
S.  W.  660,  33  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1038 
(1908). 

2 125  Fed.  445,  61  C.  C.  A.  405 
(1903). 

But  note  in  the  318^  Tons  of 
Coal,  14  Blatch.  453,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  14,010  (1878),  it  was  held  that 
a  railroad  might  not  compel  ship- 
pers to  use  its  force  of  shovelers  in 
loading  coal  into  the  buckets  of  its 
conveyor  on  its  terminal  wharf. 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  416 

into  the  cars  by  the  slow  process  of  shoveling.  The  use- 
less consumption  of  time,  and  the  additional  expense 
incident  to  the  handling  of  the  commodity  in  question, 
in  large  quantities,  in  that  primitive  manner,  would 
occasion  great  public  loss  and  inconvenience,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  loss  sustained  by  the  carrier,  and  the 
serious  manner  in  which  that  method  of  handling  coal 
would  interfere  with  the  movement  of  its  trains  and  the 
transaction  of  its  other  business."  This  decision  prob- 
ably goes  too  far.  It  is  true  that  a  railway  may  make  a 
lower  rate  to  those  shippers  of  coal  who  furnish  their  own 
facilities  for  loading  coal  in  so  economical  a  manner  as 
by  a  tipple.1  But  it  would  seem  that  the  railroads  must 
receive  for  transportation  at  reasonable  rates,  also,  coal  or 
any  other  commodity  usually  carried  in  bulk  at  its  stations 
from  wagons. 

§  416.  Service  upon  fungible  basis. 

A  very  difficult  problem  of  public  service  law  must 
soon  come  up  for  solution  now  that  the  pipe  lines  have 
been  made  common  carriers.2  It  is  obvious  that  if  the 
very  same  oil  is  to  be  delivered  to  the  consignee  that  is 
accepted  from  the  consignor,  the  unit  of  service  must  be 
very  large  to  fill  up  a  long  section  of  pipe  line,  many 
thousands  of  gallons,  as  the  pipe  line  companies  are  main- 
taining in  their  original  schedules.  But  is  it  necessary  in 
dealing  with  fungibles  to  insist  that  they  shall  be  kept 
separate  from  the  mass?  In  the  case  of  the  elevation  of 
grain  this  mixture  is  the  usual  practice; 3  and  there  would 

1  Illinois  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  yards  are  so  congested  that  ordinary 

People,    19    111.    App.    141    (1886).  shippers  cannot  be  given  room. 

And  in  Choctaw,  O.  &  G.  R.  R.  2  See  West  Virginia  Transporta- 

Co.  v.  State,  73  Ark.  373,  84  S.  W.  tion  Co.  v.  Volcanic  O.  &  C.  Co.,  5 

502  (1904),  it  was  held  that  prefer-  W.  Va.  382  (1872). 

ence  could  be  given  shippers  from  *  See  Hannah  v.  People,  198  111. 

private    tipples   when    the    freight  77,  64  N.  E.  776  (1902). 

[3611 


§  417  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

seem  to  be  no  reason  why  it  should  not  be  the  same  in 
handling  oil. 

§  417.  Proper  conditions  imposed  upon  installation. 

A  service  company  may  impose  regulations  upon  the 
making  of  connections  with  its  system.  Thus,  it  is  ob- 
vious that  a  water  company  may  make  the  conditions 
upon  which  its  pipes  shall  be  tapped.  An  applicant  who 
wishes  water  cannot  unearth  the  main  and  drill  a  hole 
in  the  pipe,  but  the  company  must  be  consulted  as  to  the 
methods  by  which,  and  as  to  the  persons  by  whom  these 
connections  shall  be  made.  There  is  a  case  in  Missouri 1 
which  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  company  may  desig- 
nate a  certain  style  of  hydrant,  or  cut-off,  as  the  only 
one  which  shall  be  used.  If  there  are  others  equally 
efficient,  it  may  seem  that  this  requirement  is  unreason- 
able. And  there  is  a  case  in  Kentucky,2  which  goes  to 
the  other  extreme  by  saying  that  a  water  company  can- 
not dictate  as  to  what  plumbers  may  be  employed  to  tap 
then*  pipes  and  make  connections,  holding  that  no  proper 
plumbers  may  be  excluded  from  this  work.  A  Louisiana 
case  holds  that  it  is  proper  to  require  the  applicant  to 
produce  a  certificate  from  some  reputable  plumber  that 
the  work  has  been  properly  done.3  If  the  company  in- 
sists upon  doing  the  work  it  involves  itself  in  obligations; 
thus  a  New  York  case  holds  that  where  a  gas  company 
insisted  upon  making  all  connections  between  house 
mains  and  the  pipes,  it  was  bound  to  a  proper  degree 
of  care  in  performing  that  duty.4 

1  State  v.  Goodfellow,  1  Mo.  App.          4  Bastian  v.  Keystone  Gas  Co.,  50 
495  (1876).  N.  Y.  Supp.  537,  27  App.  Div.  584 

2  Franke  v.  Paducah  Water  Sup-      (1898). 

ply  Co.,  88  Ky.  467,  11  S.  W.  432,  Written  permission  to  make  con- 

4  L.  R.  A.  265  (1889).  nections  may  be  waived.    Citizens' 

3  State  v.  New  Orleans  Gaslight  Gas  &  O.  Co.  v.  Whipple,  32  Ind. 
Co.,  108  La.  67,  32  So.  179  (1902).  App.  203,  69  N.  E.  557  (1904). 

[362] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT        [  §§  418, 419 

§  418.  Premises  must  be  properly  prepared. 

The  obligation  of  a  supplying  company  is  to  bring  the 
supply  to  the  premises  of  the  applicant.  The  company 
must  itself  provide  all  the  facilities  requisite  to  the  per- 
formance of  the  service  it  offers.  But  the  applicant  must 
have  his  premises  properly  equipped  to  receive  service. 
It  follows  that  the  company  cannot  usually  dictate  as  to 
the  installation  which  the  customer  may  have  for  his  own 
utilization  of  the  supply  sold;  but  this  is  subject  to  the 
condition  that  nothing  installed  by  the  customer  shall 
affect  the  service  of  the  company.  Thus,  although  a  gas 
company  cannot  dictate  as  to  the  style  of  fixtures  the 
occupant  may  install,  it  may  insist  that  no  governor 
shall  be  put  in  so  near  the  meter  as  to  affect  its  reading.1 
So  although  an  electric  company  may  not  dictate  as  to 
the  kind  of  lamps  that  the  householder  may  use,  it  may 
refuse  to  supply  current  where  the  wiring  is  found  to  have 
defective  connections,  making  possible  fires  for  which 
claims  might  be  made  against  it.2 

§  419.  Conditions  imposed  must  be  reasonable. 

The  general  principle  must  be  taken  as  established 
beyond  dispute  by  the  authorities  discussed  in  this  chap- 
ter that: 3  "In  the  absence  of  statutory  interposition  and 
regulation,  the  carrier  is  entitled  to  establish  and  pro- 
mulgate reasonable  rules  and  regulations  governing  the 
manner  and  form  in  which  it  will  receive  such  articles  of 
commerce  as  it  is  bound  to  carry,  as  well  as  the  manner 
in  which  they  shall  be  packed  and  prepared  for  shipment, 

1  Blondell   v.    Consolidated    Gas  a  substantial  quotation  from  United 
Co.,  89  Md.  732,  43  Atl.  817,  46  L.  States  ex  rel.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav. 
R.  A.  187  (1899).  Co.,  159  Fed.  975  (1908). 

2  Benson  v.  American  llluminat-  See  also  the  language  in  Platt  v. 
ing   Co.,    102    N.    Y.  Supp.    206  Lecocq,  158  Fed.  723,  730,  85  C.  C. 
(1907).  A.  621,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  558 

3  What  follows  in  this  sentence  is  (1907). 

[363] 


§  420  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

so  that  they  may  be  handled  with  convenience,  safety 
and  dispatch;  and  it  follows  as  a  corollary  to  such  author- 
ity that  the  carrier  has  also  the  power  to  alter  or  modify 
such  rules  from  time  to  time,  as  it  may  deem  proper  and 
expedient,  upon  reasonable  notice  to  the  public,  so  that 
interested  parties  may  be  apprised  of  what  is  required 
when  seeking  service  at  the  hands  of  such  carrier."  l 

§  420.  Improper  conditions  cannot  be  imposed. 

On  the  other  hand  improper  conditions  may  not  be 
imposed  even  by  regulation.  In  one  of  the  leading  cases 
to  this  effect  the  Federal  court2  said:  "A  common  car- 
rier is  under  an  obligation  to  accept,  within  reasonable 
limits,  ordinary  goods  which  may  be  tendered  to  him 
for  carriage  at  reasonable  times,  for  which  he  has  accom- 
modation. The  carrier  cannot  generally  discriminate 
between  persons  who  tender  freight,  and  exclude  a  par- 
ticular class  of  customers.  The  railroad  company  could 
not  establish  the  rule  that  it  would  receive  coal  only 
from  certain  barge  owners,  or  from  a  particular  class  of 
barge  captains.  It  carries  for  all  people  indifferently. 
But,  while  admitting  this  duty,  the  company  has  declared 
that  for  the  convenience  of  the  public,  and  in  order  to 
transport  coal  more  expeditiously,  and  to  avoid  delays, 
it  will  receive  such  coal  only,  from  barges  at  its  wharf, 
as  shall  be  delivered  through  the  agency  of  laborers 
selected  by  the  company.  This  rule  is  a  restriction  upon 
its  common  law  obligation.  The  carrier,  on  its  part,  is 
bound  to  receive  goods  from  all  persons  alike.  The  duty 
and  the  labor  of  delivery  to  the  carrier  is  imposed  upon 
the  barge  owner,  who  pays  for  the  necessary  labor.  The 

1  Robinson   v.    Baltimore   &   O.  Choctaw,  O.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  C. 

R.  R.  Co.,  64  C.  C.  A.  281,  129  Fed.  C.  A.  405,  125  Fed.  445  (1903). 
753  (1904),  is  relied  upon.  »  318^  Tons  of  Coal,  14  Blatch. 

See  also  the  language  in  Harp  v.  453,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  14,014  (1878). 

[364] 


CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  [  §  420 

service,  so  far  as  the  shoveling  is  concerned,  is  performed, 
not  upon  the  property  of  the  railroad  company,  but 
upon  the  deck  of  the  vessel.  The  company  is  virtually, 
saying  to  the  barge  owner,  you  shall  employ  upon  your 
own  property,  in  the  service  which  you  are  bound  to 
tender,  and  for  which  you  must  pay,  only  the  laborers 
whom  we  designate,  and,  though  our  general  duty  is  to 
receive  all  ordinary  goods  delivered  at  reasonable  times, 
we  will  receive  only  those  goods  which  may  be  handled 
by  persons  of  our  selection.  The  law  relating  to  car- 
riers has  not  yet  permitted  them  to  impose  such  limita- 
tion upon  the  reception  or  acceptance  of  goods."  l 

1  See  also  Crouch  v.  L.  &  N.  W.      Beadell   v.   Eastern   Counties  Ry. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  C.  B.  255  (1859);  and      Co.,  2  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  509  (1854). 


[365] 


CHAPTER  XIII 

PREPAYMENT  AS   A   CONDITION 

§  430.  Payment  as  a  condition. 

Topic  A.  Prepayment  May  Be  Required 

§  431.  Prepayment  made  a  condition. 

432.  Compensation  due  upon  acceptance. 

433.  Service  partially  completed  before  demand. 

434.  Deposit  required  when  charges  are  undetermined. 

435.  Whether  different  treatment  constitutes  discrimination. 

436.  Security  required  for  reply  telegram. 

437.  Security  for  additional  charges. 

Topic  B.  Sufficiency  of  Tender 
§  438.  What  is  proper  tender. 

439.  Denomination  of  money  tendered. 

440.  Reasonable  time  to  produce  payment. 

441.  Tender  must  be  in  proper  currency. 

442.  Waiver  of  prepayment. 

443.  Conduct  dispensing  with  tender. 

Topic  C.  The  Unit  of  Service 

§  444.  Public  service  upon  a  unit  basis. 

445.  Company  cannot  insist  upon  more  than  one  unit. 

446.  The  journey  as  a  single  unit. 

447.  Forfeiture  of  right  to  original  journey. 

448.  Effect  of  outright  repudiation. 

449.  Present  unit  distinguished  from  past  unit. 

Topic  D.  Payment  of  Arrearages  Demanded 
§  450.  Payment  for  previous  carriage  not  required. 

451.  Payment  of  arrearages  not  generally  required. 

452.  Cases  requiring  payment  of  arrearages. 

453.  Applicant  in  default  at  other  premises. 

454.  Payment  of  collateral  claims  cannot  be  demanded. 

455.  Cannot  urge  another's  default. 

456.  No  requirement  to  pay  arrears  of  predecessors. 

457.  Assumption  of  predecessor's  arrears. 

458.  Cannot  shut  off  service  for  disputed  arrearages. 

459.  Character  of  the  dispute. 

460.  Waiver  of  right  to  refuse. 

[366] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION    [  §§  430,  431 

§  430.  Payment  as  a  condition. 

Although  one  who  engages  himself  in  public  employ- 
ment is  bound  to  serve  all  who  apply,  it  is  necessarily  upon 
the  condition  that  he  may  demand  in  advance  his  reason- 
able charge  for  the  service  required.  This  was  often  re- 
marked in  the  early  cases;  in  one,  Hussey,  C.  J.,  said  that 
"a  victualler  shall  be  compelled  to  sell  his  victual  if  the 
vendee  has  tendered  him  ready  payment,  otherwise  not. 
Quod  Brian,  C.  J.,  affirmavit."  1  This  principle  is  so 
obvious  that  it  hardly  ever  is  brought  in  question  in  mod- 
ern cases.  But  the  court  thought  it  necessary  to  remind 
counsel  in  one  case  2  that  even  the  declaration  of  Constitu- 
tion, that  railways  within  the  State  are  public  highways, 
does  not  authorize  one  to  ride  on  a  train  without  payment 
of  fare.  A  service  is  certainly  public  although  compensa- 
tion is  required.3  "All  have  rights;  each  pays  in  propor- 
tion to  his  use;  and  some  are  excluded  because  of  their 
inability  to  pay;  nevertheless  it  remains  a  public  use  so 
long  as  all  persons  have  the  same  measure  of  right  for  the 
same  measure  of  money."  It  may  be  added  that  the  fact 
that  a  company  has  given  a  supply  gratuitously  in  the 
past  does  not  oblige  the  company  to  continue  to  do  so.4 

Topic  A.  Prepayment  May  Be  Required 

§  431.  Prepayment  made  a  condition. 

Of  the  right  to  demand  payment  before  undertaking 
the  service  requested,  there  can  be  no  doubt.  The  car- 
rier of  goods  may  in  all  cases  insist  upon  the  payment  of 
his  charges  when  the  goods  are  tendered  to  him.5  Even 

1  Y.  B.  10  H.  VII,  8,  pi.  14  (1494).  from  Evergreen  Cemetery  Associa- 
See  also  Y.  B.  39  H.  VI,  18,  pi.  24,  tion  v.  Beecher,  53  Conn.  551,  5 
per  Danby,  J.  Atl.  353  (1885). 

2  Farber  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  4  Borough  of  Carlisle  v.  Carlisle  G. 
Co.,  116  Mo.  81,  22  S.  W.  631,  20  &  Water  Co.  (Pa.),  4  Atl.  179  (1886). 
L.  R.  A.  350  (1893).  &  /Winozs.— Galena,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 

3  The  quotation  which  follows  is  Rae,  18  111.  488,  68  Am.  Rep.  574 

[367] 


§431] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


if  he  is  a  connecting  carrier  to  whom  the  goods  are  brought 
by  the  initial  carrier  with  the  idea  that  the  consignee  shall 
ultimately  pay,  he  may  insist.1  So  the  carrier  of  passen- 
gers may  make  it  a  condition  of  accepting  a  passenger 
for  carriage  that  the  fare  be  paid  in  advance,2  or  that  a 
ticket  shall  be  purchased  and  presented.3  Similarly  an 


(1857);  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
Frankenburg,  54  111.  88,  5  Am.  Rep. 
92  (1870). 

Michigan. — Fitch  v.  Newberry,  1 
Doug.  1,  40  Am.  Dec.  33  (1843). 

North  Carolina. — Randall  v.  Rich- 
mond &  D.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  C.  612, 
13  S.  E.  137  (1891). 

Pennsylvania. — Shipper  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.  Co.,  47  Pa.  St.  338 
(1864). 

Vermont. — Wilder  v.  St.  Johns- 
bury  &  L.  C.  R.  Co.,  66  Vt.  636,  30 
Atl.  41  (1894). 

England.— Wyld  v.  Pickford,  8 
M.  &  W.  443  (1841);  -  -  v. 
Jackson,  Peake's  Add.  Cas.,  185 
(1800). 

1  United  States.— Little  Rock  & 
M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
So.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Fed.  400  (1894); 
Southern  Ind.  Exp.  Co.  v.  United 
States  Exp.  Co.,  92  Fed.  1022,  35 
C.  C.  A.  172  (1899). 

Missouri. — Pearce  v.  Wabash  R. 
R.,  89  Mo.  App.  437  (1901). 

North  Carolina. — R  a  n  d  a  1 1  v. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  C. 
612  (1891). 

Texas. — Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Weisman,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  86, 
21  S.  W.  426  (1893). 

2  United  States. — Boylan  v.  Hot 
Springs  R.  Co.,  132  U.  S.  146,  33 
L.  ed.  290,  10  Sup.  Ct.  50  (1889). 

California. — Tarbell    v.    Central 

[  368  ] 


Pac.  R.  R.,  34  Cal.  616  (1868);  Nye 
v.  Marysville  &  Y.  C.  S.  R.  R.,  97 
Cal.  461,  32  Pac.  530  (1893). 

Illinois. — Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Whittemore,  43  111.  420,  92  Am. 
Dec.  138  (1867). 

Kansas. — South  Kansas  Ry.  v. 
Hinsdale,  38  Kans.  507,  16  Pac.  937 
(1888). 

New  York. — Elder  v.  Interna- 
tional Ry.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  Supp.  880 
(1910). 

*  Illinois. — Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 
v.  Loutham,  80  111.  App.  579 
(1898). 

Indiana.— Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L. 
R.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Vandyne,  57  Ind. 
576,  26  Am.  Rep.  68  (1877). 

Maryland. — Northern  Central 
Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Connor,  76  Md.  207, 
24  Atl.  449,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  442 
(1892). 

Michigan. — Van  Dusan  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  Co.,  97  Mich.  439,  56  N. 
W.  848,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  354  (1893). 

Minnesota. — Dickennan  v.  St. 
Paul  Union  Depot  Co.,  44  Minn. 
433,  46  N.  W.  907  (1890). 

Nebraska. — Burlington  &  M.  R. 
R.  R.  v.  Rose,  11  Neb.  177,  8  N.  W. 
433  (1881). 

New  York. — Corwin  v.  Long 
Island  R.  R.  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  City  Ct. 
106  (1885). 

Ohio.— Cleveland,  C.  &  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Bartram,  11  Ohio  St.  457  (1860). 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [  §  432 

innkeeper  has  a  right,  if  he  chooses,  to  demand  payment 
of  his  charges  in  advance  before  he  receives  the  guest.1 
By  the  same  principles,  a  telephone  user  must  pay  in  ad- 
vance the  usual  charge  made  for  the  regular  period  of 
filling  prevailing  2  and  a  patron  at  a  pay  station  must  pay 
the  charge  for  the  connection  as  required.  So  tender  of 
charges  must  accompany  a  demand  for  water  service,  es- 
pecially where  the  tap  service  is  asked  which  can  be  com- 
puted in  advance.3  Without  going  into  more  details  at 
present,  the  general  rule  may  be  repeated  that  in  all  cases 
the  service  company  may  refuse  to  act  until  payment  is 
forthcoming. 

§  432.  Compensation  due  upon  acceptance. 

Should  the  service  be  undertaken  without  demand  for 
payment,  the  whole  compensation  nevertheless  is  due 
immediately.  Thus  one  who  is  accepted  as  a  guest  at 
an  inn  then  subjects  himself  to  the  presentment  of  a  bill 
from  that  moment.4  It  is  upon  this  general  principle 

Texas. — International,  etc.,  R.  3  Alabama. — Hieronymus  Bros.  v. 

Co.  v.  Goldstein,  2  Tex.  App.  Civ.  Bienville  Water  Supply  Co.,  131 

Gas.  274  (1884).  Ala.  447,  31  So.  31  (1901). 

Vermont. — Harris  v.  Stevens,  31  Maine. — Robbins  v.  Bangor  R. 

Vt.  79,  73  Am.  Dec.  337  (1858).  &  E.  Co.,  100  Me.  496,  62  Atl.  136, 

1  England.— Fell  v.  Knight,  8  M.  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  963  (1905). 

&  W.  269,  10  L.  J.  Ex.  277,  5  Jur.  New    York—  People    v.    N.    Y. 

554  (1841);  Mulliner  v.  Florence,  3  Suburban   Water   Co.,    56    N.    Y. 

Q.  B.  D.  484,  47  L.  J.  Q.  B.  700,  38  Supp.  364,  38  App.  Div.  413  (1899). 

L.  T.  167,  26  W.  R.  385  (1878).  Tennessee.— Harbison    v.    Knox- 

2  Louisiana. — Malochee     v.     Gt.  ville  Water  Co.  (Tenn.  Chan.  App.), 
Southern  Telephone  &  T.  Co.,  49  53  S.  W.  993  (1899). 

La.  Ann.  1690,  22  So.  922  (1897).  4  New  York.— Smith  v.  Keys,  2 

Montana.— Ashley      v.       Rocky  Thomp.  &  C.  650  (1874). 

Mountain  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  25  England. — Medawar     v.     Grand 

Mont.  286,  64  Pac.  765  (1901).  Hotel,  2  Q.  B.  11,  60  L.  J.  Q.  B.  209, 

Nebraska—  Buffalo  County  Tele-  64  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  851,  55  J.  P.  614 

phone  Co.  v.  Turner,  82  Neb.  841,  (1891). 

118  N.  W.  1064,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  Canada—  Doyle   v.    Walker,    26 

693  (1908).  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  502  (1867). 

24  [  369  ] 


§  433  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

that  a  conductor  who  at  first  collects  too  little  from  his 
passenger  may  return  upon  discovering  it,  and  demand 
the  immediate  payment  of  the  balance.1  But  it  has  been 
held  that  where  a  conductor  with  full  knowledge  of  the 
facts  has  once  accepted  what  is  given  by  the  passenger 
as  full  satisfaction,  he  cannot  later  eject  him  for  his  re- 
fusal to  pay  more.2  That  the  payment  is  due  from  the 
beginning  of  the  service  is  further  shown  by  those  cases 
which  hold  it  proper  to  charge  those  who  do  not  pay 
promptly  an  additional  amount,  even  when  bills  are  ren- 
dered in  advance  of  the  performance  of  the  service.3 

§  433.  Service  partially  completed  before  demand. 

It  not  infrequently  happens  that  a  person  has  received 
part  of  his  service  before  the  price  is  demanded  and  he  is 
sometimes  dishonest  enough  to  attempt  to  get  the  re- 
mainder of  the  service  upon  payment  for  the  remainder. 
That  this  attempt  is  illegal  should  be  plain.  A  passen- 
ger who  refuses  to  pay  the  whole  fare  may  thereupon  be 
ejected,  although  he  is  willing  to  pay  fare  from  the  inter- 
mediate point  at  which  it  is  discovered  that  he  has  not 
paid.4  Upon  this  general  principle  here  involved,  a  serv- 

1  Georgia. — Coyle  v.  Southern  Ry.          Washington. — Tacoma  Hotel  Co. 
Co.,  112  Ga.  121, 37  S.E.  163(1900).      v.  Tacoma  Light  &  Water  Co.,  3 

Iowa.— Hoffman  v.  Denver  &  N.  Wash.  316,  28  Pac.  516,  14  L.  R.  A. 

W.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  Iowa,  342  (1879).  669,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  35  (1891). 

Minnesota. — Wardwell    v.     Chi-  Canada. — Attorney    General    of 

cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  46  Minn.  Canada  v.  City  of  Toronto,  23  Can. 

514,  49  N.  W.  206,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  Sup.  514  (1892). 

246(1891).  4  Alabama. — Manning    v.    Louis- 

New    York.— Elder    v.    Interna-  ville  &  N.  R.  R.,  95  Ala.  392,  11  So. 

tional  Ry.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  Supp.  880  8,  16  L.  R.  A.  55,  36  Am.  St.  Rep. 

(1910).  225  (1891). 

2  Louisville,  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  v.  Arkansas. — Kansas  City  Ry.  v. 
Joplin,  21  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1380,  55  Holden,  66  Ark.  602,  53  S.  W.  45 
S.  W.  206  (1900).  (1899). 

3  Alabama. — Hieronymus  v.  Bien-  Georgia. — Coyle  v.  Southern  Ry. 
ville  Water  Co.,  131  Ala.  447,  31  Co.,    112  Ga.   121,   37  S.  E.   163 
So.  31  (1901).  (1900). 

[370] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [  §  434 

ice  company  which  has  not  been  paid  on  the  first  day 
of  the  quarterly  period  may  insist  upon  payment  for  the 
whole  period  whenever  its  collector  comes  for  it.1  It  is 
different  in  the  case  of  goods  which  have  been  accepted 
without  demand  for  payment.  The  cases  hold  that  if 
transportation  is  undertaken  without  demanding  prepay- 
ment, payment  may  not  be  required  again  until  the  time 
comes  for  delivery.2  This  is  because  the  acceptance  of 
the  goods  upon  the  basis  that  charges  are  to  be  paid  by 
the  consignee  evidences  a  contract  to  that  effect.  This 
seems  to  be  the  law  in  the  analogous  case  of  a  telegraph 
message  at  first  received  on  the  basis  that  the  charges 
are  to  be  collected  from  the  addressee.3 

§  434.  Deposit  required  when  charges  are  undetermined. 

In  respect  to  many  services  it  will  be  seen  that  the  rule 
in  its  simple  form  that  payment  for  the  service  asked 
must  be  made  in  advance  is  not  workable,  for  it  cannot 
be  known  in  advance  how  much  service  will  be  taken. 
This  is  particularly  true  of  measured  service  whether  gas, 
water,  electricity  or  telephone, — to  name  four  prominent 
instances  of  this  situation.  The  happy  solution  of  this 
problem  has  been  to  permit  these  companies  to  demand 
a  reasonable  deposit  in  advance  to  cover  expected  supply. 

New  Jersey.— Jersey  City  R.  R.  S.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  R.,  53  Mo.  317,  14 

Co.  v.  Morgan,  52  N.  J.  L.  60,  18  Am.  Rep.  457  (1873). 

Atl.  904  (1889).  New  York.— Leach  v.  New  York, 

1  Alabama. — Hieronymus  v.  Bien-  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Hun,  377, 

ville  Water  Co.,  131  Ala.  447,  31  So.  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  305  (1895). 

31  (1901).  England.— Barnes  v.  Marshall,  18 

Pennsylvania.— Tyrone     Gas     &  Q.  B.  785  (1852). 

Water  Co.  v.  Burley,  19  Pa.  Super.  J  Alabama. — Western  Union  Tele- 

Ct.  348  (1902).  graph  Co.  v.  Cunningham,  99  Ala. 

1  Indiana.— Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  314,  14  So.  579  (1892). 

R.  Co.  v.  Diether,  10  Ind.  App.  206,  Texas.— Western     Union     Tele- 

37  N.  E.  39,  1069,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  graph  Co.  v.  Snodgrass,  94  Tex.  284, 

385  (1894).  60  S.  W.  308,  86  Am.  St.  Rep.  851 

Missouri. — Davis  v.  Kansas  City,  (1901). 

[371] 


§  435  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

As  to  what  a  reasonable  amount  is,  there  are  but  few  de- 
cisions.1 A  small  minunum  deposit  is  always  reasonable — 
$5.00  is  usual.  But  larger  sums  may  be  demanded  when 
the  circumstances  warrant  it.  Thus  it  was  held  in  the 
leading  case  2  that  a  hotel  which  used  about  $60.00  worth 
of  gas  a  week  might  be  required  to  deposit  $100.  The 
court  thought  that  the  company  might  either  require  a 
personal  guaranty  or  an  actual  deposit.  In  either  case 
the  condition  was  said  to  be  a  reasonable  one.  The  facts 
in  this  case  give  the  clue  to  the  basis  upon  which  reason- 
ableness is  predicated;  for  it  seems  clear  that  the  amount 
of  deposit  which  may  be  required  is  what  would  ordi- 
narily be  sufficient  to  cover  the  expected  use  in  the  usual 
period  for  which  bills  are  rendered. 

§  435.  Whether  different  treatment  constitutes  discrimi- 
nation. 

It  is  apparently  established  beyond  question  as  to  com- 
mon carriers  that,  as  no  one  has  a  right  to  have  service 
without  prepayment,  there  can  be  no  complaint  made 
if  some  are  given  service  without  requiring  prepayment 
of  them,  while  others  are  obliged  to  pay  in  advance.3  The 

1  Williams  v.  Mutual  Gas  Co.,  52  Missouri. — Vanderberg    v.    Kan- 
Mich.  499,  18  N.  W.  236,  50  Am.  sas  City  Missouri  Gas  Co.,  126  Mo. 
Rep.  266  (1884).  App.  600  (1907). 

2  In  the  following  cases  the  pro-  New    York. — Ford    v.    Brooklyn 
priety  of  requiring  a  deposit  was  Gaslight  Co.,  3  Hun,  621   (1875); 
recognized:  Bennett    v.    Eastchester    Gaslight 

Idaho.— Bardsly  v.  Boise  Irr.  &  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  74,  66  N. 

Land  Co.,  8  Idaho,  155,  67  Pac.  428  Y.    Supp.    292    (1900);    Pollits   v. 

(1901).  Consolidated  Gas  Co.,  102  N.  Y. 

Kentucky.— Owensboro    Gaslight  Supp.  1017  (1907). 

Co.  v.  Hildebrand,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  Wisconsin. — Shepard  v.  Milwau- 

983,  42  S.W.  351  (1897).  kee  Gaslight  Co.,  6  Wis.  539,  70 

Massachusetts. — Turner  v.  Revere  Am.  Dec.  479  (1858). 

Water  Co.,  171  Mass.  329,  50  N.  E.  »  Randall  v.  Railroad,  108  N.  C. 

634,  40  L.  R.  A.  657,  68  Am.  St.  612,  13  S.  E.  137  (1891);  Brown  & 

Rep.  432  (1898).  B.  Coal    Co  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 
[372] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION 


[§435 


cases  go  so  far  as  to  hold  a  carrier  not  liable  for  demanding 
prepayment  of  freight  for  goods  addressed  to  certain 
consignees  while  accepting  goods  addressed  to  other  con- 
signees without  prepayment.1  And  this  law  will  appar- 
ently hold  good  as  to  the  other  public  services,  notwith- 
standing certain  recent  cases  which  are  still  difficult  to 
reconcile  with  it.  In  an  Arkansas  case  2  it  was  held  lately 
that  requiring  one  subscriber  to  come  to  the  central  office 
and  prepay  toll  charges  while  customarily  giving  credit  by 
monthly  bills  to  other  subscribers,  was  illegal.  This  may 
be  so,  because  he,  as  a  subscriber,  was  not  furnished  resi- 
dence service  of  the  same  sort  that  other  subscribers  en- 
joyed. Again,  in  a  late  Kentucky  case  3  the  court  was 
indignant  because  certain  lighting  companies  were  requir- 


Co.,  159  Mich.  565,  124  N.  W.  528 
(1910). 

Consequently  a  carrier  may  take 
goods  from  one  connecting  carrier 
with  which  it  is  closely  allied,  not 
only  not  demanding  its  charges 
in  advance,  but  also  advancing  to 
the  preceding  carrier  the  accrued 
charges  while  refusing  both  favors 
to  a  rival  connection.  Little  Rock 
&  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Fed.  400  (1894); 
Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  63  Fed.  775, 
11  C.  C.  A.  417  (1894);  Southern 
Indiana  Exp.  Co.  v.  United  States 
Exp.  Co.,  92  Fed.  1022,  35  C.  C.  A. 
172  (1899);  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Miami  S.  S.  Co.,  86  Fed.  407,  30 
C.  C.  A.  142  (1898). 

1  Gamble-Robinson  Commission 
Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
168  Fed.  161,  94  C.  C.  A.  217 
(1909). 

There  may  be  prepay  stations  at 
which  the  carrier  delivera  freight  to 


the  consignee  directly,  and  without 
the  intervention  of  a  local  agent, 
and  to  which  consequently  consign- 
ments are  accepted  only  upon  the 
condition  of  charges  for  transporta- 
tion being  prepaid  by  the  shipper. 
Bird  v.  Railroads,  99  Tenn.  719,  63 
Am.  St.  Rep.  856  (1897). 

2  Yancey  v.  Batesville  Telephone 
Co.,   81   Ark.   487,   99  S.  W.   679 
(1907).     See  also  State  v.  Kinloch 
Telephone  Co.,  93  Mo.  App.  349,  67 
S.  W.  684  (1902). 

3  Owensboro     Gaslight     Co.     v. 
Hildebrand,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  983,  42 
S.  W.  351  (1897);  Long  v.  Spring- 
field Water  Co.,  8  Del.  Co.  (Pa.)  151 
(1901). 

But  by  some  cases  the  companies 
are  allowed  discretion  in  deciding 
whether  it  is  necessary  to  require 
deposit.  Turner  v.  Revere  Water 
Co.,  171  Mass.  329,  50  N.  E.  634, 
40  L.  R.  A.  657,  68  Am.  St.  Rep. 
432  (1898);  Phelan  v.  Boone  Gas 
Co.  (Iowa),  125  N.  W.  208  (1910). 

[373] 


§  436  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

ing  a  deposit  of  some  of  their  customers  but  not  of  others. 
This  may  again  be  correct,  because  the  requirement  of  a 
deposit  obliging  the  customer  to  pay  for  services  he  is  to 
receive  in  the  future  would  be  beyond  the  rights  of  the 
service  company,  were  it  not  brought  about  by  a  reason- 
able regulation;  and  to  be  reasonable  it  is  usually  held 
that  a  regulation  must  be  uniform. 

§  436.  Security  required  for  reply  telegram. 

A  striking  illustration  of  this  right  to  demand  a  deposit 
to  cover  services  which  will  probably  be  required  is  to  be 
seen  in  the  matter  of  reply  telegraph  service.  Of  course 
the  telegraph  company  may  require  prepayment  for  a 
message.  But  is  it  a  reasonable  regulation  that  persons 
sending  messages  which  ask  for  answers  must  deposit  the 
regular  amount  chargeable  for  a  reply  message?  1  In  sup- 
porting this  requirement  the  leading  case  2  said:  "We  are 
unable  to  perceive  anything  unreasonable  in  the  by-law 
under  examination.  A  person  who  sends  another  a  mes- 
sage, and  asks  an  answer,  promises  by  fair  and  just  impli- 
cation to  pay  for  transmitting  the  answer.  It  is  fairly 
inferable  that  the  sender  who  asks  an  answer  to  his  mes- 
sage will  not  impose  upon  the  person  from  whom  he  re- 
quests the  answer  the  burden  of  paying  the  expense  of  its 
transmission.  The  telegraph  company  has  a  right  to 
proceed  upon  this  natural  inference  and  to  take  reasonable 
measures  for  securing  legal  compensation  for  its  services. 
It  is  not  unnatural,  unreasonable  or  oppressive  for  the 
telegraph  company  to  take  fair  measures  to  secure  pay- 
ment for  services  rendered,  and  in  requiring  a  transient 

1  Langley  v.  Western  Union  Tele-          2  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co. 

graph  Co.,  88  Ga.  777,  15  S.  E.  291  v.  McGuire,  104  Ind.  130,  2  N.  E. 

(1892).    See  further  Western  Union  201,  54  Am.  Rep.  296  (1885).    See 

Telegraph  Co.  v.  Dubois,  128  111.  further  Hewlett  v.  Western  Union 

248,  21  N.  E.  4,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  109  Telegraph  Co.,  28  Fed.  181  (1886). 
(1889). 

[374] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [  §§  437,  438 

person  to  deposit  the  amount  legally  chargeable  for  an 
ordinary  message,  it  does  no  more  than  take  reasonable 
measures  for  securing  compensation  for  transmitting  the 
asked  and  expected  message." 

§  437.  Security  for  additional  charges. 

This  particular  problem  of  charges  comes  up  in  another 
form  as  to  the  transmission  of  telegrams.  As  the  usual 
charge  only  includes  the  delivery  of  a  telegram  within  the 
established  free  delivery  limits  at  the  point  of  destination, 
it  is  proper  for  the  company  to  make  additional  charges 
for  delivery  outside  these  limits.  If  it  is  known  to  the 
parties  at  the  time  of  transmission  that  the  addressee 
lives  outside  these  limits,  it  is  reasonable  to  require  an 
additional  amount.1  But  a  regulation  of  a  company  re- 
quiring the  sender  of  a  telegram  to  pay  in  advance  charges 
for  the  delivery  of  the  message  in  case  the  addressee  lives 
beyond  its  free-delivery  limits,  irrespective  of  whether  the 
distance  of  the  addressee's  residence  from  the  station  is 
known,  is  held  to  go  beyond  what  is  reasonable.2 

Topic  B.  Sufficiency  of  Tender 

§  438.  What  is  proper  tender. 

Much  of  the  usual  law  of  tender  holds  good  in  this 
matter.  Thus  a  mere  willingness  on  the  part  of  a  pas- 
senger to  pay  the  fare,  unaccompanied  by  a  tender  or 
act  calculated  to  suggest  such  willingness  to  the  conductor, 
is  not  sufficient  to  place  the  conductor  in  the  wrong  in 

1  Kentucky—  Western  Union  Tele-      510,  7  So.  419,  18  Am.  St.  Rep. 
graph  Co.  v.  Mathews,  107  Ky.  663,       148  (1889). 

55  S.  W.  427  (1900).  Texas.— Anderson     v.     Western 

Texas. — Western     Union     Tele-  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  84  Tex.  17, 

graph  Co.  v.  Warren  (Tex.),  36  S.  19  S.  W.  285  (1892);  Western  Union 

W.  314  (1896).  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Ayers  (Tex.),  93 

2  Alabama—  Western  Union  Tele-  S.  W.  199  (1906). 
graph  Co.  v.  Henderson,   89  Ala. 

[375] 


§  438  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

ejecting  the  passenger.1  Moreover,  this  tender  must  be 
kept  good  in  order  to  keep  the  company  in  default,  as 
was  held  in  the  case  of  an  applicant  for  water  service  who 
had  once  tendered  the  requisite  charges.2  So  also  a  tele- 
phone subscriber  must  bring  his  payment  to  the  office  of 
the  company  and  cannot  complain  that  the  custom  of 
the  company  to  send  out  a  collector  has  been  abandoned.3 
And  a  withholding  of  the  money  until  change  shall  be 
given  prevents  it  from  being  a  proper  tender.4  Despite 
these  analogies  the  payment  in  advance  of  compensation 
to  a  company  is  not  the  payment  of  a  debt,  but  the  sat- 
isfaction of  a  reasonable  condition.  A  debtor  must  make 
legal  tender  of  the  exact  amount  due,  but  a  passenger 
paying  his  fare  may  tender  a  greater  amount  and  de- 
mand change,  provided  it  is  a  reasonable  demand.5  As 
payment  is  simply  the  satisfaction  of  a  condition  prec- 
edent, not  the  performance  of  a  contractual  obligation,  it 
makes  no  difference  by  whom  the  tender  is  made.  Thus 
when  strangers  offer  to  pay  fare  for  a  person  who  is  about 
to  be  ejected  the  conductor  must  desist.6 

1  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  James,  82  It  would    seem    that    readiness 
Tex.  306,  18  S.  W.  589,  15  L.  R.  A.  should  be  enough  as  payment  and 
347    (1891).     But  a  tender  made  acceptance  should  be  simultaneous 
protesting  is  good.    Atchison,  T.  &  acts.    Tarbell  v.  Central  Pacific  R. 
S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Roberts,  3  Tex.  Civ.  R.  Co.,  31  Cal.  616  (1868). 

App.  370,  22  S.  W.  183  (1893).  •  Of  these  cases  cited  in  the  next 

2  Baker  v.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.,  section,  see  particularly  Barrett  v. 
141  Cal.  710,  75  Pac.  342  (1904).  Market  St.  Ry.  Co.,  81  Cal.  296,  22 
Therefore  a  tender  withdrawn  goes  Pac.  859,  6  L.  R.  A.  336,  15  Am.  St. 
for  nothing.     Western  Union  Tele-  Rep.  61  (1889). 

graph  Co.  v.  Power,  93  Ga.  543,  21  6  United  Stales. — Missouri  K.  & 
S.  E.  51  (1894).  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  152  Fed.  608 

3  Magruder  v.  Cumberland  Tele-      (1907). 

phone  &  T.  Co.,  92  Miss.  716,  46  Indiana.— Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R. 

So.  404,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  560  Co.  v.  Norris,  17  Ind.  App.  189,  46 

(1908).  N.  E.  554  (1896). 

4  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Indian   Territory.— Missouri,   K. 
Cottengim   (Ky.),   104  S.  W.  280  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  6  Ind.  Terr. 
(1907).  99,  89  S.  W.  668  (1905). 

[376] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [  §  439 

§  439.  Denomination  of  money  tendered. 

What  denomination  of  money  it  will  be  reasonable  to 
require  a  conductor  to  change  has  been  considered  in 
several  cases.  In  several  cases  it  has  been  held  reasonable 
to  tender  five  dollars  for  a  five-cent  street-car  fare.1  On 
the  other  hand,  a  tender  of  a  five-dollar  bill  in  a  street  car 
has  been  held  unreasonable  where  a  regulation  of  the 
company  required  the  conductors  to  furnish  change  only 
for  two-dollar  bills,  no  custom  to  change  larger  bills  being 
shown.2  The  reasons  for  such  limitations  are  well  set 
forth  in  the  New  York  case,  by  Mr.  Justice  Bartlett: 
"In  the  case  at  bar  the  reasonableness  of  the  rule  estab- 
lished by  the  defendant  is  obvious.  In  a  large  city  like 
New  York  the  round  trip  of  a  car  of  any  street  line  means 
a  very  considerable  number  of  fares  paid  in,  and  the 
necessity  for  the  conductor  to  carry  and  pay  out  a  large 
amount  of  small  change.  When  the  defendant  enacted 
the  rule  requiring  its  conductors  to  furnish  change  to  a 
passenger  to  the  amount  of  two  dollars  it  did  all  that  could 
reasonably  be  expected  of  it  in  consulting  the  convenience 
of  the  general  public,  and  it  would  be  unreasonable  and 

Missouri.— Randall   v.   Chicago,  Co.  v.  Wilkerson,  117  Term.  482,  99 

R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  102  Mo.  App.  S.  W.  992,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  579 

342,  76  S.  W.  493  (1903).  (1907). 

New     York. — O'Brien     v.     New  2  Georgia. — Wynn  v.  Georgia  Ry. 

York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  N.  Y.  &  El.  Co.,  6  Ga.  App.  77,  64  S.  E. 

236  (1880).  278  (1909). 

Pennsylvania. — Ham  v.  Delaware  New    York. — Barker    v.    Central 

&  H.  C.  Co.,  142  Pa.  St.  617,  21  Park  N.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  151  N.  Y. 

Atl.  101  (1891).  237,  45  N.  E.  550,  35  L.  R.  A.  489, 

Tennessee.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  626  (1896). 

Co.  v.  Garrett,  8  Lea,  438,  41  Am.  Pennsylvania. — Muldowney       v. 

Rep.  640  (1881).  Pittsburg  &  B.  Tr.  Co.,  8  Pa.  Super. 

1  California.— Barrett  v.  Market  Ct.  335,  43  W.  N.  C.  52  (1898). 

Street  Ry.  Co.,  81  Cal.  296,  22  Pac.  South  Carolina. — Funderburg  v. 

859,  6  L.  R.  A.  336,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  Augusta  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  81  S.  C.  141, 

61  (1889).  61  S.  E.  1075,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

Tennessee.— Knoxville     Traction  868  (1908). 

[377] 


§  440  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

burdensome  to  extend  the  amount  to  five  dollars.  It 
would  require  conductors  to  carry  a  large  amount  of  bills 
and  small  change  on  their  persons,  and  greatly  impede 
the  rapid  collection  of  fares."  Fundamentally  it  is  all  a 
question  of  the  amount  of  change  required.  Thus,  a 
tender  of  a  twenty-five  dollar  bill  to  pay  a  fare  of  one  dollar 
and  twenty-five  cents  is  obviously  unreasonable  1  while 
a  tender  of  fifteen  dollars  for  freight  charges  of  fourteen 
dollars  and  eighty-five  cents  is  plainly  reasonable.2 

§  440.  Reasonable  time  to  produce  payment. 

It  seems,  however,  that  before  breaking  off  the  negotia- 
tion for  service  the  applicant  should  be  given  a  reasonable 
time  to  produce  payment.3  Thus  a  passenger  should  be 
given  a  fair  opportunity  to  search  his  pockets  for  a  ticket 
or  get  at  his  money.4  But  of  course  one  cannot  ask  the 
conductor  to  wait  a  while  until  he  gets  ready  to  pay  and 
until  he  can  decide  whether  he  will  pay  or  not.5  It  would 

1  Fulton  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.,  17  P.  Ry.  Co.,  102  Mo.  App.  342,  76 
Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  428  (1859).  S.  W.  493  (1903). 

2  Houston  E.   &  W.   T.   Ry.   v.          North  Carolina.— Brooks  v.  Sulli- 
Campbell,  91  Tex.  551,  45  S.  W.  2,  van,  129  N.  C.  190,  39  S.  E.  822 
43  L.  R.  A.  225  (1898).  (1901). 

1  Connecticut. — Maples  v.  New  Texas. — International  &  Gt.  No. 

York  &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Conn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilkes,  68  Tex.  617,  5 

557,  9  Am.  Rep.  434  (1871).  S.  W.  491  (1887). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  *  Illinois. — Chicago  &  A.  R.  R. 

Co.  v.  Willard,  31  111.  App.  435  Co.  v.  Willard,  31  111.  App.  435 

(1888).  (1888). 

Michigan. — Ferguson  v.  Michi-  New  York. — Huba  v.  Schenectady 

gan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  98  Mich.  533,  57  Ry.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  199,  83 

N.  W.  801  (1894).  N.  Y.  Supp.  157  (1903). 

Mississippi. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  North  Carolina. — Clark  v.  Wil- 

Co.  v.  Maybin,  66  Miss.  83,  5  So.  mington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  N.  C. 

401  (1889).  506,  49  Am.  Rep.  647  (1884). 

Missouri. — Bolles  v.  Kansas  City  Texas. — International  &  Gt.  N. 

So.  Ry.  Co.,  134  Mo.  App.  696  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilkes,  68  Tex.  617,  5 

(1909);  Randall  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  S.  W.  491,2  Am.  St.  Rep.  515  (1887). 

'  California. — Nye  v.  Marysville 

[378] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION 


[§441 


seem  that  unusual  patience  ought  to  be  used  in  dealing 
with  incapable  persons.1  By  the  authorities  one  judges 
that  it  would  not  be  safe  for  the  conductor  not  to  permit 
the  passenger  to  seek  friends  upon  the  train.2  And  per- 
haps the  conductor  ought  to  accept  a  bill  as  security 
while  the  search  is  proceeding.3 

§  441.  Tender  must  be  in  proper  currency. 

The  company  must  accept  legal  tender  4  or  whatever 
passes  as  current  in  the  community.5  If  a  tender  of  proper 
currency  is  made,  the  official  refuses  it  at  his  peril.  Thus, 
if  he  rejects  a  bill  or  coin  as  counterfeit,  or  a  coin  as  too 
much  worn  and  the  money  is  found  to  be  in  fact  good, 
the  carrier  is  liable  for  the  wrongful  ejection,  if  he  puts  a 
passenger  off  under  such  circumstances.6  But  a  refusal 

&  Y.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  461,  32 
Pac.  530  (1893). 

Canada. — Fulton  v.  Grand  Trunk 
Ry.  Co.,  17  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  428 
(1858).  See  also  Thomas  v.  Geldart, 
20  New  Br.  (4  Pug.  &  B.)  95  (1880). 

1  In  Louisville,  N.  &  Gt.  So.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Fleming,  14  Lea  (Tenn.),  128 
(1884),  it  was  held  that  a  conductor 
was  under  no  obligation  to  himself 
search  for  a  ticket  in  the  pockets  of 
an  old  colored  man  whose  hands 
were  partly  paralyzed. 

But  in  Ferguson  v.  Michigan 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mich.  533,  57 
N.  W.  801  (1894),  a  person  subject 
to  chronic  drowsiness,  being  ejected 
without  sufficient  efforts  to  arouse 
him,  the  company  was  held  liable. 

"North  Carolina. — Clark  v.  Wil- 
mington &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  N.  C. 
506  (1884). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Bunn,  41  Tex.  Civ.  App.  503 
(1908) 

1  Kentucky. — Anderson  v.  Louis- 


ville &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Ky.  344, 
120  S.  W.  298  (1909). 

North  Carolina. — Knowles  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  102  N.  C.  59  (1889). 

4  Lewis  v.  New  York  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  49  Barb.  330  (1867).    But 
see  Tarbell  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.,  31  Cal.  616  (1868). 

5  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wisdom,  5  Heisk,  125  (1871).    But 
see  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Garrett,  8  Lea  (Tenn.),  438,  41  Am. 
Rep.  194  (1887). 

6  Alabama. — Mobile   St.    Ry.    v. 
Watters,   135  Ala.  227,  33  So.  42 
(1902). 

Georgia. — Atlanta  Consol.  St.  Ry. 
v.  Keeny,  99  Ga.  266,  25  S.  E.  629, 
33  L.  R.  A.  824,  and  note  (1896). 

Missouri. — Breen  v.  St.  Louis  Tr. 
Co.,  102  Mo.  App.  479,  77  S.  W.  78 
(1903). 

New  Jersey. — Jersey  City  &  B.  R. 
R.  v.  Morgan,  52  N.  J.  L.  60,  18 
Atl.  904,  52  N.  J.  L.  558,  21  Atl. 
783  (1889). 

[379] 


§  442  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

to  carry  one  who  presents  a  mutilated  note  is  justifiable, 
although  it  could  be  redeemed,  for  the  applicant  cannot 
cast  upon  the  carrier  the  redemption  of  it.1  And  a  ticket 
so  defaced  as  to  be  in  part  illegible  may  be  refused.2  Of 
course  the  official  can  refuse  to  take  the  applicant's  jewelry 
or  other  valuables  either  in  payment  or  as  security  for 
payment.3 

§  442.  Waiver  of  prepayment. 

The  necessity  of  tender  may  be  and  often  is  generally 
waived  in  practice.  Thus  if  the  inn  is  open  and  the  trav- 
eler enters  and  makes  his  desire  to  become  a  guest  known 
to  the  innkeeper,  the  latter  must  request  a  tender  if  he 
means  to  insist  upon  it  as  a  condition  of  receiving  a  guest.4 
And  generally  where  prepayment  is  commonly  waived, 
the  company  must  expressly  demand  it.5  But  in  any  case 
payment  for  service  can  never  be  demanded  on  credit 
as  a  right,  no  matter  how  common  such  a  practice  may 
have  been.6  Even  in  a  case  of  a  telephone  company 
which  for  years  had  given  patrons  a  month's  credit  by 

Wisconsin. — Vassau  v.    Madison  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Connor,  76  Md.  207, 

E.  Ry.,  106  Wis.  301,  82  N.  W.  152  24  Atl.  449,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  442 

(1900).  (1892). 

A  passenger  who  has  innocently  3  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith 

purchased  a  ticket  with  counterfeit  (Tex.),  84  S.  W.  852  (1905). 

money  may  be  ejected.     Memphis  4  Fell  v.  Knight,  8  M.  &  W.  269, 

&  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chastine,   54  10  L.  J.  Ex.  277,  5  Jur.  554  (1841); 

Miss.  503  (1877).  Pinchon's  Case,  9  Coke,  87  (1611); 

1  North  Hudson  County  Ry.  Co.  Rex    v.    Ivens,  7   Car.  &  P.  213 
v.  Anderson,  61  N.  J.  L.  248,  39  Atl.  (1835). 

905,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  703  (1898).  6  Delaware.— Reed  &  Walker  v. 

A  ticket  is  valid  although  torn  if  Phil.,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Houst. 

the  pieces  fit  together  into  a  com-  176  (1865). 

plete  ticket.    Young  v.  Central  of  Illinois. — Frink  v.  Schroyer,   18 

Georgia  Ry.  Co.,  120  Ga.  25,  47  S.  111.  416  (1857). 

E.  556  (1904).  Texas.— Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 

2  But  only  if  it  has  become  thus  Ry.    Co.    v.    Schmidt    (Tex.    Civ. 
illegible  in  the  hands  of  the  buyer—  App.),  25  S.  W.  452  (1894). 

not  if  it  was  thus  sold  him  by  the  6  Rome  &  Oswego  Road  Co.  v. 
ticket  agent.  Northern  Central  Stone,  62  Barb.  601  (1863). 

[380] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION 


§443 


the  system  upon  which  its  bills  were  rendered,  it  was  held 
that  it  might  by  a  mere  notice  require  a  particular  cus- 
tomer to  pay  in  advance.1  Where  the  waiver  is  plain  in 
a  particular  case  the  undertaking  has  of  course  begun 
without  the  condition  performed.  Thus  where  a  carrier 
accepts  a  passenger  or  goods  for  carriage  without  making 
demand  for  payment  he  is  liable  as  common  carrier  of  the 
passenger  or  goods  though  the  fare  or  freight  has  not  been 
paid.2  So  if  a  telegram  is  taken  with  the  understanding 
that  it  is  taken  collect,  the  company  is  bound  to  forward 
it  with  all  dispatch.3 

§  443.  Conduct  dispensing  with  tender. 

Certain  situations  are  free  from  difficulty.  If  the  com- 
pany has  repudiated  its  obligation  it  is  unnecessary  to  go 
further  and  make  tender.4 

1  Malochee  v.  Gt.  So.  Telephone 
&  T.  Co.,  49  La.  Ann.  1690,  22  So. 
922  (1897). 

2  United  Stales. — Mellquist  v.  The 
Wasco,  53  Fed.  546  (1892). 

Illinois. — Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  S. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  111  111.  App. 
234  (1903). 

Indiana. — Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Diether,  10  Ind.  App.  206, 
37  N.  E.  39,  1069,  53  Am.  St.  Rep. 
385  (1894). 

Iowa. — Russ  v.  Steamboat  Eagle, 
14  Iowa,  363  (1862). 

Mississippi. — Hurt  v.  Southern 
Ry.  Co.,  40  Miss.  391  (1966). 

Missouri.— Gratrot  St.  W.  Co.  v. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  124  Mo. 
App.  545,  102  S.  W.  11  (1907). 

North  Carolina.  —  Porter  v. 
Raleigh  &  G.  R.  Co.,  132  N.  C.  71, 
43  S.  E.  547  (1903). 

Texas.— Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Washington  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
30  S.  W.  719  (1895). 


Nor  need  a  tender  be  kept 

3  Alabama. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Cunningham,  99  Ala. 
314,  14  So.  579  (1892). 

Indiana. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Yopst,  118  Ind.  248,  3 
L.  R.  A.  224,  20  N.  E.  222  (1889). 

Texas. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Snodgrass,  94  Tex.  284, 
60  S.  W.  308,  86  Am.  St.  Rep.  851 
(1901). 

A  fortiori  this  is  true  when  pre- 
payment is  expressly  waived.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  O'Keefe 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W.  1137 
(1895). 

Where  a  telegraph  company  re- 
ceives payment  for  messages,  but 
sends  them  collect,  and  damages 
proximately  result  therefrom,  a  re- 
covery may  be  had.  Hall  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  51  So. 
(Fla.),  819  (1910). 

4  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Schmidt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  25  S. 
W.  452  (1894). 

[381] 


§  444  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

good  after  such  repudiation.1  So  if  excessive  payment  is 
demanded  no  tender  need  be  made  of  what  the  patron 
believes  to  be  a  reasonable  sum.2  Even  if  the  illegal  rates 
have  previously  been  submitted  to,  there  is  no  obligation 
to  pay  such  charges.3  Where  a  supply  company  has  fixed 
no  rates  it  cannot  insist  upon  a  definite  tender.4  And 
where  the  charges  to  be  made  for  a  shipment  cannot  as 
yet  be  ascertained  readiness  to  pay  is  enough.6 

Topic  C.  The  Unit  of  Service 

§  444.  Public  service  upon  a  unit  basis. 

One  applying  to  a  public  service  company  for  service 
is  not  altogether  free  to  determine  what  service  he  will 
have,  and  for  what  amount  of  service  he  will  pay.  It  is 
for  the  public  service  company  itself  hi  the  first  instance 
to  decide  upon  what  basis  it  will  render  service,  and  the 
decision  of  the  company  as  to  the  units  in  which  it  will 
provide  service  is  conclusive  unless  their  action  is  unrea- 
sonable. Thus  one  who  wishes  to  go  a  journey  cannot 
demand  the  right  to  pay  mile  by  mile,  but  the  company 
may  insist  that  he  pay  for  the  whole  journey  as  a  unit 
whenever  fare  is  demanded.  So  one  who  wishes  water 
for  irrigation  cannot  demand  a  day's  supply,  but  it 
may  be  insisted  that  he  shall  take  for  the  whole  season. 
In  these  two  instances  the  unit  insisted  upon  by  the 
company  is  the  natural  unit  of  service;  but  there  are  many 
instances  in  public  service  where  there  is  no  natural  unit, 
and  where,  therefore,  the  matter  is  left  to  the  decision  of 

1  Ashley  v.  Rocky  Mountain  Bell      City  of  Cleburne,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
Telephone  Co.,  25  Mont.  286,  64      141,  35  S.  W.  733  (1896). 

Pac.  765  (1901).  4  Bothwell  v.  Consumers'  Com- 

2  Harrison  Granite  Co.  v.  Penn-      pany,  13  Idaho,  568,  92  Pac.  533, 
sylvania  R.  Co.,  145  Mich.  712,  108      24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  485  (1907). 

N.  W.  1081  (1906).  •  Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

3  Cleburne  Water,  I.  &  L.  Co.  v.      Co.  v.  Wood  (Ind.  App.),  84  N.  E. 

1009  (1908). 
[382] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [  §  445 

the  company  unless  it  acts  outrageously.  Thus  it  would 
be  entirely  reasonable  for  the  company  to  fix  three  months 
as  the  unit  of  water  service; x  and  a  telephone  company  2 
may  fix  a  six  months'  period.  Considered  as  an  existing 
fact  the  unit  established  is  an  entirety;  payment  of  the 
whole  unit  must  be  tendered  in  order  to  be  in  a  position 
to  demand  any  service.  This  problem  may  well  be  dis- 
cussed here.  But  whether  the  established  unit  is  a  reason- 
able one  depends  upon  principles  governing  the  making  of 
rates  which  are  more  fully  developed  later;  and  discussion 
of  this  problem  is  therefore  postponed. 

§  445.  Company  cannot  insist  upon  more  than  one  unit. 
In  supplying  water  for  irrigation,  the  agricultural  sea- 
son seems  to  be  the  natural  unit  of  service  which  the  com- 
pany may  enforce  upon  the  applicant;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  company  may  not  require  the  applicant  to  en- 
gage to  take  a  supply  for  a  longer  period;  still  less,  as  the 
company  attempted  in  one  extreme  case,3  require  the 
applicant  to  pay  in  advance  for  more  than  one  season. 
The  demand  made  by  the  company  in  that  case  was  for 
the  applicant  to  pay  ten  dollars  per  acre  in  advance  for 
ten  years  and,  in  addition,  a  dollar  and  a  half  per  acre 
for  each  of  ten  years.  The  court  held  this  altogether  un- 
reasonable: "The  carrier  would  also,  under  counsel's  view, 
be  able  to  consummate  a  most  unreasonable  and  unjust 
discrimination.  B.  could  have  water  because  he  can  pay 
for  its  carriage  twenty  years  in  advance;  C.  could  not  have 

1  A  water  company  may  make  its  require  all  subscribers  to  pay  this 
unit  of  service  three  months  and  re-  rental  in  advance.    Buffalo  County 
quire  all  takers  to  pay  this  rate  in  Telephone  Co.  v.  Turner,  82  Neb. 
advance.      Harbison    v.    Knoxville  841,  118  N.  W.  1064,  19  L.  R.  A. 
Water  Co.  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.),  53  S.  (N.  S.)  693  (1908). 

W.  993  (1899).  3  Wheeler  v.  Northern  Colorado 

2  A  telephone  company  may  make      Irrigation  Co.,  10  Colo.  582,  17  Pac. 
its  unit  of  service  six  months  and      487,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  603  (1887). 

13831 


§  446  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

water  because  he  is  unable  to  pay  in  advance  for  its  car- 
riage beyond  a  season  or  two."  l 

§  446.  The  journey  as  a  single  unit. 

The  journey  for  which  a  passenger  has  a  right  to  be 
received  and  upon  which  he  enters  when  he  is  received, 
is  the  whole  transit  from  his  point  of  departure  to  his  des- 
tination; the  entire  journey  which  he  means  at  that  par- 
ticular time  to  take.  This  journey  is  a  single  unit  of  serv- 
ice; for  it  the  carrier  is  entitled  to  make  a  single  charge,2 
and  the  passenger  is  entitled  only  to  an  unbroken  car- 
riage.3 Neither  party  has  a  right  to  break  this  single  unit 
of  service  into  two.  For  the  reason  that  the  journey  is 
an  entirety,  the  ticket  with  which  a  passenger  pays  his 
fare  is  good  only  for  the  single  journey  on  which  the  pas- 
senger is  then  engaged.  It  is  good  for  any  journey  which 
is  included  within  its  terms;  thus  it  is  good  from  its  start- 
ing point  to  any  station  short  of  its  destination  or  from 
any  station  between  its  termini  and  the  point  of  destina- 
tion. If  presented  for  use  and  accepted  in  payment  of  fare 
it  is  at  once  used,  and  cannot  be  used  again.  That  the  one 
payment  is  for  the  whole  journey  well  appears  from  Auer- 
bach  v.  New  York  Central  &  Hudson  River  Railroad.4 
There  a  ticket  from  Buffalo  to  New  York  expired  on  the 

1  In  Watauga  Water  Co.  v.  Wolfe,      ton  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Met.  121,  45 
99  Tenn.  429,  41  S.  W.  1060,  63  Am.       Am.  Dec.  190  (1846). 

St.  Rep.  841  (1897),  it  was  held  that  New  Jersey. — State  v.  Overton, 

one  year  was  the  reasonable  unit  for  24  N.  J.  L.  435,  61  Am.  Dec.  671 

the  garden  sprinkling  service.  (1854). 

2  England.— London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Ohio.— Cleveland,  C.  &  C.  R.  R. 
Co.    v.    Hinchcliffe,    2    K.   B.  32  Co.  v.  Bartram,  11  Ohio  St.  457 
(1903).  (1860). 

Australia. — Davies    v.    William-  Pennsylvania. — Vankirk  v.  Penn- 

son,  21  New  South  Wales  L.   R.  sylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  66,  18 

(Law)  124  (1900).  Am.  Rep.  404  (1874). 

3  Massachusetts— Cheney  v.  Bos-  * 89  N.  Y.  281,  42  Am.  Rep.  290 

(1882). 

[384] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [  §  447 

26th  of  September,  and  the  bearer  took  the  train  for  New 
York  on  the  evening  of  that  day  and  his  ticket  was  called 
for  and  punched.  He  thus  paid  his  fare  for  the  whole 
journey  in  time,  although  the  train  did  not  reach  his 
destination  until  the  next  day.1 

§  447.  Forfeiture  of  right  to  original  journey. 

As  will  be  seen  the  penalty  accompanying  ejection  may 
be  the  forfeiture  of  the  right  to  pursue  the  original  jour- 
ney. In  most  cases  it  is  held  that  even  if  the  passenger 
who  has  refused  to  pay  properly  is  expelled  at  a  regular 
station  and  offers  to  pay  the  entire  fare,  he  cannot  demand 
further  carriage,  since  he  has  forfeited  his  right  to  be  car- 
ried on  that  journey.2  Where,  however,  the  passenger 
has  a  ticket  for  the  station  at  which  he  was  ejected,  but 
wrongfully  claimed  that  his  ticket  entitled  him  to  be  car- 
ried further,  he  has  been  held  entitled  to  take  the  train 
and  ride  on  to  his  destination  upon  paying  the  additional 
fare,3  if  the  train  did  not  stop  there  for  the  purpose  of 
ejecting  the  plaintiff  and  he  has  quietly  and  submissively 
yielded  to  expulsion. 

1  Morningstar  v.  Louisville  &  N.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  367,  5 
R.  R.  Co.,  135  Ala.  251,  33  So.  156,  N.  E.   37,    54  Am.  St.  Rep.   699 
(1902),  accord.  (1886). 

2  United  States. — Missouri,  K.  &  North   Carolina. — Clark   v.    Wil- 
T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  152  Fed.  608  mington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  N.  C. 
(1902).  506,  49  Am.  Rep.  647  (1884). 

Georgia. — Georgia  So.  &  Fla.  Ry.  Ohio. — Railroad  Co.  v.  Skillman, 

Co.  v.  Asmore,  88  Ga.  529,  15  S.  E.  39  Ohio  St.  444  (1883). 

13,  16  L.  R.  A.  53  (1891).  Tennessee.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

Iowa.— Hoffbauer  v.  O.  &  N.  W.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  8  Lea  (Term.),  438, 

R.  R.  Co.,  52  la.  342  (1879).  41  Am.  Rep.  640  (1881). 

Maryland. — Garrison    v.    United  3  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Ry.  &  E.  Co.,  97  Md.  347,  55  Atl.  Breckinridge,  99  Ky.  1,  34  S.  W. 

371,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  452  (1903).  702  (1896). 

New  Jersey. — State    v.     Camp-  See  also  Choctaw,  O.  &  G.  R.  R. 

bell,  32  N.  J.  L.  309  (1867).  Co.  v.  Hill,  110  Tenn.  396,  75  S.  W. 

New  York.— Pease  v.  Delaware,  963  (1903). 

25  [  385  ] 


§  448  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  448.  Effect  of  outright  repudiation. 

When,  however,  the  customer  alleging  no  reasonable 
grounds  repudiates  all  intention  of  ever  paying  what  the 
company  may  demand  it  is  obvious  that  such  a  person 
may  be  refused  further  service  so  long  at  least  as  that 
attitude  is  manifested.  This  is  well  brought  out  in  the 
quotation  from  a  recent  case  1  which  follows:  "No  past 
violation  of  contract  on  the  part  of  a  consignee  can  justify 
a  carrier  in  failing  to  discharge  a  present  duty.  But  in 
the  case  at  bar,  according  to  the  testimony  for  the  appel- 
lant, not  directly  denied  by  appellee,  appellee  not  only 
arbitrarily  refused  to  pay  demurrage  charges  which  had 
accrued  in  the  past,  but  expressed  his  intention  of  per- 
sisting in  his  refusal  even  should  such  charges  be  justly 
incurred  in  the  future.  If  this  be  true,  appellant  was 
warranted  in  its  refusal  to  further  switch  and  place  cars 
at  appellee's  warehouse.  By  delivering  the  cars  at  the 
warehouse  appellant  would  have  lost  its  hen,  and  could 
only  have  collected  its  charges  from  appellee  directly,  and 
he  had  already  evidenced  his  intention  of  not  paying.  We 
know  of  no  principle  of  law  under  which  anyone  can  an- 
nounce an  intention  of  not  paying  for  a  particular  service, 
and  still  rightfully  demand  that  such  service  shall  be 
rendered;  particularly  where  the  charge  for  such  service 
is  admitted  to  be  just  and  reasonable,  and  is  in  fact  paid 
by  all  others  who  enjoy  the  benefit  of  it."  2 


1  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa. — Mystic  Milling  Co.  v.  C., 
Searles,  85  Miss.  520,  37  So.  939,  68  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  131  Iowa,  10, 
L.    R.    A.    715    (1904).     See   also  107  N.  W.  943  (1906). 

Brown  v.  Interborough  R.  T.  Co.,  Maine. — Robbins  v.  Railway  Co., 

56  N.  Y.  Misc.  637, 107  N.  Y.  Supp.  100  Me.  496,  62  Atl.  136,  1  L.  R.  A. 

629  (1907).  (N.  S.)  963  (1905). 

2  To  much  the  same  effect  are:  Pennsylvania. — Smith   v.   Scran- 
California. — Fuller  v.  Azusa  Irri-  ton  Gas  &  Water  Co.,  5  Lack.  L. 

gating  Co.,  138  Cal.  204,  71  Pac.  98  News,  235  (1899). 
(1902). 

[386] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION    [  §§  449,  450 

§  449.  Present  unit  distinguished  from  past  unit. 

It  has  been  seen  that  as  to  the  particular  unit  of  service 
which  is  being  rendered  the  whole  payment  may  be  de- 
manded at  any  tune  during  the  service,  although  part 
has  already  been  performed.  It  has,  however,  seemed  to 
some  to  follow  that  payment  of  whatever  may  be  due 
from  the  applicant  may  be  demanded  at  any  time  and 
further  service  refused  if  full  settlement  is  not  made.  But 
as  the  general  principle  is  that  a  unit  of  service  is  indi- 
visible, so  different  units  of  service  should  be  regarded  as 
wholly  distinct.  It  may  be  granted  that  to  entitle  him- 
self to  any  service  the  applicant  must  pay  for  the  whole 
unit.  It  may  also  be  granted  that  an  applicant  who  has 
forfeited  his  right  to  the  present  service  must  apply  anew 
for  a  new  service. l  But  it  is  submitted  that  the  applicant 
is  entitled  to  present  service  upon  payment  for  the  pres- 
ent unit,  regardless  of  whether  he  owes  for  past  services.2 
And  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  to  refuse  future  service 
when  payment  is  offered  until  arrears  shall  be  paid  is,  for 
a  public  service  company,  illegal.  But  as  to  the  legality 
of  such  a  policy  there  is  a  surprising  conflict  of  authority. 
And  in  view  of  the  fundamental  character  of  the  problem, 
the  question  requires  the  detailed  discussion  which  it  re- 
ceives in  the  next  topic. 

Topic  D.  Payment  of  Arrearages  Demanded 

§  450.  Payment  for  previous  carriage  not  required. 

It  has  never  been  held  as  to  common  carriage  that  the 
payment  of  compensation  for  previous  carriages  can  be 

1  A  patron  of  a  railroad  who  has  2  A  subscriber  to  a  telephone  who 

forfeited  his  right  to  travel  by  sea-  has  been  cut  off  for  not  observing 

son  ticket  during  one  period  may  the  regulations  of  the  company  can 

apply   again   for  the  next    period.  apply   as  a  new   customer  might. 

Atwater  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  State  ex  rel.  v.  Kinloch  Telephone 

Co.,  48  N.  J.   L.  55,    2  Atl.   803  Co.,  93  Mo.  App.  349,  67  S.  W.  684 

(1886).  (1902). 

[387] 


§  451  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

made  a  condition  of  accepting  a  passenger  or  taking  other 
goods.  Where  a  person  had  on  one  occasion  been  found 
riding  without  showing  a  ticket,  it  was  held  that  he  could 
be  ejected  from  that  train  rightfully,  but  that  he  could 
not  on  that  account  be  refused  at  a  subsequent  time  the 
right  of  purchasing  another  ticket.1  The  court  considered 
such  a  refusal  as  inconsistent  with  the  public  duty  of  the 
common  carrier,  saying:  "We  think  that  this  misconduct 
did  not  justify  the  company  in  excluding  the  relator  there- 
after from  a  privilege  in  which,  as  a  member  of  the  com- 
munity, he  was  entitled  to  participate  in  common  with 
others  of  the  public.  Such  a  measure  of  punitive  justice 
has  not  been  granted  by  any  statute,  and  if  inflicted  by 
any  regulation  of  the  company — which  it  is  not — would 
be  an  unreasonable  exercise  of  the  company's  power  to 
make  rules  and  regulations  for  the  government  of  passen- 
gers." Another  manifestation  of  the  same  idea  is  in  an- 
other case  which  holds  that  a  railroad  cannot  refuse  a 
shipment  of  freight  because  back  charges  for  other  freight 
remain  unpaid.2  It  is  this  same  policy  which  makes  the 
carrier's  lien  upon  the  goods  specific,  not  general;  for  as 
is  well  known  it  is  not  thought  proper  that  the  carrier 
should  retain  the  goods  for  other  charges  than  for  the 
present  service. 

§  451.  Payment  of  arrearages  not  generally  required. 

As  to  the  obligation  to  continue  a  supply  when  the 
customer  is  already  in  arrears  (although  he  tenders  for 
present  service)  there  has  been,  and  there  remains,  an  ir- 
reconcilable conflict  of  authority.  On  one  hand  are  the 
decisions  which  hold  that  in  refusing  to  serve  those  who 
come  with  ready  payment,  the  company  in  question  acts 

1  Atwater  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.          2  East  Ky.  Ry.  v.  Holbrook,  4 
R.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  L.  55,  2  Atl.  803      Ky.  Law  Rep.  730  (1883). 
(1886). 

[388]  ^ 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [§451 

contrary  to  its  public  duty,  which  is  to  serve  all  that  ap- 
ply without  discrimination.  As  was  said  tersely  in  a 
California  case  l  of  an  irrigation  company  which  had 
adopted  this  policy:  "It  was  therefore  the  duty  of  the 
defendant  under  the  law  as  established  in  this  State  to 
furnish  the  plaintiff  water  upon  tender  of  the  established 
rates;  and  this  rule  precludes  the  idea  that  any  other 
duties  can  be  prescribed  or  imposed,  except  the  tender  of 
the  rate  as  a  condition  of  supplying  water  as  required  by 
law."  To  show  that  the  policy  of  requiring  payment  of 
arrearages  is  a  helpful  device  to  the  company  in  making 
its  collections  is  not  enough,  if  the  method  used  is  incon- 
sistent with  public  duty.  As  to  any  hardship  upon  the  com- 
panies in  prohibiting  them  from  collecting  back  charges 
in  this  way,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  they  need  not  have 
given  any  credit  at  the  outset.  As  one  in  public  service 
may  always  "demand  prepayment,  having  given  credit, 
the  company  must  be  content  as  other  creditors  must  be 
to  collect  its  back  bills  by  legal  means.  To  attempt  to 
make  such  collections  by  refusing  present  service  for  ready 
money  would  seem  to  be  in  the  face  of  the  public  duty.2 

1  Crow  v.  San  Joaquin  &  K.  R.  Maine. — Wood    v.    Auburn,    87 
C.  &  Irrigation  Co.,  130  Cal.  309,  Me.  287,  32  Atl.  906,  29  L.  R.  A.  376 
62  Pac.  562  (1900).  (1895). 

2  Holding  this  general  doctrine  as  Maryland. — Gaslight  Co.  v.  Colli- 
to  various  services  are:  day,  25  Md.  1  (1866). 

Alabama. — Smith  v.  Birmingham          Massachusetts. — Merrimack  Bank 

Waterworks,  104  Ala.  315,  16  So.  v.  Lowell,  152  Mass.  556,  26  N.  E. 

123  (1893).  97,  10  L.  R.  A.  122  (1891). 

Arkansas. — Danaher    v.    South-          Nebraska. — State     v.     Nebraska 

western  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  Telephone  Co.,  17  Neb.  126,  22  N. 

127  S.  W.  963  (1910).  W.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  404  (1885). 

District   of  Columbia. — Lloyd  v.  Tennessee. — Crumley  v.  Watauga 

Gaslight  Co.,  1  Mackey,  331  (1881).  Water  Co.,  99  Tenn.  420,  41  S.  W. 

Georgia. — Freeman  v.  Macon Gas-  1058  (1897). 

light  &  Water  Co.,  126  Ga.  843,  50          Texas.— Buffalo      Bayou      Ship 

S.  E.  61,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N,  S.)  917  Channel  Co.  v.  Milby  &  Dow,  63 

(1908).  Tex.  492,  51  Am.  Rep.  668  (1885); 

f  389  1 


§  452  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  452.  Cases  requiring  payment  of  arrearages. 

But  there  are  other  cases  equally  insistent  in  holding 
that  if  the  present  applicant  owes  for  a  supply  given  him, 
he  is  in  no  position  to  demand  a  further  supply  even  if 
ready  money  is  tendered  for  it.  Although  this  is  ap- 
parently in  the  face  of  public  duty,  much  is  made  in  these 
cases  of  the  argument  of  the  convenience  to  the  company 
in  making  its  collections.  This  is  ingeniously  elaborated 
in  a  Washington  case  l  thus:  "The  condition  imposed, 
that  the  company  might  refuse  to  furnish  water  to  an 
applicant  refusing  to  pay  for  it  a  sum  due  for  water  there- 
under, is  in  one  sense  a  security  for  the  payment  thereof. 
Instead  of  forming  an  estimate  of  the  water  that  would 
likely  be  used,  and  requiring  a  deposit  in  advance  of  a 
sufficient  sum  of  money  to  cover  the  same,  or  requiring 
other  security  for  the  payment  thereof,  the  water  company 
provides  that  at  stated  periods  payments  shall  be  made 
in  order  that  a  large  sum  may  not  accumulate,  it  being 
willing  to  take  its  chances  for  a  stated  time  without  other 
security;  surely  this  is  more  lenient  than  either  to  demand 
a  bond  or  other  security,  or  a  deposit  of  a  sum  of  money 
in  advance  large  enough  to  be  reasonably  certain  of  cover- 
ing the  sum  that  should  become  due."  However,  it  is  not 
enough  in  public  employment  to  show  that  a  right  would 
be  valuable  to  justify  it;  nor  even  to  show  that  it  isjpolicy 
which  is  often  employed  in  private  business.  It  must  be 

Southwestern  Telephone  &  Tele-  Nebraska. — A  m  e  r  i  c  a  n  Water- 
graph  Co.  v.  Luckett  (Tex.  Civ.  works  v.  State,  46  Neb.  194,  64  N. 
App.),  127  S.  W.  856  (1910).  W.  711,  30  L.  R.  A.  447,  50  Am.  St. 

A    rule    requiring    those    whose  Rep.  610  (1895). 

water  supply  has  been  cut  off  to  pay  l  Tacoma  Hotel  Co.  v.  Tacoma 

a  sum  for  having  the  water  turned  Light  &  Water  Co.,  3  Wash.  316,  28 

on  again  upon  payment  is  always  Pac.  516,  14  L.  R.  A.  669,  28  Am. 

held  unreasonable:  St.  Rep.  35  (1891). 

Missouri. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Jones, 
141  Mo.  App.  299,  125  S.  W.  1169 
(1910). 

[390] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION 


§453 


admitted  that  there  are  many  cases  which  support  this 
right  to  insist  upon  the  payment  of  arrearages.1  But  it 
should  be  said,  however,  that  in  several  of  these  cases  the 
right  to  shut  off  the  supply  for  past  default  was  established 
by  legislation  or  by  ordinance,  either  by  direct  provision  or 
by  clause  in  the  charter. 

§  453.  Applicant  in  default  at  other  premises. 

In  the  light  of  the  usual  arguments  upon  which  the 
cases  divide  upon  the  general  question,  it  would  seem  that 
the  case  where  the  applicant  is  in  default  at  other  premises 
for  the  same  service  should  fall  within  the  general  rule. 
And  it  is  usual  to  decide  this  case  according  to  the  general 
doctrine  held  in  the  jurisdiction — some  cases  consistently 
holding  that  arrears  at  other  premises  cannot  bar  the 
applicant  for  present  service;  other  cases  holding  that 
such  arrears  should  bar  the  applicant.2  What  is  surpris- 


1  In  the  following  cases  involving 
various  services,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  payment  of  arrearages  is 
prerequisite : 

California. — Sheward  v.  Citizens' 
Water  Co.,  90  Cal.  635,  27  Pac.  439 
(1891). 

Indiana. — Irvin  v.  Rushville  Tele- 
phone Co.,  161  Ind.  524,  69  N.  E. 
258  (1903). 

Kansas. — Shiras  v.  Ewing,  48 
Kans.  170,  29  Pac.  320  (1892). 

Minnesota. — State  v.  Board  of 
Water  Commissioners,  105  Minn. 
472,  117  N.  W.  827,  127  Am.  St. 
Rep.  581  (1908). 

Missouri. — McDaniel  v.  Water- 
works, 48  Mo.  App.  273  (1892). 

New  York. — People  v.  Manhattan 
Gaslight  Co.,  45  Barb.  136  (1865); 
Brass  v.  Rathbone,  153  N.  Y.  435, 
47  N.  E.  905  (1897). 


Ohio.— Bellaire  Goblet  Co.  v. 
Findlay,  5  Oh.  Cir.  Ct.  418  (1891). 

Oregon. — Mackin  v.  Portland  Gas 
Co.,  38  Oreg.  120,  61  Pac.  134,  49 
L.  R.  A.  596  (1900). 

Pennsylvania. — Brumm,  Appeal 
of  (Pa.),  12  Atl.  855  (1888);  Girard 
Life  Insurance  Co.  v.  Philadelphia, 
88  Pa.  St.  393  (1879);  Smith  v. 
Scranton  Gas  &  Water  Co.,  5  Lack. 
L.  News,  235  (1899). 

Washington. — Jenkins  v.  Colum- 
bia Land  Co.,  13  Wash.  502,  43  Pac. 
328  (1896). 

2  The  following  cases,  for  exam- 
ple, hold  that  a  supply  may  be  cut 
off  at  one  place  for  a  bill  owed  by 
the  applicant  for  supply  at  other 
premises : 

New  York. — People  v.  Manhattan 
Gaslight  Co.,  45  Barb.  136  (1865). 

Oregon. — Mackin  v.  Portland  Gas 

[391] 


§  454  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

ing,  if  not  significant,  is  to  find  certain  jurisdictions  which 
hold  against  the  applicant  in  general,  not  sure  enough  of 
their  ground  to  hold  against  him  in  this  particular  case 
apparently  within  the  general  rule.1 

§  464.  Payment  of  collateral  claims  cannot  be  demanded. 
It  would  probably  be  generally  conceded  that  the  pay- 
ment of  wholly  independent  claims  cannot  be  demanded 
as  a  condition  of  supplying  present  service.  Certainly  a 
gas  company  could  not  refuse  to  supply  one  who  owed  it 
for  coke  sold.2  And  it  has  been  held  in  Tennessee  3  that 
a  water  company  could  not  refuse  to  supply  a  customer 
whose  bill  for  services  and  material  was  unpaid.  "The 
defendant  in  the  present  case  cannot  justify  its  declination 
to  furnish  water  to  the  plaintiff  by  the  fact  of  his  failure 
to  pay  the  whole  or  a  part  of  his  outstanding  duebill, 
given  for  water  and  piping  furnished  a  year  or  two  before. 
Upon  tender  of  the  regular  rates,  he  was  entitled  to  the 
water  like  other  persons,  and  without  reference  to  his 
past-due  obligation.  The  company  had  given  him  credit 
for  the  matters  covered  by  the  duebill,  and  could  not 
thereafter  coerce  payment  by  denying  him  a  present 
legal  right." 

Co.,  38  Oreg.  120,  61  Pac.  134,  49  Maryland .— Gaslight  Co.  v.  Colli- 

L.  R.  A.  596  (1900).  day,  25  Md.  1  (1866). 

Tennessee. — Jones   v.    Mayor   of  Massachusetts. — Turner  v.  Revere 

Nashville,  109  Tenn.  550,  72  S.  W.  Water  Co.,  171  Mass.  329,  50  N.  E. 

985  (1903).  634,  40  L.  R.  A.  657,  68  Am.  St. 

England.— Montreal  Gas  Co.  v.  Rep.  432  (1898). 

Cadieux,  A.  C.  589  (1899).  New  Jersey. — Dayton  v.  Quigley, 

1  The  following  cases  hold  that  a  29  N.  J.  Eq.  77  (1878). 

supply   cannot  be  refused  at  one  z  See  Re  Commercial  Bank  and 

place   for   arrears   for   supply   fur-  London  Gas  Co.,  20  Up.  Can.  Q.  B. 

nished     the     applicant     at     other  233  (1860). 

premises:  s  Crumley    v.    Watauga    Water 

District  of  Columbia.— Lloyd   v.  Co.,  99  Tenn.  420,  41  S.  W.  1058 

Gaslight  Co.,  1  Mackey,  331  (1881).  (1897). 

[392] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION    [  §§  455,  456 


§  455.  Cannot  urge  another's  default. 

It  is  plain  enough  upon  these  principles  that  one  cannot 
be  required  to  pay  claims  against  another.  Thus  the  ves- 
sel of  one  owner  cannot  be  affected  by  the  unpaid  tolls  of 
another  ship  belonging  to  a  stranger.1  And  it  was  re- 
cently held  in  Missouri 2  that  "  there  is  no  more  reason  for 
compelling  a  married  woman  to  pay  her  husband's  debt, 
for  the  payment  of  which  she  is  not  legally  bound,  than 
there  would  be  for  compelling  her  to  pay  the  debt  of  a 
stranger." 

§  456.  No  requirement  to  pay  arrears  of  predecessors. 

It  is  well  agreed  that  this  disability  is  a  personal  matter. 
When  a  householder  applies  to  a  gas  or  water  company 
for  a  supply  of  gas  or  water  at  his  house,  and  tenders  the 
price,  if  it  is  required,  or  a  deposit  in  advance,  he  cannot 
be  refused  because  an  independent  earlier  occupant  of  the 
premises  is  in  arrear  for  his  gas  or  water.3  To  so  hold 


1  Buffalo  B.  S.  C.  Co.  v.  Milby  & 
Dow,  63  Tex.  492,  51  Am.  Rep.  668 
(1885). 

2  Vanderberg  v.  Gas  Co.,  126  Mo. 
App.  600  (1907). 

3  The  common-law  view  is  shown 
by  the  following  cases: 

Illinois. — City  of  Chicago  v. 
Northwestern  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co., 
218  111.  40,  75  N.  E.  803,  1  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  770  (1905). 

Kentucky. — Covington  v.  Ratter- 
man,  128  Ky.  336,  108  S.  W.  297,  17 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  923  (1908). 

Louisiana. — New  Orleans  G.  L. 
&  B.  Co.  v.  Paulding,  12  Rob. 
(La.)  378  (1845). 

Maryland. — Gaslight  Co.  v.  Colli- 
day,  25  Md.  1  (1866). 

Massachusetts. — Turner  v.  Revere 
Water  Co.,  171  Mass.  329,  50  N.  E. 


634,  40  L.  R.  A.  657,  68  Am.  St. 
Rep.  432  (1898). 

Mississippi. — Burke  v.  City  of 
Water  Valley,  87  Miss.  732,  40  So. 
820,  112  Am.  St.  Rep.  468  (1905). 

New  Jersey. — Dayton  v.  Quigley, 
29  N.  J.  Eq.  77  (1878);  Johnson  v. 
Atlantic  City  Gas  Co.,  65  N.  J.  Eq. 
129,  56  Atl.  550  (1903). 

Pennsylvania. — Miller  v.  Wilkes- 
Barre  Gas  Co.,  206  Pa.  St.  254,  55 
Atl.  974  (1903). 

South  Carolina. — Poole  v.  Paris 
Mt.  Water  Co.,  81  S.  C.  438,  62 
S.  E.  874,  128  Am.  St.  Rep.  923 
(1908). 

Washington. — Linne  v.  Bredes,  43 
Wash.  540,  86  Pac.  858,  6  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  707,  117  Am.  St.  Rep.  1068 
(1906). 

England. — Sheffield    Waterworks 

[393] 


§457] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


would  in  effect  decide  that  the  supply  is  to  the  premises, 
not  (as  it  plainly  is)  to  the  occupants.  However,  it  is  possi- 
ble for  legislative  action  to  alter  this  common  law  and  to 
provide  for  such  a  charge  upon  the  premises  either  by 
statute  or  charter  provision,  or  by  ordinance  or  (according 
to  a  very  few  cases)  by  regulation  of  which  all  concerned 
are  apprised.1 

§  457.  Assumption  of  predecessor's  arrears. 

The  distinction  should  be  noted,  that  where  the  incom- 
ing occupant  can  fairly  be  said  to  have  assumed  the  obliga- 
tions of  his  predecessor  he  will  be  held  to  succeed  to  his 
position  and  may  be  obliged  to  pay  his  arrears  when  that 
rule  prevails.2  Whether  a  trustee  in  bankruptcy  or  a 
receiver  of  a  corporation,  as  a  tenant,  is  independent  of 
the  bankrupt,  his  predecessor,  has  been  discussed.  But 
the  usual  rule  is  that  a  trustee  who  elects  to  remain  in 


Co.  v.  Wilkinson,  4  C.  P.  D.  410 
(1879). 

1  The  possibility  of  arranging  this 
by  such  methods  is  shown  in: 

Georgia. — City  of  Atlanta  v. 
Burton,  90  Ga.  486,  16  S.  E.  214 
(1892). 

Minnesota. — State  v.  Board  of 
Water  &  Light  Com'rs,  105  Minn. 
472,  117  N.  W.  827  (1908). 

New  Jersey. — Vreeland  v.  O'Neil, 
36  N.  J.  Eq.  399,  affirmed  in  37  N. 
J.  Eq.  574  (1883);  Hudson  Trust  & 
S.  Inst.  v.  Carr-Curran  Paper  Co., 
58  N.  J.  Eq.  59,  43  Atl.  418  (1899); 
Howe  v.  Orange,  70  N.  J.  Eq.  648, 
62  Atl.  777  (1906). 

New  York. — Silkman  v.  Water 
Commissioners,  71  Hun,  37,  24  N. 
Y.  Supp.  806  (1893). 

Pennsylvania. — Altoona  v.  Shel- 
lenberger,  6  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  544 
(1897);  Brumm  v.  Pottsville  Water 

[3941 


Co.,  11  Cent.  Rep.  792  (1888); 
Brumm's  Appeal,  22  Wk.  N.  Cas. 
137  (1888);  Girard  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Philadelphia,  88  Pa.  St.  393  (1879); 
Appeal  of  the  City  of  Harrisburg, 
107  Pa.  St.  102  (1884);  Common- 
wealth v.  Philadelphia,  132  Pa.  St. 
288,  19  Atl.  136  (1890);  Miller  v. 
Wilkes-Barre  Gas  Co.,  206  Pa.  St. 
254,  55  Atl.  974  (1903);  Girard  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia,  12  Phila. 
293  (1878). 

Tennessee. — Jones  v.  Mayor  of 
Nashville,  109  Tenn.  550,  72  S.  W. 
985  (1903). 

England. — East  London  Water- 
works Co.  v.  Kellerman,  2  Q.  B.  72 
(1892). 

2  Tennessee. — Jones  v.  Nashville, 
109  Tenn.  550,  72  S.  W.  985  (1902). 

England. — Gaslight  Co.  v.  Can- 
non Brewery  Co.,  1  K.  B.  593 
(1903). 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION 


§458 


possession  after  the  adjudication  of  bankruptcy  is  an 
independent  tenant,  and  may  demand  service  without 
first  paying  the  bankrupt's  arrears,  and  so  may  a  receiver. l 

§  458.  Cannot  shut  off  service  for  disputed  arrearages. 

Where  the  doctrine  is  held  that  the  company  may  refuse 
to  continue  service  while  arrearages  are  unpaid,  the  courts 
are  seldom  willing  to  give  the  company  the  power  to 
compel  settlement  of  disputed  claims  by  refusing  to  deal 
with  a  customer  until  he  comes  to  their  terms.  Here 
again  it  seems  that  as  the  exception  is  not  far  removed 
from  the  general  rule,  the  courts  do  not  have  the  courage 
to  apply  their  principle  in  peculiarly  hard  cases.  At  all 
events  the  cases  almost  universally  hold  that  a  company 
cannot  refuse  to  give  present  service  or  cut  off  existing 
service  for  refusal  to  settle  outstanding  arrearages  which 
are  in  dispute.2  Mandamus  will  issue  to  compel  the  giving 


1  New  Jersey. — Coe  v.  New  Jersey 
Midland  Ry.  Co.,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  440 
(1879). 

Massachusetts. — CojT  V.  Maiden 
&  M.  Gaslight  Co.,  199  Mass.  324, 
85  N.  E.  180,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1235  (1908). 

2  Alabama. — Bienville  Water  Co. 
v.  Mobile,  112  Ala.  260,  20  So.  742, 
33  L.  R.  A.  59,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  28 
(1895). 

Indiana. — Xenia  Real  Estate  Co. 
v.  Macy,  147  Ind.  568,  47  N.  E.  147 
(1896). 

Iowa. — Graves  v.  Key  City  Gas 
Co.,  83  Iowa,  714,  50  N.  W.  283 
(1891). 

Louisiana. — Ernst  &  Co.  v.  New 
Orleans  Waterworks  Co.,  39  La. 
Ann.  550,  2  So.  415  (1887). 

Maine. — Wood  v.  City  of  Au- 
burn, 87  Me.  287,  32  Atl.  906,  29 
L.  R.  A.  376  (1895). 


Mississippi. — Cumberland  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Baker,  85  Miss.  486,  37 
So.  1012  (1905). 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Nebraska 
Telephone  Co.,  17  Neb.  126,  22 
N.  W.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  404 
(1885). 

New  York. — Van  Nest  Land  Co. 
v.  New  York  Water  Co.,  7  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  295,  40  N.  Y.  Supp. 
212  (1896);  Sickles  v.  Manhat- 
tan Gaslight  Co.,  64*  How.  Pr. 
33  (1882);  s.  c.,  66  How.  Pr.  314 
(1884);  McEntee  v.  Kingston 
Water  Co.,  165  N.  Y.  27,  58 
N.  E.  785  (1900);  Jones  v.  Roches- 
ter Gas  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
474,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  1110,  af- 
firmed 158  N.  Y.  678,  52  N.  E. 
1124  (1896). 

Oregon. — Mackin  v.  Portland  Gas 
Co.,  38  Oreg.  120,  61  Pac.  134,  49 
L.  R.  A.  596  (1900). 

[395] 


§§  459,  460  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

of  service  under  such  circumstances  or  injunction  to 
prevent  a  threatened  shutting  off.  Although  there  thus 
can  be  no  shutting  off  pendente  lite,  as  soon  as  the  obligation 
is  settled  against  the  consumer  by  judgment  being  cast 
against  him,  his  supply  can  be  shut  off  until  he  satisfies 
the  judgment.1 

§  459.  Character  of  the  dispute. 

It  should  be  added  that  if  his  claim  is  obviously  un- 
reasonable he  cannot  insist  upon  protection  of  a  court  of 
equity  to  litigate  a  frivolous  claim.2  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  charge  disputed  is  obviously  illegal  the  injunction 
may  be  made  permanent.3  Note  also  that  a  patron  who 
has  a  counterclaim  of  a  doubtful  character  cannot  refuse 
to  make  further  payments  for  service  by  setting  this  against 
his  current  bills.4  None  of  these  problems  will  bother 
a  court  which  holds  that  there  can  be  no  shutting  off  for 
arrearages  under  any  circumstances. 

§  460.  Waiver  of  right  to  refuse. 

In  a  few  cases  it  has  been  suggested  that  where  an 
old  bill  has  been  passed  over  and  later  installments  ac- 

Pennsylvania. — Sewickley  School  Pennsylvania. — Pennsylvania 

Dist.  v.  Ohio  Valley  Gas  Co.,  154  Iron  Co.  v.  Lancaster,  17  Lane.  L. 

Pa.  St.  539,  25  Atl.  868  (1893).  R.  161  (1900). 

South  Carolina. — Poole  v.  Paris  3  Minnesota. — Gordon   &   Fergu- 

Mt.  Water  Co.,  81  S.  C.  438,  62  S.  son  v.  Doran,  100  Minn.  343,  111  N. 

E.  874,  128  Am.  St.  Rep.  923(1908).  W.  272,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1049 

Tennessee. — O'Rourke  v.  Citizens'  (1907) . 

Street  Ry.  Co.,  103  Tenn.  124,  52  New  Jersey.— Borough  of  Wash- 

S.  W.  872,  46  L.  R.  A.  614,  76  Am.  ington  v.  Washington  Water  Co.,  70 

St.  Rep.  639  (1899).  N.  J.  Eq.  254,  62  Atl.  390  (1905). 

1  New  York. — McEntee  v.  Kings-  4  Buffalo  County  Telephone  Co. 
ton  Water  Co.,  165  N.  Y.  27,  58  N.  v.  Turner,  82  Neb.  841,  118  N.  W. 
E.  785  (1900);  People  V.Manhattan  1064,    9    L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.)    693 
Gaslight  Co.,  45  Barb.  136  (1865).  (1908). 

2  Louisiana. — Ernst    &    Co.     v.  See  also  State  v.  Nebraska  Tele- 
New  Orleans  Waterworks  Co.,  39  phone  Co.,  17  Neb.  126,  22  N.  W. 
La.  Ann.  550,  2  So.  415  (1887).  237,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  404  (1885). 

[396] 


PREPAYMENT  AS  A  CONDITION  [  §  460 

cepted  the  company  cannot  make  such  arrearages  the 
basis  for  a  refusal  to  continue  service.1  But  if  this  has 
happened  by  inadvertence  the  company  may,  it  is  held, 
insist  upon  its  rights,  as  in  one  case  where  the  person  in 
arrears  changed  his  residence  so  that  it  was  not  discov- 
ered for  a  time  that  he  was  the  person  in  arrears.2  And 
where  an  agreement  between  a  water  company  and  a 
consumer,  separate  and  distinct  from  the  contract  for 
water  supply,  provides  that  the  rent  shall  be  paid  in  ad- 
vance, the  company's  recovery  by  suit  of  an  installment  for 
a  particular  period  will  not  preclude  it  from  subsequently 
setting  up  a  right  to  shut  off  the  water  during  such  period 
for  nonpayment  therefor.3  And  similarly  where  the  sub- 
ject is  covered  by  a  special  contract,  it  is  still  held  that 
the  supply  may  be  cut  off  for  arrears.4 

1  Wood  v.  City  of  Auburn,  87  Me.  3  Hieronymus  v.  Bienville  Water 
287,  32  Atl.  906,  29  L.  R.  A.  376  Co.,  131  Ala.  447,  31  So.  31  (1901). 
(1895).  «  Gallagher  v.  Equitable  Gaslight 

2  People  v.  Manhattan  Gaslight  Co.,    141    Cal.   699,    75   Pac.    329 
Co.,  45  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  136  (1865).  (1904). 


[397 


CHAPTER  XIV 

PUBLIC   DUTY   AS   TO   DEPENDENT   SERVICES 

§  470.  Nature  of  the  problem. 

Topic  A.  Public  Duty  Involved 

§  471.  The  argument  is  close. 

472.  No  direct  duty  to  the  dependent  service. 

473.  Real  duty  is  to  patrons  themselves. 

474.  Conservative  view  of  the  duty  involved. 

475.  Progressive  view  of  the  duty  involved. 

476.  Necessity  for  the  public  service  law. 

Topic  B.  Transportation  Services  in  Particular 

§  477.  Express  companies:  conservative  view. 

478.  Comment  thereon. 

479.  Express  companies:  radical  view. 

480.  Discussion  thereof. 

481.  Exclusive  contracts  with  private  car  lines. 

482.  Arrangements  for  hauling  sleeping  cars. 

483.  Hack  service:  conservative  view. 

484.  Objections  thereto. 

485.  Hack  service:  radical  view. 

486.  Argument  therefor. 

487.  Access  to  connecting  steamboats. 

488.  No  access  owed  except  at  wharf  stations. 

489.  Treatment  of  baggage  transfer  men. 

490.  Rights  of  competing  draymen. 

491.  Arrangements  with  stock  yards. 

492.  Contracts  with  grain  elevators. 

Topic  C.  Public  Services  in  General 
§  493.  Exclusive  arrangements  by  innkeepers. 

494.  Equal  facilities  for  ticker  service. 

495.  Canal  company  giving  monopoly  of  towage. 

496.  Arrangement  for  sprinkling  service. 

497.  Telephone  installation  in  public  premises. 

[398] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES         [  §§  470,  471 

Topic  D.  No  Public  Duly  Involved 

§  498.  Special  concessions  when  no  public  duty  involved. 

499.  Special  concessions  for  private  business. 

500.  Whether  service  provided  is  necessary. 

501.  Additional  favors  beyond  obligation. 

502.  Exclusive  contracts  in  private  capacity. 

503.  Private  activities  often  held  ultra  vires. 

§  470.  Nature  of  the  problem. 

A  special  problem  under  the  general  head  of  the  true 
extent  of  public  duty  is  whether  in  dealing  with  dependent 
services  those  who  conduct  the  principal  service  can 
make  such  arrangements  as  they  please  with  those  who 
apply  for  such  special  privileges,  or  whether  there  is  a 
public  duty  in  the  premises  requiring  that  equal  facilities 
shall  be  granted.  This  subject  has  such  commercial  im- 
portance that  it  is  given  separate  treatment  in  this  chapter; 
for  these  subsidiary  services  which  are  dependent  upon 
special  privileges  from  the  principal  service  carry  on  a 
great  business  in  recent  times.  Although  the  most  of 
litigation  upon  the  general  issue  involves  the  transporta- 
tion services,  because  of  their  importance  as  a  commercial 
matter,  still  the  same  problem  at  times  presents  itself  in 
certain  other  public  callings,  so  that  it  really  constitutes 
a  general  problem  of  public  service. 

Topic  A.  Public  Duty  Involved 

§  471.  The  argument  is  close. 

There  has  always  been — and  there  remains — a  square 
conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  the  law  extends  so  far 
as  to  cover  this  situation.  On  one  side  are  the  jurisdictions 
conservative  in  attitude,  which  hold  that  there  is  no  pub- 
lic duty  involved  and  that  therefore  the  carrier  may,  for 
example,  discriminate  among  expressmen.  On  the  other 
hand  are  the  progressive  jurisdictions  which  hold  that 
there  is  a  public  obligation  involved  and  that  the  inn- 

[399] 


§  472  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

keeper  may  not,  therefore,  admit  certain  hackmen  to  its 
premises  while  excluding  others.  And  in  various  other 
subsidiary  businesses  of  the  same  sort,  where  those  who 
offer  a  service  to  the  public  are  dependent  to  a  considerable 
extent  for  opportunity  to  conduct  their  calling  upon  ob- 
taining special  privileges,  there  is  the  same  conflict  of 
authority. 

§  472.  No  direct  duty  to  the  dependent  service. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  controversy  the  ground  may  be 
cleared  by  the  admission  that  there  is  no  direct  duty  owed 
to  those  who  conduct  these  dependent  services.  The 
railroad  company  surely  owes  no  duty  to  hackmen  who 
would  ply  their  trade  upon  station  premises;  its  sole  duty 
is  to  its  passengers. 1  Similarly  a  telegraph  company  owes 
no  duty  to  a  telephone  company  which  wishes  to  install 
an  instrument,2  its  sole  duty  being  to  its  patrons.  It  can- 
not be  said  that  the  principal  business  has  ever  undertaken 
the  reception  of  the  subordinate  servitors  upon  a  public 
basis.  Not  even  in  the  case  of  the  expressman  can  it 
usually  be  said  that  the  railroad  has  undertaken  to  be  a 
common  carrier  of  common  carriers.3  For  the  plain  fact 
is  that  it  does  not  purport  to  act  as  such  but  only  makes 
special  contracts  with  particular  forwarders  for  special 
kinds  of  business  conducted  in  an  unusual  way.  And 
certainly  an  innkeeper  owes  no  duty  to  coachmen  who 
would  solicit  business  from  his  guests.  For  those  hackmen 

1  Thus  solicitors  driving  special          *  Thus  a  man  carrying  a  bag  of 
omnibuses  for  particular  hotels  may      express  packages  may  be  kept  off  a 
be  kept  off  railroad  premises.  line  of  boats  as  a  passenger. 

Arkansas. — Hot  Springs  v.  Curry,  United  Stales. — The  R.  D.  Mar- 

64  Ark.  152,  41  S.  W.  55  (1897).  tin,  11  Blatch.  233  (1873). 

Missouri. — Laddonia  v.  Poor,  73  New  York. — Barney  v.  Oyster 

Mo.  App.  465  (1898).  Bay  &  H.  Steamboat  Co.,  67  N.  Y. 

2  People  v.  Western  Union  Tele-  301  (1876). 
graph  Co.,  166  111.  15,  46  N.  E.  731 

(1897). 

[400] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  473 

are  not  wayfarers  seeking  necessary  entertainment,  neither 
do  they  tender  the  innkeeper  his  usual  rates  for  entertain- 
ment.1 

§  473.  Real  duty  is  to  patrons  themselves. 

On  the  other  hand  that  there  is  some  public  duty  in  the 
premises  is  plain.  In  the  case  of  the  express  service  the 
modern  railroad  owes  a  duty  of  some  sort  in  respect  to  the 
transportation  of  small  and  valuable  parcels  safely  and 
quickly.  But  to  whom  is  this  duty  owed?  Certainly 
not  to  the  subordinate  carrier,  as  has  been  seen.  The  duty, 
if  any,  that  it  owes,  seems  to  be  rather  to  the  general  pub- 
lic who  ship  through  the  expressman.  "An  express  com- 
pany engaged  in  the  business  of  transporting  small  pack- 
ages has  as  good  a  right  to  the  benefits  of  the  railroad  as 
the  owners  of  the  packages  possess  in  person.  It  is  im- 
possible that  they  can  all  appear  in  person  to  claim  their 
rights,  and  it  is  sufficient  that  they  are  represented  by 
agents  who  are  intrusted  with  their  goods  and  have  a 
special  property  in  them."  2  So  of  the  hackmen  at  rail- 
way stations,  the  duty  is  plainly  to  the  passenger  himself. 
Thus  it  is  admitted  by  all  that  a  railroad  owes  such  duties 
to  its  incoming  and  outgoing  passengers  that  it  cannot 
exclude  from  its  station  driveways  hackmen  bringing  pas- 
sengers, or  hackmen  directed  by  passengers  to  call  for 
them. 3  For  of  course  no  one  would  go  so  far  as  to  deny  the 

1  See  State  v.  Steele,  106  N.  C.  motives  offered  it  for  transporta- 
766,  11  S.  E.  478,  8  L.  R.  A.  516,  19  tion.    It  was  held  that  plaintiff,  a 
AID.  St.  Rep.  573  (1890).  shipper  of  locomotives,   could  ob- 

2  Per  Lewis,  C.  J.,  in  Sandford  v.  ject  to  this  scheme  to  defeat  him  in 
Catawissa  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Pa.  St.  378,  his   individual    right    to    have    his 
64  Am.  Dec.  667  (1855).  property  transported. 

In  Rogers  Locomotive  &  Machine          3  Rhode      Island. — Griswold      v. 

Works  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  Webb,  16  R.  I.  649,  19  Atl.  143,  7 

379  (1869),  the  defendant  railroad  L.  R.  A.  302  (1889). 
company  entered  into  an  arrange-          Tennessee. — Summit  v.  State,   8 

ment    with    a    locomotive    express  Lea,  413,  41  Am.  Rep.  637  (1881). 
concern  for  the  handling  of  all  loco- 

26  [  401  ] 


§  474,  475  ]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

duty  of  the  carrier  of  passengers  to  permit  free  access 
and  egress  for  those  whom  it  is  serving.  Indeed  in  this 
aspect  the  duty  to  give  passengers  access  to  hackmen 
is  the  same  as  the  duty  to  admit  persons  assisting  pas- 
sengers. 

§  474.  Conservative  view  of  the  duty  involved. 

Even  when  it  is  once  established  that  there  is  a  public 
duty  toward  then'  own  patrons  in  respect  to  the  subordi- 
nate service  involved,  there  remains  the  conflict  of  author- 
ity as  to  the  extent  to  which  this  duty  goes.  According 
to  the  conservative  view,  the  principal  company  fulfills 
its  duty  by  making  provision  for  the  service  desired,  which 
may  be  done  by  an  exclusive  contract  with  one  concern. 
The  decisions  permitting  this  were  first  made  upon  the 
elementary  ground  plainly  avowed  that  as  such  service 
was  not  within  any  real  public  profession,  there  was  no 
public  obligation  in  the  premises  whatsoever.1  But  of 
late  years  those  who  support  these  decisions  have  felt 
obliged  to  defend  them  upon  grounds  of  public  policy. 
They  point  to  the  public  inconvenience  involved  in  having 
boisterous  hackmen  of  all  sorts  at  railway  stations;  they 
insist  upon  the  waste  of  duplication  of  express  services 
over  the  same  railroad.  And  very  recently  pressed  further 
they  suggest  that  it  may  be  that  in  making  these  exclusive 
arrangements  public  interests  should  not  be  left  without 
consideration.2 

§  475.  Progressive  view  of  the  duty  involved. 

According  to  the  progressive  view  the  whole  law  of 
public  service  applies  to  the  situation  throughout;  and 
the  exclusive  contract  is  held  illegal  as  a  necessary  con- 

1  For  example,  see  the  Express  2  For  example,  read  Hedding  v. 
Cases,  117  U.  S.  1, 29  L.  ed.  791,  6  Gallagher,  72  N.  H.  377,  57  Atl.  225, 
Sup.  Ct.  542,  628  (1886).  64  L.  R.  A.  811  (1903). 

[402] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  476 

sequence  of  that  law.1  It  is  believed  by  these  radical 
persons  who  take  the  progressive  view  that  however 
much  it  is  modified  the  conservative  view  of  this  matter 
cannot  give  the  public  service  the  full  protection  which 
this  progressive  view  assures.  For  if  the  public  duty  does 
not  go  to  the  extent  of  preventing  discrimination  in  per- 
forming it,  it  seems  that  none  of  the  law  of  public  service 
can  be  applied  between  the  railroad  company  and  the 
express  company,  for  example.  And  it  would  seem  to 
follow  that  any  express  company,  therefore,  may  be  justi- 
fied in  charging  extortionate  prices.  Whatever  may  be 
the  inconveniences  of  competition,  it  is  usually  worth 
more  than  it  costs.  Moreover  these  services  are  not  of 
that  class  where  enormous  sums  must  be  spent  in  providing 
a  duplicate  equipment,  nor  where  the  public  can  only  get 
adequate  service  by  the  establishment  of  a  legalized 
monopoly.  Even  if  hack  rates  are  regulated  by  law  it  is 
the  maximum  that  is  fixed  and  the  public  loses  the  chance 
of  reaching  the  minimum  by  competition. 

§  476.  Necessity  for  the  public  service  law. 

That  the  monopoly  system  works  well  in  particular 
instances  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  there  is  real  danger 
in  leaving  the  situation  without  the  full  restraint  of  the 
whole  law;  without  the  whole  law  the  monopolist  will  be 
able  to  exploit  to  some  extent  those  whom  it  is  his  duty  to 
serve.  But  even  if  the  common  carrier  at  times  exercises 
his  discretion  by  seeing  to  it  that  the  dependent  service 
is  provided  under  fair  conditions,  the  danger  remains  in 
leaving  this  important  situation  without  law.  For  if 
there  is  abuse  of  discretion  and  those  who  need  the  de- 
pendent service  are  systematically  exploited,  there  will 
be  no  law  in  reserve  by  which  redress  is  possible.  And  if 

1  See  the  language  in  McDuffee  v.      Portland  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H. 

430,  13  Am.  Rep.  72  (1873). 

[403] 


§  477  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

experience  in  dealing  with  the  public  service  companies 
is  teaching  anything,  it  is  showing  that  only  the  most 
comprehensive  law  will  prove  effectual;  for  if  a  way  of 
escape  is  left,  it  will  be  found.  The  time  has  long  since 
passed  when  laissez  faire  may  be  put  forward  as  the  better 
method  of  dealing  with  any  problem  of  public  duty.1 

Topic  B.  Transportation  Services  in  Particular 

§  477.  Express  companies :  conservative  view. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  this  problem  of  the  extent  of  the 
duty  of  the  principal  service  to  those  conducting  a  subor- 
dinate service  has  arisen  almost  exclusively  as  yet  in  re- 
spect to  transportation  services;  and  the  most  important 
instance  of  this  is  the  express  service  carried  on  over  the 
railroad  systems.  The  leading  authority  upon  this  whole 
subject  is  undoubtedly  the  Express  Cases.2  These  suits 
were  all  begun  by  expressmen  against  railways  to  compel 
them  to  give  them  respectively  the  express  facilities  on 
the  several  lines  of  railway  which  they  had  previously 
enjoyed  by  contract  and  of  which  they  had  been  dis- 
possessed by  notice  given  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
exclusive  contracts  made  with  favored  companies.  Judg- 
ments below  had  been  rendered  in  favor  of  the  express 
companies  from  which  the  railroad  companies  appealed.3 
The  cases  were  elaborately  argued;  and  the  whole  history 
of  the  course  of  dealings  that  had  gone  on  between  the 
express  companies  and  the  railroad  companies  was  dis- 
cussed. The  decision  of  the  majority  of  the  court  went 

1  See  the  language  in  Montana  eral  courts.  See  Southern  Express 

Union  Ry.  Co.  v.  Langois,  9  Mont.  Co.  v.  Memphis  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Mc- 

419,  24  Pac.  209,  8  L.  R.  A.  753,  18  Crary,  570  (1881);  Wells,  Fargo  & 

Am.  St.  Rep.  745  (1890).  Co.  v.  O.  Ry.  &  Navigation  Co.,  8 

2 117  U.  S.  1,  29  L.  ed.  791,  6  Sawyer,  600  (1883);  United  States 

Sup.  Ct.  542,  628  (1886).  v.  M.  &  L.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Fed.  237 

3  The  Express  Cases,  supra,  over-  (1881) ;  Wells  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  North- 
ruled  what  had  just  previously  been  ern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  469 
the  weight  of  authority  in  the  Fed-  (1884). 

[404] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES 


[§478 


off  upon  this  evidence,  as  may  be  seen  in  Mr.  Chief  Justice 
Waite's  conclusion  in  the  majority  opinion:  "In  all  these 
voluminous  records  there  is  not  a  syllable  of  evidence  to 
show  a  usage  for  the  carriage  of  express  companies  on  the 
passenger  trains  of  railroads  unless  specially  contracted 
for.  While  it  has  uniformly  been  the  habit  of  railroad 
companies  to  arrange,  at  the  earliest  practical  moment, 
to  take  one  express  company  on  some  or  all  of  their  pas- 
senger trains,  or  to  provide  some  other  way  of  doing  an 
express  business  on  their  lines,  it  has  never  been  the  prac- 
tice to  grant  such  a  privilege  to  more  than  one  company 
at  the  same  time,  unless  a  statute  !  or  some  special  circum- 
stances made  it  necessary  or  desirable."  - 

§  478.  Comment  thereon. 
The  arguments  from  policy  that  are  urged  in  support 


1  This  is  governed  by  statute  in 
some  jurisdictions;  for  example,  to- 
day in  Massachusetts  by  statute, 
such  number  of  local  expressmen 
shall  be  permitted  to  operate  over  a 
given  route  as  the  railroad  commis- 
sioners shall  decide.     (Rev.  Laws, 
chap.  Ill,  sec.  241.)    See  Kidder  v. 
Fitchburg  Ry.  Co.,  165  Mass.  398, 
43  N.  E.  115  (1896). 

As  to  a  general  Canadian  statute, 
see  Vickers  v.  Canadian  Pacific  Ry. 
Co.,  13  Ont.  App.  210  (1908). 

2  In    accord    with    the    Express 
Cases,  supra,  are: 

United  States. — Baltimore  &  O. 
Ry.  v.  Voigt,  176  U.  S.  498,  20  Sup. 
Ct.  385,  44  L.  ed.  560  (1900). 

California. — Pfister  v.  Central 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Cal.  169,  11  Pac. 
686,  59  Am.  Rep.  404  (1886). 

Illinois.— Blank  v.  111.  Cent.  R. 
R.  Co.,  182  111.  332,  55  N.  E.  332 
(1899),  semble. 


Indiana. — Louisville,  N.,  A.  &  C. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Keefer,  146  Ind.  21,  44 
N.  E.  796,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  348,  38 
L.  R.  A.  93  (1896),  semble. 

Kentucky. — Davis  v.  Chesapeake 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  53,  92 
S.  W.  339,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  458 
(1906),  semble. 

Maryland. — Dulaney  v.  United 
Ry.  &  El.  Co.,  104  Md.  423,  65  Atl. 
45  (1906). 

Massachusetts. — Sargent  v.  Bos- 
ton &  L.  R.  R.,  115  Mass.  416 
(1874). 

North  Carolina. — Atlantic  Ex- 
press Co.  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  463,  16  S.  E.  393 
(1892),  overruling  Alsop  v.  South- 
ern Exp.  Co.,  104  N.  C.  278,  10  S.  E. 
297  (1889). 

Vermont. — Robinson  v.  St.  Johns- 
bury  &  L.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  80  Vt.  129,  66 
Atl.  814,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  129 
(1907),  semble. 

[405] 


§  479  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

of  these  conservative  cases  are  not  conclusive,  although 
they  have  a  certain  force.  It  is  true  that  it  is  somewhat 
more  difficult  for  the  railroads  to  handle  three  distinct 
expresses  than  one,  but  not  more  difficult  than  many 
problems  of  railroading  that  are  part  of  every  day  traffic 
handling.  Subdivision  of  express  cars  upon  light  runs, 
and  more  development  of  the  special  train  for  express 
matter,  would  solve  the  difficulty;  and  the  railroad  is  pro- 
tected in  any  event  by  the  right  to  charge  a  fair  price  for 
its  services  based  upon  the  cost  of  service.  Again,  it  is 
said  that  large  express  companies  are  better  than  a  greater 
number  of  smaller  companies.  It  should  be  pointed  out, 
however,  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Express  Cases  may  be 
used  to  exclude  the  national  express  companies  with  their 
full  equipment  from  any  railroad  system,  the  directors 
of  which  favor  some  local  company. 

§  479.  Express  companies :  radical  view. 

To  bring  out  the  difference  of  opinion  upon  this  im- 
portant matter  it  may  be  well  to  give  at  some  length, 
one  of  the  leading  cases  upon  the  other  side  of  this  con- 
troversy. The  most  radical  decision  upon  this  side  is  to 
be  found  in  McDuffee  v.  Portland  and  Rochester  Rail- 
road.1 This  was  an  action  on  the  case  by  the  plaintiff, 
an  expressman,  against  the  defendant  railway  for  not 
furnishing  the  plaintiff  terms,  facilities,  and  accommoda- 
tions for  his  express  business  on  the  defendants'  road, 
reasonably  equal  to  those  furnished  by  the  defendants  to 
the  Eastern  Express  Company.  The  defendants  demurred 
to  the  declaration,  which  demurrer  the  Supreme  Court 
finally  discharged.  The  gist  of  Chief  Justice  Doe's  opinion 
may  be  seen  from  the  following  extract:  "A  railroad  cor- 
poration, carrying  one  expressman,  and  enabling  him  to 
do  all  the  express  business  on  the  line  of  their  road,  do 

1  52  N.  H.  430,  13  Am.  Rep.  72  (1873). 
[406] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  480 

hold  themselves  out  as  common  carriers  of  expresses; 
and  when  they  unreasonably  refuse,  directly,  or  indirectly, 
to  carry  any  more  public  servants  of  that  class,  they  per- 
form this  duty  with  illegal  partiality.  The  legal  principle 
which  establishes  and  secures  the  common  right,  being 
the  perfection  of  reason,  the  right  is  not  a  mere  nomi- 
nal one,  and  is  in  no  danger  of  being  destroyed  by  a 
quibble.1 

§  480.  Discussion  thereof. 

The  strongest  argument  for  the  progressive  view  may 
be  developed  from  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  opinion 
just  quoted.  If  the  public  duty  in  this  matter  does  not 
go  to  the  extent  of  preventing  discrimination  in  perform- 
ing it,  none  of  the  law  of  public  service  applies  between 
the  railroad  company  and  the  express  company;  and  it 
follows  that  any  express  company  may  be  charged  extor- 
tionate prices.  Such  unreasonable  charges,  if  not  for- 
bidden, will  inevitably  react  upon  the  general  shipping 
public  to  whom,  by  the  hypothesis,  a  public  duty  is  owed 
to  provide  adequate  service  for  reasonable  rates.  It  may 
be  urged  that  the  express  business  itself  is  a  public  calling, 
and  that  therefore  the  express  companies  themselves  are 
bound  to  give  satisfactory  service  at  reasonable  rates. 
But  their  duty  is  relative;  if  they  must  pay  extortionate 
prices,  they  may  charge  these  against  the  general  shipping 

1  In  accord  see:  wissa  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Pa.  St.  378,  64 

Maine.— New  England  Exp.  Co.  Am.  Dec.  667  (1855). 

v.  Maine  C.  R.  R.,  57  Me.  188,  2  Texas.— State  v.  Missouri,  K.  & 

Am.  Rep.  31  (1869);  International  T.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Tex.  516,  91  S.  W. 

Exp.  Co.  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.,  81  214,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  783  (1906). 

Me.  92,  16  Atl.  370  (1888).  England—  Pickford     v.     Grand 

New  Jersey.— Rogers   L.   &   M.  Junction  Ry.  Co.,  10  M.  &  W.  399 

Wks.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  (1842);  Parker  v.   Great  Western 

Eq.  379  (1869).  Ry.  Co.,  7  M.  &  G.  253  (1844); 

Pennsylvania. — Sanford  v.  Cata-  Parker  v.  Great  Western  Ry.,  11 

C.  B.  545,  583  (1851). 

[407] 


§  481  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

public  as  necessary  operating  expenses.  Therefore  if  the 
whole  law  governing  public  duty  is  not  applied  between  the 
railways  and  the  expressmen  it  would  seem  to  be  impossi- 
ble in  any  entirely  satisfactory  way  to  protect  by  the  law 
the  shippers  of  express  matter  from  the  machinations 
of  those  who  are  concerned  with  transporting  it. 

§  481.  Exclusive  contracts  with  private  car  lines. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Express  Cases  is  continually  ham- 
pering the  common  law  in  dealing  with  interstate  trans- 
portation. Within  the  last  few  years  public  opinion  has 
been  much  aroused  against  the  exclusive  arrangements 
entered  into  between  the  railways  and  the  various  private 
car  lines.  It  is  pretty  generally  agreed  that  what  ought 
to  be  done  in  dealing  with  the  private  car  lines  is  to  apply 
to  the  whole  situation  the  coercive  law  that  regulates 
public  calling.  Either  the  railways  ought  to  be  obliged 
to  conduct  these  special  services  themselves,  furnishing 
their  own  cars,  or  if  they  decide  upon  a  different  policy 
they  should  be  obliged  to  haul  the  cars  of  as  many  private 
car  lines  as  choose  to  undertake  the  business.  But  the 
conservative  doctrines  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  stand  in  the  way  of  the  immediate  appli- 
cation to  interstate  commerce  of  any  such  progressive 
views  as  these.  In  the  meantime,  in  the  absence  of  effi- 
cient regulation  by  thorough-going  law,  those  private 
car  lines,  the  refrigerator  car  lines  particularly,  that  have 
exclusive  agreements  with  the  railways  are  showing  very 
clearly  what  may  happen  when  a  common  carrier  is  per- 
mitted to  foster  a  monopoly  in  a  dependent  service. 
Similar  issues  have  been  raised  as  to  private  car  lines  for 
the  transportation  of  live  stock;  but  the  Federal  courts 
have  applied  the  doctrine  of  the  Express  Cases  to  them 
as  in  duty  bound.  The  leading  case  on  this  point  seems 
to  be  United  States  ex  rel.  Morris  v.  Delaware,  Lacka- 
[408] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  482 

wanna  &  Western  Railroad  Company  x  in  which  Mr. 
Justice  Wallace  said:  "It  is  no  part  of  the  common-law 
obligation  of  railway  companies  to  furnish  the  same  facili- 
ties or  instrumentalities  of  -transportation  to  all  alike, 
and  while  it  is  unquestionably  their  duty  to  furnish  suit- 
able and  adequate  facilities  for  all  reasonable  necessities 
of  the  business  they  engage  in,  they  may  nevertheless 
choose  their  own  appropriate  means  of  carriage."  2 

§  482.  Arrangements  for  hauling  sleeping  cars. 

Another  important  case  since  the  Express  Cases  which 
came  up  for  decision  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  relating  to  sleeping  car  service  really  involves  the 
same  general  issue.3  In  the  leading  case  an  exclusive  con- 
tract was  held  valid  by  the  terms  of  which  a  railroad 
company  gave  a  palace-car  company  the  exclusive  right 
for  fifteen  years  to  furnish  parlor  and  sleeping  cars  on 
all  passenger  trains  of  the  railroad  company,  the  railroad 
company  binding  itself  not  to  contract  with  any  other 
company  to  run  the  same  class  of  cars  over  its  lines  during 
that  period.  The  court  felt  that  there  was  no  public 
policy  violated  as  there  was  no  public  duty  involved. 
An  extract  from  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  shows 
that  this  law  still  continues:  "The  defendant  was  under 
a  duty  arising  from  the  public  nature  of  its  employment 
to  furnish  for  the  use  of  passengers  upon  its  lines,  such 
accommodations  as  were  reasonably  required  by  the  ex- 

1  40  Fed.  101  (1889).  79,  35  L.  ed.  97,  11  Sup.  Ct.  490 

2  But  the  railroad  in  making  its      (1890). 

special  contract  with  a  private  car  There  have  recently  been  cases 

line   cannot   stipulate   against   lia-  holding  the  same  doctrine: 

bility  for  personal  injuries  to  those  Colorado. — Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 

concerned.    See  Baker  v.  Boston  &  Co.  v.  Whan,  39  Colo.  230,  89  Pac. 

M.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  H.  100,  65  Atl.  39,  11  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  432  (1908). 

386  (1906).  Texas.— Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry. 

1  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  Co.  v.  State,  99  Tex.  34,  87  S.  W. 

v.   Pullman   Car  Co.,    139   U.   S.  336,  70  L.  R.  A.  950  (1905). 

[409] 


§  483  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

isting  conditions  of  passenger  traffic.  Its  duty,  as  a  car- 
rier of  passengers,  was  to  make  suitable  provisions  for 
their  comfort  and  safety.  Instead  of  furnishing  its  own 
drawing-room  and  sleeping  cars,  as  it  might  have  done, 
it  employed  the  plaintiff,  whose  special  business  was  to 
provide  cars  of  that  character,  to  supply  as  many  as  were 
necessary  to  meet  the  requirements  of  travel.  It  thus 
used  the  instrumentality  of  another  corporation  in  order 
that  it  might  properly  discharge  its  duty  to  the  public. 
So  long  as  the  defendants'  lines  were  supplied  with  the 
requisite  number  of  drawing-room  and  sleeping  cars,  it 
was  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  public  who  owned 
them."  1 

§  483.  Hack  service :  conservative  view. 

It  is  maintained  by  many  courts  that  the  railroad  com- 
pany is  under  no  public  duty  to  admit  hackmen  to  its 
station  grounds  to  solicit  business.  One  of  the  strongest 
cases  for  the  railway  in  this  matter  in  recent  years  is 
New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company  v. 
Scovill.2  In  that  case  it  appeared  from  the  complaint 
that  the  plaintiff  by  its  board  of  directors  adopted  a 
regulation  excluding  from  its  station  grounds  all  persons 
who,  without  special  permission  in  writing,  should  come 
to  solicit  the  carriage  of  passengers  or  their  luggage.  The 
defendant,  knowing  the  regulation,  soon  afterwards  en- 
tered upon  its  station  grounds  in  Middletown  to  solicit 

1  It  has  been  remarked  of  this  705,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  674,  106  Am. 

situation  as  of  other  relationships  St.  Rep.  187  (1905). 

of  this  sort  that  as  a  railroad  com-  Indiana. — Russell    v.    Pittsburg, 

pany  is  under  no  legal  duty  to  re-  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Ind. 

ceive  a  sleeping  car  from  the  Pull-  305,  61  N.  E.  678,  87  Am.  St.  Rep. 

man  Company  with  its  employes  214  (1901). 

thereon  it  may  make  special  con-  2  71  Conn.  136,  41  Atl.  246,  42 

tracts  limiting  its  liability.  L.  R.  A.  157,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  159 

Illinois— Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  (1898). 
Co.  v.  Hamler,  215  111.  525,  74  N.  E. 

[410] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  483 

business  of  that  description.  This  was  a  bill  for  an  in- 
junction to  stop  this  practice.  The  injunction  was  granted 
in  the  lower  court,  but  in  the  higher  court  this  was  set 
aside.  Mr.  Justice  Baldwin  holding  that  the  regulation 
was  reasonable:  "Such  a  grant  was  within  its  lawful 
powers,  provided  its  terms  were  not  inconsistent  with 
the  reasonable  accommodation  of  the  passengers  upon 
its  road.  Nothing  appears  on  the  record  to  indicate  any 
such  inconsistency.  It  may  well  be  more  convenient  for 
them  to  deal  with  a  single  local  carrier  than  to  be  met, 
on  alighting  from  their  train,  by  importunate  solicitations 
from  a  number  of  rival  competitors  for  their  custom;  and, 
in  the  absence  of  averments  to  the  contrary,  it  is  to  be 
presumed  that  the  prices  at  this  stand  are  fair,  and  the 
service  sufficient.  If  any  of  them  prefer  that  of  some  other 
person,  they  can  secure  it  by  an  order  in  advance,  which 
would  justify  his  entrance  on  the  grounds;  or  by  passing 
by  the  stand  established  there,  and  going  into  the  streets 
outside,  to  engage  whomsoever  they  think  fit."  1 

1  To  the  same  effect  are:  230,  58  N.  E.  689,  83  Am.  St.  Rep. 

United  States.— Donovan  v.  Penn-  275  (1900) . 

sylvania  Co.,  199  U.  S.  279,  50  L.  Minnesota. — Godbout    v.    Union 

ed.    192,   26   Sup.    Ct.   91    (1905),  Depot  Co.,  79  Minn.  188,  81  N.  W. 

affirming  124  Fed.  1016,  60  C.  C.  A.  835,  47  L.  R.  A.  532  (1900). 

168,  120  Fed.  215,  57  C.  C.  A.  362,  New     Hampshire.— Redding     v. 

116  Fed.  907.  Gallagher,  72  N.  H.  377,  57  Atl.  225, 

Colorado.— Union  Depot  &  Ry.  64  L.  R.  A.  811  (1903),  overruling 

Co.  v.  Meeking,  42  Colo.  89,  94  Pac.  on  rehearing  69  N.  H.  650,  45  Atl. 

16,  126  Am.  St.  Rep.  145  (1908).  96,  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  204. 

Georgia. — Kates  v.  Atlanta  Bag.  New  York. — Brown  v.  New  York 

&  Cab  Co.,  107  Ga.  636,  34  S.  E.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  151  N.  Y.  674, 

372,  46  L.  R.  A.  431  (1898).  46  N.  E.  1145  (1897);  New  York  C. 

Massachusetts.— Old    Colony    R.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Flynn,  74  Hun, 

R.  v.  Tripp,  147  Mass.  35,  17  N.  E.  124,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  859  (1893); 

89,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  661,  B.  &  W.  166  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

(1888);  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sheeley,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  185  (1893); 

Brown,  177  Mass.  65,  58  N.  E.  189,  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

52  L.  R.  A.  418  (1900);  Boston  &  Warren,  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  781,  31 

M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  177  Mass.  Misc.  Rep.  571  (1900). 

'4111 


§484 


§  484.  Objections  thereto. 

The  practical  inconvenience  that  the  Justice  feels  could 
be  met  by  some  reasonable  regulation  of  the  sort  uni- 
versally supported,  confining  all  hackmen  behind  a  bar 
in  the  station  and  by  other  requirements  of  orderly  con- 
duct.1 And  if  the  railroad  company  does  not  take  this 
up,  the  city  may  pass  ordinances  to  this  end.  -  But  regu- 
lations which  arbitrarily  admit  one  line  of  hacks  to  the 
station  and  exclude  another  or  give  one  a  better  position 
than  another  are  different  matters,  and  whether  they 


Ohio. — Snyder  v.  Depot  Co.,  19 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  368  (1899);  State  v. 
Union  Depot  Co.,  71  Ohio  St.  379, 
73  N.  E.  633,  68  L.  R.  A.  792  (1905). 

Rhode  Island— New  York,  N.  H. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bork,  23  R.  I.  218, 
49  Atl.  965  (1901). 

Utah. — Oregon  Short  Line  Ry.  v. 
Davidson,  33  Utah,  370,  94  Pac.  10, 
16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  777  (1908). 

England. — Painter  v.  London,  B. 
&  S.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  2  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  702 
(1857). 

Australia. — Borsum  v.  Hardie,  23 
Viet.  Sup.  Ct.  479  (1898). 

1  Regulations  of  the  company  of 
this  sort  are  valid: 

Indiana. — Lucas  v.  Herbert,  148 
Ind.  64,  47  N.  E.  146,  37  L.  R.  A. 
376  (1897). 

Massachusetts.  —  Commonwealth 
v.  Power,  7  Met.  596,  41  Am.  Dec. 
465  (1844). 

Michigan. — Cole  v.  Rowen,  88 
Mich.  219,  50  N.  W.  138,  13  L.  R. 
A.  848  (1891). 

Pennsylvania. — Smith  v.  N.  Y., 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Pa.  St. 
249,  24  Atl.  304  (1892). 

2  Municipal    ordinances    of    this 
sort  are  valid: 

[412] 


Alabama. — Lindsay  v.  Mayor  & 
City  Council  of  Anniston,  104  Ala. 
257,  16  So.  545,  27  L.  R.  A.  436,  53 
Am.  St.  Rep.  44  (1893). 

Arkansas. — Emerson  v.  McNeil, 
84  Ark.  552,  106  S.  W.  479,  15  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  715  (1907). 

Colorado. — Colorado  Springs  v. 
Smith,  19  Colo.  554,  36  Pac.  540 
(1894). 

Illinois. — Danville  v.  Noone,  103 
111.  App.  290  (1901). 

Indiana. — Veneman  v.  Jones,  118 
Ind.  41,  20  N.  E.  644,  10  Am.  St. 
Rep.  100  (1888). 

Kansas. — Ottawa  v.  Bodley,  67 
Kan.  178,  72  Pac.  545  (1903). 

Minnesota. — St.  Paul  v.  Smith, 
27  Minn.  364,  7  N.  W.  734,  38  Am. 
Rep.  296  (1880). 

Ohio. — Moerder  v.  Fremont,  19 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  394  (1899). 

Texas. — Vance,  Ex  parte,  42  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  619,  62  S.  W.  568  (1901). 

But  see: 

Georgia. — Cosgrove  v.  City  Coun- 
cil of  Augusta,  103  Ga.  835,  31  S.  E. 
445,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  149,  42  L.  R. 
A.  711  (1898). 

Michigan. — Napman  v.  People, 
19  Mich.  352  (1869). 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  485 

are  valid  or  not  depends  upon  whether  it  is  consistent 
with  the  general  duty  of  the  carrier  or  not  to  so  arrange 
matters. 

§  486.  Hack  service :  radical  view. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  position  that  a  railroad  may  not 
admit  favored  hackmen  to  solicit  business  upon  the  sta- 
tion grounds  and  exclude  other  hackmen  from  equal 
privileges  is  held  in  many  cases.  The  argument  for  this 
view  is  stated  very  clearly  in  State  v.  Reed  l  by  Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Woods:  "The  question  is  one  that  affects  the 
interests  of  the  public.  The  upholding  of  the  grant  of 
this  exclusive  privilege  would  prevent  competition  between 
rival  carriers  of  passengers,  create  a  monopoly  in  the 
privileged  hackmen,  and  might  produce  inconvenience 
and  loss  to  persons  traveling  over  the  railroad,  or  those 
having  freights  transported  over  it,  iri  cases  of  exclusion 
of  drays  and  wagons  from  its  grounds,  other  than  those 
owned  by  the  person  having  the  exclusive  right  to  enter 
the  railroad's  depot  grounds.  To  concede  the  right  claimed 
by  the  railroad  in  the  present  case  would  be,  in  effect, 
to  confer  upon  the  railroad  company  the  control  of  the 
transportation  of  passengers  beyond  its  own  lines,  and 
to  create  a  monopoly  of  such  business,  not  granted  by  its 
charter,  and  against  the  interests  of  the  public."  2 

1  76  Miss.  211,  24  So.  308,  71  Am.      Am.  St.  Rep.  274,  45  L.  R.  A.  427 
St.  Rep.  528,  43  L.  R.  A.  134  (1898).       (1899). 

2  To  the  same  effect  are:  Kentucky. — McConnell  v.  Pedigo, 
Florida.— Indian  River  S.  B.  Co.      92  Ky.  465,  18  S.  W.  15  (1892). 

v.  East  Coast  Transp.  Co.,  28  Fla.  Michigan. — Kalamazoo   Hack  & 

387,  10  So.  480,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  258  Bus  Co.  v.  Sootsma,  84  Mich.  194, 

(1891).  47  N.  W.  667,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  693, 

Illinois—  Pennsylvania     Co.     v.  10  L.  R.  A.  819  (1890). 

Chicago,  181  111.  289,  54  N.  E.  825,  Missouri.— Cravens  v.   Rodgers, 

53  L.  R.  A.  223  (1899).  101  Mo.  247,  14  S.  W.  106  (1890). 

Indiana. — Indianapolis  U.  Ry.  v.  Montana. — Montana  U.  Ry.  Co. 

Dohn,  153  Ind.  10,  53  N.  E.  937,  74  v.  Langlois,  9  Mont.  419,  24  Pac. 

[4131 


§§  486, 487  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  486.  Argument  therefor. 

There  seems  to  be  a  violation  of  the  duty  owed  by 
the  carrier  to  the  passenger  to  permit  free  egress  by  these 
special  privileges  at  the  station  which  prevent  the  pas- 
senger from  having  equal  access  to  all  who  wish  to  put 
themselves  at  his  disposal.  The  right  of  the  passenger 
to  have  ingress  to  the  station  by  any  carriage  that  he 
chooses  to  employ  nobody  dares  to  deny;  it  is  very  hard  to 
see  any  essential  difference  from  the  obligation  to  give 
egress  without  discrimination.  Moreover,  to  allow  the 
grant  of  exclusive  privilege  permits  the  exploitation  of 
the  passenger  by  this  monopoly;  for  monopoly  price  is 
always  higher  than  competitive  price.  This  may  be  shown 
by  the  fact  that  the  favored  lines  are  always  willing  to 
pay  roundly  for  the  exclusive  privilege,  even  when  maxi- 
mum fares  are  fixed  by  local  ordinance. 

§  487.  Access  to  connecting  steamboats. 

An  analogous  question  is  raised  when  a  railroad  having 
a  terminus  upon  a  wharf  in  a  navigable  stream,  enters 
into  some  arrangement  with  one  steamboat  line  whereby 
it  may  have  exclusive  access  to  the  wharf.  In  the  Indian 
River  Steamboat  Co.  v.  East  Coast  Transportation  Com- 
pany,1 a  scheme  to  give  an  exclusive  right  was  held  op- 
posed to  public  duty.  Mr.  Justice  Mabry  in  the  opinion 
of  the  court  said  in  one  place :  "  The  real  question  presented 
here  is,  can  complainant  corporation,  engaged  in  carrying 
freight  and  passengers  on  the  Indian  River  by  means  of 
steamboats,  rent  from  a  railroad  common  carrier  its  dock 
on  said  river,  on  which  its  track  and  terminal  facilities 
are  located,  and  exclude  others  from  landing  at  said  ter- 
minal point  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  freight  and  pas- 
sengers to  and  from  said  common  carrier?  This  question, 

209,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  745,  8  L.  R.  A.          »  28  Fla.  387,  10  So.  480,  29  Am. 
753  (1890).  St.  Rep.  258  (1891). 

[414] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  488 

we  think,  must  be  answered  in  the  negative.  If  it  be  com- 
petent to  sustain  such  a  contract,  the  common  carrier  can 
select  one  connecting  line  of  boats,  and  exclude  all  others 
from  doing  business  with  it.  Such  a  doctrine  would  lead 
to  the  legalizing  of  a  monopoly,  and  the  sanction  of  an  un- 
fair and  unjust  preference  between  connecting  and  com- 
peting lines  of  transportation.  We  do  not  understand  that 
a  common  carrier  ever  had  such  power  as  this."  1 

§  488.  No  access  owed  except  at  wharf  stations. 

It  should  be  said,  however,  that  as  no  access  or  egress 
is  owed  except  at  established  stations  by  a  railroad  to 
its  patrons,  the  only  legal  wrong  in  such  discrimination 
against  connecting  steamboats  at  terminal  wharves  will 
be  at  such  wharves  as  are  regular  stations.  This  was  the 
deciding  point  in  the  final  decision  in  Ilwaco  Railway 
and  Navigation  Company  v.  Oregon  Short  Line  Railway 
Company  2  where  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  held  that 
a  transportation  company  operating  a  railway  and  a  line 
of  steamboats  connecting  at  the  company's  wharf  need 
not  permit  the  steamboats  of  a  competitor  to  land  at 
such  wharf.  Mr.  Justice  McKenna  pointed  this  out: 
"We  may  add  that  the  wharf  does  not  seem  to  be  a  public 
station.  It  is  a  convenience,  only,  in  connecting  its  rail- 
roads and  boats;  the  general  station  being  at  Ilwaco,  where 
ample' facilities  exist."  3 

1  There  is  other  authority  to  the  (1903),  where  it  was  held  that  if  a 
same  effect:  Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  R.  railroad  provided  adequate  wharf- 
Co,  v.  Graham  &  Ward,   117  Ga.  age  facilities,  it  might  at  a  particu- 
555,  43  S.  E.  1000  (1903).  lar  wharf  exclude  all  but  one  line. 

2  57  Fed.  673,  15  U.  S.  App.  173,  6  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miami 
C.  C.  A.  495  (1893),  overruling  51  S.  S.  Co.,  86  Fed.  407,  52  U.  S.  App. 
Fed.  611  (1892).  732,  30  C.  C.  A.  142  (1898),  accord. 

3  See  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  But  see  The  Davidson,   122  Fed. 
West  Coast  N.  S.  Co.,  198  U.  S.  483,  1006  (1903). 

49  L.  ed.   1135,  25  Sup.  Ct.  745          There  are  two  New  York  cases  on 
(1905),    overruling    121    Fed.    645      this  point.     One  holds  that  a  rail- 

[415] 


§  489  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  489.     Treatment  of  baggage  transfer  men. 

This  question,  whether  access  to  the  station  may  be 
granted  exclusively  to  one  baggage-transfer  line  and  alto- 
gether denied  to  others,  is  another  case  under  the  general 
problem.  There  is  upon  this  issue,  therefore,  the  same 
bitter  controversy  conducted  along  the  same  lines  with  the 
same  arguments  advanced  with  the  result  that  some  ju- 
risdictions will  permit  the  exclusion  of  all  but  the  favored 
line,  while  others  allow  equal  access  to  all.  On  one  side 
it  may  be  said,  as  before,  that  there  is  no  direct  duty  owed 
by  the  company  to  the  baggage-transfer  lines  or  any  of 
them;  and  that,  therefore,  the  railroad  may  make  any 
discriminations  that  it  pleases.  For,  as  is  pointed  out  in 
the  principal  cases  cited  below  if  there  is  no  public  duty 
in  the  matter,  a  public  service  company  may  bestow  its 
favors  as  it  pleases;  and  to  many  courts  it  seems  that 
the  railways  may  deal  as  they  please  with  the  baggage- 
transfer  people.1  On  the  other  hand,  in  many  other  juris- 
dictions it  would  certainly  be  held  that  the  general  duty 
owed  by  the  railway  company  to  its  passengers  to  allow 
them  free  egress  from  its  station,  involved  the  duty  to 
allow  them  free  access  within  the  station  to  those  who 

road  which  permits  one  steamboat  Georgia. — Kates  v.  Atlanta  Bag. 

company  to  use  a  wharf  upon  which  Co.,  107  Ga.  636,  34  S.  E.  372,  46 

its  tracks  terminate  is  not  bound  to  L.  R.  A.  431   (1899).     See  further 

permit    another    line    to    do    so.  Hart  v.  Atlanta  Terminal  Co.,  128 

Alexandria  Bay  Sb.   Co.   v.   New  Ga.  754,  58  S.  E.  452  (1908). 

York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  Massachusetts.— Old    Colony    R. 

Supp.  1091,  18  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  527  R.  Co.  v.  Tripp,  147  Mass.  35,  17 

(1897).     In  the  other  it  was  held  N.  E.  89,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  661,  B.  & 

that  where  a  special  franchise  to  W.  166  (1888). 

maintain  a  public  wharf  was  granted  New  Hampshire. — Hedding       v. 

the  rule  was  otherwise.    Thousand  Gallagher,  72  N.  H.  377,  57  Atl.  225, 

Island  Sb.  Co.  v.  Visgar,  86  N.  Y.  64  L.  R.  A.  811  (1903). 

App.  Div.  126,  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  325  Virginia.— Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  v. 

(1903).  Old  Dominion  Bag.  Co.,  99  Va.  Ill, 

1  Such  is  the  doctrine  of  the  fol-  37  S.   E.   784,   50   L.   R.   A.  722 

lowing  cases,  for  example:  (1901). 

[4161 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  490 

might  wish  to  put  themselves  at  their  disposal  to  aid  them 
in  getting  their  belongings  away.1 

§  490.  Rights  of  competing  draymen. 

On  analogous  principles  to  those  discussed  in  regard  to 
baggage  transfer  it  would  seem  that  the  railroad  may  not 
permit  certain  draymen  to  have  access  to  its  freight  houses 
to  cart  goods  to  consignees,  and  refuse  all  access  to  other 
carters.  For  example,  if  a  consignee  sends  to  a  freight 
house  for  his  freight  by  a  drayman  of  his  own  selection, 
it  should  be  clear  that  the  railroad  would  act  contrary 
to  its  duty  if  it  refused  such  a  drayman  access  to  the  goods. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  granted  that  if  the  carrier 
chooses  to  extend  its  route  in  effect  by  undertaking  ^per- 
sonal delivery  of  freight  to  the  consignee  at  his  address, 
it  may  do  this  by  its  own  carts  and  men,  and  need  not 
employ  in  that  service  all  who  wish  to  engage  in  it.  But 
whether  if  it  offers  delivery  beyond  its  own  route  to  its 
patrons,  and  to  that  end  enters  into  an  exclusive  contract 
with  one  line  of  drays  to  perform  this  service,  the  owners 
of  other  drays  may  complain  if  they  are  excluded  from 
offering  their  services  to  shippers  in  this  behalf,  is  the 
question  of  the  duties  of  a  common  carrier  in  dealing 
with  a  dependent  service  presented  in  still  another  form. 
The  Federal  courts,  as  might  be  expected,  see  nothing 
wrong  in  such  an  arrangement.  The  point  is  thus  made  in 
St.  Louis  Drayage  Company  v.  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Railroad  Company  2  where  the  facts  involved  the  issue 

1  Such  is  the  doctrine  of  the  fol-  182,    19    L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.)    756 

lowing  cases,  for  example:  (1909). 

Indiana. — Indianapolis    U.     Ry.  Michigan. — Kalamazoo   Hack  & 

Co.  v.  Dohn,  153  Ind.  10,  53  N.  E.  Bus  Co.  v.  Sootsuma,  84  Mich.  194, 

937,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  274,  45  L.  R.  47  N.  W.  667,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  693, 

A.  427  (1899).  10  L.  R.  A.  819  (1890). 

Kentucky. — Palmer  Transfer  Co.  Missouri. — Cravens  v.    Rodgers, 

v.  Anderson,  131  Ky.  217, 115  S.  W.  101  Mo.  247,  14  S.  W.  106  (1890). 

2  65  Fed.  39  (1894). 

27  [417] 


§  491  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

which  has  just  been  raised.  In  that  case  Mr.  Justice 
Phillips  said :  "  It  was  essential  that,  in  selecting  a  company 
for  the  transfer  of  its  freights  between  St.  Louis  and  East 
St.  Louis,  it  should  secure  one  fully  equipped  for  doing 
the  business, — solvent  and  reliable.  It  could  not  afford 
to  take  chances  in  so  grave  a  matter.  It  might  be  unsafe 
to  trust  to  the  caprice  of  competing  transfer  companies, 
or  to  sporadic  rivalries."  1 

§  491.  Arrangements  with  stock  yards. 

The  relative  positions  of  the  railroads  and  the  stock 
yards  will  be  discussed  later  at  greater  length.  It  will 
then  be  seen  that  although  the  decision  at  first  was  other- 
wise it  now  seems  to  be  held  that  there  is  no  duty  owed 
to  the  owner  of  cattle  to  make  special  delivery  of  them  at 
any  place  along  the  line  that  he  wishes.  Consequently 
it  is  held  that  the  railroad  may  designate  certain  points  of 
delivery  reasonably  convenient,  as  it  may  of  other  freight 
which  it  has  undertaken  to  carry.  Upon  this  basis  the 
courts  have  been  willing  to  permit  the  railroad  to  designate 
one  of  several  stock  yards  as  its  cattle  station  in  effect, 
where  it  will  deliver  cattle  consigned  to  that  point  and 
have  accordingly  justified  it  in  refusing  to  deliver  at  other 
stock  yards.  This  was  well  enough  so  long  as  the  courts 
held  strictly  as  they  once  did  2  that  no  charge  could  be 
made  under  such  circumstances  against  the  shipments  for 
yardage  if  the  consignee  was  ready  to  take  the  cattle  away. 
But  under  the  latest  decisions  the  courts  have  permitted 
the  stock  yards  company  to  make  an  additional  charge, 

1  A  drayage  company  employed  2  Covington  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Keith, 

by  one  carrier  to  deliver  goods  in  139  U.  S.  128,  35  L.  ed.  73,  11  Sup. 

transit  to  another  carrier  is  its  own  Ct.  461  (1891).    See  also  Butchers' 

dependent    service — not    an    inde-  &  D.  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

pendent  connecting  carrier.   Hooper  R.  Co.,  67  Fed.  35,  14  C.  C.  A.  290 

v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  (1895);  Coe  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

27    Wis.    81,    9    Am.    Rep.    439  Co.,  3  Fed.  775  (1880),  is  practically 

(1870).  overruled  on  this  point. 

[418] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  492 

considering  it  to  be  a  connecting  service.1  It  would  seem, 
therefore,  that  there  is  danger  in  the  present  situation 
that  the  railroad  will  not  fulfill  its  duty.  And  should  it 
persist  in  handing  its  patrons  over  to  the  particular  stock 
yards,  with  which  it  has  exclusive  arrangements,  the  dan- 
ger of  exploitation  which  has  been  discussed  earlier  in 
this  chapter  will  sometime  become  apparent. 

§  492.  Contracts  with  grain  elevators. 

As  to  grain  elevators  the  rule  is  practically  established 
that  the  railroad  must  deliver  at  their  private  siding  to 
all  of  them  that  are  along  its  route.  Grain  in  bulk  is  a 
peculiar  kind  of  freight,  which  as  a  commercial  matter 
requires  special  delivery.  And  as  this  is  a  duty  owed  by 
the  railroad  to  its  patrons,  it  would  not  be  legal  for  it  to 
make  a  discrimination  in  favor  of  one  grain  elevator  re- 
quiring its  patrons  to  receive  grain  consigned  to  them 
through  it  and  pay  to  its  proprietor  his  fixed  charge.2 
Against  such  a  possibility  more  than  one  court  has  ur- 
gently protested.  "May  such  railroad  companies,  in  like 
manner,  discriminate  between  grain  elevators  in  the  same 
place, — constitute  one  elevator  its  depot  for  the  delivery 
of  grain,  and  force  competing  interests  to  receive  from  and 
transfer  the  grain  consigned  to  them  through  such  selected 
and  favored  channel?  If  railroad  corporations  possess 
such  right,  they  can  destroy  a  refractory  manufacturer, 
exterminate,  or  very  materially  cripple  competition,  and 

1  Interstate    Comm.    Comm.    v.  2  Illinois. — Chicago     &     North- 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  186  western  Ry.  Co.  v.  People  of  Illi- 
U.  S.  320,  46  L.  ed.  1182,  22  Sup.  nois,  56  111.  365  (1870). 
Ct.  824  (1902).     See  also  Central  Iowa. — Richmond  v.  Dubuque  & 
S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  S.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Iowa,  191  (1868). 
Co.,  192  U.  S.  568,  48  L.  ed.  565,  24  Minnesota.— State  v.  Chicago,  M. 
Sup.  Ct.  339  (1904).     See  further  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Minn.  402,  31 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  N.  W.  365  (1887). 
S.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S.  132,  53  L.  ed.  Nebraska.— Roby  v.  State  ex  rel., 
441,  29  Sup.  Ct.  246  (1909).  76  Neb.  450,  107  N.  W.  766  (1906). 

[4191 


§  493  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

in  large  measure  monopolize  and  control  these  several 
branches  of  useful  commerce,  and  dictate  such  terms  as 
avarice  may  suggest.  We  think  they  possess  no  such 
power  to  kill  and  make  alive."  1 

Topic  C.  Public  Services  in  General 

§  493.  Exclusive  arrangements  by  innkeepers. 

The  same  problems  present  themselves  to  a  limited 
extent  in  connection  with  the  hotel  keeper's  business, 
and  it  is  submitted  that  they  should  be  solved  upon 
the  principles  that  have  been  defended.  Thus  as  there 
is  a  duty  to  incoming  or  outgoing  guests,  it  would  seem 
that  innkeepers  should  give  the  proprietors  of  competing 
carriage  services  equal  access  to  guests.  An  innkeeper 
may  not  of  course  refuse  admission  to  the  grounds  to 
guests  who  come  in  any  sort  of  vehicle  by  whomsoever 
owned;  and  by  the  view  here  defended  they  ought  to 
give  equal  privileges  to  common  carriers  who  wish  to  take 
departing  guests.  In  a  leading  case  in  New  Hampshire  2 
it  was  decided  that  proprietors  of  stagecoaches  should 
be  given  equal  facilities  within  the  inn.  The  court  held 
that  the  defendant  had  clearly  a  right  to  establish  a  line 
of  stagecoaches,  and  to  go  to  the  plaintiff's  inn  with 
travelers;  and  he  might  of  course  lawfully  enter  it  for  the 
purpose  of  leaving  their  baggage  and  receiving  his  fare. 
"And  we  are  of  opinion  that,  so  long  as  others  were  per- 
mitted to  do  the  same,  the  defendant  had  an  equal  and 
lawful  right,  notwithstanding  any  prohibition  by  the 
plaintiff,  to  enter  the  plaintiff's  inn  for  the  purpose  of 
tendering  his  coach  for  the  use  of  travelers,  and  soliciting 
them  to  take  passage  with  him;  and  for  that  purpose  to 
go  into  the  common  public  rooms  of  the  inn,  where  guests 

1Coe  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  2  Markham  v.  Brown,  8  N.  H. 
Co.,  3  Fed.  775  (1880).  523,  31  Am.  Dec.  209  (1837). 

See  generally  §  816,  infra. 

[420] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES         [  §§  494,  495 

were  usually  placed  to  await  the  departure  of  the  stages, 
although  he  was  not  requested  by  such  guests;  provided 
there  was  a  reasonable  expectation  that  passengers  might 
be  there,  and  he  came  at  a  suitable  time,  in  a  proper 
manner,  demeaned  himself  peaceably,  and  remained  no 
longer  than  was  necessary,  and  was  doing  no  injury  to 
the  plaintiff."  1 

§  494.  Equal  facilities  for  ticker  service. 

It  seems  to  be  held  that  the  stock  exchanges  are  so 
affected  with  a  public  interest  as  to  be  under  a  duty  to 
give  the  public  access  to  their  quotations.  Having  devoted 
these  quotations  to  public  use  they  may  be  bound  to  see 
that  they  are  furnished  to  all  concerned  without  dis- 
crimination.2 And  yet  according  to  the  decision 3  on  this 
point  the  stock  exchanges  may  make  an  exclusive  contract 
with  one  telegraph  service  to  handle  its  news.  "Even 
assuming  that  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  is  under  an 
obligation  to  make  public  the  prices  at  which  stocks  are 
sold  on  its  floor,  it  has  a  right  to  control  absolutely  the 
channel  through  which  such  quotations  shall  be  given 
out.  It  may,  therefore,  select  one  'Ticker'  Company, 
and  give  to  it  all  the  privileges  of  connecting  news  upon 
its  floor  and  exclude  all  others." 

§  495.  Canal  company  giving  monopoly  of  towage. 
The  general  issue  was  involved  in  a  very  recent  case  4 

1  In  a  recent  New  York  case  a  2  See  New  York  Stock  Exchange 

clause  in  a  contract  between  a  tele-  v.  Chicago  Board  of  Trade,  127  111. 

phone  company  and  an  innkeeper  153,  19  N.  E.  855  (1889). 

by  which  it  was  provided  that  no  See    the    language    in    National 

other  telephone  company  should  be  Telegraph  N.  Co.  v.  Western  Union 

permitted  to  install  stations  in  the  Telegraph  Co.,    119   Fed.   294,   55 

hotel  was  held  void  as  against  pub-  C.  C.  A.  198  (1902). 

lie  policy.    Central  New  York  Tel.  J  Wilson  v.  The  Telegram  Co.,  18 

&  Tel.  Co.  v.  Averill,   55  N.   Y.  N.  Y.  State  Rep.  78,  3  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Misc.  346,    105  N.  Y.  Supp.  378  633  (1888),  semble. 

(1907).  « Chesapeake  &  D.  Canal  Co.  v. 

[421] 


§  496  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

in  which  among  other  regulations  of  the  Chesapeake  and 
Delaware  Canal  one  prohibiting  barges  not  the  property 
of  the  owner  of  the  tug  from  being  towed  through  the 
canal  by  a  tugboat  hired  for  the  purpose  (virtually  requir- 
ing such  barges  to  be  turned  over  to  a  particular  towing 
company  to  be  taken  through)  was  held  void, — the  United 
States  District  Judge  saying:  "We  concur  in  the  opinion 
of  the  court  below  that  this  regulation  is  not  reasonable 
or  necessary,  and  therefore  beyond  the  powers  of  the 
canal  company.  In  justification  of  this  regulation  the 
canal  company  claims  that  in  order  to  accommodate  the 
absolute  necessities  of  three-fourths  of  the  commerce 
passing  through  the  canal,  it  was  necessary  to  have  a 
towing  company  whose  charges  shall  be  low,  and  which 
will  be  ready  at  all  times  to  take  barges  through  without 
delay,  and  that  it  found  that,  in  order  to  get  such  service, 
it  was  necessary  to  secure  to  such  towing  service  a  suffi- 
cient amount  of  business  at  the  low  prices  charged  to  pay 
the  expenses  of  the  necessary  equipment.  We  find  nothing 
in  the  charter  of  the  company  which  justifies  it  in  prevent- 
ing a  tug  of  proper  dimensions  from  towing  through  the 
canal  any  barge  of  suitable  dimensions  and  equipment 
upon  the  payment  of  the  lawful  toll.  The  canal  is  a  pub- 
lic highway  and  the  public  has  the  right  to  the  free  use 
of  it  provided  the  legal  tolls  are  paid."  1 

§  496.  Arrangements  for  sprinkling  service. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  cases  upon  the  whole  sub- 
ject is  the  recent  case  of  Louisville  Water  Company  v. 
Wiemer,2  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  elaborate  regula- 

Gring,  159  Fed.  662,  86  C.  C.  A.  530  not  refuse  to  let  a  vessel  pass  in  tow 

(1908).  on  the  ground  that  the  owners  of 

1  In  Buffalo  Bayou  Ship  Channel  the  towboat  owed  the  canal  com- 

v.  Milby  &  Dow,  63  Tex.  492,  51  pany  for  unpaid  tolls. 
Am.  Rep.  668  (1885),  it  was  held          2 130  Fed.  257,  64  C.  C.  A.  503 

that  the  proprietors  of  a  canal  could  (1904). 

[422] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  497 

tions  of  a  water  company  requiring  persons  engaged  in 
sprinkling  of  streets  to  obtain  a  license  from  the  company, 
and  providing  that  more  than  one  license  would  not  be 
granted  covering  the  same  street  or  part  of  a  street,  which 
should  be  granted  to  the  applicant  having  the  largest  list 
of  petitioning  owners  of  abutting  property  were  entirely 
reasonable.  The  course  of  reasoning  followed  is  well 
worth  study.  "Certainly  it  cannot  be  said  that  there 
would  be  any  propriety  in  granting  licenses  to  any  and 
all  comers  who  should  demand  it  to  do  the  same  thing. 
In  this  particular  service  it  is  obvious  that  this  would 
lead  to  chaos,  would  embarrass  the  service  to  the  public, 
and  would  be  inconvenient  and  prejudicial  to  the  company. 
We  see  nothing,  therefore,  that  could  be  injurious  to  any 
lawful  right  of  others  in  restricting  the  grant  of  the  license 
to  one  person  for  a  definite  locality,  so  long  as  that  person 
accomplished  the  duty  of  the  company  to  the  public  in  a 
proper  way.  The  concession  of  this  place  to  the  one  who 
could  bring  the  largest  approval  of  those  of  the  other 
party  who  were  most  interested,  seems  fair.  We  are 
therefore  unable  to  find  any  satisfactory  ground  for  hold- 
ing the  rule  adopted  by  the  appellant  for  determining 
to  what  person  the  license  should  be  granted  to  be  void 
as  either  beyond  its  powers  or  unreasonable."  l  It  is  not 
beyond  the  range  of  probability  that  this  whole  problem 
might  at  some  time  long  distant  be  worked  out  along  the 
lines  of  this  decision,  avoiding  the  waste  of  duplication 
of  service  by  granting  an  exclusive  right  to  the  concern 
which  will  make  the  best  terms  with  the  public. 

§  497.  Telephone  installation  in  public  premises. 

A  most  interesting  modern  instance  of  this  general 
problem  has  come  up  in  several  ways  in  late  years  by 

1  Gallery  v.  Waterworks  Co.,  35      arrangements    with    one    sprinkler 
La.  Ann.  798  (1883),  also  allows  a      concern, 
water  company  to  make  exclusive 

[423] 


§  498  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

reason  of  the  prevalent  use  of  the  telephone  in  all  affairs. 
Where  there  are  several  telephone  systems  in  a  community, 
it  has  been  desired  at  various  times  to  have  installed  in 
public  premises  such  as  railroad  stations  and  hotel  lobbies 
the  various  telephone  systems  which  serve  the  com- 
munity. In  a  Canadian  case  l  it  was  held  by  a  divided 
Commission  that  a  railroad  might  make  an  exclusive 
arrangement  with  one  telephone  system,  the  majority 
judge  concluding  "so  far  as  I  can  discover  the  general 
interests  of  the  public  are  not  prejudicially  affected."  But 
in  a  recent  New  York  case  2  it  was  held  that  an  exclusive 
arrangement  made  by  a  hotel  keeper  with  one  telephone 
system  was  against  public  policy  as  the  judge  saw  it. 
11  Telephonic  communication  has  become  a  necessity  in 
commerce  and  business;  and,  while  there  are  disadvan- 
tages in  two  systems  in  one  territory,  a  monopoly  of  such 
a  common  necessity,  with  the  lessened  incentive  to  good 
service  and  the  best  equipment  which  follows,  is  a  greater 
evil." 

Topic  D.  No  Public  Duty  Involved 

§  498.  Special  concessions  when  no  public  duty  involved. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  outside  limits  of  the  public  duty 
which  the  principal  service  owes  in  respect  to  dependent 
services  have  now  been  reached.  So  long  as  there  was 
a  question  of  the  right  of  the  public  in  respect  to  their 
service  a  public  duty  seems  to  be  involved;  within  these 
limits  there  should  not  be  even  opportunity  for  exploita- 

1  The  Telephone  Case,  3  Can.  Ry.          2  Central  New  York  Tel.  &  Tel. 

Gas.    205    (1904).      In    People    v.  Co.   v.   Averill,    55    N.   Y.    Misc. 

Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  166  346,  105  N.  Y.  Supp.  378  (1907). 

111.  15,  46  N.  E.  731  (1897)  it  was  In  Idaho   Independent   Telephone 

held  that  a  telegraph  company  was  Co.  v.  Oregon   Short    Line  R.  R. 

not  obliged  to  let  a  telephone  com-  Co.,    8   Idaho,    175,   67    Pac.   318 

pany  put  an  instrument  in  the  office  (1901),  the  question  was  left  unde- 

although   another   telephone   com-  cided. 
pany  was  in. 

[424] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  499 

tion,  but  once  outside  public  duty  the  principal  company 
should  be  free  to  carry  on  its  own  business  in  its  own  way. 
A  carrier,  like  all  others,  may  bestow  favor  where  he 
chooses.  "Rights,  not  favors,  are  the  subject  of  demand 
by  all  parties  indiscriminately.  The  incidental  benefit 
arising  from  the  transaction  of  such  business  as  may  be 
done  on  board  of  a  boat  or  on  a  car,  belongs  to  the  carrier, 
and  he  can  allow  the  privilege  to  one  and  exclude  from  it 
another,  at  his  pleasure.  A  steamboat  company  or  a 
railroad  company,  may  well  allow  an  individual  to  open 
a  restaurant  or  a  bar  on  their  conveyance,  or  to  do  the 
business  of  boot  blacking,  or  of  peddling  books  and  papers. 
This  individual  is  under  their  control,  subject  to  their 
regulation,  and  the  business  interferes  in  no  respect  with 
the  orderly  management  of  the  vehicle."  l  It  is  because 
it  owes  no  duty  to  passengers  to  see  to  the  provision  of 
flowers,  magazines,  cigars  and  souvenirs,  that  a  railroad 
may  grant  exclusive  privileges  for  the  sale  of  these  articles 
upon  its  trains,  and  that  it  may  grant  in  a  station  exclu- 
sive rights  to  barbers  and  bootblacks  and  to  advertisers 
and  solicitors.2 

§  499.  Special  concessions  for  private  business. 

Likewise  in  respect  to  private  services  of  all  sorts,  the 
innkeeper  owes  no  duty  to  his  guests  and  may  therefore 
enter  into  such  exclusive  arrangements  as  he  pleases  with 

irThe  D.  R.  Martin,  11  Blatch.  Conn.  371,  4  Atl.  261,  55  Am.  Rep. 

233  (1873).    The  same  parties  were  115  (1885). 

involved  in  Barney  v.  Oyster  Bay          Illinois. — Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 

&  H.  Steamboat  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  301  R.  Co.  v.  Moran,  117  111.  App.  42 

(1876),  with  the  same  result.  (1904). 

2  As  it  owes  no  public  duty  in  the          Louisiana. — Higgins  v.  New  Or- 

premises  the  common  carrier  in  its  leans,  M.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  La. 

special   contracts   with  train   boys  Ann.  133  (1876). 
may  stipulate  against  liability  for          Missouri. — Padgitt    v.    Citizens' 

personal  injuries.    See:  Ry.  Co.,  159  Mo.  143,  60  S.  W.  121, 

Connecticut—  Griswold,  Adm.,  v.  52  L.  R.  A.  854,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  347 

New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  (1900). 

[425] 


§  500  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

those  who  wish  to  carry  on  such  businesses  with  guests. 
In  a  leading  case  in  North  Carolina  l  it  was  held  that  a 
proprietor  of  a  hotel  could  exclude  from  his  premises 
a  drummer  for  a  livery  stable,  as  he  had  entered  into  an 
exclusive  arrangement  with  one  livery  stable  which  had 
an  office  there.  "An  innkeeper  has  unquestionable  right 
to  establish  a  news  stand  or  barber's  shop  in  his  hotel, 
and  to  exclude  persons  who  come  for  the  purpose  of  vend- 
ing newspapers,  or  books,  or  soliciting  employment  as 
barbers;  and  in  order  to  render  his  business  more  lucrative 
he  may  establish  a  laundry  or  a  livery  stable  in  connection 
with  his  hotel,  or  contract  with  a  proprietor  of  a  livery 
stable  in  the  vicinity,  to  secure  for  the  latter,  as  far  as 
he  legitimately  can,  the  patronage  of  his  guests  in  that 
line  for  a  per  centum  of  the  proceeds  or  profits  derived 
by  such  owner  of  vehicles  and  horses,  from  dealing  with 
the  patrons  of  the  public  house."  It  should  be  noted  in 
this  connection  that  all  of  the  incidental  services  that  have 
been  mentioned  under  this  topic  are  private  in  character. 
This  is  a  significant  fact,  for  it  shows  that  none  of  them 
are  so  necessary  to  the  patrons  of  the  principal  service 
as  to  be  affected  with  a  public  interest.2 

§  500.  Whether  service  provided  is  necessary. 

The  point  has  been  raised  a  few  times  whether  there  is 
a  duty  in  respect  to  the  provision  of  food  for  passengers. 
If  there  is  a  public  duty  it  is  to  the  traveling  passenger; 
and  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  those  who  carry  pas- 

1  State  v.  Steele,  106  N.  C.  766,  2  The  cases  are  plain  that  agents 

11  S.  E.  478,  8  L.  R.  A.  516,  19  Am.  in  general  may  be  prevented  from 

St.  Rep.  573  (1890).    See  also  as  to  soliciting  on  the  premises: 

the  granting  of  similar  concessions  United  States. — Jenkes  v.   Cole- 

in  common  carriage  the  language  man,  2  Sumner,  221,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 

used  in  Memphis  News  Publishing  7258  (1835). 

Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  110  Tenn.  Louisiana. — Ford  v.  East  Louisi- 

684,  75  S.  W.  941,  63  L.  R.  A.  150  ana  R.  Co.,  110  La.  414,  34  So.  585 

(1903).  (1903). 

[426] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES  [  §  501 

sengers  over  long  distances  owe  them  the  duty  to  make 
provision  for  food  for  them.  The  rule  is  thus  stated  in 
Peniston  v.  Chicago,  St.  Louis  Railroad  Company,1  by 
Mr.  Justice  Poche:  "In  conveying  passengers  through 
long  journeys,  such  as  from  Chicago  to  New  Orleans, 
at  great  speed  and  with  rapidity,  a  common  carrier  is 
required  by  humanity,  as  well  as  by  law,  to  provide  its 
passengers  with  easy  modes  and  to  allow  them  reasonable 
time  for  the  purpose  of  sustaining  life  by  means  of  food 
and  necessary  refreshments."  But  it  seems  to  be  the 
law  that  the  railroad  company  fulfills  its  obligation  in 
this  respect  by  making  an  exclusive  contract  with  one 
concern.2  However  there  is  clearly  no  duty  to  provide 
passengers  with  refreshments  between  meals.3  "  The 
business  of  selling  lunches  to  passengers  or  of  soliciting 
from  them  orders  for  the  same  is  not  one  which  every 
citizen  has  the  right  to  engage  in  upon  the  tracks  and 
premises  of  a  railway  company,  and,  consequently,  those 
who  do  engage  in  it  and  carry  it  on  must  depend  upon 
the  company  for  the  privilege."  4 

§  501.  Additional  favors  beyond  obligation. 

Even  when  there  is.  a  duty  in  the  premises  to  give  proper 
accommodation  to  competing  services,  the  obligation  does 
not  go  beyond  reasonable  facilities.  Thus  although  there 
is  conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  a  railroad  company 
is  bound  to  give  competing  baggage  transfer  companies 
necessary  privileges,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  of  its 

1 34  La.  Ann.  777,  44  Am.  Rep.  3  The  quotation  is  from  Fluker  v. 

444  (1882).  Georgia  R.  R.  &  Banking  Co.,  81 

2  Kelly  v.  C.,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Ga.  461,  8  S.  E.  529,  2  L.  R.  A.  843, 

Co.,  93  Iowa,  436,  61  N.  W.  957  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  328  (1888). 

(1895),  and  Perth  General  Station  4  Smallman  v.  Whilter,  87  111.  545, 

Committee    v.    Ross    A.    C.     479  29  Am.  Rep.  76  (1877),  accord. 
(1897),  both  permit  exclusive  con- 
tracts with  eating  houses. 

[427] 


§  501  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

right  to  permit  certain  transfer  men  to  enter  upon  the 
trains  before  reaching  the  station,  while  refusing  this 
favor  to  others;  or  to  permit  one  man  to  check  baggage 
from  the  house  of  the  traveler,  while  refusing  this  per- 
mission to  others.1  Likewise  certain  parties  may  be  given 
office  room  upon  public  premises,  this  favor  being  refused 
others.  Thus  in  Audenried  v.  Philadelphia  &  Reading 
Railroad  Company,2  the  question  was  as  to  the  right  of 
the  defendant  company  to  so  parcel  or  divide  its  wharf 
among  other  coal  dealers  as  to  exclude  the  complainant 
therefrom.  After  expressing  great  doubt  as  to  whether 
the  defendant,  under  its  charter,  was  bound  to  provide 
wharf  accommodations  to  any  of  the  coal  dealers  in  ques- 
tion, or  was  a  trustee  to  any  extent  for  them,  the  court 
adds:  "Transportation  by  a  common  carrier  is  necessarily 
open  to  the  public  upon  equal  and  reasonable  terms.  An 
exclusive  right  granted  to  one  is  inconsistent  with  the 
rights  of  all  others.  This  was  not  transportation,  but 
wharfage,  the  nature  of  which  requires  exclusive  posses- 
sion temporarily." 

1  Georgia. — Kates  v.  Atlanta  Bag-      he  has  obtained  his  ticket  or  other 
gage,  etc.,  Co.,  107  Ga.  636,  34  S.  E.      evidence  of  the  right  of  transporta- 
372,  46  L.  R.  A.  431  (1899).  tion,  and  then,  upon  exhibition  of 

Texas. — Lewis    v.    Weatherford,  the  same,  to  act  as  his  agent  to 

M.,  W.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Tex.  check  the  parcel  as  baggage  to  be 

Civ.  App.  48,  81  S.  W.  Ill  (1904).  forwarded  to  the  point  designed  by 

2  Audenried  v.  Phila.  &  Reading  the  ticket.     Atlanta  Terminal  Co. 
R.  R.  Co.,  68  Pa.  St.  370,  8  Am.  v.  American  Trans.  Co.,   125  Ga. 
Rep.  195  (1871).  678,  54  S.  E.  711  (1906). 

See  also  State  of  Louisiana  v.  A  lease  by  a  railroad  company  of 

Southern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  52  La.  its  land  between  its  tracks  and  a 

Ann.  1822,  28  So.  372  (1900).  river  held  and  treated  by  it  as  part 

A  baggage  transfer  company  has  of  its  depot  grounds  is  not  for  a 

a  right  to  conduct  in  the  baggage  legitimate  purpose  but  constitutes  a 

room  as  an  independent  private  en-  discrimination  between  shippers,  its 

terprise  a  special  office  where  it  re-  effect  being  to  give  one  company 

ceives  and  keeps  on  storage  parcels  engaged  in  floating  ties  down  the 

of  prospective  passengers  until  they  river  for  shipment  by  the  railroad 

are  called  for  by  the  passenger  after  an  advantage  over  others  in  the 

[428] 


DEPENDENT  SERVICES         [  §§  502,  503 

§  502.  Exclusive  contracts  in  private  capacity. 

This  is  particularly  plain  where  the  business  to  which 
the  exclusive  contract  relates  is  plainly  private.  Thus 
where  a  corporation  manufacturing  gas  for  use  by  in- 
habitants of  a  certain  city  necessarily  accumulated  coke 
in  large  quantities,  and,  not  being  engaged  in  the  selling 
of  fuel,  contracted  with  a  coal  company  to  deliver  to  it  all 
its  accumulations  of  coke,  and  not  to  dispose  of  the  same 
to  any  other  person  or  company,  it  was  held  l  that  the 
agreement  to  sell  its  entire  output  to  the  coal  company 
was  not  unlawful,  on  the  ground  that  unless  there  is  a 
public  duty  in  the  premises  the  company  may  do  as  it 
pleases.  So  an  electric  company  may  maintain  a  wiring 
department  which  may  make  such  arrangements  as  it 
pleases  with  those  who  chose  to  patronize  it.  But  it  must 
not  discriminate  between  those  of  its  customers  who 
patronize  its  wiring  department  and  those  who  do  not.2 

§  503.  Private  activities  often  held  ultra  vires. 

This  is  of  course  subject  to  the  fundamental  rule  of 
corporation  law  which  forbids  a  corporation  from  engaging 
in  an  ultra  vires  business,  and  a  public  service  company 
cannot  usually  get  far  into  a  purely  private  business 
without  coming  into  conflict  with  this  law.3  However, 
the  incidental  powers  of  such  companies  may  often  fairly 
be  measured  by  the  universal  custom  prevailing  in  the 
given  business,  but  where  there  is  no  such  common  prac- 

same  business,  in  getting  them  to  8  See  People  ex  rel.  v.  Illinois  Cen- 

the  cars.     Hobart-Lee  Tie  Co.  v.  tral  R.  R.  Co.,  233  111.  378,  84  N.  E. 

Stone  (Mo.  App.),  117  S.  W.  604  368,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  604,  122 

(1909).  Am.  St.  Rep.  181  (1908),  railroad 

1  State  v.  St.  Paul  Gaslight  Co.,  has  no  implied  power  to  operate 
92  Minn.  467,  100  N.  W.  216  (1904).  grain     elevators.       And     Attorney 

2  Snell  v.  Clinton  Electric  Light  General  v.  Great  Northern  R.  R. 
Co.,  196  111.  626,  63  N.  E.  1082,  89  Co.,  29  L.  J.  Eq.  (N.  S.)  794  (1860), 
Am.  St.  Rep.  341,  58  L.  R.  A.  284  railroad  has  no  implied  power  to 
(1902).  work  coal  mines. 

[  429  ] 


§503 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


tice  the  case  is  difficult.  Thus  it  is  at  present  undecided 
what  power  a  transportation  company  has  to  make  ar- 
rangements for  granting  advertising  privileges,  although 
it  would  generally  be  agreed  that  if  it  has  corporate  power 
to  make  such  contracts  there  is  no  reason  in  the  public 
service  law  why  it  should  not  make  exclusive  arrange- 
ments. l 


1  In  New  York  v.  Interborough 
Rapid  Tr.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  Misc.  126, 
104  N.  Y.  Supp.  157  (1907),  and  in 
Burns  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  101 
Minn.  363,  112  N.  W.  412,  12  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  757  (1907),  it  was  thought 
that  such  arrangements  were  within 
the  implied  powers  of  the  trans- 
portation corporation  and  were  at 
all  events  not  in  conflict  with  any  of 
its  public  duties.  In  National  Car 
Advertising  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  110  Va.  413,  66  S.  E.  88, 
24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1010  (1909), 


and  in  Pittsburg  &  B.  Traction  Co. 
v.  Seidell,  6  Pa.  Dist.  R.  414  (1896), 
it  was  thought  that  any  advertis- 
ing arrangements  by  transportation 
companies  were  ultra  vires, '  if  not 
indeed  contrary  to  its  public  duty. 
See  also  Fifth  Ave.  Coach  Co.  v. 
New  York,  126  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  657, 
110  N.  Y.  Supp.  1037  (1908),  re- 
ferring to  Pears  v.  Manhattan  Ry. 
Co.,  N.  Y.  Law  Jour.,  Feb.  3,  1900, 
both  expressing  the  opinion  that 
such  arrangements  were  ultra  vires. 


430] 


CHAPTER  XV 

OBLIGATION  AS  TO  CONNECTING   SERVICES 

510.  Public  duty  as  to  connecting  services. 

Topic  A.  Basis  on  Which  Through  Service  Is  Undertaken 
I  511.  Through  service  may  be  undertaken. 

512.  English  presumption  of  through  carriage. 

513.  American  presumption  of  successive  service. 

514.  What  constitutes  connecting  service. 

Topic  B.  Mutual  Obligations  in  Successive  Service 

>  515.  Obligation  of  initial  service  to  take  to  connection. 

516.  Special  law  applicable  thereto. 

517.  Special  duty  to  make  delivery  to  connection. 

518.  Further  duties  of  the  initial  service. 

519.  Obligation  of  second  service  to  accept. 

520.  Peculiar  rules  relating  thereto. 

521.  Observance  of  patron's  directions. 

522.  Results  of  any  disobedience. 

523.  Discrimination  permissible  in  granting  favors. 

524.  Discrimination  forbidden  where  public  duty  involved. 

Topic  C.  Facilities  for  the  Interchange  of  Business 

525.  Construction  of  physical  connections  not  obligatory. 

526.  Statutory  requirements  go  further. 

527.  Obligation  to  have  transfer  facilities  at  junction  points. 

528.  Whether  freight  must  be  taken  in  original  cars. 

529.  Such  transportation  now  usually  held  obligatory. 

530.  Qualifications  of  the  doctrine. 

531.  Provision  of  cars  for  further  service. 

532.  Statutory  requirement  of  through  facilities. 

Topic  D.  Joint  Through  Routing  and  Rating 

533.  Through  arrangements  not  obligatory. 

534.  Initial  company  may  select  connecting  line. 

535.  Limitations  upon  joint  rates. 

536.  Statutory  provision  for  through  routes. 

[431] 


§§510,511]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  537.  Constitutionality  of  such  statutes. 

538.  Application  of  these  statutes. 

539.  Statutory  regulation  of  connecting  services. 

540.  Policy  of  such  legislation. 

§  610.  Public  duty  as  to  connecting  services. 

The  law  relating  to  connecting  services  is  quite  volumi- 
nous, but  upon  the  matter  with  which  the  present  chapter 
is  principally  concerned  there  is  as  yet  very  little  authority. 
There  are,  for  example,  many  cases  as  to  the  respective 
liabilities  of  connecting  carriers,  but  very  few  as  to  the 
duty  of  an  unwilling  carrier  to  participate  in  connecting 
carriage.  The  problem  cannot  be  dismissed  by  saying 
that  for  a  carrier  to  make  arrangements  with  one  con- 
nection while  refusing  to  do  the  same  with  another  is 
illegal  discrimination,  for  that  this  is  true  only  to  the  ex- 
tent that  public  duty  is  involved;  so  that  the  fundamental 
question  is,  what  is  the  extent  of  the  duty  of  a  railroad 
in  dealing  with  connecting  railroads.  It  may  not  refuse 
altogether  to  have  dealings  with  them,  to  accept  goods  from 
them,  for  example.  Obviously  this  will  not  do;  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  railroad  as  a  common  carrier  to  accept  from 
any  person  tendering  goods.  On  the  other  hand,  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  the  railroad  must  accord  to  all  rail- 
roads every  special  privilege  that  it  gives  one  railroad  in 
a  joint  traffic  agreement;  for  what  it  does  for  one  as  a 
favor,  another  cannot  demand  as  a  right.  The  truth  of 
this  matter  must  therefore  lie  between  two  extremes  in 
some  practicable  compromise  that  will  meet  the  neces- 
sities of  the  public  while  recognizing,  as  far  as  may  be,  the 
independence  of  the  carriers. 

Topic  A.  Basis  on  Which  Through  Service  is  Undertaken 

§  511.  Through  service  may  be  undertaken. 

The  rule  is  generally  recognized  that  the  obligation  of 
a  carrier  to  transport  goods  is  limited  to  the  route  over 
[432] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES 


[§511 


which  it  professes  service.  But  although  a  carrier  there- 
fore cannot  be  called  upon  to  undertake  the  transporta- 
tion of  goods  beyond  its  own  route,  it  may  voluntarily 
assume  through  transportation,  relying  upon  its  connec- 
tions as  agencies  to  fulfil  its  undertaking.1  For  while  a 
railroad  cannot  be  compelled  to  accept  and  to  agree  to 
carry  goods  to  points  beyond  its  own  line,  yet  it  may  do 
so.  And  if  the  carrier  expressly  or  impliedly  contracts 
to  carry  from  the  consignor  to  the  consignee  it  will  be 
liable  as  a  common  carrier  for  the  whole  distance.  Another 
example  is  the  acceptance  of  a  telegram  by  the  initial 
company  upon  the  basis  that  it  will  be  responsible  for 
its  delivery  at  its  destination,  although  that  is  a  point 
upon  the  lines  of  another  company.2  These  are  but  two 
instances  (although  by  far  the  most  prominent)  of  the 
possibility  much  described  later,  that  although  a  public 
service  company  may  not  be  compelled  to  go  outside  its 


1  United  States. — Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McCann,  174  U.  S. 
580,  43  L.  ed.  1093,  19  S.  Ct.  755 
(1898). 

California. — C  o  1  f  a  x  Mountain 
Fruit  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 
46  Pac.  668  (1896),  118  Cal,  648, 
50  Pac.  775,  40  L.  R.  A.  78  (1897). 

Georgia. — Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hasselkus,  91  Ga.  382,  17  S.  E.  838, 
44  Am.  St.  Rep.  37  (1893). 

Illinois.— Toledo,  W.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Lockhart,  71  111.  627  (1874). 

Indiana. — Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  141  Ind.  267, 
39  N.  E.  451,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  320. 

Kentucky. — F  a  r  1  e  y  v.  Laary, 
107  Ky.  523,  54  S.  W.  840,  47  L.  R. 
A.  383  (1900). 

Maine. — Perkins  v.  Portland,  S. 
&  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Me.  573,  74  Am. 
Dec.  507  (1859). 
28 


Massachusetts. — Hill  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.,  104 
Mass.  122,  6  Am.  Rep.  202  (1870). 

Michigan. — Johnson  v.  Toledo,  S. 
&  M.  Ry.  Co.,  133  Mich.  596,  95 
N.  W.  724  (1903). 

Minnesota. — Stewart  v.  Erie  & 
W.  Transp.  Co.,  17  Minn.  372 
(1871). 

Pennsylvania. — Baltimore  &  P. 
Steamboat  Co.  v.  Brown,  54  Pa.  St. 
77  (1867). 

Wisconsin. — Hansen  v.  Flint  & 
P.  M.  R.  Co.,  73  Wis.  346,  41  N.  W. 
529,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  791  (1889). 

2  Texas. — Jones  v.  Roach,  21 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  301,  51  S.  W.  549 
(1899). 

Canada. — Stevenson  v.  Montreal 
Telegraph  Co.,  16  Upp.  Can.  Q.  B. 
530  (1858). 

[433] 


§  512  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

profession  it  may  voluntarily  undertake  such  service  upon 
a  public  basis. 

§  512.  English  presumption  of  through  carriage. 

In  England  and  in  some  of  the  United  States,  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  when  goods  are  taken  marked  for  a  point 
beyond  the  route  of  the  initial  carrier,  through  service  is 
assumed.1  In  the  leading  English  case,  Muschamp  v. 
Lancaster  and  Preston  Junction  Railway  Company  2  it 
was  held  that  such  acceptance  of  goods  so  marked  in  it- 
self made  out  a  prima  facie  case  from  which  the  jury  were 
justified  in  finding  the  accepting  carrier  liable  as  such 
even  for  a  loss  occurring  beyond  its  own  line.  Lord  Abin- 
ger  thus  began  his  discussion  of  the  case:  "The  simple 
question  in  this  case  is,  whether  the  learned  judge  mis- 
directed the  jury  in  telling  them  that  if  the  case  were 
stripped  of  all  other  circumstances  beyond  the  mere  fact 
of  knowledge  by  the  party  that  the  defendants  were  car- 
riers only  from  Lancaster  to  Preston,  and  if,  under  such 
circumstances,  they  accepted  a  parcel  to  be  carried  on  to 
a  more  distant  place,  they  are  liable  for  the  loss  of  it,  this 
being  evidence  whence  the  jury  might  infer  that  they 
undertook  to  carry  it  in  safety  to  that  place.  I  think  that 

1  Alabama. — See     Lotspeich     v.          Ohio. — Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R. 

Central  R.  Co.,  73  Ala.  306  (1882).  Co.  v.  Campbell,  36  Ohio  St.  647, 

Arkansas—  Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  38  Am.  Rep.  617  (1881). 
M.    R.  R.  Co.  v.  Washington,  74          Tennessee. — See  Merchants'  Dis- 

Ark.  9,  85  S.  W.  406  (1905).  patch  Trans.  Co.  v.  Bloch,  86  Tenn. 

Georgia.— Mosher     v.     Southern  392,  6  S.  W.  881,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  847 

Exp.  Co.,  38  Ga.  37  (1868).  (1887). 

Illinois—  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Washington. — Allen  &  G.  R.  Co. 

Thomas,  222  111.  337,  78  N.  E.  777,  v.  Can.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Wash.  64, 

7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1041  (1906).  84  Pac.  620  (1906). 

Iowa. — Beard  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &          Wisconsin. — See  Tolman  v.  Ab- 

T.  H.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Iowa.  527  (1890).  bot,  78  Wis.   192,  47  N.  W.  264 

New  Hampshire. — Nashua  Lock  (1890). 

Co.  v.  Worcester  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  48          2  8   M.   &   W.   421,   5  Jur.   656 

N.  H.  339,  2  Am.  Rep.  242  (1869).  (1841). 

[434] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES 


[§513 


in  this  proposition  there  was  no  misdirection."  Later  on 
in  his  opinion  Lord  Abinger  defends  this  rule  on  policy 
saying  that  otherwise  the  shipper  will  not  know  to  whom 
to  look. 

§  513.  American  presumption  of  successive  service. 

By  the  weight  of  American  authority,  however,  the 
natural  presumption  prevails  that  each  carrier  is  liable 
only  for  carriage  over  his  own  route  unless  he  has  com- 
mitted himself  clearly  to  through  transportation.1  The 


1  United  Stales. — Insurance  Co. 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  104  U.  S.  146,  26 
L.  ed.  679  (1881). 

California. — Cavallaro  v.  Texas 
&  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  110  Cal.  348,  42 
Pac.  918,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  94  (1895). 

Connecticut. — Naugatuck  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Waterbury  Button  Co.,  24 
Conn.  468  (1856). 

Delaware. — Truax  v.  Philadelphia 
P.  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Houst.  233 
(1865). 

Florida. — Savannah,  F.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Harris,  26  Fla.  148,  7  So. 
544,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  551  (1890). 

Indiana.— Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Morton,  61  Ind.  539, 
28  Am.  Rep.  682  (1878). 

Kentucky. — Thomas  v.  Frank- 
fort &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1051,  76  S.  W.  1093  (1903). 

Kansas.— Berg  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  30  Kan.  561,  2  Pac.  639 
(1883). 

Maine. — Perkins  v.  Portland  S. 
&  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Me.  573,  74  Am. 
Dec.  507  (1859). 

Louisiana. — Vincent  v.  Yazoo  & 
M.  V.  R.  Co.,  114  La.  1021,  38  So. 
816  (1905). 

Maryland. — Hoffman  v.  Cumber- 
land R.  R.  Co.,  85  Md.  391  (1897). 


Michigan. — Marquette,  H.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirkwood,  45  Mich.  51, 
40  Am.  Rep.  453  (1880). 

Minnesota. — Ortt  v.  Minneapolis 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Minn.  396,  31 
N.  W.  519  (1887). 

Mississippi. — Illinois  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kerr,  68  Miss.  14,  8  So.  330 
(1890). 

Missouri. — Crouch  v.  Louisville 
&  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Mo.  App. 
248  (1890). 

Nebraska.— Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.  v.  Gustin,  35  Neb.  86,  52  N.  W. 
844  (1892). 

North  Carolina. — Knott  v.  Ra- 
leigh &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  C.  73, 
3  S.  E.  735,  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  321 
(1887). 

New  York. — Condit  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  500 
(1873). 

Pennsylvania. — Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Berry,  68  Pa.  St.  272 
(1871). 

Oregon. — Toffe  v.  Oregon  R.  R. 
Co.,  41  Oreg.  64,  67  Pac.  1015,  68 
Pac.  732,  58  L.  R.  A.  187  (1902). 

Rhode  Island. — Knight  v.  Provi- 
dence &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  R.  I.  572, 
43  Am.  Rep.  46  (1882). 

South  Carolina. — Dunbar  v.  Port 

[4351 


§  514  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

mere  fact  that  the  original  carrier  has  accepted  goods 
marked  for  a  point  off  his  own  route  is  not  sufficient  to 
overcome  this  presumption.  In  one  of  the  leading  Amer- 
ican cases,  Nutting  v.  Connecticut  River  Railroad  Co.,1 
Mr.  Justice  Metcalf  said:  "What,  then,  is  the  obligation 
imposed  on  them  by  law,  in  the  absence  of  any  special 
contract  by  them,  when  they  receive  goods  at  their  depot 
in  Northampton,  which  are  marked  with  the  names  of 
the  consignees  in  the  city  of  New  York?  In  our  judgment 
that  obligation  is  nothing  more  than  to  transport  the 
goods  safely  to  the  end  of  their  road,  and  there  deliver 
them  to  the  proper  carriers,  to  be  forwarded  towards  their 
ultimate  destination.  This  the  defendants  did,  in  the 
present  case,  and  in  so  doing  performed  their  full  legal 
duty.  If  they  can  be  held  liable  for  a  loss  that  happens 
on  any  railroad  besides  their  own,  we  know  not  what  is 
the  limit  of  their  liability."  It  will  be  noticed  that  to 
this  court  the  policy  seems  to  be  for  the  protection  of  the 
carrier  from  unreasonable  liability. 

§  514.  What  constitutes  connecting  service. 

It  would  not  seem  that  it  would  be  a  difficult  question 
to  determine  whether  a  particular  case  really  involves 
connecting  service  with  its  accompanying  obligations;  and 
yet  certain  decisions  will  show  that  this  problem  may  be 
very  difficult.  Thus  a  transfer  company  employed  by 
one  carrier  to  transfer  the  goods  to  the  next  carrier,2  or 

Royal  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  36  S.  C.  110,  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Va. 

15  S.  E.  357,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  860  776,  37  S.  E.  310  (1900). 

(1891).  1 1  Gray,  502  (1854). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  z  Nebraska—  Missouri     Pac.     R. 

v.  Baird,  75  Tex.  256,  12  S.  W.  530,  Co.  v.  Young,  25  Neb.  651,  41  N. 

(1889).  W.  646  (1889). 

Vermont. — Hadd  v.  United  States  Wisconsin. — Hooper  v.   Chicago 

Express  Co.,  52  Vt.  335,  36  Am.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Wis.  81,  9 

Rep.  757  (1880).  Am.  Rep.  439  (1870) . 

Virginia. — Virginia  C.  &  I.  Co.  v. 

[436] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  515 

a  cartage  company  employed  by  the  last  carrier  to  deliver 
the  goods  to  the  consignee,1  or  a  stock  yard  to  which  a 
railroad  delivers  cattle,2  or  a  telephone  used  to  deliver  a 
telegram,3  or  a  hackman  employed  by  a  passenger  at  a 
railroad  station,4  or  a  teamster  employed  by  the  con- 
signee to  remove  goods  from  the  carrier's  station,6  are 
none  of  them  connecting  services.  These  are  not  all  of 
the  same  class  although  they  come  to  the  same  result. 
In  the  transfer,  cartage,  stock  yards,  and  telegraph  cases, 
there  is  no  connecting  service  because  the  patron  is  deal- 
ing with  but  one  service  which  uses  the  others  as  a  sub- 
ordinate instrumentality  to  perform  its  service.  In  the 
hackman  and  teamster  cases  the  patron  employs  the  ad- 
ditional service  upon  a  separate  basis  altogether.  But 
as  to  both  sets  of  cases  the  law  is  that  the  particular  serv- 
ice is  free  to  make  arrangements  without  regard  to  the 
peculiar  law  governing  connecting  service. 

Topic  B.  Mutual  Obligations  in  Successive  Service 

§  515.  Obligation  of  initial  service  to  take  to  connection. 

In  successive  service  each  party  involved  is  not  really 

1  United  States. — St.  Louis  Dray-          But  see  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
age  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.,  65      v.  Turner,  94  Tex.  304,  60  S.  W.  432 
Fed.  39  (1894).  (1901). 

England. — Roach    v.     Canadian  4  New     York. — Brown    v.     New 

Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  1  Manitoba,  158  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  151 

(1884).  N.  Y.  674,  46  N.  E.  1145  (1897). 

2  Central    Stock    Yards    Co.    v.  But  see: 

Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  Michigan. — Kalamazoo  Hack  & 

568,  24  Sup.  Ct.  339,  48  L.  ed.  565  B.  Co.  v.  Sootsma,  84  Mich.  194,  47 

(1904).  N.  E.  667,  10  L.  R.  A.  819,  22  Am. 

See  also  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  St.  Rep.  693  (1890). 

v.  Jackson  &  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  6  Illinois. — Parmelee    v.   Lowitz, 

48  S.  W.  853  (1909).  74  111.  116,  24  Am.  Rep.  276  (1874). 

3  People  v.  Western  Union  Tele-  Missouri. — Nanson  v.  Jacob,  93 
graph  Co.,  166  111.  15,  46  N.  E.  731,  Mo.  331,  6  S.  W.  246,  3  Am.  St.  Rep. 
36  L.  R.  A.  637  (1897).  531  (1887). 

[437] 


§  515  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

asked  to  do  more  than  his  full  duty  within  the  limits  of 
his  own  profession,  except  that  the  special  circumstances 
may  seem  to  call  for  unusual  action  to  some  extent.  Of 
the  duty  of  the  initial  company  to  undertake  service  to 
the  point  of  connection  with  the  succeeding  company 
there  can  be  no  doubt.1  If  it  be  a  case  of  carriage,  the 
initial  carrier  is  certainly  asked  no  more  than  to  act  within 
his  profession  if  he  is  requested  to  take  certain  goods 
tendered  at  one  point  on  his  line  to  another  point  where 
that  line  connects  with  the  second  carrier.2  This  ele- 
mentary point  has  been  most  litigated  in  recent  times 
in  regard  to  telegraph  companies,  the  initial  company 
sometimes  disliking  to  accept  a  message  to  a  connecting 
point,  there  to  be  delivered  to  another  company,  very 
often  a  competitor.  But  the  established  duty  in  regard 
to  connecting  carriage  was  too  close  an  analogy  for  the 
telegraph  company  to  escape  it.  As  was  said  in  a  Texas 
case: 3  "The  law  relating  to  the  receiving  and  forwarding 
of  telegraphic  messages  to  connecting  lines  is  so  nearly 
analogous  to  that  in  regard  to  common  carriers  that  the 
established  rules  of  law  that  determine  the  liability  of  the 
common  carrier  apply  with  equal  force  to  telegraph  com- 
panies. Each  can  restrict  its  liability  to  its  own  line, 
but  each  must  receive  and  forward  with  diligence  to  the 
connecting  line,  and  each  will  be  held  liable  for  its  failure 
or  refusal  to  perform  that  duty." 

1  A  contract  by  a  carrier  not  to      R.  R.  Co.  v.  Waters,  50  Neb.  592, 
receive  goods  destined  beyond  its      70  N.  W.  225  (1897). 

own  line  is  void.     Seasongood  v.  Texas. — San    Antonio   &    A.    P. 

Tennessee  &  O.  R.  Transp.  Co.,  21  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stribling,  99  Tex.  319, 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1142,  54  S.  W.  193  89  S.  W.  963  (1905). 

(1899).  Wisconsin. — Hooper  v.   Chicago 

2  New   York.— Babcock  v.   Lake  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  27  Wis.  81,  9  Am. 
S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  491  Rep.  439  (1870). 

(1872).  »See   Western  Union  Telegraph 

Nebraska. — Fremont,  E.  &  M.  V.      Co.  v.  Simmons  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

93  S.  W.  686  (1906),  quoted. 

[438] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES         f  §§  516,  517 

§  516.  Special  law  applicable  thereto. 

There  are  some  peculiarities  in  the  situation  because  of 
the  differences  in  the  conditions.  In  case  of  carriage 
there  are  usually  marks  on  the  package  designating  its 
course;  moreover  its  bills  accompany  it.  In  case  of  the 
telegraphing,  however,  it  is  a  reasonable  requirement  by 
the  first  company  that  words  designating  the  connection 
desired  shall  be  sent  with  the  message;  1  and,  similarly, 
the  second  company  may  require  that  words  designating 
its  origin  shall  be  paid  for.2  This  duty  resting  upon  the 
initial  party  to  act  is  positive.  It  is  no  excuse  that  the 
initial  carrier  believes  that  the  succeeding  carrier  will  re- 
fuse to  accept  the  goods.3  And  similarly  a  telephone 
company  cannot  justify  its  failure  to  handle  a  message 
promptly  on  the  ground  that  it  was  sure  that  the  con- 
necting company  would  delay  it  so  long  that  it  was  use- 
less to  try  to  put  it  through.4 

§  517.  Special  duty  to  make  delivery  to  connection. 

In  several  kinds  of  connecting  service  the  duty  of  each 
successive  party  to  deliver  over  to  the  next  in  turn  is  the 
normal  one.  Thus  a  telegraph  company  undertakes  de- 
livery in  the  place  of  address,  which  in  this  case  should 
be  at  the  office  of  the  telegraph  company  designated  as 
the  connection.  So,  in  certain  kinds  of  carriage,  as  ex- 
press service,  the  carrier  is  bound  to  deliver  to  the  ad- 
dressee. But  the  railroads  and  steamboats  are  not  nor- 
mally bound  to  do  more  than  deposit  the  goods  carried 
on  their  own  wharves  or  at  their  own  terminals.  As  will 
be  seen  later,  there  is  thereupon  a  conflict  of  authority 

1  United  States  v.  Northern  Pac.  lina  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  150  N.  C. 
Ry.  Co.,  120  Fed.  Rep.  546  (1903).  608,  64  S.  E.  588  (1909). 

2  Atlantic    &    Pacific    Telegraph          4  Telephone  Co.   v.   Brown,    104 
Co.   v.   Western   Union  Telegraph  Tenn.  56,  55  S.  W.  155,  50  L.  R.  A. 
Co.,  4  Daly,  527  (1873).  277,  78  Am.  St.  Rep.  906  (1900). 

3  Wampum  Cotton  Mills  v.  Caro- 

[439] 


§  518  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

as  to  how  soon  they  cease  to  be  liable  as  common  carriers; 
but  at  all  events  it  must  be  very  soon  thereafter,  without 
any  attempt  on  their  part  to  make  physical  delivery. 
But  in  the  case  of  connecting  carriage  there  is  no  conflict 
of  authority,  the  whole  matter  being  settled  by  imper- 
ative considerations  of  convenience.  It  is  universally 
established  that  when  successive  carriage  is  involved  the 
law  necessarily  throws  upon  each  carrier  in  turn  the  duty 
of  tendering  the  goods  for  further  transportation  to  the 
succeeding  carrier;  and  normally,  until  he  effectuates 
such  delivery,  the  original  carrier  remains  liable  as  a  com- 
mon carrier.1  This  liability  would  usually  continue,  as 
the  cases  just  cited  hold,  until  the  first  carrier  has  depos- 
ited the  goods  where  the  second  carrier  actually  receives 
them,  and  given  notice,  as  would  generally  be  requisite, 
to  the  succeeding  carrier  that  the  goods  are  there  await- 
ing his  transportation.2 

§  618.  Further  duties  of  the  initial  service. 

The  initial  carrier  must  give  its  successor  the  necessary 

1  Connecticut. — Palmer  v.  Chicago,      R.  Co.  v.  Reiss,  183  U.  S.  621,  46 
B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Conn.  137,  13      L.  ed.  358,  22  Sup.  Ct.  253  (1903). 
Atl.  818  (1888).  Alabama.— Selma  &   M.   R.   R. 

Georgia. — Wallace  v.   Rosenthal,  Co.  v.  Butts  &  Foster,  43  Ala.  385, 

40  Ga.  419  (1869).  94  Am.  Dec.  694  (1869). 

Michigan. — Moore    v.    Michigan  California. — Colfax        Mountain 

Central   R.    R.    Co.,    3    Mich.    23  Fruit  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

(1853).  118  Cal.  648,  46  Pac.  668  (1896),  50 

Pennsylvania. — Vannatta  v.  Cen-  Pac.  775,  40  L.  R.  A.  78  (1897). 

tral  R.   R.  Co.,  154  Pa.   St.  262,  Kentucky.— Louisville,   St.   L.   & 

26  Atl.  384,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  823  Texas  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bourne  &  Embry, 

(1893).  16  Ky.  L.  Rep.  825,  29  S.  W.  975 

Tennessee. — Insurance     Co.      v.  (1895). 

Railroad  Co.,  8  Baxt.  268  (1874).  Michigan—  Rickerson  Roller  Mill 

West  Virginia. — Lewis  v.  Chesa-  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  R.  Co., 

peake  &  Ohio  Ry.  Co.,  47  W.  Va.  67  Mich.  110,  34  N.  W.  269  (1887). 

656,  35  S.  E.  908,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  New     York— Sprague    v.     New 

816  (1900).  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  637 

2  United  States.— Texas  &  P.  R.  (1873). 

[440] 


CONNECTING   SERVICES 


[§519 


instructions  for  forwarding  the  goods.1  If,  however,  the 
second  carrier  finally  refuses  the  goods,  the  first  carrier 
has  performed  its  duty  as  such.  But  there  rests  upon 
it  still  as  in  many  other  cases  of  unexpected  interruption, 
the  duty  to  store  the  goods  2  refused,  and  notify  the  con- 
signor of  the  situation.3  If,  thereupon,  the  shipper  wants 
his  goods  stopped  at  the  end  of  the  original  transit  he 
can  have  this  done.  As  in  successive  service  neither  side 
is  committed  beyond  the  immediate  service  which  is 
being  rendered,  he  can  revoke  his  orders  to  ship  further.4 

§  519.  Obligation  of  second  service  to  accept. 

Of  the  duty  in  each  succeeding  service  to  receive  what 
is  properly  tendered  to  it  by  its  predecessor  in  service 
there  can  also  be  no  doubt.  This  really  relates  back  to 
the  primary  duty  of  the  original  person  requesting  the 
service.5  When,  therefore,  a  succeeding  carrier  designated 


1  Illinois. — Michigan  S.  &  N.  I. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Day,  20  111.  375,  71 
Am.  Dec.  278  (1858). 

Michigan. — Hutchings  v.  Ladd, 
16  Mich.  493  (1868). 

Ohio. — Little  Miami  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Washburn,  22  Ohio  St.  324  (1872). 

Tennessee. — R  a  i  1  r  o  a  d  Co.  v. 
Southern  Seating  &  Cabinet  Co., 
104  Tenn.  568,  58  S.  W.  303,  50  L. 
R.  A.  729  (1900). 

2  United  States. — Buston  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Ry.  Co.,  119  Fed.  808,  56 
C.  C.  A.  320  (1903). 

Louisiana. — Dalzell  v.  Steamboat 
Saxon,  10  La.  Ann.  280  (1855). 

Maryland. — Baltimore  &  Ohio  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Schumacher,  29  Md.  168, 
96  Am.  Dec.  510  (1868). 

Minnesota. — Wehmann  v.  Minne- 
apolis, St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
58  Minn.  22,  59  N.  W.  546  (1894). 

Missouri. — Cramer  v.  American 


M.  U.  Express  Co.  &  Merchants' 
Dispatch  Co.,  56  Mo.  524  (1874). 

Tennessee. — Bird  v.  Railroad  Co., 
99  Tenn.  719,  42  S.  W.  451,  63  Am. 
St.  Rep.  856  (1897). 

3  United  States. — In  re  Peterson, 
21  Fed.  885  (1884). 

Alabama. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Duncan  &  Orr,  137  Ala.  446, 
34  So.  988  (1902). 

Maine. — Fisher  v.  Boston  & 
Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  99  Me.  338,  59 
Atl.  532,  68  L.  R.  A.  390,  105  Am. 
St.  Rep.  283  (1904). 

Indiana. — Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Diether,  10  Ind.  App.  206, 
53  Am.  St.  Rep.  385  (1894). 

4  Wente  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 
Co.,  79  Neb.  175,  115  N.  W.  859 
(1907). 

6  Illinois.— Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  242  111.  178, 
89  N.  E.  1022  (1909). 

[441] 


§  520  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

by  the  consignor  refuses  to  accept  goods  tendered  by  a 
proceeding,  the  default  is  really  made  to  the  consignor, 
the  preceding  carrier  being  his  agent  in  asking  this  fur- 
ther transportation.1  It  is  established  law,  made  neces- 
sary from  the  character  of  the  business,  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  common  carriers  to  accept  freight  tendered  by  another 
common  carrier,  and  that  a  consignor  of  goods  to  be  car- 
ried over  successive  routes  makes  the  first  and  each  suc- 
cessive carrier  his  forwarding  agent.  This  is  from  the 
necessities  of  the  case.  The  consignors  cannot  practi- 
cally travel  with  the  goods  which  are  shipped,  and  there 
must  be  some  one  who  is  responsible  for  transactions  in 
regard  to  their  shipment  over  the  different  routes. 

§  520.  Peculiar  rules  relating  thereto. 

Each  carrier  who  takes  charge  of  the  goods  becomes  an 
agent  of  the  consignor  to  tender  the  goods.2  And  a  tele- 
graph company  chosen  as  the  connection  is  in  default 
when  it  refuses  to  accept  a  message  tendered  by  the  ini- 
tial company.3  It  follows  that  the  connecting  company 

Iowa. — McMillan  v.  Chicago,  R.  Am.  St.  Rep.  860  (1891).    But  the 

I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  124  N.  W.  1069  refusing  carrier  is  liable  directly  to 

(1910).  the  shipper  for  such  refusal.    Crosby 

Maine. — Dunham    v.  Boston    &  v.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co.,  131 

Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Me.  164,  35  Mich.  288,  91  N.  W.  124  (1902). 

Am.  Rep.  314  (1879).  2  See  particularly  the  case  of  An- 

Texas. — Gulf   &    Interstate   Ry.  drus  v.  Columbia  &  O.  Steamboat 

Co.  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  93  Co.,  47  Wash.  333,  92  Pac.  128,  130 

Tex.   482,   56  S.   W.   328   (1900);  (1907). 

Sterling  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  3  California. — Thurn  v.  Alta  Tele- 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  86  S.  W.  655  graph  Co.,  15  Cal.  472  (1860). 
(1905).  Georgia. — Conyera  v.  Postal  Tele- 

1  The  initial  carrier  is  not  in  cases  graph  Cable  Co.,  92  Ga.  619,  19  S. 

of  successive  carriage  liable  to  the  E.  253,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  100  (1893). 

shipper  for  the  refusal  of  the  sue-  Michigan. — Western  Union  Tele- 

ceeding  carrier  to  accept  the  goods,  graph  Co.  v.  Carew,  15  Mich.  525 

Dunbar  v.  Port  Royal  &  A.  Ry.  (1867). 

Co.,  36  S.  C.  110,  15  S.  E.  357,  31  Tennessee.— Telegraph     Co.     v. 

[4421 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  521 

can  make  no  unreasonable  requirement  which  would 
seriously  interfere  with  the  course  of  through  service. 
A  connecting  railroad  cannot  require  as  to  freight  tendered 
by  a  connection  that  the  shippers  must  themselves  ap- 
pear at  the  point  of  connection,  and  rebill  their  goods.1 
Nor  can  a  telegraph  company  make  the  vexatious  re- 
quirement that  it  will  not  recognize  the  tendering  company 
as  the  agent  of  the  sender  unless  he  files  a  written  power 
of  attorney.2 

§  521.  Observance  of  patron's  directions. 

The  patron  may  himself  decide  by  what  successive 
parties  he  wishes  the  service  performed  and  from  these 
directions  the  parties  would  usually  deviate  at  their  peril.3 
Consequently  a  rule  of  a  telegraph  company  that  mes- 
sages will  be  taken  only  by  the  most  direct  connections 
notwithstanding  the  sender's  instructions  is  inconsistent 
with  its  duty.4  And  a  refusal  by  a  railroad  company  to 
take  to  the  connection  designated  is  illegal.5  But  even 
if  such  explicit  directions  are  given  the  forwarding  party 
should  notify  the  patron  if  he  knows  that  the  use  of  the 
connection  designated  will  probably  cause  unusual  delay; 6 

Munford,  87  Tenn.  190,  10  S.  W.  New    York.— Hinckley    v.    New 

318,  2  L.  R.  A.  601, 10  Am.  St.  Rep.  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 

630  (1889).  N.  Y.  429  (1874). 

Texas. — Western     Union     Tele-  Wisconsin. — Congar  v.  Galena  & 

graph  Co.  v.  Simmons  (Tex.  Civ.  Chicago  U.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Wis.  477 

App.),  93  S.  W.  686  (1906).  (1863). 

1  Dunham  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  4  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
R.  Co.,  70  Me.  164,  35  Am.  Rep.  Turner,  94  Tex.  304,  60  S.  W.  432 
314  (1879).  (1901). 

2  Atlantic    &    Pac.    Tel.    Co.    v.  6  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,   4  Stribling,  99  Tex.  319,  89  S.  W.  963 
Daly  (N.  Y.),  527  (1873).  (1905);  Feeds  River  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

3  Georgia. — Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrington    (Tex.   Civ.   App.),   99 
Cole  &  Co.,  68  Ga.  623  (1882).  S.  W.   1050  (1908);  Thompson  v. 

Minnesota. — Brown  &  Haywood      Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.), 
Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  63  Minn.       126  S.  W.  257  (1910). 
546,  65  N.  W.  961  (1896).  6  Inman  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry. 

[443] 


§522] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


and  if  it  later  turns  out  that  the  route  designated  is  im- 
practicable another  may  be  chosen.1  It  is  needless  per- 
haps to  add  that  if  the  patron  leaves  forwarding  to  the 
discretion  of  the  initial  party,  he  is  bound  to  the  disposi- 
tion which  his  agent  makes,  but  even  then  the  agent  him- 
self will  be  liable  for  proper  discretion  in  choosing  the 
connection.2 

§  522.  Results  of  any  disobedience. 

It  should  be  noted  also  that  failure  of  the  previous 
party  to  the  transit  to  transmit  his  instructions  to  his 
successor  is  a  breach  of  duty  to  the  patron  and  for  the 
consequential  deviation  that  party  is  liable.3  And  if 
the  succeeding  party  knew  of  the  violation  of  the  in- 
structions he  is  also  subject  to  all  the  disabilities  of  one 
concerned  in  a  deviation.4  On  the  question  of  the  posi- 
tion of  a  second  party  when  a  first  party  acts  contrary 


Co.,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  39,  37  S.  W. 
37  (1896). 

1  Regan  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 
61   N.   H.  579   (1881);  Andrus  v. 
Columbia  &  O.  Stb.  Co.,  47  Wash. 
333,  92  Pac.  128  (1907). 

2  Indiana. — Snow  v.  Indiana,  B. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  109  Ind.  422  (1886). 

Tennessee. — Post  v.  Railroad  Co., 
103  Tenn.  184,  52  S.  W.  301,  55  L. 
R.  A.  481  (1899). 

3  United    States. — Empire    State 
Cattle  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  210  U.  S.  1,  52  L.  ed.  931, 
28  Sup.  Ct.  607  (1908);  Harding  v. 
International   Navigation   Co.,    12 
Fed.  168  (1882). 

Michigan. — Hutchings  v.  Ladd, 
16  Mich.  493  (1868). 

New  York. — Dana  v.  New  York 
Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  How. 
Pr.  428  (1875). 

Ohio.— Little  Miami  R.  R.  Co. 

[444] 


v.  Washburn,  22  Ohio  St.  324 
(1872). 

Pennsylvania.  —  Forsythe  v. 
Walker,  9  Pa.  St.  148  (1848). 

Texas. — Booth  v.  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  37  S. 
W.  168  (1896). 

4  United  States. — Patten  v.  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Fed.  590  (1886). 

Colorado — Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Hill,  13  Colo.  35,  21  Pac.  914 
(1889). 

Georgia. — Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cole  &  Co.,  68  Ga.  623  (1882). 

Massachusetts. — Briggs  v.  Boston 
&  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Allen,  246,  83 
Am.  Dec.  626  (1863). 

New  York. — Johnson  v.  New 
York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  33  N.  Y. 
610,  88  Am.  Dec.  416  (1865). 

Pennsylvania. — Philadelphia,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Beck,  125  Pa.  St.  620, 
11  Am.  St.  Rep.  924  (1889). 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  523 

to  instructions  without  disclosing  that  he  is  doing  so,  a 
few  cases  *  have  thought  that  the  shipper  may  repudiate 
the  subsequent  transaction.  But  by  the  present  weight 
of  authority  it  is  held  that  in  forwarding  goods  to  their 
destination  by  another  connection  than  the  one  designated 
the  first  carrier  is  held  out  to  the  second  carrier  as  having 
apparent  authority; 2  so  that  the  second  carrier  even  has 
a  lien  upon  the  goods  not  only  for  his  own  charges,  but 
for  those  which  he  had  advanced  against  them  relying 
upon  the  authority  of  the  first  carrier. 

§  523.  Discrimination  permissible  in  granting  favors. 

As  all  obligations  of  the  succeeding  party  to  undertake 
service  may  thus  be  related  back  to  the  rights  of  the  orig- 
inal patron  whom  the  preceding  party  represents,  the 
succeeding  party  may  refuse  to  do  anything  not  within 
its  duty  to  patrons  generally  for  customers  using  partic- 
ular agencies.  And  thus  it  may  always  refuse  to  render 
its  service  unless  its  charges  are  tendered  it  or  secured  to 
it,  although  it  does  not  generally  insist  upon  prepayment;  3 
and,  of  course,  it  may  refuse  in  taking  over  from  one  con- 
nection to  advance  the  previous  charges,  although  it  does 
this  in  its  dealings  with  other  connections.4  There  have 

1  See  Fitch  v.  Newberry,  1  Doug.      dence  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  R.  I.  572 
(Mich.)  1,  40  Am.  Dec.  33  (1843).         (1882). 

See  also  Jones  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  3  Little  Rock  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

R.  Co.,  63  Me.  188.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  59 

2  Colorado— Price  v.  Denver  &  R.  Fed.  400  (1894);  Little  Rock  &  M. 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  12  Colo.  402,  21  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
188  (1888).  63  Fed.  775,  27  U.  S.  App.  380,  26 

Georgia.— Bird  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  L.  R.  A.  192, 11  C.  C.  A.  417,  affirm- 

Co.,  72  Ga.  655  (1884).  ing  59  Fed.  400  (1894). 

Massachusetts. — Crossan  v.  New  *  Southern  Indiana  Exp.  Co.  v. 

York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Mass.  United  States  Exp.  Co.,  92  Fed. 

196,  21  N.  E.  367,  3  L.  R.  A.  766  1022,  35  C.  C.  A.  172  (1899);  Gulf, 

(1889).  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miami  S.  S. 

Ohio—  Bowman  v.  Hilton,  11  Co.,  86  Fed.  407,  52  U.  S.  App.  732, 

Ohio,  303  (1842).  30  C.  C.  A.  142  (1898). 

Rhode  Island. — Knight  v.  Provi-  See  also  Baltimore  &  O.  Ry.  Co. 

[445] 


§  524  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

been  some  cases  dealing  with  the  obligations  of  connect- 
ing express  companies  in  recent  years  in  which  both  as- 
pects of  the  problem  were  discussed.  To  quote  from  one  * 
of  them:  "The  same  rule  applies  whether  the  articles  of 
trade  and  commerce  are  received  from  the  original  con- 
signor or  from  a  connecting  carrier.  An  express  company, 
in  the  absence  of  contract,  is  under  no  obligation  to  re- 
ceive and  transport  for  the  original  consignor,  or  to  con- 
tinue the  transportation  for  a  connecting  carrier,  with- 
out the  prepayment  of  its  charges  if  demanded.  The 
furnishing  of  equal  facilities,  without  discrimination, 
does  not  require  a  common  carrier  to  advance  money  to 
all  other  carriers  on  the  same  terms,  nor  to  give  credit 
for  the  carriage  of  articles  of  trade  and  commerce  to  all 
carriers  because  it  extends  credit  for  such  services  to 
others."  2 

§  524.  Discrimination  forbidden  where  public  duty  in- 
volved. 

But  no  policies  can  be  adopted  inconsistent  with  public 
duty  whereby  business  coming  from  one  connection  is 
favored.  Thus,  in  one  of  the  early  cases  in  public  service, 
Bennett  v.  Button,3  still  a  leading  case,  it  was  held  that 
a  stage  line  running  from  Nashua  to  Amherst  could  not 
adopt  the  rule  of  taking  passengers  who  came  from  Lowell 
to  Nashua  on  French's  line  and  refuse  those  who  came  on 
Tuttle's  line.  In  that  pioneer  case  Chief  Justice  Parker, 
after  stating  the  general  principles  of  public  duty,  thus 

v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  22  Fed.  32  statute  in  Indiana  now;  and  the 

(1884);  Oregon  Short  Line  &  U.  N.  statute  has  been  held  to  be  con- 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  stitutional.    American  Express  Co. 

Co.,  61  Fed.  158,  15  U.  S.  App.  479,  v.  Southern  Indiana  Express  Co., 

9  C.  C.  A.  409  (1894).  167  Ind.  292,  78  N.  E.  1021  (1906). 

1  Quoted  from  Southern  Indiana          3 10  N.  H.  481  (1839). 
Express  Co.  v.  United  States  Ex-          See  also  the  language  in  Cutting 

press  Co.,  88  Fed.  659,  662  (1898).  v.  Florida  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  30  Fed. 

1  It    is    otherwise    provided    by  663  (1887),  as  to  carriers  of  goods. 

[446] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  525 

applied  them  to  the  case  in  hand:  "The  defendant 
might  well  have  desired  that  passengers  at  Lowell  should 
take  French's  line  because  it  connected  with  his.  But 
if  he  had  himself  been  the  proprietor  of  the  stages  from 
Lowell  to  Nashua,  he  could  have  had  no  right  to  refuse 
to  take  a  passenger  from  Nashua,  merely  because  he  did 
not  see  fit  to  come  to  that  place  in  his  stage.  It  was 
not  for  him  to  inquire  whether  the  plaintiff  came  to 
Nashua  from  one  town  or  another,  or  by  one  conveyance 
or  another.  That  the  plaintiff  proposed  to  travel  on- 
ward from  that  place  could  not  injuriously  affect  the 
defendant's  business;  nor  was  the  plaintiff  to  be  punished 
because  he  had  come  to  Nashua  in  a  particular  manner."  l 

Topic  C.  Facilities  for  the  Interchange  of  Business 

§  525.  Construction  of  physical  connections  not  obliga- 
tory. 

One  thing  is  as  certain  as  anything  can  be  at  common 
law  in  this  doubtful  subject,  and  that  is  that  those  who 
have  provided  certain  facilities  in  order  to  give  a  desig- 
nated service,  are  under  no  obligation  to  go  beyond 
the  service  they  have  professed  and  substantially  extend 
their  existing  facilities  so  as  to  make  physical  connection 
with  another  service.  To  require  this  would  be  wholly 
outside  the  accepted  theory  of  the  proper  restriction  of 
public  obligation  to  the  profession  made.  In  a  leading 

1  Where  there  are  two  rival  lines  coming  to  or  from  it  fifty  cents  a 
of  steamboats  on  a  river  plying  be-  hundred  more  for  freight  than  in  the 
tween  the  same  points,  and  carry-  case  of  the  other,  a  suit  for  such 
ing  freight  for  hire,  both  bearing  the  discrimination  can  be  brought, 
same  relation  to  a  railroad  company  Samuels  v.  Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co., 
and  both  seeking  its  services  to  for-  31  Fed.  57  (1887). 
ward  their  freight  to  the  same  Where  a  tariff  of  a  railroad  corn- 
points  of  destination,  and  the  com-  pany  fixes  a  rate  on  shipments  origi- 
pany  systematically  discriminates  nating  on  its  own  line,  or  on  certain 
against  one  by  charging  on  goods  enumerated  connecting  lines,  it  as- 

[447] 


§  526  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Federal  case.1  in  refusing  to  order  a  railroad  company 
to  make  connections  with  a  switching  company,  the  court 
said:  " Neither  this  nor  any  other  provision  of  law  requires 
of  the  common  carrier  of  interstate  commerce  the  duty  of 
either  forming  new  connections  or  of  establishing  new  sta- 
tions for  the  reception  and  delivery  of  freights.  The  act 
to  regulate  commerce  deals  with  such  common  carriers 
as  it  finds  them,  and  leaves  to  them  full  discretion  as  to 
what  extensions  they  will  make  of  their  lines,  the  connec- 
tions they  may  form,  and  the  yards  and  depots  they  may 
choose  to  establish."  2 

§  526.  Statutory  requirements  go  further. 

In  some  jurisdictions  lately  more  explicit  statutes  have 
been  passed  providing  that  when  two  services  nearly 
approach  each  other  short  lines  for  making  connections 
should  be  constructed.  And  if  this  requirement  is 
properly  safeguarded  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  leg- 
islation is  not  so  outrageous  as  to  be  unconstitutional.3 
This  indeed  hardly  goes  beyond  the  definition  of  the 
obligation  to  provide  proper  facilities  for  the  performance 
of  the  duty  of  the  delivering  of  freight  to  a  connection. 
When  two  lines  nearly  approach,  it  is  not  outrageous  to 
consider  this  as  virtually  a  connection.4 

sumes  the  obligation  to  carry  at  2See  particularly  Wisconsin,  M. 

that  rate  for  shippers  whose  ship-  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobson,  179 

ments  originate  on  other  lines  as  U.  S.  287,  45  L.  ed.  194,  21  Sup.  Ct. 

well;  and,  if  such  a  shipper  is  re-  115  (1900),  both  to  the  same  effect, 

quired  to  pay  for  such  services  at  a  3  Alabama. — Alabama  G.  S.  R.  R. 

higher  rate  than  that  named  hi  the  Co.  v.  Thomas,  89  Ala.  294,  7  So. 

tariff,  he  is  entitled  to  recover  the  762,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  119  (1889). 

amount   of  the   overcharge.     Mis-  Nebraska. — Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

souri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New  Era  Co.  v.  Young,  25  Neb.  651,  41  N.  W. 

Milling  Co.  (Kans.),  100  Pac.  273  646  (1889). 

(1909).  4  Texas.— International  &  G.  N. 

1  Kentucky  &  I.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commission  of 

Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  37  Fed.  Texas,  99  Tex.  332,  89  S.  W.  961 

567,  2  L.  R.  A.  289  (1889).  (1905). 

[448] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES 


§527 


§  527.  Obligation  to  have  transfer  facilities  at  junction 

points. 

The  traditional  rule  at  common  law  has  been  that 
there  is  no  obligation  to  permit  connection  at  junction 
points.1  This  certainly  cannot  be  true  if  there  is  a  public 
station  at  that  point,  for  at  such  a  station,  as  has  just 
been  seen,  goods  must  be  received,  whether  tendered  by 
a  connection  or  anyone  else.  It  may  be  true  that  there 
is  not  invariably  an  obligation  to  accept  business  at  a 
private  station  from  one  connection,  even  if  business  is 
there  accepted  from  another,  as  the  Federal  courts  have 
held.1  But  can  it  be  true  that  there  is  never  an  obliga- 
tion to  stop  for  the  exchange  of  business  at  intersecting 
points  if  the  railroad  company  decides  not  to  establish 
a  station,  as  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  held?  2 
If  there  is  a  sufficient  amount  of  business  that  would 
usually  be  tendered  at  a  junction  if  a  station  should  be 


Vermont. — Rutland  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bellows  Falls  &  S.  R.  St.  Ry.  Co., 
73  Vt.  20,  50  Atl.  636  (1900). 

The  telephone  cases  furnish  a 
close  analogy.  At  common  law  at 
all  events  one  telephone  company 
was  not  bound  to  make  physical 
connections  with  the  lines  of  its 
rival  so  that  through  speech  could 
be  had.  Matter  of  Baldswinsville 
Telephone  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  Misc.  221, 
53  N.  Y.  Supp.  574  (1898).  And 
consequently  an  arrangement  by 
one  company  to  give  to  another 
company  all  its  through  toll  line 
business  is  not  contrary  to  public 
policy.  Home  Telephone  Co.  v. 
North  Manchester  Telephone  Co. 
(Ind.  App.),  92  N.  E.  558  (1910). 

1  Kentucky.— Shelbyville  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Louisville  C.  &  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
82  Ky.  541  (1885).  But  see  Louis- 

29 


ville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  S.  Y. 
Co.,  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  18, 97  S.  W.  778 
(1906). 

Maryland. — Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Baltimore,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  60 
Md.  263  (1883). 

2  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Miami  S.  S.  Co.,  30  C.  C.  A.  142,  86 
Fed.  407  (1898);  Ilwaco  Ry.  &  Nav. 
Co.  v.  Oregon  Short  Line  Ry.  Co.,  6 
C.  C.  A.  495,  15  U.  S.  App.  173,  57 
Fed.  673  (1893). 

1  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Denver  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  110  U.  S. 
667,  28  L.  ed.  291,  4  Sup.  Ct.  185 
(1884);  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S.  132, 
53  L.  ed.  441,  29  Sup.  Ct.  246 
(1909). 

See  further,  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Marrs,  60  Ark.  637,  31  S.  W. 
42  (1895). 

[449] 


§§  528,  529  ]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

opened,  according  to  the  more  advanced  views  now  held 
there  ought  to  be  a  public  station  established.  A  New 
Hampshire  court l  has  gone  so  far  as  to  say  that  a 
union  station  ought  to  be  built  by  two  roads  which  made 
connections  in  a  city,  if  it  be  shown  that  public  conven- 
ience required  it. 

§  628.  Whether  freight  must  be  taken  in  original  cars. 

As  to  whether  transportation  must  be  given  to  the 
goods  offered  by  a  first  carrier  to  a  second  carrier  in  the 
cars  in  which  they  are  tendered  by  the  first  carrier,  re- 
gardless of  the  desires  of  the  second  carrier,  there  is  still 
some  conflict  of  authority.  In  Oregon  Short  Line  and 
Utah  Northern  Railway  Company  v.  Northern  Pacific 
Railroad  Company,2  the  utilization  of  foreign  cars  being 
in  question,  the  law  as  it  then  stood,  was  summarized  thus 
by  Mr.  Justice  Field:  "  As  the  receiving  company  is  under 
no  obligation  to  take  the  freight  in  the  cars  in  which  it  is 
tendered,  and  transport  it  in  such  cars,  when  it  has  cars 
of  its  own,  not  in  use,  to  transport  it,  there  can  be  no  cus- 
tom that  it  shall  pay  the  owner  of  such  cars,  should  it 
receive  them  in  such  case,  car  mileage  for  their  use." 

§  629.  Such  transportation  now  usually  held  obligatory. 
On  the  other  hand  there  are  cases  which  hold  that 
the  railroad  is  obliged  to  accept  the  cars  of  another  road 
filled  with  goods  and  carry  them  through  to  their  desti- 
nation. In  an  opinion  written  by  Mr.  Justice  Cooley, 
in  the  case  of  Michigan  Central  Railroad  Company  v. 
Smithson,3  is  the  following  statement  which  probably 

1  Concord  &   M.   R.   R.   Co.   v.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  67  N.  Ry.  Co.,  102  Iowa,  292,  71  N.  W. 

H.  464,  41  Atl.  263  (1893).  406  (1897).    Note  the  limitation  in 

*51  Fed.  465   (1892).     See  also  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cook  & 

Little  Rock  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  4  Ga.  App.  698  (1908). 

Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Fed.  >  45   Mich.   212,    7   N.    W.   791 

400   (1894).     And  see  Green  Bay  (1881). 

[4501 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  529 

represents  the  present  law:  "The  primary  fact  that  must 
rule  this  controversy  is  that  the  Michigan  Central  Rail- 
road Company  is  compelled  to  receive  and  transport  over 
its  road  all  the  varieties  of  freight  cars  which  are  offered 
to  it  for  the  purpose,  and  which  are  upon  wheels  adapted 
to  its  gauge.  It  is  compelled  to  do  so,  first,  because  the 
necessities  of  commerce  demand  it.  It  cannot  and  would 
not  be  tolerated  that  cars  loaded  at  New  York  for  San 
Francisco,  or  at  Boston  for  Chicago,  should  have  their 
freight  transferred  from  one  car  to  another  whenever 
they  passed  upon  another  road.  Time  would  be  lost, 
expense  increased,  injuries  to  freight  made  more  numerous, 
and  no  corresponding  advantage  accrue  to  anyone.  It 
is  compelled  to  do  so,  second,  by  its  own  interest.  To 
attempt  to  stop  every  car  offered  to  it  at  its  termini,  that 
the  freight  might  be  transferred  to  its  own  vehicles,  would 
be  to  drive  away  from  its  line  a  large  portion  of  its  traffic, 
and  compel  it  to  rely  upon  a  local  business."  l 

1  See,  to  the  same  effect:  ville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Central  S.  Y. 

United    States.— R&e    v.    Grand  Co.,  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  18,  97  S.  W. 

Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  14  Fed.  401  (1882).  778  (1906). 

Alabama. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Massachusetts. — Vermont    &    M. 

Co.  v.  Boland,  96  Ala.  626,  11  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  14 

667  (1892).  Allen  (Mass.),  462,  92  Am.  Dec.  785 

Arkansas. — St.  Louis  Southwest-  (1867);  Mackin  v.  Boston  &  A.  R. 

ern  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  85  Ark.  311,  R.  Co.,  135  Mass.  201,  46  Am.  Rep. 

107  S.  W.  1180  (1907).  456  (1883). 

Illinois. — Peoria  &  P.  M.  Ry.  Co.  Michigan. — McMillan  v.  Chicago 

v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  124  N.  W.  1069 

109  111.  135,  50  Am.  Rep.  605  (1884).  (1910). 

Iowa. — Baldwin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Missouri. — Thomas   v.    Missouri 

50  la.  680  (1879);  Burlington.,  C.  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  109  Mo.  187,  18  S. 

R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dey,  82  la.  312,  W.  980  (1891). 

48  N.  W.  98,  12  L.  R.  A.  436,  31  Nebraska.— Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  477  (1891).  Co.  v.  Curtis,  51  Neb.  442,  71  N.  W. 

Kentucky.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  42,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  456  (1897). 

Co.  v.  Williams,  95  Ky.  199,  15  Ky.  New  York.— Hudson  Valley  Ry. 

L.  Rep.  548,  24  S.  W.  1,  44  Am.  St.  Co.  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co., 

Rep.  214  (1893).     See  also  Louis-  45  N.  Y.  Misc.  520,  92  N.  Y.  Supp. 

(4511 


§§  530,  531  ]       PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  530.   Qualifications  of  the  doctrine. 

It  may  be  added  that  there  is  no  duty  to  accept  cars 
which  are  not  of  a  character  to  fit  in  with  the  equipment  of 
the  company  to  which  they  are  tendered  or  in  such  a  de- 
fective condition  as  to  be  dangerous.1  Where  this  duty 
to  receive  the  cars  is  established  it  is  certainly  true  that 
the  second  railroad  can  make  no  charge  for  hauling  the 
cars  independently  of  the  regular  freight  for  then*  con- 
tents.2 On  the  other  hand  it  is  probably  true  that  the 
second  carrier  is  not  under  any  more  obligation  to  pay 
mileage  for  the  use  of  the  cars  than  is  stated  in  a  preced- 
ing paragraph.  But  a  fair  system  for  the  interchange  of 
cars  will  be  respected  by  the  courts,  as  will  be  seen  in  a 
succeeding  paraigraph. 

§  531.  Provision  of  cars  for  further  service. 

However  no  case  has  ever  gone  so  far  at  common  Jaw 
as  to  assert  that  shippers  could  insist  that  the  initial  car- 
rier should  provide  them  with  sufficient  cars  for  the  trans- 
portation of  their  goods  through  to  any  part  of  the  con- 

928  (1904),  affirmed  94  N.  Y.  Supp.          Nebraska.— Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

545,  106  App.  Div.  375  (1905).  R.  Co.  v.  Curtis,  51  Neb.  442,  71 

Texas—  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  N.  W.  42,   66  Am.  St.  Rep.  456 

v.  Lone  Star  Salt  Co.,  26  Tex.  Civ.  (1897). 

App.  531,  63  S.  W.   1025   (1901);          Ohio.— Pennsylvania  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  Snyder,  55  Ohio  St.  342,  45  N.  E. 

Short  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Tex.  Civ.  559,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  700  (1896). 
App.   387,   80  S.   W.   567   (1904);          Texas.— Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cariton,  60  Carlton,  60  Tex.  397  (1883). 
Tex.  397  (1883).  Wisconsin—  Miltimore  v.   C.  & 

1  United  States.— Baltimore  &  P.  N.    W.    Ry.    Co.,    37    Wis.    190 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Mackey,  157  U.  S.  72,  39  (1875). 
L.  ed.  624,  15  Sup.  Ct.  491  (1895).          2  Harrison  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co., 

Georgia.— Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  62  L.  J.  Q.  B.  (N.  S.)  225  (1893). 

v.  Cook  &  L.  4  Ga.  App.  698  (1908).  But  query  whether  a  shipper  can 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  get  his  own  cars  hauled  thus  for 

Co.  v.  Williams,  95  Ky.  199,  24  S.  nothing.    Green  Bay  Lumber  Co.  v. 

W.  1,  15  Ky.  Law  Rep.  548,  44  Am.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  102  la. 

St.  Rep.  214  (1893).  292,  71  N.  W.  406  (1897). 

[452] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  532 

tinent  that  can  be  reached  by  connecting  lines.1  "At 
common  law  shippers  cannot  insist  that  the  initial  carrier 
shall  provide  them  with  sufficient  cars  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  their  goods,  to  any  point  beyond  its  own  line  of 
road;  for  the  carrier's  obligation  to  provide  equipments 
was  always  held  limited  to  service  over  its  own  route."  2 
But  a  railroad  may  well  profess  to  furnish  cars  for  serv- 
ice beyond  its  route.3  "For  one  railroad  company  to  be 
an  Ishmaelite  among  its  associates  would  operate  dis- 
astrously to  its  shippers.  The  shippers  of  Arkansas  ex- 
pect the  public  carriers  to  put  their  cotton  to  the  spinners 
in  New  England  and  their  fruits  to  the  North,  and  their 
lumber  and  coal  to  the  four  quarters  of  the  Union,  with- 
out change  from  consignor  to  consignee."  4 

§  532.  Statutory  requirement  of  through  facilities. 

But  it  is  not  impossible  that  statutes  may  even  go  to 
the  length  of  requiring  such  through  service  by  reason 
of  commercial  necessity.  In  a  very  late  case,5  in  declar- 
ing unconstitutional  a  statute  requiring  a  railroad  to  fur- 
nish its  cars  for  through  transportation  off  its  own  route 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  based  its  decision  simply 

1  Florida. — State  v.  Louisville  &      Ry.  Co.  v.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Fla.  311,  40  So.      120  S.  W.  1028  (1909). 

885  (1906).  3  It  is  apparently  the  duty  of  a 

Illinois. — People  ex  rel.  v.  Chi-  connecting  carrier  on  a  joint  through 

cago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  111.  95,  8  rate  to  accept  cars  delivered  to  it  by 

Am.  Rep.  631  (1870).  the   initial    carrier.      Pennsylvania 

Indiana. — Pittsburg,     Cincinnati  Refining  Co.  v.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P. 

&  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Morton,  61  R.  R.  Co.,  208  U.  S.  208,  52  L.  ed. 

Ind.   539,  576,   28  Am.  Rep.   682  456,  28  Sup.  Ct.  268  (1908). 

(1878).  4  Quoted  from  St.  Louis  South- 

Massachusetts. — Pitlock  v.  Wells  western  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  85  Ark. 

Fargo    &    Co.,     109     Mass.     452  311,  107  S.  W.  1180,  122  Am.  St. 

(1872).  Rep.  33  (1907). 

New    York. — Babcock    v.    Lake  •  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,   v 

Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  491  Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S.  132,  , 

(1872).  143,  53  L.  ed.  441,  29  Sup.  Ct.  246 

2  Quoted  from  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  (1909). 

[453] 


§  533  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

upon  the  point  that  the  statute  did  not  provide  sufficient 
safeguards,  not  even  providing  for  compensation:  "It 
was  argued  that  the  requirement  that  the  plaintiff  in  error 
should  deliver  its  own  cars  to  another  road  was  void  under 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  an  unlawful  taking  of  its 
property.  In  view  of  the  well  known  and  necessary  prac- 
tice of  connecting  roads,  we  are  far  from  saying  that  a 
valid  law  could  not  be  passed  to  prevent  the  cost  and 
loss  of  time  entailed  by  needless  transshipment  or  breaking 
bulk,  in  case  of  an  unreasonable  refusal  by  a  carrier  to 
interchange  cars  with  another  for  through  traffic.  We 
do  not  pass  upon  the  question.  It  is  enough  to  observe 
that  such  a  law  perhaps  ought  to  be  so  limited  as  to  re- 
spect the  paramount  needs  of  the  carrier  concerned,  and  at 
least  could  be  sustained  only  with  full  and  adequate  regu- 
lations for  his  protection  from  the  loss  or  undue  detention 
of  cars,  and  for  securing  due  compensation  for  their  use. 
The  constitution  of  Kentucky  is  simply  a  universal  un- 
discriminating  requirement,  with  no  adequate  provisions 
such  as  we  have  described.  The  want  cannot  be  cured 
by  inserting  them  in  judgments  under  it.  The  law  itself 
must  save  the  parties'  rights,  and  not  leave  them  to  the 
discretion  of  the  courts  as  such."  1 

Topic  D.  Joint  Through  Routing  and  Rating 

§  533.  Through  arrangements  not  obligatory. 

At  common  law  one  public  service  could  not  be  com- 
pelled to  enter  into  arrangements  with  another  for  con- 
tinuous service  as  a  single  unit  for  a  single  rate.  Through 
arrangements  were  left  altogether  to  such  private  agree- 
ments as  the  parties  should  negotiate.2  This  is  well  ex- 

1  Much  the  same  language  is  used  rates  on  certain  commodities  with- 
in Thompson  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  out  doing  so  on  others.    Central  of 
Ry.Co.  (Tex.)  128,  S.  W.  109  (1910).  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Augusta  Brokerage 

2  Railroads  can  establish  through  Co.,  122  Ga.  646,  SOS.  E.  473  (1905). 

[454] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  534 

plained  in  the  leading  case  of  the  Atchison,  Topeka  & 
Santa  Fe  Railroad  Co.  v.  Denver  &  New  Orleans  Railroad 
Co.1  where  the  Supreme  Court  squarely  held  that  a  rail- 
road might  enter  into  through  traffic  agreements  with 
one  railroad,  pro-rating  its  through  rate,  and  at.  the  same 
time  refuse  to  enter  into  a  similar  agreement  with  another 
railroad  traversing  the  same  territory  as  the  first  and 
having  the  same  terminus.2  To  quote  but  one  paragraph 
from  the  elaborate  opinion  of  Chief  Justice  Waite:  "At 
common  law,  a  carrier  is  not  bound  to  carry  except  on 
his  own  line,  and  we  think  it  quite  clear  that  if  he  con- 
tracts to  go  beyond  he  may,  in  the  absence  of  statutory 
regulations  to  the  contrary,  determine  for  himself  what 
agencies  he  will  employ.  His  contract  is  equivalent  to 
an  extension  of  his  line  for  the  purposes  of  the  contract, 
and  if  he  holds  himself  out  as  a  carrier  beyond  the  line, 
so  that  he  may  be  required  to  carry  in  that  way  for  all 
alike,  he  may  nevertheless  confine  himself  in  carrying 
to  the  particular  route  he  chooses  to  use.  He  puts  him- 
self in  no  worse  position,  by  extending  his  route  with  the 
help  of  others,  than  he  would  occupy  if  the  means  of  trans- 
portation employed  were  all  his  own.  He  certainly  may 
select  his  own  agencies  and  his  own  associates  for  doing  his 
own  work."  3 

§  534.  Initial  company  may  select  connecting  line. 

It  follows  plainly  enough  that  the  initial  carrier  has 

1 110  U.  S.  667,  28  L.  ed.  291,  4  Terry  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  127  S.  W. 

Sup.  Ct.  185  (1884).    A  carrier  need  567  (1910). 

not  pro  rate  with  one  connection  s  These  doctrines  have  prevailed 

upon  the  same  terms  that  it  does  generally  in  the  state  courts, 

with  another.     Samuels  v.  Louis-  Georgia. — State  v.  Wrightsville  & 

ville   &   N.   Ry.  Co.,  31   Fed.   57  T.  Ry.  Co.,  104  Ga.  437,  30  S.  E. 

(1887).  891  (1898). 

2  Telephone  companies  need  not  Indiana. — Snow  v.  Indiana,  B.  & 

establish  through  toll  line  connec-  W.  Ry.  Co.,  109  Ind.  422,  9  N.  E. 

tions.     Albany  Telephone  Co.   v.  702  (1886). 

[455] 


§534 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


entire  control  over  the  situation.1  In  the  recent  Citrous 
Fruit  case  in  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 2  the  pol- 
icy of  the  Pacific  railroads  under  which  the  right  of  routing 
beyond  its  own  terminal  was  reserved  to  the  initial  carrier 
to  exercise  in  his  discretion  at  any  stage  as  the  condition 
of  guaranteeing  through  rates  to  the  shipper  was  held 
its  right  beyond  question.  As  the  court  tersely  said  in 
its  decision:  "The  important  facts  that  control  the  situ- 
ation are  that  the  carrier  need  not  agree  to  carry  beyond 
its  own  road,  and  may  agree  upon  joint  through  tariff 
rates  or  not,  as  seems  best  for  its  own  interests.  Having 
these  rights  of  contract  the  carrier  may  make  such  terms 
as  it  pleases,  at  least  so  long  as  they  are  reasonable  and  do 
not  otherwise  violate  the  law." 


1  Citation  should  be  made  here  of 
the  many  cases  which  held  that  the 
original  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
left  the  railroads  free  as  before  to 
make  such  arrangements  for  through 
routing,  billing,  or  rating  as  they 
pleased  without  its  being  a  refusal 
of  equal  facilities  for  the  interchange 
of  traffic  to  make  such  through  ar- 
rangements with  one  company  while 
refusing  to  do  so  with  another. 
Central  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  568,  48  L.  ed. 
565,  24  Sup.  Ct.  339  (1904);  Ken- 
tucky &  I.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  L.  R.  A.  289,  2 
Int.  Com.  Rep.  351,  37  Fed.  567, 
629,  630  (1889);  Little  Rock  &  M. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  2  Int.  Com.  Rep.  763, 
41  Fed.  559  (1890);  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Osborne,  3  C.  C.  A. 
347,  4  Int.  Com.  Rep.  257,  52  Fed. 
912  (1892);  Oregon  Short  Line  & 
U.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  4  Int.  Com.  Rep.  718,  9  C.  C. 

[456] 


A.  409,  15  U.  S.  App.  479,  61  Fed. 
158  (1894),  affirming  4  Int.  Com. 
Rep.  249,  51  Fed.  465  (1892);  Little 
Rock  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  & 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  26  L.  R.  A.  192,  4 
Int.  Com.  Rep.  854, 11  C.  C.  A.  417, 
27  U.  S.  App.  280,  63  Fed.  775 
(1894);  St.  Louis  Drayage  Co.  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Int. 
Com.  Rep.  137,  65  Fed.  39  (1894); 
Prescott  &  A.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atchi- 
son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  73  Fed.  438 
(1896);  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Miami  S.  S.  Co.,  86  Fed.  407,  30 
C.  C.  A.  142  (1898);  Allen  v.  Oregon 
Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  98  Fed.  16  (1899). 

But  see  (practically  overruled  on 
this  point)  New  York  &  N.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  50 
Fed.  867  (1892)-;  Augusta  S.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Wrightsville  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 
74  Fed.  522  (1896). 

2  Southern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Interstate  Comm.  Comm.,  200  U.  S. 
536,  50  L.  ed.  585,  26  Sup.  Ct.  330 
(1906). 


CONNECTING  SERVICES         [  §§  535,  536 

§  535.  Limitations  upon  joint  rates. 

It  is  entirely  proper  that  two  carriers  should  combine 
to  form  a  single  route  and  name  a  single  rate  for  that 
haul.  This  will  usually  result  in  a  lower  rate  than  the 
sum  of  the  two  individual  rates  by  reason  of  the  relative 
economy  of  the  long  haul.  For  plainly  a  railroad  may 
charge  more  for  transporting  its  local  passenger  between 
two  termini  than  it  receives  for  transporting  a  through 
passenger  over  the  same  distance  in  the  division  of  the 
through  rate  with  other  railroads. l  When  such  a  through 
rate  has  been  established  by  the  agreement  of  the  carriers, 
every  shipper  is  entitled  to  it.  If  some  shippers  are  given 
an  advantage  over  others  in  such  shipment  it  will  be  a 
case  of  illegal  discrimination.2 

§  536.  Statutory  provision  for  through  routes. 

But  the  statutes  are  going  further  than  to  make  the 
common  law  more  intensive;  they  are  making  the  legal 
obligation  more  extensive.  The  common  law  right  of  the 
initial  company  to  make  through  traffic  arrangements  with 
some  one  connecting  line  and  throw  all  the  business  which 
it  will  take  at  the  through  rate  into  the  hands  of  that  one 
line,  notwithstanding  the  desires  of  the  shipper,  has,  of 
late,  caused  such  fears  that  statutes  are  being  passed  in 
recent  years  giving  the  power  to  the  regulating  body  to 
compel  the  making  of  a  joint  rate.  This  power  was  given 
to  the  English  Railway  and  Canal  Commission  in  1888,3 
and  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in  1906. 4 
Our  Federal  legislation  was  anticipated  in  the  various 

1  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  231  (1897);  Tozer  v.  United  States, 

States,  117  U.  S.  355,  6  Sup.  Ct.  52  Fed.  917  (1892). 

772,  29  L.  ed.  920  (1886);  Texas  &  2  Blair  v.  Sioux  City  &  P.  Ry. 

P.  Ry.  Co.  v.   Interstate  Comm.  Co.,   109  la.   369,   80  N.   W.  673 

Comm.,  162  U.  S.  197,  16  Sup.  Ct.  (1899);  Bras  v.  McConnell,  114  la. 

666,  40  L.  ed.  940  (1896);  Parsons  401,  87  N.  W.  290  (1901). 

v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  167  3  51  &  52  Viet.,  Chap.  25  (1888). 

U.  S.  447,  17  Sup.  Ct.  887,  42  L.  ed.  «  Act  of  July  29,  1906. 

[457] 


§§  537,  538]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

states,  Minnesota  and  Texas  for  example.  It  will  be  no- 
ticed that  the  commission  by  these  statutes  is  to  judge 
as  to  whether  public  convenience  requires  the  additional 
through  routes  asked.  The  shipper,  therefore,  now  as 
before  has  no  rights  in  the  matter  until  the  through  rate 
has  been  duly  established,  then  of  course  he  may  demand  it. 

§  537.  Constitutionality  of  such  statutes. 

The  problem  has  not  been  settled  though  it  has  been 
raised  as  to  whether  such  statutes  are  constitutional;  but 
in  view  of  the  later  idea  of  the  obligation  of  the  carrier  to 
the  whole  community  there  seems  to  be  little  doubt  of 
the  decision.  In  holding  the  Minnesota  statute  valid, 
Mr.  Justice  Collins  said:  l  "We  see  no  reason  why,  under 
the  amendatory  act  the  commission  cannot  lawfully  com- 
pel a  joint  arrangement  in  a  case  like  this.  The  evidence 
shows  that  the  location  of  the  Duluth  road  and  the  Minne- 
apolis and  St.  Louis  road,  their  track  facilities,  equipment, 
etc.,  are  such  that,  by  operating  together  under  joint 
traffic  agreements,  the  cost  of  the  service  can  be  greatly 
lessened.  The  public  has,  at  least,  a  right  to  share  in  the 
benefits  of  this  condition.  If  it  is  judicious  to  do  so  and 
of  public  benefit  to  have  joint  traffic  arrangements  in  any 
given  case,  why  should  not  the  public  be  permitted  to 
compel  that  such  arrangements  be  made?"  2 

§  538.  Application  of  these  statutes. 

Two  recent  cases  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  bring  out  the  limitations  under  which  the  extension 
of  the  common  law  doctrines  by  legislation  is  proceeding. 
In  the  first  of  these  cases  3  it  was  held  that  the  general 

1  State  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Co.,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  39,  37  S.  W. 

R.   R.  Co.,  80  Minn.   191,  83  N.  37  (1896),  should  be  noted. 

W.    60,    89    Am.    St.    Rep.    514  3  Interstate    Comm.    Comm.    v. 

(1900).  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  216 

*  Inman  v.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  U.  S.  531,  30  Sup.  Ct.  417  (1910). 
[458] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  539 

power  given  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in 
the  recent  amendments  to  compel  an  unwilling  railroad 
to  make  connections  with  a  branch  line  was  not  intended 
"to  give  a  roving  commission  to  every  road  that  might 
see  fit  to  make  a  descent  upon  a  main  line,  but  primarily, 
at  least,  to  provide  for  shippers  seeking  an  outlet  either 
by  a  private  road  or  branch."  In  the  second  of  these 
cases  1  it  was  held  that  joint  through  routes  may  not  be 
established  by  the  commission  except  in  accordance  with 
the  powers  delegated  to  it  in  the  statute,  and  that  there- 
fore where  one  reasonable  through  route  has  been  estab- 
lished by  the  company  in  question  it  cannot  be  compelled 
to  enter  into  another  in  which  it  gets  a  far  shorter  haul, 
simply  because  the  public  might  prefer  to  have  the  ad- 
vantage of  an  alternative  route. 

§  639.  Statutory  regulation  of  connecting  service. 

This  modern  conception  of  the  fuller  extent  of  the  public 
duty  to  all  concerned  in  relation  to  the  making  of  con- 
nections has  manifested  itself  of  late  in  many  statutes 
requiring  proper  arrangements  for  the  interchange  of  busi- 
ness at  junction  points.  These  now  receive  more  respect 
from  the  courts  than  they  once  did.2  And  in  another  class 
of  cases  altogether  it  has  been  held  that  legislation  com- 
pelling telephone  companies  to  make  switch  board  con- 

1  Interstate    Comm.    Comm.    v.      S.  Y.  Co.,  97  S.  W.  778,  30  Ky.  Law 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  216  U.  S.      Rep.  18  (1906). 

538,  30  Sup.  Ct.  415  (1910).  Minnesota.— Jacobson     v.     Wis- 

2  The  possibility  of  constitution-  consin,  M.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Minn, 
ally  compelling  the  interchange  of  519,  74  N.  W.  893,  40  L.  R.  A.  389 
business  upon  equal  terms  is  shown  (1898). 

in  various  recent  cases,  such  as:  Missouri. — State  of  Missouri  v. 

Kentucky.— Louivsille  &  N.  R.  R.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  105  Mo. 

Co.  v.  Pittsburg  &  K.  Coal  Co.,  Ill  App.  207,  79  S.  W.  714  (1904). 

Ky.  960,  64  S.  W.  969,  55  L.  R.  A.  New  York.— Hudson  Valley  Ry. 

601,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  447  (1901);  Co.  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co., 

Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Central  106  App.  Div.  375,  94  N.  Y.  Supp. 

545  (1905). 

[459] 


§  540  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

nection  so  that  through  speech  may  be  had  has  been  held 
constitutional.1  This  is  going  to  an  extreme  as  will  be 
seen  in  another  connection. 

§  540.  Policy  of  such  legislation. 

It  is  well  worthy  of  particular  remark  that  the  powers 
granted  commissions  in  this  respect  now  go  so  far  as  to 
authorize  the  making  of  orders  as  to  running  of  trains  by 
the  intersecting  roads,  so  as  to  make  convenient  connec- 
tions. It  is  characteristic  of  the  new  appreciation  of  the 
extent  of  public  duty  that  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  finds  no  difficulty  with  these  statutes.  Speaking 
of  the  objection  raised  to  the  regulation  of  the  conduct  of 
one  public  service  in  its  relations  with  another  for  the 
benefit  of  all  concerned,  that  court  said  in  what  seems 
certainly  destined  to  be  a  leading  case:2  "This  reduces 
itself  to  the  contention  that,  although  the  governmental 
power  to  regulate  exists  in  the  interest  of  the  public,  yet 
it  does  not  extend  to  securing  to  the  public  reasonable 
facilities  for  making  connection  between  different  carriers. 
But  the  proposition  destroys  itself,  since  at  one  and  the 
same  time  it  admits  the  plenary  power  to  regulate  and 
yet  virtually  denies  the  efficiency  of  that  authority.3 

1  Telephone   companies  may    be  U.  S.  1,  22,  51  L.  ed.  933,  27  Sup. 

compelled    by    statute    to    make  Ct.  585  (1907). 

switchboard  connections.     Billings  *  A  statute  making  it  the  duty  of 

Mutual  Telephone   Co.   v.   Rocky  railroad    corporations    to   stop   all 

Mt.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  155  Fed.  trains  carrying  passengers  at  the 

207  (1907).     But  the  common  law  junction  of  other  railroads  a  suffi- 

obligation  to  this  effect  is  limited  cient  length  of  time  to  allow  the 

to  those  cases  where  the  company  transfer    of    passengers    and    their 

has  not  provided  through  lines  of  baggage,   enforced.     State  ex  rel. 

its  own.     Home  Telephone  Co.  v.  McPherson  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

North  Manchester  Telephone  Co.  Co.,  105  Mo.  App.  207,  79  S.  W.  714 

(Ind.  App.),  92  N.  E.  558  (1910).  (1904). 

*  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ry.  Co.  v.  A    statute    requiring      common 

North  Carolina  Corp.  Comm.,  206  carriers   to   afford   all    reasonable, 

[460] 


CONNECTING  SERVICES  [  §  540 

proper,  and  equal  facilities  for  railroad  changing  its  times  card  by 
traffic  between  their  respective  which  a  connection  with  a  connect- 
lines,  and  for  receiving,  forwarding,  ing  road  which  was  of  general  con- 
and  delivering  passengers  and  prop-  venience  was  discontinued.  South- 
erly to  and  from  their  several  lines  ern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  37 
and  connecting  lines  is  violated  by  a  S.  E.  294,  98  Va.  758  (1900). 


461 


PART  IV.     JUSTIFICATION  FOR  REFUSING 

SERVICE 

CHAPTER  XVI 

INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES  OF  PUBLIC  DUTY 

§  550.  Refusal  illegal  without  proper  justification. 

Topic  A.  Distasteful  Service 
§  551.  Malicious  motives. 

552.  Malice  as  a  factor. 

553.  Refusal  dictated  by  favoritism. 

554.  Discrimination  for  its  own  ends. 

555.  Disagreeable  persons. 

556.  Unmannerly  persons. 

557.  Slight  misbehavior. 

558.  Personal  objections. 

559.  Immoral  persons. 

560.  Undesirable  persons. 

561.  Supposed  interest  of  patron. 

562.  Wiser  course  for  patron. 

563.  Unwelcome  service. 

564.  Wrongful  refusal. 

Topic  B.  Disadvantageous  Service 
§  565.  Race  prejudice. 

566.  Separation  of  the  races. 

567.  Class  distinctions. 

568.  Social  differences. 

569.  Unpopular  organizations. 

570.  Labor  demands. 

571.  Assumption  of  peculiar  risks. 

572.  Service  involving  unusual  care. 

573.  Indirect  advantage  in  refusing. 

574.  Ultimate  advantage  in  refusing. 

575.  Particular  service  peculiarly  expensive. 

576.  Extensions  limited  by  profitableness. 

[462] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES         [  §  550,  551 

^ 

§  577.  Service  in  unprofitable  ways. 

578.  Unprofitableness  seldom  an  excuse. 

579.  Particular  service  not  indispensable. 

580.  Substitute  for  service  available. 

§  550.  Refusal  illegal  without  proper  justification. 

According  to  the  primary  principles  discussed  in  the 
preceding  chapters  one  is  bound  to  serve  all  who  come 
within  his  public  profession.  To  excuse  himself  from 
such  service  he  must  show  justification  based  upon  public 
policy.  Once  committed  to  public  employment  he  can  no 
longer  refuse  his  service  at  his  whim  or  caprice.  When 
the  obligation  of  public  service  is  clearly  established  by 
showing  that  there  is  a  plain  case  within  the  public  under- 
taking, all  conditions  precedent  being  satisfied,  the  only 
method  of  avoiding  liability  is  to  show  that  there  is  justifi- 
cation for  the  suspension  of  service  in  general  or  some 
special  excuse  for  the  particular  refusal.  And  it  is  obvious 
that  such  justification  must  be  upon  reasonable  grounds 
relating  to  the  possibility  of  performing  the  service,  and 
such  excuse  must  show  that  the  particular  request  is  truly 
improper.  A  refusal  to  serve  upon  any  other  basis  is  a 
breach  of  public  duty,  no  matter  what  plausible  grounds 
may  be  urged  in  its  defense.  Such  breaches  are  almost  too 
obvious  to  be  discussed  as  excuses;  they  are  rather  illustra- 
tions of  the  primary  duty.  As  such  the  facts  of  the  lead- 
ing cases  are  stated  rather  fully  in  this  chapter. 

Topic  A.  Distasteful  Service 

§  551.  Malicious  motives. 

One  engaged  in  a  public  employment  must  serve  friends 
and  enemies  alike.  This  is  too  obviously  the  consequence 
of  public  duty  to  provoke  much  discussion.  In  one  case 
a  traveler  recovered  for  being  refused  by  the  manager  of  a 
hotel  who  bore  a  grudge  against  him  because  he  had 
previously  attempted  to  procure  the  discharge  of  the 

[463] 


§§  552,  553  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

manager.  The  court  held  the  proprietor  liable.1  In  an- 
other case  a  shipper  recovered  from  a  railroad  for  refusal 
to  accept  goods  tendered  for  shipment,  because  of  per- 
sonal disputes  with  the  shipper.2  And  the  court  charged 
the  jury  that  no  circumstances  justifying  the  refusal  of 
the  goods  appeared. 

§  552.  Malice  as  a  factor. 

It  should  be  noted  in  this  connection  that  if  the  request 
refused  is  one  as  to  which  there  is  no  public  duty  involved 
it  makes  no  difference  with  what  motive  the  refusal  is 
made.3  But  as  regulations  must  be  enforced  in  good  faith, 
if  service  is  cut  off  from  spite  the  regulation  will  not  be  a 
defense  for  what  is  done.4  Malice  may  not  work  a  wrong. 
But  malice  may  destroy  a  justification. 

§  553.  Refusal  dictated  by  favoritism. 

It  may  be  admitted  that  there  are  sometimes  good 
reasons  for  giving  one  applicant  for  service  priority  over 
another  which  justify  refusing  one  applicant  in  favor  of 
another.  But  such  refusal  will  constitute  an  illegal  dis- 
crimination unless  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  general 
rules  of  priority  later  discussed.  Thus  a  gas  company 
cannot  give  the  supply  of  one  of  its  stockholders  priority 
and  thereby  excuse  its  refusal  to  serve  one  of  the  general 
public.5  So  a  common  carrier  by  sea  cannot  lawfully 

1  Willis  v.  McMahan,  89  Cal.  156,          3  Gamble-Robinson     Commission 
26  Pac.  649  (1891).  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

See  also  Avinger  v.  South  Caro-  168  Fed.   161,  94  C.  C.  A.  217,  21 

Una  R.  R.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  265,  7  S.  E.  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  982  (1909). 

493,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  716  (1888).  4  Phelan     v.    Boone     Gas     Co. 

2  Lanning  v.  Sussex  R.  R.  Co.,  1  (Iowa),  125  N.  W.  208  (1910). 

N.  J.  L.  Jour.  21  (1878).  *  Crescent  Steel  Co.  v.  Equitable 

See  also   Western    Union   Tele-  Gas  Co.,   23    Pitts.   L.   Jour.   316 

graph  Co.  v.  Lilliard,  86  Ark.  208,  (1892). 

110  S.  W.  1035  (1908),  holding  that  Compare  Lafaye  v.  Harris,  13  La. 

it  makes  no  difference  with   what  Ann.  553  (1858). 
motive  the  refusal  is  made. 

[464] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES       [  §§  554,  555 

reject  lumber,  a  commodity  which  it  professes  to  carry, 
and  afterwards  receive  and  transport  cotton  and  other 
goods,  where,  at  the  time  of  the  tender,  there  was  room 
in  the  vessel  for  the  rejected  lumber.1 

§  554.  Discrimination  for  its  own  ends. 

In  an  astounding  Canadian  case  2  a  railroad  openly 
announced  that  it  would  not  carry  any  more  cedar  lum- 
ber off  its  line.  The  court  held  that  it  might  thus  limit 
its  undertaking,  although  apparently  the  railroad  adopted 
this  policy  in  order  to  keep  the  cedar  timber  on  its  line 
for  its  own  uses.  But  in  a  leading  American  case  it  was 
held  that  a  railroad  could  not  discriminate  against  ship- 
pers who  would  not  sell  their  ties  to  it  at  a  fixed  price.3 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  latter  case  is  the  correct 
one. 

§  555.  Disagreeable  persons. 

The  mere  fact  that  a  person  is  distasteful  or  has  un- 
gentlemanly  habits  will  not  justify  a  carrier  or  an  inn- 
keeper in  refusing  him.  The  question,  or  a  very  similar 
one,  arose  in  Prendergast  v.  Compton.4  The  plaintiff,  a 
passenger,  sued  the  defendant,  the  captain  of  the  ship  in 
which  he  was  being  transported,  for  excluding  him  from 
eating  in  the  "cuddy,"  upon  the  ground  that  his  con- 
duct was  vulgar  and  offensive.  There  was  evidence  that 
he  was  in  the  habit  of  reaching  across  other  passengers 
and  of  taking  potatoes  and  boiled  bones  in  his  fingers. 
The  court  held,  however,  for  the  passenger:  "It  would  be 
difficult  to  say,  if  it  rested  here,  in  what  degree  want  of 

1  Ocean    Steamship    Co.    v.    Sa-          J  Louisville  E.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co. 
vannah   Locomotive   Works   &   S.      v.  Wilson,  132  Ind.  517,  32  N.  E. 
Co.,  131  Ga.  831,  63  S.  E.  577,  20      311  (1892). 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  867  (1909).  *  8  C.  &  P.  454  (1837). 

2  Rutherford  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 
Co.,  5  Rev.  Leg.  (Can.)  483  (1873). 

30  [  465  ] 


§§  556,  557  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

polish  would,  in  point  of  law,  warrant  a  captain  in  ex- 
cluding a  passenger  from  the  cuddy.  Conduct  unbecom- 
ing a  gentleman,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  might 
justify  him:  but  in  this  case  there  is  no  imputation  of  the 
want  of  gentlemanly  principle." 

§  656.  Unmannerly  persons. 

These  moderate  principles  prevail  generally.  In  an 
American  case  l  of  a  person  who  had  made  himself  dis- 
agreeable upon  a  street  car,  it  was  said:  "It  is  not  all  con- 
duct which  may  be  said  to  be  outside  the  pale  of  good 
breeding  that  will  bar  a  passenger  from  the  protection  of 
the  law  against  the  carrier  for  the  act  of  the  servant  in 
ejecting  him  from  the  car."  These  quotations  are  given 
to  show  that  the  law  is  rather  easy-going  in  these  matters. 
Those  who  engage  in  a  public  service  must  deal  with  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  men;  and  those  who  are  being 
served  along  with  the  general  public  must  not  be  too  nice 
or  too  finical. 

§  557.  Slight  misbehavior. 

Upon  these  principles  slight  misbehavior  is  not  a  suf- 
ficient excuse  for  a  refusal  to  serve.  As  was  said  in  one 
of  the  telephone  cases  2  where  the  subscriber  had  made 
some  vulgar  talk:  "  Reasonable  caution  must  be  taken 
lest  injustice  be  done.  Some  allowance  is  to  be  made 
for  the  infirmities  of  human  nature.  Local  customs  are 
not  to  be  ignored.  Habit  sometimes  excuses,  if  it  does 
not  justify,  the  use  of  objectionable  language.  Early 
environment  more  often  than  an  evil  spirit  is  respons- 
ible for  bad  manners.  Undisclosed  emergencies  may 

1  Eads  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  In  People  v.  McKay,  46   Mich. 
Co.,  43  Mo.  App.  536  (1891).  439   (1881),  it  was  held  that  one 

2  Huffman  v.  Marcy  Mutual  Tele-  could  not  be  excluded  from  a  wait- 
phone  Co.  (Iowa),  121  N.  W.  1033,  ing  room  for  spitting. 

23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1010  (1909). 

[466] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES       [  §§  558,  559 

extenuate  lapses  from  propriety."  By  these  principles 
the  profane  retort  of  an  exasperated  traveller  to  an  inn- 
keeper who  was  keeping  him  out  in  the  night  until  he 
would  answer  a  lot  of  questions  was  held  to  be  no  excuse 
for  the  subsequent  refusal  to  take  him  in.1  "  Suppose 
he  did  add  the  words,  '  and  be  damned  to  you,'  is  that  a 
sufficient  reason  for  keeping  a  man  out  of  an  inn  who 
has  travelled  till  midnight?  I  think  that  the  prosecutor 
was  not  guilty  of  such  misconduct  as  would  entitle  the 
defendant  to  shut  him  out  of  his  house." 

§  558.  Personal  objections. 

However  much  the  many  antics  of  children  may  wear 
upon  the  nerves  of  some  people,  boys  who  are  skylarking  2 
cannot  be  ejected  from  a  street  car.  Nor  is  unconven- 
tionality  of  costume  an  excuse  unless  it  be  indecent. 
Upon  this  principle  it  was  held  that  a  woman  in  bloomers 
could  not  be  excluded  from  an  inn.3  And  so  a  railroad  can- 
not dictate  what  dress  its  passengers  shall  wear.  One  may 
travel  who  wears  the  uniform  of  a  rival  line.4  These  prin- 
ciples go  far.  Even  a  man  who  has  plainly  been  drinking 
cannot  be  rejected.5 

§  559.  Immoral  persons. 

An  excellent  illustration  of  this  general  principle  that 
there  can  be  no  refusal  on  merely  personal  grounds  alone 
if  the  application  is  proper  in  itself  is  Brown  v.  Memphis 

1  Rex  v.  Ivens,  7  Car.  &  P.  213      St.  Ry.  Co.,  91  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  580, 
(1835).     Similarly  a  profane  retort      86  N.  Y.  Supp.  871  (1904). 

made   by   a   passenger   to   a   con-  3  Regina  v.  Sprague,  63  J.  P.  233 

ductor  under  extreme  provocation  (1899). 

was  held  not  to  be  a  sufficient  ex-  4  South    Florida   R.    R.    Co.    v. 

cuse   for   ejecting   him.     El    Paso  Rhodes,  25  Fla.  40,  5  So.  633,  3 

Electric  Ry.   Co.   v.   Alderete,   36  L.  R.  A.  733,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  506 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  142,  81  S.  W.  1246  (1889). 

(1904).  *  See  Story  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  R.  R. 

2  Rosenberg  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  Co.,  133  N.  C.  59, 45 S.  E.  349  (1903). 

[467] 


§  560  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

&  Corinth  Railroad.1  The  plaintiff  brought  this  suit 
for  being  ejected  by  the  defendant's  servants  from  the 
ladies'  car,  her  behavior  while  on  the  car  being  admittedly 
ladylike.  The  defendant  pleaded  that  the  plaintiff  was 
a  notorious  public  courtesan;  but  notwithstanding  this 
plea  Hammond,  district  judge,  charged  the  jury  "that  the 
same  principles  of  law  were  to  be  applied  to  women  as 
men  in  determining  whether  the  exclusion  was  lawful 
or  not;  that  the  social  penalties  of  exclusion  of  unchaste 
women  from  hotels,  theatres  and  other  public  places 
could  not  be  imported  into  the  law  of  common  carriers; 
that  they  had  a  right  to  travel  in  the  streets  and  on  the 
public  highways,  and  other  people  who  travel  must 
expect  to  meet  them  in  such  places;  and,  as  long  as  their 
conduct  was  unobjectionable  while  in  such  places,  they 
could  not  be  excluded.  The  carrier  is  bound  to  carry 
good,  bad  and  indifferent,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  morals  of  his  passengers,  if  their  behavior  be  proper 
while  travelling." 

§  560.  Undesirable  persons. 

Certain  persons  because  of  their  personal  notoriety 
are  often  undesirable  customers  because  they  injure 
general  patronage;  indeed  this  is  true  to  some  extent 
of  all  in  certain  callings — prize  fighters,3  for  one  example. 
In  this  connection  the  important  case  of  Pearson  v. 
Duane  4  should  be  cited.  Duane  had  been  ordered  from 
San  Francisco  by  the  Vigilance  Committee  and  upon  the 

1  5  Fed.  499  (1880);  S.  C.,  4  Fed.  118   N.    W.    14    (1908).     But  see 
37  (1880).    Compare  Curtis  v.  Mur-  Stevenson  v.  West  Seattle  Land  & 
phy,  63  Wis.  4,  22  N.  W.  825,  53  Improvement  Co.,  22  Wash.  84,  60 
Am.  Rep.  242  (1885),  where  the  par-  Pac.  51  (1900). 

ties  resorted  to  an  inn  for  the  pur-  *  See  the  dictum  to  this  effect  in 
poses  of  prostitution.  Nelson  v.  Boldt,  180  Fed.  779 

2  See  also  Meisner  v.  Detroit,  B.       (1910). 

&  I.  W.  Ferry  Co.,  154  Mich.  545,          4  4  Wall.  605, 18  L.  ed.  447  (1867). 

[468] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES      [  §§  561,  562 

discovery  of  that  fact  Pearson  expelled  him  from  his 
ship.  The  United  States  Supreme  Court  hardly  knew 
whether  there  were  circumstances  of  justification  in  this 
case  or  not.  "Common  carriers  of  passengers,  like  the 
steamship  Stevens,  are  obliged  to  carry  all  persons  who 
apply  for  passage,  if  the  accommodations  are  sufficient, 
unless  there  is  a  proper  excuse  for  refusal.  If  there  are 
reasonable  objections  to  a  proposed  passenger,  the  car- 
rier is  not  required  to  take  him.  In  this  case  Duane 
could  have  well  been  refused  a  passage  when  he  first 
came  on  board  the  boat,  if  the  circumstances  of  his 
banishment  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the  master,  have 
tended  to  promote  further  difficulty,  should  he  be  re- 
turned to  a  city  where  lawless  violence  was  supreme." 

§  561.  Supposed  interest  of  patron. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  shipmaster  in  the  case 
just  discussed  1  might  justify  himself  in  refusing  to  take 
the  passenger  to  San  Francisco  where  a  violent  fate  prob- 
ably eventually  awaited  him  by  saying  that  the  refusal 
was  in  his  own  interest.  So  a  ferryman  once  attempted 
to  excuse  his  refusal  to  take  a  passenger  who  apparently 
easily  succumbed  to  temptation  across  to  a  city  on  the 
ground  that  she  usually  reappeared  late  at  night  in  an 
intoxicated  condition.2  But  this  ground  is  obviously 
indefensible. 

§  662.  Wiser  course  for  patron. 

Certainly  it  is  not  the  business  of  the  public  servant 
to  decide  whether  the  patron  is  wise  in  pursuing  the 
course  he  is  setting  out  upon.  Thus  a  telegraph  com- 
pany cannot  escape  liability  for  refusal  to  accept  a  mes- 
sage for  transmission  because,  in  the  opinion  of  the 

1  Pearson  v.  Duane,  4  Wall.  605,  2  Stevenson  v.  West  Seattle  L.  &  I. 
18  L.  ed.  447  (1866).  Co.,  22  Wash.  84,  60  Pac.  51  (1900). 

[469] 


§§  563,  564  ]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

operator,  it  would  not  have  accomplished  its  purpose 
if  sent.1  And  so  where  a  telephone  company  has  con- 
tracted to  submit  and  deliver  a  message  summoning  a 
physician,  it  cannot  excuse  its  liability  for  delay  in  de- 
livery by  proof  that  it  was  not  the  custom  of  the  physician 
to  make  professional  calls  at  a  distance  without  prepay- 
ment or  guaranteed  payment  of  his  charges.2 

§  563.  Unwelcome  service. 

An  interesting  point  is  whether  compliance  with  the 
request  for  a  party  in  interest  that  service  be  discon- 
tinued will  excuse  the  proprietors  of  the  service,  or 
whether  they  must  undertake  the  often  distasteful  task 
of  forcing  service  upon  one.  That  a  buyer  has  notified  a 
railroad  company  not  to  bring  any  more  of  the  seller's 
property  consigned  to  the  buyer,  does  not  absolve  the 
railway  of  its  duty  to  the  seller  to  furnish  him  transporta- 
tion requested.3  And  the  fact  that  the  sendee  of  a  tele- 
gram has  notified  the  company  to  deliver  no  telegrams  at 
his  house  on  Sunday  will  not  apparently  excuse  the  com- 
pany from  its  obligation  to  the  sender  of  attempting  to 
deliver  such  telegrams.4 

§  564.  Wrongful  refusal. 

This  means  that  the  duty  to  the  moving  party  must  be 
performed  notwithstanding  the  expressed  dissent  of  the 
receiving  party.  So  the  refusal  of  a  connecting  carrier  to 
receive  freight  for  a  certain  consignee  will  not  relieve  the 
initial  carrier  from  liability  for  a  penalty  for  a  failure  to 
receive  such  freight.5  But  a  carrier  may  demand  its  pay 

1  Cordell  v.  Western  Union  Tele-      Campbell,  91  Tex.  551,  45  S.  W.  2, 
graph  Co.,  149  N.  C.  402,  63  S.  E.      43  L.  R.  A.  225  (1898). 

71  (1908) .  «  Brashears  v.  Western  Union  Tel- 

2  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  egraph  Co.,  45  Mo.  App.  433  (1891). 
Henderson,  89  Ala.  510,  18  Am.  St.  5  Wampum  Cotton  Mills  v.  Caro- 
Rep.  148  (1889).  lina  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  150  N.  C.  608, 

3  Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  64  S.  E.  588  (1909). 

[470] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES       [  §§  565,  566 

in  advance  for  goods  directed  to  certain  consignees.1    For 
there  is  no  discrimination  where  there  is  no  duty. 

Topic  B.  Disadvantageous  Service 

§  565.  Race  prejudice. 

A  carrier  cannot  refuse  to  carry  persons  because  of 
their  color  or  race,  whatever  may  be  the  prejudices 
current  against  them  in  the  community.2  It  must  be 
admitted  that  this  requirement  may  result  in  pecuniary 
loss.  This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  innkeeping; 
but  the  public  duty  is,  nevertheless,  imperative  in  this 
calling  as  in  all  others.3  However,  one  southern  court  was 
so  impressed  with  this  hardship  that  it  said  in  a  dictum 
that  a  landlord  could  exclude  from  his  inn  persons  so 
objectionable  to  the  patrons  of  the  house  on  account  of 
the  race  to  which  they  belong,  that  it  would  injure  the 
business  to  admit  them.4 

§  566.  Separation  of  the  races. 

However,  it  would  seem  to  be  the  plain  right  of  the 
carrier  or  indeed  the  innkeeper,  to  assign  the  different 
races  to  different  accommodations,  since  the  manage- 
ment of  the  business  is  left  to  the  proprietor.5  Therefore 

1  Gamble-Robinson    Commission      Ry.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  71,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  168      667  (1910). 

Fed.  161,  94  C.  C.  A.  217,  21  L.  R.  Alabama.— Bowie  v.  Birmingham 

A.  (N.  S.)  982  (1909).  Ry.  &  El.  Co.,  125  Ala.  397,  27  So. 

2  Brown  v.  Memphis  &  C.  Ry.  1016,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  247  (1899). 
Co.,  5  Fed.  499  (1880).  Arkansas.— Bradford  v.  St.  Louis 

3  Younger  v.  Judah,  111  Mo.  303,  I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  (Ark.),  124  S. 
19  S.  W.  1109,  16  L.  R.  A.  558,  33  W.  516  (1910). 

Am.  St.  Rep.  527  (1892).  Kentucky.— Chiles  v.  Chesapeake 

4  State  v.  Steele,  106  N.  C.  766,  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1332, 
11  S.  E.  478,  8  L.  R.  A.  516,  19  Am.  101  S.  W.  386,  11  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
St.  Rep.  573  (1890).  268  (1907). 

6  United  States. — Houck  v.  South-          Michigan. — Day  v.  Owen,  5  Mich, 
ern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Fed.  Rep.  226      520,  72  Am.  Dec.  62  (1858). 
(1888) ;  Chiles  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.          Missouri. — Chilton  v.  St.  Louis  & 

[471] 


§567 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


the  legislation  in  certain  States  which  have  provided  by 
statute  that  separate  accommodations  may  be,  or  shall 
be,  furnished  by  the  railroads  to  colored  passengers 
which  are  equal  to  those  furnished  white  passengers  is 
constitutional,  so  far  as  its  being  due  process  of  law  is  con- 
cerned.1 But  at  all  events,  public  carriers  until  they 
do  furnish  separate  accommodations  equal  in  comfort 
and  safety  to  those  furnished  other  travellers  have  no 
right  to  discriminate  between  passengers.2 

§  567.  Class  distinctions. 

One  who  is  engaged  in  public  service  cannot  make  a 
valid  restriction  of  his  service  to  certain  classes  of  society. 
It  is  only  as  to  innkeepers  apparently  that  this  general 
principle  has  ever  been  questioned.  It  is  no  doubt  com- 
petent for  an  innkeeper  to  fix  the  character  of  his  enter- 
tainment so  high  that  his  reasonable  charges  will  shut 

Co.  v.  Catron,  102  Ky.  323,  43  S.  W. 
443  (1897). 

Louisiana. — Ex  parte  Plessy,  45 
La.  Ann.  80,  11  So.  948,  18  L.  R.  A. 
639  (1893). 

Mississippi. — Louisville,  N.  O.  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  66  Miss.  662,  6 
So.  203,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  599  (1889). 

Tennessee. — Smith  v.  State,  100 
Tenn.  494,  46  S.  W.  566,  41  L.  R.  A. 
432  (1888). 

4  United  States. — Houck  v.  South- 
ern Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Fed.  226 
(1888). 

Illinois.— Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Williams,  55  111.  185,  8  Am. 
Rep.  641  (1870). 

Iowa. — Coger  v.  North  Western 
Union  Packet  Co.,  37  la.  145 
(1873). 

Team.— Pullman  P.  Car  Co.  v. 
Cain,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  503,  40  S. 
W.  220  (1897). 


I.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  114  Mo.  88,  21  S.  W. 
458,  19  L.  R.  A.  269  (1892). 

North  Carolina. — Britton  v.  At- 
lanta &  C.  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  88  N.  C. 
536,  43  Am.  Rep.  749  (1883). 

Pennsylvania. — West  Chester  & 
Philadelphia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Miles,  55 
Pa.  St.  209,  93  Am.  Dec.  744  (1867). 

South  Carolina. — Smith  v.  Cham- 
berlain, 38  S.  C.  529,  17  S.  E.  371, 
19  L.  R.  A.  710  (1892),  waiting 
rooms. 

Tennessee. — Chesapeake,  O.  &  S. 
W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wells,  85  Tenn.  613, 
4  S.  W.  5  (1887). 

1  United  States. — Chesapeake  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  179  U.  S. 
388,  45  L.  ed.  244,  21  Sup.  Ct.  101 
(1900);  McGuinn  v.  Forbes,  37  Fed. 
639  (1889). 

Florida. — Croons  v.  Shadd,  51 
Fla.  168,  40  So.  497  (1906). 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 

[4721 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES       [  §§  568,  569 

out  all  but  wealthy  or  well-to-do  patrons.1  "He  does  not 
absolutely  engage  to  receive  every  person  who  comes 
to  his  house,  but  only  such  as  are  capable  of  paying  a  com- 
pensation suitable  to  the  accommodation  provided."  2 

§  568.  Social  differences. 

But  if  a  person  applies  for  such  accommodation  and 
is  prepared  to  pay  the  price  demanded,  the  innkeeper 
could  hardly  refuse  to  receive  the  guest  on  the  ground 
that  he  was  a  poor  man,  and  ought  not  to  afford  such  an 
entertainment.  Yet  Baron  Parke  3  once  said:  "A  man 
may  keep  an  inn  for  those  only  who  come  in  then*  own 
carriages."  This  doctrine  is  a  very  doubtful  one;  but 
it  is  doubtless  competent  for  an  innkeeper  to  entertain 
guests  of  different  classes  in  different  rooms  or  require 
them  to  eat  at  separate  tables,  provided  each  gets  reason- 
able accommodations.4 

§  569.  Unpopular  organizations. 

That  there  is  a  prejudice  against  the  members  of  cer- 
tain organizations  in  general  cannot  in  accordance  with 
these  principles  excuse  the  refusal  of  certain  members  of 
that  organization.  Thus  there  is  in  some  communities 
a  deplorable  prejudice  against  social  association  with 
enlisted  men  in  uniform;  but  this  cannot  justify  their  re- 
fusal. In  a  Maine  case5  this  whole  matter  was  threshed 
out  in  a  case  against  an  innkeeper  who  wanted  to 
put  in  the  defense,  that  others  wearing  the  same  uni- 
form had  earlier  in  the  day  acted  in  a  disorderly  man- 
ner in  his  house,  but  Emery,  J.,  said:  " These  plaintiffs, 

1  Jaquet  v.  Edwards,  1  Jamaica,  *  Regina  v.  Sprague,  63  J.  P.  233 
4  (1867).  (Eng.,  1899). 

2  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  Thompson  v.  5  Atwater  v.  Sawyer,  76  Me.  539, 
Lacy,  3  B.  &  Aid.  283,  285  (1820).  49  Am.  Rep.  634  (1884). 

3  In  Johnson  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co., 
4  Exch.  (Eng.)  367,  371  (1849). 

[473] 


§  570  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

though  members  of  the  militia  companies,  were  not  of 
this  disorderly  party,  nor  with  them.  It  is  not  claimed 
that  the  plaintiffs  were  otherwise  than  sober,  orderly 
and  respectable.  The  only  connection  shown  between 
them  and  the  disorderly  ones  was  their  membership  of 
the  same  militia  companies.  It  is  not  even  shown  they 
were  of  the  same  company.  The  only  similarity  in 
appearance  was  in  the  uniform.  Such  membership  was 
honorable,  and  there  was  not  in  that  any  reasonable 
cause  to  believe  the  plaintiffs  intended  insult.  The  uni- 
form was  honorable  and  the  rightful  wearing  it  by  the 
plaintiffs  was  no  reasonable  cause  for  apprehension  of 
insult."  ' 

§  570.  Labor  demands. 

A  public  servant  owing  a  general  duty  to  all  men 
requiring  his  service  cannot  be  permitted,  if  he  would, 
to  defer  to  the  demands  which  the  laboring  class  often 
makes  upon  the  whole  community  in  its  labor  disputes. 
Thus  a  railroad  cannot  refuse  to  take  scab  workmen  to 
do  their  work  against  the  violent  protests  of  the  union 
men,  although  the  protection  of  such  workmen  as  pas- 
sengers may  impose  upon  them  unusual  burdens.  That 
the  carrier  must  put  forth  extraordinary  efforts  in  such 
emergencies  is  but  part  of  the  general  duty  to  meet  all 
contingencies  with  adequate  service.2  Thus  a  railroad 
cannot  refuse  to  take  freight  from  a  boycotted  line,  even 
if  its  reception  may  involve  a  sympathetic  strike  on  its 
own  line.3  As  the  court  said  in  a  case  of  this  extreme  sort : 

1  Rex   v.   Smith,    65   J.    P.    521  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burlington,  C.  R. 
(1901),  accord.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Fed.  481  (1888). 

2  Chicago   &   A.   R.   R.   Co.   v.  See  also  Toledo,  A.,  A.  &  N.  M. 
Pillsbury,  123  111.  9,  14  N.  E.  22  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  54 
(1827).  Fed.  730,  19  L.  R.  A.  387  (1893); 

But  see  Pounder  v.  North  E.  Ry.  and  Thomas  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  & 
Co.,  1  Q.  B.  385  (1891).  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  62  Fed.  803 

$  The  quotation  is  from  Chicago,       (1894). 

[474] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES       [  §§  571,  572 

"Now,  the  question  is,  what  shall  be  obeyed, — the  law 
of  the  land,  or  the  order  of  the  chiefs  of  the  locomotive 
engineers?  Shall  a  railway  company  refuse  obedience 
to  the  express  provisions  of  the  statutory  law  because 
some  of  its  employe's  threaten  to  quit  its  service,  and 
thus  stop  the  running  of  its  trains? " 

§  571.  Assumption  of  peculiar  risks. 

It  is  part  of  the  business  in  public  service  to  undertake 
in  particular  cases  a  service  which  will  involve  more  risk 
than  in  the  ordinary  case.  Thus  in  a  recent  Massachusetts 
case  l  it  was  held  that  a  sender  of  a  telegram  might  inform 
the  company  of  the  nature  of  the  message  and  its  impor- 
tance from  a  financial  point  of  view,  so  that  the  nature  and 
particulars  of  the  undertaking  of  the  company  may  be 
understood  by  it.  And  consequently  the  telegraph  com- 
pany was  held  liable  for  refusing  to  take  the  message  to 
which  this  notice  was  attached.2 

§  572.  Service  involving  unusual  care. 

More  familiar  illustrations  of  this  principle  may  be 
found  in  the  law  of  the  carriage  of  passengers.  For  ex- 
ample, a  railroad  cannot  refuse  to  carry  a  blind  man  who 
can  get  about  after  a  fashion.  Thus  in  Lackery  v.  Mobile 
&  Ohio  Railroad  Company  3  it  was  said:  "It  is  not  every 
sick  or  crippled  or  infirm  person  whom  a  railroad  regula- 
tion can  exclude,  but  one  so  sick  or  so  crippled  or  so  infirm 
as  not  to  be  able  to  travel  without  aid."  Women  and 
children,  cripples  and  invalids,  the  halt  and  the  blind — all 
have  a  right  to  travel.  If  they  will  put  an  outrageous 
burden  upon  the  carrier  in  particular  cases,  that  is  a  mat- 
ter of  excuse.4 

1  Vermilye    v.   Postal  Telegraph          » 75  Miss.  751,  23  So.  435,  41  L. 
Cable  Co.,  205  Mass.  298,  91  N.  E.  R.  A.  385,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  617 
904  (1910).  (1898). 

2  See  generally  chapter  XXIX.  4  See  generally  chapter  XVIII. 

[475] 


§§  573,  574  ]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  573.  Indirect  advantage  in  refusing. 

A  public  servant  or  one  representing  him  cannot 
refuse  service  for  his  own  private  advantage  or  for  his 
own  profit  in  an  outside  business.  A  plain  example  of 
this  may  be  seen  in  a  late  case  l  where  a  telegraph  oper- 
ator refused  to  take  a  message  complaining  of  his  con- 
duct. Another  aggravated  case  was  that  of  a  railroad 
which  refused  to  handle  coal  of  a  shipper  because  he 
would  not  sell  it  to  a  coal  company  of  which  an  officer 
of  the  road  was  an  officer.  In  granting  a  mandamus  in 
that  case  Mr.  Justice  Dean  said:  "The  public  duty  of 
defendant  was  to  carry  freight  and  passengers.  Suppose 
it  had  refused  to  sell  him  a  ticket  as  a  passenger,  and 
notified  him  that  such  refusal  would  be  kept  up  unless 
he  sold  his  coal  to  the  president's  coal  company;  the 
wrong  would  have  been  a  violation  of  a  duty  which  de- 
fendant owed  to  the  general  public  and  a  common  car- 
rier of  passengers,  but  it  would  also  have  been  a  wrong 
special  to  himself,  distinct  from  the  public  of  which  he 
was  one,  and  from  which  he  alone  specially  suffered.  It 
would  have  been  a  demand  on  him  to  do  something 
having  no  connection  with  defendant's  business  of  trans- 
portation, and,  if  he  refused,  to  deprive  him  of  a  right 
which  it  had  undertaken."  2 

§  674.  Ultimate  advantage  in  refusing. 

A  public  servant  should  not  set  himself  up  as  the  con- 
stituted arbiter  of  the  economic  advantage  of  the  com- 
munity he  serves,  even  if  it  may  be  said  that  its  own 
interests  are  bound  upon  those  of  the  community.  A 
railroad  company,  for  example,  could  not,  as  one  court 
pointed  out,3  refuse  to  handle  the  freights  of  a  new  dealer 

1  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  205  Pa.  St.  132,  54  Atl. 

Lillard,  86  Ark.  208,  110  S.  W.  1035  580,  61  L.  R.  A.  502  (1903). 

(1908).  •  Coe  v.  Louisville  &  Nashville 

1  Loraine  v.  Pittsburg,  J.  E.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Fed.  775  (1880). 

[476] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES  [  §  575 

upon  the  ground  that  the  particular  trade  already  had 
sufficient  followers  in  that  community,  and  was  being 
over  done  to  the  detriment  of  all  concerned.  This  was 
well  brought  out  in  a  late  case  where  a  railroad  had  re- 
fused to  accept  coal  for  shipment  from  a  mine  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  of  such  inferior  quality  to  other  coal 
shipped  from  the  region  over  its  line  as  to  injuriously 
affect  the  sale,  and  subsequently  the  shipment  of  superior 
qualities  of  other  mines.  Here,  obviously,  the  railroad 
assumed  too  much.  That  this  sort  of  economic  argu- 
ment is  out  of  place  in  legal  discussion  of  plain  breach  of 
established  duty  is  plain  to  all  lawyers  when  outright 
refusal  of  service  is  in  question;  but  later  in  this  treatise 
it  will  be  seen  that  in  the  making  of  relative  rates  for 
service,  apparent  discrimination  is  often  justified  upon 
the  ground  of  general  economic  advantage.1 

§  576.  Particular  service  peculiarly  expensive. 

Even  in  the  extreme  case  where  it  is  shown  that  in  the 
particular  case  it  will  be  unprofitable  to  serve  the  appli- 
cant in  question  as  he  desires,  there  is  no  excuse.  For 
clearly  it  should  be  obvious  that  in  a  public  employment  all 
applicants  must  be  served  at  established  rates,  even  if  in  a 
particular  case  it  is  especially  bothersome  or  even  partic- 
ularly expensive.  Those  who  profess  a  public  employ- 
ment must  fulfill  their  public  duty  to  all  who  apply,  and 
must  realize  that  this  will  be  more  troublesome  in  some 
cases  than  in  others;  and  indeed  so  long  as  the  business 
as  a  whole  is  profitable  they  should  not  complain  if  some 
occasional  services  may  result  in  loss.  Thus  a  railroad 
cannot  cancel  a  scheduled  train  because  not  enough  busi- 
ness has  appeared  for  it  on  a  particular  day  to  make 
it  pay.2  Nor  can  a  telegraph  company  refuse  to  take  a 

1  Beech    Creek    R.    R.    Co.    v.          *  Kansas  &   A.   V.   Ry.    Co.   v. 
Olanta  Coal  Mining  Co.,  158  Fed.      Ayres,  63  Ark.  331  (1897). 
36,  85  C.  C.  A.  148  (1907). 

[477] 


§§  576,  577  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

telegram  which  it  is  obvious  it  will  not  be  profitable  to 
handle  under  the  circumstances . 1 

§  576.  Extensions  limited  by  profitableness. 

But  although  unprofitableness  in  a  particular  instance 
will  not  justify  a  refusal  to  act  in  accordance  with  the 
general  obligation,  general  unprofitableness  may  excuse 
the  failure  to  make  further  extension  of  the  service  in 
question.  Particularly  in  those  services  where  the  gen- 
eral profession  calls  for  the  expansion  of  the  facilities 
offered  to  meet  increased  demands,  reasonable  time  is 
given.  Two  recent  telephone  cases  throw  light  on  this. 
In  one  2  in  approving  the  granting  mandamus  against 
a  telephone  company  which  had  pleaded  that  its  switch 
board  was  full,  it  was  said  that  a  reasonable  time  for  the 
construction  and  installation  of  an  enlargement  should  be 
allowed  for.  In  the  other 3  the  court  was  more  lenient 
still,  holding  that  new  trunk  cables  need  not  be  installed 
so  as  to  give  one  applicant  a  private  line  until  other 
applications  made  such  a  considerable  addition  obli- 
gatory. 

§  577.  Service  in  unprofitable  ways. 

As  has  been  seen  there  may  be  upon  proper  announce- 
ment partial  withdrawal  from  any  separable  branch  of 
the  service  offered  which  is  proving  unprofitable  unless 
a  mandatory  charter  stands  in  the  way.4  But  so  long 
as  public  service  is  still  professed  in  any  branch  it  would 
seem  that  it  was  necessary  to  continue  to  give  such  serv- 
ice as  the  business  in  general,  taken  as  a  whole,  really 
demands.5  To  a  certain  extent  also  the  amount  of  serv- 

1  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.          3  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
v.   Matthews,   24  Ky.   L.   Rep.   3  Kelly,  160  Fed.  316  (1908). 
(1902).  <See  Railway  Co.  v.  Smith,  60 

2  State  ex  rel.  v.  Citizens'  Tele-  Ark.  221,  29  S.  W.  752  (1895). 
phone  Co.,  61  S.  C.  83,  39  S.  E.  257,          5  See  Steenerson  v.  Great  North- 
85  Am.  St.  Rep.  870  (1901).  ern  Ry.  Co.,  69  Minn.  353  (1897). 

[478] 


INEXCUSABLE  BREACHES      [  §§  578,  579 

ice  that  must   be  rendered   depends  upon   the  existing 
demand. 

§  578.  Unprofitableness  seldom  an  excuse. 

However  it  does  not  follow  at  all  that  no  more  need  be 
expended  in  performing  a  service  than  will  be  profitable. 
Thus  a  railroad  cannot  excuse  itself  from  running  sep- 
arate trains  for  passengers  by  urging  that  it  would  not 
be  sufficiently  profitable.  Passengers  are  entitled  to 
appropriate  service  so  long  as  passenger  service  is  main- 
tained.1 Nor  can  a  canal  company  allow  a  lateral  which 
is  unprofitable  to  fall  into  disrepair;  if  it  is  bound  to  main- 
tain it,  it  must  do  so  properly.2 

§  579.  Particular  service  not  indispensable. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  breach  shall  be  upon  per- 
sonal grounds.  When  service  is  refused  for  other  motives 
than  personal  prejudice,  there  will  be  no  defense  unless 
there  are  sufficient  public  grounds  to  justify  the  refusal, 
whatever  arguments  might  be  urged  otherwise.  Thus 
the  defense  that  the  applicant  has  another  service  avail- 
able will  not  prevail  although  public  necessity  is  appar- 
ently not  so  strong  in  this  case  as  in  the  typical  case  of 
virtual  monopoly.  Although  there  have  been  several 
cases  in  which  this  defense  has  been  brought  forward, 
it  has  failed  in  all.  Thus  an  innkeeper  cannot  refer  a 
traveler  to  other  hotels,  many  of  which  are  near  by, 
because  he  does  not  wish  to  take  him.3  A  gas  company 
cannot  refuse  service  to  a  householder  upon  its  mains 
though  another  company  with  mains  in  that  street  is 
ready  to  supply  him.4 

1  See  People  ex  rel.  v.  St.  Louis,  A.          3  See  dicta  in  Lamond  v.  Richard 
&  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  111.  512,  52      1  Q.  B.  541  (1897). 

N.  E.  292,  35  L.  R.  A.  656  (1898).  4  Portland  Natural  Gas  &  O.  Co. 

2  See  Savannah  &  O.  Canal  Co.  v.  v.  State  ex  rel.,  135  Ind.  54,  34  N.  E. 
Shuman,  91  Ga.  400,  17  S.  E.  937,  818,  21'  L.  R.  A.  639  (1893).    See 
44  Am.  St.  Rep.  43  (1893).  also  Jones  v.  Rochester  Gas  &  E. 

[479] 


§  580  J  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  680.  Substitute  for  service  available. 

Upon  similar  principles  it  has  been  held  no  defense  to  an 
express  company's  obligation  to  comply  with  the  rail- 
road commissioners'  order  that  shippers  of  money  could 
use  the  United  States  mails,  and  were  therefore  not 
prejudiced  by  the  express  company's  rule,  requiring 
presentation  of  money  packages  for  shipment  at  un- 
reasonable hours . 1  And  of  course  a  telephone  company 
cannot  refuse  to  give  service  to  one  still  using  another 
telephone  system  as  the  services  are  not  fairly  equivalent.2 
And  generally  speaking  once  the  law  has  satisfied  itself 
that  a  business  is  public  in  character,  the  invariable  conse- 
quence follows  that  a  universal  duty  is  owed  to  its  public 
notwithstanding  occasional  competition  of  a  limited  sort. 
Unless  this  were  so,  the  applicant  might  be  refused  in 
turn  by  the  few  other  services  available,  and  be  left  un- 
served  without  remedy. 

Co.,  168  N.  Y.  65,  60  N.  E.  1044          » State  ex  rel.  v.  Citizens'  Tele- 

(1901).  phone  Co.,  61  S.  C.  83,  39  S.  E.  257, 

1  Platt  v.  Le  Cocq,  150  Fed.  391  55  L.  R.  A.  139  (1901). 
(1906). 


[480] 


CHAPTER  XVII 

REFUSAL   BECAUSE   OF   ILLEGALITY   INVOLVED 

§  590.  Illegality  involved  in  performing  service. 

Topic  A.  Subservience  to  Governmental  Authority 

§  591.  Obedience  to  executive  orders. 

592.  Subservience  to  military  necessity. 

593.  Prohibitions  in  administrative  regulations. 

594.  Obedience  to  legal  processes. 

595.  Contravention  of  charter  limitations. 

596.  Situation  at  expiration  of  franchise. 

Topic  B.  Contravention  of  Statutory  Provisions 
§  597.  Statutes  expressly  controlling  service. 

598.  The  criminal  law  generally. 

599.  Sunday  laws. 

600.  Liquor  laws. 

601.  Game  laws. 

602.  Health  regulations. 

603.  Gaming  statutes. 

Topic  C.  Service  Promoting  Illegal  Transaction 

§  604.  Participation  in  the  illegality. 

605.  Implication  in  illegality. 

606.  Service  aiding  immoral  business. 

607.  Service  indispensable  to  illegal  business. 

608.  Reasonable  rejection  usually  justified. 

609.  Cases  holding  that  rejection  is  at  peril. 

Topic  D.  Proximity  to  the  Illegality 
§  610.  Service  promoting  the  illegality. 

611.  Illegality  prior  to  service. 

612.  Illegality  subsequent  to  service. 

613.  Public  policy  the  explanation. 

§  590.  Illegality  involved  in  performing  service. 
The  plainest  basis  for  a  refusal  to  render  service  is  il- 
31  [  481  ] 


§§591,  592  ]        PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

legality.  Where  service  of  the  sort  asked,  is  plainly  in  the 
face  of  legal  inhibitions,  the  propriety  of  the  refusal  is 
obvious.  And,  if  in  giving  the  service  asked  illegality  of 
any  kind  would  be  directly  abetted,  the  case  is  hardly 
less  plain.  Where,  however,  the  matter  involved  is  rather 
contra  bones  mores  than  prohibited  by  explicit  law  a  doubt- 
ful problem  arises.  And  where  the  illegality  alleged  is 
remote  from  the  service  requested,  a  still  more  difficult 
question  is  presented. 

Topic  A.  Subservience  to  Governmental  Authority 

§  591.  Obedience  to  executive  orders. 

Subservience  to  executive  orders  constitutes  the  most 
obvious  head  of  justification  for  refusal  to  serve.  Thus 
military  necessity  might  justify  the  declaration  of  an 
embargo,  in  which  case  a  steamship  line  would  be  obliged 
to  tie  up  its  vessels  and  refuse  further  freight.1  For  like 
reasons  it  was  held  that  the  railroad  would  have  an  excuse 
for  refusing  to  accept  food  stuffs  tendered  it  without  the 
transit  permit  which  the  military  authorities  had  required 
should  be  obtained  from  them  by  the  shipper.2  What  is 
true  of  martial  authority  within  the  belligerent's  own 
territory  is  of  course  still  more  clear  of  military  govern- 
ment over  conquered  territory,  namely,  that  those  en- 
gaged in  any  service  in  that  territory  are  subservient  to 
the  order  of  the  military  arm  in  accepting  business. 

§  592.  Subservience  to  military  necessity. 

Martial  law  under  our  system  of  government  depends 
always  upon  showing  overruling  necessity,  and  therefore 
supplants  the  civil  authorities  only  so  far  as  the  neces- 
sities of  the  case  dictate.  If,  therefore,  the  military  au- 

>See  Palmer  v.  Lorillard,  16  Phelps,  4  111.  App.  238  (1879); 
Johns.  348  (1819).  S.  C.  94  111.  548  (1880). 

2  Illinois  Central  R.   R.   Co.  v. 

[482] 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  593 

thorities  forbid  service,  this  constitutes  an  excuse  for  not 
accepting  goods.1  But  where  the  military  authorities 
are  in  control  their  interference  justifies  suspension  of 
public  service  only  to  the  extent  that  their  interruption 
causes  delay.  And  so  even  if  a  railroad  is  subjected  to 
military  supervision  it  is  liable  for  delays  caused  by  fail- 
ure of  the  company  to  conduct  its  regular  service  so  far 
as  it  had  power  to  do  so.2  Belligerency  brings  into  play 
unusual  law.  Thus  the  furtherance  of  trade  between 
enemies  would  be  illegal.3  And  as  contraband  shipped 
by  neutrals  is  subject  to  seizure,  a  carrier  could  refuse  to 
undertake  its  transportation  to  a  belligerent.4 

§  593.  Prohibitions  in  administrative  regulations. 

It  must  be  obvious  that  when  the  refusal  to  serve  is 
made  necessary  by  the  governmental  authority  that  there 
is  an  excuse.  An  interesting  case  in  point  is  Decker  v. 
Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Railroad  Company.5  The 
plaintiff  was  not  given  the  transportation  he  demanded 
upon  the  morning  in  question  because  on  the  16th  day  of 
September,  1893,  the  defendant  railroad  company  had 
prescribed  a  certain  rule  for  the  government  of  its  trains 
entering  the  Cherokee  Outlet  on  the  day  of  its  opening 
for  settlement,  providing  that  no  train  should  enter  said 
outlet  within  six  hours  of  12  o'clock  noon  of  said  day. 
Mr.  Justice  Scott  held  this  refusal  under  these  circum- 

1  Illinois  Central   R.   R.   Co.   v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,   112  Fed. 
Hornberger,  77  111.  457  (1875).  829  (1902). 

2  Illinois   Central   R.   R.   Co.   v.          In  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 
McClennan,  54  111.  58,  5  Am.  Rep.  American  Trading  Co.,  195  U.  S. 
83  (1870).  439,  49  L.  ed.  269,  25  Sup.  Ct.  84 

3  Dunn    v.     Bucknall     Bros.,     2  (1904),  it  was  held  that  a  collector 
K.  B.  614,    71    L.    J.   K.   B.  963  could  not  legally  refuse  a  clearance 
(1902).  to  a  vessel  bound  to  a  port  of  a 

See  Gay's  Gold,  13  Wall.  358  belligerent  because  it  had  on  board 
(1871).  articles  contraband  of  war. 

4  See  Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.          s  3  Okla.  553,  41  Pac.  610  (1895). 

[483] 


§§  594,  595]   PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

stances  to  be  entirely  justifiable;  he  said:  "Had  trains 
gone  into  the  country  prior  to  12  o'clock,  hundreds  would 
have  become  violators  of  the  law,  no  doubt,  and,  had  the 
defendant  in  error  permitted  those  already  aboard  when 
the  trains  arrived  at  the  line  to  remain  in  the  coaches, 
those  waiting  on  the  line  to  enter  trains  according  to  the 
order  of  the  secretary  of  the  interior  and  the  rules  pre- 
scribed by  the  company  would  have  been  placed  at  a 
disadvantage,  and  their  rights  under  the  law  would  have 
been  unequal  and  prejudiced  thereby."1 

§  594.  Obedience  to  legal  processes. 

The  same  excuse  results  from  obedience  to  the  lawful 
commands  of  another  of  the  great  departments  exer- 
cising governmental  authority,  the  judiciary.  Perhaps 
the  plainest  case  of  this  justification  is  where  an  irrigation 
company  2  of  which  the  service  was  asked,  was  under  an 
injunction  ordering  it  not  to  render  such  service.  Plainly 
in  such  case  it  is  a  good  defense  that  compliance  with  the 
request  will  involve  the  company  in  contempt  of  court.3 
But  it  is  almost  equally  plain  that  common-law  process 
should  be  respected.4  Thus  a  carrier  of  goods  could  re- 
fuse to  accept  them  if  subject  to  attachment.5 

§  595.  Contravention  of  charter  limitations. 

A  public  service  company  cannot  be  required  to  fur- 
nish a  service  which  it  is  not  authorized  to  perform.6  Thus 

1  Query  for  the  constitutionality      Co.,  86  S.  W.  676,  27  Ky.  Law.  Rep. 
of  empowering  the  Secretary  to  es-      551  (1900). 

tabliah   quarantine   lines.      Illinois  4  Indiana,    I.    &    I.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Central  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McKendree,  Doremeyer,  20  Ind.  App.   605,  50 

203  U.  S.  514,  51  L.  ed.  298,  27  Sup.  N.  E.  497,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  264 

Ct.  153  (1906).  (1898). 

2  Sample   v.  Fresno  F.  &  Irriga-  5  Mitchell  v.  Kansas  City,  C.  & 
tion  Co.,  129  Cal.  222,  61  Pac.  1085  S.  Ry.  Co.,  116  Mo.  App.  116,  90 
(1900).  S.  W.  1164  (1906). 

3  Nairin    v.    Kentucky    Heating  6  People  v.  St.  Louis  &  B.  Electric 

Ry.  Co.,  122  111.  App.  422  (1905). 

[484] 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  596 

it  cannot  be  called  upon  to  render  any  sort  of  service  which 
it  is  not  empowered  to  perform.  In  a  recent  case  a  peti- 
tioner sought  to  have  an  illuminating  gas  company  which 
it  had  been  shown  in  other  litigation  had  only  authority 
to  supply  heating  gas.1  Said  the  court:  "Obviously,  un- 
less the  defendant  be  shown  to  be  exercising  a  public  fran- 
chise in  the  vending  of  gas  for  lighting  purposes,  there 
is  no  more  ground  for  injunction  shown  here  than  if  he 
had  sought  one  to  restrain  Peaslee,  Gaulbert  &  Co.  from 
refusing  to  vend  oil  to  him.  But  the  petition  on  its  face 
shows  that,  as  to  the  sale  of  gas  for  lighting  purposes,  the 
defendant  was  not  only  not  exercising  a  public  franchise, 
but  was,  by  the  ordinance  which  permitted  it  to  do  busi- 
ness in  Louisville  at  all,  expressly  forbidden  to  sell  gas  for 
any  other  than  heating  purposes.  The  plaintiff  is  there- 
fore in  the  position  of  asking  an  injunction  requiring  the 
defendant  to  violate  an  ordinance  of  the  city." 

§  596.  Situation  at  expiration  of  franchise. 

The  situation  at  the  expiration  of  the  franchise  has  al- 
ready been  discussed.  In  a  late  case 2  a  water  company 
was  held  justified  in  preparing  to  discontinue  service,  its 
franchise  having  expired.  The  doctrine  of  the  court  is 
thus  summarized  in  the  headnote:  "On  the  expiration  of  a 
water  company's  franchise  by  limitation,  the  company's 
right  to  operate  its  plant  and  use  the  streets  of  the  city 
therefor  ceased,  and  with  it  the  right  of  the  city  to  demand 
service.  But  where,  after  the  expiration  of  a  water  com- 
pany's franchise,  it  continued  to  operate  its  plant  and  ren- 
der service  to  the  public,  it  was  bound  during  such  period 
to  perform  the  obligations  growing  out  of  such  assumed 
quasi-public  service,  to  the  extent  that  it  was  required  to 
supply  water  adequate  to  its  reasonable  capacity  and  at 

1  Nairin    v.    Kentucky    Heating          2  Laighton  v.  Carthage,  175  Fed. 
Co.,  27  Ky.  Law  Rep.  551,  86  S.  W.      145  (1909). 
676  (1900). 

[485] 


§  597  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

reasonable  rates,  and  to  that  extent  it  was  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts  to  enforce  its  implied  under- 
taking." 1 

Topic  B.  Contravention  of  Statutory  Provisions 

§  597.  Statutes  expressly  controlling  service. 

Wherever  there  is  a  statute  directly  applying  to  the 
service  in  question  and  expressly  stating  the  conditions 
under  which  alone  service  can  be  given,  there  is  of  course 
a  resulting  excuse  whenever  a  service  is  asked  which  comes 
within  its  prohibitions.  A  clear  example  may  be  drawn 
from  the  Federal  statute  where  the  number  of  passengers 
which  a  vessel  may  carry  is  regulated;  under  the  provisions 
of  this  statute,  the  carrier  would  of  course  have  an  excuse 
for  not  accepting  additional  passengers  who  offer  them- 
selves after  the  vessel  has  its  complement.2  So  if  it  is 
illegal  for  a  railroad  to  let  its  cars  stand  in  the  street  it 
can  refuse  to  permit  goods  to  be  loaded  upon  that  part 
of  a  spur  which  is  laid  through  a  street  without  liability 
for  discrimination  in  so  refusing.3  Where  an  explicit 
ordinance  of  the  Board  of  Health  forbids  the  transporta- 
tion of  corpses  except  when  accompanied  by  a  person  in 
charge  having  a  transit  permit  containing  specified  in- 
formation a  railroad  may  refuse  transportation  when  all 
of  this  information  is  not  filled  in.4  And  where  a  revenue 
law  directed  that  a  stamp  should  be  affixed  to  a  telegram 
it  was  held  that  a  telegraph  company  could  refuse  to  ac- 
cept a  telegram  without  a  stamp.5 

1  To  the  same  effect  concerning  a      S.  W.  969,  55  L.  R.  A.  601,  98  Am. 
gas  company,  see  East  Ohio  Gas      St.  Rep.  447  (1901). 

Co.  v.  City  of  Akron,  81  Ohio  St.  4  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
33  (1909).  James,  10  Ind.  App.  550,  38  N.  E. 

2  See  The   Charles   Nelson,    149      192  (1894). 

Fed.  846  (1906) .  •  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

"Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Waters,  139  Ala.  652,  36  So.  773 

Pittsburg  &  K.  Coal  Co.,  Ill  Ky.  (1904). 
Rep.  960,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1318,  64 

[486   ] 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  598, 599 

§  598.  The  criminal  law  generally. 

Those  who  conduct  a  public  service  are  not  bound  by 
their  general  obligation  to  serve  all  to  abet  criminals.  One 
of  the  leading  cases  upon  this  question  is  Thurston  v. 
Union  Pacific  Railroad  Company,1  where  the  question 
raised  was  whether  the  defendant  railroad  had  the  right  to 
exclude  a  notorious  gambler  from  its  train.  Judge  Dillon 
said  it  was  entirely  justified.  "The  railway  company  is 
bound,  as  a  common  carrier,  when  not  over-crowded,  to 
take  all  proper  persons  who  may  apply  for  transporta- 
tion over  its  line,  on  their  complying  with  all  reasonable 
rules  of  the  company.  But  it  is  not  bound  to  carry  all 
persons  at  all  times,  or  it  might  be  utterly  unable  to  pro- 
tect itself  from  ruin.  It  would  not  be  obliged  to  carry 
one  whose  ostensible  business  might  be  to  injure  the  line; 
one  fleeing  from  justice;  one  going  upon  the  train  to  as- 
sault a  passenger,  commit  larceny  or  robbery,  or  for  inter- 
fering with  the  proper  regulations  of  the  company,  or 
for  gambling  in  any  form,  or  committing  any  crime;  nor 
is  it  bound  to  carry  persons  who  travel  for  the  purpose 
of  gambling.  As  gambling  is  a  crime  under  the  State 
laws,  it  is  not  even  necessary  for  the  company  to  have  a 
rule  against  it.  It  is  not  bound  to  furnish  facilities  for 
carrying  out  an  unlawful  purpose.  Necessary  force  may 
be  used  to  prevent  gamblers  from  entering  trains,  and 
if  found  on  them  engaged  in  gambling  and  refusing  to 
desist,  they  may  be  forcibly  expelled."  2 

§  599.  Sunday  laws. 

Where  the  service  in  question  is  forbidden  on  Sunday, 
either  by  legislation  applying  generally,  or  by  a  specific 
statute  dealing  with  the  particular  business,  there  is  of 
course  an  excuse  as  a  consequence.  Thus  a  carrier  may 

1  4  Dillon  (U.  S.),  321,  Fed.  Gas.      fused  by  a  carrier,  Coppin  v.  Braith- 
No.  14,019  (1877).  waite,  8  Jurist  (Eng.),  875  (1844). 

2  So  a  pickpocket  might  be  re- 

[487] 


599] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


refuse  to  carry  on  Sunday  1  and  need  not  even  be  pre- 
pared to  carry  even  when  necessity  or  charity  is  involved, 
so  long  as  any  statutory  prohibition  which  applies  to 
him  remains.2  Even  if  there  is  no  statutory  prohibi- 
tion, the  cases  hold  that  it  does  not  follow  that  the  car- 
rier is  bound  to  transact  business  on  that  day  unless  he 
chooses  to  do  so.3  It  is  generally  agreed  that  a  carrier 
must  promptly  complete  transportation  already  begun  on 
Sunday; 4  and  by  a  similar  principle  he  must  accept  goods 
from  a  connecting  carrier  on  Sunday.  The  law  on  this 
point  has  been  elaborately  worked  out  in  relation  to  tele- 
graphing. A  telegraph  company  if  open  for  business  must 
receive  on  Sunday  all  messages  which  it  may  fairly  be 
said  it  is  a  work  of  necessity  or  charity  to  handle.5  But 
unless  the  circumstances  have  been  explained  to  the  op- 
erator so  that  the  message  bears  on  its  face  evidence  of  its 
special  character,  it  may  be  refused  as  all  commercial  or 


1  Walsh  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  42  Wis.  23,  24  Am.  Rep. 
376    (1877).     As  to  the  constitu- 
tionality of  forbidding  service  on 
Sunday  see  Hennington  v.  Georgia, 
163  U.  S.  299,   41   L.  ed.  166,   16 
Sup.  Ct.  1086  (1896). 

2  Horton  v.    Norwalk  Tramway 
Co.,    66   Conn.    272,    33   Atl.    914 
(1895). 

3  Merchants'  Wharfboat  Assoc.  v. 
Wood,  64  Miss.  661,  2  So.  76  (1887). 
But  see  Carroll  v.  Staten  I.  R.  R. 
Co.,   58  N.   Y.   126   (1874),   ferry 
should  run  Sunday. 

And  see  as  to  holidays  other  than 
Sunday,  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Naive,  112  Tenn.  239,  79  S.  W.  124, 
64  L.  R.  A.  443  (1903);  Guinn  v. 
W.  St.  L.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Mo. 
App.  453  (1886). 

The   same   rule  applies  to   tele- 

[488] 


graph  companies.  Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  McLaurin,  70 
Miss.  26,  13  So.  36(1892). 

<  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lehman,  56  Md.  209  (1881). 

6  Alabama. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Wilson,  93  Ala.  32,  9 
So.  414,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  23  (1890). 

Indiana. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Yopst,  118  Ind.  248, 
20  N.  E.  222,  3  L.  R.  A.  224  (1888). 

Mississippi. — Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  McLaurin,  70 
Miss.  26,  13  So.  36  (1892). 

Missouri. — Burnett  v.  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  39  Mo.  App. 
599  (1890). 

South  Carolina. — Smith  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  72  S.  C. 
116,  51  S.  E.  537  (1905). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Levy,  59  Tex.  542  (1883). 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  600 

social  messages  may.1  As  to  the  other  services,  there 
is  not  as  yet  much  authority.  Some  services  it  is  generally 
agreed  should  be  open  to  the  public  on  all  days;  inns  2 
and  canals3  are  examples  to  which  a  citation  may  be 
given.  And  it  is  most  obvious  that  in  many  other  callings 
service  should  be  given  regardless  of  days,  such  is  the 
imperative  necessity.  Gas  and  electric  supply,  water 
and  sewerage  service,  are  plain  examples  of  services  where 
modern  necessity  overbears  the  Sunday  policy. 

§  600.  Liquor  laws. 

Some  difficult  problems  arise  as  to  the  duty  of  com- 
mon carriers  to  transport  liquors  into  prohibition  terri- 
tory. It  is  certain  that  if  the  delivery  would  involve 
the  carrier  in  an  illegal  transaction  he  may  refuse  to 
undertake  it.  In  the  leading  case  on  this  topic,  State 
v.  Goss  4  Mr.  Justice  Rowell  said:  "Although  express 
companies  are  common  carriers,  and  liable  as  such,  yet 
the  law  neither  requires  nor  permits  them  to  do  illegal 
acts;  and  they  are  not  bound  to  transport  and  deliver 
intoxicating  liquor  or  other  commodities,  if  thereby  they 
would  commit  an  offence  or  incur  a  penalty.  They  can- 
not be  allowed,  any  more  than  other  people,  knowingly 
and  with  impunity,  to  make  themselves  agents  for  others 
to  break  the  laws  of  the  State."  This  is  especially  clear 
where  the  local  legislation  goes  so  far  as  to  forbid  the 
transportation  of  intoxicating  liquors.5  The  carrier  may 

1  Georgia. — Western  Union  Tele-          3  McArthur  v.  Green  Bay  &  Miss, 
graph  Co.  v.  Hutcheson,  91  Ga.  252,      Canal  Co.,  34  Wis.  139  (1874). 

18  S.  E.  297  (1892).  4  59  Vt.  266,  9  Atl.  829,  59  Am. 

Indiana.— Western   Union  Tele-  St.  Rep.  706  (1886). 

graph  Co.  v.  Henley,  23  Ind.  14,  54  6  The  carrier  must  make  out  the 

N.  E.  775  (1899).  validity  of  such  legislation  at  his 

Missouri. — Burnett  v.  Western  peril.  Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Common- 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  39  Mo.  App.  wealth,  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  224,  29 
599  (1890).  S.  W.  932  (1906);  Southern  Express 

2  Rex  v.  Ivens,  7  C.  &  P.  213  Co.  v.  Rose  Co.,  124  Ga.  581,  53  S. 
(1835).  E.  185,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  619  (1905). 

[489] 


§  601  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

then,  of  course,  refuse  to  accept  them;  l  and,  more- 
over, as  one  case  2  holds,  the  carrier  has  discretionary 
power  to  determine  whether  the  liquors  offered  are  in- 
toxicating in  the  sense  of  the  law.  But  while  the  carrier 
is  not  liable  as  a  violator  of  such  statutes  if  he  had  no 
cause  to  know  that  he  was  transporting  liquors,3  he  must 
act  in  good  faith  upon  reasonable  suspicions.4  If  the 
final  selling  only  is  illegal  the  carrier  probably  cannot 
refuse  to  bring  liquors  on  the  ground  of  the  possibility 
that  they  might  be  resold  illegally.5  Thus,  where  the 
sale  of  liquor  in  original  packages  was  lawful  in  South 
Carolina,  though  it  was  forbidden  in  any  other  form, 
the  carrier  could  not  refuse  to  receive  liquor  in  the  orig- 
inal packages  for  delivery  in  South  Carolina.6 

§  601.  Game  laws. 

Where  it  is  made  illegal  by  statute  to  transport  game 
or  fish,  a  carrier  may  refuse  to  accept  such  game  or  fish, 
if  acceptance  would  promote  the  violation  of  the  statute 
or  impede  its  administration.  But  it  will  not  itself  be 
guilty  of  violating  the  act  if  it  has  in  its  possession  such 
game  or  fish  which  it  has  received  in  packages  in  regular 
course  without  reasonable  grounds  of  suspicion.7  If  in 

1  State  legislation  of  this  sort  may      Co.,    109    Va.    22,    63    S.    E.    6 
be  unconstitutional.  American  Exp.       (1908). 

Co.  v.  Kentucky,  206  U.  S.  139,  51  s  United  States.— Crescent  Liquor 

L.  ed.  993,  27  Sup.  Ct.  609  (1907);  Co.  v.  Platt,  148  Fed.  894  (1906). 

8.  c.,  s«6  nom.  American  Exp.  Co.  Georgia. — Southern  Exp.   Co.  v. 

v.    Commonwealth,     reversing    30  State,  107  Ga.  670,  33  S.  E.  637,  73 

Ky.   L.    Rep.   207,  97    S.  W.  807  Am.  St.  Rep.  146  (1899);  Southern 

(1906).  Exp.  Co.  v.  Rose  Co.,  124  Ga.  581, 

2  Milwaukee  M.  E.  Co.  v.  Chi-  53  S.  E.  185,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  619 
cago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  73  la.  98,  (1905). 

34N.W.  761  (1887).  6  Blumenthal    v.    Southern    Ry. 

3  Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Common-      Co.,  84  Fed.  920  (1898). 

wealth,  33  Ky.  L.  Rep.  967,  112  S.  7  State  v.  Swett,  87  Me.  99,  32 
W.  577  (1908).  Atl.  806,  29  L.  R.  A.  714,  47  Am. 

4  Brewing  Co.  v.  Southern  Exp.      St.  Rep.  306  (1895). 

[490] 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  602 

obedience  to  orders  of  game  inspectors  or  fish  wardens  it 
delivers  up  such  game  or  fish  for  seizure,  it  will  have  a 
sufficient  excuse;  but  no  protection  apparently  if  these 
officers  acted  without  authority  of  law.1 

§  602.  Health  regulations. 

Quarantine  regulations  duly  established  by  law  will 
excuse  a  carrier  from  accepting  passengers  destined  be- 
yond the  quarantine  barriers  which  are  set  up  against 
all  passengers  coming  from  a  certain  district  to  a  certain 
district,2  or  any  passengers,  association  with  whom  would 
detain  other  passengers; 3  and  the  same  is  true  of  freight 
against  which  quarantine  is  legally  declared.4  However, 
a  carrier  who  knows  of  the  quarantine  and  accepts 
business  without  disclosing  it  at  the  time  of  acceptance, 
will  be  liable  to  his  patrons  5  unless  the  quarantine  is  so 
notorious  that  he  may  assume  that  it  is  known.6  But 
it  is  usually  provided  that  under  certain  conditions  certif- 
icates may  be  obtained,  in  which  case  they  should  be 
duly  notified.7  Similar  in  character  are  those  regula- 
tions providing  that  water  shall  not  be  turned  on  until 
an  officer  of  the  Board  of  Health  is  satisfied  as  to  the 
plumbing  arrangements.8  And  so  if  a  Board  of  Health 

1  Merriman   v.    Great    Northern      R.  R.  Co.,  77  Miss.  789,  28  So.  957 
Exp.  Co.,  63  Minn.  543,  65  N.  W.      (1900). 

1080  (1896).  4  Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

2  A  patron  cannot  maintain  an  ac-      Masterson,  95  Tex.  262,  66  S.  W. 
tion  against  a  railroad  company  on      833  (1902). 

the  ground  that  he  was  wrongfully  B  Hasseltine  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

expelled  from  its  train,  which  he  75  S.  C.  141,  55  S.  E.  142  (1906). 

left,  in  obedience  to  the  order  of  a  6  St.  Clair  v.  Kansas  City,  M.  & 

quarantine  or  health  officer,  before  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Miss.  473,  24  So. 

reaching  his  destination,  the  con-  904,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  534  (1899). 

ductor  pointing  him  out.     Baldwin  7  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  58  S.  Roane,  93    Miss.    7,    46    So.    711 

E.  35,  128  Ga.  567  (1907).  (1908) 

3  St.  Clair  v.  Kansas  City  M.  &  B.  8  But  see  Johnson  v.  Belmar,  58 

N.  J.  Eq.  354,  44  Atl.  166  (1899). 

[491] 


§  603  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

should  close  an  inn,  the  proprietor  would  doubtless  have 
an  excuse  for  not  entertaining  guests.1 

§  603.  Gaming  statutes. 

Gaming  laws  were  involved  in  a  notable  case  lately.2 
The  New  York  police  department  had  ordered  a  telephone 
instrument  removed  from  certain  premises,  on  the  ground 
that  pools  were  being  sold  there;  and  the  telephone  com- 
pany had  thereupon  refused  to  reinstate  the  telephone  in 
these  premises  for  a  new  applicant  without  assurance 
as  to  his  intentions  accompanied  by  references  as  to 
his  character.  This  attitude  the  court  held  justifiable: 
"  Under  the  circumstances,  this  does  not  seem  to  us  to 
have  been  an  unreasonable  requirement.  The  New 
York  Telephone  Company  had  been  informed  by  the 
police  department  that  the  premises  ha'd  been  used  as 
a  pool  room.  It  was  also  aware  that  a  telephone  which 
it  had  previously  installed  therein  had  been  removed 
therefrom  by  the  police.  The  officers  of  the  company 
might  not  unreasonably  apprehend  that  they  would 
render  themselves  liable  for  aiding  and  abetting  a  viola- 
tion of  the  law  if  they  furnished  further  telephone  serv- 
ice to  the  premises  in  view  of  this  information.3  It 

1  See    Gilbert    v.    Hoffman,    66      fusing  to  give  its  service  to  "  bucket 
Iowa,  205  (1885).  shops"   maintained  in  defiance  of 

2  Matter  of  Cullen,    106   N.   Y.      express  statutes.    See: 

App.  Div.  250,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  290  United  States.— Board  of  Trade  v. 

(1905).      In    the    leading    case    of  Christie   Grain   &   Stock   Co.,    198 

Thurston  v.   Union  Pacific  R.   R.  U.  S.  236,  49  L.  ed.  1031,  25  Sup. 

Co.,  4  Dillon  (U.  S.),  321,  Fed.  Gas.  Ct.  637  (1905);  Bryant  v.  Western 

No.  14,019  (1877),  it  was  held  that  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  17  Fed.  825 

one     reason     why    the    notorious  (1883);  Sullivan  v.  Postal  Telegraph 

gambler  could  be  refused  passage  Cable  Co.,  123  Fed.  411,  61  C.  C.  A. 

was  that  the  company  might  make  1  (1903). 

itself  liable  for  maintaining  prem-  Illinois. — Central  S.  &  G.  Exch. 

ises  for  gambling.  v.  Board  of  Trade,  196  111.  396,  63 

3  There  are  numerous  cases  ex-  N.  E.  740  (1902). 

cusing  a  telegraph  company  for  re-          Indiana. — Western   Union   Tele- 

[492] 


[  §§  604,  605 

was  quite  proper,  therefore,  for  them  to  request  the 
assurance  from  the  appellant  which  the  contracting 
agent  suggested,  and  for  them,  also,  to  require  the  ap- 
pellant to  furnish  a  reference  as  to  his  character." 

Topic  C.  Service  Promoting  Illegal  Transaction 

§  604.  Participation  in  the  illegality. 

Of  course  one  engaged  in  public  employment  should 
refuse  to  take  any  action  which  would  make  him  liable 
for  abetting  illegality.  Thus  a  carrier  of  passengers 
could  refuse  to  take  upon  the  train  one  fleeing  from 
justice,  one  going  upon  the  train  to  assault  a  passenger, 
or  to  commit  larceny.1  In  an  analogous  case  it  was 
assumed  that  the  carrier  might  refuse  to  take  a  rebel 
officer  going  to  the  front  to  join  his  command.2  But,  if 
the  carrier  does  not  know  of  the  illegal  nature  of  the  re- 
quest he  is  not  legally  liable  to  the  owner  for  taking  goods 
according  to  his  prima  facie  duty.3  However,  a  railroad 
company  which  negligently  permitted  slaves  to  be  trans- 
ported without  the  authority  of  their  owner,  was  held 
liable  for  their  value  by  reason  of  being  concerned  in 
their  escape.4 

§  605.  Implication  in  illegality. 
Upon  similar  principles  a  telegraph  company  should 

graph  Co.  v.  State,  165  Ind.  492,  76          Pennsylvania. — Sterrett  v.  Phila- 

N.  E.  100,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  153  delphia    Local    Telegraph    Co.,    18 

(1905).  Wk.  N.  Gas.  77  (1886). 

Kentucky. — Smith     v.     Western          l  See   the   dicta   in   Thurston   v. 

Union  Telegraph  Co.,  84  Ky.  664,  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Dill.  (U.  S.) 

2  S.  W.  483  (1887).    But  see  Louis-  321  (1877). 

ville  v.  Wehmhoff,  116  Ky.  812,  79          2  Turner  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R. 

S.  W.  201,  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1924  Co.,  63  N.  C.  522  (1869). 
(1903).  3  Jackson  v.  Railway  Co.,  87  Mo. 

Ohio—  Cain    v.    Western    Union  422,  56  Am.  Rep.  460  (1885). 
Telegraph  Co.,  18  Cinn.  Wk.  Bui.          4  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

267  (1887).  Young,  1  Bush  (Ky.),  401  (1866). 

[493] 


§  600  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

refuse  to  transmit  messages  which  would  implicate  it 
in  illegality.  While  it  is  true  there  can  be  no  discrim- 
ination where  the  business  is  lawful,  no  one  can  be  com- 
pelled to  aid  unlawful  undertakings  in  any  way  whatever.1 
"A  telegraph  company  should  refuse  to  send  libelous  2 
or  obscene  3  messages,  or  those  which  clearly  indicate 
the  furtherance  of  an  illegal  act,  or  the  perpetration  of 
some  crime.  But  recently  in  New  York  the  telephone 
and  telegraph  instruments  were  taken  out  of  'pool 
rooms'  which  were  used  for  the  purpose  of  selling  bets 
on  horse  races."  4  Thus  a  telegraph  company  will  be 
liable  for  transmitting  a  forged  message  knowing  it  to 
be  such;  it  is,  therefore,  its  undoubted  right  to  refuse 
unauthorized  messages  5  since  it  might  thereby  become 
involved  in  the  perpetration  of  frauds.6 

§  606.  Service  aiding  immoral  business. 

There  are  several  cases  involving  prostitution  which 
test  these  principles,  some  of  which  have  been  mentioned.7 
In  none  of  them  is  the  general  problem  so  well  worked 
out  as  in  a  recent  case  8  where  a  telephone  company 

1  Quoted  from  Gray  v.  Western  7  United  States. — Brown  v.  Mem- 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  87  Ga.  350,  phis  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Fed.  37  (1880). 
13  S.  E.  562  (1891).  Texas.— Pullman  Palace  Car  Co. 

2  See  Dominion  Telegraph  Co.  v.  v.  Bales,  80  Tex.  211,  15  S.  W.  785 
Silver,  10  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  238  (1881).  (1891). 

3  See  Archambault  v.  Great  North  Unless  these  women  notoriously 
Western  Telegraph  Co.,  14  Quebec,  habitually  misconduct  themselves. 
8  (1886).  Iowa—  Beeson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 

4  See  Matter  of  Cullen,  106  N.  Y.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  62  la.  173, 17  N.  W. 
App.  Div.  250,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  290  448  (1883). 

(1905),    and   other   cases    cited   in  Washington. — Stevenson  v.  West 

§  603,  supra.  Seattle  Land  Co.,  22  Wash.  84,  60 

6  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  Pac.  51  (1900). 

v.  Totten,  141  Fed.  533,  72  C.  C.  A.  «  Godwin  v.  Carolina  Tel.  &  Tel. 

591  (1905).  Co.,  136  N.  C.  258,  48  S.  E.  636 

6  Bank  of  Havelock  v.  Western  (1904). 

Union  Telegraph  Co.,  141  Fed.  522,  See,    however,    Western    Union 

72  C.  C.  A.  580  (1905).  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  57  Ind. 
[494] 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  607 

refused  to  give  service  to  a  bawdyhouse  upon  general 
principles  fully  discussed.  The  opinion  of  Chief  Justice 
Clark  is,  therefore,  well  worth  the  quotations  which  fol- 
low. "It  is  argued  that  a  common  carrier  would  not  be 
authorized  to  refuse  to  convey  the  plaintiff  because  she 
keeps  a  bawdyhouse.  Nor  is  the  defendant  refusing  her 
a  telephone  on  that  ground,  but  because  she  wishes  to 
place  the  telephone  in  a  bawdyhouse.  A  common  car- 
rier could  not  be  compelled  to  haul  a  car  used  for  such 
purpose.  If  the  plaintiff  wished  to  have  the  phone 
placed  in  some  other  house  used  by  her,  or  even  in  a 
house  where  she  resided,  but  not  kept  as  a  bawdyhouse, 
she  would  not  be  debarred  because  she  kept  another 
house  for  such  unlawful  and  disreputable  purpose.  It 
is  not  her  character,  but  the  character  of  the  business 
at  the  house  where  it  is  sought  to  have  the  telephone 
placed,  which  required  the  court  to  refuse  the  mandamus. 
In  like  manner,  if  a  common  carrier  knew  that  passage 
was  sought  by  persons  who  are  traveling  for  the  execu- 
tion of  an  indictable  offense,  or  a  telegraph  company 
that  a  message  was  tendered  for  a  like  purpose,  both 
would  be  justified  in  refusing;  and  certainly  when  the 
plaintiff  admits  that  she  is  carrying  on  a  criminal  busi- 
ness in  the  house  where  she  seeks  to  have  the  telephone 
placed,  the  court  will  not,  by  its  mandamus,  require 
that  facilities  of  a  public  nature  be  furnished  to  a  house 
used  for  that  business.  For  like  reason  a  mandamus 
will  not  lie  to  compel  a  water  company  to  furnish  water, 
or  a  light  company  to  supply  light,  to  a  house  used  for 
carrying  on  an  illegal  business.  The  courts  will  enjoin 
or  abate,  not  aid,  a  public  nuisance." 

§  607.  Service  indispensable  to  illegal  business. 

What  surely  may  be  refused  upon  general  principles 

495,  in  which  it  was  held  that  a  might  be  refused  but  not  an  am- 
message  sending  for  prostitutes  biguous  one  upon  mere  suspicion. 

[495] 


§  607  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

is  a  service  which  is  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  an  illegal 
business.  It  would  seem  plain,  for  example,  that  a  tele- 
graph company  is  not  obliged  to  furnish  a  service  inti- 
mately connected  with  illegal  operations.  Where  the 
running  of  a  bucket  shop  is  held  an  illegal  business,  it  is 
therefore  held  in  most  cases  that  the  telegraph  company 
is  not  bound  to  furnish  it  with  market  reports,1  either 
by  virtue  of  its  duties  as  a  public  servant  to  serve  all 
customers  without  discrimination,  or  even  by  virtue  of 
any  contract  which  it  may  have  entered  into  with  such 
a  subscriber  as  this.  And  so  obedience  to  the  regulation 
of  an  exchange  designed  to  prevent  such  distribution 
of  its  quotations  is  held  reasonable.  "It  is  simply  a 
restraint  on  the  acquisition  for  illegal  purposes  of  the 
fruits  of  the  plaintiff's  work,"  as  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  recently  said.2  Where  the  business  is 
simply  against  public  policy,  the  question  is  more  difficult. 
The  cases  are  somewhat  divided  as  to  whether  a  tele- 
graph company  can  refuse  to  handle  messages  in  relation 
to  the  sale  of  options  or  futures  in  jurisdictions  where 
the  law  simply  refuses  to  enforce  such  contracts  as  contra 
bonos  mores.  There  are  cases  3  which  imply  that  the 
company  is  assuming  too  much  in  refusing  to  transmit 
such  message,  but  by  the  weight  of  authority  it  is  justi- 

1  United  States.— Bryant  v.  West-  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  84  Ky.  664, 

ern  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  17  Fed.  2  S.  W.  487  (1887). 

825  (1883);  Sullivan  v.  Postal  Tele-  Ohio.— Cain   v.    Western   Union 

graph  Cable  Co.,  123  Fed.  411,  61  Telegraph  Co.,  18  Cinn.  Wk.  Bull. 

C.  C.  A.  1  (1903).  267  (1887). 

Illinois. — Central  S.  &  G.  Exch.  Pennsylvania. — Sterrett  v.  Phila- 

v.  Board  of  Trade,  196  111.. 396,  63  delphia   Local   Telegraph   Co.,    18 

N.  E.  740  (1902).  Wk.  N.  Gas.  77  (1886). 

Indiana. — Western   Union   Tele-  2  United  States. — Board  of  Trade 

graph  Co.  v.  State,  165  Ind.  492,  76  v.  Christie  Grain  &  Stock  Co.,  198 

N.  E.  100,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  153  U.  S.  236,  49  L.  ed.  1031,  25  Sup. 

(1905).  Ct.  637  (1905). 

Kentucky. — Smith     v.     Western  3  Gray  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 

[496] 


[§608 

fied.1    These  last  cases  seem  to  the  writer  fundamentally 
right. 

§  608.  Reasonable  rejection  usually  justified. 

If  as  things  appear  to  the  company  there  is  real  danger 
that  it  will  be  involved  in  an  illegal  transaction  if  it 
renders  the  service  asked,  it  would  seem  that  it  should 
be  justified  in  refusing  to  perform  the  service  asked, 
although  in  fact  there  is  no  illegality  on  foot.  The  most 
striking  case  of  this  sort  was  one  against  a  sleeping  car 
company.2  Husband  and  wife  had  dealt  separately  with 
the  company,  procuring  different  berths,  and  late  at 
night  the  wife  went  to  the  husband's  berth  clandestinely. 
It  was  finally  held  that  the  company  was  justified  in 
refusing  to  permit  them  to  occupy  the  berth  together 
that  night.  "It  may  be  admitted,"  said  the  upper 
court,  "that  there  was  nothing  improper  in  the  conduct 
of  the  plaintiff  and  his  wife,  when  their  relationship  to 
each  other  is  considered.  And  yet  it  cannot  be  affirmed 
that  their  actions  were  not  under  the  circumstances 
calculated  to  excite  the  suspicion  and  arouse  the  vigilance 
of  defendant's  servants."  In  what  is  probably  the  lead- 
ing case  3  on  this  point  where  the  exclusion  of  a  notorious 

graph  Co.,  87  Ga.  350,  13  S.  E.  562,  290  (1905),  holding  that  a  telegraph 

14  L.  R.  A.  95,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  259  company  may  insist  upon  reason- 

(1891).     And  see  Western   Union  able  assurances  that  its  news  service 

Telegraph  Co.  v.   Hill   (Tex.  Civ.  is  not  wanted  for  use  in  an  illegal 

App.),  65  S.  W.  1123  (1902).  business,  by  the  successor  of  a  per- 

1  Gist  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  45  S.  C.  son  who  had  run  a  bucket  shop  at 
344,  23  S.  E.  143  (1895).    And  see  these  premises. 

Western   Union  Telegraph   Co.   v.  So  a  pickpocket  may  be  refused 

Harper,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  37,  39  transportation  as  is  said  in  a  case 

S.  W.  599  (1896).  which  holds  that  if  he  is  accepted 

2  Pullman    Palace    Car    Co.    v.  he   cannot  afterwards  be  ejected. 
Bales,  80  Tex.  211,  14  S.  W.  855,  15  Coppin  v.  Braithwaite,  8  Jurist,  875 
S.  W.  785  (1891).  (1844).    Sed  quaere  as  to  the  actual 

See  also  Matter  of  Cullen,   106      decision. 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  250,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.          J  Thurston  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  R. 

32  [  497  ] 


§§609,610]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

gambler  from  a  passenger  train  was  justified  the  general 
principle  was  thus  stated  by  the  court.  "Whether  the 
plaintiff  was  going  upon  the  train  for  gambling  purposes, 
or  whether,  from  his  previous  course,  the  defendant  might 
reasonably  infer  that  such  was  his  purpose,  is  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury." 

§  609.  Cases  holding  that  rejection  is  at  peril. 

There  are,  however,  cases  which  hold  that  refusal  is 
always  made  at  peril  of  mistake  as  to  the  true  conditions; 
for  it  is  said  unequivocally  that  proper  applicants  can 
never  be  refused.  Thus  in  an  early  telegraph  case  l 
where  it  was  admitted  that  the  telegraph  company  had 
ground  to  believe  that  the  message  refused — "Send  me 
four  girls  on  first  train  to  Francesville  to  tend  fair," — 
was  addressed  by  a  keeper  of  prostitutes  to  a  procurer 
of  such  women,  the  court  held  that  the  telegraph  com- 
pany could  not  refuse  the  message  upon  mere  suspicion. 
And  in  another  telegraph  case  2  it  was  held  that  the  com- 
pany could  not  justify  itself  for  its  default  in  handling 
the  message  in  question  on  the  ground  that  it  believed 
that  the  message  was  being  sent  to  direct  an  illegal 
operation  in  stocks.  It  is  submitted  that  both  of  these 
decisions  are  erroneous. 

Topic  D.  Proximity  to  the  Illegality 

§  610.  Service  promoting  the  illegality. 

In  the  cases  which  have  been  discussed  in  the  preced- 
ing paragraphs  the  service  asked  might  fairly  be  said  to 
promote  the  illegality  directly.  In  such  cases  the  policy 
justifying  refusal  is  sufficiently  plain.  But  when  the 

Co.,  4  Dillon  (U.  S.),  321,  Fed.  Cas.  2  Gray  v.  Western  Union  Tele- 
No.  14,019  (1877).  graph  Co.,  87  Ga.  350,  13  S.  E.  562, 

1  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  14  L.  R.  A.  95  (1891). 
Ferguson,  57  Ind.  495  (1877). 

[498] 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  611 

illegality  is  far  remote  from  the  service  asked  it  was 
assumed  that  the  request  cannot  be  refused.  Thus, 
to  illustrate  this  distinction,  innkeepers  can  refuse  to 
harbor  an  immoral  woman  who  is  entertaining  her  com- 
panions in  her  rooms.1  But  a  railroad  cannot  refuse 
to  transport  a  prostitute  to  a  new  field. 2  To  make  another 
distinction,  it  has  been  held  that  a  carrier  could  refuse 
to  take  money  intended  for  use  in  the  contraband  trade  3 
while,  as  has  been  said,  it  might  be  obliged  to  transport 
a  bundle  of  stationery  intended  by  the  consignee  for 
use  in  his  business  of  dealing  in  futures.4  This  last  point 
is  interesting  as  it  shows  another  aspect  of  this  principle. 
When  the  business  which  will  be  aided  is  illegal  in  a 
high  degree  it  taints  transactions  much  removed  from  it, 
but  where  the  business  is  simply  against  public  policy 
the  taint  does  not  even  touch  collateral  transactions. 
For  example,  a  carrier  cannot  refuse  to  accept  goods 
for  transportation  even  if  it  is  known  that  the  owner 
intends  to  dispose  of  them  on  Sunday; 5  but  it  would 
seem  that  a  carrier  might  refuse  to  bring  firearms  into 
a  district  where  mob  violence  prevailed.6 

§  611.  Illegality  prior  to  service. 

Whatever  illegality  there  may  have  been,  previous  to 
the  time  when  the  service  is  requested,  should  not  affect 
the  right  to  have  present  service  if  the  illegal  conduct 
has  ceased  to  operate.  Thus  where  a  man  who  had 
brought  a  prostitute  to  an  inn  remained  after  the  woman 

1  See  Curtis  v.  Murphy,  63  Wis.      graph  Co.,  87  Ga.  350,  13  S.  E.  562, 
4,  22  N.  W.  825,  53  Am.  Rep.  242      14  L.  R.  A.  95  (1891). 

(1885).  'Waters  v.  Railroad  Co.,  110  N. 

2  Brown  v.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.,  C.  338,  14  S.  E.  802,  16  L.  R.  A.  834 
4  Fed.  37  (1880).  (1892). 

3  Cantu  v.  Bennett,  39  Tex.  303  6  See,  however,  Railroad  Co.  v. 
(1873).  O'Donnell,  49  Ohio  St.  489,  32  N.  E. 

4  Gray  v.  Western  Union  Tele-  476  (1892). 

[499] 


§  612  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

had  left  the  inn,  and  lost  his  goods,  it  was  held  that 
he  might  recover  from  the  innkeeper.  Even  assuming 
that  such  misconduct  would  have  barred  him  while  the 
misconduct  continued,  the  loss  here  happened  after  his 
misconduct  ceased,  and  his  previous  immorality  could 
not  affect  his  subsequent  status  as  a  guest.1  On  the 
same  principle,  in  a  case  where  it  appeared  that  the 
defendant  was  received  at  the  inn  on  Sunday,  and  that 
to  reach  the  inn  on  that  day  he  had  broken  the  statute 
which  forbade  traveling  on  Sunday,  he  was  held  to  be 
a  guest  nevertheless,  since  the  relationship  was  estab- 
lished by  acts  not  necessarily  connected  with  traveling 
on  Sunday.2  That  the  guest  had  been  long  a  prize  fighter, 
most  of  his  battles  being  in  violation  of  law,  it  would  seem 
should  not  justify  refusing  to  entertain  him.3  Even  a 
man  with  a  jail  record  has  a  right  to  travel.4 

§  612.  Illegality  subsequent  to  service. 

To  go  to  the  other  extreme  it  makes  no  difference  to 
the  right  to  service  that  illegal  conduct  may  happen 
after  the  service  is  complete,  provided  that  such  conduct 
will  be  really  independent  of  the  service  asked.  Thus 
a  railroad  cannot  excuse  itself  for  failure  to  transport 
liquor  by  showing  that  the  consignee  may  probably 
resell  it  in  violation  of  the  prohibition  law.5  It  is  no  ex- 
cuse that  a  passenger  may  get  into  trouble  upon  her 
arrival  at  her  destination,  it  being  usual  for  her  to  get 
intoxicated  there.6  This  is  not  so  plain  upon  the  authori- 

1  Lucia  v.  Omel,  46  N.  Y.  App.      ton,  8  C.  &  P.  654  (1837),  going  too 
Div.  200  (1899),  affirmed  in  53  N.      far  in  favor  of  the  applicant. 

Y.  App.  Div.  641  (1900).  « Southern  Express  Co.  v.  State, 

2  Cox  v.  Cook,  14  Allen  (Mass.)  107  Ga.  670,  33  S.  E.  637,  46  L.  R. 
165  (1867).  A.    417,    73    Am.    St.    Rep.    146 

3  But  see  Nelson  v.  Boldt,   180  (1899). 

Fed.  779  (1910),  going  too  far  against  « Stevenson  v.  West  Seattle  Land 
the  applicant.  &  Imp.  Co.,  22  Wash.  84,  60  Pac.  51 

4  And  see  Prendergast  v.  Comp-      (1900). 

[500] 


ILLEGALITY  INVOLVED  [  §  613 

ties  as  it  seems  it  ought  to  be.  In  one  early  leading  case 
it  seems  to  have  been  held  that  a  competitor  might  be 
refused  transportation  to  a  point  where  he  intended  to 
take  return  passage  for  the  purpose  of  soliciting  business 
in  violation -of  proper  regulations.1  In  a  later  case2 
much  cited,  it  was  said  that  a  passenger  who  had  been 
banished  by  the  vigilance  committee  might  be  refused 
transportation  back  to  San  Francisco  where  a  violent 
fate  probably  awaited  him.  But  there  are  additional 
elements  in  each  of  these  cases. 

§  613.  Public  policy  the  explanation. 

It  will  have  been  noted  throughout  this  chapter,  that 
this  excuse  which  one  engaged  in  public  service  has  by 
reason  of  illegality,  is  not  confined  to  those  obvious 
cases  where  rendering  the  service  would  subject  the 
proprietor  to  legal  proceedings  as  a  participant  in  the 
illegality.  The  defense  is  plainly  wider,  it  justifies  the 
proprietor  in  refusing  to  render  a  service  which  would 
promote  illegality  although  he  might  not  be  liable  person- 
ally to  legal  proceedings,  if  he  should  render  the  service 
in  question.  Considered  broadly,  then,  the  defense  is 
rather  the  general  one  of  public  policy  than  a  particular 
one  of  illegality.  Upon  the  whole  it  would  seem  to  be 
clear  that  the  law  relating  to  the  various  matters  dis- 
cussed in  this  chapter  is  being  worked  out  very  well, 
if  one  may  judge  it  by  the  closest  analogy  in  established 
law.  The  true  extent  of  public  duty  depends  in  last 
analysis  upon  public  policy  just  as  does  the  real  extent 
of  contractual  obligation.  Whatever  policy  is  strong 
enough  to  excuse  one  from  the  performance  of  a  con- 
tract obligation  ought  surely  to  justify  one  in  refusing 
to  perform  this  common-law  obligation. 

1  Jencks  v.  Coleman,  2  Sumn.  221      S.)   605,   discussed   18  L.  ed.  44? 
(1835).  (1866).. 

2  Pearson  v.  Diiane,  4  Wall.  (U. 

[501] 


CHAPTER  XVIH 

REJECTION    FOR   PERSONAL   DISQUALIFICATION 

§  620.  Right  of  protection  the  basis  of  the  defense. 

Topic  A.  Self-Protection 
§  621.  Dangerous  service. 

622.  Risk  of  possible  liability. 

623.  Fraudulent  customers. 

624.  Abuse  of  privileges. 

625.  Interference  with  the  service. 

626.  Persons  bringing  dangerous  things. 

Topic  B.  Protection  of  Others  Served 
§  627.  Dangerous  persons. 

628.  Suspected  criminals. 

629.  Violent  passengers. 

630.  Disorderly  guests. 

631.  Persons  having  contagious  disease. 

632.  Intoxicated  persons 

633.  Profane  patrons. 

634.  Ejection  governed  by  same  general  principles  as  rejection. 

Topic  C.  Applicant  Under  Disability 
§  635.  Disabled  persons  in  general. 

636.  Persons  subject  to  an  incapacity. 

637.  Blind  persons. 

638.  Sick  persons. 

639.  Insane  persons. 

640.  Arrested  persons. 

Topic  D.  Basis  for  Rejection 
§  641.  Rejection  for  present  misconduct. 

642.  Rejection  for  past  misconduct. 

643.  Rejection  upon  probable  cause. 

644.  Ejection  before  actual  misconduct. 

645.  Whether  refusal  should  be  at  peril. 

646.  Rejection  for  misconduct  of  companion. 

[502] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION       [  §§  620,  621 

§  620.  Right  of  protection  the  basis  of  the  defense. 

For  the  protection  of  others  being  served  as  well  as 
for  the  protection  of  its  own  interests,  an  applicant  for 
service  who  will  endanger  person  or  property  may  be  re- 
jected at  the  outset,  or  ejected  afterwards.  Thus  one 
who  is  attacking  another  passenger  may  be  ejected  by 
the  carrier,1  principally,  of  course,  for  the  protection  of 
the  others  then  receiving  service.  But  even  if  no  guests 
should  happen  to  be  present,  for  his  own  protection  the 
innkeeper  may  refuse  to  take  in  one  who  has  attempted 
to  break  down  his  door.2  This  duty  and  right  to  pro- 
tect combined  calls  upon  the  carrier  or  the  innkeeper 
to  use  due  diligence  and  good  faith.  If,  therefore,  they  act 
reasonably  and  honestly  it  would  seem  that  they  make 
out  their  justification  in  all  cases. 

Topic  A.  Self-Protection 

§  621.  Dangerous  service. 

It  requires  no  argument  to  establish  the  justification 
of  self-protection.  A  carrier  of  goods  may  refuse  freight 
which  would  injure  his  vehicle,  or  his  employes.  Thus 
he  may  refuse  high  explosives,3  at  least  as  ordinary 
freight,  or  tainting  liquids,4  particularly  when  contained 
in  leaking  barrels, — to  cite  two  examples.  Another  way 
of  explaining  his  right  to  refuse  goods  under  such  cir- 
cumstances would  be  to  say  that  if  he  took  such  freight 
with  knowledge,  or  even  with  reasonable  suspicion,  and 
injuries  subsequently  followed,  to  other  persons  or  other 

1  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  See  generally  chapter  XXVII. 

Logan,  88  Ky.  232,  10  S.  W.  655,  21  »  Nitroglycerine   Case,   15   Wall. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  332,  3  L.  R.  A.  80  (U.  S.)  524,  21  L.  ed.  206  (1872). 

(1889).  See  Boston  &  Albany  R.  R.  Co. 

See  generally  this  chapter.  v.  Shanly,  107  Mass.  568  (1871). 

2Goodenow  v.  Travis,  3  Johns.  4The    Montana,    22    Fed.    715 

(N.  Y.)  427  (1808).  (1884). 

[503] 


§§  622,  623  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

property,  he  might  be  held  liable,  and,  therefore,  he  might 
well  refuse  to  put  himself  in  a  position  where  such  liability 
might  be  attributed  to  him.  It  may  be  added  that  a 
carrier  is  not  necessarily  under  liability  when  he  does 
take  such  goods,  unless  he  is  blameworthy,1  or  should 
have  his  suspicions  as  to  what  the  packages  contain.2 

§  622.  Risk  of  possible  liability. 

Similarly  an  electric  company  could  refuse  to  make 
connections  with  a  building  improperly  wired,  upon  the 
ground  of  their  possible  liability  for  explosion  or  fire.3 
Indeed,  it  was  recently  held,4  that  a  gas  company  could 
refuse  to  supply  a  house  improperly  piped  by  reason  of 
the  danger  that  if  an  explosion  should  occur  they  might 
be  charged  with  liability.  This  is  perhaps  the  best  basis 
for  those  cases  previously  discussed  where  it  was  held 
that  a  service  company  might  make  installation  according 
to  certain  rules  or  equipment  within  certain  specifications, 
conditions  precedent.  Such  regulation  may  thus  be  de- 
fended. To  recall  one  example,  there  is  the  case  where 
a  water  company  was  allowed  to  refuse  to  supply  a  house 
unless  a  certificate  from  a  reputable  plumber  were  pro- 
duced.5 And  to  cite  another  instance,  a  gas  company  was 
held  entitled  to  regulate  the  installation  of  governors.6 

§  623.  Fraudulent  customers. 
For  its  own  protection  also,  one  engaged  in  public  em- 

1  See  Farrant  v.  Barnes,  11  C.  B.  Co.,  108  La.  67,  32  So.  Rep.  179 
(N.  S.)  553  (1856).  (1902). 

2  But  see  Norfolk  &  Western  R.  But  see  Franke  v.  Paducah  Water 
R.  Co.  v.  Irvine,  85  Va.  217,  7  S.  E.  Supply  Co.,  88  Ky.  467,  11  S.  W. 
233,  1  L.  R.  A.  110  (1888).  432,  4  L.  R.  A.  265  (1889). 

3  Benson  v.  American  Illuminat-  6  Foster  v.  Gas  Works  of  Phila- 
ing  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  Supp.  206  (1907).  delphia,  12  Phila.  511  (1878). 

*  Bastain  v.  Keystone  Gas  Co.,  50  See  also  Blondell  v.  Consolidated 

N.  Y.  Supp.  537,  27  App.  Div.  584  Gas  Co.,  89  Md.  732,  43  Atl.  817 

(1898).  (1899).  % 

8  State  v.  New  Orleans  Gas  Light 

[504] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION 


[§624 


ployment  may  refuse  to  serve  those  who  design  to  defraud 
him,  or  who  are  actually  engaged  in  defrauding  him.  Thus 
a  carrier  of  passengers  may  eject  those  attempting  to 
beat  their  way;  l  and  a  carrier  of  freight  does  not  owe 
his  special  duties  to  those  who  have  concealed  valuable 
goods  bearing  a  higher  rate  of  freight  in  deceptive  pack- 
ages.2 An  innkeeper  likewise  owes  no  duty,  as  such,  to 
those  who  are  imposing  upon  him.3  One  who  is  engaged 
in  a  scheme  of  defrauding  a  supply  company  as  by  tapping 
the  mains,  or  by  tampering  with  the  meter,  cannot  com- 
plain if  his  service  is  cut  off.4 

§  624.  Abuse  of  privileges. 

A  customer  who  abuses  his  privileges  in  getting  service 
may  be  refused  further  service  on  that  ground.    A  passen- 


1  See  among  the  many  cases  to 
this  effect: 

Illinois—  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Mehlsack,  131  111.  61,  22  N. 
E.  812,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  17  (1889). 

Iowa. — Way  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  64  la.  48,  19  N.  W. 
828,  52  Am.  Rep.  431  (1884). 

Kansas. — Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Nichols,  8  Kan.  505,  12  Am.  Rep. 
475  (1871). 

Maryland. — State  v.  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84,  87  Am. 
Dec.  600  (1865). 

Massachusetts. — Planz  v.  Boston 
&  Albany  R.  R.  Co.,  157  Mass.  377, 
32  N.  E.  356,  17  L.  R.  A.  835 
(1892). 

Missouri. — Muehlhausen  v.  St. 
Louis  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Mo.  332,  2  S.  W. 
315  (1886). 

Montana. — Higley  v.  Gilmer,  3 
Mont.  90,  35  Am.  Rep.  450  (1878). 

Neio  York. — Barry  v.  Union  Ry., 
105  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  520,  94  N.  Y. 
Supp.  449  (1905). 


England. — Great  Northern  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Harrison,  10  Exch.  Rep.  376 
(1854). 

2  See  among  the  many  cases  to 
this  effect: 

Georgia. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Everett,  37  Ga.  688  (1868). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Thompson,  19  111.  578  (1858); 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shea,  66 
111.  471  (1873). 

New  York. — Warner  v.  Western 
Trans.  Co.,  5  Robt.  490  (1868). 

England.— Batson  v.  Donovan, 
4  B.  &  Aid.  21  (1820);  Gibbon  v. 
Paynton,  4  Burr.  2298  (1769); 
Bradley  v.  Waterhouse,  3  C.  &  P. 
318  (1828). 

3  Curtis  v.  Murphy,  63  Wis.  4,  22 
N.  W.  825,  53  Am.  Rep.  242  (1885). 

4  Reasonable  suspicion  that  the 
consumer  is  taking  water  surrepti- 
tiously is  sufficient  ground  for  tak- 
ing action.    Krumenaker  v.  Dough- 
erty, 77  N.  Y.  Supp.  467,  74  App. 
Div.  452  (1902). 

[  505  ] 


§  625  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

ger  in  a  sleeping  car  is  responsible  for  decent  care  of  his 
berth.1  Where  water  is  supplied  upon  tap  basis,  a  water 
company  may  refuse  to  continue  serving  one  who  wantonly 
wastes  water.2  One  who  permits  unauthorized  access 
to  his  telephone  in  contravention  of  the  basis  upon  which 
service  is  rendered,  may  be  refused  further  service,3  And 
one  who  resells  his  ticker  quotations  may  be  cut  off  in- 
stantly.4 

§  625.  Interference  with  the  service. 

It  is  obvious  that  in  general  those  who  interfere  with 
the  service  as  arranged  may  be  refused  service.  Thus 
as  a  telephone  company  undertakes  to  provide  all  the 
apparatus  necessary  for  its  service,  it  may  positively  for- 
bid any  interference  with  the  instruments.  As  one  case 
held  5  it  can  prevent  a  subscriber  from  attaching  to  his 
instrument  his  own  wires  for  an  extension  service  in  some 
other  part  of  the  building.  It  is  justification  enough  for 
this  regulation  that  the  company  may  protect  its  circuit 
from  possible  interference.  Again,  a  telephone  company 
may  cut  out  a  subscriber  who  persists  in  breaking  in  upon 
a  party  line  when  others  are  using  it.6  The  proper  main- 
tenance of  the  whole  service  demands  that  those  who  thus 
interrupt  others  who  are  using  the  wires  shall  be  summa- 
rily dealt  with. 

1Nevin  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  graph  Co.,  38  Hun   (N.  Y.),  338 

Co.,  106  111.  222,  46  Am.  Rep.  688  (1885). 

(1883) .  And  see  National  Tel.  News  Co.  v. 

2  Harbison    v.    Knoxville    Water  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  119 
Co.  (Tenn.),  53  S.  W.  993  (1899).  Fed.  294,  55  C.  C.  A.  198  (1902). 

Robbing  v.  Bangor  Ry.  &  Elec.  5  Gardner  v.  Providence  Tele- 
Co.,  100  Me.  496, 62  Atl.  136  (1905),  phone  Co.,  23  R.  I.  312,  50  Atl.  1014 
accord.  (1901). 

3  See   People   v.    Hudson   River  •  Huffman     v.     Marcy     Mutual 
Telephone  Co.,  19  Abb.  N.  C.  466  Telephone  Co.,  143  la.  590,  121  N. 
(1887).  W.  1033,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1010 

4  Shepard  v.  Gold  &  S.  &  Tele-  (1909). 

[506] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION   [  §§  626,  627 

§  626.  Persons  bringing  dangerous  things. 

A  carrier  is  justified  in  excluding  from  the  vehicle  any 
person  who  insists  upon  bringing  into  it  articles  that  are 
dangerous  to  the  carrier,  or  obnoxious  to  other  passengers. 
Thus,  those  may  be  refused  entrance  to  a  boat  who  have 
with  them  guns  with  bayonets.1  One  who  has  valises 
which  will  block  the  aisles  may  be  ordered  from  a  car.2 
And  one  may  be  forbidden  entrance  who  is  trying  to  bring 
cumbrous  parcels  into  a  street  car.3  For  the  same  reason 
a  rule  is  proper  and  legal  which  excludes  from  a  passenger 
car  a  person  accompanied  by  a  dog.4  And  plainly  a  pas- 
senger cannot  insist  upon  entering  a  street  car  accompanied 
by  a  goat.5  Upon  like  principles  an  innkeeper  may  re- 
fuse to  accept  a  guest  bringing  a  large  dog  although  he 
had  him  on  a  leash.6  A  street  car  conductor  may  order 
a  workman  with  heavy  tools  to  go  upon  the  platform.7 
But  a  street  car  company  must  permit  a  passenger  to 
carry  in  the  car  a  cake  of  ice  securely  wrapped.8 

Topic  B.  Protection  of  Others  Served 

§  627.  Dangerous  persons. 

The  right  of  a  common  carrier  of  passengers  or  of  a 

1  Flint  v.  Transportation  Co.,  6  B  Daniel  v.  North  Jersey  St.  Ry. 
Blatch.  158,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  4873,  34  Co.,  64  N.  J.  Law,  603,  46  Atl.  625 
Conn.  554,  (1868).  (1900). 

2  Chicago   &   A.    R.   R.    Co.    v.  •  Regina  v.  Rymer,  2  Q.  B.  D.  136 
Buckmaster,  74  111.  App.  575  (1897).  (1877). 

3  Dowd  v.  Albany  Ry.  Co.,  47  7  See  Mittleman  v.  Philadelphia 
N.  Y.  App.   Div.  202,  62  N.  Y.  R.  T.  Co.,  70  Atl.  828,  18  L.  R.  A. 
Supp.  179  (1900).    See  also  Ray  v.  (N.  S.)   503,  221   Pa.   485   (1908). 
United  Traction  Co.,  96  N.  Y.  App.  But  the  train  men  cannot  throw 
Div.  48,  89  N.  Y.  Supp.  49  (1904).  his  tools  off  the   cars.     Smith  v. 

4  Gregory  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  112 
Ry.  Co.,  100  Iowa,  345,  69  N.  W.  Mo.    App.    85,    97    S.    W.    1007 
532  (1896).    See  further,  Wescott  v.  (1907). 

Seattle,  R.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Pac.          8  Mclntosh  v.  Augusta  &  A.  Ry. 
588,  41  Wash.  618,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.      Co.  (S.  C).,  69  S.  E.  159  (1910). 
S.)  947  (1906.)  See  also  Runyan  v.  Central  R.  R. 

[507] 


§  628  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

public  innkeeper  to  exclude  or  reject  applicants  who  openly 
threaten  violence  to  the  other  patrons  then  being  served 
is  perhaps  too  plain  to  require  explanation.  This  explana- 
tion is  plainly  to  be  seen  in  the  law  making  the  proprietors 
of  those  services  in  which  the  patrons  are  taken  in  charge 
liable  for  not  exercising  due  care  in  protecting  their  pa- 
trons not  merely  from  actual  assault  and  fear  of  injury, 
but  from  insult  and  shock.  So  it  is  easy  to  understand 
why  the  law  not  only  justifies  the  proprietors  of  such 
services  in  refusing  to  serve  such  persons  as  are  openly 
threatening  injury  to  others  being  served,  but  in  refusing 
to  accept  such  persons  as  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  may 
do  injury  to  others.  If  they  are  liable  for  not  taking  all 
reasonable  steps  to  protect  their  patrons,  they  should 
certainly  have  the  right  not  merely  to  reject  those  who 
it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  might  injure  their  patrons, 
but  also  to  eject  those  already  accepted  who  it  is  reason- 
able to  suppose  may  injure  their  patrons.  As  Judge 
Dillon  said  in  one  of  the  leading  cases  l  on  this  branch 
of  the  law  of  carriers,  a  railroad  is  not  bound  to  receive 
on  its  cars  or  to  permit  to  remain  upon  its  cars  one  going 
upon  a  train  or  staying  upon  it  to  assault  a  passenger, 
commit  larceny  or  robbery,  or  perpetrating  any  other 
crime.2 

§  628.  Suspected  criminals. 

The  right  of  an  innkeeper  to  exclude  those  who  are 
actually  dangerous  to  the  others  who  are  being  served  at 
the  same  time  may  seem  to  be  obvious.  The  plainest 
case  of  this  excuse  is  the  rejection  of  evil-disposed  persons 
who  might  prey  upon  the  persons  whom  the  proprietor 

Co.,  65  N.  J.  L.  228,  47  Atl.  422  2  So  a  pickpocket  may  be  rejected 

(1900).  as  is  held  in  a  case  which  (wrongly 

1  Thurston  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  as  it  seems)  holds  that  he  may  not 

Co.,  4  Dillon  (U.  S.),  321,  Fed.  Cas.  be  ejected.    Coppin  v.  Braithwaite, 

No.  14,019  (1877).  8  Jurist  (Eng.),  875  (1844). 

[508] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION  [  §  629 

is  bound  to  protect.  As  Judge  Parsons  said  in  one  of  the 
earliest  American  cases  discussing  the  right  of  the  inn- 
keeper 1  to  exclude  dangerous  persons:  "Where  is  the 
distinction  to  be  drawn?  If  one  may  enter  the  inn  and 
tarry  there,  all  may.  The  pickpocket,  the  burglar,  gam- 
bler and  horse  thief,  can  come  and  take  his  seat  by  the 
side  of  the  most  virtuous  man  in  the  community  in  the 
gentleman's  common  parlor  at  the  hotel,  and  the  proprie- 
tor cannot  eject  him  (no  matter  how  annoying  it  may 
be  to  the  guest)  without  being  indicted  for  an  assault 
and  battery.  Nor  would  the  line  of  distinction  be  drawn 
here — the  filthy  and  unclean  would  claim  the  same  right. 
It  is  only  necessary  to  state  such  a  proposition  to  show 
its  absurdity."  2 

§  629.  Violent  passengers. 

That  violent  persons  may  be  excluded  from  a  common 
service  would  seem  to  be  obvious.  This  is  particularly 
plain  when  the  person  in  question  is  actually  threatening 
an  assault.  In  one  of  the  leading  cases  of  this  sort,3 
where  the  passenger  ejected  drew  a  knife  the  Court  of  Ap- 
peals of  Kentucky  held  the  railroad  justified  in  putting 
him  off,  giving  a  full  review  of  the  various  points 
usually  involved  in  such  cases.  "  The  law  makes  it  the 
duty  of  a  railroad  company  to  use  all  reasonable  care  in 
operating  trains  for  both  the  safety  and  protection  from 
molestation  and  insult  of  passengers;  otherwise  elderly 
and  infirm  persons  and  females,  who,  upon  the  faith 
of  such  protection,  frequently  travel  unattended,  would 
have  no  security  against  turbulent,  bad  men.  And  as 

1  Commonwealth   v.    Mltchel,    2  3  Louisville    &   N.    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Parsons  (Pa.),  431  (1850).  Logan,  88  Ky.  232,  10  S.  W.  655,  21 

2  The  same  points  are  made  in  a  Am.  St.  Rep.  332,  3  L.  R.  A.  80 
still  earlier  case  as  to  the  duties  of  (1889). 

innkeepers.    Markham  v.  Brown,  8 
N.  H.  523,  31  Am.  Dec.  209  (1837). 

[509] 


§§  630,  631  ]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

it  is  obvious  a  train  must  be  run  with  skill  and  system 
in  order  to  assure  safety  and  comfort,  the  conduct  of  any- 
one who  interferes  with  the  management,  or  without  just 
cause  attempts  to  do  bodily  injury  to,  or  put  in  fear,  those 
in  charge,  is  reprehensible,  and  unlawful."  1 

§  630.  Disorderly  guests. 

If  the  guest  after  being  received  misconducts  himself 
so  as  to  annoy  the  other  guests,  he  may  for  that  cause 
be  ejected  from  the  inn.2  "If  a  man  comes  into  a  public 
house  and  conducts  himself  in  a  disorderly  manner,  and 
the  landlord  requests  him  to  go  out,  and  he  will  not,  the 
landlord  may  turn  him  out.  There  is  no  doubt  that  a 
landlord  may  turn  out  a  person  who  is  making  a  disturb- 
ance in  a  public  house,  though  such  disturbance  does  not 
amount  to  a  breach  of  the  peace."  3  Thus  one  could  be 
kept  out  who  came  avowedly  to  assault  a  guest.4  And 
if  one  who  has  gained  admission  commits  violence  he  may 
be  treated  as  a  trespasser  ab  initio.5 

§  631.  Persons  having  contagious  disease. 

For  the  protection  of  all  concerned  the  right  is  obvious 
also  to  exclude  those  having  a  contagious  disease,  or  who 
are  in  loathsome  condition.  It  is  well  established  that 
a  carrier  of  passengers  may  refuse  to  carry  any  persons 
in  this  condition,  even  if  they  have  bought  tickets.6  And 

1  See  also  to  the  same  effect :  2  The  quotation  which  follows  is 

Kansas. — Atchison,    T.   &  S.   F.  from  Parke,  B.,  in  Howell  v.  Jack- 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Weber,  33  Kan.  543,  son,  6  Car.  &  P.  (Eng.)  723,  725 

6  Pac.  877,  52  Am.  Rep.  543  (1885).  (1834). 

Missouri. — Leonard  v.  St.  Louis  3  See  also  Goodenow  v.  Travis,  3 

Transit  Co.,  115  Mo.  App.  349,  91  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  427  (1808). 

S.  W.  452  (1905).  «  See  Markham  v.  Brown,  8  N.  H. 

Ohio— Scioto     Valley     Traction  523,  31  Am.  Dec.  209  (1837). 

Co.  v.  Graybill,  29  Ohio  Cir.   Ct.  6The   Six   Carpenters'    Case,    8 

(1906).  Coke,  146a  (1610). 

Texas. — Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  6  See  dicta  in  Jencks  v.  Coleman, 

Co.  v.  Wood  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  77  2  Sumn.  221,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  7258 

S.  W.  964  (1903).  (1835),  and  in  Thurston  v.  Union 

[510] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION  [  §  632 

so  he  may  eject  them  after  acceptance  as  passengers  when 
the  occasion  arises.1  Upon  similar  principles,  an  inn- 
keeper may  plainly  refuse  entertainment  to  a  person 
with  contagious  disease.2  "Where  a  guest  is  taken  ill 
at  a  hotel  with  a  contagious  disease,  likely  to  be  communi- 
cated to  others,  the  proprietor,  after  notifying  the  sick 
guest  to  leave,  has  the  right  to  remove  such  guest  in  a 
careful  and  becoming  manner,  and  at  an  appropriate 
hour,3  to  some  hospital  or  other  place  of  safety,  provided 
the  life  of  the  guest  be  not  imperilled  thereby.  This  is 
not  only  a  right  inherent  in  the  hotel  keeper,  but  a  duty 
owing  to  other  guests,  and  to  the  preservation  of  public 
health."  4  This  reasoning  was  followed  in  a  recent  case 
where  it  was  held  that  a  sleeping  car  company  might  under 
proper  conditions  exclude  passengers  apparently  suffering 
from  contagious  disease  from  its  cars  to  avoid  the  danger 
they  cause  to  other  passengers.5 

§  632.  Intoxicated  persons. 

According  to  the  general  principles  governing  the  proper 
conduct  of  a  public  service,  it  would  seem  plain  that  a 
carrier  is  justified  in  refusing  to  transport  an  intoxicated 

Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Dill.   (U.  S.),  2  See  dicta  in  Markham  v.  Brown, 

321,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  14,019  (1877).  8  N.   H.  523,    31    Am.   Dec.  209 

1  United  States.— Paddock  v.  At-  (1837). 

chison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  See  also  what  is  said  in  State  v. 

Fed.  841  (1889).  Steele,  106  N.  C.  766,  11  S.  E.  478, 

Louisiana. — Conolly  v.  Crescent  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  573,  8  L.  R.  A.  516 

City  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann.  57,  5  (1890). 

So.  259,  6  So.  526,  3  L,  R.  A.  133,  17  3  McHugh  v.  Schlosser,  159  Pa. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  389  (1889).  480,  28  Atl.  291,  39  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Massachusetts. — Connors    v.  Cu-  699,     34     Wkly.     Notes    Cas.    33 

nard  S.  S.  Co.,  204  Mass.  310,  90  (1894). 

N.  E.  601  (1910),  semble.  4  McAdam,  C.  J.,  charging  jury 

Minnesota. — Groom  v.    Chicago,  in  Levy  v.  Corey,  1  City  Ct.  Rep. 

M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Minn.  296,  Supp.  57  (1884). 

53  N.  W.  1128,  18  L.  R.  A.  602,  38  «  Pullman    Co.    v.    Krauss,    145 

Am.  St.  Rep.  557  (1893),  semble.  Ala.  395,  40  So.  398  (1906). 

[511] 


§632] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


person.  Those  who  are  engaged  in  serving  the  public 
may  well  justify  themselves  for  refusing  to  serve  persons 
so  intoxicated  as  to  be  dangerous  or  obnoxious  to  the 
proprietors  of  the  service  or  to  the  others  who  are  being 
served  at  the  same  time.  Such  persons  are  apt  to  be  dan- 
gerous and  likely  to  be  unruly.  If  they  are  really  intoxi- 
cated it  would  seem  plain  that  they  may  be  rejected.1 
And  it  seems  equally  clear  that  if  they  are  really  obnoxious 
they  may  be  ejected.2  Upon  both  points  there  is  a  con- 
siderable body  of  authority,  although  there  is  now  little 


1  United  States. — Jencks  v.  Cole- 
man,  2  Sumn.  221,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
7258  (1835). 

Arkansas. — Price  v.  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  75  Ark.  479,  88  S. 
W.  575,  112  Am.  St.  Rep.  79 
(1905). 

Indiana. — Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Vandyne,  57  Ind.  576, 
26  Am.  Rep.  68  (1877). 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  E.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  McNally,  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1357,  105  S.  W.  124  (1907). 

Minnesota. — Harrold  v.  Winona 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Minn.  17,  49 
N.  W.  389  (1891),  semble. 

New  York. — Freedon  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  App. 
Div.  306,  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  584  (1897). 

North  Carolina. — Story  v.  Nor- 
folk &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  N.  C.  59, 
45  S.  E.  349  (1903). 

Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg  &  C. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Pillow,  76  Pa.  510,  18 
Am.  Rep.  424  (1874). 

Texas.— Paris  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Robinson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  114  S. 
W.  658  (1909). 

Washington. — Stevenson  v.  West 
Seattle  Land  &  Improvement  Co., 
22  Wash.  84,  60  Pac.  51  (1900). 

[512] 


2  Alabama. — Johnson  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Ala.  241, 
16  So.  75,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  39  (1893). 

District  of  Columbia. — Converse 
v.  Washington  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 
MacAr.  504  (1876). 

Georgia. — Peavy  v.  Georgia  R.  R. 
&  Banking  Co.,  81  Ga.  485,  8  S.  E. 
70,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  334  (1888). 

Illinois. — Chicago  City  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Pelletier,  134  111.  120,  24  N.  E. 
770  (1890). 

Kentucky. — Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Saulsberry,  112  Ky.  915,  66 
S.  W.  1051,  112  Ky.  915,  23  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  2341,  56  L.  R.  A.  580  (1902). 

Maine. — Robinson  v.  Rockland, 
T.  &  C.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Me.  387,  32 
Atl.  994,  29  L.  R.  A.  530  (1895). 

Massachusetts. — Hudson  v.  Lynn 
&  Boston  R.  R.  Co.,  178  Mass.  64, 
59  N.  E.  647  (1901). 

New  Hampshire. — Edgerly  v.  Un- 
ion St.  Ry.  Co.,  67  N.  H.  312,  36 
Atl.  558  (1892). 

Texas. — Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Evans,  71  Tex.  361,  9  S.  W.  325,  1 
L.  R.  A.  476  (1888). 

West  Virginia. — Fisher  v.  West 
Virginia  Co.,  42  W.  Va.  183,  24  S.  E. 
570,  33  L.  R.  A.  69  (1896). 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION  [  §  633 

or  no  dispute  as  to  the  extent  to  which  the  law  should 
go.  It  is  not  the  mere  intoxication  that  disables  the  person 
from  requiring  service;  it  is  the  fact  that  he  may  be  ob- 
noxious to  the  others.  Therefore  the  mere  fact  that  he 
has  been  drinking  is  not  enough;  he  must  be  shown  to  be 
so  intoxicated  as  to  be  irresponsible.1  The  same  rules 
apply  to  innkeepers,  justifying  them  in  rejecting  intoxi- 
cated persons  and  in  ejecting  guests  who  have  become 
drunk.2 

§  633.  Profane  patrons. 

In  accordance  with  these  principles  it  is  established 
that  persons  using  indecent  or  profane  language  may  be 
refused  service  at  the  outset,  or  cut  off  from  further  serv- 
ice. Both  the  proprietor  and  his  other  patrons  have 
the  right  to  insist  that  they  shall  not  be  thus  insulted 
or  offended.  The  most  extreme  case  of  this  sort  is  a  re- 
cent Texas  case  3  where  the  language  and  conduct  of  the 
passenger  ejected  showed  such  a  depth  of  degradation 
as  to  horrify  the  court.  However  the  facts  need  not  go  to 
this  extent.  A  person  may  be  refused  service  if  there  is 
reason  to  believe  that  if  he  is  allowed  to  enter  the  carrier's 
vehicle  he  will  so  conduct  himself  as  to  become  obnoxious. 
Thus  it  has  been  held  4  where  a  woman  was  suing  a  carrier 

1  New   York.— Milliman  v.   New      Schlosser,  159  Pa.  St.  480,  28  Atl. 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.      302,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  699  (1894). 
642  (1876).  England.— Rex  v.  Ivens,  7  Car.  & 

Texas—  Paris  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  P.  213  (Eng.,  1835). 
Robinson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  114S.  W.          3  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

658  (1908).  Wood  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  77  S.  W. 

2  See  the  dicta  in:  964    (1903).      See    also    Peavy    v. 
New    Hampshire. — Markham    v.  Georgia  R.  R.  &  Banking  Co.,  81 

Brown,  8  N.  H.  523,  31  Am.  Dec.  Ga.  485,  8  S.  E.  70,  12  Am.  St.  Rep. 

209  (1837).  334  (1888);  Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co. 

North  Carolina.— State  v.  Steele,  v.  Logan,  88  Ky.  232,  10  S.  W.  655, 

106  N.  C.  766,  11  S.  E.  478,  19  Am.  3  L.  R.  A.  80,  21  Am.  Rep.  332 

St.  Rep.  573,  8  L.  R.  A.  516  (1890).  (1889). 

Pennsylvania.  —  McHugh      v.          4 Stevenson  v.  West  Seattle  L.  & 

33  [  513  ] 


§  634  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

for  refusal  to  receive  her  as  a  passenger,  that  evidence  was 
admissible  that  prior  to  this  the  plaintiff  while  a  passenger 
upon  the  boat  had  been  guilty  of  obscene  language  l  and 
indecent  conduct  in  the  presence  of  other  passengers  in- 
cluding ladies.  Telegraph  companies  likewise  need  not  ac- 
cept obscene,  blasphemous,  profane  or  indecent  messages,2 
although  there  is  a  case  which  holds  that  the  telegraph 
company  refuses  an  equivocal  message  at  its  peril.3  But 
although  telephone  service  may  be  cut  off  from  a  sub- 
scriber habitually  profane,4  it  cannot  later  be  cut  off  from 
a  subscriber  who  has  desisted  from  objectionable  language 
upon  complaint  being  made  to  him.6 

§  634.  Ejection  governed  by  same  general  principles  as 

rejection. 

To  strengthen  the  citation  throughout  this  chapter 
prominent  cases  of  ejection  for  misconduct  have  been  put 
in  with  the  cases  of  rejection  for  the  same  reason.  This 
is  believed  to  be  in  every  way  justifiable  notwithstanding 
some  dicta  to  the  contrary.6  Even  after  one  has  been 
once  duly  accepted  he  may  be  ejected  later  for  proper 
cause.  By  his  admission  he  is  perhaps  in  a  better  position 
to  demand  the  services  than  when  he  first  applied  for 
service;  but  probably  this  advantage  is  merely  tactical. 
While  the  burden  is  on  one  who  applies  for  service  to  prove 

I.  Co.,  22  Wash.  84,  60  Pac.  51  Western  Telegraph  Co.,  14  Quebec, 

(1900).    See  also  Louisville,  N.,  A.  8  (1886). 

&  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wolfe,  128  Ind.  347,  » Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

27  N.  E.  606,  25  Am.  Rep.  643  Ferguson,  57  Ind.  495  (1877). 

(1890).  <  Pugh  v.  City  &  Sub.  Telephone 

1  However  a  profane  retort  pro-  Assn.,  9  Cinn.  Law  Bull.  104  (1883). 
voked  by  the  act  of  the  servant  does  6  Huffman  v.  Marcy  Mutual  Tele- 
not  excuse  rejection  or  ejection;  see  phone  Co.,  143  la.  590,  121  N.  W. 
Rexv.  Ivens,  7  Car.  &  P.  213  (1835),  1033,   23  L.   R.   A.    (N.  S.)    1010 
and  El  Paso  Electric  Ry.  Co.  v.  (1909). 

Alderete,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  142,  81  6  See  Pearson  v.  Duane,  4  Wall. 
S.  W.  1246  (1904).  605, 18  L.  ed.  447  (1866);  Coppin  v. 

2  Archambault     v.     Gt.     North      Braithwaite,  8  Jurist,  875  (1844). 

[514] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION  [  §  635 

himself  entitled  to  demand  it,  as  soon  as  he  has  been  re- 
ceived the  burden  is  placed  on  the  manager  to  justify  the 
act  of  ejecting  him.  But  so  far  as  substantive  right  goes,  it 
is  doubtful  if  the  applicant  gains  any  by  his  acceptance. 
If  after  his  admission  circumstances  occur  which  would 
have  justified  refusal  at  the  onset  if  they  had  existed  when 
he  applied,  they  will  equally  justify  ejecting  him.1 

Topic  C.  Applicant  Under  Disability 

§  635.  Disabled  persons  in  general. 

The  aged  and  crippled  cannot  be  refused  service,  al- 
though to  some  degree  special  care  must  be  taken.  The 
right  of  passenger  carriage  is  not  confined  to  persons  who 
are  vigorous  and  sound,  but  is  open  to  those  ailing  and 
infirm.2  If,  however,  the  applicants  be  so  far  incapaci- 
tated as  not  to  be  able  to  look  out  for  themselves  with 
the  ordinary  assistance  which  the  carrier  is  bound  to  ex- 
tend, they  may  be  refused  transportation;  but  the  carrier 
must  use  proper  discretion  in  deciding  that  question. 
"It  is  not  every  sick  or  crippled  or  infirm  person  whom 
a  railroad  regulation  can  exclude,  but  one  so  sick  or  so 
crippled  or  so  infirm  as  not  to  be  able  to  travel  without 
aid."  3  It  should  be  added  that  even  if  they  might  be 
refused  if  presenting  themselves  unaccompanied  they  may 
insist  upon  being  taken  when  they  do  not  ask  special  at- 

1  See  among  the  many  cases  to      without  an  attendant.    Louisville, 
this  effect  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.      N.  &  Gt.  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fleming, 
v.  Logan,  88  Ky.  232,  10  S.  W.  655,      14  Lea  (Tenn.),  128  (1884). 

3  L.  R.  A.  80  (1889),  and  Hudson  v.          » Quoted  from  Zachery  v.  Mobile 

Lynn  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  178  Mass.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Miss.  746,  23  So. 

64,  59  N.  E.  647  (1901).  434,  65  Am.  Rep.  617,  41  L.  R.  A. 

2  Wabash  Ry.   Co.   v.   Mathew,  385  (1898). 

199  U.  S.  605,  50  L.  ed.  329,  26  Sup.  See    also    similar    language    in 

Ct.  752  (1905).  Shendan  v.  Brooklyn  &  N.  Ry.  Co., 

But  an  aged  man  who  is  partly  36    N.   Y.   39,   93  Am.   Dec.   490 

paralyzed  cannot  expect  to  travel  (1873). 

[515] 


§636] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


tention  if  accompanied  by  attendants  of  their  own,1  unless 
even  with  such  attendants  they  will  be  an  extraordinary 
care  to  the  carrier.2 

§  636.  Persons  subject  to  an  incapacity. 

As  has  been  seen  incapable  persons  non  sui  juris  cannot 
be  refused  as  passengers  simply  because  they  are  inca- 
pable of  contracting.  As  to  children,3  for  example,  a  dis- 
tinction must  be  obviously  made.  Grown  children  al- 
though within  age,  may  travel  alone  with  practically  as 
much  assurance  as  adults;  but  infants  of  tender  years 
could  not  of  course  travel  without  danger  to  themselves, 
or  undue  demands  upon  the  carrier  unless  they  were  ac- 


1  Pullman  P.  Car  Co.  v.  Barker, 
4  Colo.  344,  34  Am.  Rep.  89  (1878). 

See  also  New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Statham,  42  Miss.  607, 
97  Am.  Dec.  478  (1869). 

2  Connors  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co., 
204  Mass.  310,  90  N.  E.  601,  26 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  171  (1910). 

See  also  Furgason  v.  Citizens' 
Street  Ry.  Co.,  16  Ind.  App.  171,  44 
N.  E.  936  (1896). 

Temporary  assistance  should  be 
given  those  who  are  quite  capable  of 
traveling  if  given  slight  assistance. 
See: 

Georgia. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Hobbs,  118  Ga.  227,  45  S.  E.  23,  63 
L.  R.  A.  68  (1903). 

Minnesota. — Groom  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Minn.  296, 
53  N.  W.  1128,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  557, 
18  L.  R.  A.  602  (1893). 

Tennessee. — R  a  i  1  r  o  a  d  Co.  v. 
Mitchell,  98  Tenn.  27,  40  S.  W.  72 
(1896). 

Texas.— Central  Texas  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Holloway  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  54  S.  W.  419  (1899). 

[516] 


If  the  company  through  its 
agents  undertakes  to  assist  a  party 
it  must  perform  the  service  with  due 
diligence.  See: 

Georgia. — Western  &  A.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Voils,  98  Ga.  446,  26  S.  E.  483,  35 
L.  R.  A.  655  (1896). 

New  Hampshire. — Foss  v.  Boston 
&  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  H.  256,  21 
Atl.  222,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  607,  11 
L.  R.  A.  367  (1890). 

New  York. — Hanlon  v.  Central 
Ry.  Co.,  187  N.  Y.  73,  79  N.  E.  846 
(1908). 

Texas. — International  &  G.  N. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilmer,  18  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  680,  45  S.  W.  1028  (1898). 

'See: 

Minnesota. — Braun  v.  Northern 
Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  79  Minn.  404,  82 
N.  W.  675,  49  L.  R.  A.  319,  79  Am. 
St.  Rep.  497  (1900). 

Tennessee. — Warfield  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Tenn.  74, 
55  S.  W.  304,  78  Am.  St.  Rep.  911 
(1900). 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION  [  §  637 

companied  by  grown  persons,  such  older  persons  being 
responsible  for  them.  In  the  former  days  the  question 
of  slaves  *  would  have  had  place  here;  and  it  would  have 
then  seemed  plain  that  one  could  refuse  a  slave  traveling 
alone  without  proper  permit,  because  of  the  danger  of 
being  implicated  in  an  escape.  But  a  master,  or  one  hav- 
ing authority,  could  insist  on  having  the  slaves  accepted 
when  traveling  in  his  company. 

§  637.  Blind  persons. 

Primarily  the  affliction  of  blindness  unfits  every  person 
for  safe  travel  by  railway,  if  unaccompanied.  No  blind 
person  without  previous  experience  could  possibly  ac- 
commodate himself  to  the  many  exigencies  incident  to 
travel  by  railroad,  or  guard  himself  against  peril  in  board- 
ing and  alighting  from  trains,  changing  from  one  train  to 
another,  or  threading  his  way  in  safety  across  the  railway 
tracks  at  crowded  stations.  Nor  is  such  a  regulation 
a  hardship  upon  the  persons  afflicted  with  blindness  or 
other  disabling  physical  infirmity.  It  is  rather  a  safe- 
guard thrown  around  them  for  their  own  protection. 
Therefore,  as  a  carrier  cannot  be  called  upon  to  care  for 
helpless  persons,  when  a  blind  person  applies  to  purchase 
a  ticket,  being  himself  unknown  to  the  agent,  and  that 
ticket  is  refused,  the  carrier  is  not  liable  in  damages.2  But 
if  the  agent  of  the  carrier  knows  of  his  personal  knowledge 
of  the  competency  to  travel  of  the  particular  person,  or 
if  the  fact  of  such  ability  is  made  known  to  him  in  any 
manner,  and  he  still  persists  wantonly  and  arbitrarily 
in  his  refusal  to  sell  the  person  desiring  passage  a  ticket, 

xSee:  "Zachery  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  R. 

United  States.— Boyce  v.  Ander-  Co.,  75  Miss.  746,  23  So.  435,  65 

son,  2  Pet.  150  (1829).  Am.  St.  Rep.  617,  41  L.  R.  A.  385 

Kentucky.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  (1898). 
Co.  v.  Young,  1  Bush.  401  (1866). 

[517] 


§  638  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

the  carrier  may  be  made  to  respond  in  damages  for  his 
oppressive  act.1 

§  638.  Sick  persons. 

It  has  been  seen  that  a  public  servant  is  under  no  obli- 
gation to  accept  a  person  infected  with  a  contagious  dis- 
ease or  in  a  disgusting  condition.2  To  go  to  the  other 
extreme,  travelers  who  are  simply  ailing,  but  quite  able 
to  care  for  themselves,  cannot  be  refused.3  Nor  can  per- 
sons who  by  reason  of  their  afflictions  might  perhaps  be 
unpleasant  to  other  passengers  be  excluded.4  And  to 
put  intermediate  cases,  if  a  person  ill  or  disabled,  but  not 
really  dangerous  or  obnoxious  to  others,  presents  himself 
with  proper  attendance  provided  by  himself,  it  seems 
right  to  require  that  he  shall  be  given  proper  service.5 
But  where  the  applicant  is  so  ill  as  to  require  constant 
medical  attendance,  he  may  be  refused  although  accom- 
panied by  a  nurse.6  If,  however,  a  person  who  is  appar- 
ently ill  is  actually  accepted  7  or  if  a  person  is  stricken 
after  acceptance  8  then  a  special  duty  to  take  peculiar 

1  This  whole  paragraph  is  largely      Co.  v.  Crunk,  119  Ind.  542,  21  N.  E. 
a  paraphrase  from  the  opinion  of      31,   12  Am.  St.  Rep.  443   (1889), 
Justice  Truly  in  Illinois  Central  R.      semble. 

R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  85  Miss.  349,  37  Minnesota. — Groom  v.   Chicago, 

So.  643,  70  L.  R.  A.  642  (1905),  in  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Minn.  296, 

which  this  last  distinction  is  made.  53  N.  W.  1128,  18  L.  R.  A.  602,  38 

Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Allen,  Am.  St.  Rep.  557  (1893). 

28  Ky.  Law.  R.  108,  89  S.  W.  150  6  Connors  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co., 

(1905),  accord.  204  Mass.  310,  90  N.  E.  601  (1910). 

2  See  §  631,  supra.    See  also  Pull-  7  See  particularly: 

man  Co.  v.  Krauss,  145  Ala.  395,  40  Louisiana. — Conolley     v.    Cres- 

So.  398  (1906),  and  other  cases  cited,  cent  City  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann.  57, 

3  Wabash  Ry.   Co.   v.   Mathew,  5  So.  259,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  389,  3  L. 
199  U.  S.  605,  50  L.  ed.  329,  26  S.  R.  A.  133  (1889). 

Ct.  752  (1905).    See  §  635,  supra.  «  United   States.— Meyer    v.    St. 

4  Regner  v.  Glens  Falls,  S.  H.  &  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  54  Fed. 
F.  E.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  116,  4  C.  C.  A.  221  (1893),  semble. 
625,  74  Hun,  202  (1893).  New  Hampshire.— Foss  v.  Boston 

6  Indiana.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.      &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  H.  256, 

[518] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION  [  §  639 

care  arises  when  the  circumstances  are  known,  but  not 
until  they  are  known.  Of  course  diseased  persons  may 
properly  be  segregated  from  the  others;  1  and  such  persons 
may  at  convenient  times  be  given  over  to  proper  attend- 
ance. All  this  is  as  good  law  for  innkeepers  as  it  is  for 
carriers.2 

§  639.  Insane  persons. 

As  to  the  case  of  insane  persons  similar  distinctions 
are  necessary.  If  they  present  themselves  unattended 
they  may  be  refused  service  as  a  general  rule,  because, 
even  if  not  violent  at  the  time,  they  are  always  a  poten- 
tial peril  to  other  persons  being  served.3  Perhaps  one 
ought  to  distinguish  between  various  kinds  of  mental 
incapacity,  thus  a  slightly  feeble-minded  person  who  went 
habitually  without  attendants  could  not,  it  seems,  be 
refused.  On  the  other  hand  even  violently  insane  per- 
sons must  be  taken  when  accompanied  by  sufficient  guards. 
In  one  case  of  this  sort 4  where  a  lunatic  with  his  keepers 
was  excluded  from  a  passenger  train,  permission  being 
given  to  travel  by  a  freight  train  soon  to  follow,  the  gen- 

21  Atl.  222,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  607,  11  New    York.— Levy   v.   Corey    1, 

L.  R.  A.  367  (1890)  .  City  Ct.  Rep.  Supp.  57  (1884). 

New   Jersey. — Newark   &   S.    O.  2 Pennsylvania.  —  McHugh    v. 

Ry.  Co.  v.  McCann,  58  N.  J.  L.  Schlosser,  159  Pa.  480,  28  Atl.  302, 

642,  34  Atl.  1052,  33  L.  R.  A.  127  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  699  (1894). 

(1896).  3  Meyer  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 

New  York— Sheridan  v.  Brook-  Ry.  Co.,  54  Fed.  116,  10  U.  S.  App. 

lyn  Cy.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  39,  677,  4  C.  C.  A.  221  (1893).     See  also 

93  Am.  Dec.  490  (1867).  Pullman  Co.  v.  Krauss,   145  Ala. 

Texas.— St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  395,  40  So.  398,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

Co.  v.  Finley,  79  Tex.  85,  15  S.  W.  103  (1906),  (disease),  and  Atchison, 

266  (1980).  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Weber,  33 

1  United  States.— The  Steamship  Kan.  543,  6  Pac.  877,  52  Am.  Rep. 

Hammonia,  10  Ben.  512,  Fed.  Cas.  543  (1885),  (delirium  tremens). 

No.  6006  (1879).  *  Owens  v.  Macon  &  B.  R.  R. 

District  of  Columbia.— Lemont  v.  Co.,  119  Ga.  230,  46  S.  E.  87,  63  L. 

Washington   &   G.   R.   R.   Co.,    1  R.  A.  946  (1903). 
Mackey,  180  (1881). 

[519] 


§  640  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

eral  problem  of  this  topic  was  thus  discussed  by  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Lamar:  "In  the  case  of  unfortunates  who  are  not 
responsible  for  their  disorderly  conduct,  and  who,  at  best, 
are  involuntary  passengers,  a  different  question  is  pre- 
sented, calling  in  each  case  for  the  exercise  of  a  wise  dis- 
cretion. On  the  one  hand,  regard  must  be  had  for  the 
safety  and  comfort  of  other  travelers,  and,  on  the  other, 
to  the  fact  that  in  losing  his  mind  the  lunatic  has  not  lost 
the  right  to  be  transported.  It  may  be  vitally  important 
that  he  be  taken  to  a  place  where  he  can  receive  the  at- 
tention and  confinement  rendered  necessary  by  his  mental 
state.  The  carrier  cannot  absolutely  refuse  transportation 
to  insane  persons,  but  it  may  in  all  cases  insist  that  he 
be  properly  attended,  safely  guarded,  and  securely  re- 
strained. And  even  where  such  precautions  have  been 
taken,  it  is  not  bound  to  afford  him,  if  violent,  transpor- 
tation in  the  cars  in  which  other  travelers  are  being  con- 
veyed." 

§  640.  Arrested  persons. 

The  public  duty  to  transport  officers  having  criminals 
in  their  charge  is  equally  obvious.  It  is  equally  plain 
that  such  passengers  need  not  be  taken  along  with  other 
passengers  if  it  may  reasonably  be  thought  that  they  are 
of  a  sort  which  might  prove  to  be  dangerous  or  annoying 
to  other  passengers.1  The  right  to  eject  the  attendants 
of  dangerous  persons  is  involved  in  the  right  to  reject 
such  persons  themselves.  The  nurse  accompanying  a 
person  with  contagious  disease  may  be  dealt  with  as  the 
patient.  The  attendant  of  a  dangerously  insane  person 
may  be  compelled  to  take  his  charge  away.  Officers  hav- 
ing a  dangerous  criminal  in  charge  may  be  compelled  to 

1  See  Brunswick  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.          See  Owens  v.  Macon  &  B.  R.  R. 

Ponder,  117  Ga.  63,  43  S.  E.  430,  Co.,  119  Ga.  230,  46  S.  E.  87,  63 

60  L.  R.  A.  713,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  152  L.  R.  A.  946  (1903). 
(1903). 

[520] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION   [  §§  641 ,  642 

take  him  apart  from  other  passengers.     And  the  adult 
accompanying  a  too  boisterous  child  may  be  ejected.1 

Topic  D.  Basis  for  Rejection 

§  641.  Rejection  for  present  misconduct. 

The  typical  case  for  refusing  service  is  when  the  appli- 
cant is  in  flagrante  delicto,  when  his  present  misconduct 
is  such  as  to  justify  the  refusal  to  give  the  service  asked 
under  the  existing  circumstances.  These  disqualifications 
have  been  brought  out  in  extreme  form  in  the  present 
chapter.  The  rule  is  sometimes  so  stated  as  to  cover  only 
such  extreme  cases;  but  this  must  not  be  taken  too  liter- 
ally.2 "  Suppose  a  known  or  suspected  thief  were  to  come 
on  board;  would  they  not  have  a  right  to  refuse  him  a 
passage?  Might  they  not  justly  act  upon  the  presump- 
tion that  his  object  was  unlawful?  Suppose  a  person  were 
to  come  on  board,  who  was  habitually  drunk,  and  gross 
in  his  behavior,  and  obscene  in  his  language,  so  as  to  be  a 
public  annoyance;  might  not  the  proprietors  refuse  to 
allow  him  a  passage?  I  think  they  might,  upon  the  just 
presumption  of  what  his  conduct  would  be."  3 

§  642.  Rejection  for  past  misconduct. 

One  would  not  be  justified  in  pressing  this  doctrine  to 
the  point  of  saying  as  is  sometimes  incautiously  said  that 
an  applicant  may  be  rejected  by  reason  of  his  evil  reputa- 
tion. Where  the  past  misconduct  has  no  relation  to  the 

1  Jackson  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.      modern  times  is  Thurston  v.  Union 
Ry.  Co.,  87  Mo.  422,  56  Am.  Rep.      Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Dillon  (U.  S.), 
460  (1885).  321,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  14,019  (1877), 

See  Jardine  v.  Cornell,  50  N.  J.  where   Judge   Dillon   held   that   a 

L.  485  (1888).  notorious  gambler  could  be  refused 

2  Quoted  from  Mr.  Justice  Story's  transportation  as  the  railroad  corn- 
opinion   in  Jencks  v.   Coleman,   2  pany  might   reasonably   anticipate 
Sumn.  (U.  S.)  221,  225  (1835).  that  he  might  cause  harm  to  some 

3  The  leading  case  to  this  effect  in  of  their  passengers. 

[521] 


§  643  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

present  service,  there  certainly  can  be  no  refusal.  And 
indeed  past  misconduct  as  such  cannot  justify  a  refusal. 
Thus  a  railroad  cannot  refuse  to  carry  a  man  who  once 
disobeyed  its  ticket  regulations.1  So  a  man  who  once 
previously  had  presented  himself  drunk  cannot  be  refused 
at  another  time  when  plainly  sober.2  And  a  patron  who 
once  profane  in  his  speech  had  long  since  desisted  upon 
warning,  cannot  be  refused  further  service.3  But  if  the 
past  misconduct  has  been  so  long  continued  that  it  makes 
only  too  probable  a  repetition  of  it,  notwithstanding  pro- 
tests of  reformation  there  may  perhaps  be  a  refusal  to 
give  the  service  which  will  present  the  opportunity.4 

§  643.  Rejection  upon  probable  cause. 

If  the  danger  or  inconvenience  to  the  carrier  or  his  pa- 
trons seems  reasonably  imminent  although  not  absolutely 
certain  there  would  seem  to  be  sufficient  ground  to  justify 
the  carrier  in  refusing  to  perform  the  service  asked.  This 
is  well  elaborated  in  a  late  Massachusetts  case,5  where  a 
steamship  company  refused  to  take  the  risk  of  accept- 
ing a  woman  whose  condition  was  serious,  Mr.  Justice 
Loring  thus  summarizing  the  authorities:  "It  was  held 
in  all  these  cases  that  the  justification  was  made  out  if 
the  carrier  had  reasonable  cause  to  suppose  and  did  sup- 
pose that  the  safety  or  convenience  of  other  passengers 
would  be  endangered  by  the  person  in  question,  and  that 
it  was  not  necessary  to  wait  to  see  if  the  person  believed 
and  with  reason  to  be  afflicted  with  an  infectious  disease, 

»Atwater  v.   Del.,  Lack.  &  W.  1033,  23  L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.)    1010 

R.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  L.  55,  2  Atl.  803  (1909). 

(1886).  « Stevenson  v.  West  Seattle  Land 

1  Story  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  &  Imp.  Co.,  22  Wash.  84,  60  Pac.  51 

133  N.  C.  59,  45  S.  E.  349  (1903).  (1900). 

1  Huffman  v.  Marcy  Mutual  Tele-  •  Connors  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co., 

phone  Co.,  143  Iowa,  590, 121  N.  W.  204  Mass.  310,  90  N.  E.  601,  26  L. 

R.  A.  (N.  S.)  171  (1910). 
[522] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION          [  §  644 

or  so  insane,  drunk,  or  sick  as  to  be  likely  to  interfere  with 
the  safety  or  convenience  of  other  passengers,  was  or  was 
not  in  fact  in  the  condition  he  appeared  to  be  in."  1 

§  644.  Ejection  before  actual  misconduct. 

As  the  same  principles  should  apply  whether  it  be  a 
case  of  ejection  after  acceptance  or  rejection  at  the  outset, 
the  leading  case  of  Vinton  v.  Middlesex  Street  Railway 
Company  2  may  be  cited  here.  In  this  case  the  defendant 
railway  introduced  evidence  tending  to  show  that  at  the 
time  of  the  expulsion  the  plaintiff,  intoxicated  and  using 
loud  and  profane  language,  was  attempting  to  strike  at 
the  conductor.  At  the  trial  the  judge  ruled  that  the  con- 
ductor had  no  right  to  eject  unless  the  actual  conduct 
of  the  plaintiff  at  the  time  was  offensive  or  annoying  to 
the  passengers.  The  Massachusetts  court — Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Bigelow  writing  the  opinion — held  this  view  too 
limited:  "Certainly  the  conductor  in  charge  of  the  vehicle 
was  not  bound  to  wait  until  some  overt  act  of  violence, 
profaneness  or  other  misconduct  had  been  committed, 
to  the  inconvenience  or  annoyance  of  other  passengers, 
before  exercising  his  authority  to  exclude  or  expel  the 
offender.  The  right  and  power  of  the  defendants  and 
their  servants  to  prevent  the  occurrence  of  improper  and 
disorderly  conduct  in  a  public  vehicle  is  quite  as  essential 
and  important  as  the  authority  to  stop  a  disturbance  or 
repress  acts  of  violence  or  breaches  of  decorum  after  they 
have  been  committed,  and  the  mischief  of  annoyance 
and  disturbance  have  been  done.  Indeed,  if  the  rule  laid 
down  at  the  trial  be  correct,  then  it  would  follow  that 
passengers  in  public  vehicles  must  be  subjected  to  a  cer- 
tain amount  or  degree  of  discomfort  or  insult  from  evil- 

1  See     also,     holding     similarly,          2 11  Allen  (Mass.),  304,  87  Am. 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Krauss,   145      Dec.  714  (1865). 
Ala.  395,  40  So.  398,  4  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  103  (1906). 

[523] 


§§  645,  646]     PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

disposed  persons  before  the  right  to  expel  them  would 
accrue  to  a  carrier  or  his  servant.  There  would  be  no 
authority  to  restrain  or  prevent  profaneness,  indecency, 
or  other  breaches  of  decorum  in  speech  or  behavior,  until 
it  had  continued  long  enough  to  become  manifest  to  the 
eye  or  ears  of  other  passengers.  It  is  obvious  that  any 
such  restriction  on  the  operation  of  the  rule  of  law  would 
greatly  diminish  its  value."  ! 

§  646.  Whether  refusal  should  be  at  peril. 

It  would  seem  to  follow  from  all  this,  if  the  public  serv- 
ant is  to  be  allowed  due  power  to  protect  himself  in  his 
service  and  the  public  which  he  is  serving,  that  the  ques- 
tion in  such  cases  should  be  whether  the  applicant  had 
given  him  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  the  defense 
existed.  Thus  a  traveler  may  be  ejected  who  from  outward 
signs,  such  as  eruptive  fever,  appears  to  have  a  contagious 
disease,2  although  in  fact  he  has  not.  This  case  (as  will 
have  transpired  throughout  the  paragraphs  just  preceding) 
represents  the  great  weight  of  authority.  But  there  are 
a  few  cases  to  the  contrary  holding  in  effect  that  as  no 
proper  applicant  can  ever  be  refused  the  company  acts 
at  its  peril.  And  a  street  railway  was  recently  held  for 
rejecting  a  passenger  who  was  apparently  in  delirium 
tremens,  but  who  really  was  afflicted  with  St.  Vitus  Dance.3 

§  646.  Rejection  for  misconduct  of  companion. 

The  right  is  sometimes  claimed  to  reject  one  person  by 
reason  of  the  misconduct  of  another  accompanying  him. 

1  See  also  the  later  Massachusetts      Tex.  211,  14  S.  W.  855,  15  S.  W.  785 
case  of  Hudson  v.  Lynn  &  Boston       (1890). 

R.  R.  Co.,  178  Mass.  64,  59  N.  E.  »  Regner  v.  Glens  Falls,  etc.,  R. 

647  (1901).  R.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.   Supp.  625,  74 

2  Paddock  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Hun,  202  (1893).    See  also  Seaboard 
Ry.  Co.,  37  Fed.  841  (1889).    See  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Quin,  124  Ga. 
also  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Bales,  80  357,  52  S.  E.  427  (1905). 

[524] 


PERSONAL  DISQUALIFICATION 


I  §646 


This  may  be  true  where  the  misconduct  is  that  of  an  at- 
tendant in  charge  of  a  child  or  a  patient ;  *  but  this  is  not 
true  of  a  mere  companion.2  Thus  in  a  leading  case  3  an 
innkeeper  refused  to  serve  an  applicant  because  he  be- 
longed to  the  militia  and  wore  the  uniform,  other  members 
of  which  wearing  the  same  uniform  having  previously 
misconducted  themselves.  The  innkeeper  alleged  that 
he  was  unable  to  discriminate  between  them,  and  took 
them  all  as  parties  who  came  there  to  create  a  disturbance 
in  the  house.  This  excuse  was  held  insufficient.4  However 
where  5  certain  persons  attempted  to  procure  passage  in  a 
stock  car,  some  of  whom  had  transportation  and  others 
had  not,  those  holding  transportation  attempting  to  con- 
ceal the  others,  it  was  held  that  they  all  became  trespassers 
and  subjected  themselves  to  ejection.6 


'See  Warfield  v.  Railroad  Co., 
104  Tenn.  74,  55  S.  W.  304,  78  Am. 
St.  Rep.  911  (1900). 

Thus  a  passenger  may  be  ejected 
along  with  his  dog.  Gregory  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  100  la.  345, 
69  N.  W.  532  (1896). 

2  Mississippi. — Louisville    &    N. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Maybin,  66  Miss.  83, 
5  So.  401  (1888). 

West  Virginia. — Gillingham  v. 
Ohio  River  R.  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va. 
588,  14  S.  E.  243,  14  L.  R.  A.  798, 
29  Am.  St.  Rep.  827  (1891). 

3  Atwater  v.  Sawyer,  76  Me.  539, 
49  Am.  Rep.  634  (1884). 

4  However,  where  premises  have 


been  closed  by  the  police  for  har- 
boring a  bucket  shop,  the  telegraph 
company  may  require  assurances 
from  the  successor  to  the  pro- 
prietor of  the  business.  Matter  of 
Cullen,  106  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  250, 
94  N.  Y.  Supp.  290  (1905). 

5  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Diefen- 
bach,  167  Fed.  39  (1909). 

6  The  conductor  is  not  required  to 
permit  the  person  to  continue  on  the 
train  upon  the  promise  of  another 
passenger  to  see  that  he  will  hurt 
nobody.    Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Setser's  Admr.  (Ky.),  128  S.  W. 
341  (1910). 


[525] 


CHAPTER  XIX 

JUSTIFICATION   FOR  SUSPENDING  SERVICE 

§  650.  General  situations  justifying  suspension. 

Topic  A.  Natural  Conditions 

§  651.  Failure  of  water  supply. 

652.  Exhaustion  of  irrigation  supply. 

653.  Division  of  natural  gas. 

654.  Service  dependent  on  water  power. 

Topic  B.  Inevitable  Accidents 
§  655.  Convulsions  of  nature. 

656.  Storms  and  floods. 

657.  Electrical  disturbance. 

658.  Normal  conditions. 

659.  Unavoidable  accidents. 

Topic  C.  Insufficient  Facilities 
§  660.  When  accommodations  offered  are  exhausted. 

661.  Limitations  upon  the  carrier's  obligation. 

662.  Extended  obligation  of  the  railroads. 

663.  Facilities  unexpectedly  become  outgrown. 

664.  Normal  fluctuations  of  business. 

665.  Division  of  facilities  among  applicants. 

Topic  D.  Human  Obstacles 

§  666.  Enemy  forces. 

667.  Domestic  violence. 

668.  Refusal  to  receive  because  of  strike. 

669.  Refusal  to  receive  because  of  violent  strike. 

670.  Situation  when  sympathetic  strike. 

671.  How  employe's  of  the  carriers  are  affected. 

§  650.  General  situations  justifying  suspension. 

There  are  many  situations  in  which  it  is  justifiable  to 
suspend  service  in  whole  or  in  part.    These  are  discussed 
in  much  detail  later  in  dealing  with  the  obligation  to  carry 
[526] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  651 

through  properly  a  particular  service  after  it  has  been 
undertaken.  But  it  is  obvious  that  the  same  considera- 
tions will  justify  a  refusal  to  accept  new  applications  for 
service  during  the  period,  if  the  company  would  be  excused 
for  not  completing  in  regular  course  business  already  on 
hand.  Without  going  into  the  matter  further  at  present 
as  to  the  various  circumstances  which  may  make  suspen- 
sion permissible  it  is  enough  to  point  out  here  that  when 
the  management  has  done  the  best  that  could  be  expected 
of  it  under  the  conditions  at  the  time,  it  has  done  all  that 
the  law  requires.  "But  in  the  absence  of  the  existence 
of  an  exceptional  cause,  such  as  the  act  of  God,  the  public 
enemy,  unavoidable  accident  or  an  abnormal  and  un- 
anticipated inrush  of  business  which  will  prevent  the 
performance  of  its  common-law  duty  to  shippers,  a  com- 
mon carrier  has  no  right  to  refuse  to  receive  and  trans- 
port property  offered  for  shipment."  *  It  will  be  seen 
that  these  are  general  considerations  applying  to  service 
in  general;  and  therein  this  general  justification,  imper- 
sonal in  its  application,  differs  from  the  particular  ex- 
cuses, personal  in  character,  which  have  just  been  under 
discussion  recently.2 

Topic  A.  Natural  Conditions 

§  651.  Failure  of  water  supply. 

In  dealing  with  water  companies  it  must  always  be 
taken  into  account  that  natural  limitations  to  a  consid- 
erable extent  limit  the  supply.  For  example  an  unusual 
drought  long  continuing  would  excuse  a  partial  suspen- 
sion of  service.3  But  failure  to  be  ready  to  meet  the  de- 

1  The  quotation  is  from  Knight  v.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayes,  201  U. 
Quincy,  O.  &  K.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  S.  329,  50  L.  ed.  72,  26  Sup.  Ct. 
Mo.  App.  311  (1906).  491  (1906). 

2  See  also  the  various  instances  of          s  State  Trust  Co.   of  N.  Y.  v. 
justification  enumerated  in  Houston  City  of  Duluth,  70  Minn.  257,  73 

[527] 


§  652  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

mands  of  its  public  during  dry  periods  which  are  to  be 
expected  is  a  plain  breach  of  its  duty.  So  serious  was 
this  believed  to  be  in  the  case  of  one  water  company,  at 
least,  as  to  warrant  forfeiture  of  its  charter.1  In  this  case 
the  water  company  attempted  to  excuse  its  four  failures 
to  supply  proper  water  in  the  preceding  four  years  by 
alleging  that  there  was  a  protracted  drought  at  each  time; 
but  the  evidence  tended  to  show  that  this  long  drought 
was  usual  in  the  heated  season  of  each  year.  The  case 
is  therefore  sufficiently  differentiated  from  the  first  cases, 
where  the  drought  was  of  unprecedented  duration. 

§  652.  Exhaustion  of  irrigation  supply. 

In  irrigation  we  have  a  typical  case  of  natural  limita- 
tion. When  the  flow  of  a  stream  is  diverted  by  irrigation 
works,  the  profession  of  the  managing  company  may 
fairly  be  said  to  be  confined  to  the  water  that  may  prop- 
erly be  appropriated.  It  is  consequently  under  no  duty 
to  provide  other  sources  of  supply  even  against  recurrent 
drought,  as  its  obligation  is  limited  to  the  proper  diver- 
sion of  the  appropriated  water.2  Only  while  it  has  avail- 
able water  is  it  bound  to  supply  applicants.  Thus  an 
answer  to  a  complaint  for  mandamus  that  the  irrigation 
company  has  not  sufficient  water  to  supply  the  plaintiff 
and  all  others  owning  lands  lying  under  the  flow  of  the 
ditch,  was  held  plainly  insufficient  without  an  averment 
that  the  available  supply  had  been  exhausted  by  prior 
demands.3  But  such  prior  takings  exhausting  the  depend- 

N.  W.  249  (1897).     See  also  State  105  Ala.  406,  432,  18  So.  62,  29  L. 

ex  rel.  Olmstead  v.  Proprietors  of  R.  A.  743  (1894). 

the  Morris  Aqueduct,  46  N.  J.  L.  2  See  Lowe  v.  Yolo  County  Con- 

495  (1884).  solidated  Water  Co.,  6  Cal.  App. 

But  see  Gainesville  Water  Co.  v.  Div.  646,  96  Pac.  379  (1908). 

City  of  Gainesville  (Tex.),  128  S.  W.  »  Merrill  v.  Southside  Irrigation 

370  (1910).  Co.,    121    Cal.    426,    44   Pac.   720 

1  Capital  City  Water  Co.  v.  State,  (1896) . 
[  528  ] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  653 

able  supply  do  constitute  a  justification  for  the  refusal 
of  further  applications.1  Indeed,  there  are  several  cases 
which  go  to  the  extent  of  granting  an  injunction  brought 
by  present  users  upon  the  showing  that  the  supply  is  taken 
up  to  a  proper  capacity,  ordering  the  company  to  cease 
from  taking  on  new  customers.2 

§  653.  Division  of  natural  gas. 

Natural  gas  presents  another  plain  instance  of  natural 
limitation.  After  a  piping  system  has  once  been  con- 
structed from  certain  fields  for  the  supply  of  a  certain 
community,  it  is  true  in  an  abstract  sense  that  all  have 
equal  rights  to  the  service  offered.  When  the  available 
supply  has  been  taken  up  by  the  present  customers  and 
new  applications  still  come  in,  it  may  be  that  reasonable 
efforts  ought  to  be  made  to  get  more  out  of  these  fields 
by  sinking  more  wells;  but  certainly  it  will  not  be  com- 
pelled to  establish  a  plant  for  the  manufacture  of  gas 
since  that  would  be  outside  its  profession.  When  this 
natural  limitation  is  certain,  the  cases  hold  that  the 
available  supply  must  be  shared  by  the  present  takers 
with  the  new  applicants.  In  a  late  case  3  on  that  point, 
the  Indiana  Supreme  Court  insisted  that:  "In  the  ren- 
dering of  such  a  service  there  should  be  no  advantage 
accorded  to  prior  applicants.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that 
there  is  equality  of  right  on  the  part  of  each  of  the  inhab- 
itants living  along  appellant's  mains."  The  rule  for  nat- 
ural gas  it  will  be  noticed  is  opposed  to  the  rule  for  the 

1  United  States. — See  San  Diego      Anaheim  Union  Water  Co.,  124  Cal. 
Flume  Co.  v.  Souther,  112  Fed.  228      112,  56  Pac.  779  (1899). 

(1901).  Colorado. — Brown  v.  Farmers'  H. 

Idaho. — Bardsly  v.  Boise  Irr.  &  L.  Canal  &  Reservoir  Co.,  26  Colo. 

Land  Co.,  8  Idaho,  155,  67  Pac.  428  66,  56  Pac.  183  (1899). 
(1901);  Shelby  v.  Farmers'  Coop-          J  Indiana  Natural  Gas  &  O.  Co. 

erative   Ditch  Co.,  10  Idaho,  732,  v.  State  ex  rel.,  162  Ind.  690,  71 

80  Pac.  222  (1905).  N.  E.  133  (1904). 

2  California, — M cDermont    v. 

34  [  529  ] 


§§  654,  655  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

disposition  of  the  irrigation  cases  discussed  in  the  last 
paragraph.  Logical  though  it  may  be,  it  seems  to  the 
writer  to  be  lacking  in  appreciation  of  the  situation  as  a 
whole.  A  rule  which  may  result  in  satisfactory  service 
to  none,  not  even  to  the  applicant  in  question,  is  hardly 
consistent  with  public  service  for  all.  Certainly  where 
the  supply  now  available  is  not  sufficient  to  meet  the 
proper  demands  of  present  customers,  it  would  seem  that 
later  applicants  could  not  demand  the  reduction  of  the 
takings  of  older  customers.1 

§  654.  Service  dependent  on  water  power. 

Where  a  service  is  undertaken  generally,  as  the  supply 
of  electricity  to  a  city  for  illumination,  although  the  chief 
reliance  of  the  company  is  upon  a  water  power,  neverthe- 
less where  it  undertakes  the  delivery  of  constant  current, 
it  should  provide  itself  with  auxiliary  power.2  But  where 
a  company  undertakes  impliedly  no  more  than  the  trans- 
mutation of  water  power  into  electric  energy  in  the  sense 
that  it  only  undertakes  the  delivery  of  such  amount  of 
electricity  as  its  water  power  may  produce,  it  will  not  be 
liable  for  failure  to  supply  energy  consequent  upon  the 
variations  in  the  flow  of  the  river.3 

Topic  B.  Inevitable  Accidents 

§  655.  Convulsions  of  nature. 

One  of  the  characteristic  defenses  in  the  law  of  public 
callings  generally  is  the  happening  of  an  accident  without 
the  intervention  of  human  action.4  Of  this  so-called  act 

1  State  ex  rel.  v.  Consumers'  Gas      Gas   Co.,   23   Pa.   Super.   Ct.   339 
Trust  Co.,  157  Ind.  345,  61  N.  E.      (1903). 

674,  55   L.  R.  A.  245    (1901);  In-  3  See  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me. 

diana  Natural  &  111.   Gas  Co.   v.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  70  L.  R.  A.  472,  109 

State  ex  rel.,  158  Ind.  516,  63  N.  E.  Am.  St.  Rep.  526  (1905). 

220,  57  L.  R.  A.  761  (1901),  accord.  *  See,  for  examples  of  this,  Slater 

2  Compare  Boal  v.  Citizens'  Nat.  v.  South  Carolina  Ry.  Co.,  29  S.  C. 

[530] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  656 

of  God,  convulsions  of  nature  such  as  earthquakes  and 
landslides  are  perhaps  the  most  striking  examples.  This 
defense  of  act  of  God  comes  up  principally  as  a  defense 
after  service  has  been  undertaken;  and  it  is  there  discussed 
chiefly  in  this  treatise.1  But  it  is  equally  a  defense  for 
refusing  to  undertake  further  service  upon  usual  terms 
during  the  time  that  the  disturbance  affects  the  situation. 
A  carrier  is  not  only  excused  for  loss  of  goods  in  his  hands 
by  a  convulsion  of  nature,  but  if  his  communications  are 
interrupted  he  is  excused  from  not  rendering  proper  serv- 
ice to  new  applicants  at  that  time. 

§  656.  Storms  and  floods. 

Similarly  extraordinary  weather  conditions  excuse  not 
only  defaults  in  the  service,  but  justify  suspension  of 
service  as  well.  Storms  of  unusual  violence,  unexpected 
floods  from  unusual  rains,  are  prominent  examples  of 
natural  forces  which  may  excuse  default  in  a  service  al- 
ready undertaken,  unless  the  carrier  is  negligent  in  the 
matter.2  A  fortiori  such  phenomena  would  justify  a  re- 

96,  6  S.  E.  936  (1888),  and  Gleeson          Illinois.— Wald  v.  Pittsburg,  C., 

v.  Virginia  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  140  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  162  111.  545, 

U.  S.  435,  35  L.  ed.  458,  11  Sup.  Ct.  44  N.  E.  888,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  332, 

859  (1889).    See  §§  978  et  seq.,  infra.  35  L.  R.  A.  356  (1896). 

1  See,  for  instances  of  this,  The          Iowa. — Green  Wheeler  Shoe  Co. 
Charles  Nelson,  149  Fed.  846  (1906)  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  130 
and  Blythe  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Iowa,  123,  106  N.  W.  498  (1906). 
Co.,  15  Colo.  333/25  Pac.  702,  11          Minnesota.— Bibb    Broom    Corn 
L.  R.  A.  615,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  403  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
(1891).  94  Minn.  269,  102  N.  W.  709,  69 

2  Leading  cases  for  this  general  L.  R.  A.  509  (1905). 

doctrine  are:  Nebraska. — Wabash  Ry.   Co.   v. 

United  States— Empire  State  C.  Sharpe,  76  Neb.  424,   107  N.  W. 

Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  758,  124  Am.  St.  Rep.  823  (1906). 
210  U.  S.  1,  52  L.  ed.  931,  28  Sup.          Pennsylvania. — Long  v.  Pennsyl- 

Ct.  Rep.  607  (1907).  vania  R.  R.  Co.,  147  Pa.  343,  23 

Alabama.— Smith  &  Co.  v.  West-  Atl.  459, 14  L.  R.  A.  741,  30  Am.  St. 

ern  Ry.  of  Ala.,  91  Ala.  455,  8  So.  Rep.  732  (1892). 
754,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  929  (1890).  See  further  §§  980-981  et  seq. 

[531] 


§  657  J          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

fusal  to  undertake  further  service  so  long  as  the  disturb- 
ance seriously  affects  the  situation.  In  a  recent  case  ! 
of  this  sort  a  connecting  carrier  expressly  refused  to  re- 
ceive certain  cars  loaded  with  freight  placed  upon  its 
connecting  track  because  the  Missouri  River  was  over- 
flowing the  freight  yards  and  further  rise  was  obviously 
imminent.  Said  the  appellate  court:  "In  this  instance 
defendant's  tracks  were  threatened  with  inundation  from 
an  impending  and  unprecedented  flood  of  water,  which 
finally  culminated  in  great  disaster  to  railroads  and  ship- 
ments and  interruption  of  all  kinds  of  transportation  for 
several  days.  Under  such  conditions,  defendant  had  the 
right  to  refuse  plaintiff's  property  in  order  to  avoid  li- 
ability for  its  loss  or  damage  which  was  then  threatened. 
The  flood  was  of  such  a  character  as  to  fall  properly  within 
the  legal  definition  of  an  act  of  God,  and  such  was  a  suffi- 
cient excuse  for  the  defendant  in  refusing  plaintiff's  ship- 
ment." 

§  657.  Electrical  disturbance. 

Electrical  disturbances  which  with  our  present  knowl- 
edge are  all  but  unforeseen,  and  against  which  sufficient 
protection  in  the  present  state  of  the  art  is  very  difficult, 
will  often  excuse  a  telephone  company  or  a  telegraph 
company  for  suspending  service.2  The  whole  situation 
is  elaborately  worked  out  in  one  case  thus: 3  " Under  these 

1  Gray  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  119  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Mont.  297,  72  Pac. 

Mo.  App.  144,   149,   95  S.  W.  983  642  (1903). 

(1906).      See    also    Empire    State  2  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Cattle  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Birge-Forbes  Co.,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

Ry.  Co.,  135  Fed.  135  (1905);  s.  c.  526,  69  S.  W.  181  (1902);  White  W. 

210  U.  S.  1,  51  L.  ed.  331,  27  Sup.  &  K.  v.  Western  Union  Telegraph 

Ct.  780  (1908).  Co.,  14  Fed,  710  (1882)  accord. 

But  even  where  the  obstruction  3  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
of  line  is  by  act  of  God,  a  carrier  Bierhans,  12  Ind.  App.  17,  39  N.  E. 
who  with  knowledge  of  this  accepts  881,  882  (1895);  Fleischner  v.  Pa- 
goods  without  notifying  the  shipper  cine  Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co. 
is  liable.  Nelson  v.  Gt.  Northern  (C.  C.),  55  Fed.  738  (1893),  accord. 
[532] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  658 

issues  we  think,  when  the  appellees  proved  the  delivery 
of  the  message  for  transmission,  and  the  failure  to  trans- 
mit and  deliver  the  same  to  sendee  within  the  time  re- 
quired, the  appellees  had  made  a  prima  facie  case  against 
appellant.  If  the  latter  could  avoid  liability  under  the 
issues  it  must  be  because  of  something  averred  by  way 
of  defense  in  the  answer.  Had  the  appellant  proved  that 
it  was  prevented  from  transmitting  the  message  on  ac- 
count of  the  storm,  this  would  not  be  a  complete  defense, 
according  to  the  former  holding  in  this  case.  The  appel- 
lant would  also  be  required  to  show  that  the  appellees  had 
notice  of  the  fact  that  the  appellant  was  thus  prevented, 
and  left  the  message  for  transmission  with  knowledge  of 
the  disturbing  atmospheric  conditions.  All  this  is  by 
way  of  defense,  and  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  same." 

§  658.  Normal  conditions. 

The  usual  variations  in  temperature,  the  usual  range 
of  velocity  in  winds,  the  expected  variations  in  precipita- 
tion, the  regular  progression  of  seasonal  changes — what- 
ever interruption  of  service  is  due  to  these  is  not  excused. 
For  the  person  professing  the  service  should  take  proper 
precautions  to  avoid  interference  with  the  regular  course 
of  business  by  such  conditions.  This  is  true  of  all  serv- 
ices of  which  there  is  general  profession.  Dew  upon 
the  tracks  does  not  excuse  a  railroad;  1  winds  do  not  ex- 
cuse a  boatman,2  cold  weather  does  not  excuse  a  gas  com- 
pany; 3  and  darkness  does  not  excuse  a  ferryman  4 — to 
put  four  examples.  In  this  last  case  of  the  ferryman  who 

1  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  2  Koretke  v.  Irwin  &  Co.,  100  Ala. 

Truskett,  2  Ind.  T.  633,  53  S.  W.  323,  13  So.  943  (1893). 

444  (1899);  s.  c.  44  C.  C.  A.  179,  3  Indiana  Natural  &  111.  Gas.  Co. 

104  Fed.  728;  s.  c.  186  U.  S.  480,  v.  Anthony,  26  Ind.  App.  307,  58 

46  L.  ed.   1259,  22  Sup.  Ct.  943  N.  E.  868  (1900). 

(1902).  4  Quoted  from  Pate  v.  Henry,  5 

Stew.  &  P.  (Ala.)  101  (1833). 

[533] 


§  659  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

refused  to  put  out  when  conditions  did  not  suit  him,  these 
distinctions  were  quaintly  put:  "The  defendant  dwells 
upon  the  great  hardship  of  requiring  persons  in  this  situa- 
tion to  expose  themselves  to  the  dangers  attendant  upon 
the  transportation  of  persons,  etc.,  during  excessive  dark- 
ness, the  prevalence  of  high  winds,  or  in  the  dead  hour  of 
the  night.  To  require  this  would  be  hard.  But  it  cer- 
tainly would  be  equally  so  to  permit  a  ferryman  to  stop 
a  person  traveling  upon  urgent  business  just  at  nightfall, 
when  there  might  be  a  moon  shining  rendering  it  almost 
as  light  as  it  would  be  of  a  cloudy  day,  merely  because 
he  chose  to  do  so." 

§  659.  Unavoidable  accidents. 

Loss  caused  by  inevitable  accident  subjects  no  one  in 
public  employment  to  liability;  even  the  carrier  of  goods 
is  not  liable  in  such  a  case.1  By  a  parity  of  reasoning 
such  accidents,  if  they  make  service  temporarily  imprac- 
ticable, might  well  justify  a  suspension  of  service.  This 
was  said  with  discrimination  in  a  Kentucky  case  2  where 
a  railroad  had  failed  to  furnish  freight  cars  promptly  upon 
request.  "It  seems  to  us  as  a  railroad  company  is  not 
nor  should  be  generally  held  to  more  than  reasonable 
diligence  and  care  in  furnishing  cars  for  transportation 
of  freight,  the  wreck  of  a  train  whereby  free  movement 
of  cars  is  temporarily  prevented,  ought  to  be  treated  as 
legal  excuse  for  delay  in  having  them  under  special  agree- 
ment at  a  particular  time  and  place." 


1  Goldey  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  2  Newport    News,    etc.,    Co.    v. 

Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  242,  72  Am.  Dec.  Mercer  &  W.,  96  Ky.  475,  29  S.  W. 

703(1858).    But  if  the  carrier  might  301(1985). 

by  any  possibility  have  avoided  the  See  also  Knight  v.  Quincy,  O.  & 

catastrophe  he  is  liable.    Central  of  K.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  Mo.  App.  311 

Ga.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  124  Ga.  322,  (1906). 
52  S.  E.  679  (1905). 

[534] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE          [  §§  660,  661 

Topic  C.  Insufficient  Facilities 

§  660.  When  accommodations  offered  are  exhausted. 

It  has  also  been  seen  that  in  certain  services  the  pro- 
fession to  serve  the  public  is  limited  to  the  premises 
devoted  to  the  public  service.  In  such  instances  it  is  a 
sufficient  excuse  that  the  accommodations  offered  are  ex- 
hausted. When  the  innkeeper's  accommodation  is  ex- 
hausted, he  may  refuse  to  receive  an  applicant  as  a  guest. 
If  all  his  sleeping  rooms  are  occupied,  he  need  not  admit 
any  more  guests.1  The  same  is  unquestionably  true  of 
others  who  go  no  further  in  their  profession  of  public  em- 
ployment than  to  devote  their  premises  to  public  use. 
Thus  warehousemen,  and  wharfingers,  to  cite  two  ex- 
amples, are  certainly  bound  to  serve  the  public  to  the 
extent  of  their  capacity;  but  it  seems  to  be  equally  clear 
that  they  have  an  excuse  for  refusing  further  service  after 
their  capacity  is  exhausted.2 

§  661.  Limitations  upon  the  carrier's  obligation. 

According  to  the  early  cases  also  the  carrier  was  only 
bound  to  accept  goods  if  he  had  room  in  his  pack.3  And 
this  remains  true  of  carriers  of  the  earlier  type,  such  as 
carters,  that  they  need  not  accept  anything  beyond  the 
capacity  of  their  vehicle.4  So  no  demands  may  be  made 
upon  carriers  of  special  freight  beyond  their  peculiar  equip- 
ment.6 And  as  it  has  recently  been  held  steamship  owners 
have  no  obligation  to  take  freight  after  their  vessel  is 

1  Browne  v.  Brandt,  1  K.  B.  696,      N.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  15  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  680 
71   L.  J.  K.  B.  367,  86  L.  T.  625,      (1864). 

50    W.  R.   654    (1902).    See   also  4  Tunnel   v.   Pettijohn,   2   Harr. 

State  v.  Steele,  106  N.  C.  766,  11  (Del.)  48  (1835).    See  also  Fish  v. 

S.  E.  478,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  573,  8  Chapman,  2  Ga.  349,  46  Am.  Dec. 

L.  R.  A.  516  (1890).  393  (1847). 

2  See  §  269,  supra.  5  Gillingham  v.  Ohio  River  Ry. 

3  Jackson  v.  Rogers,  2  Show,  327  Co.,  35  W.  Va.  588,  14  S.  E.  243,  29 
(1683).     See  also  In  re  Oxlade  v.  Am.  St.  Rep.  827,  14  L.  R.  A.  798 

(1891). 

[535] 


§  662  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

loaded  to  its  capacity.1  The  explanation  of  these  cases 
seems  to  be  that  the  profession  made  is  originally  limited 
to  the  devotion  simply  of  the  original  equipment  to  the 
public.  This  was  certainly  the  original  common  law  be- 
fore modern  conditions  were  anticipated. 

§  662.  Extended  obligation  of  the  railroads. 

The  great  carriers  of  modern  times  profess  a  general 
service  independent  of  particular  vehicles.  The  modern 
railroad  is  bound  to  use  due  diligence  to  provide  suffi- 
cient cars  to  carry  on  its  business,  and  in  the  ordinary 
case  it  cannot  excuse  itself  for  failure  to  carry  passengers 
or  goods  merely  by  showing  that  it  did  not  have  vehicles 
enough  to  transport  them.2  This  might  result  in  allowing 
the  carrier  to  urge  its  own  failure  in  its  duty  to  provide 
adequate  facilities  as  an  excuse.  It  is  however  true  that 
if  cars  are  needed  in  which  to  load  car  loads  of  goods, 
notice  of  that  fact  must  be  given  to  the  carrier  in  advance.3 
It  cannot  be  expected  to  provide  empty  cars  of  every 
sort  at  each  station  enough  to  meet  an  unexpected  de- 
mand; but  if  it  is  given  reasonable  notice  of  the  need  of 
such  a  car  he  must  supply  the  car.4  Default  in  these  ob- 
ligations subjects  the  carriers  to  an  inexorable  liability.5 

1  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Savannah  L.      S.  S.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 
W.  &  S.  Co.  (Ga.),  63  S.  E.  577,  20      104  Md.  693,  65  Atl.  425  (1906). 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  867  (1909).  Illinois—  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co. 

2  Kansas.— See  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.      v.    Erickson,    91    111.    613    (1879). 
Co.  v.  Nichols  &  Co.,  9  Kan.  235,          And  see  generally  §  801. 

72  Am.  Rep.  494  (1872).  *  Maryland.— Baltimore  &  O.  R. 

Missouri.— Tucker  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitehall,  104  Md.  295. 

R.  Co.,  50  Mo.  385  (1872).  64  Atl.  1033  (1906). 

North   Carolina. — H  a  n  s  1  e  y   v.  Wisconsin. — Ayres  v.  Chicago  & 

Jamesville  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  117  N.  Northwestern  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Wis. 

C.  565,  23  S.  E.  443,  53  Am.  St.  372,  37  N.  W.  432  (1888). 

Rep.  600  (1895).  And  see  generally  §  799. 

Texas. — Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  s  Yazoo  &  Mississippi  Valley  R. 

v.  Harris,  67  Tex.  166,  (1886).  R.  Co.  v.  Blum  Co.,  88  Miss.  180, 

And  see  generally  §  268.  40  So.  Rep.  748  (1906). 

3  Maryland. — Di  Giorgio  Imp.  &  See  also  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T. 

[536] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE 


§663 


§  663.  Facilities  unexpectedly  become  outgrown. 

This  duty  it  will  be  seen  is  relative,  not  absolute.  Where 
facilities  are  suddenly  outgrown  there  is  an  excuse  for 
not  having  sufficient  facilities  in  readiness  to  meet  new 
demands.  The  railroad  is  bound  to  provide  only  for  such 
a  demand  for  carriage  as  it  may  reasonably  foresee;  it 
cannot  be  required  to  be  able  at  any  time  to  care  for  an 
extraordinary  and  unexpected  demand  for  carriage.1  The 
unexpected  demand  rendering  it  impossible  after  its  ve- 
hicles are  all  in  use  to  carry  more  goods  or  passengers, 
will  excuse  it  for  refusing  to  receive  additional  goods  or 
passengers.2  Thus  a  rule  of  a  street  car  company  that 
no  passengers  would  be  taken  after  the  car  had  become 
overcrowded  is  plainly  reasonable.3  And  where  a  train 
has  become  dangerously  overcrowded  the  conductor  is 
justified  in  ordering  that  the  train  shall  be  run  without 


Ey.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  69  Miss.  421, 
13  So.  697  (1891). 

And  see  generally  §  800. 

1  See  generally  §§  798-802. 

2  See  particularly: 

United  States. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hampton,  162  Fed. 
693  (1908). 

Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Wynne  H.  &  C.  Co.,  81 
Ark.  373,  99  S.  W.  375  (1907). 

Georgia. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Atlanta  Land  &  S.  Co.  (Ga.),  68 
S.  E.  807  (1910). 

Indiana. — Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  141  Ind.  267, 
39  N.  E.  451,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  320 
(1894). 

Kansas. — Udall  Milling  Co.  v. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  82 
Kan.  256,  108  Pac.  137  (1910). 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Queen  City  Coal  Co.,  99  Ky. 
217,  35  S.  W.  626  (1896). 


Missouri. — Dawson  v.  Chicago  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Mo.  296  (1883). 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Neb.  593,  99 
N.  W.  309  (1904). 

New  York.— Wibert  v.  New  York 
&  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  245 
(1855). 

North  Carolina. — Branch  v.  Wil- 
mington &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  N.  C. 
347  (1877). 

South  Carolina. — Porcher  v. 
Northeastern  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Rich. 
Law,  181  (1867). 

Texas. — Wallace  v.  Pecos  &  N.  T. 
Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  110  S.  W. 
162  (1908). 

Wisconsin. — Ayres  v.  Chicago  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372,  37 
N.  W.  432,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  226 
(1888). 

3  Hanna  v.  Nassau  Electric  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  137,  45 
N.  Y.  Supp.  437  (1897). 

[537] 


§  664  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

stopping  according  to  schedule  at  a  station  where  more 
passengers  are  awaiting  it.1 

§  664.  Normal  fluctuations  of  business. 

It  follows  from  what  has  just  been  said  that  if  the  sud- 
den press  of  business  might  have  been  provided  against 
by  reasonable  diligence  there  is  no  such  excuse.  For  ex- 
ample, a  railroad  company  should  provide  more  cars  upon 
its  passenger  trains  if  it  should  have  been  anticipated 
that  more  passengers  than  usual  would  offer  themselves 
for  transportation.2  And  to  apply  the  same  rule  to  the 
transportation  of  freight,  the  carrier  performs  his  public 
duty  only  if  he  provides  for  the  normal  fluctuation  in  the 
offering  of  freight.3  The  sufficiency  of  such  accommoda- 
tions must  be  determined  by  the  number  of  passengers 
and  the  amount  of  freight  ordinarily  transported  on  the 
given  line  of  road.  The  duty  of  a  company  to  the  public 
in  this  respect  is  not  peculiar  to  any  season  of  the  year, 
or  to  any  particular  emergency  that  may  arise  in  the  course 
of  its  business.  The  amount  of  business  ordinarily  done 
by  the  road  is  the  proper  measure  of  its  obligation  to  fur- 
nish transportation.  This  requirement  it  must  be  pre- 
pared to  meet,  and  if  by  reason  of  a  sudden  and  unusual 
demand  for  stock  or  produce  in  the  market,  or  from  any 
other  cause  there  should  be  an  unexpected  influx  of  busi- 

1  Gordon  v.  Manchester  &  L.  R.      v.  Geraty,  166  Fed.  10,  91  C.  C.  A. 
R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  596,  13  Am.  Rep.      602  (1908). 

97  (1873).  Arkansas.— St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 

2  New  Hampshire. — Gordon      v.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wynne  Hoop  &  C.  Co., 
Manchester  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  81  Ark.  373,  99  S.  W.  375  (1907). 
H.  596,  13  Am.  Rep.  97  (1873).  Illinois.— Illinois  Central  Ry.  Co. 

North  Carolina.— Purcell  v.  Rich-  v.   Cobb,   C.    &    Co.,  64    111.   128 

mond  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  C.  414,  (1872). 

12  S.  E.  954,  12  L.  R.  A.  113,  and          Indiana.— Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P. 

note  (1891).  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  141  Ind.  267, 

3  United     States—  Trumbull     v.  39  N.  E.  451  (1894). 

Erickson,  97  Fed.  891,  38  C.  C.  A.          Mississippi.— Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R. 
536  (1899);  Atlantic  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.      R.  Co.  v.  Blum  Co.,  88  Miss.  180, 

[538] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  665 

ness  to  the  road,  this  obligation  will  be  fully  met  by  ship- 
ping such  stock  or  produce  in  the  order  of  time  in  which 
it  is  offered. 

§  665.  Division  of  facilities  among  applicants. 

As  will  be  seen  when  the  subject  of  facilities  is  reached, 
it  is  not  a  complete  disposition  of  the  problem  to  say  that 
when  the  facilities  available  prove  insufficient  to  meet 
unexpected  demands,  the  failure  to  handle  all  the  busi- 
ness offered  is  excused.  The  problem  still  remains — and 
it  is  a  difficult  one — as  to  the  basis  upon  which  the  avail- 
able facilities  shall  be  divided  among  the  persons  apply- 
ing. When  such  an  emergency  happens,  the  carrier  must 
accept  and  carry  things  of  a  higher  class  before  accepting 
and  carrying  those  of  a  lower  class.  In  general,  it  may 
be  said  that  preference  must  be  given  to  passengers.  Live 
stock  must  be  preferred  to  dead  freight.  And  among  the 
classes  of  dead  freight,  perishable  goods  must  be  accepted 
and  carried  before  nonperishable  goods.1  In  regard  to  the 

40  So.  748,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  432  See  generally  §§  798-802. 

(1906).  Upon   similar  principles  a   tele- 

Missouri. — Ballentine  v.  North  phone  company  must  expand  its 
Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  491,  93  Am.  facilities  to  meet  the  increasing  de- 
Dec.  315  (1867),  paraphrased  above.  mands  upon  its  service.  State  ex 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Chicago,  B.  rel.  v.  Citizens'  Telephone  Co.,  61 

&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Neb.  593,  99  N.  S.  C.  83,  39  S.  E.  257,  55  L.  R.  A. 

W.  309  (1904).  139,  85  Am.  St.  Rep.  870  (1901). 

New  York. — Tierney  v.  New  York  But  the  telephone  company  has  a 

C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  305  reasonable  time  granted  it  to  pro- 

(1879).  vide  additional  facilities  when  the 

North      Carolina. — Hansley      v.  growth   in    its   business   has   been 

Jamesville  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,   117  larger  than  it  ought  fairly  to  be  re- 

N.  C.  565,  23  S.  E.  443,  53  Am.  St.  quired  to  provide  against.     Cum- 

Rep.  600  (1895).  berland   Telephone   &   T.    Co.    v. 

South     Carolina.  —  Porcher     v.  Kelly,  160  Fed.  316,  87  C.  C.  A.  268 

Northeastern  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Rich.  (1908). 

Law,  181  (1867).  1  This  matter  is  fully  discussed 

Wisconsin. — Ayres  v.  Chicago  &  later:  see  §§  837,  842,  passim,  citing 

Northwestern  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Wis.  among  other  cases: 

372,  37  N.  W.  432  (1888).  Georgia— Southern   Ry.    Co.    v. 

[539] 


§666 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


distribution  of  facilities  for  shipments  of  the  same  class 
there  has  been  much  discussion  of  late.  The  earlier  view 
was  that  applicants  should  be  served  in  rotation  in  order 
of  their  application.  But  it  seems  to  be  agreed  in  recent 
years  that  there  should  be  a  proration  to  stations  first 
in  proportion  to  their  usual  business  and  at  stations  to 
shippers  in  proportion  to  their  average  business.1 

Topic  D.  Human  Obstacles 
§  666.  Enemy  forces. 
Another  immemorial  excuse  for  failure  in  performance 


Atlanta  Sand  &  S.  Co.  (Ga.),  68 
S.  E.  80  (1910). 

Illinois. — Michigan  C.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Curtis,  80  111.  324  (1875). 

Iowa. — Dixon  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  64  la.  531,  21  N.  W.  17, 
52  Am.  Rep.  460  (1884). 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Queen  City  Coal  Co.,  13  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  832  (1892). 

New  York. — Tierney  v.  New  York 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  305 
(1879). 

West  Virginia. — McGraw  v.  Bal- 
timore &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  W.  Va. 
361,  41  Am.  Rep.  696  (1881). 

England. — Briddon  v.  Great 
Northern  Ry.  Co.,  28  L.  J.  Ex.  51 
(1858). 

1  This  matter  is  fully  discussed 
later,  see  §§  850-857,  passim,  citing 
among  other  cases: 

United  States. — United  States  v. 
Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  109  Fed.  831 
(1901);  Harp  v.  Choctaw,  O.  &  G. 
Ry.  Co.,  118  Fed.  169  (1902); 
United  States  v.  West  Virginia 
Northern  Ry.  Co.,  125  Fed.  252 
(1903);  United  States  v.  Norfolk  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  138  Fed.  849  (1905); 
United  States  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry. 

[540] 


Co.,  143  Fed.  266,  74  C.  C.  A.  404 
(1906);  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pitcairn  Coal  Co.,  215  U.  S.  481,  30 
S.  Ct.  Rep.  164  (1910). 

Arkansas. — Choctaw,  Oklahoma 
&  Gulf  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  73  Ark. 
373,  84  S.  W.  502,  92  S.  W.  26 
(1904). 

Indiana. — Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  141  Ind.  267, 
39  N.  E.  451,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  320 
(1894). 

Massachusetts. — Swetland  v.  B. 
&  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  Mass.  276 
(1869). 

Minnesota. — Martin  v.  Gt.  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  110  Minn.  118,  124  N. 
W.  825  (1910). 

Missouri. — Ballentine  v.  North 
Missouri  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  491,  93 
Am.  Dec.  315  (1867). 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Neb.  593,  99 
N.  W.  309  (1904). 

New  York— Strough  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  App.  Div. 
584,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  30  (1904). 

Wisconsin. — Ayres  v.  Chicago  & 
Northwestern  Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372, 
37  N.  W.  432,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  226 
(1888). 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  667 

by  one  in  public  employment  is  the  interference  of  the 
King's  enemies.  In  so  far  as  public  service  is  interrupted 
by  enemy  forces  or  service  rendered  dangerous  by  enemy 
forces  there  is  plain  justification  l  for  suspension  of  serv- 
ice. Not  only  does  the  interference  of  the  public  enemy 
excuse  default  in  service  already  begun  but  it  justifies 
a  refusal  to  engage  in  a  service  in  which  the  risk  is  immi- 
nent. One  may  refuse  to  undertake  a  service  which  will 
lead  him  into  the  enemy's  lines  or  subject  him  to  the  dan- 
gers of  capture.2  Because  he  would  be  excused  if  the 
worst  should  happen  is  no  reason  why  he  should  be  called 
upon  to  take  the  risk. 

§  667.  Domestic  violence. 

It  would  seem  that  abstractly  the  problem  is  the  same 
whether  it  is  a  case  of  collision  with  a  foreign  power  or 
the  suppression  of  domestic  violence.  However  when 
it  is  a  question  of  excusing  a  carrier  from  whom  the  goods 
have  been  taken  or  in  whose  hands  the  goods  have  been 
destroyed  from  his  liability  as  an  insurer,  the  excuse  is 
limited  to  acts  of  a  public  enemy,  mere  domestic  violence 
furnishing  no  excuse.3  According  to  the  traditional  law 

1  Georgia. — Wallace   v.    Landers,      Hornberger,    77    111.    457    (1875) ; 
42    Ga.  486  (1871),  s.  c.,  50    Ga.      Phelps  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co., 
134  (1872).  94  111.  548  (1880). 

Kentucky. — Bland  v.  Adams  Ex-  See  generally  §  980,  infra. 

press  Co.,   1   Duval,  232,  85  Am.  But  if  the  railroad  continues  to 

Dec.  623  (1864).  accept  freight  with  knowledge  of  its 

New        Mexico. — Seligman        v.  situation  and  without  notifying  the 

Armijo,  1  N.  Mex.  459  (1870).  shipper  it   may  not  urge  this  ex- 

North     Carolina. — Patterson     v.  cuse  for  delay.    Illinois  Central  R. 

No.  Carolina  R.  R.  Co.,  64  N.  C.  R.  Co.  v.    Ashmead,    58   111.   487 

147  (1870).  (1871);  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co. 

Rhode  Island—  Hubbard  &  Co.  v.  v.  Cobb,  Christy  &  Co.,  64  111.  128 

Harnden  Express  Co.,  10  R.  I.  244  (1872). 

(1872).  3  United      States.— Sherman      v. 

Tennessee. — Southern  Express  Co.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  Fed.  Cas. 

v.  Womack,  1  Heisk.  256  (1870).  No.   12,769,   8  Wkly.   Notes  Cas. 

2  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  (Pa.)  269  (1880). 

[541] 


§  668  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

if  a  carrier  be  robbed  by  a  hundred  men  he  is  never  the 
more  excused.1  But  where  it  is  a  question  of  a  refusal 
to  accept  goods  or  of  a  delay  in  performing  their  trans- 
portation, it  is  as  good  an  excuse  that  rioters  have  inter- 
rupted service  or  made  it  dangerous  as  that  enemies  have 
done  it.2  But  it  seems  according  to  certain  authorities 
at  least  that  the  carrier  must  judge  at  his  peril  as  to  the 
reality  of  the  necessity  of  suspending  service.3 

§  668.  Refusal  to  receive  because  of  strike. 

Since  the  carrier  undertakes  to  carry,  and  to  provide 
vehicles  and  servants  for  that  purpose,  he  is  bound  to  do 
so;  and  he  is  therefore  remiss  in  the  performance  of  his 
undertaking  if  for  any  reason  he  fails  to  provide  sufficient 
equipment.  The  fact  that  he  is  prevented  from  doing 
so  by  a  strike  of  his  employe's  is,  therefore,  no  defense 
to  him.  The  most  important  case  upon  the  question  is 
probably  People  v.  New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  Railroad 
Co.,4  where  a  mandamus  was  granted  against  a  railroad 

Arkansas. — Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  burg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Co.  v.  Nevill,  60  Ark.  375,  30  S.  W.  Chicago,  242  111.  178,  89  N.  E.  1022 

425,  28  L.R.  A.  80(1895).  (1909). 

Pennsylvania. — Lang  v.  Pennsyl-  Minnesota. — See  Fewings  v.  Men- 

vania  R.  R.  Co.,  154  Pa.  342,  26  denhall,  83  Minn.  237,  86  N.  W.  96, 

Atl.  370,  20  L.  R.  A.  360,  35  Am.  St.  55  L.  R.  A.  713.    See  also  s.  c.,  88 

Rep.  846  (1893).  Minn.  336,  93  N.  W.  127,  97  Am. 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  St.  Rep.  519,  60  L.  R.  A.  601  (1903). 

v.  Levi,  76  Tex.  337,  13  S.  W.  191,  New    York.— Geismer    v.    Lake 

8  L.  R.  A.  323  (1889).  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  102  N.  Y. 

See  generally  §  981,  infra.  563,  7  N.  E.  828,  55  Am.  Rep.  837 

'See    Mora    v.  Slue,  1  Mod.  85  (1886). 

(1671),  and  Edwards  v.  Sherratt,  1  Pennsylvania. — Hall  v.  Pennsyl- 

East.  604  (1801).  vania   R.   R.    Co.,    14   Phila.   414 

*  Kentucky.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  (1880). 

R.  Co.  v.  Bell,  13  Ky.  L.  Rep.  393  3  Railroad  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  49 

(1891).  Ohio  St.  489,  32  N.  E.  476,  34  Am. 

Illinois.— Indianapolis      &      St.  St.  Rep.  579  (1892). 

Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Juntgen,  10  111.  4  28  Hun  (N.  Y.),  543  (1883). 

App.  295  (1881).     See  also  Pitts-  See  also  Blackstock  v.  New  York 

[542] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  669 

which  had  partially  suspended  its  business  temporarily 
because  of  a  strike  for  higher  wages.  In  the  course  of  an 
elaborate  opinion  upon  public  service  in  general  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Davis  said:  " These  facts  reduce  the  question  to  this: 
can  railroad  corporations  refuse  or  neglect  to  perform 
their  public  duties  upon  a  controversy  with  their  em- 
ploye's over  the  cost  or  expense  of  doing  them?  We  think 
this  question  admits  of  but  one  answer.  The  excuse  has 
in  law  no  validity.  The  duties  imposed  must  be  discharged 
at  whatever  cost.  They  cannot  be  laid  down  or  aban- 
doned or  suspended  without  the  legally-expressed  consent 
of  the  State.  The  trusts  are  active,  potential,  and  im- 
perative and  must  be  executed  until  lawfully  surrendered, 
otherwise  a  public  highway  of  great  utility  is  closed  or 
obstructed  without  any  process  recognized  by  law."  1 

§  669.  Refusal  to  receive  because  of  violent  strike. 

When,  however,  the  carrier  has  provided  sufficient 
vehicles  and  servants  to  carry,  and  is  prevented  from 
proceeding  by  the  violence  of  a  mob  over  which  he  has 
no  control,  he  is  excused  from  his  duties  with  respect  to 

&  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  48,  75  Am.  Heights  R.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Dec.  372  (1859),  to  the  same  effect.  996,  14  N.  Y.  Misc.  208  (1895). 

1  The  general  rule  in  all  public  Texas. — International  &  G.  N. 

services  seems  to  be  that  a  mere  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tisdale,  74  Tex.  8,  11  S. 

strike  of  its  own  employes  fur-  W.  900,  4L.  R.  A.  545  (1889).  Mis- 

nishes  no  excuse  for  discontinuance  souri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Levi  (Tex.), 

of  service  "for  even  one  hour."  14  S.  W.  1062  (1889). 

Georgia. — Central  R.  R.  &  Bank-  But  see  Murphey  Hardware  Co. 

ing  Co.  v.  Georgia  Fruit  &  V.  Ex-  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  150  N.  C.  703, 

change,  91  Ga.  389,  17  S.  E.  904  64  S.  E.  873,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

(1893).  1200  (1909),  holding  that  a  ma- 

Illinois. — Pittsburg,  Ft.  Wayne  chinists'  strike  which  has  got  be- 

&  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazen,  84  111.  36,  yond  the  railroad's  control  may  be 

25  Am.  Rep.  422  (1876).  an  excuse  for  not  serving  promptly. 

Indiana. — Bartlett  v.  Pittsburg,  Mere  proof  that  there  is  a  strike 

C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  94  Ind.  281  upon  the  defendant's  road  is  no 

(1883).  excuse  for  failing  to  furnish  cars  as 

New  York. — Loader  v.  Brooklyn  it  may  be  a  "slight  affair";  but  one 

[543] 


§  670  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

transportation. 1  Thus  in  Lake  Shore  and  Michigan  South- 
ern Railway  Company  v.  Bennett,2  the  suit  was  brought 
by  the  shipper  against  the  carrier  for  damages  to  live 
stock,  caused  by  delay  in  transportation  beyond  the  regu- 
lar time.  It  was  shown  that  a  violent  strike  was  in  prog- 
ress throughout  the  system,  and  that  mobs  held  up  the 
traffic,  delaying  the  movement  of  freights.  The  violence 
could  not  be  held  in  check  by  the  public  authorities.  The 
court,  therefore,  held  the  carrier  excused.  On  petition 
for  rehearing,  Hammon,  J.,  said:  "The  appellee's  loss 
resulted  from  causes  over  which  the  appellant  had  no 
control,  and  against  which  no  care  or  prudence  could  have 
provided;  and  the  special  findings  show  that  the  appellee's 
property  had  all  the  care  and  attention  that,  under  the 
circumstances,  an  ordinarily  careful  man  would  have 
bestowed  upon  his  own  property." 

§  670.  Situation  when  sympathetic  strike. 
Even  when  a  railroad  is  faced  by  a  sympathetic  strike, 

of  such  magnitude  as  to  tie  up  the  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  14  Mont.  381,  36 

whole  system  would  be.    Southern  Pac.  458  (1894). 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Sand  &  S.  Co.  New    York. — Geismer    v.    Lake 

(Ga.),  68  S.  E.  807  (1910).  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  102  N.  Y. 

1  Kentucky.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  563,  7  N.  E.  828,  55  Am.  Rep.  837 

R.  Co.  v.  Bell,  13  Ky.  L.  Rep.  393  (1886). 

(1891).  Pennsylvania. — Hall  v.  Pennsyl- 

Ittinois. — Indianapolis      &      St.  vania   R.    R.    Co.,    14    Phila.    414 

Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Juntgen,  10  111.  (1880). 

App.  295  (1881).  Texas— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

Indiana.— Pittsburgh,   C.   &   St.  v.  Levi,  76  Tex.  337, 13  S.  W.  191,  8 

L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hollowell,  65  Ind.  L.  R.  A.  323,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  45 

188,  32  Am.  Rep.  63  (1879).  (1890). 

Minnesota. — See  Fewings  v.  Men-  2  89  Ind.  457  (1883). 

denhall,  83  Minn.  237,  86  N.  W.  See  also: 

96,  55  L.  R.  A.  713  (1901).     See  Mississippi— Kansas  City,  M.  & 

also  s.  c.,  88  Minn.  336,  93  N.  W.  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer,  72  Miss. 

127,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  519,  60  L.  R.  491,  17  So.  168  (1894). 

A.  601  (1903).  New  York— Steiger  v.  Erie  Ry. 

Montana.— State  ex  rel.  v.  Great  Co.,  5  Hun,  345  (1875). 

[544] 


SUSPENDING  SERVICE  [  §  671 

if  it  should  call  upon  its  employes  to  move  the  cars  ten- 
dered by  a  railroad  against  which  a  boycott  has  been  de- 
clared, it  cannot  refuse  to  accept  such  freight.1  As  Mr. 
Justice  Graham  said  in  granting  a  mandatory  injunction 
in  such  a  case: 2  "No  temporary  inconveniences  to  the  de- 
fendant company  or  the  public  which  it  serves  are  in 
my  judgment,  for  one  moment  to  be  compared  with  the 
fatal  consequences  which  must  ensue  from  a  precedent 
by  which  it  would  be  established  that  a  railway  company 
may  in  violation  of  the  law  of  the  land  refuse  to  receive 
and  have  the  cars  of  a  connecting  line  at  the  command 
of  any  irresponsible  persons,  or  from  its  own  belief  and 
apprehension  that  its  employes  will  leave  its  service  and 
stop  the  operation  of  its  lines.  Such  an  excuse  as  this  is 
wholly  inadmissible  and  must  be  set  aside." 

§  671.  How  employes  of  the  carriers  are  affected. 

In  the  present  state  of  the  law,  it  may  be  seen  that 
those  that  conduct  a  public  service  are  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage in  dealing  with  their  employes.  If  the  law  be 
left  that  the  employers  are  under  a  duty  to  serve  every 
instant  even  if  the  employe's  quit  work  without  notice, 
grave  injustice  may  result.  But  if  the  law  would  go  fur- 
ther and  enforce  some  duty  upon  the  employes  in  the 
premises,  this  impartial  attitude  would  preserve  the  equi- 
librium. And,  indeed,  it  is  no  more  difficult  to  declare 
that  employes  must  complete  their  term  of  service  in 
a  reasonable  way  than  it  is  to  compel  the  employers  to 
continue  to  provide  adequate  service.  Nor  is  it  more 
harsh  to  apply  the  coercive  processes  of  the  courts  to  en- 
Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  2  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
v.  Georgia  F.  &  V.  Exchange,  91  Ga.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  34 
389,  17  S.  E.  904  (1893).  See  also  Fed.  481  (1888).  The  same  doctrine 
Murphey  Hardware  Co.  v.  South-  is  expressed  in  Toledo  A.  A.  &  N. 
ern  Ry.  Co.,  150  N.  C.  703,  64  S.  E.  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  Ry. 
873,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1200  (1909).  Co.,  54  Fed.  746  (1893). 

35  [  545  ] 


§  671  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

force  those  obligations  in  one  case  than  in  the  other.1 
This  view  of  the  matter  is  suggested  by  Toledo,  Ann  Arbor 
and  North  Michigan  Railway  v.  Pennsylvania  Railway.2 

1  See  Thomas  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.          2  54  Fed.  746  (1893). 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  62  Fed.  803  (1894). 


[546] 


CHAPTER  XX 

PROMOTION   OF  ITS  BUSINESS   INTERESTS 

§  680.  Business  policies  inconsistent  with  public  employment. 

Topic  A.  Unfair  Competition 
§  681.  Exclusive  custom  cannot  be  demanded. 

682.  Partial  service  already  rendered  by  rival  carrier. 

683.  Telephone  companies  cannot  forbid  rival  installation. 

684.  Exclusive  regulations  by  the  associated  press. 

685.  Status  of  exclusive  contracts. 

686.  Refusal  to  take  another's  customers. 

Topic  B.  Contracts  Opposed  to  Public  Service 
§  687.  Contract  not  to  deal  with  other  applicants. 

688.  Special  contract  for  priority. 

689.  Contract  to  exclude  others  from  simultaneous  service. 

690.  Exclusive  contracts  with  an  intermediate  service. 

691.  Effect  of  restrictive  covenants  in  conveyances. 

692.  Contract  limitations  upon  licensees. 

693.  Contract  for  division  of  territory. 

694.  Pooling  agreements  usually  void. 

Topic  C.  Refusal  of  the  Demands  of  a  Rival 
§  695.  Shipments  made  by  a  rival. 

696.  No  obligation  to  carry  packed  parcels. 

697.  Competitor  must  be  taken  as  a  passenger. 

698.  Railroad  not  compelled  to  give  running  rights. 

699.  Obligation  to  give  trackage. 

700.  Connections  with  another  telephone  system. 

701.  Utilization  of  the  waterworks  of  another. 

702.  Gas  works  not  bound  to  supply  rivals. 

Topic  D.  Promotion  of  a  Collateral  Business 
§  703.  Right  to  engage  in  a  collateral  business. 

704.  Telephone  company  favoring  its  messenger  service. 

705.  Municipality  promoting  its  water  service. 

706.  Electric  company  favoring  its  wiring  department. 

707.  Railroad  cutting  its  own  rates  for  itself. 

[547 


§§  680,  681  ]    PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  708.  Grain  elevators  storing  their  own  grain. 

709.  Constitutionality  of  statutory  prohibition. 

710.  Argument  for  radical  law. 

§  680.  Business  policies  inconsistent  with  public  em- 
ployment. 

New  conditions  seem  to  us  often  to  create  new  laws, 
however  much  we  may  be  told  that  nothing  more  is  hap- 
pening than  an  orderly  evolution  by  the  application  of 
existing  rules  to  present  circumstances.  In  the  case  of 
the  public  service  companies,  the  increase  in  their  power 
has  led  to  such  development  in  the  law  as  to  work  an 
apparant  revolution  for  which  many  people  were  not 
prepared.  We  have  been  so  used  to  the  many  liberties 
permitted  those  who  carry  on  a  private  business  that  it 
has  not  been  seen  how  fundamentally  different  are  the 
limitations  upon  public  calling.  Those  who  conduct  a 
private  business  may  adopt  such  policies  as  will  produce 
the  greatest  profits;  but  those  who  profess  a  public  em- 
ployment must  not  do  anything  inconsistent  with  their 
public  duty.  Accordingly,  many  policies  for  getting  pa- 
trons away  from  others  or  protecting  an  established  cus- 
tom from  competition  which  are  legal  enough  in  private 
business  must  be  held  illegal  in  public  business. 

Topic  A.  Unfair  Competition 

§  681.  Exclusive  custom  cannot  be  demanded. 

From  a  business  standpoint  it  may  be  an  effective  policy 
at  times  to  refuse  to  have  any  dealings  with  a  customer 
who  persists  in  patronizing  a  rival  also.  But  in  the  case  of 
public  services  such  a  policy  would  seem  to  be  in  the  face 
of  the  public  duty  to  serve  all  that  apply.  For  example, 
a  railroad  must  take  the  freight  of  all  who  tender  it  prop- 
erly, regardless  of  whether  the  shipper  at  times  employs 
another  carrier  to  get  his  goods  to  market.  In  one  lead- 
[548] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  682 

ing  case,  Chicago  and  Alton  Railroad  Company  v.  Suf- 
fern,1  it  appeared  that  defendants  having  connection  with 
a  switch  to  plaintiff's  mine,  disconnected  it  and  refused 
to  supply  cars  and  receive  coal  from  plaintiff,  because  he 
allowed  another  road  to  connect  with  the  switch.  The 
Illinois  court  held  that  mandamus  would  issue  to  compel 
the  connection,  saying  in  effect  that  a  railroad  cannot 
refuse  to  receive  coal  over  its  road  because  shippers  send 
over  another  road  also.  Such  a  company  it  was  said  must 
carry  all  freight  offered,  if  legal  charges  are  paid.  Since 
fair  competition  between  roads  is  for  public  interest,  if 
a  road  could  do  so  it  would  establish  the  most  odious  sort 
of  monopoly.2 

§  682.  Partial  service  akeady  rendered  by  rival. 

It  will  sometimes  be  found  that  a  carrier  is  refusing 
to  complete  a  service  for  an  applicant  who  has  already 
received  a  part  of  the  service  desired  from  a  rival.  Where 
the  applicant  is  demanding  no  more  than  any  other  mem- 
ber of  the  public  might  demand,  refusal  of  the  request 
cannot  be  justified  upon  any  such  ground  as  that  the 
enforcement  of  this  policy  may  result  in  the  getting  the 
whole  of  the  business  for  the  carrier.  In  one  of  the  lead- 
ing cases  in  the  law  of  passenger  carriers,  Bennett  v.  Dut- 

1  129  111.  274,  21  N.  E.  824  (1889).  Rep.    589    (1892);    Fitzgerald    v. 

2  Now  that  the  law  against  dis-  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Vt.  169, 
crimination  has  been  developed  it  22  All.  76,  13  L.  R.  A.  70  (1890). 
is  seen  that  there  can  be  no  legal  But  before  there  was  any  princi- 
justification  for  a  carrier  who  makes  pie  against  discrimination  a  differ- 
lower  rates  to  particular  shippers  in  ence  in  rates  might  be  made  for  this 
order  to  get  them  away  from  a  rival  as  well  as  for  any  other  rational 
carrier.     See  especially  Wright  v.  reason.     See   especially   Lough   v. 
United  States,  167  U.  S.  512,  42  L.  Outerbridge,  143  N.  Y.  271,  38  N. 
ed.  258,   17  Sup.  Ct.  822   (1897);  E.  292,  25  L.  R.  A.  674,  42  Am.  St. 
Menacho   v.   Ward,   27   Fed.   529  Rep.    712    (1894);  Ragan  &  B.  v. 
(1886);  Brundred  v.  Rice,  49  Ohio  Aiken,  9  Lea,  609,  42  Am.  Rep.  684 
St.  640,  32  N.  E.  169,  34  Am.  St.  (1882). 

[549] 


§682 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


ton,1  it  appeared  that  a  through  line  of  coaches  which 
ran  from  A  to  C  through  B,  was  refusing  to  take  into  its 
coaches  at  B  for  transportation  to  C,  passengers  who  had 
come  up  from  A  to  B  on  the  same  day  by  a  rival  line  which 
ran  only  from  A  to  B.  The  court  held  this  to  be  a  plain 
violation  of  public  duty;  but  it  conceded  that  seats  might 
be  held  in  the  second  coach  for  through  passengers.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  order  to  further  its  business  interests 
in  this  respect  a  carrier  may  refuse  to  do  anything  for 
applicants  who  have  received  partial  service  from  a  rival 
which  it  is  not  plainly  its  public  duty  to  do.  Thus  a  trans- 
portation line  may  accept  goods  without  requiring  pre- 
payment from  one  connection  with  which  it  is  associated 
and  demand  prepayment  from  a  rival  connection;  and 
more  plainly  still,  it  may  as  a  favor  to  an  affiliated  con- 
nection advance  to  it  the  charges  already  incurred  while 
refusing  to  do  this  for  the  rival.2 


1 10  N.  H.  481  (1839). 

So  a  carrier  of  freight  cannot 
make  a  higher  charge  against  goods 
which  do  not  come  to  the  connect- 
ing point  by  the  line  with  which  it  is 
associated.  Samuels  v.  Louisville  & 
N.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Fed.  57  (1887).  See 
also  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
New  Era  Milling  Co.  (Kan.),  100 
Pac.  273  (1909). 

As  the  law  of  discrimination  is 
now  developed  it  is  held  that  a 
lower  rate  cannot  be  made  for  tak- 
ing goods  from  B  to  C  which  came 
from  A  whence  a  competitive  line 
to  C  ran.  Bigbee  &  W.  R.  P.  Co.  v. 
Mobile  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  Fed.  545 
(1893).  See  also  Alabama,  etc., 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commission,  86 
Miss.  667  (1908). 

2  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Adams  Exp.  Co.,  22  Fed.  32  (1884); 

[550] 


Little  Rock  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Fed. 
400  (1894);  Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.,  61  Fed.  158,  9  C.  C.  A.  409 
(1984);  Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  63  Fed. 
775,  11  C.  C.  A.  417  (1894);  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miami  S.  S. 
Co.,  86  Fed.  407,  30  C.  C.  A.  142 
(1898);  Southern  Indiana  Exp.  Co. 
v.  United  States  Exp.  Co.,  92  Fed. 
1022,  35  C.  C.  A.  172  (1899). 

It  is  otherwise  provided  by  stat- 
ute in  some  States  now;  and  stat- 
utes are  held  to  be  so  in  furtherance 
of  the  highest  development  of  the 
law  calling  for  the  utmost  im- 
partiality in  public  service  as  to  be 
constitutional.  American  Exp.  Co. 
v.  Southern  Indiana  Exp.  Co.,  167 
Ind.  292,  78  N.  E.  1021  (1906). 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §§  683,  684 

§  683.  Telephone  companies  cannot  forbid  rival  instal- 
lation. 

The  general  principle  now  under  examination  that  a 
public  service  company  must  serve  all  who  apply  whether 
they  are  dealing  with  a  rival  or  not,  is  well  illustrated  in 
the  recent  case  of  State  ex  rel.  Gwynn  v.  Citizens'  Tele- 
phone Company  1  the  facts  of  which  sufficiently  appear 
in  this  significant  passage  from  the  opinion  of  Chief  Jus- 
tice Mclver.  "It  seems  to  us  that  the  respondent,  after 
offering  to  the  public  its  telephone  system  for  the  trans- 
mission of  news,  would  have  no  more  right  to  refuse  to 
furnish  the  relator  its  facilities  for  the  transmission  of 
news  unless  he  would  agree  not  to  use  the  Bell  telephone 
system  in  operation  in  the  same  city,  but  use  exclusively 
respondent's  system,  than  a  railway  company  would  have 
to  refuse  to  transport  the  goods  of  a  shipper  unless  such 
shipper  would  agree  to  patronize  its  line  exclusively,  and 
not  give  any  of  its  business  to  any  competing  railway 
line."  2 

§  684.  Exclusive  regulations  by  the  Associated  Press. 

In  one  of  the  leading  cases  3  in  public  service  law  in 
recent  times  action  was  brought  by  a  newspaper  company 
against  the  Associated  Press  for  threatening  to  cut  off 
the  news  service  which  the  newspaper  company  was  re- 
ceiving under  a  contract  providing  that  the  newspaper 
company  would  not  deal  with  any  other  association  whose 
news  service  the  Associated  Press  should  decide  to  be 
antagonistic.  The  plaintiff  having  taken  news  from  a 
rival  news  bureau  upon  the  list  of  those  declared  antag- 

1  61  S.  C.  83,  39  S.  E.  257,  55  L.  was  forced  to  enter  into  void  as 
R.  A.   139,  85  Am.  St.  Rep.  870  contrary  to  public  policy. 
(1901).  3  Inter-Ocean  Publishing  Co.   v. 

2  See    also    Gwynn    v.    Citizens'  Associated  Press,   184  111.  438,  56 
Telephone  Co.,  69  S.  C.  434,  48  S.  E.  N.  E.  822,  48  L.  R.  A.  568,  75  Am. 
460,  67  L.  R.  A.  Ill  (1904),  holding  St.  Rep.  184  (1900). 

the  contract  which  the  subscriber 

[551] 


§  685  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

onistic  was  refused  further  service  by  the  Associated  Press. 
The  court  decided  that  the  complaint  of  the  newspaper 
owners  should  not  have  been  dismissed.  Justice  Phillips 
having  decided  that  the  business  was  public  in  character, 
not  private  as  had  been  contended,  proceeded  to  apply  the 
peculiar  law  of  public  service  to  the  situation  in  hand, 
"The  character  of  appellee's  business  is  not  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  contract  which  it  made  respecting  the  li- 
abilities which  would  attend  it  but  by  the  nature  of  the 
business,  its  fixed  legal  character  growing  out  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  that  business  is  conducted,  and  the  purpose 
of  its  creation.  The  legal  character  of  the  corporation 
and  its  duties  cannot  be  disregarded  because  of  any  stipu- 
lation incorporated  in  a  contract  that  it  should  not  be 
liable  to  discharge  a  public  duty.  Its  obligation  to  serve 
the  public  is  not  one  resting  on  contract,  but  grows  out 
of  the  fact  that  it  is  in  the  discharge  of  a  public  duty,  or  a 
private  duty  which  has  been  so  conducted  that  a  public 
interest  has  attached  thereto."  1 

§  685.  Status  of  exclusive  contracts. 

Exclusive  contracts  cannot  be  imposed  upon  applicants 
against  their  will,  nor  always  enforced  against  them  if  they 
have  entered  into  them.  This  is  certainly  true  when  the 
exclusive  feature  might  deprive  the  contracting  party  of 
necessary  service  which  the  original  company  cannot  ade- 
quately furnish  him.  Thus  in  a  Minnesota  case  2  it  was 
held  that  a  covenant  by  a  quarryman  that  his  freight 
shall  go  exclusively  by  one  railroad  does  not  run  with 
the  land  to  a  purchaser  of  the  quarry,  even  against  one 
who  has  notice  thereof.  In  the  South  Carolina  case 3  al- 

1  State  v.  Associated  Press,  159  2  Kettle  River  R.  R.  Co.  v.  East- 
Mo.  410,  60  S.  W.  91,  81  Am.  St.  ern  Ry.  Co.  of  Minn.,  41  Minn.  461, 
Rep.  368  (1900),  is  contra  on  the  43   N.  W.  469,   6   L.   R.   A.    Ill 
ground   that  the  business  was  not  (1889^. 
public  in  character.  »  Gwynn  v.  Citizens'  Telephone 

[552] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  685 

ready  discussed  in  this  chapter  service  was  refused  a  cus- 
tomer who  had  subscribed  to  a  rival  telephone  in  breach 
of  his  exclusive  contract  with  the  original  company.  But 
the  court  finally  held  the  contract  against  public  policy, 
and  the  customer  not  liable  therefore  for  its  breach.  It 
is  therefore  idle  for  a  public  service  company  to  attempt 
to  ward  off  approaching  competition  by  making  it  ad- 
vantageous for  its  patrons  to  enter  into  exclusive  con- 
tracts for  terms  of  years.  But  in  Indiana  lately  x  a  con- 
tract by  a  consumer  of  electricity  to  take  all  the  current 
he  might  use  from  the  company  with  which  he  was  con- 
tracting for  a  reduced  rate  given  him  was  assumed  to  be 
valid.  And  in  a  Pennsylvania  case  a  contract  under  which 
a  mine  was  developed  with  the  aid  of  the  railroad  with 
a  provision  in  the  contract  that  all  its  freight  should  go 
out  by  that  railroad,  was  held  not  to  be  against  public 
policy.2  Perhaps  these  last  cases  can  be  reconciled  with 
those  which  were  first  stated  by  saying  that  in  these  cases 
the  customer  is  offered  all  the  service  that  he  can  possibly 
need  by  the  original  company  with  which  he  has  con- 
tracted, while  in  the  cases  discussed  previously  in  this 
paragraph  the  original  company  did  not  furnish  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  other  service  desired. 

Co.,  69  S.  C.  434,  48  S.  E.  460,  67  granting  the  reduction.     See  par- 

L.  R.  A.  Ill  (1904).  ticularly  Menacho  v.  Ward,  27  Fed. 

!Beck  v.  Indianapolis  L.  &  P.  529  (1886);  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L. 

Co.,  36  Ind.  App.  600,  76  N.  E.  312  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  132  Ind. 

(1905).  517,  32  N.  E.  311,  18  L.  R.  A.  105 

2  Bald  Eagle  Valley  Ry.  Co.  v.  (1892). 

Nittany  Valley  Ry.  Co.,   171  Pa.          But  formerly  when  there  was  no 

284,  33  Atl.  239,  29  L.  R.  A.  423,  50  principle  against  discrimination  as 

Am.  St.  Rep.  807  (1895).  such,  reductions  could  be  made  to 

Certainly  in  the  modern  view  as  get  exclusive  contracts.    See  Lough 

to  the  extent  of  public  duty  it  is  v.  Outerbridge,  143  N.  Y.  271,  38 

held  to  be  no  legal  justification  for  N.  E.  292,  25  L.  R.  A.  674,  42  Am. 

making  a  lower  rate  to  a  particular  St.  Rep.  712  (1894);Fitchburg  R.  R. 

customer  that  he  has  agreed  to  give  Co.  v.  Gage,  12  Gray  (Mass.),  393 

all   his   business   to   the   company  (1859). 

[553] 


§  686  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  686.  Refusal  to  take  another's  customers. 

Sometimes  a  contract  will  be  found  between  two  or 
more  public  service  companies  operating  within  the  same 
district,  that  one  will  not  take  on  applicants  who  are  being 
served  by  another.  As  this  is  in  defiance  of  their  public 
duty  to  the  community  they  serve,  it  would  seem  to  be 
altogether  bad.  Indeed  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana 
felt  in  one  case  that  such  an  agreement  between  gas  com- 
panies l  was  so  outrageous  as  to  constitute  ground  for 
forfeiture  of  its  charter.  "By  the  agreement  in  question, 
when  carried  into  effect,  the  patrons  of  one  company  were 
excluded  from  being  supplied  with  gas  from  the  other 
company.  Each  company  was,  by  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment, bound  to  abide  by  and  maintain  the  prices  fixed, 
and  each  was  prohibited  from  furnishing  gas  to  the  cus- 
tomers of  the  other.  That  the  people  of  that  city  who 
desired  to  become  consumers  of  gas  were,  by  the  agree- 
ment in  question,  deprived  of  the  benefits  that  might 
result  to  them  from  competition  between  the  two  com- 
panies certainly  cannot  be  successfully  denied.  The  ex- 
clusion of  competition,  under  the  agreement,  redounded 
solely  to  the  benefit  of  appellee  and  the  other  company, 
and  the  enforcement  of  the  compact  between  them  could 
be  nothing  less  than  detrimental  to  the  public.  By  unit- 
ing in  this  agreement  appellee  disabled,  or  at  least  pro- 
fessed to  have  disabled,  itself  from  the  performance  of 
its  implied  duties  to  furnish  gas  impartially  to  all,  and 
thereby  made  public  accommodations  subservient  to  its 
own  private  interests."2 

1  State  ex  rel.  v.  Portland  Natu-  solidated  Gas  Co.,   130  U.  S.  396, 
ral   Gas   and    Oil    Co.,    153    Ind.  9  S.  Ct.  553,  32  L.  ed.  979  (1888). 
483,  489,  53  N.  E.  1089,  53  L.  R.          Illinois.— People  ex  rel.  v.  Chi- 
A.    413,    74    Am.    St.    Rep.    314  cago  Gas  Trust  Co.,  130  111.  268,  22 
(1899).  N.  E.  798,   17  Am.  St.  Rep.  319 

2  Citing  among  other  cases:  (1889). 

United  States. — Gibbs    v.    Con-          Indiana. — Portland  Natural  Gas 

[554] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  687 

Topic  B.  Contracts  Opposed  to  Public  Service 

§  687.  Contract  not  to  deal  with  other  applicants. 

It  is  plain  at  all  events  that  no  engagement  which  one 
committed  to  public  service  may  have  made  can  be  urged 
by  him  as  an  excuse  for  not  being  ready  to  perform  the 
usual  obligations  of  his  employment  which  are  imposed 
upon  him  by  positive  law.  A  striking  instance  of  this 
general  problem  is  where  the  applicant  is  refused  service 
on  the  ground  that  the  company  had  previously  entered 
into  a  contract  with  a  former  applicant  not  to  serve  him. 
In  a  late  case;  *  Sammons  v.  Kearney  Power  &  Irrigation 
Company,  a  contract  made  by  a  reservoir  company  with 
one  taker  of  water  for  power  to  run  its  electrical  machinery 
providing  that  it  would  not  furnish  any  other  applicant 
with  water  to  be  used  to  generate  electricity  was  held  in- 
valid. In  the  elaborate  opinion  covering  the  whole  mat- 
ter as  to  the  public  services  in  general,2  Commissioner 
Albert  said:  "In  the  case  at  bar  we  are  dealing  with 
an  irrigation  company — a  quasi-public  corporation.  It  is 
also  a  governmental  agency,  but  its  main  purpose  is  the 
administration  of  a  public  utility.  To  the  extent  of  its 
capacity  it  is  bound  to  furnish  water  from  its  canal  to 
persons  desiring  to  use  it  on  equal  terms  and  without 
discrimination.  In  this  respect  it  stands  on  the  same 
footing  as  a  railroad  company.  Neither  has  the  right 

&  O.  Co.  v.  State,  135  Ind.  54,  34  Line  Co.,  22  W.  Va.  600,  46  Am. 

N.  E.  818,  21  L.  R.  A.  639  (1893).  Rep.  527  (1883). 

1  77  Neb.  580,  110  N.  W.  308,  312  See  to  the  same  effect  Cumber- 
(1906).  land  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

2  Citing    particularly    State    v.  Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  La. 
Hartford  &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Ann.  29,  24  So.  803,  72  Am.  St. 
Conn.  538  (1861);  Chicago  Gaslight  Rep.  442   (1889),   contract  not  to 
Co.  v.  People's  Gaslight  Co.,   121  give  a  rival  telegraph  company  the 
111.  530, 13  N.  E.  169,  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  transportation    service    which    had 
124     (1887);    and    West    Virginia  been   given  the   contracting   com- 
Transp.  Co.   v.  Ohio   River  Pipe  pany  held  void. 

[555] 


§§  688,  689  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

or  the  power  to  place  itself  in  a  position  where  it  cannot 
serve  every  person  on  equal  terms  with  every  other  person. 
Neither  has  the  right  or  power  to  bind  itself  by  a  contract 
which,  if  enforced,  would  render  it  unable  to  serve  the 
public  on  those  terms  or  to  carry  out  its  main  purpose." 

§  688.  Special  contract  for  priority. 

Upon  the  same  principles  a  contract  between  a  public 
service  company  and  one  of  its  customers  to  give  him 
service  in  priority  to  others  is  against  public  policy.  Thus 
a  clause  in  a  contract  between  a  telegraph  company  and 
a  railroad  company  in  which  the  railroad  business  was 
given  precedence  was  held  no  excuse  for  a  default  to  a 
private  customer.  "It  cannot  subtract  itself  from  obe- 
dience to  the  rates  prescribed  by  the  authority  of  the 
State  acting  through  the  Commission  by  a  contract  giv- 
ing one  customer  the  railroad  preference  in  business  and 
pleading  that  such  business  occupies  the  only  wire  it 
has."  l  In  another  case  of  the  same  sort  it  has  been  held 
that  a  natural  gas  company  cannot  make  contracts  with 
an  earlier  consumer  to  supply  him  with  all  the  gas  he  may 
need  and  urge  this  contract  as  an  excuse  for  failing  to 
give  a  sufficient  supply  to  later  customers.2 

§  689.  Contract  to  exclude  others  from  simultaneous 

service. 

Where  service  is  being  rendered  upon  a  private  basis 
a  special  arrangement  maybe  made;  but  where  the  serv- 
ice is  upon  a  public  basis  a  contract  not  to  give  to  others 

1  Leavell  v.  Western  Union  Tele-  v.  Star  Gas  Co.  (Pa.  Co.  Ct.),  66 
graph  Co.,  116  N.  C.  211,  21  S.  E.  Legal  Intelligencer,  544  (1909). 
391,  27  L.  R.  A.  843,  47  Am.  St.          But  the  surplus  above  all  public 
Rep.  798  (1895).  service  requirements  may  be  sold 

See  also  Western  Union  Tele-  to  one  taker  exclusively.  Cone- 
graph  Co.  v.  Rosentreter,  80  Tex.  maugh  Gas  Co.  v.  Jackson  Farm 
406,  16  S.  W.  25  (1891),  accord.  Gas  Co.,  186  Pa.  St.  443,  40  Atl. 

2  Fairchance  Window  Glass  Co.  1000,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  865  (1898). 

[556] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  690 

the  same  service  at  the  same  time  is  void.  The  Tennessee 
court  pointed  this  out  plainly  in  a  recent  case  where  one 
newspaper  company  got  the  railroad  company  to  agree 
not  to  take  other  newspapers  upon  the  early  train.1  The 
opinion  of  Chief  Justice  Beard  in  holding  that  this  ex- 
clusive arrangement  was  inconsistent  with  public  duty 
is  a  very  striking  argument.  He  said:  "It  would  hardly 
be  contended  that  a  railroad  by  making  a  special  and 
exclusive  contract  to  transport  shoes  manufactured  by  one 
party  in  a  community,  could  strip  itself  of  its  common- 
law  character,  and  decline,  without  -any  reason  save 
the  existence  of  said  contract,  to  transport  boxes  of  shoes 
for  another  manufacturer  in  the  same  community.  If 
this  be  so,  where  is  the  controlling  difference  between 
such  a  case  and  the  one  now  before  us?"  2 

§  690.  Exclusive  contracts  with  an  intermediate  service. 

Arrangements  may  sometimes  be  found  between  a 
principal  service  company  for  selling  a  supply  to  an  inter- 
mediate company  for  resale  to  consumers  accompanied 
by  an  agreement  not  to  engage  in  direct  service  within 
the  sphere  of  the  intermediate  service  in  competition  with 
it.  How  far  such  arrangements  may  be  made  depends 
upon  whether  they  conflict  with  public  duty.  If  the  ter- 
ritory covered  by  the  intermediate  service  is  included 
within  the  district  which  the  company  is  bound  to  serve 
such  an  arrangement  could  not,  it  seems,  excuse  an  ap- 
plication for  direct  service.3  But  if  the  seller  has  not  as 

1  Memphis  News  Publishing  Co.,  3  Note    the    arrangements    made 
v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  110  Tenn.  684      in: 

75S.W.  941,  63  L.R.  A.  150(1903).  Nebraska.— A  m  e  r  i  c  a  n    Water 

2  See    also   Youghiogheny    &    O.  Works  Co.  v.  State,  46  Neb.  194, 
Coal  Co.  v.  Erie  Ry  Co.,  24  Ohio  64  N.  W.  711,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  610 
Cir.  Ct.  289  (1902),  where  it  was  (1895). 

held  that  the  owners  of  a  coal  con-  Oregon. — Hangen  v.  Abina  Light 
veyor  could  not  give  exclusive  right  &  W.  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac.  244, 
to  utilize  it  to  one  concern.  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

[557] 


§  691  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

yet  committed  itself  to  the  service  of  that  territory  it 
may  it  seems,  refuse  to  go  into  the  district  with  direct 
service.1  As  for  contracts  between  a  principal  service 
and  a  subordinate  service  whereby  the  principal  service 
delegates  to  one  concern  the  exclusive  privilege  of  per- 
forming the  service  required  of  it,  there  are,  as  has  been 
seen  in  a  previous  chapter,  two  opinions.  Thus  the  cases 
are  divided  as  regards  the  right  of  a  railroad  to  agree  with 
an  express  company  that  it  shall  have  the  exclusive  right 
to  do  that  business  over  the  route  free  from  any  competi- 
tion, even  that  of  the  railroad  itself.  There  are  cases 
which  hold  that  such  an  exclusive  contract  is  not  opposed 
to  public  duty.2  But  there  are  perhaps  as  many  courts 
which  feel  that  such  arrangements  are  contrary  to  public 
duty.3 

§  691.  Effect  of  restrictive  covenants  in  conveyances. 

It  is  a  safe  principle  to  go  by  that  no  arrangement  will 
be  enforced  by  the  courts  whereby  public  service  is  ham- 
pered, even  if  such  arrangements  are  generally  supported 
where  private  business  is  involved.  A  striking  example 
of  this  was  a  case  where  a  clause  in  a  conveyance  between 
a  farmer  and  a  pipe  line  company  providing  that  no  simi- 
lar service  should  be  permitted  within  the  tract  covered 
was  held  void.4  In  the  latest  case  5  in  the  grant  of  a  right 
of  way  through  his  land  to  one  gas  company  the  grantor 
covenanted  that  no  other  should  pass  through  his  lands. 

1  Note  the  arrangements  made  in :          3  See   McDuffee   v.    Portland   & 
Georgia.— Milledgeville  Water  Co.      Rochester  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  430, 

v.  Edwards,  121  Ga.  555,  49  S.  E.  13  Am.  Rep.  72  (1873),  and  cases 

621  (1904).  cited   in   the   discussion   in    §  516, 

Missouri. — Mulrooney  v.  Obear,  supra. 

171  Mo.  613,  71  S.  W.  1019  (1903).  4  West    Virginia    Transportation 

2  See  the  Express  Cases,  117  U.  S.  Co.  v.  Ohio  River  Pipe  Line  Co.,  22 
1,  29  L.  ed.  791,  6  Sup.  Ct.  542,  628  W.  Va.  600,  46  Am.  Rep.  527  (1883). 
(1886),  and  cases  cited  in  the  dis-  5  Calor  O.  &  G.  Co.  v.  Franzell, 
cussion  in  §  515,  supra.  128  Ky.  715,  109  S.  W.  328  (1908). 

[558] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  692 

This  was  held  invalid,  the  Kentucky  court  saying:  "  What 
would  be  thought,  for  instance,  of  the  proposition  that 
a  railroad  corporation  could  lease  from  the  owners  a  belt 
of  land  surrounding  a  municipality,  and  provide  in  the 
lease  that  it  should  have  the  exclusive  right  to  operate 
a  railroad  across  the  land  in  question?"  Certainly  there- 
fore such  restrictions  will  not  excuse  a  refusal  to  act  ac- 
cording to  the  ordinary  obligations  of  public  service.  Thus 
it  was  held  in  an  English  case  1  where  a  railroad  refused 
to  accept  coal  or  coke  from  a  particular  station  not  mined 
or  made  on  the  estate,  since  the  land  for  the  station  was 
conveyed  to  them  only  on  that  condition,  that  such  a 
private  arrangement  was  held  contrary  to  the  public  in- 
terest; and  the  railroad  was  accordingly  ordered  to  carry 
the  coal  of  every  shipper  from  that  station.  Similarly 
in  a  recent  Kentucky  case,2  a  covenant  giving  to  the 
grantor  of  the  right  of  way  for  a  public  siding  the  exclu- 
sive right  to  ship  coal  from  it,  was  held  no  excuse  for 
refusal  to  accept  coal  from  another  shipper.  As  the  court 
pointed  out,  the  railroad  must  see  to  it  that  it  was  able 
to  handle  all  shipments;  and  it  could  always  acquire  the 
right  of  way  by  eminent  domain  free  of  entangling  con- 
ditions. 

§  692.  Contract  limitations  upon  licensees. 

A  more  extreme  application  of  these  principles  was 
made  in  a  series  of  telephone  cases,  all  involving  practically 
the  same  facts.  It  appeared  that  the  operating  companies 
were  usually  licensees  of  a  parent  company  which  had 

1  Rishton  Local  Board  v.  Lanca-          See  further: 

shire  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  8  R.  &  C.  T.  C.  United    States.— Western    Union 

74  (1893).  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Baltimore  &  O. 

2  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tel.  Co.,  19  Fed.  Rep.  660  (1884). 
Pittsburg  &  K.  Coal  Co.,  Ill  Ky.  Illinois.— St.  Louis  &  C.  R.  R. 
960,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1318,  64  S.  W.  Co.  v.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  173  111.  508, 
969,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  447,  55  L.  R.  51  N.  E.  382  (1898). 

A.  601  (1901). 

[559] 


§  692  J          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

entered  into  a  contract  with  a  telegraph  company  prac- 
tically giving  it  exclusive  privileges  in  the  use  of  the  tele- 
phone in  handling  messages.  Notwithstanding  these 
arrangements  the  courts  held  that  as  the  telephone  com- 
panies must  serve  all  patrons  alike,  they  could  not  refuse 
to  install  a  telephone  in  the  office  of  another  telegraph 
company  alleging  as  an  excuse  the  disabilities  which  they, 
as  licensees,  were  under  by  the  terms  of  their  arrangements 
with  their  licensers.  There  is  no  better  statement  of  the 
full  principles  of  the  uncompromising  law  of  public  serv- 
ice than  in  these  telephone  cases.  In  the  earliest  of  them  1 
Thayer,  J.,  said:  "In  my  judgment,  this  clause  of  the 
contract  is  indefensible  when  called  in  question  by  any 
person  or  corporation  injuriously  affected  thereby.  In 
so  far  as  the  contract  between  the  respondent  and  the 
patentee  compels  the  former  to  discriminate  against  one 
class  of  its  would-be  customers,  and  to  deny  them  the 
same  privileges  and  service  which  it  accords  to  others, 
the  contract  is  invalid.  It  is  not  possible  to  admit  the 
principle  that  a  railroad,  telegraph,  or  telephone  company 
may  avoid  the  performance  of  any  part  of  the  paramount 
duty  they  owe  to  the  entire  public  by  contract  obliga- 
tions which  they  may  enter  into,  even  with  the  patentee 
of  an  invention."  2 

1  22  Alb.  L.  J.  363  (T880).  22  N.  W.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  404 

2  United  States.— State  of  Missouri      (1885). 

v.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  23  Fed.  Rep.  Ohio. — State  ex  rel.,  etc.,  v.  Bell 

539  (1885);  Delaware  &  A.  Tele-  Telephone    Co.,   36   Ohio    St.   296 

graph  &  Telephone  Co.  v.  State  of  (1880). 

Delaware,  50  Fed.  677,  2  C.  C.  A.  1  Pennsylvania— &  e  1 1   Telephone 

(1892).    See  5  L.  R.  A.  161,  note.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth  ex  rel.  (Pa.), 

Maryland— Chesapeake     &     P.  3  Atl.  825  (1886). 

Telephone  Co.  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  Vermont. — Commercial    U.    Tel. 

Telegraph  Co.,  66  Md.  399,  7  Atl.  Co.  v.  New  England  T.  &  T.  Co.,  61 

809,  59  Am.  Rep.  167  (1886).  Vt.  241, 17  Atl.  1071,  5  L.  R.  A.  161, 

Nebraska.— State  ex  rel.  v.  Ne-  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  893  (1889). 

braska  Telephone  Co.,  17  Neb.  126,  But  see  American  Rapid  Tele- 

[560] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS 


[§693 


§  693.  Contract  for  division  of  territory. 

Upon  similar  principles  a  contract  between  public  serv- 
ice companies  for  partition  of  common  territory  between 
themselves  is  generally  held  unenforcible  as  peculiarly 
against  public  policy  even  though  the  companies  were 
under  no  mandatory  duty  to  supply  the  territory  divided. l 
In  the  leading  case  2  on  this  point  the  Illinois  court  re- 
fused to  enforce  such  a  contract  between  gas  companies, 
not  listening  to  the  cases  involving  private  businesses 
where  such  contracts  are  often  held  valid.  "The  ordinary 
rule  that  contracts  in  partial  restraint  of  trade  are  not 
invalid,"  said  the  court,  "does  not  apply  to  corporations 
like  the  appellant  and  appellee  because  they  were  engaged 
in  a  public  business  and  in  furnishing  that  which  was  a 
matter  of  public  concern  to  all  the  inhabitants  of  the 


graph  Co.  v.  Connecticut  Telephone 
Co.,  49  Conn.  352,  44  Am.  Rep.  237 
(1881). 

The  establishment  of  this  law  in- 
volved ignoring  the  supposed  right 
of  a  patentee  to  exploit  the  public. 
As  Mr.  Justice  Brewer  said  in  State 
of  Missouri  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co., 
23  Fed.  539  (1885),  the  patentee 
who  devotes  his  devise  to  public  use 
can  claim  no  greater  sanctity  for  it 
than  can  the  owner  of  any  other 
property. 

Similar  reasoning  was  followed  in 
a  striking  case  where  a  city  ordinance 
ordered  a  railroad  company  to  light 
its  platforms  with  the  equipment 
furnished  by  the  local  electric  light 
company.  The  company  urged  that 
the  ordinance  was  void  because  it 
subjected  them  to  the  unlimited  ex- 
tortion of  the  patentees,  but  the 
court  held  that  the  electric  company 
must  deal  with  them  upon  a  reason- 
able basis  as  the  whole  business  was 

36 


affected  with  a  public  interest. 
Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bowling  Green,  57  Ohio  St.  336,  49 
N.  E.  121,  41  L.  R.  A.  422  (1897). 

1  See  on  this  point: 

Delaware. — Wilmington  City  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Wilmington,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  8 
Del.  Ch.  468  (1900). 

Kansas. — Keene  Syndicate  v. 
Wichita  Gas,  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  69 
Kans.  284,  76  Pac.  834,  67  L.  R.  A. 
61  (1904). 

Illinois. — South  Chicago  City  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Calumet  Ry.  Co.,  171  111. 
391,  49  N.  E.  576  (1898). 

Indiana. — Chicago,  I.  &  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Southern  Ind.  Ry.  Co.,  38 
Ind.  App.  234,  70  N.  E.  843  (1904). 

2  Chicago   G.    L.    &   C.    Co.    v. 
People's  G.  L.  &  C.  Co.,  121  111.  530, 
13  N.  E.  169  (1887). 

See  also  the  language  in  South 
Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Calumet 
Ry.  Co.,  171  111.  391,  49  N.  E.  576 
(1898). 

[561] 


§  694  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

City."  However  if  such  a  contract  for  withdrawal  from 
particular  territory  has  been  executed,  a  person  resident 
in  one  district  cannot  demand  service  from  the  outside 
company.1  By  the  execution  of  such  a  contract  the  com- 
panies in  question  have  signified  their  withdrawal  from 
the  territories  in  question.  If  they  have  thus  confined 
their  profession  to  their  respective  territories  there  is  no 
way  to  compel  them  to  serve  a  larger  district  thenceforth. 
This  arrangement  however  could  not  be  effectively  per- 
fected if  there  were  mandatory  clauses  in  their  charters. 
Moreover  there  are  authorities  to  the  effect  that  reason- 
able arrangements  for  partition  of  territory  between  pub- 
lic service  companies  will  be  enforced  for  reasons  of  policy 
to  be  set  forth  presently.2  For  there  are  some  courts 
which  are  hospitably  inclined  toward  pooling  agreements. 

§  694.  Pooling  arrangements  usually  void. 

In  accordance  with  the  doctrines  shown  in  this  chapter, 
any  arrangements  between  public  service  companies  for 
pooling  then-  business  in  any  way  must  inevitably  be  held 
invalid  as  in  restraint  of  trade.  Perhaps  the  most  lucid 
statement  of  the  actual  law  is  that  of  Mr.  Justice  Calwell, 
in  one  of  the  more  recent  Federal  cases  3  where  all  relief 
was  refused  one  party  to  an  elaborate  pooling  contract 
against  another  for  refusal  to  account  according  to  its  terms 
upon  these  general  principles  thus  succinctly  stated.  "A 
railroad  company  is  a  quasi-public  corporation,  and  owes 
certain  duties  to  the  public,  among  which  are  the  duties 

1  Weld  v.  Gas  &  Electric  Light      Co.  v.  North  Manchester  Telephone 
Commissioners,  197  Mass.  556,  84      Co.  (Ind.  App.),  92  N.  E.  558  (1910) 
N.  E.  101  (1908).  that  such  contracts  are  only  invalid 

See  also  Leslie  v.  Lorillard,  110  in  so  far  as  they  interfere  with  a 

N.  Y.  519,  18  N.  E.  363,  1  L.  R.  A.  desirable  public  service. 

456  (1888).  3  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

2  Ives  v.  Smith  et  al.,  8  N.  Y.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  61 
Supp.  46  (1889).    See  the  compro-  Fed.  993,  9  C.  C.  A.  659  (1894). 
mise  view  taken  in  Home  Telephone 

[562] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS 


§694 


to  afford  reasonable  facilities  for  the  transportation  of 
persons  and  property,  and  to  charge  only  reasonable  rates 
for  such  service.  Any  contract  by  which  it  disables  itself 
from  performing  these  duties  or  which  makes  it  to  its 
interest  not  to  perform  them,  or  removes  all  incentive 
to  their  performance,  is  contrary  to  public  policy  and 
void."  *  However  there  are  a  few  cases  which  hold  that 
pooling  in  public  services  instead  of  being  peculiarly  il- 
legal, should  really  be  regarded  as  truly  in  accordance 
with  public  interests,  and  therefore  not  against  public 
policy.  To  this  view  many  eminent  economists  and  sev- 
eral law  writers  incline.  Indeed  this  seems  to  be  the  Eng- 
lish law,2  which  is  followed  in  some  few  American  juris- 
dictions.3 In  the  leading  English  case  just  cited,  Vice 


1  Citing: 

United  States. — Gibbs  v.  Con- 
solidated Gas  Co.,  130  U.  S.  396,  9 
Sup.  Ct.  553,  32  L.  ed.  979  (1889). 

Georgia. — Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  American  Union  Tel. 
Co.,  65  Ga.  160,  38  Am.  Rep.  781 
(1880). 

Indiana. — Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  I. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Closser,  126  Ind.  348,  26 
N.  E.  159,  9  L.  R.  A.  754,  22  Am.  St. 
Rep.  593  (1890). 

Kentucky. — Sayre  v.  Louisville 
Union  Benevolent  Association,  1 
Duv.  143,  85  Am.  Dec.  613  (1863). 

Louisiana. — Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  41  La. 
Ann.  970,  6  So.  888,  17  Am.  St. 
Rep.  445  (1889). 

New  York. — Hooker  v.  Vande- 
water,  4  Denio,  349,  47  Am.  Dec. 
258  (1847);  Stanton  v.  Allen,  5 
Denio,  434,  49  Am.  Dec.  282  (1848). 

Texas— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  State,  72  Tex.  404,  10  S.  W.  81 
(1888). 


Pooling  agreements  are  against 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  In  re 
Pooling  Freights,  115  Fed.  588 
(1902);  Southern  Pacific  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, 200  U.  S.  536,  26  Sup.  Ct.  330, 
50  L.  ed.  585  (1906). 

Pooling  agreements  also  fall 
within  the  Federal  Anti-trust  Act. 
United  States  v.  Trans-Missouri 
Freight  Association,  166  U.  S.  290, 
17  Sup.  Ct.  540,  41  L.  ed.  1007 
(1897);  United  States  v.  Joint 
Traffic  Association,  171  U.  S.  505, 

19  Sup.  Ct.  25,  43  L.  ed.  259  (1898). 

2  Hare  v.  London  &  Northwestern 
Ry.  Co.,  2  Johns.  &  H.  80  (1861). 

3  Manchester  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Concord  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  H.  100, 

20  Atl.  383,  9  L.  R.  A.  689  (1889). 
In  Raritan  River  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Middlesex  &  S.  Traction  Co.,  70 
N.  J.  L.  732  (1904),  it  was  held  that 
an  agreement  made  between  a  rail- 
road company  and  a  competitor, 
that  the  companies  would  not  re- 

[563] 


§  695  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Chancellor  Wood  dismissed  the  argument  that  the  pooling 
agreement  which  was  being  questioned  was  against  public 
policy  by  saying:  "It  is  a  mistaken  notion  that  the  public 
is  benefitted  by  pitting  two  railway  companies  against 
each  other  till  one  is  ruined,  the  result  being,  at  last,  to 
raise  the  fares  to  the  highest  possible  standard."  Strong 
though  this  argument  may  be,  it  must  address  itself  now 
to  the  legislative  branch;  the  weight  of  authority  against 
it  at  common  law  is  overwhelming. 

Topic  C.  Refusal  of  the  Demands  of  a  Rival 

§  695.  Shipments  made  by  a  rival. 

It  sometimes  happens  in  the  course  of  competition 
between  two  public  service  companies  that  one  of  them 
may  be  bold  enough  to  apply  to  the  other  for  some  service 
it  requires  in  the  conduct  of  its  business.  It  is  obvious 
that  we  have  a  delicate  matter  here.  If  the  competitor 
can  put  himself  in  such  a  position  that  he  can  be  said  to 
apply  as  one  of  the  public  might,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
his  application  can  be  refused.  And  yet  this  may  aid  him 
in  the  course  of  his  business  in  various  ways.  For  exam- 
ple one  railroad  may  apply  to  a  rival  railroad  to  forward 
some  materials  to  an  intersecting  point.1  It  is  submitted 
that  it  is  the  clear  duty  of  the  railroad  to  which  this  ap- 
plication is  made  to  accept  the  shipment,  although  it 
might  benefit  much  this  road  to  which  the  application 
is  made  to  cripple  its  rival  by  refusing  to  transport  the 
supplies.  For  this  is  true  of  every  public  service  company 
that  it  must  accede  to  every  proper  application  for 

duce  their  present  rates  for  a  time  thrown  out  that  the  courts  might 
fixed  unless  required  by  law  to  do  sometime  enjoin  them, 
so  was  not  contrary  to  public  policy.  1  See  Rogers  Locomotive  &  Ma- 
in Averill  v.  Southern  Ry.,   75  chine  Works  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  20  N. 
Fed.  736  (1896),  rate  wars  were  de-  J.  Eq.  379  (1869). 
plored;    and    the    suggestion    was 

[564] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS          [  §§  696,  697 

service,  although  it  might  be  more  profitable  to  promote 
its  own  interests  by  imposing  conditions,  or  even  by  re- 
fusing altogether.1 

§  696.  No  obligation  to  carry  packed  parcels. 

An  excellent  illustration  of  this  distinction  is  Johnson 
v.  Dominion  Express  Company.2  Defendant  in  this  ac- 
tion was  a  general  express  company,  while  plaintiff  was 
an  association,  trading  under  the  name  of  the  National 
Package  Express  Company,  engaged  in  forwarding  small 
parcels.  This  action  was  brought  to  compel  the  defend- 
ant to  accept  from  the  plaintiff,  at  the  regular  schedule 
rates  for  large  packages,  cases  containing  small  parcels, 
which  the  plaintiff  had  collected  for  transportation  from 
various  shippers,  to  be  delivered  by  them  later  to  various 
consignees.  The  court  held  that  the  refusal  was  justifi- 
able. "That  a  number  of  persons  should  combine  to 
carry  on  a  business  in  competition  with  the  defendant, 
to  take  from  it  the  most  profitable  part  of  its  business; 
to  make  use  of  its  capital  and  facilities  for  its  destruction, 
cannot  be  assumed  to  have  been  considered  or  provided 
for  by  the  company  in  fixing  its  present  tariff."  3 

§  697.  Competitor  must  be  taken  as  a  passenger. 

The  proposition  in  the  heading  is  against  the  apparent 
doctrine  of  the  well-known  case  of  Jencks  v.  Coleman,4 

1  See  also  American  Banana  Co.  *  So  a  railroad  is  not  bound  to 
v.  United  Fruit  Co.,  160  Fed.  184  accept  at  the  carload  rate  a  ship- 
(1908).  ment    got    together   from    various 

2  28  Ont.  Rep.  203  (1896).    The  customers  by  a  forwarding  agent, 
view  of  the  English  cases  seems  to  Lundquist  v.  Grand  Trunk  W.  Ry. 
be  that  if  a  railway  carries  packed  Co.,  121  Fed.  915  (1901). 
parcels  for  forwarders  generally  it  4  2   Sumn.   221,   Fed.   Gas.   No. 
cannot  refuse  a  particular  applicant.  7258  (1835). 

Crouch  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  It  is  generally  admitted  that  a 
14  C.  B.  255  (1854);  Baxendale  v.  passenger  can  be  prevented  from 
So.  West  Ry.  Co.,  35  L.  J.  Exch.  carrying  on  a  business  while  on 
108  (N..S.)  (1866).  board.  See  the  D.  R.  Martin,  11 

[565] 


§  698  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

where  Mr.  Justice  Story  virtually  directed  the  jury  to 
find  against  the  plaintiff,  an  agent  for  a  rival  line  (who 
was  going  from  Providence  down  to  Newport  intending 
upon  the  return  trip  to  solicit  business  on  board  for  his 
line)  upon  the  general  principle  that  proprietors  of  steam- 
boats are  not  "bound  to  admit  passengers  on  board  whose 
object  it  is  to  interfere  with  the  interests  or  patronage 
of  the  proprietors,  so  as  to  make  the  business  less  lucra- 
tive to  them."  Little  exception  can  be  taken  to  the  gen- 
eral principle  thus  stated;  but  it  would  now  be  recognized 
that  the  presiding  justice  went  too  far  in  applying  it  to 
the  particular  case,  for  the  plaintiff  was  applying  as  a 
traveler  for  this  particular  journey.  According  to  the 
present  authorities  this  distinction  must  be  taken.  In 
a  late  Louisiana  case  l  it  is  pointed  out  that  although 
a  person  who  is  detected  in  "scalping"  tickets  while  on 
the  train,  might  be  ejected,  a  person  who  " scalps"  railway 
tickets  elsewhere  than  on  the  train  cannot  be  denied  trans- 
portation over  the  lines  of  the  railroads  in  whose  tickets 
he  traffics.  He  is  a  part  of  the  general  public,  it  was  said, 
and  railway  companies,  as  common  carriers,  must,  ordi- 
narily, permit  all  who  pay  the  regular  fare  to  travel  on 
their  trains. 

§  698.  Railroad  not  compelled  to  give  running  rights. 

As  has  been  seen,  common  carriers  by  reason  of  their 
public  duty  must  serve  their  rivals  who  ask  as  members 
of  the  public  those  things  which  members  of  the  public 
might  ask;  but  they  can  demand  no  more.  The  princi- 

Blatch.  (U.  S.)  233,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  The  distinction  is  recognized  in 

1030  (1873),  and  Runyan  v.  Central  other  recent  cases,  such  as  South 

R.  Co.,  65  N.  J.  L.  228,  47  Atl.  422  Florida  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rhodes,  25 

(1900).  Fla.  40,  5  So.  633,  23  Am.  St.  Rep. 

1  Ford  v.  East  Louisiana  R.  R.  506  (1889),  and  Phillips  v.  Southern 

Co.,    110    La.    414,    34    So.    585  Ry.  Co.,   114  Ga.  284,  40  S.  E.  268 

(1903).  (1901). 

[566] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  699 

pies  discussed  do  not  go  so  far  as  to  give  to  one  common 
carrier  the  right  to  demand  the  use  of  the  facilities  of 
rival  common  carriers  in  order  to  compete  against  them. 
Thus,  it  seems  plain  that  one  railroad  cannot  be  required 
to  make  physical  connections  with  its  rival  so  that  it  may 
take  its  business  away  from  it.1  Nor  is  the  railroad  under 
any  obligation  to  grant  running  rights  over  its  trackage 
to  the  trains  of  its  rivals.  If  it  makes  an  arrangement 
of  this  sort,  it  may  dictate  its  own  terms;  it  may  even 
go  so  far  as  to  require  that  competitive  business  shall 
not  be  taken.  The  case  which  decided  this  2  went  on  the 
ground  that  the  public  retained  its  original  right  to  have 
adequate  service  by  the  company  which  owns  the  rails. 
Whether  even  legislation  may  go  so  far  as  to  require  the 
giving  of  running  rights  is  a  difficult  question  of  consti- 
tutional law.  It  is  probable  that  if  the  legislation  con- 
tains proper  provisions  for  adequate  compensation  that 
it  is  valid.3  However  a  strong  argument  against  such 
meddlesome  legislation  may  be  made  as  the  opinion  of 
Mr.  Justice  Dean  in  one  of  the  cases  opposed  to  this  will 
show.4 

§  699.  Obligation  to  give  trackage. 

In  certain  public  services,  as  has  been  noted,  there  is 
an  obligation  to  give  trackage  rights  provided  this  is  the 
service  which  is  professed.  Thus  when  terminal  com- 

1  Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  M.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S. 

R.  R.  Co.,  71  Minn.  519,  74  N.  W.  132,  29  Sup.  Ct.  246  (1909). 

893,  40  L.  R.  A.  389,  70  Am.  St.  2  Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Rep.   358     (1898),   aff'd  sub  nom.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co.,  128  Mich. 

Wisconsin,  M.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  333,  87  N.  W.  271  (1901). 

Jacobson,  179  U.  S.  287,  45  L.  ed.  3  Toledo  Electric  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

194,  21  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  115  (1900).  Toledo  Consolidated  St.  Ry.  Co., 

See  also  Central  S.   Y.   Co.   v.  26  Ohio  Wk.  L.  Bui.  172  (1891). 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  4  Philadelphia  M.  &  S.  Street  Ry. 

568,  48  L.  ed.  565,  24  Sup.  Ct.  339  Co.'s  Petition,  203  Pa.  St.  354,  53 

(1904),  and  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Atl.  191  (1902). 

[5671 


§  699  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

panics  are  organized  to  receive  railways  in  general  they 
must  permit  any  railway  to  use  their  trackage.1  But  if 
a  railroad  possesses  a  terminal  of  its  own  it  is  not  obliged 
to  permit  other  railways  to  make  use  of  it  by  demanding 
rights  over  its  trackage  from  a  connecting  point  nearby.2 
The  general  problem  now  under  discussion  has  arisen  as 
to  the  obligations  of  bridge  companies  to  street  railways. 
In  the  case  of  the  Covington  bridge  3  over  the  Ohio  River, 
the  evidence  went  so  far  as  to  show  that  the  bridge  com- 
pany had  maintained  railway  tracks  for  many  years  over 
which  various  street  car  lines  had  run.  On  these  facts 
the  court  had  no  difficulty  in  holding  that  the  particular 
appellee  had  a  right  to  have  its  cars  pass.  "This  bridge  is 
a  highway  and  dedicated  by  the  company  not  only  to  the 
uses  of  ordinary  travel,  but  to  its  use  by  street  railway 
companies  in  passing  cars  over  it  from  one  city  to  the 
other."  This  case  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  case  of  an- 
other Ohio  bridge  4  in  which  it  is  held  as  to  what  was  ap- 
parently a  railroad  bridge  primarily  that  an  electric  rail- 
way could  not  insist  upon  running  over  the  tracks  of  the 
steam  railroad.  "While  fully  recognizing  the  well-known 
doctrine  that  public  service  companies  are  bound  to  render 
to  the  public  certain  services  appropriate  to  the  particular 
functions  of  the  corporation,  that  doctrine  has  not  been 

1  Florida.— State  v.   Jacksonville      So.  Covington  &  C.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  93 
Terminal  Co.,  41  Fla.  363,  27  So.      Ky.  136,  19  S.  W.  403,  15  L.  R.  A. 
221   (1899).  828  (1892).     See  also  Pittsburg  & 

Maryland. — Union     Railway     of  West  End  Ry.  Co.  v.  Point  Bridge 

Baltimore  v.  Canton  R.  R.  Co.,  105  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  37,  30  Atl.  511,  26 

Md.  12,  65  Atl.  409  (1907).  L.  R.  A.  323  (1894). 

2  Illinois.— Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.          4  Evansville  &  H.  Traction  Co.  v. 
R.  Co.  v.  Peoria  P.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  167  Henderson   Bridge   Co.,    134   Fed. 
111.  296,  47  N.  E.  513  (1897).  973  (1904),  citing  Elliott  on  Rail- 

Virginia.  —  Commonwealth  v.  roads,  §§  922,  974,  1084.  See  Cam- 
Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Va.),  68  S.  bridge  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Charles  R.  St. 
E.  351  (1910).  Ry.  Co.,  139  Mass.  454,  1  N.  E.  925 

3  Covington  &  C.  Bridge  Co.  v.  (1888). 

[568] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  700 

supposed  to  reach  far  enough  to  make  the  corporation 
serve  the  purposes  or  be  subject  to  the  uses  of  a  mere 
rival  in  business.  One  water  company  or  one  telephone 
company  or  one  telegraph  company  or  one  street  railway 
company  or  one  railroad  company,  while  bound  appro- 
priately to  serve  the  general  public,  cannot,  unless  under 
express  statutory  enactment  and  by  due  process  of  law 
thereunder  be  compelled  to  give  its  property  to  the  uses 
and  benefits  of  a  rival  except  by  some  form  of  condemna- 
tion. The  rival  is  not  ordinarily  to  be  included  in  the  term 
general  public." 

§  700.  Connections  with  another  telephone  system. 

A  modern  instance  of  this  problem  is  whether  a  tele- 
phone company  must  give  switch  board  connection  to  the 
lines  of  a  rival  system  so  as  to  permit  through  speech.  A 
few  years  ago  it  seemed  to  be  law  that  such  connections 
could  not  be  insisted  upon  by  a  rival  company  any  more 
than  a  private  individual  could  insist  on  having  his  private 
apparatus  connected  with  the  switch  board.  As  was  said 
in  one  case  1  "The  petitioner's  rights  are  to  be  measured  by 
those  secured  to  an  ordinary  person,  seeking  to  employ 
defendant's  telephone  system."  But  in  later  cases  legis- 
lation specifically  compelling  such  connections  for  com- 
peting companies  has  been  held  constitutional.2  Re- 
cently, moreover,  there  have  been  common  law  cases 
which  impose  the  duty  of  permitting  such  through  connec- 
tions when  the  company  in  question  has  once  committed 
itself  to  such  service  by  permitting  such  other  companies 

1  Matter  of  Baldwinsville  Tele-  2  Billings  Mutual  Telephone  Co.  v. 
phone  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  Misc.  221,  53  Rocky  Mt.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  155 
N.  Y.  Supp.  574  (1898).  And  see  Fed.  207  (1907).  Compare  Camp- 
Rural  Home  Telephone  Co.  v.  bellsville  Telephone  Co.  v.  Lebaron 
Kentucky  &  I.  Telephone  Co.,  32  L.  &  L.  Telephone  Co.,  118  Ky. 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  1068,  107  S.  W.  787  277,  80  S.  W.  1114,  84  S.  W.  518 
(1908).  (1904). 

[569] 


§  701  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

to  connect  in  certain  instances.  In  one  of  these  cases  the 
court  held  that  while  such  service  was  offered  there  could 
be  no  discrimination  in  granting  such  connections.1  An- 
other goes  further,  it  would  seem,  in  refusing  to  allow  the 
discontinuance  of  a  switch  board  connection  when  once 
established.2  These  cases  are  probably  to  be  explained 
by  saying  they  really  present  an  extension  of  the  doctrine 
of  connections  rather  than  a  true  case  of  utilization  of 
facilities.  To  draw  an  analogy,  they  seem  more  like  the 
case  of  demanding  of  a  connecting  railway  through  car- 
riage in  the  original  cars  than  of  asking  running  rights  for 
through  trains. 

§  701.  Utilization  of  the  waterworks  of  another. 

Another  instance  of  this  same  law  is  to  be  found  in  those 
decisions  which  hold  that  an  irrigation  company  need  not 
enter  into  arrangements  with  a  rival  company  which 
wishes  to  connect  with  the  system  in  promotion  of  its  own 
service.3  And  a  rival  system  cannot  even  under  general 

1  United  States  Telephone  Co.  v.      Postal  Cable  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Cum- 
Central  Union  Telephone  Co.,  171      berland  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co., 
Fed.  130  (1909).    And  see  Cumber-      177  Fed.  726  (1910). 

land  Telephone  &  T.  Co.  v.  Cart-  For  the  A  telephone  company  to 

wright  C.  Telephone  Co.,  128  Ky.  contract  with  the  B  telephone  com- 

395,  108  S.  W.  875  (1908).  pany  for  exclusive  toll  business  in 

2  State    ex   rel.    v.    Cadwallader  sending  messages  over  the  lines  of 
(Ind.),  87  N.  E.  644  (1909).     See  the  C  telephone  company  to  patrons 
further   Home   Telephone    Co.    v.  of  the  B  company  who  could  be 
North  Manchester  Telephone  Co.  reached  over  its  lines  (with  the  re- 
(Ind.  App.),  92  N.  E.  558  (1910).  suit  that  such  patrons  would   be 

That  a  telephone  company  was  compelled  to  go  to  public  stations 

engaged     in     transmitting      long-  and  pay  messengers)  was  held  to  be 

distance  telephone  communications,  a  wrong  to  the  public  which  could 

and  therefore  came  into  competition  form  the  basis  for  an  injunction, 

to  some  extent  with  a  telegraph  Home    Telephone    Co.    v.    North 

company,    did   not   justify   a   dis-  Manchester    Telephone  Co.    (Ind. 

criminating    charge    for    telephone  App.),  92  N.  E.  558  (1910). 
service  furnished  the  telegraph  com-          *  Paxton  &  H.  Irr.  Canal  &  L.  Co. 

pany    as    legitimate    competition,  v.  Farmers'  &  M.  I.  &  L.  Co.,  45 

[570] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  t  §  702 

enabling  legislation  insist  upon  the  enlargement  of  the 
present  ditches  of  another  company.1  In  both  of  these 
cases  the  rival  company  might  seem  at  first  sight  perhaps 
to  be  only  asking  what  a  private  taker  might  have  de- 
manded. But  since  it  appeared  that  what  was  really  on 
foot  was  a  scheme  by  one  supplying  company  to  utilize 
the  works  of  another,  it  was  properly  decided  that  the 
service  asked  could  be  refused.  Upon  similar  principles 
a  waterworks  company  may  refuse  to  supply  water  upon 
the  large  consumer  basis  to  a  taker  who  intends  to  dis- 
tribute it  to  various  buildings.2  But  such  arrangements 
may  be  made  voluntarily.3 

§  702.  Gas  works  not  bound  to  supply  rivals. 

The  most  remarkable  case  in  this  series  is  Public  Service 
Corporation  v.  American  Lighting  Company.4  The  plain- 
tiff corporation  was  the  owner  of  the  established  gas  works 
in  Jersey  City  from  which  it  was  accustomed  to  light  the 
streets  of  the  city  under  contract.  The  defendant  cor- 
poration was  simply  the  proprietor  of  a  gas  burner  which 
it  wished  to  introduce  for  street  lighting.  This  being  the 
state  of  affairs,  the  city  of  Jersey  City  on  December  1st, 
1904  advertised  as  usual  for  bids  for  lighting  the  city  for 
the  next  year.  The  bid  of  the  American  Lighting  Com- 
pany being  much  the  lowest,  the  contract  was  awarded 
to  it.  Thereupon  it  demanded  from  the  Public  Service 

Neb.  884,  64  N.  W.  334,  29  L.  R.  A.          3  Voluntary    arrangements    may 

853,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  585  (1895).  be  entered  into  for  the  provision  of 

1  Junction  Creek  &  N.  D.  D.  &  I.  water    through    an    intermediary. 
Ditch  Co.  v.  Durango,  21  Colo.  194,  See: 

40  Pac.  356  (1895) .  Georgia.— Milledgeville  Water  Co. 

2  United     States     v.     American      v.  Edwards,  121  Ga.  555,  49  S.  E. 
Waterworks  Co.,  37  Fed.  747  (1889).      621  (1904). 

But  it  has  been  held  that  a  con-  Missouri. — Mulrooney  v.  Obear, 

cern  which  has  a  water  contract  171  Mo.  613,  71  S.  W.  1019  (1903). 

may  sell  its  surplus  at   a  profit.  4  Public  Service  Corp.  v.  Ameri- 

Mayor,  etc.,  of    Halifax    v.  Local  can  Lighting  Co.,  67  N.  J.  Eq.  122, 

Board,  30  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  513  (1874).  57  Atl.  482  (1904). 

[571] 


§§  703,  704  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

Corporation  a  supply  of  gas  delivered  at  the  top  of  every 
lamp-post  in  Jersey  City,  sufficient  to  supply  one  light 
one  night  at  each.  But  when  the  case  was  brought  before 
the  Vice  Chancellor  he  held  that  a  competitor  corporation 
making  such  demands  was  asking  what  the  established 
company  owed  to  no  one  in  its  position.1 

Topic  D.  Promotion  of  a  Collateral  Business 

§  703.  Right  to  engage  in  a  collateral  business. 

The  recognition  of  the  limitations  upon  the  rights  of 
one  engaged  in  a  public  employment  if  he  enters  into  com- 
petition with  members  of  the  public  in  a  business  in  which 
his  own  services  are  necessary,  constitutes  one  of  the  latest 
developments  in  the  public  service  law.  This  law  might, 
perhaps,  have  been  anticipated  by  the  strict  construction 
given  to  railroad  charters.  Wherever  the  question  was 
arguable  the  court  would  invariably  decide  that  the  col- 
lateral business  was  ultra  vires.  Thus  in  Illinois  2  it  was 
held  ultra  vires  for  a  railroad  to  maintain  a  grain  elevator, 
on  the  ground  that  the  public  duties  of  a  railroad  company 
forbade  this  monopolization  of  the  warehouse  business. 
And  in  an  English  case  3  a  railroad  which  was  absorbing 
the  coal  business  along  its  route  was  held  to  be  acting 
ultra  vires.  This  was  squarely  put  upon  public  policy,  the 
fear  being  expressed  that  once  started  in  such  a  career 
railroads  conceivably  might  monopolize  all  business. 

§  704.  Telephone  company  favoring  its  messenger  serv- 
ice. 

Where  a  public  service  company  engages  itself  in  an- 
other collateral  business  the  temptation  always  is  to  use 

1  The  same  decision  between  the      R.  R.  Co.,  233  111.  378,  84  N.  E. 
same  parties  as  to  the  same  matter      368,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  604,  122 
was  reached  in  American  Lighting      Am.  St.  Rep.  181  (1908). 

Co.  v.  Public  Service  Co.,  132  Fed.  J  Attorney-General  v.  Great 
794  (1904).  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  29  L.  J.  Eq. 

2  People  ex  rel.  v.  Illinois  Central      (N.  S.)  794  (1860). 

[572] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  704 

the  power  in  its  public  businesses  to  promote  its  col- 
lateral business.  An  illustration  of  this  appears  in  the 
case  of  Louisville  Transfer  Company  v.  American  Dis- 
trict Telegraph  Company.1  Plaintiff  in  that  case  was  a 
transfer  company  providing  omnibuses  and  other  car- 
riages. Defendant  was  a  telephone  company  which  also 
conducted  a  carriage  and  coupe*  service.  To  promote  that 
business  it  refused  to  give  full  telephone  service  to  the 
plaintiff,  so  that  people  might  not  call  the  plaintiff  and 
order  carriages.  Edwards,  the  Chancellor  puts  the  objec- 
tion to  this  very  well  indeed :  "  It  is  the  opinion  of  the  court 
that  defendant  is  engaged  in  two  distinct  employments — 
one  in  operating  a  telephonic  exchange,  and  the  other  in 
operating  a  carriage  or  coupe  service.  Plaintiff  and  de- 
fendant are  not  rivals  in  the  former  business  and,  as  to 
that  part  of  defendant's  business,  it  occupies  the  same 
position  toward  plaintiff  as  it  does  toward  the  rest  of  the 
public;  the  defendant  is  a  quasi-public  servant,  and  as 
such,  is  bound  to  serve  the  general  public,  including  the 
plaintiff  on  reasonable  terms  with  impartiality."  2 

1 1  Ky.  L.  J.  144  (1881).  When  the  plaintiff,  who  was  en- 
Electric  Despatch  Co.  v.  Bell  gaged  in  a  general  messenger  busi- 
Telephone  Co.,  20  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  83  ness,  had  a  contract  with  the  de- 
(1891),  and  also  People  ex  rel.  fendant  telephone  company  for  the 
Postal  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hudson  River  use  of  its  telephone  in  his  place  of 
Telephone  Co.,  19  Abb.  N.  C.  466  business,  the  defendant  had  no 
(1887),  both  accord.  right  to  refuse  to  permit  the  tele- 
2  That  a  telephone  company  also  phone  to  be  used  in  calling  up  the 
furnished  telegraph  service  did  not  plaintiff  to  order  a  messenger  sent 
authorize  it  to  charge  discriminat-  to  inform  a  party  that  he  was 
ing  rates  for  telephone  service  fur-  wanted  at  a  station  of  a  rival  tele- 
nished  to  a  competing  telegraph  phone  company.  This  policy  of  the 
company  in  order  to  enlarge  the  telephone  company  was  held  to  be 
profits  derived  from  the  telegraph  contrary  to  the  duty  owed  to  the 
part  of  its  business.  Postal  Cable  whole  public  using  their  system. 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Cumberland  Tele-  Owensboro  Harrison  Telephone  Co. 
phone  &  Telegraph  Co.,  177  Fed.  v.  Wisdom,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  97,  62 
726  (1910).  S.  W.  529  (1901). 

[573] 


§§  705,  706]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  705.  Municipality  promoting  its  water  service. 

An  equally  extreme  case  of  unfair  action  may  be  seen  in 
Mobile  v.  Bienville  Water  Supply  Company.1  In  that 
case  it  was  shown  that  the  city,  the  original  defendant, 
had  constructed  a  sewerage  system  and  at  the  same  time 
had  constructed  waterworks.  The  city  never  fixed  any 
rate  for  the  use  of  its  sewers  alone,  but  it  would  not  allow 
any  takers  of  complainant's  water  to  connect  with  or  use 
its  sewers,  except  at  the  same  price  as  the  city  charged 
for  both  its  water  and  sewers  together,  in  effect  forcing  its 
citizens  and  inhabitants  to  take  the  water  of  the  city,  or 
to  pay  for  the  water  of  complainant  in  addition  to  what 
each  citizen  would  have  to  pay  for  the  city's  water  and 
sewerage  together.  Obviously  this  was  unfair  competi- 
tion, because  in  defiance  of  the  public  duty  of  the  city  to 
give  either  service  at  a  fair  rate.  The  language  of  Mr. 
Justice  Harelson  in  granting  the  injunction  is  well  worth 
quoting:  "  Whether  intended  by  the  city  to  so  operate  or 
not,  one  can  scarcely  conceive  of  a  more  effective  scheme  to 
deprive  the  complainant  of  its  customers  than  the  one 
alleged  in  the  bill.  If  complainant  has  to  furnish  its  cus- 
tomers with  water,  and  they  are  required  by  the  city  to 
pay  for  sewerage  the  same  price  it  charges  its  own  cus- 
tomers for  its  water  and  sewerage,  it  follows  the  complain- 
ant would  have  to  furnish  water  practically  free  or  aban- 
don the  business;  for  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  anyone  would  use  the  complainant's  water  and  bear 
the  additional  expense  imposed  for  so  doing."  2 

§  706.  Electric  company  favoring  its  wiring  department. 
Another  case  of  the  abuse  of  its  power  by  a  public  serv- 

1 130  Ala.  379,  30  So.  445  (1900).  plying  gas  for  both  illumination  and 

See  also  Hamilton  City  v.  Hamilton  fuel  cannot  make  a  lower  rate  for 

Gas  L.  &  C.  Co.,  11  Ohio  Dec.  513  illuminating  gas  to  those  of  its  cus- 

(1901).  tomers  who  will  take  gas  for  fuel 

2  Upon  similar  principles  it  has  also.  Baily  v.  Fayette  Gas  Fuel  Co., 

been  held  that  a  gas  company  sup-  193  Pa.  St.  175,  44  Atl.  251  (1899). 

[574] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  707 

ice  company  to  promote  a  collateral  branch  of  its  busi- 
ness was  decided  recently  in  Illinois,  Snell  v.  Clinton  Elec- 
tric Light,  Heat,  and  Power  Company.1  The  defendant 
/company  in  that  case  charged  the  plaintiff  who  had  ap- 
plied for  electricity  an  additional  price  for  a  transformer, 
in  pursuance  of  their  policy  openly  announced  to  supply 
transformers  free  to  those  who  had  the  wiring  of  their 
houses  done  by  the  company's  own  wiring  department, 
but  to  charge  applicants  like  the  plaintiff  who  had  their 
wiring  done  by  other  parties  the  full  price  of  the  trans- 
former. This  transformer  was  a  necessary  part  of  the  sys- 
tem of  distributing  electricity  for  the  protection  of  the 
consumer.  Upon  this  showing  the  highest  court  held  that 
the  treatment  of  the  plaintiff  by  the  defendant  was  un- 
justifiable. Mr.  Justice  Carter  said:  "It  is  entirely  im- 
material who  does  the  wiring  of  the  house — the  electric 
light  company  or  some  other  party;  the  transformer  is 
necessary  in  either  case.  If  the  company  does  the  wir- 
ing, that  is  a  business  distinct  from  that  of  furnishing  elec- 
tricity for  lighting  purposes,  just  as  the  putting  in  of  gas 
and  water  pipes  into  a  house  is  a  distinct  business  from 
furnishing  the  gas  or  water  to  flow  through  them.2 

§  707.  Railroad  cutting  its  own  rates  for  itself. 

This  development  which  is  going  on  in  the  law  was 
brought  to  the  attention  of  all  not  long  ago  by  a  striking 
decision  handed  down  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
in  regard  to  the  coal  roads,  New  York,  New  Haven  & 
Hartford  Railroad  v.  Interstate  Commerce  Commission.3 

1 196  111.  626,  63  N.  E.  1082,  58  own  protection  reserve  the  right  to 

L.  R.  A.  284,  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  341  tap  its  own  mains.     See  Pocatello 

(1902).  Water  Co.   v.  Standley,   7  Idaho, 

2  Upon    similar    principles    it    is  155,  61  Pac.  518  (1900),  and  Keen 

held  that  a  water  company  cannot  v.  Mayor  &  Council  of  Waycross, 

establish  an  official  plumbing  serv-  101  Ga.  588,  29  S.  E.  42  (1897). 
ice   and    require    that   all    piping          3  200  U.  S.  361,  50  L.  ed.  515,  26 

shall  be  done  by  it;  but  it  can  for  its  Sup.  Ct.  272  (1906).     See  also  In- 

[575] 


§  707  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

The  complaint  in  that  case  was  filed  by  the  attorney- 
general  under  the  provisions  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  which  forbid  discrimination  between  shippers,  charg- 
ing that  traffic  was  being  moved  at  less  than  the  published 
rates.  It  was  shown  that  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Rail- 
road had  sold  to  the  New  York,  New  Haven  and  Hartford 
Railroad  sixty  thousand  tons  of  coal  to  be  delivered  to 
the  buyer  at  $2.75  per  ton;  and  it  was  averred  that  the 
price  of  the  coal  at  the  mines  where  the  Chesapeake  and 
Ohio  bought  it  and  the  cost  of  transportation  from  New- 
port News  to  Connecticut  would  aggregate  $2.47  per  ton, 
thus  leaving  to  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  only  about 
twenty-eight  cents  a  ton  for  carrying  the  coal  from  the 
Kanawha  district  to  Newport  News,  whilst  the  published 
tariff  for  such  carriage  was  $1.45  per  ton.  Mr.  Justice 
White,  who  wrote  the  opinion  of  the  court,  puts  the  matter 
well  when  he  says:  "If  by  the  mere  fact  of  purchasing  and 
selling  merchandise  to  be  transported,  a  carrier  is  en- 
dowed with  the  power  of  disregarding  the  published  rate, 
it  becomes  apparent  that  the  carrier  possesses  the  right 
to  treat  the  owners  of  like  commodities  by  entirely  differ- 
ent rules.  The  existence  of  such  a  power  in  its  essence 
would  enable  a  carrier,  if  it  chose  to  do  so,  to  select  the 
favored  persons  from  whom  he  would  buy  and  the  fa- 
vored persons  to  whom  he  would  sell,  thus  giving  such  per- 
sons an  advantage  over  every  other,  and  leading  to  a 
monopolization  in  the  hands  of  such  persons  of  all  the 
products  as  to  which  the  carrier  chose  to  deal."  l 


terstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Banana  Co.  v.  United  Fruit  Co., 

Baird,  194  U.  S.  25,  48  L.  ed.  860,  160  Fed.  184  (1908). 

24  Sup.  Ct.  563  (1904).  l  When  a  canal  is  owned  by  a 

A  fruit  corporation  operating  a  cement  company  it   cannot   make 

line     of     steamships     cannot     dis-  discriminatory    rates    against    an- 

criminate  against  one  of  its  rivals  other  cement  company.     New  York 

in   the   fruit   business.     American  Cement  Co.  v.  Consolidated  Rosen- 

[576] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §§  708,  709 

§  708.  Grain  elevators  storing  their  own  grain. 

But  some  courts  are  disposed  to  go  one  step  further  yet 
and  to  say  that  it  may  be  inconsistent  with  public  service 
for  the  public  servant  to  engage  at  all  in  the  outside  busi- 
ness and  to  make  use  of  his  own  facilities  in  conducting  it. 
A  square  decision  in  point  is  Central  Elevator  Co.  et  al.  v. 
People  l  where  perpetual  injunctions  were  granted  to  re- 
strain defendants,  as  warehousemen,  from  storing  grain 
in  their  own  warehouses.  Cartwright,  the  justice  who 
wrote  the  opinion,  said  in  part:  "The  public  warehouses 
established  under  the  law  are  public  agencies,  and  the 
defendants,  as  licensees,  pursue  a  public  employment. 
They  are  clothed  with  a  duty  towards  the  public.  The 
evidence  shows  that  defendants,  as  public  warehousemen 
storing  grain  in  their  own  warehouses,  are  enabled  to, 
and  do,  overbid  legitimate  grain  dealers,  by  exacting  from 
them  the  established  rate  for  storage,  while  they  give  up 
a  part  of  the  storage  charges  when  they  buy  or  sell  for 
themselves.  By  this  practice  of  buying  and  selling  through 
their  own  elevators  the  position  of  equality  between  them 
and  the  public  whom  they  are  bound  to  serve  is  destroyed, 
and  by  the  advantage  of  their  position  they  are  enabled 
to  crush  out,  and  have  nearly  crushed  out,  competition 
in  the  largest  grain  market  of  the  world."  2 

§  709.  Constitutionality  of  statutory  prohibition. 

There  is  then  this  general  feeling  abroad,  that  for  a 
public  service  company  to  engage  in  serving  itself  in  a 

dale  Cement  Co.,  178  N.  Y.  167,  70  2  Accord,  Hannah  v.  People,  198 

N.  E.  451  (1904).  111.  77,  64  N.  E.  776  (1902).     A 

And  a  gas  company  cannot  make  more  extreme  case,  holding  an  act 

special    rates    to    its    own    stock-  passed  to  enable  the  warehouses  to 

holders.     Redkey  C.  Nat.  Gas.  L.,  do  what  was  provided  in  this  de- 

F.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Orr,  27  Ind.  App.  1,  cision,     unconstitutional     because 

60  N.  E.  716  (1901).  against  the  clauses  declaring  ware- 

1 174  111.  203,  51  N.  E.  254,  43  houses  public. 
L.  R.  A.  658  (1898). 

37  [  577  ] 


§  710  J          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

collateral  business  is  inconsistent  with  its  full  performance 
of  its  public  duties;  and  clear  evidence  of  this  public  opin- 
ion is  the  "Commodities  Clause"  added  in  1906  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  by  which  it  was  provided  gen- 
erally that  a  carrier  should  not  transport  after  1908  any 
commodities  owned  by  it  that  it  had  produced.  It  is  true 
that  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  recently  l  con- 
strued the  statute  so  that  it  does  not  apply  to  commodities 
owned  by  a  corporation  controlled  by  the  carrier.  But 
while  deciding  this,  as  to  the  particular  act,  the  court 
affirmed  the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  regulate  carriers 
to  the  extent  of  forbidding  them  to  transport  goods  in 
which  they  had  an  interest.  Such  legislation  is  due  proc- 
ess of  law  because  it  does  not  go  much  beyond  what  are 
the  accepted  principles  of  regulation  embodied  in  the  pub- 
lic service  law  itself.2 

§  710.  Argument  for  radical  law. 

This  at  least  may  be  regarded  as  conceded,  that  a  public 
service  company  if  engaged  in  private  business  for  itself 
dependent  upon  the  service  it  conducts  ought  not  to  pre- 
fer itself  to  its  competitors  in  business  among  the  general 
public  who  have  already  made  application  for  service. 
But  a  position  has  already  been  taken  far  beyond  this  prop- 
osition; it  is  now  urged  that  those  who  are  undertaking  a 
public  service  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  engage  in  private 
business  in  competition  with  those  whom  they  are  pro- 
fessing to  serve  unless  matters  may  be  so  arranged  that 
the  competition  shall  be  upon  equal  terms.  And  in  gen- 
eral it  should  be  said,  as  this  position  that  the  same  busi- 

1  United  States  ex  rel.  v.  Dela-  mine  so  that  it  is  not  the  property 
ware  &  Hudson  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  of  the  railroad  while  being  trans- 
53  L.  ed.  836, 29  Sup.  Ct.  527  (1909).  ported.    Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Pitts- 

2  The  law  is  not  to  be  circum-  burg  S.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  Y. 
vented  by  having  title  to  the  coal  Misc.   195,   101   N.   Y.  Supp.   837 
pass  to  the  buyer  at  the  railroad's  (1906). 

[578] 


BUSINESS  INTERESTS  [  §  710 

ness  policies  are  justifiable  in  public  employments  as  in 
private  enterprises  is  taken  with  such  confidence  at  times, 
that  it  is  most  necessary  that  those  who  are  conducting 
the  public  services  should  be  told  in  so  uncompromising  a 
manner  that  they  may  realize  at  length  its  full  significance, 
that,  while  those  who  conduct  private  enterprises  may  use 
many  schemes,  those  who  profess  a  public  employment 
must  not  adopt  any  business  policies  which  are  in  any 
way  truly  inconsistent  with  their  public  duties.  And  it 
may  very  probably  turn  out  that  it  will  be  found  neces- 
sary for  the  maintenance  of  the  highest  type  of  public 
service  to  forbid  those  who  undertake  such  callings  from 
engaging  at  all  in  business  of  their  own  where  their  in- 
terests might  come  in  conflict  with  the  interests  of  those 
whom  they  are  serving. 


[579] 


BOOK  III.     CONDUCT  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOY- 
MENT 


PART  V.     COMMENCEMENT  OF  SERVICE 
CHAPTER  XXI 

BEGINNING   OF   THE    UNDERTAKING 

§  720.  Commencement  of  the  relation. 

Topic  A.  When  Public  Service  is  Begun 
§  721.  Position  of  prospective  customers. 

722.  Requisitions  made  for  service. 

723.  Actual  agreement  must  be  shown. 

724.  Acceptance  as  common  carrier. 

725.  Reception  as  a  guest. 

726.  Goods  withheld  from  transportation. 

727.  Goods  at  carrier's  disposal. 

728.  Conditional  acceptance. 

Topic  B.  How  the  Relationship  is  Established 
§  729.  Evidence  of  actual  acceptance  necessary. 

730.  Notice  not  enough  in  itself. 

731.  When  acceptance  takes  place. 

732.  Where  acceptance  takes  place. 

733.  Consent  to  delivery  implied. 

734.  Customary  acceptance  of  goods. 

735.  Acceptance  of  passengers  at  stations. 

736.  Boarding  a  moving  vehicle. 

737.  Carriage  of  goods  secured  by  fraud. 

738.  Stealing  a  ride. 

Topic  C.  Whether  Acceptance  is  Authorized 
§  739.  Who  is  the  real  proprietor. 

740.  Situation  after  railroad  leases. 

741.  Dealings  with  unauthorized  persons. 

742.  For  whom  a  servant  acts. 

743.  Independent  service  by  servant. 

744.  Private  arrangements  with  employee. 

745.  Guests  invited  by  servants. 

[583] 


§§  720,  721  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  746.  Service  obtained  by  connivance. 

747.  Bill  of  lading  issued  without  goods. 

748.  Jurisdictions  holding  carrier  liable. 

§  720.  Commencement  of  the  relation. 

It  is  often  of  the  greatest  importance  to  determine 
whether  the  service  undertaken  has  actually  been  begun. 
This  problem  has  two  aspects,  as  the  usual  extent  of  the 
service  in  general  and  the  particular  action  taken  in  the 
service  in  question  must  both  be  considered.  What  is 
the  usual  extent  of  the  service  in  general  has  already  been 
considered  at  length  under  the  general  discussion  of  pub- 
lic profession.  The  question  remains  whether  in  the 
particular  case  the  relationship  has  been  established  by 
the  undertaking  of  the  service  asked.  As  will  be  seen  in 
this  chapter  the  question  of  acceptance  is  rather  a  ques- 
tion of  fact  than  of  law;  and  for  this  reason  little  more  is 
attempted  in  this  connection  than  to  bring  forward  a  few 
authorities  from  the  innumerable  cases  bearing  upon  this 
subject.  Moreover  this  matter  is  primarily  a  problem  of 
the  general  law  of  bailment  more  than  of  the  peculiar  law 
of  public  service.  At  the  same  time  the  problem  of  the  ex- 
tent of  the  public  undertaking  assumed  necessarily  in- 
volves an  inquiry  as  to  the  very  point  at  which  that 
service  may  properly  be  said  to  have  been  begun  upon 
a  public  basis. 

Topic  A.  When  Public  Service  is  Begun 

§  721.  Position  of  Prospective  Customers. 

To  state  the  first  requisite  to  the  beginning  of  the  rela- 
tionship in  simplest  terms,  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  bring 
the  relation  about  that  the  parties  to  it  shall  be  brought 
together.  The  individual  must  properly  present  himself; 
and  his  application  must  be  duly  accepted.  The  first 
part  of  this  statement,  that  the  applicant  must  conform 
to  all  conditions  precedent  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to 
[584] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  722 

demand  service,  has  been  fully  discussed  already  in  a 
former  chapter.  To  bring  that  matter  again  to  mind  it 
is  sufficient  to  revert  to  those  cases  which  hold  that  until 
the  shipper  has  tendered  his  goods  for  transportation  the 
relationship  has  not  been  established  as  yet  although  the 
carrier  is  awaiting  him.1  And  even  when  he  has  con- 
formed to  every  requirement  which  can  be  made  of  him, 
the  fact  remains  that  unless  he  may  properly  be  said  to 
have  been  accepted  the  relationship  has  not  come  about.2 
He  may  complain  of  being  refused  service;  but  he  has  not 
the  rights  of  one  with  whom  the  relationship  has  been 
established. 

§  722.  Requisitions  made  for  service. 

Still,  whenever  service  is  presently  desired  an  arrange- 
ment may  properly  be  made  in  advance  so  that  the  facili- 
ties may  be  at  hand  at  the  time  desired.  Thus  a  shipper 
intending  a  considerable  shipment  in  car  lots  may  apply 
a  reasonable  time  in  advance  to  the  railroad,  particularly 
requesting  a  certain  mumber  of  cars  in  readiness  for  cer- 
tain freight  at  a  certain  day  and  at  a  certain  station.3 
This  does  not  seem  to  be  a  premature  application  even 
upon  the  general  common-law  principles;  and  there  are 

1  See,  for  one  example,  Illinois  &  112,  79  N.  E.  381  (1906);  Pittsburg, 
St.  L.  R.  R.  &  Coal  Co.  v.  People,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood 
19  111.  App.  141  (1886).  (Ind.  App.),  84  N.  E.  1009  (1908). 

2  See,  for  one  example,  Yoakum         Maryland. — Di  Giorgio  Imp.   & 
v.  Dryden  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 
W.  312  (1894).  104  Md.  693,  65  Atl.  425,  8  L.  R.  A. 

3  See  on  the  general  principle:  (N.  S.)  108  (1906). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  New  York. — Tierney  v.  New  York 

Co.  v.  Erickson,  91  111.  613,  33  Am.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  305 

Rep.  70  (1879);  Illinois  Central  R.  (1879). 

R.  Co.  v.  Bundy,  97  111.  App.  202  Wisconsin. — Ayres  v.  Chicago  & 

(1901).  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372, 

Indiana—  Lake  Shore  &   M.   S.  37  N.  W.  432,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  226 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  39  Ind.  App.  (1888). 

[585] 


§  723  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

many  statutes  upon  this  common  law  basis.1  Indeed  it 
is  generally  held  as  to  car  shipments  that  when  a  shipper 
requires  a  car  at  a  railroad  station  for  his  exclusive  use, 
he  must  necessarily  give  notice  to  the  railroad  company, 
after  which  it  will  have  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to 
furnish  the  car.2  A  correlative  duty  rests  upon  the  rail- 
road to  notify  the  applicant  if  by  reason  of  unexpected 
press  of  business  the  cars  asked  for  cannot  be  furnished 
in  usual  time.3 

§  723.  Actual  agreement  must  be  shown. 

An  actual  agreement  must  be  shown  in  such  cases.4  A 
mere  promise  by  a  carrier  to  furnish  facilities  to  ship  the 
goods  is  not  enough; 5  nor  is  a  mere  order  by  a  shipper  for 
cars  standing  alone  sufficient.6  And  there  is  no  obligation 
in  the  case  of  the  mere  option  to  make  shipments  within 
the  time  or  in  the  quantity  desired  by  the  shipper.7  It  is 
necessary  that  the  intending  shipper  should  at  least  com- 
mit himself  to  an  arrangement  binding  himself  to  the 
payment  of  the  freight  involved,8  if  the  carrier  is  content 
with  that;  else  he  must  pay  down  the  freight  unless  the 

1  See  construing  such  statutes:  4  Reed  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B. 
United  States.— Houston  &  T.  C.      R.  R.  Co.,  3  Houst.  176  (1865). 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayes,  201  U.  S.  321,  •  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  99 

50   L.   ed.   772,   26   Sup.   Ct.   491  Va.  394,  39  S.  E.  144  (1901). 

(1906).  6  Missouri    Pacific    Ry.    Co.    v. 

North     Carolina.— McDuffie     v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Fed.  864 

Seaboard   Air  Line  Ry.   Co.,    145  (1887). 

N.  C.  397,  59  S.  E.  122  (1907).  »  Missouri.— White    v.    Missouri 

Texas.— Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pac.   Ry.   Co.,   19   Mo.   App.   400 

Barrow,  33  Tex.  Civ.  App.  611,  77  (1885). 

S.  W.  643  (1903);  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  New  York.— Chicago  &  G.  E.  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Blocker,  48  Tex.  Civ.  App.  Co.  v.  Dane,  43  N.  Y.  240  (1870). 

100,  106  S.  W.  718  (1907).  •  Arkansas—  Little    Rock  &  Ft. 

2  Illinois  Central  R.   R.   Co.   v.  Smith  Ry.  Co.  v.  Conatser,  61  Ark. 
Bundy,  97  111.  App.  202  (1901).  560,  33  S.  W.  1057  (1896). 

3  Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  New  York— Chicago  &  G.  E.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Racer,  5  Ind.  App.  209,  31  Co.  v.  Dane,  43  N.  Y.  240  (1870). 
N.  E.  853  (1892). 

[586] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  724 

statute  provides  for  a  partial  deposit.  And  since  the  in- 
tending shipper  must  rely  upon  a  special  agreement,  he 
must  show  that  his  application  was  made  to  an  agent  of 
the  company  having  apparent  authority  to  make  the 
arrangement.  Thus  a  station  agent  has  authority  to 
make  a  contract  to  furnish  cars  at  his  station  on  a  certain 
day;  l  it  is  not  necessary  to  go  higher  up  and  notify  a 
superintendent.2  But  a  notice  given  to  a  train  master  or 
a  train  crew  would  not  be  sufficient.3  A  tender  and  re- 
fusal must  be  shown.4  But  this  may  be  waived  by  a  re- 
pudiation of  the  contract.6 

§  724.  Acceptance  as  common  carrier. 

A  carrier  of  goods  is  a  bailee  of  the  goods  for  the  purpose 
of  carriage;  and  his  responsibility  as  carrier  cannot  begin 
until  he  has  become  a  bailee.  And  since  possession  of  the 
bailee  is  the  gist  of  the  bailment,  the  carrier's  responsi- 
bility does  not  begin  until  the  moment  when  he  assumes 
possession.  But  the  carrier's  liability  begins  at  once  on 
the  receipt  of  goods  for  transportation,6  though  the  goods 
have  not  yet  been  placed  in  the  carrier's  vehicle  for  trans- 

1  Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &          6  Arkansas. — Little  Rock   &  Ft. 
So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  87  Ark.  331,      Smith  Ry.  Co.  v.  Conatser,  61  Ark. 
112  S.  W.  745  (1908).  560,  33  S.  W.  1057  (1896). 

Texas. — McCarty  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  Indiana. — Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C. 

S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Tex.  33,  15  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Flanagan,  113  Ind.  488, 

164  (1890).  14  N.  E.  370,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  674 

2  Hoffman  H.   &  S.   Co.   v.   St.  (1887). 

Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  119  Mo.  Vermont— Wilder  v.  St.  J.  &  L.  C. 
App.  495,  94  S.  W.  597  (1906).  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Vt.  636,  30  Atl.  41 

3  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.       (1891). 

Moss,  75  Ark.  64,  86  S.  W.  828  Wisconsin.— Doty  v.  Strong,  1 
(1905).  Pin.  313,  40  Am.  Dec.  773  (1843). 

4  Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.          6  See  in  support  of  this: 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Lee,  69  Ark.  584,  65  S.  W.  Massachusetts. — Nichols  v.  Smith, 

99  (1901).  115  Mass.  332  (1874). 

North  Carolina. — Currie  v.   Ra-  New  York. — Rogers  v.  Wheeler, 

leigh,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  135  N.  C.  535,  52  N.  Y.  262  (1873). 
47  S.  E.  654  (1904). 

[587] 


§  725  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

portation,1  and  even  though  no  bill  of  lading  has  been 
issued  for  them,2  and  the  freight  has  not  been  prepaid.3 
That  is,  the  liability  of  the  carrier  as  such  depends  upon 
his  possession,  with  the  obligation  to  transport  and  the 
right  to  transport  immediately.4  Thus  where  goods  are  of- 
fered to  a  railroad  company  at  an  unreasonably  long  time 
before  the  train  starts,  if  the  carrier  takes  the  goods  he 
becomes  responsible  at  once  as  a  carrier,  although  the 
shipper  knows  that  according  to  the  time-table  the  goods 
will  not  be  carried  until  a  later  time.5  And  where  a  horse 
was  delivered  to  a  railway  before  the  train  was  prepared, 
and  was  put  by  the  railway  company  into  a  horse  box 
and  killed  before  it  was  put  on  board  the  train,  the  railway 
was  held  liable.6 

§  725.  Reception  as  a  guest. 

In  innkeeping,  the  other  calling  in  which  this  is  of  real 
importance,  similar  law  is  followed.  When  a  traveler 
comes  to  an  inn  and  is  received  by  the  innkeeper  for  the 
purpose  of  entertaining  him  during  his  journey,  the  rela- 

1  To  this  effect  see:  'Examples  of  cases  of  this  sort 
Illinois. — Grand    Tower    M.    &      are: 

Transp.  Co.  v.  Ullman,  89  111.  244          Illinois.— Woods    v.    Devin,    13 

(1878).  111.  746,  56  Am.  Dec.  483  (1852). 

Massachusetts. — Fitchburg  &  W.          Indiana. — Evansville  &  T.  H.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hanna,  6  Gray,  539,  66  R.  Co.  v.  Keith,  8  Ind.  App.  57,  35 

Am.  Dec.  427  (1856).  N.  E.  296  (1893). 

New  Hampshire. — Moses  v.  Bos-          4  United  States. — Louisville  &  N. 

ton  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States,  39  Ct. 

71,  55  Am.  Dec.  222  (1851).  of  Cl.  405  (1904). 

New  York. — Blossom  v.  Griffin,          Pennsylvania. — Clarke    v.     Nee- 

13    N.    Y.  569,  67  Am.   Dec.  75  dies,  25  Pa.  338  (1855). 
(1856).  *  Hickox  v.  Naugatuck  R.  R.  Co., 

2  These  cases,  among  others,  sup-  31  Comm.  281,  83  Am.  Dec.  143 
port  the  text:  (1863).    See  also  Camden  &  A.  R. 

United  States.— Show  v.  Carruth,  R.  Co.  v.  Belknap,  21  Wend.  (N. 

1  Sprague,  324  (1856).  Y.)  354  (1839). 

Texas.— East  Line  &  Red  River  •  Moffat  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  R. 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  64  Tex.  615  (1885).  Co.,  15  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  630  (1867). 

[588] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  726 

tion  of  host  and  guest  is  thereby  established.1  No  lapse 
of  time  is  required  for  the  establishment  of  this  relation; 
if  the  guest  presents  himself  for  entertainment  and  is  ac- 
cepted, the  relation  "is  instantly  established  between 
them."  2  A  traveler  may,  however,  enter  a  public  room 
at  an  inn  without  at  once  presenting  himself  as  a  guest; 
and  in  such  case  the  relation  of  host  and  guest  is  not  estab- 
lished between  the  innkeeper  and  himself.  So  a  traveler 
who  enters  a  public  room  of  an  inn  for  a  temporary  purpose 
without  intending  to  lodge  or  be  otherwise  entertained  at 
the  inn  is  not  a  guest.3  To  be  received  at  an  inn  the  guest 
must  usually  communicate  with  the  innkeeper  or  with 
some  servant  authorized  to  receive  the  guests.4  Not  only 
must  the  guest  communicate  his  intention  to  the  inn- 
keeper; the  latter  must  consent  to  receive  him  as  a  guest.5 
If  the  innkeeper  refuses  to  receive  a  person  as  a  guest, 
whether  the  refusal  is  legal  or  illegal,  the  relation  is  not 
established.  Therefore  when  an  innkeeper  refuses  to  re- 
ceive a  guest  whether  justifiably  because  his  house  is  full, 
or  unjustifiably,  such  person  cannot,  by  placing  his  prop- 
erty in  the  inn,  make  the  innkeeper  liable  for  it.6 

§  726.  Goods  withheld  from  transportation. 

Even  after  a  relationship  has  been  entered  into  it  may 
by  understanding  of  the  parties  be  of  a  preliminary  char- 
acter, the  regular  service  not  to  be  begun  as  yet.  This  is 

1  California, — Pinkerton  v.  Wood-         3  Gastenhofer  v.  Clair,  10  Daly, 
ward,  33  Cal.  557,  91  Am.  Dec.  657      265  (N.  Y.,  1881). 

(1867).  4  Bernard    v.    Lalonde,    8    Leg. 

Maine.— Healey  v.  Gray,  68  Me.  News,  215  (Can.,  1885). 

489,  28  Am.  Rep.  80  (1878).  6  Brewer  v.  Caswell,  132  Ga.  563, 

Minnesota—  Ross  v.   Mellin,   36  64  S.  E.  674,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

Minn.  421,  32  N.  W.  172  (1887).  1107  (1909). 

2  Maine. — Norcross  v.   Norcross,  6  Bird  v.  Bird,  1  And.  29,  Benl.  & 
53  Me.  163  (1865).  D.    60    (Eng.,    1558);    Bennett   v. 

Minnesota.— Ross  v.   Mellin,   36      Mellor,  5  T.  R.  (Eng.,  1793)  273. 
Minn.  421,  32  N.  W.  172  (1887). 

[589] 


§726 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


of  chief  importance  in  respect  to  the  carriage  of  goods, 
the  law  holding  the  common  carrier  while  acting  simply 
as  warehouseman  of  the  goods  until  the  time  comes  for 
transportation,  responsible,  as  those  in  any  private  busi- 
nesses are,  simply  for  due  care,  while  after  that  time  comes 
he  is  held  responsible  as  a  public  carrier  to  the  liability 
for  an  insurer,  as  will  be  seen  later.  When,  therefore,  goods 
are  received  by  the  carrier,  not  for  immediate  transporta- 
tion, but  to  be  held  until  further  orders  of  the  shipper,  the 
carrier  holds  the  goods,  pending  such  orders,  as  a  ware- 
houseman, not  as  a  carrier.1  Thus  where  shipping  direc- 
tions are  to  be  sent  later,  the  carrier  until  such  directions 
are  received,  holds  the  goods  as  a  warehouseman  only.2 
And  where  although  the  goods  are  in  control  of  the  carrier 
something  more  is  to  be  done  to  them  by  the  shipper,  the 
carrier  is  still  a  warehouseman  only; 3  and  so  where  the 
goods  are  not  to  go  until  the  shipper  appears  to  accom- 

1  Massachusetts. — Barren    v.    El-      R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hanna,  6  Gray,  539, 
dredge,  100  Mass.  455,  1  Am.  Rep. 

126  (1868). 

Michigan. — Michigan  Southern  & 
X.  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shurtz,  7  Mich. 
515  (1859). 

New  Hampshire. — Moses  v.  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  H.  71, 
55  Am.  Dec.  222  (1851). 

New  York. — Rogers  v.  Wheeler, 
52  N.  Y.  262  (1873). 

Ohio.— Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Barrett,  36  Ohio  St.  448 
(1881). 

Wisconsin. — Schmidt  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Wis.  504,  63 
N.  W.  1057  (1895). 

England. — White  v.  Humphrey, 
11  Q.  B.  43  (1847). 

2  Illinois.— St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montgomery,  39  111. 
335  (1866). 

Massachusetts. — Fitchburg  &  W. 

[5901 


66  Am.  Dec.  427  (1856). 

Michigan. — Michigan  So.  &  N.  I. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shurtz,  7  Mich.  515 
(1859). 

Missouri. — Goodbar  v.  Wabash 
Ry.  Co.,  53  Mo.  App.  434  (1893). 

New  York. — Spade  v.  Hudson  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  Barb.  383  (1853). 

North  Carolina. — Basnight  v.  At- 
lantic &  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C. 
592,  16  S.  E.  323  (1892). 

Canada. — Milloy  v.  Grand  Trunk 
Ry.  Co.,  21  Ont.  App.  404 
(1894). 

3  United  States. — St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knight,  122  U.  S. 
79,  30  L.  ed.  1077,  7  S.  Ct.  1132 
(1887). 

Alabama. — Alabama  Great  South- 
ern R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mt.  Vernon  Co., 
84  Ala.  173,  4  So.  356  (1887). 

Dakota. — Mulligan    v.    Northern 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  727 

pany  them,  the  carrier  is  not  as  yet  liable  as  such.1  One 
of  the  cases  that  was  particularly  plain  was  where  for  the 
shipper's  convenience  the  carrier  received  goods  into  his 
warehouse  before  the  opening  of  navigation.2  Another 
was  where  a  railroad  had  been  seized  by  the  government 
for  the  transportation  of  troops  and  goods  were  accepted 
to  be  held  until  the  government  relinquished  control  of 
the  railroad.3  And  in  general  where  the  goods  are  to  be 
transported  at  a  certain  time  named  the  carrier  will  hold 
them  as  a  warehouseman  until  that  time,  and  as  carrier 
as  soon  as  the  stated  time  arrives.4  But  if  the  goods  are 
detained  before  transportation,  not  by  request  of  the 
shipper,  but  from  his  failure  to  furnish  legible  or  adequate 
shipping  directions,  the  carrier,  not  being  able  to  trans- 
port at  once,  is  responsible  only  as  a  warehouseman.5 

§  727.  Goods  at  carrier's  disposal. 

By  the  general  rule  if  the  goods  have  been  taken  into 
the  possession  of  the  carrier  for  immediate  despatch  with 
proper  shipping  directions,  he  then  becomes  liable  as  a 
common  carrier  although  transportation  has  not  begun.6 

Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  4  Dak.  315,  29  N.  2  Ham    v.    McPherson,    6    Upp. 

W.  659  (1886).  Can.  Q.  B.  (O.  S.)  360  (1871). 

Georgia. — Dixon    v.    Central    of  3  Illinois   Central  R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  110  Ga.  173,  35  S.  E.  Ashmead,  58  111.  487;  Illinois  Cen- 

369  (1899).  tral  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hornberger,   77 

Massachusetts. — Judson  v.  West-  111.  457  (1875). 

ern  R.  R.  Corp.,  4  Allen,  520,  81  4  Illinois  Central  R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Am.  Dec.  718  (1862).  Tronstine,  64  Miss.  834,  2  So.  255 

Michigan. — Stapleton    v.    Grand  (1887). 

Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  133  Mich.  187,  94  8  O'Neill  v.  New  York  Central  & 

N.  W.  739  (1903).  H.  R.   R.  R.  Co,,  60  N.  Y.   138 

New  York.— Wade  v.  Wheeler,  3  (1875). 

Lans.  201  (1870).  See  also  Campion    v.   Canadian 

England.— Cairns   v.    Robins,    8  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  43  Fed.  775  (1890). 

M.  &  W.  258  (1841).  6  This  general  principle  is  shown 

1  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  Ry.  by  the  following  cases: 

Co.  v.  Hunter,  42  Ark.  200  (1883).  United  States.— St.  Louis,  I.  M. 

[591] 


§727 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


If  the  carrier  delays  transportation  thereafter  to  suit  his 
own  convenience,  that  is  no  affair  of  the  shipper.  And 
this  will  be  true  even  if  something  remains  to  be  done  by 
the  carrier,  as  the  issue  of  a  bill  of  lading.1  But  if  there  is 
an  agreement  whereby  the  goods  placed  in  the  carrier's 
care  are  to  be  held  until  he  chooses  to  begin  transporta- 
tion,2 the  rule  is  otherwise.  On  this  principle  it  has  been 
held  that  where  cattle  were  by  the  permission  of  a  rail- 
road company  placed  in  its  pens  by  the  shipper's  servants 
and  remained  in  their  charge,  the  carrier  had  not  become 
responsible.3  And  the  same  decision  was  reached  in  a 
case  where  the  shipper  retained  the  right  to  remove  the 
cattle  from  the  pens  to  feed  and  water  them.4  And  it  has 


&  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knight,  122  U.  S. 
79,  30  L.  ed.  1077,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1132 
(1887). 

Connecticut. — Merriam  v.  Hart- 
ford &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Conn. 
354,  52  Am.  Dec.  344  (1850). 

Illinois. — Grand  Tower  M.  & 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Ullman,  89  111.  244 
(1878). 

Indiana. — Louisville,  N.,  A.  &  C. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Godman,  104  Ind.  490, 
4  N.  E.  163  (1885). 

Minnesota. — Shaw  v.  Northern 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  144,  41 
N.  W.  548  (1889). 

Missouri. — Mason  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  25  Mo.  App.  473 
(1887). 

New  Hampshire. — Moses  v.  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  H. 
71,  55  Am.  Dec.  222  (1851). 

New  York. — Ames  v.  Fargo,  114 
App.  Div.  666,  99  N.  Y.  Supp.  994 
(1906). 

Pennsylvania. — Clarke  v.  Nee- 
dles, 25  Pa.  338  (1855). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

[592] 


v.  Trawick,  80  Tex.  270,  15  S.  W. 
568,  19  S.  W.  948  (1891). 

1  See  to  this  effect  the  following 
recent  cases: 

Arkansas. — Garner  v.  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Ark.  353,  96 
S.  W.  187,  116  Am.  St.  Rep.  83 
(1906). 

Michigan. — Meloche  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  116  Mich.  69, 
74  N.  W.  301  (1898). 

North  Carolina. — Berry  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  1002,  30  S.  E. 
14  (1898). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Compton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  38 
S.  W.  220  (1896). 

2Fitchburg  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hanna,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  539,  66  Am. 
Dec.  427  (1856),  semble. 

3  Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Riley   (Tex.   App.),    1   S.   W.   446 
(1886). 

4  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Powers,  73  Neb.  816,  103  N.  W. 
678  (1905). 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  728 

even  been  held  l  that  when  a  shipment  is  being  delivered 
to  the  carrier  he  does  not  become  liable  as  such  until  the 
whole  shipment  is  delivered,  although  he  might,  if  he  had 
chosen,  forwarded  it  in  parcels  as  delivered.  It  should  be 
added  that  the  receipt  of  goods  by  a  common  carrier 
raises  the  presumption  that  he  takes  them  as  such.2  But 
of  course  if  the  goods  are  taken  by  a  warehouseman  even 
although  such  warehouseman  is  associated  with  the  car- 
rier in  the  service  the  presumption  is  otherwise.3 

§  728.  Conditional  acceptance. 

Another  possibility,  although  the  case  is  rare,  is  that  of 
a  conditional  responsibility.  The  most  significant  cases 
on  this  point  deal  with  the  receipt  of  baggage.  If,  for 
example,  his  baggage  is  received  at  a  station  before  the 
traveler  arrives  the  railroad  is  liable  from  the  outset  as  a 
common  carrier,  provided  he  soon  presents  himself  as  a 
passenger,  even  if  no  ticket  has  been  bought  in  advance; 4 
but  if  the  owner  fails  to  accompany  his  baggage  the  rail- 
road ceases  to  be  a  common  carrier  ab  initio.  In  like 
manner,  where  the  traveler  gave  his  luggage  to  the  porter 
of  the  inn  at  the  railroad  station,  and  the  porter  carried 
it  to  the  inn,  but  the  owner  never  became  a  guest,  it  was 
held  that  the  innkeeper  never  became  responsible  for  it 
as  innkeeper.5  In  this  case  it  will  be  noticed  that  if  the 
traveler  had  come,  the  special  responsibility  for  the  goods 
would  have  dated  from  the  moment  when  possession  was 

1  Watts  v.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R.      (1893).    But  see  Arthur  v.  Texas  & 
Corp.,  106  Mass.  466  (1871).    But     P.  Ry.  Co.,  204  U.  S.  505,  51  L.  ed. 
see  Shaw  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.      690,  27  Sup.  Ct.  338  (1907). 

Co.,  40  Minn.  144,  41  N.  W.  548  « Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
(1889).  Foster,  104  Ind.  293,  4  N.  E.  20,  54 

2  Berry  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  122      Am.  Rep.  319  (1885). 

N.  C.  1002,  30  S.  E.  14.  5  Tulane  Hotel  Co.  v.  Holohan, 

3  Reed  v.  Wilmington  Stb.  Co.,  1      112    Tenn.    214,    79    S.    W.    113 
Marv.    (Del.)    193,    40    Atl.    955      (1904). 

38  [  593  ] 


§  729  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

taken,  but  as  the  owner  never  came,  the  special  liability 
was  canceled.  In  other  words,  during  that  period  the 
degree  of  responsibility  is  doubtful,  and  it  is  settled  only 
by  the  event. 

Topic  B.  How  the  Relationship  is  Established 

§  729.  Evidence  of  actual  acceptance  necessary. 

To  establish  the  creation  of  the  relationship  between 
the  proprietor  and  his  customer  in  all  cases  there  must  be 
evidence  from  which  the  fact  of  actual  acceptance  on 
behalf  of  the  proprietor  may  be  shown.  Thus  the  de- 
posit of  goods,  beside  a  railroad  track,  as  upon  a  platform 
provided  to  receive  them,  though  they  are  so  deposited 
for  immediate  shipment  ready  to  be  loaded  upon  the 
freight  train  when  it  arrives,  is  not,  in  the  absence  of 
special  custom,  enough  to  render  the  carrier  liable.1  For 
as  a  general  rule  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  or  cus- 
tom, placing  goods  in  the  place  where  the  carrier  usually 
receives  them  does  not  render  the  carrier  liable  as  such.2 
Of  course  the  case  is  correct  which  held  that  a  delivery  to 
a  railroad  warehouse,  about  dark,  and  after  it  was  closed 
and  locked  for  the  night,  by  plaintiff's  agent,  by  opening 
the  upper  door  and  thereby  putting  the  goods  in,  there 
being  no  one  in  charge,  did  not  show  such  delivery  as 
would  charge  the  railroad.3  And  equally  obvious  is  the 
case  4  which  decides  that  loading  goods  on  a  car  standing 
on  a  side  track  does  not  constitute  a  delivery  to  the  rail- 

1  Georgia. — Wilson  v.  Atlanta  &          Texas. — Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
C.  Ry.  Co.,  82  Ga.  386,  9  S.  E.  1076      Co.  v.  Beard,  34  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
(1889).  188,  78  S.  W.  253  (1904). 

North   Carolina. — Wells  v.   Wil-  3  Spofford    v.    Pennsylvania   R. 

mington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Jones  L.  R.    Co.,    11    Pa.    Super.    Ct.    97 

(N.  C.)  47,  72  Am.  Dec.  556  (1858).  (1904). 

2  New  York. — Grosvenor  v.  New  *  Yoakum  v.  Dryden  (Tex.  Civ. 
York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  App.),  26  S.  W.  312  (1894). 

34  (1868). 

[594] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKNIG         [  §  730 

road  company,  where  the  station  agent,  on  being  notified 
thereof,  declines  to  ship  the  goods,  and  there  is  no  custom 
or  regulation  of  the  railroad  company  making  such  load- 
ing a  delivery. 

§  730.  Notice  not  enough  in  itself. 

In  these  cases  there  is  some  .authority  for  holding  that 
a  deposit  in  the  regular  place  for  receiving  goods  followed 
by  notice  to  the  carrier  is  enough  to  make  the  carrier 
responsible  as  such,  even  without  proof  of  a  special  cus- 
tom to  that  effect.1  In  one  case  it  was  even  said  that  in 
such  a  case  the  goods  were  in  possession  of  the  carrier  as 
warehouseman  until  notice,  and  thereafter  in  his  posses- 
sion as  carrier.2  This  is  an  untenable  contention  which, 
another  court  said,  no  one  would  make.3  The  true  doc- 
trine seems  to  be  that  mere  notice  could  not  in  such  a 
case  impose  liability  on  the  company;  although  acquies- 
cence of  an  authorized  servant  of  the  company  at  the  time 
of  receiving  the  notice  would  amount  to  an  express  ac- 
ceptance of  the  goods.  So  if  the  carrier  is  in  the  habit  of 
issuing  checks  for  trunks  upon  taking  them,  it  is  not  good 
delivery  to  leave  a  trunk  at  the  baggage  room  door  with- 
out getting  a  check.4  On  the  other  hand  it  is  well  agreed 
that  where  the  usual  notice  is  given  the  facts  may  show 
customary  acceptance  as  where  a  baggage  transfer  com- 
pany put  the  guest's  baggage  on  the  platform  of  the  hotel 
and  shouted  "baggage"5  or  on  the  sidewalk  in  front  of 
the  hotel  and  rang  the  porter's  bell.6 

1  Rogers  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  3  Yoakum  v.  Dryden  (Tex.  Civ. 
2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  269  (1869).    Contra,  App.),  26  S.  W.  312  (1894). 
Anderson  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Ball  v.  New  Jersey  Sb.  Co.,  1 
38  So.  661  (1905).  Daly,  491  (1865). 

2  Basnight  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  6  Maloney  v.  Bacon,  33  Mo.  App. 
R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  592,  16  S.  E.  323  501  (1888). 

(1892).  •  Becker  v.  Haynes,  29  Fed.  441 

(1887). 

[595] 


§  731  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  731.  When  acceptance  takes  place. 

It  sometimes  becomes  important  to  determine  at  what 
moment  goods  delivered  to  the  carrier  by  tackling  or  other 
mechanical  device  pass  into  the  possession  of  the  carrier. 
Where  goods  are  taken  out  of  the  vehicle  in  which  they 
are  brought  to  the  conveyance  of  the  carrier,  the  tackling 
by  which  the  transfer  is  effected  usually  belongs  to,  or  at 
least  is  operated  by  the  carrier;  and  in  that  case  the 
carrier's  responsibility  begins  as  soon  as  the  goods  are 
attached  to  the  tackling.1  The  determining  fact  in  such 
cases  is  the  control  of  the  machinery.2  Much  will  depend 
upon  the  manner  in  which  they  receive  goods  for  trans- 
portation, the  provision  they  make  for  raising  heavy 
articles  into  their  cars,  and  the  active  participation  of  the 
agent  of  the  company  in  reference  to  the  same.3  Where 
grain  or  liquid  is  shipped  in  bulk,  it  is  usually  delivered 
through  a  pipe  or  chute;  and  it  may  be  important  to  de- 
termine the  moment  during  delivery  when  the  liability  of 
the  carrier  begins.  The  cases  hold  (following  the  doctrine 
laid  down  in  the  case  of  delivery  by  a  crane)  that  when  the 
carrier,  has  control  of  the  mouth  of  the  pipe,  he  is  responsi- 
ble for  the  grain  spilled.4  But  it  would  seem  that  the 
same  result  might  be  reached  on  a  more  general  ground. 
As  soon  as  goods  are  allowed  to  fall  freely  into  a  receptacle 
provided  by  the  carrier,  like  coal  passing  from  the  mouth 
of  a  chute  or,  in  this  case,  the  grain  falling  past  the  cut-off 
at  the  top  of  the  pipe,  the  shipper  has  completely  lost  con- 
trol and  the  carrier,  it  would  seem,  has  accepted  posses- 
sion. At  that  moment  then  the  bailment  and  the  carrier's 
liability  begins. 

^ee  The  Cordillera,  5  Blatch.  3  Dewey,   J.,  in   Merritt  v.  Old 

518  (1867).  Colony  &   N.   Ry.   Co.,    11   Allen 

2  Thomas   v.    Day,    4   Esp.   262  (Mass.),  80,  83  (1865). 

(1803).    See  also  Street  v.  Morrison,  4  The  R.  G.  Winslow,  4  Biss.  13, 

5  Allen  (New  Bruns.),  296  (1862).  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,736  (1860). 

[596] 


§  732.  Where  acceptance  takes  place. 

If  the  carrier  consents  to  send  for  a  parcel  at  the  house 
of  the  shipper,  it  would  seem  to  be  clear  that  he  becomes 
liable  at  the  shipper's  house,  where  his  servant  accepts 
the  parcel.1  So  if  an  express  company  by  its  agent  re- 
ceives goods  as  they  arrive  at  the  freight  station  of  a  rail- 
road, the  express  company  is  liable  from  that  time,  though 
it  has  not  yet  brought  the  goods  to  its  office.2  Upon  the 
same  principle,  where  a  carrier  by  sea,  in  a  harbor  where 
a  vessel  cannot  reach  the  wharf  to  take  its  cargo,  is  ac- 
customed to  send  lighters  to  the  wharf  to  receive  the 
cargo  and  bring  it  to  the  vessel,  the  carrier's  liability 
begins  as  soon  as  the  goods  are  received  on  board  the 
lighter.3  In  one  recent  case  a  train  master  was  held  to 
have  authority  to  accept  freight  when  deposited  beside 
the  track  far  from  the  nearest  station.4  And  in  another 
case  where  a  railroad  at  a  certain  station  was  accustomed 
to  issue  bills  of  lading  for  cotton  delivered  at  a  compress, 
it  was  held  that  the  railroad  was  thereafter  responsible 
for  the  cotton.5 

§  733.  Consent  to  delivery  implied. 

The  consent  of  the  carrier  to  receive  goods  when  placed 
in  a  certain  place  may  be  established  by  evidence  of  a 
special  custom  to  that  effect.  In  such  a  case  the  extent  of 
the  carrier's  responsibility  would  be  determined  by  the 
nature  of  the  custom.  If  a  custom  can  be  shown  for  the 
carrier  to  be  in  charge  and  undertake  responsibility  for  the 
goods  from  the  moment  of  deposit,  then  he  will  undergo 

^Davey  v.  Mason,  Car  &  M.  45  The  Oregon,   Deady,    179    (1866); 

(1841).    But  see  Boys  v.  Pink,  8  C.  The  City  of  Alexandria,  28  Fed. 

&  P.  361  (1838).  202  (1886);  Campbell  v.  The  Bark 

2  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Newby,  36  Sunlight,  2  Hughes,  9  (1877). 

Ga.  635  (1867).  *  Georgia  S.  &  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

3  Bulkley  v.  Naumkeag  S.  C.  Co.,      Marchman,  121  Ga.  235,  48  S.  E. 
24  How.  (U.  S.)  386  (1860);  The     961  (1904). 

Bark  Edwin,   1  Spra.  477  (1859);         5  Arthur  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

[597]  ' 


§733 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


the  legal  liability  of  carrier  from  the  moment  of  deposit 
in  accordance  with  the  custom,1  even  though  he  has  no 
notice  of  the  deposit.2  But  if  the  giving  of  notice  is  part 
of  the  custom,  notice  must  be  shown  in  the  particular  case.3 
This  problem  often  arises  in  the  case  of  a  union  station, 
where  goods  arriving  by  one  carrier  are  to  be  delivered  by 
it  to  a  second  carrier  for  further  carriage.4  Under  these 
circumstances  it  is  frequently  the  custom  for  the  first 
carrier  to  deposit  the  goods  in  a  part  of  the  station  ap- 
propriated to  the  second  carrier,  and  for  the  latter  then 
to  be  in  charge  of  the  goods  without  notice.  In  such  a  case 
the  liability  of  the  second  carrier  begins  at  the  moment  of 
deposit,  even  though  the  deposit  is  made  at  night  or  some 
other  time  when  the  second  carrier  has  in  fact  no  servants 
at  hand  to  receive  and  care  for  the  goods  thus  deposited. 
Where  such  a  custom  is  proved  to  place  goods  in  a  freight 
car  on  a  siding,  the  carrier  is  responsible  as  such  from  the 


204  U.  S.  505,  51  L.  ed.  590,  27  Sup. 
Ct.  338  (1907). 

1  Alabama. — Montgomery    &    E. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Kolb,  73  Ala.  396,  49 
Am.  Rep.  54  (1882). 

Connecticut. — Merriam  v.  Hart- 
ford &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Conn. 
354,  52  Am.  Dec.  344  (1850). 

Indiana. — Evansville  &  T.  H.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Keith,  8  Ind.  App.  57,  35 
N.  E.  296  (1893). 

Iowa. — Green  v.  Milwaukee  &  S. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  la.  100  (1874). 

2  It  has  indeed  been  asserted  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York, 
that  a  delivery  in  accordance  with 
any   custom   must    always   be   ac- 
companied by  notice  to  some  au- 
thorized agent  of  the  company;  but 
this    undoubtedly    goes    too    far. 
Packard  v.  Getman,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
757  (1827). 

[598] 


3  See  particularly : 
Connecticut. — Trowbridge  v.  Cha- 

pin,  23  Conn.  595  (1855). 

Michigan. — Wright  v.  Caldwell, 
3  Mich.  51  (1853). 

4  The  cases  put  in  the  text  as  to 
transfer  in  a  union  station  in  suc- 
cessive carriage  are  based  upon  the 
following  authorities: 

Alabama. — Montgomery  &  E. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Kolb,  73  Ala.  396,  49 
Am.  Rep.  54  (1882). 

Arkansas. — Railway  Co.  v.  Mur- 
phy, 60  Ark.  333,  30  S.  W.  419 
(1895). 

Connecticut. — Converse  v.  Nor- 
wich &  N.  Y.  Transp.  Co.,  33  Conn. 
166  (1865). 

Illinois. — Illinois  Central  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Smyser,  38  111.  354,  87  Am. 
Dec.  301  (1865). 

Indiana.— Evansville  &  T.  H.  R. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING        [  §  734 

moment  the  car  is  loaded  and  ready  for  the  carrier  to  take 
it,  and  if  the  custom  is  to  take  charge  of  goods  deposited 
beside  the  track  ready  for  shipment,  the  carrier's  re- 
sponsibility begins  from  the  moment  of  such  deposit. 

§  734.  Customary  acceptance  of  goods. 

Where  the  carrier  consents  to  receive  goods  when  they 
have  been  placed  in  a  certain  spot,  he  may  become  re- 
sponsible for  goods  as  soon  as  they  are  placed  there,  with- 
out further  act  of  acceptance  by  any  person  acting  for  him. 
Where  a  railroad  company  made  an  express  agreement 
to  accept  freight  when  placed  beside  its  track  at  a  point 
between  stations,  it  was  held  that  its  responsibility  as 
carrier  began  as  soon  as  the  goods  were  deposited  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  agreement.1  And  so  where  a  railway 
company  furnished  an  intending  shipper,  at  his  request, 
with  a  car  and  left  it  upon  a  switch  where  it  was  loaded, 
and  thereupon  the  agent  of  the  carrier  was  notified 
thereof  and  he  in  turn  had  telegraphed  to  the  train  master, 
it  was  held  that  the  car  must  be  deemed  delivered  to  the 
carrier  for  the  purpose  of  shipment,  though  no  bill  of 
lading  had  been  issued  therefor,  it  being  the  custom  of 
the  carrier  to  move  freight  in  advance  of  the  issuing  of 
such  bill.2  But  it  was  held  in  another  case  3  that  the 
mere  loading  of  cotton  by  a  shipper  on  a  car  set  out  at  a 
siding  as  was  customary  at  a  point  where  the  carrier  had 
no  station  or  agent,  neither  it  nor  its  agent  having  any 
knowledge  that  the  car  was  loaded  for  shipment,  was  not 

R.  Co.  v.  Keith,  8  Ind.  App.  57,  35  Marchman,  121  Ga.  235,  48  S.  E. 

N.  E.  296  (1893).  961  (1904). 

Kentucky. — Newport  News  &  N.  z  Railway    Co.    v.    Murphy,    60 

V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mendell,  17  Ky.  Ark.  333,  30  S.  W.  419,  46  Am.  St. 

Law   Rep.    1400,   34   S.   W.    1081  Rep.  202  (1895). 

(1896).  'Tate  v.  Yazoo  R.  R.  Co.,  78 

Georgia  S.  &  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Miss.  842,  29  So.  392,  84  Am.  St. 

Rep.  649  (1901). 

[599] 


§  735  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

such  a  delivery  to  the  carrier  as  to  make  it  liable  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  for  its  loss  by  fire  before  the  arrival  of  the 
train  which  in  the  regular  course  of  business  would  have 
transported  it  to  its  destination.  The  carrier  will  there- 
fore not  be  liable  under  the  custom,  without  express  assent 
and  assumption  of  actual  possession,  unless  the  custom  is 
strictly  followed  out  by  depositing  the  goods  in  the  cus- 
tomary and  reasonable  place.  Thus  where  a  cutter  1  was 
placed  upon  the  platform  of  a  freight  station  and  the 
proper  agent  notified,  but  it  was  carelessly  placed  so  that 
it  projected  over  the  tracks  and  was  struck  and  injured  by 
a  passing  train,  the  court  held  that  the  delivery  was  not 
as  perfect  and  complete  as  it  should  have  been,  and  that 
the  carrier  had  never  come  into  possession  of  the  cutter. 

§  735.  Acceptance  of  passengers  at  stations. 

It  must  be  obvious  that  the  relation  of  carrier  and  pas- 
senger may  arise  before  actual  transportation  has  begun. 
Thus,  if  a  person  who  intends  to  be  carried  is  on  board 
a  vehicle  which  is  ready  to  start  he  has  become  a  pas- 
senger, though  the  vehicle  has  not  yet  started.2  So  one 
who  is  on  a  steamboat  at  a  wharf,  ready  to  start,  is  a  pas- 
senger, though  the  boat  has  not  yet  started.3  One  who  is 
in  the  waiting  room  of  a  station,  waiting  to  take  the  car- 
rier's car,  has  been  held  to  be  a  passenger.4  But  the  ques- 
tion involved  is  merely  the  right  of  such  person  to  safe 
premises,  or  to  proper  treatment  by  the  carrier's  servants, 

1  Grosvenor  v.  New  York  Central  Co.  v.  Strange,  171  Ind.  160,  84  N. 

R.  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  34  (1868).  E.  819,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1041 

2Massiter  v.  Cooper,  4  Esp.  260  (1908). 

(1803).  New  York.— Gordon  v.  Grand  St. 

3  United  States.— Hrebrik  v.  Carr,  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
29  Fed.  Rep.  298  (1886).  546  (1863). 

New  York. — Dougherty  v.  N.  Y.  Virginia. — Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R. 

Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  Co.  v.  Galliher,  89  Va.  639,  16  S.  E. 

Supp.  746  (1904).  935  (1893). 

4  Indiana. — Pere  Marquette  R.  R. 

[600] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING        [  §  736 

and  this  right  would  exist  independently  of  the  relation  of 
carrier  and  passenger.  It  is  better,  therefore,  to  speak  ] 
of  the  obligation  which  the  carrier  owes  "to  one  intending 
to  become  a  passenger  "  in  one  of  its  trains,  who  would 
have  a  right  to  use  the  waiting  room  for  a  reasonable  time 
before  the  arrival  of  the  expected  train.2  The  essential 
elements  are  summarized  thus  in  a  recent  case — "a  per- 
son intending  to  become  a  passenger  must  go  to  the  station 
at  a  reasonable  time  before  the  time  fixed  for  the  departure 
of  the  train  upon  which  he  intends  to  take  passage,  in  a 
proper  manner,  and  there,  either  by  the  purchase  of  a 
ticket  or  in  some  other  manner,  indicate  to  the  carrier  his 
intention  to  take  passage  and  thus  place  himself  in  the 
carrier's  charge."  3 

§  736.  Boarding  a  moving  vehicle. 

It  was  early  held  that  when  a  man,  intending  to  take 
passage  in  a  vehicle  which  has  stopped  to  receive  him, 
puts  his  foot  upon  the  step  or  his  hand  upon  a  hand  rail, 
he  has  been  accepted  as  a  passenger,  and  the  responsibility 
of  the  carrier  toward  him  as  a  passenger  begins.  The 
leading  case  is  the  English  case  of  Brienv.  Bennett.4  An 
omnibus  had  stopped  for  a  passenger,  and  just  as  the 
passenger  put  his  foot  on  the  step  the  omnibus  started, 
throwing  the  passenger  to  the  ground;  the  carrier  was 

1  Devens,  J.,  in  Heinlien  v.  Bos-      I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  103  Mo.  App.  308, 
ton  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  147  Mass.  136,      77  S.  W.  153  (1903). 

16  N.  E.  698,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  676  New     York.— Poucher    v.     New 

(1888).  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y. 

2  See    also    among    many    other  263,  10  Am.  Rep.  364  (1872). 
cases:  Texas. — Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Georgia.— Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  Jones  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  39  S.  W. 

v.  Perry,  58  Ga.  461  (1877).  124  (1897). 

Kentucky—  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  3  Fremont,  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co. 

Co.  v.  Reynolds,  71  S.  W.  516,  24  v.  Hagblad,  72  Neb.  773,  101  N.  W. 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1402  (1903).  1033,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  254,  and 

Missouri. — Albin  v.  Chicago,  R.  cases  cited  (1904). 

4  8  C.  &  P.  724  (1839). 

[601] 


§736 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


held  liable.  What  Lord  Abinger  then  said  has  been  uni- 
versally followed.1  "I  think  that  the  stopping  of  the 
omnibus  implies  a  consent  to  take  the  plaintiff  as  a 
passenger."  In  accordance  with  this  reasoning  it  has 
heen  held  in  most  cases  2  that  the  relation  of  carrier  and 
passenger  is  established  the  moment  the  vehicle  begins 
to  slacken  its  speed  in  response  to  the  passenger's  signal.3 
Where  the  invitation  is  express,  there  is  no  doubt  of  this. 
So  where  a  train  which  was  going  slowly  was  flagged  by 
an  intending  passenger,  and  the  conductor  told  him  to 
jump  on,  he  became  a  passenger  at  once.4  On  the  other 
hand  if  a  person  gets  on  a  moving  train  after  it  has  started, 
he  is  "outside  of  any  implied  invitation"  on  the  part  of 
the  carrier,  and  does  not  at  once  acquire  the  rights  of  a 


1  See  among  the  many  cases  on 
this  point: 

Maryland. — Central  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  74  Md.  212,  21  Atl.  706 
(1891). 

Massachusetts. — Gordon  v.  West 
End  St.  Ry.,  175  Mass.  181,  55  N. 
E.  990  (1900);  Davey  v.  Green- 
field &  T.  F.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  177  Mass. 
106,  58  N.  E.  172  (1900). 

Minnesota. — Smith  v.  St.  Paul 
City  Ry.  Co.,  32  Minn.  1,  18  N.  W. 
827,  50  Am.  Rep.  550  (1884). 

2  California. — Finkeldey   v.    Om- 
nibus Cable  Co.,   114  Cal.  28,  45 
Pac.  996  (1896)  "the  slackening  of 
the  speed  in  response  to  his  signal 
was  an  invitation  from  the  driver 
for  him  to  board  the  car." 

Georgia. — White  v.  Atlanta  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  92  Ga.  494,  17  S.  E.  672 
(1893). 

Illinois. — North  Chicago  St.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  140  111.  275,  29 
N.  E.  672  (1892)  "it  was  a  fair  ques- 
tion for  the  jury  whether,  under  all 

[602] 


the  circumstances,  the  plaintiff  was 
not  invited  to  get  on  the  car.  If  he 
was  so  invited,  he  was  a  passenger." 

New  York. — Butler  v.  Glens 
Falls,  S.  H.  &  F.  E.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 
121  N.  Y.  112,  24  N.  E.  187 
(1890). 

Texas. — Lewis  v.  Houston  Elec. 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  88  S.  W.  489 
(1905). 

3  In  some  jurisdictions,  however, 
it  is  held  that  though  the  car  stops 
in  response  to  a  signal,  the  person 
for  whom  it  stops  does  not  become  a 
passenger    until    he    reaches    the 
vehicle. 

Connecticut. — Donovan  v.  Hart- 
ford St.  Ry.  Co.,  65  Conn.  201,  32 
Atl.  350,  29  L.  R.  A.  297. 

Massachusetts. — Duchemin  v. 
Boston  E.  Ry.  Co.,  186  Mass.  353, 
71  N.  E.  780,  66  L.  R.  A.  980 
1904). 

4  Kansas  &  G.  S.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Borough,  72  Tex.  108,  10  S.  W.  711 
(1888). 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  737 

passenger.1  In  the  case  just  cited,  it  is  held  that  even  his 
reaching  the  platform  of  the  car  safely  does  not  give  him 
those  rights.  "If  he  had  reached  a  place  of  safety  and 
seated  himself  inside  of  the  car,  the  bailment  of  his  person 
to  the  defendant  would  have  been  accomplished,  so  that 
he  would  not  have  been  prevented  from  asserting  such 
rights  because  of  his  improper  way  of  getting  upon  the 
train.  But  we  think  that  he  could  not  assert  them  until 
he  had  passed  the  danger  which  met  him  in  the  threshold, 
and  had  put  himself  in  the  proper  place  for  the  carriage 
of  passengers."  There  are  variations  among  the  author- 
ities on  this  point,  but  this  may  go  as  a  composite  state- 
ment of  the  law.2 

§  737.  Carriage  of  goods  secured  by  fraud. 

When  the  carriage  of  goods  is  secured  by  some  fraud 
upon  the  carrier  practiced  by  the  shipper,  the  carrier  does 
not  occupy  the  position  of  a  common  carrier  with  regard 
to  the  goods.  Thus,  when  one  shipped  a  bag  of  money 
concealed  in  a  bundle  of  hay  and  the  money  was  lost,  the 
carrier  was  held  to  be  not  responsible  for  the  loss.3  And 
in  similar  cases  a  carrier  has  been  held  not  responsible  for 
money  hidden  in  package  of  tea,4  or  in  boxes  with  house- 
hold goods.5  Upon  like  principles  it  has  often  been  held 
that  if  the  goods  are  tendered  in  such  a  shape  as  to  inevi- 

1  Merrill  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,         Mississippi. — Georgia   Pac.    Ry. 
139  Mass.  238,  1  N.  E.  548,  52  Am.      Co.  v.  Robinson,  68  Miss.  643,  10 
Rep.  705  (1885).  So.  60  (1891). 

2  See  also:  Pennsylvania. — Sharrer    v.    Pax- 
United  Slates.— Pennsylvania  R.      son,     171    Pa.    26,    33    Atl.    120 

R.  Co.  v.  Reed,  60  Fed.  694  (1894).  (1895). 

Illinois. — Illinois  Central  R.  R.  3  Gibbon    v.    Paynton,    4    Burr. 

Co.  v.  O'Keefe,  168  111.  115,  48  N.  E.  2298  (1769). 

294,  39  L.  R.  A.  148,  61  Am.  St.  4  Bradley  v.  Water-house,  3  C.  & 

Rep.  68  (1897).  P.  318  (1828). 

Massachusetts. — Lockwoodv.Bos-  'Chicago   &   A.    R.    R.   Co.    v. 

ton  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  200  Mass.  Thompson,  19  111.  578  (1858). 
537,  86  N.  E.  934  (1908). 

[603] 


§  738  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

tably  mislead  the  carrier  in  judging  their  character,  then 
there  is  not  such  acceptance  as  gives  rise  to  the  obliga- 
tion which  a  common  carrier  owes  a  shipper.  Thus,  when 
goods  of  great  value  were  sent  in  an  ordinary  package 
without  declaring  their  nature,  the  carrier  was  not  held 
liable  for  their  value  in  case  of  loss.1  And  the  same  de- 
cision was  reached  where  a  box  containing  a  diamond  was 
given  a  mean  appearance  by  the  shipper.2  So,  where 
valuable  laces  and  jewels  were  packed  in  ordinary  dry 
goods  boxes  to  look  like  merchandise  the  principle  was 
held  to  apply.3  And  this  was  even  held  to  extend  to  a 
case  where  valuable  clothing  was  hidden  in  bedding.4 
On  the  other  hand  if  there  is  no  apparent  design  to  tender 
the  goods  in  false  dress,  the  obligation  seems  to  be  upon 
the  carrier  to  inquire  the  value  of  the  goods,5  or  their 
character.6  But  this  principle  obviously  has  no  applica- 
tion to  a  case  where  a  box  containing  jewels  was  marked 
"glass,"  7  or  where  a  very  large  sum  of  money  was  sent 
under  circumstances  indicating  very  little  value.8 

§  738.  Stealing  a  ride. 

One  who  steals  a  ride  upon  a  vehicle  of  the  carrier,  that 
is,  conceals  himself,  intending  to  evade  fare,  is  not  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  passenger.9  And  the  same  thing  is  true  where 
a  person  gets  on  board  the  carrier's  vehicle,  refuses  either 

1  Batson   v.    Donovan,    4   B.    &  7  Relf  v.  Rapp,  3  W.  &  S.  (Pa.) 
Aid.  21  (1820).  21,  37  Am.  Dec.  528  (1841). 

2  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Everett,  8Oppenheimer  v.  United  States 
37  Ga.  688  (1868).  Exp.  Co.,  69  111.  62,  18  Am.  Rep. 

3  Warner    v.     Western    Transp.  596(1873). 

Co.,  5  Robt.  (N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.)  490  9  Georgia.— Wynn  v.  City  &  Sub- 
(1868).  urban  Ry.  Co.  of  Savannah,  91  Ga. 

4  Chicago   &   A.   R.    R.    Co.    v.      344,  17  S.  E.  649  (1893). 

Shea,  66  111.  471  (1873).  Illinois—  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

6  Phillips  v.  Earle,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  Co.  v.  Mehlsack,  131  111.  61,  22  N. 

182  (1829).  E.    812,     19    Am.    St.    Rep.     17 

6  Merchants'  Desp.  Co.  v.  Bolles,  (1889). 

80  111.  473  (1875).  Indiana.— Chicago  &  E.  Ry.  Co. 

[604] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  738 

to  pay  fare  or  to  leave  the  vehicle,  and  succeeds  in  staying 
on  the  vehicle  by  force.  In  a  case  of  this  sort  a  person 
entered  a  stagecoach  with  a  revolver  and  compelled  the 
driver  to  allow  him  to  ride  without  payment  of  fare.  The 
coach  broke  down,  and  he  was  injured  and  sued  for  dam- 
ages; but  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  a  passenger  and  could 
not  recover  damages.1  So  where  a  perso.n  is  riding  on  a 
train,  having  used  or  intended  to  use  a  ticket  which  he 
knows  he  has  no  right  to  use,  and  concealing  or  intending 
to  conceal  that  fact  from  the  conductor,  he  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  a  passenger,  even  if  the  conductor  permits  him 
to  ride.2  The  consent  of  the  conductor  to  accept  the 
ticket  is  not  material  if  the  consent  was  obtained  by  fraud; 
though  probably  if  knowing  the  facts  the  conductor  al- 
lowed the  substitution,  the  person  so  allowed  to  ride  would 
be  a  passenger; 3  and  clearly,  if  the  carrier  habitually  per- 
mitted such  substitution,  in  spite  of  the  exact  terms  of 
the  ticket,  the  person  using  it  in  accordance  with  the  cus- 
tom would  be  a  passenger.4  It  sometimes  happens  that  a 
person  enters  a  carrier's  vehicle  prepared  to  pay  fare  if  it 

v.  Field,  7  Ind.  App.  172,  34  N.  E.  Iowa.— Way  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 

406  (1893).  P.  Ry.  Co.,  64  la.  48,  19  N.  W.  828, 

Maryland. — State  v.  Baltimore  &  52  Am.  Rep.  431  (1884),  nontrans- 

O.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84  (1865).  ferable  mileage  book  issued  to  an- 

Massachusetts. — Planz  v.  Boston  other. 

&  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  157  Mass.  377,  32  Kansas.— Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

N.  E.  356,  17  L.  R.  A.  835  (1892).  Nichols,  8  Kan.,  505,  12  Am.  Rep. 

Missouri. — Muehlhausen    v.    St.  475   (1871),  fraudulent  impersona- 

Louis  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Mo.  332,  2  S.  tion  of  express  messenger. 

W.  315  (1886).  Massachusetts. — Fitzmaurice      v. 

New  York.— Barry  v.  Union  Ry.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 

Co.,  105  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  520,  94  192  Mass.  159,  78  N.  E.  418,  6  L.  R. 

N.  Y.  Supp.  449  (1905).  A.   (N.  S.)   1146  (1906),  students' 

1  Higley  v.  Gilmer,  3  Mont.  90.  ticket  obtained  by  fraud. 

2 Illinois—  Toledo  W.  &  W.  Ry.  3  Way  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Beggs,  85  111.  80,  28  Am.  Co.,  supra. 

Rep.   613    (1887),    nontransferable  4  Great    Northern    Ry.    Co.    v. 

free  pass  issued  to  another.  Harrison,  10  Exch.  Rep.  376  (1854). 

[605] 


§  739  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

is  demanded,  but  hoping  to  escape  the  notice  of  the  con- 
ductor and  so  avoid  paying  fare.  It  is  hard  to  see  how 
this  form  of  fraud  differs  from  any  other,  and  the  better 
view  would  seem  to  be  that  such  a  person  is  not  a  passenger 
until  by  paying  his  fare  he  is  received  as  such  by  express 
consent  of  the  conductor.1  On  the  other  hand  one  who 
takes  a  train  intending  to  pay  his  fare  with  a  ticket  which 
he  bona  fide  believes  to  be  a  good  one  is  a  passenger, 
though  in  fact  the  ticket  is  not  good  for  a  passage  in  that 
train;  and  he  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  passenger  2  until  he 
learns  his  mistake  and  has  a  chance  to  leave  the  train,  or 
decides  to  stay  on  the  train  and  pay  his  fare. 

Topic  C.  Whether  Acceptance  is  Authorized 

§  739.  Who  is  the  real  proprietor. 

Questions  often  arise  as  to  by  whom  the  undertaking  is 
professed.  The  service  may  actually  be  undertaken  by 
one  party,  and  yet  another  be  the  party  ultimately  respon- 
sible whom  it  is  wished  to  reach.  Thus  it  is  often  of  first 
importance  to  determine  which  one  of  several  parties  en- 
gaged in  the  service  in  question  is  the  real  principal.  That 
question  as  we  shall  then  see  is  often  difficult  of  solution 
by  reason  of  the  confusion  in  the  facts;  but  the  legal 
problem  is  simply  that  of  determining  which  party  it  is 
who  has  undertaken  the  service  of  the  public.  Even  the 
ostensible  manager  is  not  the  true  proprietor  of  the  public 

1  See  Gardner  v.  New  Haven  &  N.         Missouri. — Short  v.  St.  Louis  & 
Co.,  51  Conn.  143,  50  Am.  Rep.  12     S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  130  S.  W. 
(1883),  and  note;  Ramm  v.  Minne-      488  (1910). 

apolis  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  94  la.  296,  Pennsylvania. — Arnold   v.   Penn- 

62   N.   W.   751    (1895).     But   see  sylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  115  Pa.  135,  8 

Doran  v.  East  River  Ferry  Co.,  3  Atl.  213,  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  542  (1887), 

Lans.  (N.  Y.)  105  (1870).  passenger  on  freight  train. 

2  Indiana. — Cincinnati,   H.  &  I.  West  Virginia. — Boggess  v.  Ches- 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Carper,  112  Ind.  26,  14  apeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  297, 
N.  E.  352  (1887),  traveler  on  freight  16  S.   E.   525,   23  L.   R.   A.  777, 
train.  limited  ticket  had  expired  (1892). 

[606] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  740 

enterprise.  Thus  the  salaried  manager  of  a  hotel  belong- 
ing to  a  corporation  is  not  to  be  held  responsible  as  an 
innkeeper;  the  real  owner  of  the  enterprise,  the  person  in 
actual  charge  of  it  cannot  escape  responsibility  by  taking 
out  a  license  to  conduct  an  inn  in  the  name  of  another,  or 
by  placing  another's  name  on  the  sign  or  the  advertise- 
ments as  the  ostensible  innkeeper.  In  spite  of  such  de- 
vices, the  person  who  actually  conducts  the  inn  will  be 
held  as  the  innkeeper.1  However,  it  must  be  shown  that 
the  party  sought  to  be  charged  is  in  truth  the  proprietor 
of  the  enterprise.  Thus  it  was  held  in  an  early  case  that 
the  owners  of  a  ferry  were  not  liable  for  the  defaults  of 
their  lessee  who  operated  it.2 

§  740.  Situation  after  railroad  leases. 

Thus,  generally  speaking,  it  is  the  one  who  is  conduct- 
ing the  service  who  assumes  the  duties  with  respect  to  its 
facilities  to  the  public.  This  proprietor  is  not  necessarily 
the  owner  of  the  facilities  used;  indeed  very  frequently 
the  plant  is  leased  by  the  party  that  is  operating  it.  The 
chief  example  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  history  of  rail- 
roads in  this  country  which  has  been  one  of  constant  com- 
bination of  the  existing  roads  into  longer  lines.  This  is 
sometimes  accomplished  by  a  consolidation  of  two  rail- 
way corporations  into  one.  But  it  is  frequently  done  by 
leasing  one  railroad  to  another,  the  latter  road  then  oper- 
ating both.  Where  this  is  the  case,  it  must  be  clear  that 
the  operating  road  is  the  carrier,  and  cannot  escape  lia- 
bility as  such.  It  is  in  fact  carrying  on  the  business  of 
carriage  over  the  whole  line.3  On  the  other  hand,  the 

1  Davis  v.  Button,  78  Cal.  247,  18          United    -States.— Illinois    Central 
Pac.  133,  20  Pac.  545  (1889).  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sheegog,  215  U.  S.  308, 

2  Ladd  v.  Cholard,  Minor  (Ala.),      30  L.  ed.  101  (1909). 

366.  Alabama.— South  Western  R.  R. 

3  See  among  other  cases  illustrat-     Co.  v.  Webb,  48  Ala.  585  (1872). 
ing  the  general  principle:  Arkansas. — Eureka  Springs  Ry. 

[607] 


§  741  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

leasing  corporation  has  evidently  gone  out  of  the  busi- 
ness of  carrying  and  can  no  longer  be  held  to  be  a  carrier, 
though  it  may  as  a  corporation,  continue  liable  for  the 
reception  and  safe  carriage  of  persons  or  goods  because 
of  some  provision  in  its  charter.1 

§  741.  Dealings  with  unauthorized  persons. 

One  who  has  dealings  with  an  unauthorized  person  can- 
not charge  his  alleged  principal.  Thus  one  who  delivers 
goods  to  a  person  purporting  to  act  for  a  carrier  must  see 
to  it  that  the  person  is  actually  authorized  by  the  carrier 
to  accept  goods  on  his  behalf;  the  shipper  takes  the  risk 
of  the  authority  of  the  person  with  whom  he  chooses  to 
deal.2  In  accordance  with  this  test  it  is  not,  or  may  not 
be,  enough  to  charge  the  carrier  by  coach  to  show  that 
the  goods  were  handed  to  the  driver  3  to  charge  an  express 
company  to  show  that  the  goods  were  handed  to  a  man 
in  its  uniform,  or  to  charge  a  carrier  by  water,4  to  show 
that  the  goods  were  handed  to  a  person  standing  on  the 
wharf,5  or  to  a  deck  hand  or  other  member  of  the  crew.6 

Co.  v.  Timmons,  51  Ark.  459,  US.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Thorton,  3  Tex.  Civ. 

W.  690  (1888).  App.  197,  22  S.  W.  67  (1893). 

Illinois. — People   ex   rel.    v.    St.  Virginia. — Winchester  &  S.  R.  R. 

Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  111.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  106  Va.  264, 

512,  52  N.  E.  292  (1898).  55  S.  E.  692  (1906). 

Massachusetts. — McCluer  v.  Man-  1  Langley  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R. 

cheater  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Gray,  R.  Co.,  10  Gray  (Mass.),  103  (1859). 

124,  74  Am.  Dec.  624  (1859).  *  Elkins  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Michigan—  Patterson  v.  Wabash,  Co.,  23  N.  H.  275  (1851). 

St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  54  Mich.  91,  19  J  Blanchard   v.    Isaacs,   3   Barb. 

N.  W.  761  (1884).  (N.  Y.)  388  (1848). 

New  York. — Reidman  v.  Brook-  *  Abrams  v.  Platt,  23  N.  Y.  Misc. 

lyn,  Q.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  51  N.  Y.  637,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  153  (1898). 

Supp.  196,  28  App.  Div.  540  (1898).  6  Buckman  v.  Levi,  3  Camp.  414 

North  Carolina. — Dunn  v.   Ash-  (1813). 

ville&C.  M.Ry.Co.,  141N.C.  521,  «  Gleason    v.    Goodrich   Transp. 

54  S.  E.  416  (1906).  Co.,  32  Wis.  85,  14  Am.  Rep.  716 

Texas.— International   &   G.    N.  (1873). 

[608] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  742 

It  is,  however,  sufficient  to  deliver  the  goods  to  a  servant 
of  the  carrier  who  is  usually  employed  in  receiving  and 
forwarding  goods  for  the  carrier;  for  a  shipper  has  a  right 
to  assume  that  such  a  person  has  ample  authority  to  deal 
with  him  in  this  matter.1 

§  742.  For  whom  a  servant  acts. 

The  possibility  is  to  be  considered  that  the  servant  of 
the  proprietor  may  be  acting  as  the  servant  of  the  patron 
in  doing  the  act  in  question.  This  is  often,  as  will  be  seen, 
a  close  question  of  fact.  The  issue  is  perhaps  best  brought 
out  in  certain  of  the  telegraph  cases.  It  would  seem  to  be 
clear  that  a  telegraph  operator  in  writing  a  message  down 
for  the  sender  acts  almost  invariably  as  his  amanuensis. 
And  so  the  majority  of  the  cases  hold  2  although  there  is 
some  dissent.3  But  it  is  a  doubtful  question  whether  a 
telegraph  boy  bringing  a  message  to  a  telegraph  office  is 
acting  for  the  sender,4  or  for  the  company.5  The  doubt 
is  whether  it  is  the  company  that  the  messenger  is  acting 
for,  or  whether  the  sender  consciously  adopts  the  servant 

1  The  City  of  Alexandria,  28  Fed.      Tel.  Co.  v.  Stevenson,  128  Pa.  St. 
202  (1886).  442,  18  Atl.  441,  15  Am.  St.  Rep. 

2  The  company  was  held  not  lia-     687,  5  L.  R.  A.  515  (1889). 

ble  in :  4  The  company  was  held  not  lia- 

North  Carolina. — Pegram  v.  W.  ble  in  Stamey  v.  Western  Union 

U.  Tel.  Co.,  100  N.  C.  28,  6  S.  E.  Tel.  Co.,  92  Ga.  613,  18  S.  E.  1008, 

770,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  557  (1888).  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  95  (1894). 

Texas. — Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  6  The  company  was  held  liable  in 

v.    Edsall,    63    Tex.    668    (1885);  Will  v.   Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  3 

Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Foster,  App.  Div.  22,  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  933 

64   Tex.    220.    53    Am.    Rep.    754  (1896). 

(1885);  Gulf,  Colorado  &  S.  F.  Ry.  On  the  other  hand  the  agent  of 

Co.  v.  Geer,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  349,  another  may  be  held  out  as  one's 

24  S.  W.  86  (1893).  own.      Thus  a  telegraph   operator 

3  The  company  was  held  liable  in :  permitted  to  act  for  the  railway  as  a 
Indiana. — Western    Union    Tel.  ticket  agent  subjects  the  railroad 

Co.  v.  Sanders,  39  Ind.  App.  146,  company  to  liabilities.  Rohrig  v. 
79  N.  E.  406  (1906).  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  130 

Pennsylvania.  —  Western    Union      la.  380, 106  N.  W.  935  (1906). 

39  [  609  ] 


§  743  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

as  his  own,  being  apprised  that  the  company  never  send 
for  messages  except  as  a  favor  in  particular  cases. 

§  743.  Independent  service  by  servant. 

Where  the  customer  is  dealing  with  an  employe"  it  is 
sometimes  difficult  to  say  whether  the  servant  is  under- 
taking public  service  on  behalf  of  his  master  or  whether 
he  is  agreeing  to  a  private  service  in  his  personal  capacity. 
Thus  in  one  set  of  early  cases  the  question  was  repeatedly 
raised  as  to  the  liability  of  the  proprietor  of  a  conveyance 
where  a  parcel  is  given  to  the  servant  of  a  carrier  under 
such  circumstances  that  it  seems  doubtful  whether  the 
servant  or  the  master  becomes  the  bailee  and  carrier.  It 
is  quite  possible  for  the  servant  of  a  carrier  to  take  and 
carry  goods  independently  of  his  master,  and  when  this  is 
alleged  to  be  the  case  all  the  circumstances  must  be  ex- 
amined to  determine  the  question.  If  the  shipper  is 
aware  that  the  carriage  is  a  private  matter,  for  the  private 
gain  of  the  servant,  he  cannot  hold  the  master  liable; 
and  so  if  he  delivers  to  the  servant  to  be  carried  gratui- 
tously, as  a  matter  of  friendship,  since  such  an  arrange- 
ment is  not  a  business  arrangement  and  could  hardly  be 
supposed  by  the  shipper  to  be  made  on  the  master's  ac- 
count.1 The  mere  fact  that  by  an  arrangement  between 
the  carrier  and  his  servant  the  latter  was  to  receive  the 
compensation  would  not  absolve  the  carrier  from  liability 

1  In  the  following  cases  collected  Missouri. — Choteau   v.    The   St. 

from  many  others  this  issue  is  well  Anthony,  16  Mo.  216  (1852). 

discussed:  Pennsylvania. — Sneider  v.  Geiss, 

United    States— Suarez    v.    The  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  34  (1791). 

Washington,   1  Woods,  96  (1871),  England.— Butler  v.  Basing,  2  C. 

Fed.  Gas.  No.  13,585  (1870);  Citi-  &  P.  613  (1827). 

zens'  Bk.  v.  Nantucket  Sb.  Co.,  2  Similarly  in  King  v.  Lenox,  19 

Story,  16  (1841).  Johns.  235  (1821),  commissions  in- 

Louisiana. — Mechanics'      &      T.  trusted    to  the  captain  within  hia 

Bank  v.  Gordon,  5  La.  Ann.  604  "master's  privilege"  were  held  not 

(1850).  chargeable  to  the  owners. 

[610] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §§  744,  745 

if  he  had  permitted  it  to  be  understood  that  he  authorized 
the  transaction.1 

§  744.  Private  arrangement  with  employ 6. 

To  cite  still  other  instances,  baggage  given  over  to  the 
porter  of  a  hotel  will  either  be  a  bailment  to  the  innkeeper 
or  a  private  arrangement  with  the  porter  as  the  under- 
standing may  be.2  When  the  customer  is  aware  that  the 
service  is  outside  the  scope  of  the  employment  or  apprised 
that  the  service  is  a  private  matter  for  the  private  gain  of 
the  employe"  himself,  he  cannot  then  hold  the  proprietor 
liable.  It  may  be  added  that  such  dealings  with  the  serv- 
ant are  obviously  upon  a  private  basis  in  such  cases,  for 
it  would  almost  never  appear  that  the  servant  was  under- 
taking such  accidental  services  with  publicity  and  regu- 
larity for  fixed  charges  and  without  discrimination.3 

§.  745.  Guests  invited  by  servants. 

One  who  is  received  as  a  guest  upon  the  invitation  of  the 
servant  of  the  proprietor  certainly  should  understand  that 
he  does  not  fall  within  the  profession  of  that  master.  Thus 
one  who  is  riding  in  the  carrier's  vehicle,  not  as  ordinary 
passengers  ride,  but  upon  invitation  of  the  carrier's  serv- 

1  Alabama. — Knox  v.   Rives,    14  2  Acceptance  obviously  on  private 

Ala.  249,  48  Am.  Dec.  97  (1848).  basis: 

Massachusetts. — Dwight  v.  Brew-  Pennsylvania. — Houser  v.  Tully, 

ster,  1  Pick.  50,  11  Am.  Dec.  133  62.  Pa.  92,  1  Am.  Rep.  390  (1869). 

(1822).  Tennessee.— Tulane    Hotel    v. 

Mississippi.— Powell  v.  Mills,  30  Holohan,  112  Tenn.  214,  79  S.  W. 

Miss.  231  (1855).  113  (1903). 

New  Hampshire. — Bean  v.  Sturte-  Acceptance  apparently  on  public 

vant,  8  N.  H.  146,  28  Am.  Dec.  389  basis: 

(1835).  Georgia— -Coskery  v.   Nagle,  83 

Pennsylvania.  —  Beckman        v.  Ga.  696,  10  S.  E.  491,  20  Am.  St. 

Shouse,  5  Rawle,  179  (1835).  Rep.  333,  6  L.  E.  A.  483  (1889). 

Vermont. — Farmers'  &   Mechan-  Pennsylvania. — Sneider  v.  Geiss, 

ics'  Bank  v.  Champlain  T.  Co.,  23  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  34  (1791). 

Vt.  186,  56  Am.  Dec.  68  (1851).  «  Shelden  v.  Robinson,  7  N.  H. 

157,  26  Am.  Dec.  726  (1834). 

[611] 


§745 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


ant,  without  paying  fare,  is  not  a  passenger;  his  relation 
is  with  the  servant,  not  with  the  carrier.1  Thus,  where  a 
yard  master  out  of  hours  took  an  engine  and  car  without 
permission  of  the  defendant  company,  and  invited  persons 
to  ride  free  in  the  car  to  a  meeting,  over  a  portion  of  the 
road  not  used  for  passenger  trains,  he  was  held  not  to  have 
even  apparent  authority  to  act  for  the  company,  and  the 
persons  so  riding  were  not  passengers.2  And  where  a 
party  of  children  were  invited  by  a  servant  of  the  carrier 
to  ride  on  a  train  which  was  being  shifted  through  the 
yard,  they  were  not  passengers.3  However  far  the  ap- 


1  United  States. — Waterbury  v. 
New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  Fed.  Rep.  671  (1883),  rid- 
ing on  engine  by  consent  of  en- 
gineer; Clark  v.  Colorado  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  165  Fed.  408,  91  C.  C.  A. 
358,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  988  (1908), 
riding  in  cab  by  invitation  of  en- 
gineer. 

Colorado.— Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Headland,  18  Colo.  477, 
33  Pac.  185,  20  L.  R.  A.  822  (1893), 
conductor  induced  to  let  plaintiff 
ride  free  on  freight  train. 

Illinois—  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Brooks,  81  111.  245  (1876), 
conductor  induced  to  let  plaintiff 
ride  free  on  passenger  train;  Chi- 
cago &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Michie,  83 
111.  427  (1876),  riding  on  engine  by 
consent  of  engineer. 

Minnesota. — McVeety  v.  St. 
Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  45  Minn. 
268,  47  N.  W.  809,  11  L.  R.  A.  174, 
22  Am.  St.  Rep.  728  (1891),  riding 
free  on  freight  train. 

Missouri. — Youmans  v.  Wabash 
Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  127  S.  W.  959 
(1910),  conductor  induced  to  let 
plaintiff  ride  free  on  freight  train. 

[612] 


Nebraska. — Woolsey  v.  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Neb.  798,  58 
N.  W.  444,  25  L.  R.  A.  79  (1894), 
riding  on  engine  by  consent  of  fire- 
man, to  shovel  coal. 

New  York. — Robertson  v.  New 
York  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  91  (1856),  riding  on  engine  by 
consent  of  engineer. 

2  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Bryant,  65  Fed.  Rep.  969  (1895). 

3  Reary  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T. 
Ry.  Co.,  40  La.  Ann,  32,  3  So.  390, 8 
Am.  St.  Rep.  497  (1888). 

In  a  few  cases,  however,  it  has 
been  held  that  children  riding  on  a 
vehicle  by  invitation  of  a  servant  of 
the  company  are  entitled  to  be  re- 
garded as  passengers.  Thus,  where 
the  driver  of  a  street  car  invited 
children  to  ride  on  the  front  plat- 
form, they  were  held  to  be  pas- 
sengers. Wilton  v.  Middlesex  R.  R. 
Co.,  107  Mass.  108,  9  Am.  Rep.  11 
(1871);  MUehlhausen  v.  St.  Louis 
R.  R.  Co.,  91  Mo.  332,  2  S.  W.  315 
(1886);  Buck  v.  People's  St.  Ry.  & 
E.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  108  Mo.  185,  18  S. 
W.  1090  (1892).  And  where  a  con- 
ductor invited  a  boy  to  ride  in  a 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING         [  §  746 

parent  authority  of  a  conductor  may  be  held  to  extend,  it 
cannot  cover  an  invitation  to  ride  free;  free  carriage  is  not 
the  carrier's  business.1  If  one  riding  free  by  invitation  of 
a  servant  is  not  a  passenger,  a  fortiori  one  who  by  mis- 
representation induces  the  servant  to  let  him  ride  free  is 
not  a  passenger,  and  still  more  clearly  one  who  bribes 
the  servant  by  a  small  fee  to  let  him  ride  without  paying 
the  regular  fare  is  not  a  passenger.2 

§  746.  Service  obtained  by  connivance. 

One  who  is  on  the  carrier's  vehicle  not  by  any  arrange- 
ment with  the  carrier,  but  by  the  connivance  of  the  con- 
ductor, for  the  purpose  of  selling  newspapers  or  other 
articles  to  the  passengers,  is  not  in  any  sense  a  passenger, 
and  is  entitled  to  little  more  care  than  a  trespasser.3  A 
newsboy  jumping  on  and  off  a  moving  street  car  to  sell 
his  newspapers  without  being  stopped  by  the  conductor 
is  not  a  passenger.4  So  where  a  person  on  a  train  induces 
the  conductor  out  of  charity,5  or  by  misrepresentation,  to 

freight  train  (on  which  passengers  cago.  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  64 

were  sometimes   carried)   the  boy  Minn.  168,  66  N.  W.  401  (1896). 

was  held  to  be  a  passenger.     St.  Texas. — Rucker  v.  Missouri  Pac. 

Joseph  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  Ry.  Co.,  61  Tex.  499  (1884). 

35  Kan.  185,  10  Pac.  461   (1886);  Upon  similar  principles  a  traveler 

Sherman  v.  Hannibal  &  S.  J.  R.  R.  refused  by  an  innkeeper  because  the 

Co.,  72  Mo.  62,  37  Am.  Rep.  423  inn  was  full,  who  was  taken  in  by  a 

(1880);  Whitehead  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  guest  was  held  not  to  be  a  guest  him- 

M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Mo.  263,  US.  self.    Bird  v.  Bird,  Anderson,  29. 

W.  751,  6  L.  R.  A.  409  (1889).    But  3  Connecticut.— Griswold  v.  New 

these  cases  can  hardly  be  supported.  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Conn. 

1  United  States.— Condran  v.  Chi-  371,  55  Am.  Rep.  115  (1885). 
cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  67  Fed.  Missouri.— Padgitt    v.    Moll.    & 
522  (1895).  Citizens'  Ry.  Co.,  159  Mo.  143,  60 

Colorado.— Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  S.  W.  121  (1900). 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Headland,  18  Colo.  477,  4  Barry  v.   Union  Ry.  Co.,   105 

33  Pac.  185,  20  L.  R.  A.  822  (1893).  App.  Div.  520,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  449 

2  Minnesota. — McNamara  v.  Gt.  (1905). 

Northern  Ry.  Co.,  61  Minn.  296,  63  6  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
N.  W.  726  (1895);  Brevig  v.  Chi-  Brooks,  81  111.  245  (1876). 

[613] 


§  747  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

allow  him  to  ride  free,  such  a  person  is  not  a  passenger. 
"It  is  manifest  that  if  a  person  were  stealthily,  and  wholly 
without  the  knowledge  of  any  of  the  employe's  of  the 
company,  to  get  upon  a  train  and  secrete  himself,  for  the 
purpose  of  passing  from  one  place  to  another,  he  could 
not  recover  if  injured.  In  such  a  case  his  wrongful  act 
would  bar  him  from  all  right  to  compensation.  Then, 
does  the  act  of  the  person  who  knowingly  induces  the 
conductor  to  violate  a  rule  of  the  company,  and  prevails 
upon  him  to  disregard  his  obligations  to  fidelity  to  his 
employer,  to  accomplish  the  same  purpose,  occupy  a 
different  position  or  is  he  entitled  to  any  more  rights? 
He  thereby  combines  with  the  conductor  to  wrong  and 
defraud  his  employer  out  of  the  amount  of  his  fare,  and 
for  his  own  profit."  l 

§  747.  Bill  of  lading  issued  without  goods. 

Since  a  bailment  is  required  before  the  carrier  of  goods 
becomes  responsible  as  such,  it  must  be  clear  that  without 
such  bailment  one  cannot  be  a  carrier  of  goods.  It  some- 
times happens  that  a  bill  of  lading  is  issued  by  the  servant 
of  a  carrier  without  a  delivery  to  the  carrier  of  the  goods 
named  in  the  bill.  According  to  what  is  clearly  the 
weight  of  authority  the  issue  of  a  bill  of  lading  by  a  servant 
under  these  circumstances  does  not  make  his  master  liable 

One   obtaining   permission   from  Colorado. — Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

the  conductor  to  ride  upon  a  freight  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Headland,  18  Colo, 

train  for  less  than  the  regular  fare,  477,  33  Pac.  185,  20  L.  R.  A.  822 

who  is  shut  into  a  freight  car  for  the  (1893). 

trip,  has  not  the  rights  of  a  passen-  Kansas. — Mendenhall   v.    Atchi- 

ger.    Grahn  v.  International  &  G.  son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  66  Kan. 

N.  Ry.  Co.,  100  Tex.  27,  93  S.  W.  438,  71  Pac.  846,  61  L.  R.  A.  120 

104,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1025  (1906).  (1903). 

1  United  States. — Condran  v.  Chi-  Pennsylvania. — Duff  v.  Allegheny 

cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  67  Fed.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Pa.  458,  36  Am. 

522,  14  C.  C.  A.  506,  32  U.  S.  App.  Rep.  675  (1879). 
182,  28  L.  R.  A.  749  (1895). 

[614] 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING 


§748 


in  any  way  therefor,  not  even  to  a  purchaser  for  value 
without  notice.1  In  the  leading  case  of  Grant  v.  Norway  2 
this  is  thus  explained.  "It  is  not  contended  that  the 
captain  had  any  real  authority  to  sign  bills  of  lading, 
unless  the  goods  had  been  shipped.  Nor  can  we  discover 
any  ground  upon  which  a  party  taking  a  bill  of  lading  by 
indorsement  would  be  justified  in  assuming  that  he  had 
any  authority  to  sign  such  bills,  whether  the  goods  were  on 
board  or  not." 


§  748.  Jurisdictions  holding  carrier  liable. 

In  other  jurisdictions,  however,  it  is  held  that  if  a  bill 
of  lading  is  issued  by  the  proper  agent  of  the  carrier  with- 
out receiving  the  goods  and  is  indorsed  for  value  by  the 
taker  to  a  bonafide  purchaser,  the  carrier  cannot  as  against 
him  dispute  the  receipt  of  the  goods.3  There  is  much  to 


1  United  States. — Schooner  Free- 
man v.  Buckingham,  18  How.  (U. 
S.)  182,  15  L.  ed.  341  (1855);  Pol- 
lard v.  Vinton,  105  U.  S.  7,  26  L.  ed. 
998  (1881);  The  Loon,  7  Blatch. 
244,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  8499  (1870); 
Clark  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  148  Fed. 
243  (1905). 

Louisiana. — Fellows  v.  The 
Powell,  16  La.  Ann.  316,  79  Am. 
Dec.  581  (1851). 

Maryland. — Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Wilkens,  44  Md.  11,  22  Am. 
Rep.  26  (1875). 

Massachusetts. — Sears  v.  Win- 
gate,  3  Allen,  103  (1861). 

Minnesota. — National  Bank  of 
Commerce  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  44  Minn.  224,  46  N.  W.  342,  9 
L.  R.  A.  263,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  566 
(1890). 

Missouri. — Louisiana  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Lavielle,  52  Mo.  380  (1873). 

Mississippi. — Hazard    &    C.    v. 


Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Miss. 
32,  7  So.  280  (1889). 

North  Carolina. — Williams  v. 
Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  N. 
C.  42  (1885). 

Ohio.— Dean  v.  King,  22  Ohio  St. 
118  (1871). 

Washington. — Roy  &  R.  v. 
Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  42  Wash. 
572,  85  Pac.  53,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
302  (1906). 

2 10  C.  B.  665  (1851). 

3  Alabama. — Jasper  Trust  Co.  v. 
Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  99 
Ala.  416,  14  So.  546,  42  Am.  St. 
Rep.  75  (1892). 

Connecticut. — Relyea  v.  New 
Haven  R.  M.  Co.,  42  Conn.  579 
(1873). 

Kansas. — Wichita  Sav.  Bank  v. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20 
Kan.  519  (1878). 

Nebraska. — Sioux  City  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  F.,  10 

[615] 


§748] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


be  said  for  this  view  both  on  general  principle  and  as  to  its 
practical  effect.  Theoretically,  to  hold  the  carrier  liable 
for  such  acts  of  his  agent  would  be  going  no  further  than 
the  law  usually  goes  in  holding  a  principal  liable  for  acts 
of  his  agent  within  his  apparent  authority.  Practically 
there  is  good  ground  for  an  estoppel,  as  the  cases  just 
cited  urge.  The  carrier  is  not  responsible  as  such  on  the 
real  facts;  but  in  this  particular  case  the  real  facts  cannot 
be  shown  against  a  purchaser  for  value  without  notice. 
At  all  events  the  bill  should  be  conclusive  against  the  car- 
rier who  himself  signs  the  document;  and  so  where  a  car- 
rier issued  two  bills  of  lading  for  the  same  goods,  and  the 
two  bills  came  into  the  hands  of  two  holders  for  value  and 
without  notice,  it  was  held  that  the  carrier  could  not  dis- 
pute the  receipt  of  two  lots  of  goods.1 


Neb.  556,  7  N.  W.  311,  35  Am.  St. 
Rep.  488  (1880). 

New  York. — Armour  v.  Michigan 
Central  Ry.  Co.,  65  N.  Y.  Ill,  22 
Am.  Rep.  603  (1875). 

Pennsylvania. — Brooke  v.  New 
York,  L.  E.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  108  Pa. 
St.  529,  1  Atl.  206,  56  Am.  Rep. 
235  (1885). 


Tennessee. — Watson  v.  Memphis 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  9  Heisk.  255 
(1872). 

1  Coventry  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry. 
Co.,  11  Q.  B.  D.  776  (1883).  Ap- 
parently there  is  no  conflict  of  au- 
thority as  to  the  liability  of  a  carrier 
who  himself  makes  the  bills. 


[616] 


PART  VI.     MANAGEMENT  OF  THE 
BUSINESS 

CHAPTER  XXII 

BASIS   OF   THE   UNDERTAKING 

§  750.  Whether  the  transaction  is  public  or  private. 

Topic  A.  Service  Rendered  upon  a  Special  Basis 
§  751.  Boarders  at  an  inn. 

752.  Special  acceptance  as  guest. 

753.  Chartered  accommodations. 

754.  Special  passenger  trains. 

755.  Special  freight  trains. 

756.  Regular  train  established  upon  special  guaranty. 

757.  Excursion  trains. 

758.  Chartered  train. 

Topic  B.  Unusual  Methods  of  Service 
§  759.  Passengers  traveling  in  an  unusual  place. 

760.  Whether  there  is  acceptance  in  such  cases. 

761.  Vehicle  not  intended  for  passengers. 

762.  Carriage  on  construction  trains. 

763.  Passenger  carriage  on  freight  trains. 

764.  Such  transportation  often  upon  a  private  basis. 

765.  Special  services  in  telephoning. 

766.  Unrepeated  telegrams. 

Topic  C.  Peculiar  Conditions  of  Service 
§  767.  Owner  accompanying  his  goods. 

768.  Carrier  in  general  control. 

769.  Luggage  carried  by  passengers. 

770.  Special  arrangements  with  innkeepers. 

771.  Goods  taken  across  a  ferry. 

772.  Owner  going  with  his  freight. 

773.  Switching  cars. 

774.  Towing  vessels. 

[617] 


§  750  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  775.  Responsibility  for  through  cars. 
776.  Relations  with  dependent  services. 

Topic  D.  Special  Arrangements  with  Particular  Classes 

§  777.  Mail  clerks. 

778.  Express  messengers. 

779.  Employes  of  car  companies. 

780.  Owners  accompanying  their  shipments. 

781.  Employes  of  contracting  shippers. 

782.  Concessionaires  in  general. 

783.  Employes  while  on  duty. 

784.  Employes  receiving  independent  service. 

785.  Full  liability  in  gratuitous  service. 

786.  Explicit  limitation  to  private  basis. 

§  760.  Whether  the  transaction  is  public  or  private. 

It  has  been  seen  that  unless  there  has  been  a  public 
profession  to  perform  the  service  in  question  there  is  no 
duty  to  undertake  that  service.  But  this  is  not  all.  Sup- 
pose that  one  engaged  in  a  public  employment  makes  a 
special  arrangement  with  one  whom  he  would  have  been 
obliged  to  serve — is  this  service  upon  a  public  or  a  private 
basis?  Or  suppose  not  being  obliged  to  serve  the  particu- 
lar applicant  he  actually  receives  him  as  though  he  were — 
is  this  service  upon  a  public  or  a  private  basis?  It  is  im- 
portant to  get  from  the  cases  discussed  in  this  chapter  a 
clear  conception  of  the  conclusive  effect  of  the  actual  re- 
ception. If  there  has  been  actual  acceptance  in  a  particu- 
lar case  the  question  whether  the  acceptance  was  upon  a 
public  or  a  private  basis  is  not  settled  by  determining 
whether  the  service  was  obligatory  or  not;  for  whatever 
the  presumption  may  be  in  a  given  case,  this  may  be 
negatived  by  the  proof  as  to  the  actual  basis  of  the  accept- 
ance.1 These  distinctions  are  shown  plainly  in  the  two 

1  In  the  late  case  of  Santa  Fe,  P.  &  whether  a  carrier  is  a  '  common 
P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  Const,  carrier'  are:  First,  he  must  be  en- 
Co.  (Ariz.),  108  Pac.  467  (1910),  gaged  in  the  business  of  carrying 
the  traditional  law  on  this  point  is  goods  for  others  as  a  public  em- 
thus  elaborately  stated :  "The  tests  ploy£,  and  so  hold  himself  out;  sec- 

[618] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  751 

sections  immediately  following.  In  the  first  it  is  pointed 
out  that,  although  obliged  to  receive  a  traveler  as  a  guest, 
the  innkeeper  may,  by  special  arrangement  with  him, 
receive  him  as  a  boarder.  In  the  second,  it  is  shown  that 
although  not  obliged  to  receive  a  neighbor  as  a  guest,  an 
innkeeper  may  voluntarily  receive  him  as  such. 

Topic  A.  Service  Rendered  upon  a  Special  Basis 

§  751.  Boarders  at  an  inn. 

An  innkeeper  may,  and  commonly  does,  entertain  not 
merely  transient  guests,  but  other  persons  who  stay  at 
the  inn  for  a  considerable  period,  making  in  fact  their 
residence  there;  such  persons  are  boarders,  not  guests.1 
If  a  person  is  at  an  inn  for  entertainment,  the  question 
whether  he  is  a  guest  or  a  boarder  is  a  question  of  fact, 
the  crucial  point  being  whether  he  is  taken  as  a  traveler 
or  whether  a  special  arrangement  is  made  with  him.2  The 
relation  of  innkeeper  and  guest  once  being  established 
will  be  presumed  to  continue  until  the  contrary  appears, 
and  not  to  be  changed  to  the  relation  of  host  and  boarder. 
The  relation  is  not  necessarily  and  conclusively  changed 

ond,  he  must  undertake  to  carry  Pennsylvania. — Jeffords  v.  Crump, 

goods  of  the  kind  to  which  his  busi-  12  Phila.  (Pa.)  500  (1878). 

ness  is  confined;  third,  he  must  un-  Utah. — Lawrence   v.    Howard,    1 

dertake  to  carry  by  the  methods  by  Utah,  142  (1874). 

which  his  business  is  conducted  and  2  Arizona. — Haff    v.     Adams,    6 

over  his  established  roads;  fourth,  Ariz.  395,  59  Pac.  Ill  (1899). 

transportation   must   be   for   hire;  California. — Magee  v.  Pacific  Im- 

and,    fifth,    an    action    must    lie  pavement  Co.,  98  Cal.  678,  33  Pac. 

against  him  if  he  refused  without  772  (1893). 

reason  to  carry  such  goods  for  those  Iowa. — Pollock  v.  Landis,  36  la. 

willing  to  comply  with  his  terms."  651  (1873). 

1  Connecticut. — Walling    v.    Pot-  Massachusetts. — Hall  v.  Pike,  100 

ter,  35  Conn.  183  (1868).  Mass.  495  (1868). 

Massachusetts. — Hall  v.  Pike,  100  New    York. — Hancock   v.   Rand, 

Mass.  495  (1868).  94  N.  Y.  1,  46  Am.  Rep.  112  (1883). 

Neiv  Mexico. — Homer  v.  Hai  vey,  New  Brunswick. — Light  v.  Abel, 

3  N.  Mex.  197,  5  Pac.  329  (1885).  6  Allen,  400  (1866). 

[619] 


§  752  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

by  an  agreement  as  to  price,  or  any  definite  length  of 
sojourn.1  When  one  is  staying  at  the  inn  under  a  con- 
tract by  which  he  is  to  remain  there  a  certain  considerable 
time,  and  in  return  gets  a  special  rate  for  board,  he  is  pre- 
sumably a  boarder.2  But  the  mere  fact  that  he  has  stayed 
for  a  week  or  longer,  and  that  he  is  paying  the  weekly 
rather  than  the  daily  rate,  does  not  prove  that  he  is  a 
boarder.3 

§  752.  Special  acceptance  as  guest. 

On  the  other  hand  a  person  not  entitled  to  demand  ad- 
mittance, not  being  a  bona  fide  traveler,  will  become  a 
guest  and  entitled  to  all  the  rights  of  a  guest  if  he  is  re- 
ceived voluntarily  in  the  inn  upon  the  footing  of  a  guest. 
The  innkeeper  has  a  right  to  refuse  to  receive  him,  but 
that  right  he  may  waive;  and  he  does  waive  it  by  con- 
senting to  receive  the  guest.  Thus  it  is  usually  stated 
that  one  who  lives  in  the  same  town  with  the  innkeeper 
cannot  be  a  guest,  since  he  is  not  a  traveler  seeking  en- 
tertainment during  his  journey.  While  it  is  true  that 
such  a  person  is  often  received  to  be  entertained  out  of 

1  Ross  v.  Mellin,  36  Minn.  421,  Australia. — Ex  parte  M'Manus, 
32  N.  W.  172  (1887).  6  Austral.  L.  T.  (Viet.)  12  (1884). 

2  Arizona. — Haff    v.    Adams,    6  3  Alabama. — Beale  v.   Posey,   72 
Ariz.  395,  59  Pac.  Ill  (1899).  Ala.  323  (1882). 

California.  —  Moore     v.     Long  California. — Fay  v.   Pacific   Im- 

Beach  Development  Co.,   87  Cal.  provement  Co.,  93  Cal.  253,  26  Pac. 

483,  26  Pac.  92,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  1099,  28  Pac.  943,  27  Am.  St.  Rep. 

265  (1891).  198,  16  L.  R.  A.  188  (1892). 

Iowa. — Shoecraft  v.  Bailey,  25  la.  Iowa. — Pollock  v.  Landis,  36  la. 

553  (1868).  651  (1873). 

Kansas. — Johnson  v.  Reynolds,  3  Massachusetts. — Berkshire  Wool- 
Kan.  257  (1865).  en  Co.  v.  Proctor,  7  Gush.  (Mass.) 

New  York.— Smith  v.  Keyes,  2  417  (1851). 

Th.  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  650  (1874).  Micron.— Polk  &  Co.  v.  Melen- 

Tennessee. — Meacham   v.   Gallo-  backer,  136  Mich.  611,  99  N.  W. 

way,  102  Tenn.  415,  52  S.  W.  859,  867  (1904). 

46  L.  R.  A.  319,  73  Am.  St.  Rep.  Minnesota. — Ross  v.   Mellin,  36 

886  (1899).  Minn.  421,  32  N.  W.  172  (1887). 

[620] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING    [  §§  753,  754 

friendship  merely,  and  therefore  is  not  a  guest,1  yet  if  he 
is  really  received  on  the  footing  of  a  guest  the  relation  of 
host  and  guest  is  thereby  established.2 

§  763.  Chartered  accommodations. 

When  the  owner  of  a  vehicle  makes  a  lease  of  it  to 
another  party,  who  uses  it  for  the  carriage  of  goods, 
plainly  the  lessor  is  not  the  carrier.  Thus,  in  Bell  v. 
Pidgeon,3  the  owner  of  some  scows,  which  he  used  in  his 
business,  leased  them  to  others  for  the  transportation  of 
their  chalk.  It  was  held  that  the  owner  was  in  no  sense 
a  carrier,  since  he  neither  took  possession  nor  furnished 
the  motive  power.  And  in  the  Daniel  Burns,4  it  was  held 
that  a  canal  boat  hired  at  a  daily  rate  for  use  in  storing 
grain  about  the  harbor,  subject  wholly  to  the  control  of 
the  hirer  in  respect  to  loading,  unloading,  navigation,  and 
delivery  of  the  cargo,  was  not  carrying.  In  Campbell  v. 
Perkins,5  where  the  defendants  owned  a  line  of  boats, 
and  used  them  as  common  carriers  of  passengers  and  goods, 
and  chartered  one  of  them  to  another  company  for  a 
single  trip,  but  retained  the  charge  of  it,  and  of  navigating 
it,  it  was  held  that  they  were  liable  to  a  passenger  for  the 
loss  of  his  baggage.  There  are  other  cases  of  this  type.6 

§  754.  Special  passenger  trains. 
A  railroad  may  run  a  special  train,  not  intended  for 

New  York.— Metzger  v.  Schnabel,          l  Walling  v.  Potter,  35  Conn.  183 

23  N.  Y.  Misc.  698,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  (1868). 
105  (1898).  2  Orchard  v.  Bush  (1898),  2  Q.  R. 

North  Carolina.— Holstein  v.  Phil-  284,  67  L.  J.  Q.  B.  650,  78  L.  T. 

lips,  146  N.  C.  366,  59  S.  E.  1037,  Rep.  557,  46  W.  R.  527  (1898). 
14  L.  R.  A.  475  (1907).  3  5  Fed.  634  (1882). 

Wisconsin.— Jalie  v.  Cardinal,  35         4  52  Fed.  159  (1892),  aff'd  56  Fed. 

Wis.  118  (1874).  605  (1893). 

Canada.— Whiting    v.    Mills,    7         B  4  Selden  (N.  Y.),  430  (1853). 
Upp.  Can.  Q.  B.  450  (1849).  6  Phelps  v.  Windsor  Stb.  Co.,  131 

N.  C.  12,  42  S.  E.  335  (1902). 

[621] 


§  754  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

passengers  in  general,  in  which  therefore  no  one  can  claim 
to  be  carried  as  a  passenger  as  of  right.  In  a  case  in  Geor- 
gia l  this  problem  is  well  covered.  It  appeared  that  there 
had  been  a  wreck  on  a  branch  of  the  defendant's  road, 
several  miles  from  the  town  of  Washington,  by  reason 
of  which  regular  traffic  on  that  branch  had  been  suspended. 
A  train  was  run  from  Washington  to  the  scene  of  the 
wreck,  and  the  plaintiffs  and  others  requested  permission 
of  the  conductor  in  charge  of  the  train  to  ride  thereon, 
which  was  granted.  This  train,  on  its  return  trip,  did  not 
leave  the  scene  of  the  wreck  until  about  midnight,  and, 
when  it  did,  the  conductor,  acting  under  instructions  from 
the  superintendent  of  the  railroad,  refused  to  transport  the 
plaintiffs,  who  walked  back  to  Washington  and  brought 
suit  for  the  refusal.  The  court  held  that  the  action  would 
not  lie.  Mr.  Justice  Candler  said:  "The  train  upon  which 
the  plaintiffs  rode  from  Washington  to  the  scene  of  the 
wreck  was  in  no  sense  a  regular  passenger  train.  Indeed, 
it  was  neither  regular  nor  passenger.  Its  sole  purpose 
was  to  meet  an  emergency  with  which  the  employe's  of 
the  defendant  were  confronted.  This  fact  was  well  known 
to  the  plaintiffs.  The  defendant  was  under  no  obligation 
to  transport  them  on  this  train  at  all."  2 

1  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  ville  Traction  Co.,  72  S.  C.  134,  51 

Du  Bose,  120  Ga.  339,  47  S.  E.  917  S.  E.  545  (1905). 

(1904).  2  See  also: 

Upon   similar  principles  it   was  Georgia. — Southwestern  R.  R.  Co. 

recently  held  that  a  street  railroad  v.  Singleton,  66  Ga.  252  (1880). 

had   the  right   to  refuse  to   carry  Missouri. — Wagner  v.  Mo.  Pac. 

passengers    on    cars    during    their  Ry.  Co.,  97  Mo.  512,  10  S.  W.  486, 

passage  between  the  barns  and  the  3  L.  R.  A.  146  (1888). 

lines  where  they  were  to  be  put  in  Minnesota. — Ahem  v.  Minn.  St. 

service.     Hermann   v.   St.   Joseph  Ry.  Co.,  102  Minn.  435  (1907). 

Ry.,  Light,  Heat  &  Power  Co.  (Mo.  Tennessee. — Louisville   &   N.   R. 

App.),  129  S.  W.  414  (1910).  R.  Co.  v.  Stacker,  86  Tenn.  343,  6 

But  if  one  is  accepted  upon  a  S.   W.   737,   6  Am.   St.   Rep.   840 

special  car  as  a  passenger  he  has  the  (1888). 
rights  of  one.    McCarter  v.  Green- 

[622] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING    [  §§  755,  756 

§  755.  Special  freight  trains. 

Where  cars  loaded  with  freight  are  to  be  hauled  in  a 
special  train  at  special  times  not  on  the  regular  schedule 
and  by  a  special  arrangement,  the  railroad  company  in 
so  hauling  the  cars  is  not  a  common  carrier.  This  ar- 
rangement is  commonly  made  between  the  owner  of  a 
circus  and  the  railroad  which  transmits  the  establishment 
from  one  place  of  exhibition  to  another.  The  circus  is 
transported  in  a  special  train,  made  up  exclusively  of  the 
circus  cars,  on  a  special  schedule  of  time,  and  for  a  price 
less  than  the  regular  rates;  and  the  owner  furnishes  men 
to  load  and  unload.  For  such  transportation  the  railroad 
is  not  responsible  as  a  common  carrier.1  In  the  leading 
case  on  the  subject,2  Mr.  Justice  Campbell  said:  "The 
business  of  common  carrier,  while  it  prevents  any  right 
to  refuse  the  carriage  of  property  such  as  is  generally  car- 
ried, implies,  especially  on  railroads,  that  the  business 
will  be  done  on  trains  made  up  by  the  carrier,  and  running 
on  their  own  time.  It  is  never  the  duty  of  a  carrier,  as 
such,  to  make  up  special  trains  on  demand,  or  to  drive 
such  trains  made  up  entirely  by  other  persons,  or  by  their 
cars." 

§  756.  Regular  train  established  upon  special  guaranty. 

If  a  regular  train  is  established  upon  the  guaranty  by 
an  individual  of  the  expense  of  maintaining  it,  the  rail- 

1  United  States. — Chicago,  M.  &  Michigan. — Coup  v.  Wabash,  St. 

St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallace,  66  Fed.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  56  Mich.  Ill,  22 

506,  30  L.  R.  A.  161  (1895);  Wilson  N.  W.  215,  56  Am.  Rep.  374  (1885). 

v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  129  New  York.— Brown  v.  Weir,  88 

Fed.  774  (1904).  N.  Y.  Supp.  479,  95  App.  Div.  78 

Indiana.— Cleveland,    C.,    C.    &  (1904). 

St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henry,  170  Ind.  Pennsylvania. — Forepaugh  v.  Del- 

94,  83  N.  E.  710  (1908).  aware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  Pa. 

Massachusetts. — Robertson  v.  Old  St.  217,  18  Atl.  503,  15  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  525,  672,  5  L.  R.  A.  508  (1889). 

31  N.  E.  650,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  482  2  Coup  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 

(1892).  Ry.  Co.,  supra. 

[623] 


§  756  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

road  is  none  the  less  a  common  carrier  in  running  the 
train,  and  it  cannot  give  the  guarantor  an  advantage 
over  his  business  rivals.  This  question  was  raised  and 
elaborately  discussed  in  the  case  of  Memphis  News  Pub- 
lishing Company  v.  Southern  Railway  Company.1  In 
that  case  it  appeared  that  a  railroad  company  contracted 
with  a  newspaper  publisher,  agreeing  to  run  a  special 
early  morning  train  carrying  only  the  newspapers  of  the 
publisher,  in  consideration  of  the  publishing  company 
guaranteeing  to  it  a  certain  revenue  from  the  operation 
of  the  train.  This  train  became  one  of  its  scheduled  trains, 
and  was  advertised  as  such.  It  was  controlled  exclusively 
by  the  company,  and  all  the  revenue  derived  from  its 
operation  in  the  carrying  of  passengers  and  freight  was 
its  property.  It  was  held  that  the  railroad  could  not, 
relying  on  its  contract,  refuse  to  carry  on  such  train  news- 
papers tendered  it  by  a  rival  publishing  house,  which 
offered  to  comply  with  all  the  conditions  as  to  indemnity, 
complied  with  by  the  house  making  the  contract,  and 
the  fact  that  the  publishing  company  solicited  the  institu- 
tion of  the  train  was  held  immaterial.  One  of  the  most 
enlightening  opinions  in  the  books  as  to  the  real  extent 
of  public  duty  was  given  upon  this  case  by  Chief  Jus- 
tice Beard.  It  concludes  thus:  " These  general  principles 
being  established,  what  is  there  to  prevent  their  applica- 
tion in  this  case?  We  see  nothing.  A  railroad  by  its  very 
nature,  as  has  been  seen,  is  a  common  carrier.  The  train 
in  question  is  a  scheduled  one,  advertised  to  the  world 
as  such.  An  invitation  is  given  to  the  public  to  take  pas- 
sage and  ship  freight  upon  it.  Its  own  employe's,  mana- 
gers, and  the  railway  company  appropriate  all  its  reve- 
nues. So  far  as  the  record  shows,  it  receives  on  this  train 
merchandise  from  every  other  member  of  the  community, 
and  refuses  carriage  alone  to  that  of  this  complainant; 

1 110  Tenn.  684,  75  S.  W.  941,  63  L.  R.  A.  150  (1903). 

[624] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  757 

and  this  refusal  is  based,  not  upon  a  lack  of  carrying  ca- 
pacity, but  exclusively  upon  the  ground  that  it  has  con- 
tracted away  its  duty,  in  respect  to  such  property  as  the 
complainant  has  tendered,  to  another  party.  Such  an 
excuse  cannot  relieve  the  railway  company  from  its  ob- 
ligations to  complainant  as  one  of  the  public."  l 

§  757.  Excursion  trains. 

When  a  .railroad  company  hires  a  train  to  private  in- 
dividuals to  use  as  an  excursion  train,  the  railroad  in 
running  the  train  is  not  strictly  a  common  carrier,2  and 
cannot  be  compelled  to  carry  any  person  on  the  train  who 
is  not  invited  by  the  lessee.3  "The  railroad  company, 
having  provided  for  meeting  the  reasonable  demands  of 
the  public  for  the  carriage  of  passengers,  is  at  liberty  to 
employ  its  trains  in  its  own  way,  with  the  proviso  that 
these  trains  must,  as  a  matter  of  public  policy,  be  operated 
and  run  by  its  own  qualified  servants,  for  the  protection 
and  safety  of  life  and  property.4  Nevertheless  the  rail- 
road is  under  the  same  duty  toward  any  person  invited 
by  the  lessee,  or  to  whom  the  latter  sells  a  ticket,  that  it 

1  See  also  the  following  cases  as  to  Tennessee. — Nashville  &  C.  R.  R. 

public  trains  in  general :  Co.     v.    Messino,     1     Sneed,    220 

Arizona.— Santa  Fe,  P.  &  P.  Ry.  (1853). 

Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  C.  Co.  (Ariz.),  Texas.— Galveston  C.  R.  R.  Co. 

108  Pac.  467  (1910).  v.  Hewitt,  67  Tex.  473,  3  S.  W.  705, 

Indiana.— Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.  60  Am.  Rep.  32  (1887). 

v.  Twiname,  111  Ind.  587,  13  N.  E.  2  The  cases  on  this  subject  are 

55  (1887).  well    collected    in    Fitzgibbons    v. 

Iowa.— Kellow,    Jr.,    Admr.,    v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  108 

Cent.  la.  Ry.  Co.,  68  la.  470,  23  la.  614,  79  N.  W.  477  (1889). 

N.  W.  740,  56  Am.  Rep.  858  (1886).  3  Moore  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 

Minnesota.— Oviatt  v.  Dak.  Cent.  Ry.,   67  Ark.  389,   55  S.   W.   161 

Ry.  Co.,  43  Minn.  300,  45  N.  W.  (1900). 

436  (1890).  4  Bunn,  C.  J.,  in  his  dissenting 

New  York. — Springer  v.  Wescott,  opinion  in  Moore  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 

29  N.  Y.  Supp.  149,  78  Hun,  365  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  supra. 
(1894). 

40  [  625  ] 


§  758  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

is  under  to  any  passenger.  It  is  therefore  liable  to  one 
who  having  been  allowed  by  the  lessee  to  buy  a  ticket 
is  then  refused  by  him  permission  to  ride,1  or  is  assaulted 
or  insulted  by  other  excursionists,2  or  is  negligently  in-, 
jured  by  an  accident  to  the  train.3  It  should  be  pointed 
out,  moreover,  that  if  such  a  train  is  stopped  at  a  regular 
station  and  a  traveler  is  permitted  to  board  it  without 
being  apprised  of  its  character,  he  cannot  be  ejected  from 
the  train  after  it  has  pulled  out.4 

§  758.  Chartered  train. 

If  an  entire  train,  including  the  motive  power,  be  char- 
tered to  a  person  who  undertakes  the  entire  management 
himself,  the  railroad  is  not  a  carrier  of  goods  or  persons 
carried  on  the  train.5  And  so,  where  a  railroad  simply 
loaned  a  train  to  an  association  of  railroad  employees, 
who  themselves  operated  and  managed  the  train,  the 
railroad  was  held  not  to  owe  the  duty  of  a  common  car- 
rier to  persons  riding  on  the  train.6  Where  a  single  car 
is  chartered  and  loaded  by  a  shipper,  and  is  then  taken 
by  the  railroad  for  transportation,  on  its  regular  trains, 
the  railroad  is  a  carrier  of  the  goods  loaded  in  the  car.7 
But  where  an  express  company  obtained  a  train  of  cars 

1  Moore  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  ing  Harmon  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R. 
Ry.  Co.,  supra.  R.  Co.,  28  S.  C.  401,  5  S.  E.  835,  13 

2  Texarkana  &  F.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Am.  St.  Rep.  686  (1887). 
Anderson,  67  Ark.   123,  53  S.  W.  8  East  Tenn.  &  Ga.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
673  (1899);  White  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  Whittle,  27  Ga.  535,  73  Am.  Dec. 
R.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  C.  631,  20  S.  E.  741  (1859).    See,  however,  Kirkland 
191,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  489  (1894).  v.  Charleston  &  W.C.  Ry.  Co.,  79 
See  also  Collins  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  S.  C.  273,  60  S.  E.  668,  15  L.  R.  A. 
Co.,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  169,  39  S.  W.  (N.  S.)  425  (1908). 

643  (1897).  •  Davis  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  & 

3  Skinner  v.  London,  B.  &  S.  C.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  543  (1891). 
Ry.  Co.,  5  Ex.  787  (1850).  7  Arkansas—  Fordyce     v.      Mc- 

4  Kirkland  v.  Charleston  &  W.  C.  Flynn,  56  Ark.  424,  19  S.  W.  961 
Ry.  Co.,  79  S.  C.  273,  60  S.  E.  668,  (1892). 

15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  425  (1907),  cit- 

[6261 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  759 

and  an  engine  from  a  railroad  for  the  purpose  of  making 
a  particular  shipment  of  stock,  no  passengers  being  car- 
ried except  the  owners  of  the  stock  and  their  employe's, 
the  shipment  being  accompanied  by  the  messenger  of 
the  express  company,  although  the  train  was  operated 
by  the  servants  of  the  railroad,  the  railroad  was  held  to 
be  the  mere  agent  of  the  express  company  for  the  trans- 
portation and  forwarding  of  the  stock,  and  the  express 
company  was  held  liable  for  the  railroad's  negligence.1 

Topic  B.  Unusual  Methods  of  Service 

§  759.  Passengers  traveling  in  an  unusual  place. 

When  a  person  desiring  to  be  transported  enters  a  car 
or  other  part  of  a  railroad  train  not  intended  for  passen- 
gers, he  does  not  thereby  accept  the  carrier's  invitation; 
and  if  there  is  no  express  acceptance  of  him  as  a  passenger 
he  is  not  entitled  to  be  so  treated.  In  a  Texas  case  2  it 
appeared  that  an  intending  passenger,  having  money  to 
pay  his  fare,  came  late  to  the  station,  and  was  just  able 
to  get  on  board  the  front  platform  of  the  first  car  as  the 
train  started.  This  proved  to  be  the  front  platform  of  a 
baggage  car.  The  fireman,  discovering  him,  compelled 
him  to  jump  off  by  turning  hot  water  from  a  hose  on  him; 
and  in  jumping  he  was  injured.  The  Court  of  Civil  Ap- 
peals held  that  he  could  recover  as  a  passenger.  "  While," 
they  said,  "the  place  one  may  be  occupying  upon  the 
train  at  the  time  of  his  injury  may  be  important  in  de- 
Georgia. — Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  1  American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Ogles 
Anderson,  58  Ga.  393  (1877).  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  81  S.  W.  1023 

Illinois— Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  -  (1904). 

Dunbar,  20  111.  623,  71  Am.  Dec.  2  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
291  (1858).  Williams  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40  S.  W. 

Vermont. — Kimball  v.  Rutland  350  (1897);  in  the  upper  court 
&  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Vt.  247,  62  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Am.  Dec.  567  (1854),  apparently  Williams,  91  Tex.  255,  42  S.  W. 
contra.  Rep.  855  (1897). 

[627] 


§  760  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

termining  whether  or  not  he  intended  to  pay  his  fare,  it 
does  not  conclusively  fix  his  status,  either  as  a  passenger 
or  a  trespasser."  This  decision  was  however  reversed 
on  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court.  One  may  become  a 
passenger,  the  court  said,  by  either  an  express  or  an  im- 
plied contract.  There  was  no  express  contract  in  this 
case;  and  "in  order  to  raise  such  an  implied  contract,  the 
party  desiring  to  be  carried  by  the  railroad  company  must 
take  passage  on  that  part  of  the  train  provided  by  it  for 
carrying  passengers."  l 

§  760.  Whether  there  is  acceptance  in  such  cases. 

As  between  the  original  decision  and  the  final  decision 
of  the  case  just  discussed,  the  latter,  it  seems,  is  prefer- 
able. The  case  is  not  like  that  of  taking  a  wrong  train  by 
mistake;  for  there  the  person  gets  into  a  car  intended  for 
passengers,  while  here,  as  the  Chief  Justice  pointed  out,  he 
knew  that  a  baggage  car  was  not  prepared  for  the  recep- 
tion of  passengers.  The  same  facts  came  up  in  Illinois; 2 
and  it  was  held  that  the  person  did  not  become  a  passenger 
by  getting  safely  upon  the  platform.  "  A  passenger  must 
put  himself  in  the  care  of  the  railroad  company,  and  there 
must  be  something  from  which  it  may  fairly  be  implied 

1  A  case  almost  identical  in  its  on  a  railroad  train  and  there  con- 
facts  was  decided  in  South  Carolina  tinues  his  journey  without  entering 
between  the  first  decision  and  the  the  cars,  in  violation  of  the  rules 
appeal  in  the  Texas  case;  and  largely  and  regulations  of  the  company, 
on  the  authority  of  the  Texas  does  not  become  a  passenger,  al- 
Court  of  Civil  Appeals  the  plaintiff  though  his  fare  is  demanded  by,  and 
was  held  to  be  a  passenger.  Chief  paid  to,  the  brakeman  on  the  train, 
Justice  Mclver  dissented,  taking  who  is  not  authorized  to  demand  or 
the  same  ground  on  which  the  Su-  receive  fares.  Chicago  &  Erie  R.  R. 
preme  Court  placed  itself  in  the  Co.  v.  Field,  7  Ind.  App.  172,  34  N. 
Texas  case.  Martin  v.  Southern  E.  406,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  444  (1893). 
Ry.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  150,  28  S.  E.  Rep.  2  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
303  (1897).  O'Keefe,  168  111.  115,  48  N.  E.  294, 

A  person  who  takes  passage  on  39  L.  R.  A.  148,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  68 

the  platform  of  a  passenger  coach  (1897). 

[628] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  761 

that  the  company  had  accepted  him  as  a  passenger."  l 
The  distinction  is  to  be  noted  between  persons  who  having 
once  become  passengers  then  go  without  permission  of  the 
company  into  some  place  not  provided  for  passengers,  and 
persons  who,  intending  to  become  passengers,  go  in  the 
first  instance  to  such  a  place.  While  the  latter  do  not 
technically  become  passengers  at  all,  since  they  never 
place  themselves  within  the  terms  of  the  carrier's  offer  to 
receive  them,2  persons  who  have  already  become  pas- 
sengers do  not  forfeit  that  position  by  going  into  some  car 
or  some  part  of  a  car  in  which  passengers  are  not  allowed 
to  ride.  Such  conduct  may  be  negligent,  and  if  the  negli- 
gence contributes  to  an  injury  it  may  therefore  bar  re- 
covery for  the  injury;  but  the  recovery  cannot  be  denied 
on  the  ground  that  the  injured  person  was  not  a  pas- 
senger.3 

§  761.  Vehicle  not  intended  for  passengers. 

In  general,  a  carrier  who  by  his  servants  receives  a 
person  to  be  carried  on  any  vehicle  or  portion  of  a  vehicle 
not  provided  by  the  carrier  for  passengers  is  not  a  common 
carrier  of  such  person;  nor  can  such  person  demand  to  be 
carried  in  such  a  vehicle  or  place.  On  this  principle,  a 
railroad  is  not  a  common  carrier  of  a  person  who  by  permis- 

1  Parks  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,      Am.  Rep.  10  (1883),  top  of  freight 
178  Mo.  108,  77  S.  W.  70  (1903).      car. 

See  also  Udell  v.  Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Kentucky. — Kentucky  Central  R. 

Co.,  152  Ind.  507,  52  N.  E.  799  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  79  Ky.  160,  42 

(1899).  Am.  Rep.  208  (1880),  express  car. 

2  Bricker  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Massachusetts. — Merrill  v.  East- 
Co.,  132  Pa.  1,  18  Atl.  983,  19  Am.  ern  R.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  238,  1  N. 
St.  Rep.  585  (1890).  E.  548,  52  Am.  Rep.  705,  (1885), 

United  States. — New  Orleans  &  step  of  steam  car. 

N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  60  Fed.  Pennsylvania. — Bard  v.  Pennsyl- 

379,  9  C.  C.  A.  29,  23  U.  S.  App.  37  vania  Traction  Co.,  176  Pa,  97,  34 

(1894)  top  of  cattle  car.  Atl.   953,   53     Am.   St.   Rep.   672 

1  Arkansas. — Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  (1896),  bumper  of  street  car. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Miles,  40  Ark.  298,  48 

[629] 


§761 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


sion  of  the  carrier's  servant  or  otherwise  rides  on  a  loco- 
motive,1 a  hand  car,2  a  railroad  velocipede,3  or  a  flat  car.4 
And  so  a  passenger,  who  without  the  knowledge  or  consent 
of  the  conductor  of  the  train,  rides  in  the  baggage,  mail,  or 
express  car,  cannot  maintain  an  action  against  the  railroad 
company  for  injuries  sustained  which  would  not  have  hap- 
pened to  him  had  he  been  in  a  passenger  car; 5  nor  can  he  be 
heard  to  contend  that  the  conductor  ought  to  have  dis- 
covered and  ordered  him  out.  But  here  too  there  are  cases 
which  go  so  far  as  to  hold  that  one  may  be  accepted  as  a 
passenger  even  in  so  unusual  a  vehicle  by  one  high  enough 
in  authority  to  authorize  unusual  procedure.6 


1  Illinois. — Lake  Shore  &  Mich. 
S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  123  111.  162, 
14  N.  E.  197,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  510 
(1887). 

Iowa. — Ramm  v.  Minneapolis  & 
St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  94  la.  296,  62  N. 
W.  751  (1895). 

Massachusetts. — Merrill  v.  East- 
ern R.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  238,  1  N. 
E.  548,  52  Am.  Rep.  705  (1885). 

Nebraska. — Woolsey  v.  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Neb.  798, 
58  N.  W.  444,  25  L.  R.  A.  79 
(1894). 

New  York. — Robertson  v.  New 
York  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  91  (1856). 

Oregon. — Radley  v.  Columbia 
Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  44  Oreg.  332, 
75  Pac.  212  (1904). 

South  Carolina. — Darwin  v.  Char- 
lotte, C.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  S.  C.  531, 
55  Am.  Rep.  32  (1885). 

Texas. — Wilcox  v.  San  Antonio  & 
A.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  487,  33  S.  W.  379  (1895). 

Virginia. — Virginia  Midland  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  83  Va.  375,  5  S.  E. 
175  (1887). 

[630] 


*  North  Carolina. — Willis  v.  At- 
lantic R.  R.  Co.,  120  N.  C.  508,  26 
S.  E.  784  (1897). 

Ohio. — Cincinnati,  J.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Morley,  4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  559 
(1890). 

Oregon. — Rathbone  v.  Oregon  R. 
R.  Co.,  40  Oreg.  225,  66  Pac.  909 
(1901). 

Texas. — Prince  v.  International 
&  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  64  Tex. 
144  (1885). 

3  Georgia. — Higgins  v.   Cherokee 
R.  R.  Co.,  73  Georgia,  149  (1884). 

Louisiana. — Snyder  v.  Natchez 
R.  R.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann. 
302,  7  So.  Rep.  582  (1890). 

4  The  Frank  and  Willie,  45  Fed. 
488  (1891). 

8  Kentucky. — Kentucky  Central 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  79  Ky.  160, 
42  Am.  Rep.  208  (1880). 

Pennsylvania. — Bricker  v.  Phila- 
delphia &  Reading  R.  R.  Co.,  132 
Pa.  St.  1,  18  Atl.  983,  19  Am.  St. 
Rep.  585  (1890). 

6  Lake  Shore  &  Mich.  S.  R.  R.  v. 
Brown,  123  111.  162,  14  N.  E.  197,  5 
Am.  St.  Rep.  510  (1887). 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  762 

§  762.  Carriage  on  construction  trains. 

On  these  principles  a  railroad  is  not  usually  a  common 
carrier  of  one  who  is  received  by  its  servants  for  carriage 
on  a  construction  train.  Certainly  one  who  knowingly 
takes  passage  over  an  unfinished  railway  should  not  ex- 
pect to  be  cared  for  as  passengers  are  after  regular  service 
has  begun.1  Even  after  the  road  is  in  operation  one  rid- 
ing upon  a  construction  train,2  a  gravel  train,3  a  lumber 
train,4  or  a  train  of  flat  cars  5  must  appreciate  that  he  is 
not  being  accepted  as  a  passenger  by  the  company.  Yet 
even  in  these  cases  the  possibility  remains  that  one  may 
be  accepted  even  upon  a  construction  train,  if  the  circum- 
stances are  such  as  give  him  to  understand  that  he  is 
being  especially  received  as  a  passenger.  Thus  where  a 
person  purchased  a  ticket  and  was  accepted  by  the  con- 
ductor of  a  construction  train  as  a  passenger  thereon, 
against  the  carrier's  orders,  it  was  held  that  the  conductor 
had  apparent  authority  to  accept  him  as  a  passenger.6 

1  United  States. — Wade  v.  Lutcher  Missouri. — Berry  v.  Missouri  Pac. 

Cypress  Lumber  Co.,  74  Fed.  517,  Ry.  Co.,  124  Mo.  223,  25  S.  W.  229 

33  L.  R.  A.  255,  41  U.  S.  App.  45,  20  (1894). 

C.  C.  A.  515  (1896).  3  Indiana. — Lawrenceburgh&Up- 

Indiana. — Evansville     &     Rich-  per  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montgom- 

mond  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes,  137  Ind.  ery,  7  Ind.  474  (1856). 

306,  36  N.  E.  1092  (1893).  4  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mea- 

Kansas— Chicago,  K.  &  W.  Ry.  cham,  91  Tenn.  428,  19  S.  W.  232 

Co.  v.  Frazer,  55  Kan.  582,  40  Pac.  (1892). 

923  (1895).  B  Georgia. — Higgins  v.   Cherokee 

Tennessee.— Nashville  &  C.  R.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Ga.  149  (1884),  semble. 

Co.  v.  Messino,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.),  Louisiana. — Snyder    v.   Natchez 

220  (1853),  semble.  R.  R.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann. 

Texas.— San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  302,  7  So.  Rep.  582  (1890). 

Co.  v.  Robinson,  79  Tex.  608,  15  S.  6  Little  Rock,  M.  R.  &  T.  Ry. 

W.  584  (1891).  Co.    v.    Glidewell,    39    Ark.    487 

Canada. — McRae    v.    Canadian  (1882). 

Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  Montreal,  L.  R.  4  See  also  on  this  topic: 

S.  C.  186  (1888).  Tennessee.— Nashville  &  C.  R.  R. 

*  Alabama. — McCauley   v.    Ten-  Co.  v.  Messino,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.), 

nessee,  C.  I.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Ala.  220  (1853). 

356,  9  So.  611  (1890).  Xemsos.— St.  Joseph  &  Western 

[631] 


§  763  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  763.  Passenger  carriage  on  freight  trains. 

It  often  happens  that  persons  are  received  by  the  em- 
ploye's of  the  carrier  upon  freight  trains.  In  accordance 
with  the  principles  now  under  examination,  such  a  recep- 
tion will  make  the  person  a  passenger  provided  the  re- 
ception is  within  the  authority  of  the  servant,  either 
because  of  express  permission  given  by  the  carrier,  or 
because  the  reception  is  within  the  apparent  authority  of 
the  servant.  A  case  of  the  first  kind  occurs  when  a  railroad 
is  accustomed  to  carry  passengers  in  freight  cars.1  Where 
such  a  custom  exists,  one  received  on  a  freight  train  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  passenger  quite  as  much  as  one  who  rides 
on  an  ordinary  passenger  train.  A  case  of  the  second 
kind  occurs  when  passengers  are  not  uncommonly  so  car- 
ried on  freight  trains  in  that  part  of  the  country,  and  one 
is  permitted  to  ride  on  such  a  train  by  the  conductor.2 
When  for  either  reason  the  conductor  has  apparent  au- 
thority to  receive  a  passenger,  and  does  so,  the  relation  of 
carrier  and  passenger  is  established.3  But  in  any  case 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  35  Kan.  185,  jured    any   the   less   a   passenger, 

10  Pac.  461  (1886).  when  at  the  time  he  bought  his 

1  Long  continued  violation  of  the  ticket  he  had  no  knowledge  of  such 
carriers'  rules  prohibiting  the  car-  rules  and  took  the  train  under  the 
riage   of    passengers    upon    freight  instructions  of  an  agent  of  the  corn- 
trains  as  such,   so  notorious  that  pany. 

this  must  have  come  to  the  notice  Alabama. — Louisville  &  N.  Ry. 

of  the  company  has  the  same  ef-  Co.  v.  Hine,  121  Ala.  234,  25  So. 

feet.  857  (1899). 

Missouri. — Jones  v.  Wabash,  St.  Illinois. — Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  Mo.  App.  158  v.  Davenport,  177  111.  110,  52  N.  E. 

(1885).  266  (1898). 

Texas. — Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Missouri. — McGee  v.  Missouri 

Co.  v.  Huff,  98  Texas,  110,  81  S.  W.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  92  Mo.  208,  4  S.  W. 

525  (1904).  739,  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  706  (1887). 

2  The  fact  that  the  train  in  ques-  Texas. — Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
tion  was  a  freight  train  on  which,  Black,  87  Tex.  160,  27  S.  W.  118 
under  the  rules  of  the  company,  (1894). 

passengers  were  not  permitted  to         s  United  States. — Hazard  v.  Chi- 
ride,  does  not  render  the  person  in-     cago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  503, 

[632] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING 


§763 


when  thus  bound  to  such  persons  as  to  passengers,  it  is  gen- 
erally held  that  only  such  care  is  owed  such  passengers  as 
is  practicable  in  connection  with  the  operation  of  freight 
trains.1 


Fed.  Gas.  No.  6,275  (1865);  Reber 
v.  Bond,  38  Fed.  822  (1889). 

District  of  Columbia.  —  United 
States  v.  Saul,  58  Fed.  763  (1893). 

Georgia. — Crine  v.  East  Tennes- 
see V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Ga.  651,  11 
S.  E.  555  (1890). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Winters,  175  111.  293,  51  N.  E. 
901  (1898). 

Indiana. — Ohio  &  M.  R.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Dickerson,  59  Ind.  317  (1877). 

Kansas. — Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Holcomb,  44  Kan,  332,  24 
Pac.  467  (1890). 

Maine. — Dunn  v.  Grand  Trunk 
Ry.  Co.,  58  Me.  187,  4  Am.  Rep. 
267  (1870). 

Michigan. — Greenfield  v.  Detroit 
&  M.  Ry.  Co.,  133  Mich.  557,  95  N. 
W.  546  (1903). 

Mississippi. — Perkins  v.  Chicago 
S.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  Miss. 
726  (1883). 

Missouri. — Wagner  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  97  Mo.  512,  10  S.  W. 
486,  3  L.  R.  A.  156  (1888);  White- 
head  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  99  Mo.  263,  11  S.  W.  751,  6  L. 
R.  A.  409  (1889). 

Nebraska. — Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Troyer,  70  Neb.  293,  103 
N.  W.  680  (1905). 

New  Hampshire. — Murch  v.  Con- 
cord R.  R.  Corp.,  29  N.  H.  9,  61 
Am.  Dec.  631  (1854). 

New  York. — Edgerton  v.  New 
York  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y. 
227  (1868). 


Ohio. — Allen  v.  Lake  Shore  & 
Mich.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  57  Ohio  St.  79,  47 
N.  E.  1037  (1897). 

Texas.— I.  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Irvine,  64  Tex.  529  (1885) ;  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Huff,  98  Tex. 
110,  81  S.  W.  525  (1904). 

Wisconsin. — Lucas  v.  Milwaukee 
Ry.  Co.,  33  Wis.  41  (1873). 

West  Virginia. — B  o  g  g  e  s  a  v. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  37  W.  Va. 
297,  16  S.  E.  525  (1892). 

1  United  States. — S  p  r  a  g  u  e  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  92  Fed.  59,  34 
C.  C.  A.  207  (1899). 

California. — Wieland  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.,  1  Cal.  App.  343,  82  Pac. 
226  (1905). 

Georgia. — Central  of  Georgia  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Lippman,  110  Ga.  665,  36 
S.  E.  202,  50  L.  R.  A.  673  (1900). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Arnol,  144  111.  261,  33  N.  E.  204,  19 
L.  R.  A.  313  (1893). 

Minnesota. — Campbell  v.  Duluth 
&  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  107  Minn.  358,  120 
N.  W.  375,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  190 
(1909). 

Missouri. — Green  v.  Missouri,  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  121  Mo.  App.  720,  97 
S.  W.  646  (1906). 

North  Carolina. — Means  v.  Caro- 
lina Cent.  R.  Co.,  124  N.  C.  574, 
32  S.  E.  960,  45  L.  R.  A.  164 
(1899). 

Oklahoma.— St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Gosnell,  23  Okla.  588,  101 
Pac.  1126,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  892 
(1909). 

[633] 


§764 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  764.  Such  transportation  often  upon  a  private  basis. 

If,  however,  a  passenger  is  received  by  the  servant  of 
the  carrier  upon  a  freight  train  under  circumstances  which 
show  that  he  knows,  or  at  least  should  know,  that  persons 
are  not  carried  as  passengers,  where,  therefore,  it  is  suffi- 
ciently plain  that  the  conductor  has  no  authority  to  per- 
mit him  to  ride  as  such,  even  if  he  can  be  induced  to  do  so, 
he  does  not  become  a  passenger  whether  he  pays  fare  or 
not;  and  a  fortiori  where  the  conductor  informs  him  that 
passengers  are  forbidden  to  ride  on  a  freight  train,  but  he 
persuades  the  conductor  to  let  him  ride,  nevertheless  he 
is  not  a  passenger. l  The  acceptance,  that  is,  in  such  cases 
is  upon  a  private  basis  and  the  special  liabilities  which  are 
imposed  upon  common  carriers  of  passengers  are  therefore 
not  involved.  In  comparing  the  cases  in  this  section  with 
those  in  the  preceding  one  it  will  be  obvious  that  whether 
the  service  is  upon  a  public  basis  or  a  private  basis  is  in 
last  analysis  more  a  question  of  fact  than  a  question  of 


1  United  States. — Shoemaker  v. 
Kingsbury,  12  Wall.  369,  20  L.  ed. 
432  (1870);  Purple  v.  Union  Pacific 
R.  R.  Co.,  114  Fed.  123,  51  C.  C.  A. 
564,  57  L.  R.  A.  700  (1902). 

California. — Wieland  v.  Southern 
Pacific  Co.,  1  Cal.  App.  343,  82  Pac. 
226  (1905). 

Connecticut. — Bergan  v.  Central 
Vt.  Ry.  Co.,  82  Conn.  574,  74  Atl. 
937  (1909). 

Indiana. — Smith  v.  Louisville,  E. 
&  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Ind.  394,  24 
N.  E.  753  (1890). 

Kentucky. — Ohio  Valley  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Watson's  Admr.,  93  Ky.  654,  21 
S.  W.  244,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  211,  19 
L.  R.  A.  310  (1893). 

Maine. — Dunn  v.  Grand  Trunk 
Ry.  Co.,  58  Me.  187,  4  Am.  Rep. 
267  (1870). 

[634] 


Massachusetts. — Powers  v.  Boston 
&  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  153  Mass.  188, 
26  N.  E.  446  (1891). 

New  York. — Eaton  v.  Delaware, 
L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  382,  15 
Am.  Rep.  513  (1874). 

Tennessee. — Washburn  v.  Nash- 
ville &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Head  (Tenn.), 
638,  75  Am.  Dec.  784  (1859);  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Hailey,  94  Tenn.  383, 
29  S.  W.  367,  27  L.  R.  A.  549 
(1895). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Campbell,  76  Tex.  174,  13  S.  W. 
19  (1890). 

Utah. — Everett  v.  Oregon,  S.  L. 
&  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  9  Utah,  340,  34 
Pac.  289  (1893). 

Wisconsin. — Lucas  v.  Milwaukee 
&  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.,  33  Wis.  41,  14 
Am.  Rep.  735  (1873). 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  765 

law.    But  the  undertaking  need  not  be  explicit,  the  par- 
ties may  act  upon  reasonable  inferences.1 

§  765.  Special  services  in  telephoning. 

This  topic  may  be  concluded  with  examples  drawn  from 
other  public  callings  of  the  general  doctrine  that  public 
service  may  be  undertaken  beyond  usual  obligation  in 
particular  cases  by  special  acceptance.  Thus  although 
the  usual  profession  of  the  telephone  company  is  to  put 
its  patrons  into  communication  so  that  they  may  have 
speech  with  each  other,  it  may  in  particular  instances  be 
shown  to  have  undertaken  more.  The  sending  for  a  per- 
son to  come  to  a  toll  office  may  often  be  seen  to  be  a  spe- 
cial favor  that  is  being  extended,  but  it  is  not  impossible 
that  it  may  be  part  of  the  service  undertaken.2  Again,  al- 
though the  telephone  company  does  not  commonly  under- 
take the  delivery  of  messages,  it  may  have  done  enough  so 
that  a  particular  customer  may  understand  that  when 
such  service  is  undertaken  for  him  it  is  upon  a  public 
basis.3  And  likewise  a  telegraph  company  may  agree  to 
deliver  by  telephone  a  message  addressed  to  a  person 
living  beyond  the  free  delivery  limits.4  This  follows  the 
usual  rule  that  when  a  telegraph  company  deliberately 

1  To  put  an  extreme  illustration :  ceeding  note,  see  particularly  Eaton 

In  one  case  it  appeared  that  the  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  57 

passenger  was  informed  by  a  servant  N.    Y.    382,    15    Am.    Rep.    513 

of  the  carrier  that  he  could  not,  un-  (1874). 

der  the  carrier's  rules,  attach  his  2  See,  for  one  example,  Central 

own  freight  car  to  a  passenger  train  Union    Telephone    Co.    v.    Swove- 

and  ride  in  it,  as  he  desired  to  do;  land,  14  Ind.  App.  341,  42  N.  E. 

but    the    servant    afterwards    per-  1035  (1895). 

mitted  it.     He  was  held  to  be  a  8  See,  for  one  example,  Telephone 

passenger.    Lackawanna  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Brown,    104  Tenn.    56,   55 

Co.  v.  Chenewith,  52  Pa.  382,  91  S.  W.  155,  78  Am.  St.  Rep.  906 

Am.  Dec.  168  (1866).  (1900). 

But     that    the     usual    inference  4  Lylesy.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 

would  be  to  the  contrary  is  plain.  77  S.  C.  174,  57  S.  E.  725,  12  L.  R. 

Among  the  cases  cited  in  the  pro-  A.  (N.  S.)  534  (1906). 

[635] 


§  766  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

undertakes  to  deliver  messages  outside  its  regular  limits 
it  is  bound  to  do  so.1 

§  766.  Unrepeated  telegrams. 

Unrepeated  telegrams  probably  belong  here;  for  the 
real  issue  as  to  them  it  seems,  is  whether  the  taking  of 
telegrams  to  be  repeated  should  be  considered  the  regular 
business,  so  that  the  sending  of  unrepeated  telegrams  may 
be  treated  as  outside  the  usual  course.  Upon  the  usual 
facts,  it  must  be  said,  this  is  not  true.  Indeed  it  is  the 
unrepeated  message  which  is  the  regular  course,  the  re- 
peated one  being  rare  indeed.  Nevertheless,  by  what  is 
apparently  the  weight  of  authority  2  an  agreement  that 
the  telegraph  company  shall  not  be  held  liable  for  mis- 
takes in  unrepeated  telegrams  although  caused  by  their 
negligence  is  held  valid,  notwithstanding  upon  general 
principles  such  agreements  as  to  regular  service  are  held 
void  as  against  public  policy.  Therefore  those  cases  which 
hold  that  as  the  unrepeated  business  is  the  regular  busi- 
ness such  an  agreement  is  inconsistent  with  the  public 

1  North     Carolina.  —  Rosser    v.      Union  Tel.  Co.,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  164, 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  130      71  Am.  Dec.  461  (1858). 

N.  C.  251,  41  S.  E.  378  (1902).  Maryland.— United    States    Tel. 

Texas.— Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  Co.  v.  Gildersleve,  29  Md.  232,  96 

v.  Warren  (Texas),  36  S.  W.  314  Am.  Dec.  519  (1868). 

(1986);  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Michigan.— Western  Union  Tel. 

Taylor,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  310,  22  Co.  v.  Carew,  15  Mich.  525  (1867). 

S.W.  532  (1893);  Evans  v.  Western  New    York.— Breese    v.    United 

Union   Tel.    Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  States  Tel.  Co.,  48  N.  Y.  132,  8  Am. 

56  S.  W.  609  (1900).  Rep.  526  (1871). 

2  United    Stales.  —  Primrose    v.  Pennsylvania. — Western      Union 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  154  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Stevenson,  128  Pa.  442, 
1,  38  L.  ed.  883,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1098  18  Atl.  441,  5  L.  R.  A.  515,  15  Am. 
(1894).  St.  Rep.  687  (1889). 

California.  —  Coit    v.    Western  England. — McAndrew  v.  Electric 

Union  Tel.  Co.,  130  Cal.  657, 63  Pac.  Telegraph  Co.,  17  C.  B.  3  (1855). 

83,  53  L.  R.  A.  678,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  Canada.— Baxter    v.     Dominion 

153  (1900).  Telegraph  Co.,  37  U.  C.  Q.  B.  470 

Kentucky. — Camp    v.    Western  (1875). 

[636] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  767 

duty  of  the  telegraph  companies  seem  to  be  better  upon 
theory.1 

Topic  C.  Peculiar  Conditions  of  Service 

§  767.  Owner  accompanying  his  goods. 

If  the  owner  of  goods  goes  along  with  them  and  retains 
possession  of  them,  the  person  who  furnishes  the  vehicle 
is  not  a  carrier,  since  he  is  not  a  bailee.  This  was  the  posi- 
tion of  affairs  presented  by  the  leading  case  of  the  East 
India  Company  v.  Pullen.2  The  defendant  in  that  case 
was  a  common  lighterman.  "It  was  the  usage  of  the  com- 
pany on  the  unshipping  of  their  goods  to  clap  an  officer, 
who  is  called  a  guardian,  in  the  lighter,  who,  as  soon  as 
the  lading  is  taken  in,  puts  the  company's  lock  on  the 
hatches,  and  goes  with  the  goods  to  see  them  safe  delivered 
at  the  warehouse."  This  usage  having  been  followed,  and 
part  of  the  goods  lost,  the  company  sued  the  defendant. 
At  the  trial,  before  Lord  Chief  Justice  Raymond,  the 
court  "was  of  opinion  this  differed  from  the  common  case, 
this  not  being  any  trust  in  the  defendant,  and  the  goods 
were  not  to  be  considered  as  ever  having  been  in  his  pos- 
session, but  in  the  possession  of  the  company's  servant, 
who  had  hired  the  lighter  to  use  himself.  He  thought, 
therefore,  the  action  was  not  maintainable,  so  the  plain- 
tiffs were  nonsuited."  3  But  in  a  later  case  where  a  servant 

1  Alabama. — Western  Union  Tel.  North  Carolina. — Brown  v.  Postal 

Co.  v.  Chamblee,  122  Ala.  428,  25  Tel  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  187,  16  S.  E.  179, 

So.  232,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  89  (1898).  17  L.  R.  A.  648,  32  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Illinois.— Tyler  v.  Western  Union  793  (1892). 

Tel.  Co.,  60  111.  421,  14  Am.  Rep.  Ohio.— Telegraph    Co.    v.    Gris- 

38,  74  111.  168  (1871).  wold,  37  Ohio  St.  301,  41  Am.  Rep. 

.Kansas.— Western     Union     Tel.  500  (1881). 

Co.  v.  Crall,  38  Kan.  679,  17  Pac.  *  1  Strange,  690  (1726). 

309,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  795  (1888).  3  See  White  v.  Winnisimmet  Co., 

Maine. — Ayer  v.  Western  Union  7  Gush.  155  (1851),  and  New  York 

Tel.  Co.,  79  Me.  493,  10  Atl.  495,  1  v.  Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1,  12  N.  E.  631 

Am.  St.  Rep.  353  (1887).  (1887). 

[637] 


§  768  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

of  the  shipper  went  along  with  the  carrier,  on  account  of 
the  carrier  being  a  stranger  to  the  shipper,  this  was  held 
not  to  negative  the  carrier's  responsibility,  the  case  being 
distinguished  from  the  usage  of  the  East  India  Company, 
"who  never  intrust  the  lighterman  with  their  goods,  but 
give  the  whole  charge  of  the  property  to  one  of  their 
officers."  In  this  case,1  the  court  said  the  defendant 
"must  have  had  possession  of  them  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  his  contract  into  effect,  which  he  could  not  have 
done  without  such  possession."  2 

§  768.  Carrier  in  general  control. 

The  difficult  cases  are  those  in  which  both  the  carrier 
of  these  goods  and  the  owner  who  accompanies  them 
have  a  certain  degree  of  control  over  them.  In  such  cases 
the  question  of  fact  would  seem  to  be  as  to  which  has  the 
superior  right.  In  a  leading  case  3  in  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  the  carrier  was  engaged  in  transport- 
ing a  body  of  soldiers  and  their  baggage,  an  armed  guard 
accompanying  the  baggage,  which  the  soldiers  themselves 
packed  in  the  car.  Mr.  Justice  Field,  speaking  for  the 
court,  said  "If  it  were  admitted  that  a  special  guard  was 
appointed  for  the  car  on  the  route  the  admission  would 
not  aid  the  company  or  relieve  it  of  liability.  The  control 
and  management  of  the  car,  or  of  the  train,  by  the  serv- 
ants and  employe's  of  the  company  were  not  impeded 
or  interfered  with,  and  where  no  such  interference  is  at- 
tempted it  can  never  be  a  ground  for  limiting  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  carrier  that  the  owner  of  the  property  accom- 
panies it  and  keeps  a  watchful  lookout  for  its  safety."  In 
another  important  case  4  a  railroad  company  which  was 

1  Robinson  v.  Dunmore,  2  B.  &  Nowlen,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  234,  32 
P.  416  (1801).  Am.  Dec.  455  (1838). 

2  See  also  Brind  v.  Dale,  8  C.  &  *  Hannibal  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  12 
P.  207  (1837);  Cohen  v.  Frost,  2  Wall.  262,  20  L.  ed.  423  (1870). 
Duer,    335     (1853);    Hollister    v.  4  Terre  Haute  &  Ind.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

[638] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  769 

being  paid  for  hauling  the  locomotives  of  another  road, 
put  one  of  their  employes  in  the  cab  in  charge  of  the 
train  movements.  It  was  held  that  as  the  railroad  thus 
took  control  of  the  situation  it  was  liable  for  a  collision 
although  the  company  that  owned  the  engines  furnished 
an  engineer  and  mechanics  to  operate  it  under  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  pilot. 

§  769.  Luggage  carried  by  passengers. 

Where  a  passenger  takes  with  him  in  the  vehicle  in 
which  he  is  carried  small  articles  of  personal  baggage  it 
may  be  difficult  to  determine  how  far  the  responsibility 
of  the  carrier  extends  to  them.  The  English  law,  dating 
from  an  early  case, !  where  a  stage  driver  was  held  respon- 
sible for  the  loss  of  the  portmanteau  of  a  passenger,  goes 
so  far  as  to  hold  the  railroad  responsible  as  a  carrier  for 
hand  luggage  brought  by  the  passenger  into  the  carriage 
and  kept  by  him  during  the  journey.2  "It  is  the  every- 
day's  practice  of  passengers  by  railways"  said  the  court  in 
a  leading  case,3  "to  carry  cloaks  and  such  like  articles 
with  them  in  the  carriages,  with  the  consent  of  the  com- 
pany, and  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  company  have  on  that 
account  parted  with  their  custody  of  them  as  carriers." 
It  is,  however,  clear  enough  on-  the  authorities  that  the 
carrier  is  not,  under  such  circumstances,  an  insurer  and 
that  the  amount  of  care  required  of  it  is  materially  les- 
sened by  the  fact  that  the  passenger  is  in  actual  control.4 
In  this  country  (very  likely  because  of  a  different  usage 
as  to  the  matter),  it  has  never  been  supposed  that  the  rail- 
Chicago,  Peoria  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Lush,  J.,  in  Le  Conteur  v.  Lon- 
150  111.  502,  37  N.  E.  915  (1894).  don  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  6  B.  &  S.  961, 

1  Chambre,    J.,    in    Robinson    v.      L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  54  (1865). 
Dunmore,  2  B.  &  P.  416,  419  (1801).          4  Talley  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  R.  Co., 

2  Munster  v.  South  Eastern  Ry.      L.  R.  6  C.  P.  44  (1870). 
Co.,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  676,  27  L.  J. 

(C.  P.)  308  (1858). 

[639] 


§769 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


road  company  assumed  possession  of  personal  luggage 
taken  into  its  train  by  a  passenger;  and  it  has  therefore 
never  been  held  liable  for  such  luggage  as  carrier.1  And  so 
a  steamboat  company  is  not  a  carrier  of  the  passenger's 
watch  and  clothing,  which  he  wears  on  his  person,  or  the 
luggage  he  takes  with  him  into  his  stateroom,  since  the 
possession  of  it  is  not  given  to  the  company.2  And  sleep- 

1  United  Slates. — Henderson  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  123  U.  S. 
61,  31  L.  ed.  92  (1887);  Walsh  v. 
The  Wright,  Newb.  Adm.  (U.  S.) 
494,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  17,115  (1854); 
Bacon  v.  Pullman  Co.,  159  Fed.  1, 
89  C.  C.  A.  1,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
578  (1908). 

Illinois. — Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Fairclough,  52  111.  106 
(1869). 

Massachusetts. — Murray  v.  In- 
ternational Steamship  Co.,  170 
Mass.  166,  48  N.  E.  1093,  64  Am. 
St.  Rep.  290  (1898);  Kingsley  v. 
Lake  Shore  Ry.  Co.,  125  Mass.  54, 
28  Am.  Rep.  200  (1878). 

Minnesota. — McKibbin  v.  Wis- 
consin Cent.  R.  Co.,  100  Minn.  270, 
110  N.  W.  964  (1907). 

Mississippi. — Illinois  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Handy,  63  Miss.  609,  56  Am. 
Rep.  846  (1886). 

New  York. — Weeks  v.  New  York, 
N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  Y.  50, 
28  Am.  Rep.  104  (1878);  Schalscha 
v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  141,  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  251 
(1897). 

Ohio. — Greenfield  First  National 
Bank  v.  Marietta  &  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  Ohio  St.  259,  5  Am.  Rep.  655 
(1870). 

Pennsylvania. — American  Steam- 
ship Co.  v.  Bryan,  83  Pa.  St.  446 
(1877). 

[640] 


Texas. — Bonner  v.  Demendoza 
(Texas  App.,  1891),  16  S.  W.  976 
(1891). 

1  United  States.— The  R.  E.  Lee, 
2  Abb.  (U.  S.)  49,  Fed.  Gas.  No. 
11,690  (1870);  Walsh  v.  The  H.  M. 
Wright,  Newb.  Adm.  (U.  S.)  494, 
Fed.  Gas.  No.  17,115  (1854). 

Kentucky.  —  Steamboat  Crystal 
Palace  v.  Vanderpool,  16  B.  Monr. 
(Ky.)  302  (1855). 

Maine. — Abbott  v.  Bradstreet,  55 
Me.  530  (1868). 

Massachusetts. — Clark  v.  Burns, 
118  Mass.  275,  19  Am.  Rep.  456 
(1875). 

Michigan. — McKee  v.  Owen,  15 
Mich.  115  (1866). 

Pennsylvania. — A  m  e  r  i  c  a  n  St. 
Ship  Co.  v.  Bryan,  83  Pa.  St.  446 
(1877). 

Wisconsin. — Gleason  v.  Good- 
rich Transp.  Co.,  32  Wis.  85,  14  Am. 
Rep.  716  (1873). 

Contra,  New  York. — Gore  v.  Nor- 
wich Trans.  Co.,  2  Daly  (N.  Y.), 
254  (1867);  Mudgett  v.  Bay  State 
Steamboat  Co.,  1  Daly  (N.  Y.),  151 
(1861);  Van  Horn  v.  Kermit,  4  E. 
D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  453  (1855); 
Crozier  v.  Boston,  N.  Y.  &  M. 
Steamboat  Co.,  43  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  466  (1871).  These  cases  place 
the  liability  of  the  company  on  the 
same  ground  as  that  of  an  inn- 
keeper. 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  770 

ing  car  companies  are  held  liable  for  the  hand  baggage  of 
passengers  only  upon  the  same  theory;  but  of  course  the 
danger  from  theft  from  sleeping  passengers  being  peculiar, 
the  company  owes  to  them  the  utmost  protection,  and  the 
porter  must  keep  continual  watch.1  But  in  any  case  the 
companies  ought  to  be  held  liable  for  luggage  actually 
intrusted  to  porters  in  the  regular  course  of  business.2 

§  770.  Special  arrangements  with  innkeepers. 

In  order  for  the  innkeeper  to  become  responsible  for 
the  goods  of  his  guest  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  posses- 
sion of  them  should  be  given  up  to  the  innkeeper;  so  where 
the  innkeeper  gives  the  guest  a  key  3  to  his  room  and  the 
guest  takes  the  goods  to  his  room  and  keeps  them  there, 
the  innkeeper  is  liable  for  the  safety  of  the  goods.4  But 
while  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  make  the  innkeeper 
responsible  for  the  goods,  that  they  should  be  delivered 
into  his  possession,  still  they  must  be  within  his  general 
care  and  control.  If  the  guest  himself  undertakes  the 
care  of  them,  or  if  he  makes  a  special  arrangement  by 

1  United  States.— Barrott  v.  Pull-  Car     Co.,      42     Mo.     App.     134 

man  Palace  Car  Co.,  51  Fed.  796  (1890). 

(1892).  New  York.— Williams  v.  Webb, 

Alabama.— Cooney    v.     Pullman  22  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  513,  49  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Palace  Car  Co.,  121  Ala.  368,  25  So.  1111,  27  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  508,  58  N.  Y. 

712,  53  L.  R.  A.  690  (1898).  Supp.  300  (1898). 

Georgia. — Pullman     Palace     Car  2  Richards  v.  London  B.  &  S.  C. 

Co.  v.  Martin,  95  Ga.  314,  22  S.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  7  C.  B.  839,  18  L.  J.  (C.  P.) 

700,  29  L.  R.  A.  498  (1894).  251  (1849);  Butcher  v.  London  &  S. 

Kentucky—  Pullman  Palace  Car  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  C.  B.  13,  24  L.  J. 

Co.  v.  Hunter,  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1248,  (C.  P.)  137  (1855);  Le  Conteur  v. 

54  S.  W.  845,  47  L.  R.  A.  286  (1900).  London  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  6  B.  &  S. 

Massachusetts.— Whicher  v.  Bos-  961,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  54  (1865). 

ton  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  Mass.  275,  3  Y.  B.,  42  Ed.  3,  pi.  13  (1367); 

57  N.  E.  601  (1900).  11  H.  4,  45  pi.  18  (1410). 

Mississippi. — 111.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  4  Fay  v.  Pacific  Imp.  Co.,  93  Cal. 

v.  Handy,  63  Miss.  609,56  Am.  Rep.  253,  26  Pac.  1099,  28  Pac.  943,  16 

846  (1886).  L.  R.  A.  188,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  198 

Missouri. — Hampton  v.  Pullman  (1892). 

41  [  641  ] 


§  771  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

which  the  control  of  them  is  removed  from  the  innkeeper, 
the  latter  is  not  liable. 1  Thus  in  an  old  case  the  innkeeper 
gave  the  guest  his  keys,  and  went  away;  and  the  goods 
were  lost.  It  was  held  that  the  innkeeper  was  not  liable.2 
Upon  similar  principles,  where  a  guest  places  his  over- 
coat or  gloves  in  the  place  provided  for  them  in  the  inn, 
although  the  innkeeper  is  not  notified  of  the  fact,  the 
liability  of  the  innkeeper  attaches.3  But  where  the  guest's 
personal  baggage  is  placed  in  a  public  room  in  the  inn, 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  innkeeper,  or  even  by  the 
special  request  of  the  guest,  the  innkeeper  is  liable.4 

§  771.  Goods  taken  across  a  ferry. 

In  the  case  of  a  ferry,  the  fact  that  the  owner  usually 
goes  along  with  the  goods  and  often  retains  the  entire 
charge  and  management  of  them  (as  for  instance  where 
he  drives  a  horse  on  the  ferryboat  and  manages  him  while 
on  the  boat),  materially  modifies  the  relation  of  carrier 
and  shipper,  so  that  the  carrier  may  not  be  responsible 
for  any  injury  caused  by  defect  in  placing  or  managing 
the  property;  but  this  does  not  necessarily  prevent  the 
ferryman  from  being  a  carrier.  In  one  of  the  early  cases  5 
the  law  was  thus  stated:  "It  is  the  duty  of  the  ferryman 
to  see  that  teams  are  safely  driven  on  board  the  boat;  he 
may  drive  himself,  or  unharness  the  team,  or  unload  them, 

1  Vance  v.  Throckmorton,  5  Bush         4  Kentucky. — Packard  v.   North- 

(Ky.),  41,  96  Am.  Dec.  327  (1868).  craft's  Admr.,  2  Met.  439  (1859). 

2Y.  B.,  11  Hen.    4,  45,    pi.  18         Maryland.— Burrows  v.  Trieber, 

(1410).  21  Md.  320,  83  Am.  Dec.  590  (1863). 

3  Maine. — Norcross  v.   Norcross,          New  York. — Bradner  v.  Mullen, 

53  Me.  163  (1865).  27  N.  Y.  Misc.  479,  59  N.  Y.  Supp. 

New    York—  McDonald   v.    Ed-  178  (1899). 
gerton,  5  Barb.  560  (1849).  England. — Richmond    v.    Smith, 

Vermont.— Read  v.  Amidon,  41  8  B.  &  C.  9,  2  M.  &  Ry.  235  (1828). 
Vt.  15,  98  Am.  Dec.  560  (1868).  •  May  v.  Hanson,  5  Cal.  360,  63 

Freland.— Shaw  v.  Ray,  1  Cr.  &  Am.  Dec.  135  (1855). 
Dix.  C.  C.  84  (1839). 

[642] 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [§772 

for  the  purpose  of  getting  them  safely  on  board;  but  if 
he  permits  the  party  to  drive  himself,  he  constitutes  him, 
quoad  hoc,  his  agent,  and  is  still  responsible  for  all  acci- 
dents." And,  indeed,  where  the  ferryman  takes  such 
charge  of  the  passenger's  goods  (as  was  probably  the  or- 
dinary case  in  the  older  ferries),  the  ferryman  is  a  carrier  of 
the  goods  as  well  as  of  the  passenger. l  The  modern  ferry- 
man, however,  seldom  concerns  himself  with  the  property 
of  the  traveler;  and  while  he  is,  of  course,  a  carrier  of  the 
passenger,  the  goods  are  not  so  bailed  to  him  as  to  con- 
stitute him  a  carrier  of  the  goods.  As  Mr.  Justice  Dewey 
said  in  the  leading  case: 2  "The  only  possession  and  cus- 
tody, by  the  ferryman,  of  the  horse  and  vehicle  to  which 
he  is  attached,  is  that  which  necessarily  results  from  the 
traveler's  driving  his  horse  and  wagon,  or  other  vehicle, 
on  board  the  boat  and  paying  the  ordinary  toll  for  pas- 
sage." 3 

§  772.  Owner  going  with  his  freight. 

Though  the  owner  of  cattle  or  his  servant  may  accom- 
pany the  cattle,  as  a  drover,  while  they  are  being  carried, 
and  may  care  for  them,  feed  and  water  them,  and  help 

1  Accord  are:  Arkansas. — Harvey  v.   Rose,   26 
Arkansas.— Evans   v.    Rudy,    34      Ark.  3,  7  Am.  Rep.  595  (1870). 

Ark.  383  (1879).  Indiana.— Yerkes    v.    Sabin,    97 

Illinois.— Fisher   v.    Clisbee,    12  Ind.  141,  49  Am.  Rep.  434  (1884). 

111.  344  (1851).  New  Jersey.— Dudley  v.  Camden 

New  York.— New  York  v.  Starin,  &  P.  Ferry  Co.,  42  N.  J.  Law,  25, 

106  N.  Y.  1,  12  N.  E.  631  (1887).  36  Am.  Rep.  501  (1880). 

Ohio. — Wilson    v.    Hamilton,    4  New   York. — Wyckoff  v.  Queens 

Ohio  St.  722  (1855).  County  Ferry  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  32,  11 

South  Carolina. — Cook  v.  Gour-  Am.  Rep.  650  (1873). 

din,  2  N.  &  McC.  19  (1819).  Goods  taken  across  a  bridge.— 

England. — East     India     Co.     v.  As   intimated   in   the  text,    bridge 

Pullen,  2  Strange,  690;  Walker  v.  proprietors  are  not  held  responsible 

Jackson,  10  M.  &  W.  161  (1842).  as  carriers  for  goods  taken  across 

2  In  White  v.  Winnisimmet  Co.,  them  by  their  owners.     Grigsby  v. 
7  Gush.  155  (1851).  Chappell,  5  Rich.  L.   (S.  C.)  443 

3  Accord  are:  (1852). 

[643] 


§773 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


load  and  unload  them,  the  railroad  company  is  none  the 
less  the  bailee  and  carrier  of  the  cattle.1  He  must  do  all 
this  while  the  cattle  are  in  the  possession  of  the  railroad 
company  and  at  such  times  as  it  chooses  to  select  for  the 
purpose.2  But  to  go  to  an  opposite  extreme  it  has  been 
held  in  the  many  cases  which  have  arisen  that  the  rail- 
road company  is  not  a  common  carrier  of  circus  trains 
which  it  hauls  under  special  agreement,  the  keeping  of 
the  wild  beasts  obviously  remaining  with  the  servants 
of  the  proprietors.3  And  the  same  rule  applies  where 
the  keepers  of  a  race  horse  in  transit  assume  direct  charge 
of  it.4 

§  773.  Switching  cars. 
Whether  switching  cars  constitutes  common  carriage 


1  Dennison,  J.,  in  Atchison,  T.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  v.  Ditmars,  3  Kan.  App. 
459,  43  Pac.  833  (1896). 

2  Alabama. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Webb,   143  Ala.  304,  39  So.  262; 
Webb   v.    Southern   Ry.    Co.,    Id. 
(1905). 

Arkansas. — Fordyce  v.  McFlynn, 
56  Ark.  424,  19  S.  W.  961  (1892). 

Kentucky. — Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Eblen,  71  S.  W.  919,  24  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  1609  (1903). 

Louisiana. — Peters  v.  New  Or- 
leans &  Gt.  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  La. 
Ann.  222,  79  Am.  Dec.  578  (1861). 

Missouri. — Duvenick  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  57  Mo.  App.  550  (1894). 

Nebraska. — Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Slattery,  107  N.  W.  1045 
(1906). 

New  Jersey. — Feinberg  v.  Dela- 
ware, L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J. 
L.  451,  20  Atl.  33  (1890). 

New  York. — Harris  v.  Northern 
Indiana  R.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  232 
(1859). 

[644] 


3  United  Stales. — Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallace,  66  Fed. 
506,  14  C.  C.  A.  257,  30  L.  R.  A. 
161  (1895);  Wilson  v.  Atlantic  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  129  Fed.  774  (1904). 

Indiana. — Cleveland,  C.,  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henry,  170  Ind. 
94,  83  N.  E.  710  (1908). 

Massachusetts. — Robertson  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  525,  31 
N.  E.  650,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  482 
(1892). 

Michigan. — Coup  v.  Wabash,  St. 
L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  56  Mich.  Ill,  22 
N.  W.  215,  56  Am.  Rep.  374 
(1885). 

New  York. — Brown  v.  Weir,  95 
N.  Y.  App.  78,  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  479 
(1904). 

Pennsylvania. — Forepaugh  v.  Del- 
aware, L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  Pa. 
St.  217,  18  Atl.  503, 15  Am.  St.  Rep. 
672,  5  L.  R.  A.  508  (1889). 

4  Bowie  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  1 
MacArthur,  94  (1873). 


BASIS  OP  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  774 

depends  as  in  all  these  cases  upon  the  exact  conditions 
upon  which  the  service  is  rendered.  If  the  full  possession 
is  not  given  over  to  the  switching  company  it  is  not  a 
carrier,  even  though  it  furnishes  transportation.  Thus 
a  bridge  company  :  which  owns  a  bridge  used  by  a  rail- 
road company  is  not  a  carrier  of  the  goods  hauled  over 
it  by  the  railroad,  even  if  the  bridge  company  itself  fur- 
nishes the  motive  power  for  hauling  cars  over  its  tracks; 
for  while  it  hauls  the  cars,  it  has  no  possession  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  cars,  which  remain  at  all  times  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  railroad  company  as  the  carrier.2  But  there 
are  switching  companies  3  which  assume  full  control  of 
the  cars  being  transported  by  them  through  their  corps 
of  train  men  as  fully  as  any  connecting  carrier  would; 
and  this  of  course  constitutes  common  carriage.4 

§  774.  Towing  vessels. 

The  apparant  conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  towage 
is  carriage  disappears  when  this  principle  is  observed, 
that  the  conditions  of  the  service  determine  its  character. 
It  will  then  be  seen  that  sometimes  the  towboat  does  act 
as  a  carrier,  but  often  the  facts  show  that  the  tugboat 
in  question  did  not.  Thus  the  towing  lines  which  accept 
barges  from  various  owners  which  are  incorporated  into 
the  tow,  all  under  the  direct  control  of  the  towing  boat, 
may  properly  be  said  to  be  common  carriage;  and  when 
this  is  indisputably  shown  the  towboat  is  usually  held 
liable  as  an  insurer.5  On  the  other  hand  the  harbor  tug 
which  tows  vessels  in  and  out  could  rarely  be  said  to  be 

1  Kentucky  &  I.   Bridge  Co.   v.          4  United  States  v.  Sioux  City  S. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed.      Y.  Co.,  162  Fed.  556  (1908). 

567,  2  L.  R.  A.  289  (1889).  5  United   States.— Vanderslice    v. 

2  Swift  Co.  v.  Ronan,  103  111.  App.  The   Superior,   28   Fed.   Gas.    No. 
475  (1902).  16,843  (1850). 

3  Norfolk  &  P.  Belt  Line  R.  R.  California.— White  v.  Mary  Ann. 
Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  103  Va.  289,  6  Cal.  462,  65  Am.  Dec.  523  (1856). 
49  S.  E.  39  (1904).  Louisiana. — Bussey  v.  Mississippi 

[645] 


§775] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


undertaking  common  carriage,  since  real  possession  is 
retained  by  the  master  of  the  ship,  and  in  such  case  tug- 
boat is  held  liable  only  for  due  care.1 

§  775.  Responsibility  for  through  cars. 

It  is  of  course  plain  that  where  a  railroad  takes  over 
a  car  from  any  shipper  and  then  incorporates  it  in  its 
own  trains  for  further  transportation,  it  takes  the  position 
of  carrier  although  there  is  no  breaking  of  bulk.2  Simi- 


Valley  Transp.  Co.,  24  La.  Ann. 
165. 

North  Carolina. — Walston  v.  My- 
ers, 5  Jones  (N.  C.),  174  (1857). 

New  Jersey. — Ashmore  v.  Penn. 
Steam  Towing  Trans.  Co.,  28  N.  J. 
180  (1860). 

1  United  States. — Steamer  New 
Philadelphia,  1  Black,  62,  17  L.  ed. 
84  (1861);  The  Quickstep,  9  Wall. 
66,  19  L.  ed.  767  (1869);  Steamer 
Webb,  14  Wall.  406,  20  L.  ed.  774 
(1871);  The  Margaret,  94  U.  S.  494, 
24  L.  ed.  146  (1876);  Transporta- 
tion Line  v.  Hope,  95  U.  S.  297,  24 
L.  ed.  477  (1877);  The  Princeton,  3 
Blatch.  54,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,434 
(1853);  The  Lyon,  1  Brown's  Adm. 
59,  15  Fed.  Cas.  8,645  (1861); 
Steamboat  Angelina  Corning,  1 
Ben.  109,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  13,525 
(1867);  The  Oconto,  5  Biss.  460, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,421  (1873);  The 
Merrimac,  2  Sawyer,  586,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  9,478  (1874);  The  Neaffie,  1 
App.  465  (1807). 

Illinois. — Knapp  v.  McCaffrey, 
178  111.  107,  52  N.  E.  898,  69  Am. 
St.  Rep.  290  (1899),  aff'd  177  U.  S. 
638,  44  L.  ed.  921,  20  Sup.  Ct.  824 
(1900),  giving  a  lien  for  towage  al- 
though it  is  not  carriage. 

Kentucky. — Varble  v.  Bigley,  14 

[646] 


Bush,  698,  29  Am.  Rep  435 
(1879). 

Maryland. — Pennsylvania  D.  & 
M.  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Dandridge,  8 
Gill  &  J.  248, 29  Am.  Dec.  543  (1836). 

Massachusetts. — Sproul  v.  Hem- 
mingway,  14  Pick.  1,  25  Am.  Dec. 
350  (1833). 

New  York. — Caton  v.  Rumney, 
13  Wend.  387  (1835);  Alexander  v. 
Greene,  3  Hill,  9  (1842),  7  ibid.  533 
(1844);  Wells  v.  Steam  Nav.  Co., 
2  N.  Y.  204  (1849);  Merrick  v. 
Brainard,  38  Barb.  574  (1860); 
Arctic  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  54 
Barb.  559  (1869);  Abbey  v.  Steam- 
boat Stevens,  22  How.  Pr.  78 
(1861);  Emiliusen  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  30  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  203,  51 
N.  Y.  Supp.  606  (1898). 

Pennsylvania. — Leonard  v.  Hen- 
drickson,  18  Pa.  St.  40,  55  Am.  Dec. 
587  (1851);  Hays  v.  Paul,  51  Pa. 
St.  134,  88  Am.  Dec.  569  (1865); 
Brown  v.  Clegg,  63  Pa.  St.  51,  3 
Am.  Rep.  522  (1869);  Hays  v. 
Millar,  77  Pa.  St.  238,  18  Am.  Rep. 
445  (1874). 

England. — The  Julia,  14  Moore 
P.  C.  210  (1860);  Symonds  v.  Pain, 
6  Hurl.  &  N.  709  (1861);  The  Min- 
nehaha,  1  Lush,  335  (1861). 

2  Arkansas. — F  o  r  d  y  c  e  v.  Me- 


BASIS  OP  THE  UNDERTAKING 


[§776 


larly  when  a  railroad  takes  over  even  a  train  from  a 
connection  and  draws  it  over  its  own  line  with  its  own 
employe's  in  charge  it  is  obviously  now  the  carrier. :  But 
when  it  merely  furnishes  haulage  for  the  trains  of  another 
road  it  seems  clear  that  the  original  carrier  maintains 
its  position  as  such,  the  hauling  company  being  liable 
only  for  its  negligence  in  that  service.2  And  where  one 
railroad  has  running  rights  over  the  rails  of  another  it 
is  plain  that  the  company  operating  the  train  through 
remains  the  carrier.3 

§  776.  Relations  with  dependent  services. 

The  effect  upon  the  arrangements  between  a  principal 
service  and  a  dependant  service  upon  the  situation  as 
regards  the  public  is  sometimes  difficult  to  determine.  In 
the  case  of  express  service  the  proper  theory  is  held  that 
the  express  company  holds  itself  out  as  the  common  car- 
rier,4 to  the  general  public  and  that  the  railroad  acts  as  a 


Flynn,  56  Ark.  424,  19  S.  W.  961 
(1892). 

Illinois. — Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dunbar,  20  111.  623,  71  Am.  Dec. 
291  (1858). 

New  York. — See  Jetter  v.  New 
York  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  458 
(1865). 

Vermont. — Kimball  v.  Rutland  & 
B.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Vt.  247,  62  Am. 
Dec.  567  (1854). 

1  United  States.— Hannibal  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Swift,  12  Wall.  262,  20  L.  ed. 
423  (1870). 

Illinois. — Peoria  &  P.  Union  Ry. 
Co.  v.  United  States  Rolling  Stock 
Co.,  136  111.  643,  27  N.  E.  59,  29 
Am.  St.  Rep.  348  (1891). 

Nebraska. — See  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Curtis,  51  Neb.  442,  71 
N.  W.  42  (1897). 

New  Jersey. — New  Jersey  R.  R. 


&  Transp.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Co.,  27  N.  J.  L.  100  (1858). 

Georgia. — East  Tennessee  &  Ga. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whittle,  27  Ga.  535,  73 
Am.  Dec.  741  (1859). 

New  York. — Mallory  v.  Tioga  R. 
R.  Co.,  39  Barbour,  488  (1862). 

*See  Vermont  &  M.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen 
(Mass),  462,  92  Am.  Dec.  785 
(1867). 

3  See  North  British  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Caledonian  Ry.  Co.,  3  Ry.  &  C.  Tr. 
Gas.  273  (1878). 

4  United  Stales.— Bank   of   Ken- 
tucky v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  93  U.  S. 
174,  23  L.  ed.  872  (1876);  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dinsmore,  108 
U.  S.  30  (1882),  27  L.  ed.  640,  2 
Sup.    Ct.   9    (1884);   The   Express 
Cases,  117  U.  S.  1,  29  L.  ed.  791,  6 
Sup.  Ct.  628  (1886);  Southern  Exp. 

[647] 


§776] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


private  carrier,  instead  of  as  a  common  carrier,  in  carry- 
ing goods  for  an  express  company  under  their  special 
agreement.  So  as  the  government  keeps  possession  of 
the  mails  throughout  their  transit,  the  transportation  of 
them  is  not  carriage.1  But  there  is  another  possibility  as 


Co.  v.  St.  Louia,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
3  McCreary,  872,  10  Fed.  210 
(1882). 

Alabama. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Crook,  44  Ala.  468,  4  Am.  Rep. 
140  (1870);  Southern  Express  Co.  v. 
Hess,  53  Ala.  19  (1875). 

Colorado. — Merchants'  Despatch 
&  Transp.  Co.  v.  Cornforth,  3  Colo. 
280,  25  Am.  Rep.  757  (1877). 

District  of  Columbia. — Gait  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  MacArthur  & 
M.  124,  48  Am.  Rep.  742  (1879). 

Florida. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Van  Meter,  17  Fla.  783,  35  Am. 
Rep.  107  (1880). 

Georgia. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Newby,  36  Ga.  635,  91  Am.  Dec. 
783  (1867). 

Illinois. — Boscowitz  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  93  111.  523,  34  Am. 
Rep.  191  (1879). 

Indiana. — American  Express  Co. 
v.  Hockett,  30  Ind.  250,  95  Am. 
Dec.  691  (1868). 

Kansas. — Adams  Express  Co.  v. 
McConell,  27  Kan.  238  (1882). 

Massachusetts. — Buckland  v.  Ad- 
ams Express  Co.,  97  Mass.  124,  93 
Am.  Dec.  68  (1867). 

Michigan. — United  States  Ex- 
press Co.  v.  Root,  47  Mich.  231,  10 
N.  W.  351  (1881). 

Minnesota. — C hristenson  v. 
American  Express  Co.,  15  Minn. 
270,  2  Am.  Rep.  122  (1870). 

Missouri. — Kirby  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  369  (1876). 

[648] 


New  York. — Belger  v.  Dinsmore, 
51  N.Y.  166, 10  Am.  Rep.  575  (1872). 

Ohio. — American  Express  Co.  v. 
Smith,  33  Ohio  St.  511,  31  Am.  Rep. 
561  (1878). 

Oregon. — Bennett  v.  Northern 
Pac.  Exp.  Co.,  12  Oreg.  49,  6  Pac. 
160  (1885). 

Pennsylvania. — Grogan  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  114  Pa.  St.  523,  7  Atl. 
134,  60  Am.  Rep.  360  (1886); 
Union  Express  Co.  v.  Ohleman,  92 
Pa.  St.  323  (1879). 

South  Carolina. — Stadhecker  v. 
Combs,  9  Rich.  Law,  193  (1856). 

Tennessee. — Southern  Express  Co. 
v.  Wormack,  1  Heisk.  256  (1870). 

Texas. — Pacific  Express  Co.  v. 
Darnell,  62  Texas,  639  (1884). 

Vermont. — Hadd  v.  United  States 
&  Canada  Express  Co.,  52  Vt.  335, 
36  Am.  Rep.  757  (1880). 

Wisconsin. — Wells  v.  American 
Express  Co.,  55  Wis.  23,  11  N.  W. 
537,  12  N.  W.  441,  42  Am.  Rep.  695 
(1882). 

1  United  States. — Bankers'  Mut- 
ual Casualty  Co.  v.  Minneapolis, 
St.  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  117  Fed. 
434,  65  L.  R.  A.  397,  54  C.  C.  A. 
608  (1902). 

Alabama. — Central  Railroad  & 
Banking  Co.  v.  Lampley,  76  Ala. 
357,  52  Am.  Rep.  334  (1884). 

Iowa. — Boston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  118  la. 
423,  92  N.  W.  88,  59  L.  R.  A.  796 
(1902). 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  777 

the  case  of  sleeping  car  service  shows.  There  not  only  is 
the  sleeping  car  company  in  direct  relations  with  its  pub- 
lic and  liable  for  any  default  to  it,  but  the  railroad  com- 
pany must  also  answer  to  the  passengers  it  is  thus  carry- 
ing. The  result  is  a  cumulative  liability,  both  the  railroad 
company  and  the  car  company  being  liable  to  an  injured 
patron.1 

Topic  D.  Special  Arrangements  with  Particular 
Classes 

§  777.  Mail  clerks. 

In  the  majority  of  cases  mail  clerks  although  traveling 
in  the  mail  cars  are  said  to  be  passengers;  for  it  is  pointed 
out  that  their  transportation  is  included  in  the  sum  paid 
the  railroad  by  the  government.  It  is,  however,  generally 
recognized  that  as  they  are  necessarily  carried  in  a  different 
car  from  ordinary  passengers,  to  extent  to  which  it  is 
dangerous  to  travel  in  such  a  car  instead  of  the  ordinary 
passenger  car  the  mail  agent  takes  the  risk  of  injury;  but 
in  all  other  respects  it  is  still  insisted  that  the  agent  has  the 
rights  of  an  ordinary  passenger.2  Notwithstanding  this 

1  United     States.  —  Pennsylvania      this  first  paragraph  are  supported 
Co.  v.  Roy,  102  U.  S.  451,  26  L.  ed.      by     the     following     cases     among 
141  (1880).  others: 

Louisiana. — Airey     v.     Pullman  United  States. — Gleeson   v.    Vir- 

Palace  Car  Co.,  50  La.  Ann.  648,  ginia  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  140  U.  S. 

23,  So.  512  (1898).  435,  35  L.  ed.  458,  11  Sup.  Ct.  859 

New    York. — Dwindle    v.    New  (1891);  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Cavin, 

York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  144   Fed.   348,   75   C.   C.   A.   350 

120  N.  Y.  117,  24  N.  E.  319,  8  L.  R.  (1906);  Arrowsmith  v.  Nashville  & 

A.  224,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  611  (1890).  D.  Ry.  Co.   (C.  C.),  57  Fed.  165 

Ohio—  Railroad  Co.  v.  Walrath,  (1893). 

38  Ohio  St.  461,  43  Am.  Rep.  433  Alabama.— Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 

(1882).  Harrington  (Ala.),  52  So.  57  (1910). 

South   Carolina. — Taber  v.    Sea-  District     of     Columbia. — Chesa- 

board  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  84  S.  C.  peake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Patton,  23 

291,  66  S.  E.  292  (1909).  App.  D.  C.  113  (1904). 

2  The   propositions   advanced   in  Illinois. — Barker  v.  Chicago,  P. 

[649] 


§777] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


general  language  it  should  be  considered  that  mail  clerks 
are  to  be  carried  in  a  special  car,  under  special  circum- 
stances; and  they  are  not  strictly  travelers,  since  they  de- 
sire merely  to  do  business  on  the  railroad  train.  The 
carrier  is  not  bound  to  receive  them  as  passengers,  and  it 
is  therefore  held  in  several  cases  that  it  may  make  such 
arrangements  as  it  pleases  with  regard  to  terms  of  car- 
riage and  its  liability  for  injury.1  In  other  words  the  mail 


&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  243  111.  482,  90 
N.  E.  1057,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1058  (1909);  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Jellison,  124  111.  App.  652  (1906). 

Indiana. — Cleveland,  C.,  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ketcham,  133 
Ind.  346,  33  N.  E.  116,  19  L.  R.  A. 
339,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  550  (1893); 
Malott  v.  Central  Trust  Co.,  168 
Ind.  428,  79  N.  E.  368,  11  A.  &  E. 
Ann.  Cas.  879  (1906). 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kingman,  18  Ky.  Law  Rep. 
82,  35  S.  W.  264  (1896). 

Maine. — Libby  v.  Maine  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  85  Me.  34,  26  Atl.  943, 
20  L.  R.  A.  812  (1892). 

Maryland. — Baltimore  &  Ohio 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  72  Md.  36,  18 
Atl.  1107,  6  L.  R.  A.  706,  20  Am. 
St.  Rep.  454  (1890). 

Massachusetts. — Stoddard  v.  New 
York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  181 
Mass.  422,  63  N.  E.  927  (1902). 

Minnesota. — Decker  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  102  Minn.  99 
112  N.  W.  901  (1907). 

Missouri. — Mellor  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  105  Mo.  455,  14  S.  W. 
758,  10  L.  R.  36  (1891). 

Montana. — Hoskins  v.  Northern 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Mont.  394,  102 
Pac.  988  (1909). 

New     York. — Seybolt     v.     New 

[650] 


York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  N. 
Y.  562,  47  Am.  Rep.  75  (1884). 

North  Carolina. — Grant  v.  Ra- 
leigh &  Gaston  R.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  C. 
462,  13  S.  E.  209  (1891). 

South  Carolina. — Hammond  v. 
North  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  6  S.  C. 
130,  24  Am.  Rep.  467  (1874). 

Tennessee. — Illinois  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Porter,  117  Tenn.  13,  94  S. 
W.  666,  10  A.  &  E.  Ann.  Cas.  789 
(1908). 

Texas. — International  &  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Davis,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
340,  43  S.  W.  540  (1897);  Houston 
&  T.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McCullough,  22 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  208,  55  S.  W.  392 
(1899);  Sproule  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  91  S.  W. 
657  (1906). 

Virginia.— Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Shott,  92  Va.  34,  22  S.  E.  811 
(1895). 

England. — Collett  v.  London  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  Q.  B.  984  (1851). 

1  The  propositions  advanced  in 
this  paragraph  are  supported  by  the 
following  cases,  among  others: 

United  States. — Baltimore  &  Ohio 
S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Voigt,  176  U.  S.  498, 
44  L.  ed.  56,  20  Sup.  Ct.  385 
(1899). 

Indiana. — Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Reefer,  146  Ind.  21,  44 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING 


[§778 


clerks  may  be  taken  upon  a  public  or  a  private  basis,  as 
the  facts  may  show. 

§  778.  Express  messengers. 

The  same  things  are  true  of  an  express  messenger.  If 
he  is  being  carried  by  the  railroad  in  a  special  car,  under 
the  contract  with  the  express  company,  he  is  usually  held 
to  be  a  passenger,  except  so  far  as  he  accepts  the  risk  of 
being  carried  in  an  express  car.1  But  by  the  weight  of 
authority  he  also  will  be  affected  by  a  contract  providing 
that  the  company  shall  not  be  liable  to  him  as  a  carrier  of 
passengers  would  be,2  although  there  are  some  cases  to 


N.  E.  796,  38  L.  R.  A.  93,  58  Am. 
St.  Rep.  348  (1896). 

Massachusetts.  —  Bates  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  147  Mass.  255, 
17  N.  E.  633  (1888). 

Ohio. — But  see  Pennsylvania  Co. 
v.  Woodworth,  26  Ohio  St.  585 
(1875). 

Pennsylvania. — Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Price,  96  Pa.  St.  256 
(1880). 

Wisconsin. — But  see  Chamber- 
lain v.  Milwaukee  &  Miss.  R.  R. 
Co.,  11  Wis.  238  (1860). 

But  see  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Crudup,  63  Miss.  291  (1885). 

And  see  Schuyler  v.  Southern 
Pacific  Ry.  Co.  (Utah),  109  Pac. 
458  (1910). 

1  The  foregoing  statements  are 
supported  by  the  following  cases: 

Arkansas. — Fordyce  v.  Jackson, 
56  Ark.  594,  20  S.  W.  528,  597 
(1892). 

California. — Yeomans  v.  Contra 
C.  S.  Nav.  Co.,  44  Cal.  71  (1872). 

Indiana. — Cleveland,  C.,  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ketcham,  133  Ind. 
346,  33  N.  E.  116,  19  L.  R.  A.  339, 
36  Am.  St.  Rep.  550  (1893). 


Kansas. — Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Nichols,  8  Kan.  505,  12  Am. 
Rep.  475  (1871). 

Kentucky. — Davis  v.  Chesapeake 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Ky.  Law  Rep.  53, 
92  S.  W.  339,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  458 
(1906). 

Missouri. — Jones  v.  St.  Louis 
Southwestern  Ry.  Co.,  125  Mo.  666, 
28  S.  W.  883,  26  L.  R.  A.  718,  46 
Am.  St.  Rep.  514  (1894). 

New  York. — Blair  v.  Erie  Ry. 
Co.,  66  N.  Y.  313,  23  Am.  Rep.  55 
(1876). 

Ohio.  —  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Woodworth,  26  Ohio  St.  585  (1875). 

Texas.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Wilson,  79  Tex.  371,  15  S.  W. 
280,  11  L.  R.  A.  486,  23  Am.  St. 
Rep.  345  (1891). 

Wisconsin. — Peterson  v.  Chicago 
&  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.,  119  Wis. 
197,  96  N.  W.  532,  100  Am.  St.  Rep. 
897  (1903). 

2  United  States. — Chicago  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  132  Fed. 
593,  67  C.  C.  A.  421  (1904). 

Delaware. — Perry  v.  Philadelphia 
B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  (Del.  Supr.),  77 
Atl.  725  (1910). 

[651] 


§779] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


the  contrary  that  deserve  attention.1  The  conditions  of 
the  transportation  are  as  before  peculiar,  and  the  rail- 
road may  therefore  insist  upon  making  it  a  private  ar- 
rangement with  special  terms.  Some  of  these  cases  insist 
that  the  individual  messenger  must  be  brought  into  this 
understanding  by  contract  to  that  effect  with  his  em- 
ployers,2 but  others  say  that  he  is  affected  by  knowledge 
of  the  agreement.3  These  problems  are  not  worked  out; 
and  it  seems  to  the  writer  that  they  will  never  be  satis- 
factorily worked  out  until  the  attempt  to  explain  them 
upon  the  basis  of  contracting  is  given  up  in  favor  of  the 
theory  of  the  character  of  the  acceptance. 

§  779.  Employes  of  car  companies. 

The  same  law  governs  the  liability  of  railroad  com- 
panies to  the  employe's  of  car  companies  on  duty.  Such 
employe's  are  held  presumptively  passengers,4  compen- 
sation for  their  transportation  being  included  in  the  whole 


Illinois. — Blank  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  182  111.  332,  55  N.  E.  332 
(1899). 

Indiana. — Louisville  N.  A.  &  C. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Keefer,  146  Ind.  21,  44 
N.  E.  796,  38  L.  R.  A.  93,  58  Am. 
St.  Rep.  348  (1896). 

Massachusetts. — Bates  v.  Old  Col- 
ony R.  R.  Co.,  147  Mass.  255,  17 
N.  E.  633  (1888). 

New  Jersey. — Dodd  v.  Central 
R.  R.  of  N.  J.  (N.  J.  L.),  76  Atl.  544 
(1910). 

Vermont. — Robinson  v.  St.  Johns- 
bury  &  L.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  80  Vt.  129, 
66  Atl.  814,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1249 
(1907). 

1  See  Davis  v.  Chesapeake  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  29  Ky.  Law  Rep.  53,  92 
S.  W.  339,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  458 
(1906). 

[652] 


2  United  States. — Chamberlain  v. 
Pierson,  87  Fed.  420,  59  U.  S.  App. 
55,  31  C.  C.  A.  157  (1898). 

New  York. — Brewer  v.  New  York, 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  N.  Y.  59, 
26  N.  E.  324,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  647, 
47  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Gas.  485  (1891). 

3  Illinois. — Blank  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  182  111.  332,  55  N.  E.  332 
(1899). 

Indiana. — Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mahoney,  148 
Ind.  196,  47  N.  E.  917,  62  Am.  St. 
Rep.  503,  40  L.  R.  A.  101  (1897). 

4  See  to  this  effect,  among  others: 
United     States. — McDermon     v. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.,  122  Fed.  669 
(1903). 

Illinois. — Blank  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  182  111.  332,  55  N.  E.  332 
(1899). 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING 


§780 


transaction.  But  here  again  the  cases  allow  the  railroad, 
in  making  arrangements  to  have  sleeping  car  facilities 
for  the  public,  to  obtain  an  indemnity  contract  from  the 
sleeping  car  company  and  an  exemption  contract  from  the 
employe's  of  the  sleeping  car  company.1 

§  780.  Owners  accompanying  their  shipments. 

Where  public  duty  is  involved  no  special  arrangement 
can  be  insisted  upon.  The  established  basis  upon  which 
cattle  shipments  are  made  being  that  representatives  of 
the  owners  may  accompany  them,  such  drovers  are  prop- 
erly considered  passengers,  their  fare  being  included  in  the 
rate.  Therefore  any  contract  that  provides  for  exemption 
of  the  railroad  from  liability  with  respect  to  them  is  void. 
The  most  that  the  peculiar  method  of  traveling  results  in 
is  that  they  must  submit  to  whatever  special  disabilities 
that  there  may  be  necessarily  incident  to  the  undertaking.2 


1  See  to  this  effect,  among  others: 
Illinois. — Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Hamler,  215  111.  525,  74  N.  E. 
705,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  674,  106  Am. 
St.  Rep.  187  (1905). 

Indiana. — Russell  v.  Pittsburg, 
C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Ind. 
305,  61  N.  E.  678,  87  Am.  St.  Rep. 
214  (1901). 

The  right  to  obtain  such  an  in- 
demnity contract  results  from  the 
fact  that  a  railroad  company  is  un- 
der no  legal  duty  to  receive  a 
sleeping  car  from  a  Pullman  com- 
pany, nor  its  employ^  thereon.  Rus- 
sell v.  Pittsburg,  C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  157  Ind.  305,  61  N.  E.  678,  87 
Am.  St.  Rep.  214  (1901). 

2  These  general  propositions  may 
be  found   in   the  following   cases, 
among  others: 

United  States. — Railroad  Co.  v. 


Lockwood,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.)  357,  21 
L.  ed.  627  (1873);  Delaware,  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashley,  67  Fed. 
209,  28  U.  S.  App.  375,  14  C.  C.  A. 
368  (1895). 

Arkansas. — Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Miles,  40  Ark.  298,  48 
Am.  Rep.  10  (1883). 

Delaware. — Flinn  v.  Philadelphia 
W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Houst.  (Del.) 
469  (1857). 

Illinois. — Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Anderson,  184  111.  294,  56  N.  E. 
331  (1900). 

Indiana. — Louisville  N.  A.  &  C. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  126  Ind.  126, 
25  N.  E.  869  (1890). 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bell,  100  Ky.  203,  38  S.  W. 
3,  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  735  (1896). 

Minnesota.  —  Olson  v.  St.  Paul 
&  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  536,  48 

[653] 


§781 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


And  similarly  where  by  an  arrangement  between  a  lumber 
company  and  a  railroad  company  it  was  agreed  that  the 
lumber  company's  employes  should  be  carried  to  and  from 
work,  an  employe  riding  to  work  on  a  logging  train  was 
entitled  to  the  rights  of  a  passenger.1 

§  781.  Employe's  of  contracting  shippers. 

There  are  some  extreme  cases  where  the  fundamental 
principle  in  all  this  is  said  to  be  that  the  carrier  cannot 
make  stipulations  against  liability  for  injuries  to  persons 
being  transported  in  connection  with  matters  as  to  which 
he  owes  a  duty,  obliging  him  to  permit  persons  to  travel 
in  the  way  described  as  a  matter  of  right.2  Thus  in  a  late 
New  Hampshire  case,3  it  was  held  that  the  railroad  could 
not  by  special  contract  relieve  itself  of  its  liabilities  to 
employe's  of  milk  contractors  traveling  in  their  milk  cars. 
The  court  pointing  out  that  in  regard  to  such  trans- 

N.  W.  445,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  749 
(1891). 

Missouri. — Carroll  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  88  Mo.  239,  57  Am. 
Rep.  382  (1885). 

Nebraska.  —  Missouri  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Tietken,  49  Neb.  130,  68  N. 
W.  336,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  526  (1896). 

Ohio—  Cleveland  P.  &  A.  R.  R. 


Co.  v.  Curran,  19  Ohio  St.  1,  2  Am. 
Rep.  362  (1869). 

Texas— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Cole,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  635,  28 
S.  W.  391  (1894). 

Wisconsin. — Lawson  v.  Chicago, 
St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  64  Wis. 
447,  24  N.  W.  618,  54  Am.  Rep. 
634  (1885). 

But  see: 

New  York. — Poucher  v.  New 
York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  263, 
10  Am.  Rep.  364  (1872). 

South  Dakota. — Meuer  v.  Chicago 

[654] 


M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  5  S.  D.  568,  59 
N.  W.  945,  25  L.  R.  A.  81,  45  Am. 
St.  Rep.  898  (1894). 

1  Trinity  Val.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stewart 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  62  S.  W.   1085 
(1901). 

2  See    the    uncompromising    rea- 
soning in  such  cases  as: 

United  States. — Voight  v.  Balti- 
more, O.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Fed. 
561  (1897). 

Kentucky. — Davis  v.  Chesapeake 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Ky.  528,  92  S.  W. 
339,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  458  (1906). 

Minnesota. — Starr  v.  Gt.  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  67  Minn.  18,  69  N.  W. 
632  (1896). 

Ohio. — Pennsylvania  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Woodworth,  26  Ohio  St.  585 
(1875). 

3  New  Hampshire. — Baker  v.  Bos- 
ton &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  H.  100, 
65  Atl.  386  (1906). 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING   [  §§  782,  783 

portation  the  company  owes  the  special  duty  to  accom- 
modate this  peculiar  service,  which  means  special  cars 
properly  equipped. 

§  782.  Concessionaires  in  general. 

On  the  other  hand,  unless  such  a  duty  can  be  made  to 
appear  there  is  no  obligation  to  receive  the  persons  con- 
cerned upon  a  passenger  basis  and  they  may  therefore  be 
properly  taken  upon  a  special  basis  with  limited  liability. 
Thus  a  street  railway  would  not  in  any  case  owe  a  duty 
similar  to  that  which  it  owes  to  passengers,  to  newsboys 
whom  it  permits  to  jump  on  and  off  of  its  cars  while  in 
motion,  since  the  conditions  are  so  different  from  those 
under  which  passengers  are  carried.1  And  generally  the 
contract  with  a  train  boy  permitting  him  to  do  business  on 
board  would  not  be  upon  the  basis  of  his  acceptance  as 
a  passenger;  at  all  events  as  the  railroad  owes  no  duty  to 
accept  him,  it  may  stipulate  that  it  shall  not  be  liable  as 
it  would  to  a  passenger.2 

§  783.  Employes  while  on  duty. 

The  question  has  been  much  discussed  whether  a  serv- 
ant of  the  company  who  is  being  carried  gratuitously  is 
entitled  to  be  regarded  as  a  passenger.  If  the  carriage  is 
directly  in  connection  with  his  work  he  is  really  engaged 
while  being  carried  in  his  employment  and  his  relation  to 
the  carrier  is  that  of  servant  and  certainly  not  that  of  a 
passenger;  as  where  a  workman  on  a  construction  or  a 
gravel  train  is  taken  from  place  to  place  on  the  road,  as 

1  Illinois. — Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac.  2  Connecticut. — Griswold,   Admr., 

R.  R.  Co.,  v.  Moran,  117  111.  App.  v.  New  York,  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  53 

42  (1904).  Conn.  371,  4  Atl.  261,  55  Am.  Rep. 

Missouri.— Padgitt    v.    Moll.    &  115  (1885). 

Citizens'  Ry.  Co.,  149  Mo.  143,  60  Louisiana. — Higgins  v.  New  Or- 

S.  W.  121,  52  L.  R.  A.  854,  81  Am.  leans,  M.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  La. 

St.  Rep.  347  (1900).  Ann.  133  (1876). 

[655] 


§783 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


his  services  are  needed.1  If  he  is  not  actually  working  at 
his  employment,  but  is  being  carried  to  or  from  the  place 
of  employment,  by  agreement  with  the  company,  as  an 
assistance  to  his  work,  he  would  seem  equally  to  be  en- 
gaged in  his  employment,  and  not  to  be  a  passenger.2 


1  Georgia. — Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Austin,  116  Ga.  264,  42  S.  E.  522, 
59  L.  R.  A.  107,  94  Am.  St.  Rep. 
125  (1902). 

Indiana. — Evansville  &  Rich- 
mond R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes,  137  Ind. 
306,  36  N.  E.  1092  (1893). 

Louisiana. — Dobson  v.  New  Or- 
leans &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  La.  Ann. 
1127,  27  So.  670  (1900). 

Massachusetts.  —  Gillshannon  v. 
Stony  Brook  R.  R.  Corp.,  10  Gush. 
228  (1852);  Kilduff  v.  Boston  Elev. 
Ry.  Co.,  195  Mass.  307,  81  N.  E. 
191,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  873  (1907), 
employ^  being  brought  from  work 
in  special  cars,  not  passengers. 

New  York. — Streets  v.  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  178  N.  Y.  553,  76 
App.  Div.  480,  aff'd  70  N.  E.  1109 
(1904). 

Pennsylvania. — Benignia  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.  Co.,  197  Pa.  384,  47 
Atl.  359  (1900). 

Though  not  a  passenger,  yet  being 
rightfully  on  the  train,  he  can  have 
damages  for  an  injury  caused  by 
actual  negligence  imputable  to  the 
carrier,  unless  he  is  barred  by  the 
fact  that  the  negligence  was  that  of 
a  fellow  servant. 

Indiana. — Evansville  &  R.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Maddux,  134  Ind.  571,  33  N. 
E.  345,  34  N.  E.  511  (1893). 

Louisiana. — Dobson  v.  New  Or- 
leans &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  La.  Ann. 
1127,  27  So.  670  (1900). 

[656] 


Texas.— Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  64  Tex.  549  (1885). 

West  Virginia.  —  Sanderson  v. 
Panther  L.  Co.,  50  W.  Va.  42,  40 
S.  E.  368,  55  L.  R.  A.  908,  88  Am. 
St.  Rep.  841  (1901). 

1  Illinois—  Chicago  T.  T.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  213  111.  545,  72 
N.  E.  1133  (1905). 

Indiana. — Columbus  &  I.  Cent. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  31  Ind.  174,  99 
Am.  Dec.  615  (1869). 

Massachusetts. — Kilduff  v.  Bos- 
ton Elev.  Ry.  Co.,  195  Mass.  307, 
81  N.  E.  191,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  873 
(1907). 

New  York. — Ross  v.  New  York 
Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  Y. 
617  (1878). 

North  Carolina.  —  Wright  v. 
Northampton  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  122 
N.  C.  852,  29  S.  E.  100  (1898). 

Ohio. — Manville  v.  Cleveland  & 
T.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Ohio  St.  417  (I860). 

Rhode  Island. — lonnone  v.  New 
York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  R.  I. 
452,  44  Atl.  592,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
812  (1899). 

Wisconsin. — Ewald  v.  Chicago  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  70  Wis.  420,  36  N. 
W.  12,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  178  (1888). 

Tennessee. — Transit  Co.  v.  Ven- 
able,  105  Tenn.  460,  58  S.  W.  861, 
51  L.  R.  A.  866  (1900). 

Texas. — Johnson  v.  Texas  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  93  S.  W. 
433  (1906). 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING 


I  §784 


§  784.  Employes  receiving  independent  service. 

If,  however,  he  receives  in  part  compensation  for  his 
services  the  right  to  travel  as  passengers  do,  then  in  so 
traveling  he  is  to  be  regarded  as  in  all  respects  a  passenger.1 
To  cite  a  late  example  of  this,  in  Herbert  v.  Portland  Rail- 
road Company,2  it  appeared  that  one  who  was  employed 
as  greaser,  while  being  transported  by  his  employer  to  his 
place  of  work,  was  injured  by  a  derailment  of  the  car. 
It  was  contended  on  the  ground  that  he  had  paid  his  fare 
by  a  ticket  given  by  the  company  and  that  he  was  going 
to  his  work  that  he  was  not  a  passenger,  but  the  Maine 
court  held  that  although  the  ticket  was  given  him  by  the 
company  for  that  ride  he  had  paid  for  his  services.  It 
was  part  of  his  wages  and  delivered  to  him  as  such.  It 

Pennsylvania. — McNulty  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.  Co.,  182  Pa.  479,  38 
Atl.  524,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  721,  38 
L.  R.  A.  376  (1897). 

Utah. — Williams  v.  Oregon  S.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  Utah,  210,  54  Pac. 
991,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  777  (1898). 

Washington. — Peterson  v.  Seattle 
Traction  Co.,  23  Wash.  615,  63  Pac. 
539,  53  L.  R.  A.  586  (1900). 

Two  cases  may  seem  contra,  but 
they  need  not  be  troublesome. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Books, 
57  Pa.  339,  98  Am.  Dec.  229  (1868), 
which  seems  to  hold  that  a  servant 
riding  on  an  employer's  pass  is  not 
to  be  regarded  as  a  passenger  under 
any  circumstances,  must  be  con- 
sidered overruled  on  that  point; 
Higgins  v.  Hannibal  &  S.  J.  R.  R. 
Co.,  36  Mo.  418  (1865),  which  held 
that  an  employ^  riding  free  in  a 
baggage  car  on  his  own  business 
was  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  passen- 
ger in  the  language  of  a  statute  giv- 
ing damages  for  death. 

3 103  Me.  315,  69  Atl.  266  (1907). 

[657] 


England. — Tunney  v.  Midland 
Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  C.  P.  291  (1866). 

Canada. — May  v.  Ontario  &  Q. 
Ry.  Co.,  10  Ont.  Rep.  70  (1885). 

1  See  among  many  other  cases  to 
this  effect: 

United  States. — Whitney  v.  New 
York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  C. 
C.  A.  19,  102  Fed.  850,  50  L.  R.  A. 
615  (1900). 

Georgia. — Carswell  v.  Macon,  D. 
&  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  Ga.  826,  45  S.  E. 
695  (1903). 

Indiana. — Indianapolis  Traction 
&  Terminal  Co.  v.  Romans,  40  Ind. 
App.  184,  79  N.  E.  1068  (1907). 

Maryland.  —  State  v.  Western 
Maryland  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Md.  433 
(1884). 

Massachiisetts.  —  Dickinson  v. 
West  End.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  177  Mass. 
363,  59  N.  E.  60,  83  Am.  Rep.  284, 
52  L.  R.  A.  326  (1901).  Employ^ 
riding  free  to  dinner  is  a  passenger. 

Oregon. — Simmons  v.  Oregon  R. 
R.  Co.,  41  Oreg.  151,  69  Pac.  440 
(1902). 

42 


§785] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


could  make  no  difference  in  his  status  as  a  passenger 
whether  he  paid  his  fare  in  cash  or  in  tickets  thus  earned. 

§  785.  Full  liability  in  gratuitous  service. 

A  most  important  point  has  not  been  brought  forward 
for  discussion  as  yet.  Although  not  obliged  to  perform 
gratuitous  service  upon  the  usual  terms,  the  one  who  is 
performing  the  service  may  assume  the  usual  obligations 
pertaining  to  the  service.  Thus  there  is  no  doubt  upon 
the  authorities  that  a  person  carried  gratuitously  by  a 
railroad  is  a  passenger,  and  is  entitled  to  the  same  care 
as  any  passenger. *  A  recent  case  2  brings  this  out  clearly. 


1  United  States. — Philadelphia  & 
R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Derby,  14  How. 
(U.  S.)  468,  14  L.  ed.  502  (1852); 
Indianapolis,  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Lavvson, 
74  C.  C.  A.  630, 143  Fed.  834  (1906). 

Illinois. — Benner  Livery  &  U. 
Co.  v.  Busson,  58  111.  App.  17 
(1894). 

Indiana. — Gillenwater  v.  Madi- 
son &  Ind.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Ind.  339,  61 
Am.  Dec.  101  (1854);  Ohio  &  Miss. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Nickless,  71  Ind.  271 
(1880);  Russell  v.  Pittsburgh  Ry. 
Co.,  157  Ind.  305,  61  N.  E.  678,  87 
Am.  St.  Rep.  214,  55  L.  R.  A.  253 
(1901). 

Iowa. — Rose  v.  Des  Moines  Val- 
ley R.  R.  Co.,  39  la.  246  (1874). 

Maine. — Hoar  v.  Me.  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.,  70  Me.  65,  35  Am.  Rep.  299 
(1879). 

Maryland.  —  State  v.  Western 
Maryland  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Md.  433 
(1884). 

Massachusetts. — Todd  v.  Old  Col- 


ony R.  R.  Co.,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  18, 
80  Am.  Dec.  49  (1861);  Wilton  v. 
Middlesex  R.  R.  Co.,  107  Mass. 
108,  9  Am.  Rep.  11  (1871);  Wilton 
v.  Middlesex  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Mass. 
130  (1878);  Littlejohn  v.  Fitchburg 
R.  R.  Co.,  148  Mass.  478,  20  N.  E. 
103,  2  L.  R.  A.  502  (1889);  Doyle 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass. 
66,  37  N.  E.  770,  44  Am.  St.  Rep. 
335,  25  L.  R.  A.  157  (1894). 

Michigan. — Flint  &  Pere  M.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Weir,  37  Mich.  Ill,  26  Am. 
Rep.  499  (1877). 

Minnesota. — Jacobus  v.  St.  Paul 
&  C.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Minn.  125,  18  Am. 
Rep.  360  (1873). 

Missouri. — Lemon  v.  Chanslor, 
68  Mo.  340,  30  Am.  Rep.  799  (1878) ; 
Buck  v.  People's  St.  Ry.,  E.  L.  &  P. 
Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  555  (1891); 
Dorsey  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  83  Mo.  App.  528  (1900). 

New  York—  Perkins  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  196,  82  Am. 


2  Indiana  Traction  &  Terminal 
Co.  v.  Klentschy,  167  Ind.  598,  79 
N.  E.  Rep.  908  (1907);  and  see 

[658] 


Indianapolis  Traction  &  T.  Co.  v. 
Lawson,  143  Fed.  834,  74  C.  C.  A. 
630,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  721  (1906). 


BASIS  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING  [  §  786 

Plaintiff,  a  member  of  a  ladies'  society,  was  attending  a 
convention  in  defendant's  city.  With  other  members  of 
the  convention  she  was  invited  to  ride  on  defendant's  cars, 
and  during  the  progress  of  the  ride  a  collision  occurred 
between  two  of  the  cars  by  which  the  plaintiff  was  injured. 
It  was  contended  that  inasmuch  as  the  members  of  the 
convention  were  riding  gratuitously,  they  did  not  become 
passengers  so  as  to  impose  liability  upon  defendant  com- 
pany. The  court  in  holding  that  the  company  was  liable 
for  the  injuries  sustained,  said:  "A  passenger  who  is  car- 
ried gratuitously  by  a  common  carrier  is  as  much  a  pas- 
senger as  if  he  were  paying  full  fare,  and  the  mere  fact  that 
he  is  carried  gratuitously  will  not  of  itself  deprive  him  of 
his  right  of  action  if  injured  by  the  negligence  of  the 


§  786.  Explicit  limitation  to  private  basis. 

It  should  however  be  plain  that  a  carrier  who  is  carry- 
ing a  passenger  gratuitously  does  not  owe  him  the  duty 
owed  by  a  common  carrier.  Although  he  is  obliged  to  take 
care  even  of  a  gratuitous  passenger,  still  the  obligations 
of  the  common  carrier  do  not  bind  him.  The  question 
commonly  arises  where  a  passenger  riding  on  a  free  pass 
exempts  the  carrier  from  liability  for  injury  by  negligence. 
Such  an  exemption  is  generally  held  binding,  though  in 
the  case  of  a  common  carrier  it  would  be  void.1  The  rail- 
Dec.  282  (1862);  Carroll  v.  Staten  W.  282,  58  Am.  Rep.  848  (1886); 
Island  R.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y.  126,  17  Gabbert  v.  Hackett,  135  Wis.  86. 
Am.  Rep.  221  (1874).  115  N.  W.  345,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

Pennsylvania.— Buffalo,  P.  &  W.      1070  (1908). 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Hara,*  3  Pennyp.  1  United  States— Northern  Pac. 
(Pa.)  190,  12  Wkly  Note  Gas.  (Pa.)  Ry.  Co.  v.  Adams,  192  U.  S.  440,  48 
473  (1882).  L.  ed.  513,  24  Sup.  Ct.  408  (1904); 

Texas. — Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  Boering  v.  Chesapeake  Beach  Ry. 
v.  McGown,  65  Tex.  640  (1886).  Co.,  193  U.  S.  442,  48  L.  ed.  742,  24 

Wisconsin. — Annas  v.  Milwaukee      Sup.  Ct.  515  (1903). 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Wis.  46,  30  N.         Connecticut—  Griswold    v.    New 

[659] 


§786] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


way  company  is  not  truly  in  such  a  case  a  carrier  for  hire. 
It  only  offers  its  guest  the  privilege  of  riding  in  its  coaches 
without  charge  if  he  would  assume  the  risk  of  negligence. 
He  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  company  and  obliged  to 
accept  its  terms;  they  stand  on  an  equal  footing.  If  he 
desires  to  hold  it  to  its  common  law  obligations  to  him 
as  a  passenger,  he  may  pay  his  fare  and  compel  the  com- 
pany to  receive  and  carry  him.  He  freely  and  voluntarily 
chooses  to  accept  the  privilege  offered,  and  having  ac- 
cepted that  privilege  cannot  repudiate  the  conditions. 
In  some  jurisdictions  *  however,  it  is  held  that  even  in  the 
case  of  a  free  passenger  a  limitation  of  liability  for  negli- 
gence is  invalid;  but  this  is  more  on  general  grounds  of 
public  policy,  for  it  is  hardly  denied  that  the  carrier  is  not 
as  to  such  passenger  a  mere  private  carrier. 


York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Conn. 
371,  4  Atl.  261,  55  Am.  Rep.  115 
(1885). 

Illinois.— Toledo  W.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Beggs,  85  111.  80,  28  Am.  Rep. 
613  (1877). 

Indiana. — Payne  v.  Terre  Haute 
&  I.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Ind.  616,  62  N.  E. 
472,  56  L.  R.  A.  472  (1902). 

Maine. — Rogers  v.  Kennebec  Stb. 
Co.,  86  Me.  261,  29  Atl.  1069,  25 
L.  R.  A.  491  (1894). 

Massachusetts. — Quimby  v.  Bos- 
ton &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  150  Mass.  365, 
23  N.  E.  205,  5  L.  H.  A.  846  (1890). 

Montana. — John  v.  Northern  Pa- 
cific Ry.  Co.  (Mont.),  Ill  Pac.  632 
(1910). 

New  Jersey. — Kinney  v.  Central 
R.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J.  L.  513,  3  Am. 
Rep.  265  (1869). 

New  York. — Wells  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  181  (1862). 

Tennessee. — Marshall  v.  Nash- 
ville R.  &  Light  Co.,  118  Tenn.  254, 

[660] 


101  S.  W.  419,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1246  (1906). 

Texas— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  McGown,  65  Tex.  640  (1886). 

Washington. — Muldoon  v.  Seattle 
City  Ry.  Co.,  7  Wash.  528,  35  Pac. 
422,  22  L.  R.  A.  794  (1893). 

Wisconsin. — Annas  v.  Milwaukee 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Wis.  46,  30  N.  W. 
282,  58  Am.  Rep.  848  (1886). 

1  Ato&ama.— Mobile  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hopkins,  41  Ala.  486,  94  Am. 
Dec.  607  (1868). 

Indiana. — Indiana  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Mundy,  21  Ind.  48,  83  Am.  Dec. 
339  (1863). 

Minnesota. — Jacobus  v.  St.  Paul 
&  C.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Minn.  125,  18  Am. 
Rep.  360  (1873). 

Missouri. — Bryan  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Mo.  App.  228 
(1888). 

Pennsylvania. — Camden  &  A.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bausch  (Pa.  St.),  7  Atl. 
731  (1887). 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

PROVISION   OF   ADEQUATE    FACILITIES 

§  790.  Basis  of  the  duty  to  supply  equipment. 

Topic  A.  Provision  of  Proper  Facilities 
§  791.  Profession  limited  to  original  facilities. 

792.  Adherence  to  the  original  scope. 

793.  Proper  equipment  must  be  provided. 

794.  Ultimate  responsibility  for  proper  equipment. 

795.  Improvement  of  present  facilities. 

796.  Provision  of  special  equipment. 

Topic  B.  Obligation  to  Increase  Facilities 
§  797.  Facilities  which  the  service  requires. 

798.  The  obligation  is  not  absolute. 

799.  Equipment  sufficient  for  expected  business. 

800.  Expected  business  not  provided  for. 

801.  Demand  foreseen  although  unusual. 

802.  Reasonable  time  to  increase  facilities. 

803.  Pressure  for  short  periods. 

804.  Equipment  beyond  its  control. 

Topic  C.  Establishment  of  Stational  Facilities 
§  805.  Establishment  of  stations  by  legislation. 

806.  Requirement  of  stations  by  commissions. 

807.  Requirement  of  stations  by  the  courts,  conservative  view. 

808.  Progressive  view  of  the  question  of  stations. 

809.  Where  stations  are  required. 

810.  Closing  stations. 

811.  Exact  location  of  stations. 

812.  Proper  facilities  at  stations. 

813.  Establishment  of  freight  stations. 

814.  Establishing  offices  in  other  services. 

Topic  D.  Provision  of  Private  Installation 
§  815.  No  right  to  private  sidings  generally. 
816.  Rights  of  the  railroad  paramount. 

[661] 


§  790  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  817.  When  private  switches  must  be  granted. 

818.  The  problem  of  stock  yards. 

819.  Constitutionality  of  further  legislation. 

820.  Railroad  never  obliged  to  construct  siding. 

821.  Duty  confined  to  permitting  connection. 

822.  Obligation  to  receive  upon  spurs. 

823.  The  company  need  only  provide  requisite  facilities. 

824.  Provision  of  service  pipes  and  feed  wires. 

825.  Provision  of  transformers  and  meters. 

826.  Dictation  as  to  fittings. 


§  790.  Basis  of  the  duty  to  supply  equipment. 

It  must  be  obvious  that  the  provision  of  adequate 
facilities  in  the  conduct  of  the  business  which  has  been 
undertaken  is  one  of  the  fundamental  obligations  resting 
upon  those  who  undertake  a  public  service;  for  without 
the  recognition  of  this  duty  to  provide  proper  facilities 
the  general  requirement  of  service  would  be  idle.  It  has 
indeed  always  been  recognized  that  the  public  servant 
must  keep  his  equipment  up  to  the  standard  of  his  under- 
taking; but  it  must  be  conceded  that  until  recent  times 
the  law  had  not  advanced  much  beyond  this.  This  is  the 
most  obvious  phase  of  this  obligation,  the  requirement 
that  the  facilities  furnished  shall  be  adequate  to  complete 
properly  the  performance  of  any  service  actually  under- 
taken. It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  originally  it 
was  supposed  that  when  the  facilities  put  at  the  disposal 
of  the  public  were  exhausted  the  proprietors  of  the  service 
were  excused.  But  of  late  years  it  has  been  seen  that  in 
certain  businesses  at  least  one  is  committed  to  more  than 
the  utilization  of  the  original  facilities  in  the  service  of 
the  public.  Just  how  far  both  of  these  classes  of  cases 
may  exist  without  inconsistency  is  one  of  the  problems 
of  this  chapter.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  tendency 
of  the  times  to  put  as  many  businesses  into  the  second 
class  as  possible.  The  common  law  is  certainly  becoming 
more  exacting  as  to  what  constitutes  an  adequate  provi- 
[662] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES      [  §  791 

sion  of  facilities.  And  it  must  be  obvious  to  all  observers 
of  the  tendencies  of  legislation  regulating  public  service 
that  the  oversight  of  facilities  is  going  to  be  most  intimate 
in  the  immediate  future. 

Topic  A.  Provision  of  Proper  Facilities 

§  791.  Profession  limited  to  original  facilities. 

According  to  the  original  conception  of  the  devotion  of 
property  to  a  public  use  the  obligation  was  limited  to  the 
facilities  offered.  And  indeed  there  are  still  several  in- 
stances in  public  service,  where  the  original  profession 
still  does  not  contemplate  the  expansion  of  the  business 
beyond  the  original  facilities.  A  carter  l  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  equip  himself  with  a  wagon  of  larger  capacity 
even  if  business  is  continually  offered  him  requiring  better 
equipment.  It  is  a  sufficient  excuse  that  his  cart  is  too 
small  for  the  freight  offered.  A  shipowner  2  may  hold 
himself  out  to  the  public  to  carry  certain  goods  of  a  certain 
sort  for  hire.  As  to  the  goods  he  proposes  to  carry  he  is 
a  public  carrier;  but  he  is  under  no  obligation  to  provide 
other  ships,  because  his  vessel  is  inadequate  to  transport 
all  goods  which  may  be  offered  to  him.  Again,  an  inn- 
keeper who  commits  himself  to  public  service  is  not  obliged 
to  enlarge  his  original  building.  His  showing  that  his 
house  is  full  is  always  a  defense,  no  matter  how  often  this 
may  have  happened  before.3  So  an  elevator  man  performs 
his  whole  duty  when  he  devotes  his  whole  structure  to 
the  service  of  the  public,  reserving  none  of  it  for  his  own 
purposes.4  This  has  been  remarked  before  in  this  treatise 

1  Tunnel   v.    Pettijohn,    2    Hair.          3  Browne  v.  Brandt  1  K.  B.  696, 
(Del.)  48  (1835).  71  L.  J.  K.  B.  367,  86  L.  T.  625,  50 

2  Ocean    Steamship    Co.    v.    Sa-      W.  R.  654  (1902). 

vannah  Locomotive  Works  &  Sup-          4  Hannah  v.  People,  198  111.  77, 
ply  Co.,  131  Ga.  831,  63  S.  E.  577,      64  N.  E.  776  (1902). 
20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  867,  127  Am. 
St.  Rep.  265  (1909). 

[663] 


§  792]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

in  connection  with  the  discussion  of  the  primary  duty, 
which  in  these  cases  is  in  reality  limited  by  the  original 
profession  to  the  devotion  of  the  facilities  offered  to  the 
service  of  the  public.  In  these  particular  instances  the 
obligation  undertaken  being  simply  to  devote  given  facil- 
ities, no  further  obligation  in  respect  to  facilities  results. 
But  in  the  most  important  modern  services  the  profession 
made  is  to  render  a  given  service  to  the  community  in 
general;  and  a  proper  consequence  of  this  undertaking 
is  the  obligation  to  provide  adequate  facilities  to  perform 
the  service  promised. 

§  792.  Adherence  to  the  original  scope. 

These  cases  under  discussion  are  not  exceptional  in- 
stances but  extreme  illustrations  of  the  rule  (difficult 
though  it  may  be  to  apply)  that  within  the  scope  of  the 
original  commitment  the  public  servant  must  provide 
all  the  facilities  which  his  business  requires,  but  outside 
his  public  profession  he  is  not  bound  to  go  at  all,  no  matter 
how  much  the  community  may  need  his  services.  Thus 
it  has  been  common  law  that  a  railroad  is  not  obliged  to 
equip  itself  with  cars  to  send  beyond  its  established  route, 
no  matter  how  much  the  service  requested  is  desired  by 
its  shippers.1  And  as  a  carrier  need  never  equip  itself  to 
perform  any  service  which  is  outside  its  public  profession, 
it  need  not,  for  example,  carry  unusual  freights  which 
require  special  equipment.2  Thus  a  railroad  need  not 

1  Indiana.— Pittsburg,   C.   &  St.  Fargo    &    Co.,     109    Mass.     452 

L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Morton,  61  Ind.  539,  (1872). 

28  Am.  Rep.  682  (1878).  Pennsylvania.— See     Gordon     v. 

Illinois.— People  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Hutchinson,  1  W.  &  S.  285,  37  Am. 

R.  R.  Co.,  55  111.  95,  8  Am.  Rep.  631  Dec.  464  (1841). 

(1870).  Texas.— Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co. 

Kentucky.— Pittsburg,   C.,   C.    &  v.  Buchanan,  42  Tex.  Civ.  App.  620, 

St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Viers,  113  Ky.  526,  94  S.  W.  199  (1906). 

68  S.  W.  469  (1902).  J  A  variety  of  cases  on  this  point 

Massachusetts. — Pitlock  v.  Wells,  are  subjoined: 

[664] 


[  § 


even  provide  equipment  to  carry  passengers  unless  it 
undertakes  that  service  upon  a  public  basis.1  The  same 
principles  should  apply  throughout  public  service.  It  is 
highly  improbable  that  any  fundamental  change  can  be 
forced  upon  a  company  against  its  will.  A  fuel  gas  com- 
pany cannot  be  compelled  to  supply  gas  for  illumination  2 
any  more  than  it  could  be  compelled  to  provide  electricity. 


United  States. — Kuter  v.  Michi- 
gan Central  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  35 
(1853). 

California. — Pfister  v.  Central 
Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Cal.  169,  11 
Pac.  686,  59  Am.  Rep.  404  (1886). 

Delaware. — Tunnel  v.  Pettijohn, 
2  Harr.  (Del.)  48  (1835). 

Georgia. — Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v. 
Savannah,  L.  W.  &  S.  Co.,  131  Ga. 
831,  63  S.  E.  577,  20  L.  R.  A.  867, 
127  Am.  St.  Rep.  265  (1909). 

Indiana. — Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henry,  170  Ind.  94,  83 
N.  E.  710  (1908). 

Louisiana. — Mechanics'  &  T.  Bk. 
v.  Gordon,  5  La.  Ann.  604  (1850). 

Massachusetts. — Robertson  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  525,  31 
N.  E.  650,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  482 
(1892). 

Michigan. — Coup  v.  Wabash,  St. 
L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  56  Mich.  Ill,  22 
N.  W.  215,  56  Am.  Rep.  374  (1885). 

Missouri. — Chouteau  v.  Steam- 
boat St.  Anthony,  16  Mo.  216 
(1852). 

New  York. — Bouker  v.  Long  Is- 
land R.  R.  Co.,  89  Hun  (N.  Y.),  202, 
35  N.  Y.  Supp.  23  (1895). 

New  York. — People  v.  Babcock, 
16  Hun,  313  (1878). 

North  Carolina. — Fender  v.  Rob- 
bins,  6  Jones'  Law.  207  (1858). 

Pennsylvania. — Forepaugh  v.  Del- 


aware, L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  Pa. 
St.  217,  18  Atl.  503,  5  L.  R.  A.  508, 
15  Am.  St.  Rep.  572  (1889). 

England. — In  re  Oxlade  v.  N.  E. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  680  (1864). 

Canada. — Leonard  v.  American 
Express  Co.,  26  Upp.  Can.  (Q.  B.) 
533  (1867). 

1  A  railroad  may  confine  its  busi- 
ness to  the  handling  of  freight  ex- 
clusively.    Wiggins    Ferry    Co.   v. 
East  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  107  111.  450 
(1883). 

It  may  even  limit  its  business  to 
the  carriage  of  freight  in  the  origi- 
nal cars.  United  States  v.  Sioux 
City  Stock  Yards  Co.,  162  Fed.  556 
(1908). 

A  railroad  doing  both  freight  and 
passenger  business  may  give  up  its 
passenger  trains  and  do  freight  busi- 
ness exclusively.  Commonwealth 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Gray, 
180  (1858). 

A  railroad  may  do  passenger  busi- 
ness upon  a  public  basis  while 
doing  freight  business  upon  a  pri- 
vate basis.  Edgar  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Cornie  Stave  Co.  (Ark.),  130  S.  W. 
452  (1910). 

2  Nairin    v.    Kentucky    Heating 
Co.,  27  Ky.  Law  Rep.  551,  86  S.  W. 
676  (1900).    And  see  People  v.  Los 
Angeles  Independent  Gas  Co.,  150 
Cal.  557,  89  Pac.  108  (1907). 

[665] 


§§  793,  794  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

And  in  general  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  obligation 
to  provide  facilities  arises  from  the  obligation  to  render 
service. 

§  793.  Proper  equipment  must  be  provided. 

It  is  well  agreed,  however,  that  all  engaged  in  public 
service  are  held  to  a  high  degree  of  responsibility  in  respect 
to  the  facilities  furnished,  although  of  course  their  liability 
is  not  absolute.  Sometimes  this  duty  is  underrated;  more 
often  it  is  overstated.  One  of  the  fairest  statements  that 
the  writer  has  noted  is  in  a  recent  Florida  case  1  where  the 
court  said:  "In  determining  whether  or  not  the  road-bed, 
track,  rolling  stock  and  other  equipment  of  a  common  car- 
rier railroad  corporation  is  reasonably  sufficient,  and  is 
being  maintained  and  operated  in  a  reasonably  safe  and 
adequate  condition,  and  is  being  managed  for  the  proper 
rendering  of  the  public  service  that  the  corporation  has 
undertaken  to  perform,  the  conditions  under  which  the 
service  is  being  rendered,  the  character  and  extent  of  the 
service,  its  reasonable  requirements,  and  the  means,  facil- 
ities, and  methods  best  suited  to  such  service  in  common 
use,  will  be  considered  by  the  court,  together  with  any 
other  material  and  pertinent  matters  available."  2 

§  794.  Ultimate  responsibility  for  proper  equipment. 

The  proprietors  of  the  service  are  themselves  responsible 
for  the  proper  performance  of  the  service  they  have  pro- 
fessed. They  must  therefore  see  to  it  that  they  have 
proper  equipment  to  render  the  service  which  they  have 
undertaken.  If  they  have  their  facilities  constructed  by 

1  State  ex  rel.  Ellis  v.   Atlantic  as  freight  must  by  these  general 
C.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Fla.  650,  44  So.  principles   run   separate   passenger 
213,  13  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  330  (1907).  trains.    People  ex  rel.  v.  St.  Louis, 

2  Thus  a  railroad   which  is  en-  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  111.  512, 
gaged  in  carrying  passengers  as  well  52  N.  E.  292,  35  L.  R.  A.  656  (1898). 

[G66] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  794 

independent  concerns  they  cannot  escape  this  personal 
liability  even  by  making  a  careful  choice  of  contractors; 
for  they  remain  liable  themselves  for  failure  in  their  under- 
taking if  there  has  been  negligence  in  the  construction. 
Thus  if  a  railroad  bridge  is  built  for  a  railroad  by  a  repu- 
table bridge  works  so  negligently  that  an  accident  results, 
the  railroad  is  liable.1  Upon  similar  principles  if  they 
utilize  the  equipment  of  another  concern  they  are  liable 
if  it  proves  not  to  be  safe  although  they  had  no  reason  to 
believe  that  it  was  not.  Thus  a  railroad  hauling  the  cars 
of  another  road  is  liable  for  any  accident  occurring  by 
any  defect  in  the  cars  even  when  its  own  inspection  showed 
none.2  This  general  duty  to  provide  facilities  is  one  which 
cannot  be  delegated.  A  railroad  cannot  by  having  its 
passengers  carried  in  sleeping  cars  belonging  to  an  inde- 
pendent company  escape  ultimate  liability  for  the  safety 
of  the  equipment  provided.3  Nor  can  the  proprietors 
escape  personal  liability  for  failure  to  provide  sufficient 
facilities  by  contracting  with  another  concern  to  provide 
them.  Thus  a  railroad  which  is  getting  all  its  freight  cars 
of  a  certain  class  from  an  outside  source  cannot  excuse 
its  failure  to  supply  cars  demanded  by  its  customers  by 
showing  that  the  parties  who  had  contracted  to  supply 
them  are  in  default.4 

1  See,  for  one  example,  Louisville,  Some  cases  go  so  far  as  to  say 

N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  117  that  the  shipper  is  not  necessarily 

Ind.  435,  20  N.  E.  284,  3  L.  R.  A.  estopped  by  declining  to  take  a  new 

434,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  60  (1888).  car  in  place  of  defective  one  from 

1  See,  for  one  example,  New  York,  asserting  liability  for  damages 

P.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cromwell,  98  caused  by  defects.  See  Texas  &  P. 

Va.  227,  35  S.  E.  444,  81  Am.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Townsend  (Tex.  Civ. 

Rep.  722,  49  L.  R.  A.  462  (1900).  App.),  106  S.  W.  760  (1907),  and 

J  See,  for  one  example,  Pennsyl-  Cleveland,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

vania  Company  v.  Roy,  102  U.  S.  Louisville  Tin.  &  S.  Co.  (Ky.),  Ill 

451,  26  L.  ed.  141  (1880).  S.  W.  358  (1908). 

4  See,  for  one  example,  Missouri  For  the  railway  must  furnish  a 

&  N.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Sneed,  85  Ark.  safe  car.  Even  if  shipper  sees  it  un- 

293,  107  S.W.  1182  (1908).  safe  some  cases  hold  that  he  may 

[667] 


§  795  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  795.  Improvement  of  present  facilities. 

It  is  not  enough  to  maintain  the  original  equipment  at 
its  former  standard.  It  may  be  said  in  general  that  one 
who  is  committed  to  the  conduct  of  a  public  business 
must  keep  his  facilities  up  to  the  demands  of  the  times. 
Thus  it  has  been  intimated  that  those  who  are  chargeable 
with  maintaining  a  bridge  for  public  use  are  not  limited 
in  their  duty  to  the  previous  business  use  of  the  structure.1 
Likewise  it  was  held  in  a  recent  case  that  where  the  original 
ordinance  under  which  a  telephone  company  was  operat- 
ing prohibited  it  from  increasing  to  its  subscribers  the 
telephone  rates  then  established,  the  telephone  company 
was  not  thereafter  entitled  to  limit  its  services  at  the  rates 
so  fixed  to  the  original  appliances  (which  had  become  to 
a  certain  extent  obsolete),  and  to  charge  higher  rates  for 
improved  equipment.2  On  the  other  hand,  a  public  service 
company  is  not  obliged  to  make  improvements  in  advance 
of  the  demonstration  of  their  practical  necessity,  and 
certainly  it  is  not  obliged  to  adopt  improvements  which 
are  still  in  an  experimental  stage.3  Thus  by  the  general 
rule  a  railroad  has  discharged  its  duty  to  its  passengers 
in  respect  to  its  cars  and  trains  when  it  has  supplied  the 
best  equipment  that  a  highly  prudent  person  would  have 
supplied  in  the  same  business  in  the  then  known  condition 
of  the  art  and  the  particular  business.4  It  is  an  interest- 
hold  the  carrier  unless  he  agrees.  2  Illinois. — People  v.  Chicago  Tel- 
See  Railroad  Company  v.  Pratt,  22  ephone  Co.,  220  111.  238,  77  N.  E. 
Wall.  123,  22  L.  ed.  827  (1874),  and  245  (1906). 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.          Indiana. — Johnson  v.  The  State, 
Marshall,  74  Ark.  597,  86  S.  W.  802      113  Ind.  143,  15  N.  E.  215  (1887). 
(1905).  3  Indiana. — Indianapolis     &     C. 

1  Nebraska. — S  e  y  f  e  r     v.    Otoe     R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rutherford,  29  Ind.  82, 
County,  66  Neb.  566,  92  N.  W.  756     92  Am.  Dec.  336  (1867). 
(1902).  New  York.— Steinweg  v.  Erie  Ry. 

Minnesota.— A  n  d  e  r  s  o  n  v.  St.      Co.,  43  N.  Y.  123,  3  Am.  Rep.  673 
Cloud,  79  Minn.  88,  81  N.  W.  746      (1870). 
(1900).  «  United  States.— Ozanne  v.   Illi- 

[668] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  796 

ing  speculation  whether  the  railroads  may  ultimately  be 
obliged  by  this  principle  to  equip  themselves  with  electric 
motive  power.  And  one  wonders  whether  a  traction  com- 
pany could  be  compelled  to  construct  a  subway. 

§  796.  Provision  of  special  equipment. 

In  a  diversified  business,  such  as  common  carriage,  a 
special  equipment  of  various  sorts  must  often  be  provided. 
In  the  case  of  the  railroads  very  different  cars  of  course 
are  requisite  for  the  transfer  of  passengers  and  of  freight. 
And  although  many  kinds  of  freight  may  be  transported 
in  open  cars  with  safety,  more  kinds  require  box  cars. 
But  in  the  conduct  of  a  modern  railroad  far  more  facilities 
than  these  simpler  forms  have  been  found  to  be  necessary. 
Thus  for  the  transportation  of  many  perishable  food  stuffs, 
such  as  butter  and  fruit,  refrigerator  cars  have  been  found 
to  be  indispensable;  and  it  is  generally  held  in  modern 
cases  that  these  improved  cars  are  imperatively  demanded 
for  the  proper  transportation  of  perishable  articles.1  The 

nois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  151  Fed.  900  T.  H.  Ry.  Co.,  79  la.  527,  44  N.  W. 

(1907).  803  (1890). 

Mississippi. — Natchez    &    Jack-  Michigan. — See  Johnson  v.  To- 

son  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McNeil,  61   Miss,  ledo,  S.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  133   Mich. 

434(1884).  596,  95  N.  W.  724,   103  Am.  St. 

1  United  States—  Atlantic  C.   L.  Rep.  464  (1903). 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Geraty,  166  Fed.  10,  91  Minnesota.  —  Calender  -  Vander- 

C.  C.  A.  602,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  310  hoof  Co.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

(1908).  Co.,  99  Minn.  295,  109  N.  W.  402 

Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  (1906). 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Renfroe,  82  Ark.  143,  100  Missouri.— See  Udell  v.  Illinois, 

S.  W.  889,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  317  C.  Ry.  Co.,  13  Mo.  App.  254  (1883). 

(1907).  New  Hampshire. — Baker  v.  Bos- 

Colorado—  Merchants'    Desp.    &  ton  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  H.  100, 

Transp.  Co.  v,  Cornforth,  3  Colo.  65  Atl.  386,  124  Am.  St.  Rep.  937 

280,  25  Am.  Rep.  757  (1877).  (1906). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  New  York. — Steinweg  v.  Erie  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Davis,  159  111.  53,  42  N.  E.  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  123,  3  Am.  Rep.  673 

382  (1895).  (1870). 

Iowa. — Beard  v.  St.  L.,  Alton  &  South  Carolina. — Mathisv.  South- 

[669] 


796  j 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


same  law,  by  reason  of  the  same  necessity,  applies  to  the 
provision  of  ventilator  cars  for  those  commodities  which 
would  be  injured  by  transportation  in  closed  cars.1  As 
soon  as  the  railways  begin  the  transportation  of  live  stock 
upon  a  large  scale,  as  part  of  their  regular  business,  the 
provision  of  special  stock  cars  becomes  necessary.2  And 
so  where  a  railroad  runs  through  a  district  shipping  large 
quantities  of  oil  it  should,  it  seems,  equip  itself  with  tank 
cars  to  meet  the  commercial  necessity  of  shipment  in 
bulk.3  These  cases  would  seem  to  justify  the  generaliza- 

ern  Ry.  Co.,  65  S.  C.  271,  43  S.  E. 
684,  61  L.  R.  A.  824  (1902). 

Virginia. — New  York,  P.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cromwell,  98  Va.  227, 
35  S.  E.  444,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  722, 
49  L.  R.  A.  462  (1900). 

Wisconsin. — Lamb  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Wis.  138, 
76  N.  W.  1123  (1898). 

1  New  York. — See  Tucker  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Ry.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  Misc. 
117,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  93  (1895). 

North  Carolina. — Forrester  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  147  N.  C.  553, 
18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  508,  61  S.  E. 
524  (1908). 

Pennsylvania. — See  Davenport  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  173  Pa. 
St.  398,  34  Atl.  59  (1896). 

Wisconsin. — Densmore  Commis- 
sion Co.  v.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  101  Wis.  563,  77  N.  W.  904 
(1899). 

2  Arkansas. — St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Marshall,  74  Ark.  597, 
86  S.  W.  802  (1905). 

Kansas. — Kansas  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Nichols,  K.  &  Co.,  9  Kan. 
235,  12  Am.  Rep.  494  (1872). 

Maine. — Sager  v.  Portsmouth,  S. 
&  P.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  31  Me.  228,  50 
Am.  Dec.  659  (1850). 

[670] 


Maryland. — Di  Giorgio  I.  &  S. 
S.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 
104  Md.  693,  65  Atl.  425,  8  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  108  (1906). 

Missouri. — Emerson  v.  St.  Louis 
&  H.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  161,  19  S. 
W.  1113  (1892). 

Nebraska. — Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  61  Neb.  608,  85 
N.  W.  832,  55  L.  R.  A.  289  (1901). 

South  Dakota. — Berry  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.),  124 
N.  W.  859  (1910). 

Texas.— Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Barrow  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  77  S.  W. 
643  (1903). 

3  United  States.— Western  N.  Y. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Penna.  Ry.  Co.,  137 
Fed.  343,  70  C.  C.  A.  23  (1905). 

Ohio. — State  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Oh.  St.  130,  23 
N.  E.  928  (1890). 

It  should  be  added  that,  as  the 
cases  go,  there  is  no  obligation  to 
provide  such  special  car  for  a  par- 
ticular shipper,  if  other  cars  which 
are  good  enough  are  supplied  to 
him;  and  where  a  shipper  insists 
upon  peculiar  cars  in  his  requisition 
he  may  subject  himself  to  longer  de- 
lays than  would  have  been  excus- 
able if  he  had  not  thus  specified. 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  797 

tion  that  wherever  the  territory  served  by  the  railroad 
produces  in  sufficient  quantities  commodities  which  re- 
quire special  equipment  for  their  proper  shipment  such 
equipment  should  be  provided. 

Topic  B.  Obligation  to  Increase  Facilities 

§  797.  Facilities  which  the  service  requires. 

In  most  of  the  public  employments  of  the  modern  type 
what  is  undertaken  is  not  merely  the  devoting  of  particular 
equipment  to  public  use  but  rather  the  rendering  of  a 
certain  service  to  the  community  with  which  it  professes 
to  deal.  Thus  a  modern  railroad  plainly  undertakes 
general  transportation  along  its  route;  and  since  it  has 
professed  this  general  service  it  must  see  to  it  that  it 
has  sufficient  equipment  to  handle  the  business  which  it 
has  in  effect  invited  by  this  general  profession.  The  term 
adequate  facilities  is  not  in  its  nature  capable  of  exact 
definition.1  It  is  a  relative  expression,  and  has  to  be  con- 
sidered as  calling  for  such  facilities  as  might  be  fairly  de- 
manded, regard  being  had,  among  other  things,  to  the 
extent  of  the  demand  for  transportation,  and  the  cost  of 

Texas.— Texas  &   P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  satonic  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Conn.  531,  23 

Barrow  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  77  S.  W.  Atl.  870, 15  L.  R.  A.  534  (1892). 

643  (1903).  Wisconsin. — Densmore   Commis- 

Virginia. — Moore    v.    Baltimore  sion  Co.  v.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry. 

&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Va.  189,  48  S.  E.  Co.,  101  Wis.  563,  77  N.  W.  904 

887  (1904).  (1899). 

And  attention  should  be  called  1  The  sentence  which  follows  is 

to  those  cases  which  hold  that  if  substantially  a  quotation  from  At- 

the  shipper  deliberately  accepts  a  lantic   Coast   Line   R.    R.   Co.   v. 

car  of  an  inferior  sort  for  his  ship-  Wharton,  207  U.  S.  328,  28  S.  Ct. 

ment  he  thereby  assumes  the  risk  121,  52  L.  ed.  230  (1907),  where 

of  losses  due  to  the  fact  that  a  car  the  obligation  to  provide  train  serv- 

specially    adapted    for    such    ship-  ice  was  discussed, 

ments  was  not  employed.  See  also  the  language  in  People  v. 

Connecticut—  Coupland  v.  Hou-  St.  L.,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  176 

111.  512,  52  N.  E.  292(1898). 

[671] 


§  797  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

furnishing  the  additional  accommodations  asked  for.1  All 
this  is  particularly  true  of  the  municipal  services — such 
as  waterworks,  gas  plants,  electric  plants,  and  telephone 
systems.  There  are  sufficient  authorities,  most  of  which 
have  been  discussed  elsewhere,  to  the  effect  that  their 
obligation  to  give  service  is  not  confined  to  the  original 
pipes  which  have  been  laid,  or  wires  which  have  been 
strung.  Such  companies  are  held  to  undertake  the  service 
of  their  communities;  and  they  must,  to  speak  in  general, 
be  prepared  to  extend  this  system  throughout  their  dis- 
trict to  meet  the  reasonable  demands  of  the  growing  com- 
munity.2 If  this  involves  the  acquisition  of  new  sources 
of  supply,  or  a  laying  of  pipes  in  new  streets,  or  extension 
of  wires  to  other  streets  or  the  construction  of  new  ex- 
changes, all  these  new  facilities  must  be  provided  to  meet 
the  expansion  of  the  business  within  the  community  to 
the  service  of  which  the  company  has  committed  itself. 
But  it  is  true  of  such  supply  as  it  is  of  other  public  service 
that  the  duty  to  give  adequate  service  to  those  to  whom 
it  owes  this  primary  duty  is  relative,  not  absolute.3  The 

1  Applying  these  general  princi-      mands  of  those  within  the  district 
pies  in  a  recent  case  in  an  action      which    they    have    undertaken    to 
against  a  carrier  for  failure  to  accept      serve. 

property  tendered  for  shipment  the  Idaho. — Pocatello  Water  Co.   v. 

court   held   that   as   the   evidence  Standley,  7  Idaho,  155,  61  Pac.  518 

showed   a  failure  on  the   carrier's  (1900). 

part  to  provide  sufficient  stational  Oregon. — Haugen  v.  Albina  Light 

facilities  for  taking   care  of   such  &  Water  Co.,  21  Oreg.  411,  28  Pac. 

property    awaiting    transportation  244,  14  L.  R.  A.  424  (1891). 

under  ordinary  conditions,  it  was  But  they  need  not  serve  beyond 

no  defense  that  an  unusual  emer-  the  borders  of  their  defined  districts 

gency  caused  a  shortage  of   cars,  under  any  circumstances. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kansas. — Crouch  v.   Arnett,   71 

State,  84  Ark.  150,  104  S.  W.  1106  Kan.  49,  79  Pac.  1086  (1905). 

(1907).  Massachusetts. — Weld  v.  Gas  & 

2  Speaking  generally,   such  sup-  Electric  Light  Commissioners,  197 
ply  companies  must  keep  expand-  Mass.  556,  84  N.  E.  101  (1908). 

ing  their  facilities  to  meet  the  de-         s  A  water  company  is  liable  for  not 

[672] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  798 

service  company  will  be  held  to  the  exercise  of  due  fore- 
sight in  anticipating  the  progress  of  the  demand  for  its 
supply  accompanying  the  growth  of  the  community.  But 
it  will  not  be  liable  if  the  unexpected  happens  in  the  shape 
of  an  unforeseen  demand  for  which  its  existing  supply  is 
in  adequate. 

§  798.  The  obligation  is  not  absolute. 

As  appears  throughout  this  chapter,  at  common  law 
this  duty  is  relative  not  absolute.  One  is  liable  for  not 
providing  sufficient  facilities  to  meet  expected  demands, 
but  one  is  excused  where  the  present  demand  was  fairly 
unforeseen.  There  have  been  in  late  years  many  statutes 
defining  this  obligation  to  provide  facilities  by  requiring 
that  cars  requested  by  shippers  shall  be  furnished  within 
a  certain  number  of  days.  Sometimes  these  statutes 
have  saving  clauses  excusing  the  railroad  which  is  not 
negligent  under  the  circumstances  in  failing  to  provide 
facilities;  and  then  all  is  well.  But  not  infrequently  the 
legislation  is  absolute  in  its  terms;  and  if  this  be  so  one 
of  two  things  must  be  done  by  the  courts  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  railroad  against  such  oppressive  legislation 
which  is  so  far  from  being  what  was  due  process  of  law 
before.  When  the  Federal  courts  have  come  upon  such 
absolute  State  legislation  they  have  been  inclined  to  deal 

sinking    more   wells   to   meet    the  liable  for  failure  to  be  prepared  to 

plainly  increasing  demands  of  the  render  the  sort  of  service  the  ap- 

community.     Capital  City  Water  plicant  wants.    State  ex  rel.  v.  Citi- 

Co.  v.  State,  105  Ala.  406,  18  So.  zens'  Telephone  Co.,  61  S.  C.  83,  39 

62,  29  L.  R.  A.  743  (1894).    But  an  S.  E.  257,  55  L.  R.  A.  139,  85  Am. 

unusual    drought    long    continuing  St.  Rep.  870  (1901).     But  if  there 

would  excuse  a  partial  suspension  have  been  unusual  calls  upon  its 

of   service   by    a   water   company,  service  it  is  excused  for  the  time 

State  Trust  Co.  v.  Duluth,  70  Minn,  being.     Cumberland   Telephone   & 

257,  73  N.  W.  249  (1897).  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Kelly,  160  Fed. 

Thus   a   telephone   company   is  316  (1908). 

43  [ 673  ] 


§  799  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

uncompromisingly  with  it,  declaring  it  utterly  void.1  But 
the  State  courts  have  fought  to  save  their  statutes,  wher- 
ever possible,  by  construing  them  to  intend  no  more  by 
their  general  phraseology  than  the  common-law  require- 
ments; and  wherever,  therefore,  the  company  would  be 
excused  at  common  law  for  not  providing  facilities,  it 
will  be  held  that  the  statute  has  not  been  violated.2 

§  799.  Equipment  sufficient  for  expected  business. 

The  duty  resting  upon  one  engaged  in  a  public  service 
to  have  at  hand  sufficient  equipment  is,  to  repeat  the 
rule  again,  relative,  not  absolute.  What  the  law  requires 
of  him  is  to  have  sufficient  equipment  for  expected  busi- 
ness. Therefore  what  is  required  of  him  by  the  common 
law,  or  by  the  statutes  in  definition  of  it,  is  to  furnish 
facilities  sufficient  for  the  usual  course  of  his  business, 
as  far  as  by  ordinary  forethought  he  may  anticipate  it. 
There  is  therefore  an  established  excuse  when  an  unex- 
pected demand  renders  it  impossible  to  give  further  serv- 
ice after  all  his  equipment  is  employed  to  best  advantage.3 

1  United  States. — Houston    &    T.  Georgia. — Pennington    &    E.    v. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayes,  201  U.  S.  Douglass,  A.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Ga. 
321,  50  L.  ed.  772,  26  Sup.  Ct.  491  App.  665,  60  S.  E.  485  (1907). 
(1906);  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  North  Carolina.— Hardware     Co. 
Co.    v.    Hampton,    162    Fed.    693  v.  Railroad  Co.,  150  N.  C.  703,  64 
(1908).  S.  E.  873,  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1200 

Texas.— See  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (1909). 

v.  Allen,  42  Tex.  Civ.  App.  331,  98         Texas.— B.  F.  Allen  v.  Texas  & 

S.  W.  450  (1906).  P.  Ry.  Co.,  100  Tex.  525,  101  S.  W. 

2  Arkansas.— St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  792  (1907). 

Co.  v.  Clay  Ginn.  Co.  77  Ark.  357,  3  Leading  cases  to  this  effect  are: 

92S.W.  531  (1906);  St.  Louis  S.W.  Arkansas.— St.   Louis,    I.    M.   & 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Leder,   79  Ark.  59,  95  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wynne  H.  &  C.  Co., 

S.   W.    170    (1906);    St.   Louis,  I.  81  Ark.  373,  99  S.  W.  375  (1907). 

M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wynne  H.  &  C.  Georgia.— Southern    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Co.,  81   Ark.   373,   99  S.   W.   375  Atlanta   Sand   &  S.  Co.  (Ga.),  68 

(1907);  Oliver  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  S.  E.  807  (1910). 

P.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Ark.  466,  117  S.  W.  Indiana.— Chicago,  St.  Louis  & 

238  (1909).  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  141  Ind. 

[674] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  799 


In  a  recent  application  of  this  test  l  in  an  action  against  a 
carrier  for  failure  to  furnish  freight  cars,  the  evidence 
showed  that  there  was  a  shortage  in  cars  by  reason  of  an 
extraordinary  accumulation  of  freight;  that  the  carrier 
had  seven  cars  per  mile  for  each  mile  of  its  main  line 
and  branches,  which  compared  favorably  with  other  car- 
riers in  that  part  of  the  country;  and  that  in  expecta- 
tion of  new  business,  it  had  ordered  fifteen  hundred  new 
freight  cars,  which  it  had  reasonably  thought  would  be 
sufficient  to  handle  the  business.  Upon  this  showing  it 
was  held  that  the  carrier  was  not  liable  for  its  delay 
caused  by  the  insufficiency  of  its  equipment  for  handling 
this  unexpected  business. 


267,  39  N.  E.  451,  50  Am.  St.  Rep. 
320  (1894). 

Kansas. — Udall  Milling  Co.  v. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  82 
Kan.  256,  108  Pac.  137  (1910). 

Kentucky. — Louisville  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Queen  City  Coal  Co.,  99  Ky. 
217,  35  S.  W.  626  (1896). 

Mississippi. — Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  McKay,  91  Miss.  138,  44 
So.  780  (1907). 

Missouri. — Ballentine  v.  No.  Mis- 
souri R.  R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  491,  93  Am. 
Dec.  315  (1867). 

Nebraska. — State  v.  Chicago  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Neb.  518,  120 
N.  W.  165  (1909). 

New  Hampshire. — G  o  r  d  o  n  v. 
Manchester  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  52 
N.  H.  596,  13  Am.  Rep.  97  (1873). 

New  York. — S  trough  v.  New 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  87 
N.  Y.  Supp.  30,  92  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
584  (1904). 

North  Carolina. — Branch  v.  Wil- 
mington &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  N.  C. 
347  (1877). 

South  Carolina. — Mauldin  v.  Sea- 


board Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  73  S.  C.  9, 
52  S.  E.  677  (1905). 

Texas. — Wallace  v.  Pecos  &  N. 
T.  Ry.  Co.,  50  Tex.  Civ.  App.  296, 
110S.  W.  162  (1908). 

Wisconsin. — Ayres  v.  Chicago  & 
N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372,  37 
N.  W.  432,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  226 
(1888). 

'St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Clay  Ginn.  Co.,  77  Ark.  357,  92 
S.  W.  531  (1906).  See  also  St.  Louis 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Leder,  79  Ark.  59, 
95  S.  W.  170  (1906),  and  Oliver  v. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  89 
Ark.  466,  117  S.  W.  238  (1909). 

But  as  is  noted  elsewhere  a  car- 
rier who  has  a  plain  justification  for 
refusing  a  further  application  be- 
cause he  is  confronted  unexpectedly, 
without  his  negligence  in  any  re- 
spect, by  expected  demands  for  his 
service  cannot  after  he  has  knowl- 
edge of  the  situation  apparently  ac- 
cede to  further  application,  Di 
Giorgio  Importing  &  S.  S.  Co.  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Md. 
*693,  65  Atl.  425,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

[675] 


§  800  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  800.  Expected  business  not  provided  for. 

It  would  seem  to  be  true  also,  if  the  press  of  business 
might  have  been  provided  against  by  reasonable  diligence 
of  the  carrier  that  there  is  no  such  excuse.1  To  apply 
this  rule  to  the  transportation  of  freight,  the  carrier  per- 
forms his  public  duty  only  by  providing  for  the  normal 
fluctuations  in  offerings  of  freight.  "The  sufficiency  of 
such  accommodations  must  be  determined  by  the  amount 
of  freight  and  the  number  of  passengers  ordinarily  trans- 
ported on  any  given  line  of  road.  The  duty  of  a  com- 
pany to  the  public,  in  this  respect,  is  not  peculiar  to  any 
season  of  the  year,  or  to  any  particular  emergency  that 
may  possibly  arise  in  the  course  of  its  business.  The 
amount  of  business  ordinarily  done  by  the  road  is  the 
only  proper  measure  of  its  obligation  to  furnish  transpor- 
tation. If  by  reason  of  a  sudden  and  unusual  demand  for 
stock  or  produce  in  the  market,  or  from  any  other  cause, 
there  should  be  an  unexpected  influx  of  business  to  the 
road,  this  obligation  will  be  fully  met  by  shipping  such 
stock  or  produce  in  the  order  and  priority  of  tune  in 
which  it  is  offered."  2 

108  (1906),  or  actually  accept  more  North  Carolina. — Hansley   v. 

goods,   Helliwell    v.  Grand  Trunk  JamesvUle  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  117 

Ry.  Co.,  7  Fed.  68  (1881),  without  N.  C.  565,  23  S.  E.  443,  53  Am.  St. 

subjecting  himself  to  liability.  Rep.  600  (1895). 

1  Arkansas. — Fordyce  v.  Nix,  58  South  Carolina. — P  o  r  c  h  e  r     v. 

Ark.  136,  23  S.  W.  967  (1893).  North  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Rich. 

Georgia.— Southern    Ry.    Co.    v.  L.  181  (1867). 

Atlanta  Sand  &  S.  Co.  (Ga.),  68  S.  Texas.— Galveston,   H.  &  S.   A. 

E.  807  (1910).  Ry.  Co.  v.  Morris,  94  Tex.  505,  61 

Illinois.— Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  S.  W.  709  (1901). 

v.  Cobb,  C.  &  Co.,  64  111.  128  (1872).  Wisconsin.— Ayres  v.  Chicago  & 

Missouri—  Hoffman  H.  &  S.  Co.  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372,  37 

v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  119  N.  W.   432,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  226 

Mo.  App.  495,  94  S.  W.  597  (1906).  (1888). 

Mississippi. — Louisville,  N.  O.  &  2  Fagg,  J.,  in  Ballentine  v.  North 

T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  69  Miss.  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  491,  93 

421,  13  So.  697,  22  L.  R.  A.  259  Am.  Dec.  315  (1867). 

(1891).  There  are  cases  which  hold  that 

[676] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  801 

§  801.  Demand  foreseen  although  unusual. 

If,  then,  the  abnormal  demand  should  have  been  fore- 
seen by  a  reasonable  management  it  is  in  default  unless 
it  has  made  every  effort  to  meet  the  emergency.  Thus  in 
the  conduct  of  passenger  business,  when  it  is  known  that 
some  exhibition  or  other  event  will  bring  together  a  large 
number  of  people,  the  transportation  lines  should  make 
seasonable  allotment  of  facilities  to  meet  the  extraordi- 
nary demand  at  this  point.1  But  if  the  number  of  pas- 
sengers applying  is  unprecedentedly  large  the  railroad  is 
of  course  excused  if  it  has  provided  as  much  additional 
service  as  would  seem  to  be  necessary  at  such  a  time.2  A 
recent  case  goes  so  far  as  to  hold  that  if  a  railroad  had  not 
provided  sufficient  equipment  to  move  the  cotton  crop 
each  recurring  season,  a  plea  in  its  defense  that  in  the 
particular  season  the  crop  was  above  average  will  not 
save  it.3  And  in  a  still  later  case  it  was  held  that  a  rail- 
road company  which  had  obligated  itself  to  furnish  re- 
frigerator cars  to  transport  garden  truck  to  market  cannot 
escape  liability  for  breach  of  that  duty  upon  the  ground 

a  passenger  on  a  railroad  train,  who  x  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dum- 

exhibits  his  ticket  and  demands  a  ser,   161   111.    190,   43  N.    E.  698 

seat,  need  not  surrender  the  ticket  (1896). 

till  the  seat  is  furnished.    See  Davis  See  also  Trumbull  v.  Erickson,  97 

v.  The  Kansas  City,  St.  Joseph  &  Fed.  891  (1890). 

C.  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  317,  14  Am.  2  Gordon  v.  Manchester  &  L.  R. 

Rep.  457   (1873),  and  Hardenberg  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  596,  13  Am.  Rep. 

v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  39  97  (1873). 

Minn.  3,  38  N.  W.  625,  12  Am.  St.  See  also  Pursell  v.  Richmond  & 

Rep.  610  (1888).  D.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  C.  414,  12  S.  E. 

But  without  payment  of  fare  it  954,    12  L.   R.   A.   113,   and  note 

would  seem  that  he  certainly  is  not  (1891). 

entitled  to  transportation  and  may  8  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

be  put  off.     See  Pittsburg,  C.  &  Blum  Co.,  88  Miss.  180,  40  So.  748 

St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Houton,  48  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  432  (1906). 

Ind.  90  (1874) ;  Memphis  &  Charles-  See  also  Cronan  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 

ton  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Benson,  85  Tenn.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  130  S.  W.  437 

627,  4  S.  W.  5,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  776  (1910). 
(1887). 

[677] 


§  802  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

that  the  crop  was  unusually  large,  if  it  was  no  larger  than 
might  reasonably  have  been  expected  from  the  acreage 
planted,  knowledge  of  which  the  railroad  company  either 
had,  or  had  the  means  of  obtaining.1 

§  802.  Reasonable  time  to  increase  facilities. 

When  it  is  said  that  the  company  is  responsible  for  not 
meeting  an  increase  in  demand  which  has  been  foreseen, 
this  is  subject  to  the  qualification  that  the  company  shall 
be  given  a  reasonable  time  after  it  should  have  anticipated 
the  future  demands  to  equip  itself  for  them.  And  it  must 
be  recognized  that  this  is  often  a  matter  of  considerable 
time.  It  is  a  long  time  after  orders  for  railroad  equip- 
ment have  been  placed  before  rolling  stock,  particularly 
locomotives,  is  delivered.2  This  point  has  been  well 
brought  out  recently  in  the  case  of  telephone  service. 
When  a  switch  board  is  full  or  all  the  wires  in  the  conduit 
are  exhausted,  it  is  recognized  that  it  will  necessarily  take 
considerable  time  to  replace  the  switch  board  or  introduce 
new  cables.3 

1  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ger-  In  one  recent  case  it  was  held 
aty,  166  Fed.  10,  91  C.  C.  A.  602  that  mandamus  will  not  issue  to 
(1908).  compel  a  railroad  company  to  fur- 
See   also   Southern   Ry.    Co.    v.  nish  sufficient   motive   power  and 

Atlanta  Sand  &  S.  Co.   (Ga.),  68  cars  to  transport  freight,  since  a 

S.  E.  807  (1910).  large  discretion  in  such  cases  must 

Telegraph  companies  must  have  be  left  to  the  management  of  the 

enough  wires  to  transact  all  busi-  road.    State  ex  rel.  Ellis  v.  Atlantic 

ness  usually  offered  to  them.    Lea-  Coast  Line  Ry.  Co.,  53  Fla.  650, 

veil  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  116  44  So.  213  (1907). 

N.  C.  211,  21  S.  E.  391,  27  L.  R.  A.  3  See  particularly: 

843,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  798  (1895).  United  States.— Cumberland  Tel- 

2  See  particularly:  ephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Kelly, 
Arkansas— St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  160  Fed.  316,    87  C.  C.    A.  268 

Co.  v.  Clay  Ginn.  Co.,  77  Ark.  357,  (1908). 

92  S.  W.  531  (1906).  South  Carolina.— State  ex  rel.  v. 

South  Carolina. — Mauldin  v.  Sea-  Citizens'  Telephone  Co.,  61  S.  C. 

board  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  73  S.  C.  9,  83,  39  S.  E.  257,  55  L.  R.  A.  139, 

52  S.  E.  677  (1905).  85  Am.  St.  Rep.  870  (1901). 

[678] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES      [  §  803 

§  803.  Pressure  for  short  periods. 

It  sometimes  happens  in  certain  businesses  that  for 
short  times  at  recurring  intervals  there  is  such  extraor- 
dinary demand  for  service  that  really  sufficient  facilities 
could  hardly  be  provided  upon  any  commercial  basis. 
The  most  striking  case  of  this  kind  is  that  of  the  traction 
companies  about  six  o'clock  at  night.  Indeed  in  the  case 
of  the  street  car  companies  it  would  be  physically  impos- 
sible to  give  any  headway  to  sufficient  cars  to  provide 
seats  for  all  passengers  at  that  hour.1  All  that  can  be 
expected  is  the  best  that  expert  management  can  do,  and 
although  this  will  leave  passengers  standing,  it  probably 
cannot  be  helped  in  many  cases.  But  sheer  physical 
impossibility  need  not  be  shown;  commercial  impracti- 
cability is  enough.  Doubtless  a  granger  railroad  has  at 
every  harvest  time  more  demand  for  grain  cars  than  it 
can  instantly  supply.  But  to  buy  sufficient  cars  to  meet 
every  demand  the  very  day  it  is  made,  would  leave  per- 
haps idle  during  the  year  ten  times  the  number  of  cars 
that  the  average  business  demands.  This  would  inevi- 
tably react  upon  the  freight  rate,  increasing  it  to  an  un- 
bearable extent.  If  the  management  of  such  a  railway 
provides  sufficient  cars  to  move  the  crop  within  reasonable 
time  to  meet  the  market,  it  would  seem  that  it  is  doing  all 
that  should  be  required.2 


1  But  few  seats  need  be  provided  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City,  75  N.  J.  L. 

in  ferryboats,  not  nearly  enough  to  349,  67  Atl.  1072  (1907). 
give  all  passengers  a  seat  at  rush          2  See  to  this  effect:  State  ex  rel. 

hours.      Burton    v.    West    Jersey  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  71 

Ferry  Co.,  114  U.  S.  474,  29  L.  ed.  Neb.  593,  99  N.  W.  309  (1904),  and 

215,  5  Sup.  Ct.  960  (1885).  State  ex  rel.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

However    an    ordinance    requir-  R.  Co.,  72  Neb.   542,   101   N.  W. 

ing  traction  lines  to  provide  cars  323  (1904). 

enough  so  that  there  will  usually          Yazoo  &   M.   V.   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

be  seats  at  other  hours  is  not  un-  Blum,  88  Miss.  180,  40  So.  748,  10 

reasonable.      North   Jersey   Street  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  432  (1906),  is  ap- 

[679] 


§  804  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

§  804.  Equipment  beyond  its  control. 

A  special  problem  under  this  topic,  which  has  come 
into  prominence  of  late  years,  is  whether  a  railroad  may 
show  as  justification  for  not  furnishing  cars  demanded 
by  its  shippers  that  although  it  owns  freight  cars  enough 
to  transport  the  goods  which  are  being  offered  to  it  at 
this  time,  it  happens  that  so  large  a  per  cent  of  its  cars 
are  at  the  moment  away  upon  other  railroads  that  it  is 
unable  to  render  promptly  the  service  asked.  It  may  seem 
that  the  weight  of  the  argument  would  be  against  any 
such  justification.  A  railroad  by  the  common  law  cer- 
tainly is  not  bound  to  send  its  cars  beyond  its  own  rails;  l 
and  no  legislation  has  as  yet  been  devised  which  can  con- 
stitutionally compel  it  to  do  so.2  It  may  be  argued,  there- 
fore, if  it  has  gotten  itself  into  this  position  by  sending  its 
cars  elsewhere  without  being  obliged  to  do  so,  it  could 
not  set  up  a  shortage  thus  caused  as  a  defense.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  railroad  may  legally  enter  into  a  through 
route,  or  contract  for  through  shipments,  and  then  in  either 
case  it  will  be  obliged  to  let  all  patrons  who  may  desire 
ship  through  in  the  original  cars.3  No  one  doubts  that 
it  may  properly  undertake  this  additional  service  to  the 
public  if  it  wishes,  and  it  follows  that  if  it  has  kept  as 
many  cars  in  hand  as  it  might  well  feel  would  be  enough 

parently    contra.      But    Martin    v.  take    on    passengers.      Gordon    v. 

Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  110  Minn.  Manchester  &  L.   R.   R.   Co.,   52 

118,  124  N.  W.  825  (1910),  is  ap-  N.  H.  596,  13  Am.  Rep.  97  (1873). 

parently  accord.  l  See  to  this  effect :  Pittsburg,  C. 

It  is  a  reasonable  rule  that  no  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Morton,  61  Ind. 

more  passengers  will  be  taken  into  539,  28  Am.  Rep.  682  (1878). 

a  street  car  which  is  overcrowded.  2  See  to  this  effect:  Louisville  & 

Hanna  v.  Nassau  Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  N.  R.   R.   Co.    v.    Central  S.   Y. 

18  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  137,  45  N.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S.  132,  29  S.  Ct.  246 

Supp.  437  (1897).  (1909). 

It  is  a  reasonable  decision  that  a  3  See  to  this  effect:  Houston  &  T. 

train   which   is   overcrowded   shall  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buchanan,  42  Tex. 

omit  all  further  scheduled  stops  to  Civ.  App.  620,  94  S.  W.  199  (1906). 

[680] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES      [  §  805 

for  its  local  service,  it  should  have  the  usual  justification.1 
But  the  argument  may  be  carried  further.  As  the  rail- 
road business  is  conducted  in  the  United  States  the  inter- 
change of  cars  is  the  regular  course  of  affairs.  A  railroad 
which  would  hold  out  against  this  policy  would  be  "an 
Ishmaelite  among  its  fellows."  A  traffic  manager  might 
therefore  well  figure  upon  getting  in  the  course  of  exchange, 
under  average  circumstances,  about  as  many  cars  as  he 
sends  off;  but  if  the  conditions  of  traffic  over  his  own  road 
at  the  season  would  usually  make  the  balance  of  exchange 
against  him  or  in  his  favor  he  should  take  that  into  ac- 
count. It  may  well  be  argued  that  he  may  take  all  these 
facts  into  account  in  judging  whether  he  is  leaving  cars 
enough  for  his  own  business  as  it  would  apparently  be  at 
this  season.2  But  he  should  also  consider  the  probabilities 
of  his  not  being  able  to  get  back  the  cars  he  is  sending  off.3 

Topic  C.  Establishment  of  Stational  Facilities 

§  805.  Establishment  of  stations  by  legislation. 

It  is  everywhere  agreed  that  the  State  may  by  statute 
establish  stations  at  places  where  the  public  need  requires 
them  4  by  special  statute.  Such  legislation  is  plainly 

1  See  to  this  effect :  Missouri,  K.          4  See  for  example : 

&  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kyser,  38  Tex.  Civ.  United  States.— Atchison,    T.    & 

App.  355,  87  S.  W.  389  (1905).  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Denver  &  N.  O. 

2  See  the  general  language  in  Mid-  R.  R.  Co.,  110  U.  S.  667,  681,  23 
land  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoffman  Coal  L.  ed.  291  (1884). 

Co.,  91  Ark.  180,   120  S.  W.  380  Arkansas.— Louisville  &  A.  Ry. 

(1909);  Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Co.  v.  State,  85  Ark.  12,  106  S.  W. 

Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  960  (1907). 

18,  97  S.  W.  778  (1906).  Connecticut.— State  of  Conn.   v. 

3  See  the  actual  decision  in  St.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  37  Conn.  153 
Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Phoenix  Cot-  (1870). 

ton  Oil  Co.,  88  Ark.  594,  115  S.  W.  Massachusetts.— Mayor    v.    Nor- 

393  (1909);  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  wich  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  109  Mass.  103 

Barrow  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  94  S.  W.  (1871). 

176  (1906).  New  York.— People  v.  New  York, 

[681] 


§  806  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

within  the  reserved  power  of  regulation.  "If  the  directors 
of  a  railroad  were  to  find  it  for  the  interest  of  the  stock- 
holders to  refuse  to  carry  any  freight  or  passengers  except 
such  as  they  might  take  at  one  end  of  the  road  and  carry 
entirely  through  to  the  other  end,  and  were  to  refuse  to 
establish  any  way  stations  or  do  any  way  business  for 
that  reason,  though  the  road  passed  for  a  long  distance 
through  a  populous  part  of  the  State,  this  would  be  a 
case  manifestly  requiring  and  authorizing  legislative  inter- 
ference under  the  clause  in  question.  And  on  the  same 
ground,  if  they  refuse  to  provide  reasonable  accommoda- 
tion for  the  people  of  any  smaller  locality,  the  legisla- 
ture may  reasonably  alter  and  modify  the  discretionary 
power  which  the  charter  confers  upon  the  directors,  so 
as  to  make  the  duty  to  provide  the  accommodation  abso- 
lute. Whether  a  reasonable  ground  for  interference  is 
presented  in  any  particular  case  is  for  the  legislature  to 
determine;  and  their  determination  on  this  point  must  be 
conclusive."  l 

§  806.  Requirement  of  stations  by  commissions. 

The  more  usual  method  of  exercising  the  legislative 
power  in  this  regard  is  by  delegation  of  the  determination 
of  the  necessity  of  the  establishment  of  new  stations  or 
the  propriety  of  changing  existing  stations  to  the  railroad 
commission.  Of  the  constitutionality  of  such  legislation 

L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  58,  358,  121  S.  W.  284  (1909),  that  a 

58  Am.  Rep.  484,  9  N.  E.  856  special  act  of  the  legislature  was 

(1887).  unreasonable  and  void,  which  re- 

Vermont. — Re  Railroad  Commis-  quired  the  construction  and  main- 

sioners,  79  Vt.266,  65  Atl.  82  (1906).  tenance  of  a  station  at  a  point  in 

1  Per  Chapman,  C.  J.,  in  Com-  a  sparsely  settled  community  with 

monwealth  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  meager  business  interests,  which 

103  Mass.  254,  4  Am.  Rep.  555  would  result  in  a  large  expense  to 

(1869).  the  railway  company  without  any 

However  it  was  held  in  Louis-  corresponding  benefit  to  it  or  the 

iana  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  91  Ark.  public. 

[682] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  806 

and  the  consequent  force  of  such  orders  there  can  be  no 
doubt.1  Indeed  many  courts  believe,  as  will  be  seen 
presently,  that  without  legislative  interposition  in  some 
form,  the  railroad  companies  are  forced  to  do  as  they 
please  in  these  respects.  Thus  in  an  Alabama  case  2 
where  it  was  urged  in  argument  that  a  common-law  duty 
rested  on  the  railroad  company  to  establish  and  maintain 
comfortable  waiting  rooms  at  its  stations,  it  was  said: 
"An  examination  of  the  cases  bearing  on  this  question 
discloses  that  no  such  duty  exists,  unless  imposed  by  the 


1  United  States. — Minneapolis  & 
St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Minnesota,  193 
U.  S.  53,  48  L.  ed.  614,  24  Sup.  Ct. 
396  (1904). 

Alabama. — Nashville,  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  137  Ala.  439, 
34  So.  401  (1902). 

Kansas. — Board  of  R.  R.  Commrs. 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Kan. 
193,  80  Pac.  53(1905). 

Iowa. — State  v.  Des  Moines  &  K. 
C.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Iowa,  644,  54  N.  W. 
461  (1893). 

Louisiana. — Morgan's  L.  &  T. 
R.  &  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion, 109  La.  247,  33  So.  214  (1902); 
Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Commission,  121  La.  847,  46 
So.  884  (1908). 

Maine. — R  a  i  1  r  o  a  d  Commis- 
sioners v.  Portland  &  O.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  63  Me.  269,  18  Am.  Rep.  208 
(1872). 

Minnesota. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Min- 
neapolis &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  87 
Minn.  195,  91  N.  W.  465  (1902); 
State  ex  rel.  Railroad  &  W.  Com- 
mission v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.,  90 
Minn.  277,  96  N.  W.  81  (1903). 

Mississippi. — State  v.  Mobile, 
J.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Miss.  172, 


38  So.  732  (1905);  State  v.  Yazoo  & 
M.  Valley  Ry.  Co.,  87  Miss.  679, 
40  So.  263  (1905). 

New  Jersey. — Delaware,  L.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Commrs.  (N.  J.), 
74  Atl.  269  (1909). 

New  York. — People  v.  New  York, 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  58, 
9  N.E.  856,  58  Am.  Rep.  484  (1887). 

South  Carolina.  —  Railroad 
Commrs.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  71 
S.C.  130,508.  E.  641  (1905). 

South  Dakota. — State  ex  rel.  v. 
Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
12  S.  D.  305,  47  L.  R.  A.  569,  81 
N.  W.  503  (1900). 

Vermont. — Re  Railroad  Commrs., 
79  Vt.  266,  65  Atl.  82  (1906). 

Wisconsin. — Minneapolis,  St.  P. 
&  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com- 
mission, 136  Wis.  146,  116  N.  W. 
905,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  821  (1908). 

The  action  of  the  commission 
will  not  be  questioned  unless  it  is 
acting  outside  of  the  jurisdiction 
conferred  upon  it  by  law.  People  v. 
President,  etc.,  of  D.  &  H.  Canal 
Co.,  165  N.  Y.  362,  59  N.  E.  138 
(1901). 

2  Page  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  129  Ala.  237,  29  So.  676  (1898). 

[683] 


§  807  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

charter  of  the  defendant,  or  by  a  statutory  regulation, 
or  by  some  other  legislative  authorization  conferring  the 
powers  upon  a  railroad  commission  to  impose  the  duty." 

§  807.  Requirement  of  stations  by  the  courts :  conserva- 
tive view. 

Whether  the  carrier  can  be  required  to  establish  reason- 
able stations  through  judicial  process  in  the  courts  is  a 
matter  of  more  doubt.  The  leading  authority  to  the 
effect  that  the  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to  interfere  is 
Northern  Pacific  Railroad  v.  Washington  Territory  ex  rel. 
Dustin,1  a  United  States  Supreme  Court  case.  This  was  a 
petition  for  a  mandamus  to  compel  the  defendant  railroad 
to  erect  and  maintain  a  station  at  Yakima  City,  through 
which  the  road  passed.  The  defendant  had  at  one  time 
stopped  its  trains  at  Yakima  City,  but  moved  the  station 
to  North  Yakima.  In  consequence,  apparently,  of  this, 
Yakima  City  which  at  the  time  of  filing  the  petition  for 
mandamus,  was  the  most  important  town  in  population 
and  business  in  the  county,  rapidly  dwindled,  and  most 
of  its  inhabitants  removed  to  North  Yakima,  which  at 
the  time  of  the  verdict  had  become  the  largest  and  most 
important  town  in  the  county.  The  Territorial  court 
granted  the  writ,  but  this  judgment  was  reversed  on  appeal 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  The  decision 
was  thus  made  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Yakima  City  had 
ceased  to  be  a  sufficiently  considerable  place  to  require 
station  facilities.  It  is  therefore  not  actually  decided  in 
the  case  that  the  railroad  had  not  violated  its  legal  duty 
in  failing  to  stop  at  Yakima  City,  or  that  some  form  of 
action  might  not  lie  against  it  for  the  failure.  The  court, 
however,  discussed  the  general  question  very  fully,  and 
concluded  that  "to  hold  that  the  directors  of  this  corpora- 
tion, in  determining  the  number,  place,  and  size  of  its 

1  142  U.  S.  492,  35  L.  ed.  1092,  12  Sup.  Ct.  283  (1892). 

[684] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  808 

stations  and  other  structures,  having  regard  to  the  public 
convenience  as  well  as  to  its  own  pecuniary  interests,  can 
be  controlled  by  the  courts  by  writ  of  mandamus,  would 
be  inconsistent  with  many  decisions  of  high  authority  in 
analogous  cases."  1 

§  808.  Progressive  view  of  the  question  of  stations. 

The  progressive  view  of  the  question  is  taken  in  several 
courts,  which  allow  the  writ  of  mandamus  to  issue  to 
compel  the  railroad  to  establish  stations  in  reasonable 
places.  A  leading  case  is  that  of  the  People  v.  Chicago 
and  Alton  Railroad.2  In  that  case  a  petition  for  a  writ 
of  mandamus  was  granted  compelling  the  defendant  to 
establish  and  maintain  a  station  at  Upper  Alton,  a  town 
of  over  1,800  inhabitants  situated  on  the  line  of  the 
defendant's  railway  about  midway  between  two  other 
stations,  Mr.  Justice  Bailey  saying:  "It  is  undoubtedly 
the  rule  that  railway  companies,  in  the  absence  of  statu- 
tory provisions  limiting  and  restricting  their  powers,  are 
vested  with  a  very  broad  discretion  in  the  matter  of  locat- 
ing, constructing,  and  operating  their  railways,  and  of 
locating  and  maintaining  their  freight  and  passenger 
stations.  This  discretion,  however,  is  not  absolute,  but 
is  subject  to  the  condition  that  it  must  be  exercised  in 
good  faith,  and  with  a  due  regard  to  the  necessities  and 

1  This  conservative  view  prevails  New  Jersey. — Jacquelin    v.    Erie 

at  the  following  jurisdictions:  R.  R.  Co.,  69  N.  J.  Eq.  432,  61  Atl. 

United   States. — Atchison,    T.    &  18   (1905),  no  jurisdiction  to  pre- 

S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Denver  &  N.  O.  vent  discontinuance  of  station. 

R.  R.  Co.,  110  U.  S.  667,  23  L.  ed.  Wisconsin.— Whiting  v.  Sheboy- 

292,  4  Sup.  Ct.  185  (1884).  gan  &  F.  Du  Lac,  25  Wis.  167,  3 

Alabama. — Page  v.  Louisville  &  Am.  Rep.  30  (1870). 

Nashville  R.  R.  Co.,  129  Ala.  232,  England.— South  Eastern  Ry.  v. 

29  So.  676  (1900),  semble.  Ry.    Commrs.,    50    L.   J.   Q.    B. 

Louisiana.— State  ex  rel.  v.  Kan-  201,  6  Q.  B.  D.  586,  44  L.  T.  203 

sas  City  Ry.  Co.,  51  La.  Ann.  200,  (1881). 

25  So.  126  (1899).  2 130  111.  175,  22  N.  E.  857  (1888) 

[685] 


§  809  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

convenience  of  the  public.  Railway  companies,  though 
private  corporations,  are  engaged  in  a  business  in  which 
the  public  have  an  interest,  and  in  which  such  companies 
are  public  servants,  and  amenable  as  such."  1 

§  809.  Where  stations  are  required. 

The  circumstances  which  call  for  the  establishment  of 
stations  are  brought  out  in  the  cases  which  have  been 
cited.  Public  necessity  is  the  real  basis.  Wherever  there 
is  a  community  which  has  business  enough  to  make  the 
establishment  of  the  station  plainly  profitable,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  railroad  is  acting  unreasonably  in 
not  establishing  a  station  there.2  On  the  other  hand,  it 
would  be  outrageous  for  the  regulating  authorities  to 
require  a  railroad  to  establish  an  additional  station  in  a 
sparsely  settled  country  producing  no  additional  busi- 
ness.3 Stations,  of  course,  should  be  more  frequent  in 
thickly  settled  districts;  and  for  a  railroad  to  run  through 
such  a  country  without  a  station  for  several  miles  would 
be  unreasonable.4  Despite  these  rules  the  regulating 
authorities  may  go  so  far  as  to  order  the  establishing  of  a 


1  This  progressive  view  prevails  in          New  Hampshire. — Concord  &  M. 

the  following  jurisdictions:  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

Florida—  Florida,  C.  &  P.  R.  R.  67  N.  H.  464,  41  Atl.  263  (1893). 
Co.  v.  State  ex  rel.  Tavares,  31  Fla.          Washington.  —  Northern    Pacific 
482,  13  So.  103,  20  L.  R.  A.  419,  34  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Territory  of  Washing- 
Am.  St.  Rep.  30  (1893).  ton,  3  Wash.  Territory,  303,  13  Pac. 

Illinois.— Mobile  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  604  (1887). 

v.  People  ex  rel.,  132  111.  559,  24          2  People  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R. 

N.  E.  643,  22  Am.  St.  Rep:  556  Co.,    130  111.    175,   22   N.   E.   857 

(1890).  (1889). 

Nebraska. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Re-          3  Louisiana  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 

publican  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Neb.  91  Ark.  358,  121  S.  W.  284  (1909). 
647,  24  N.  W.  329,  52  Am.  Rep.  424          «  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  St.  M. 

(1885);  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commission, 

v.  State,  74  Neb.  77,  103  N.  W.  136  Wis.  146,  116  N.  W.  905,  17 

1087  (1905).  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  821  (1908). 

[686] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  810 

station  to  meet  public  necessities,  although  its  mainte- 
nance may  not  be  profitable.1 

§  810.  Closing  a  station. 

Upon  similar  principles  a  station  may  be  closed  when 
public  necessity  no  longer  requires  it.  Thus  a  station 
may  be  abandoned  after  experience  has  shown  that  there 
is  not  a  sufficient  demand  for  it.2  The  plainest  case  of  the 
right  to  close  a  station  is  when  another  station  is  provided 
within  the  same  sphere  of  influence.3  Thus  the  shifting 
of  the  location  of  a  station  from  one  point  in  the  region 
to  another  (where  it  might  originally  have  been  located 
without  objection)  is  plainly  within  the  discretion  of  the 
company.4  And  if  the  company  takes  over  another  par- 
allel road  it  may  close  the  stations  of  the  acquired  line, 
or  of  its  own  line,  so  long  as  sufficient  accommodations 
are  provided  for  public  convenience.5  On  the  other  hand, 
an  order  of  a  commission  that  a  station  which  the  railroad 
is  about  to  abandon  shall  be  kept  open  will  not  be  con- 
sidered outrageous,  although  it  would  plainly  be  advan- 
tageous to  the  railroad  to  close  it.6  And  there  may  be 
outstanding  obligations  by  legislation  or  charter,  fran- 
chise or  contract,  to  maintain  the  particular  station.7 

1  See  on  this  crucial  point:  2  Jacquelin  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  69 

Louisiana.— Morgan's    L.    &    T.  N.  J.  Eq.  432,  61  Atl.  18  (1905). 

R.  &  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commis-  3  Mobile    &    O.    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

sion,  109  La.  247,  33  So.  214  (1902).  People,  132  111.  559,  24  N.  E.  643, 

Minnesota.— State    v.    Northern  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  556  (1890). 

Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  90  Minn.  277,  96  4  Chicago   &    E.    I.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

N.  W.  81  (1903).  People,  222  111.  396,  78  N.  E.  784 

Mississippi. — Southern  Ry.   Co.  (1906). 

v.  State  (Miss.),  48  So.  236  (1909).  5  Chicago  &  A.  R.R.  Co.  v.  People, 

Nebraska—  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  152  111.  230,  38  N.  E.  562  (1894). 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nebraska  State  Ry.  6  Delaware,   L.  &    W.  R.  Co.  v. 

Commission,  85  Neb. 818, 124  N.W.  Railroad   Commission    (N.   J.),   74 

477,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  444  (1910).  Atl.  269  (1909). 

Oklahoma. — Kansas  City,   M.  &  "State  ex  rel.  v.  Northern  Pac. 

O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State  (Okla.),  107  Ry.  Co.,  89  Minn.  363,  95  N.  W. 

Pac.  912  (1910).  297  (1903). 

[687] 


§811 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


§  811.  Exact  location  of  stations. 

Generally  speaking  the  exact  location  of  the  station 
buildings,  is  for  the  railroad  to  decide,  and  in  ordering 
the  establishment  of  a  station  the  location  will  be  left  to 
its  discretion.1  But  there  may  be  cases  where  but  one 
location  is  advisable,  such  as  the  case  of  union  stations 
which  should  be  at  the  railroad  intersections.  This  was 
the  occasion  of  the  most  advanced  case  upon  the  subject, 
Concord  &  Montreal  Railroad  v.  Boston  &  Maine  Rail- 
road 2  where  it  was  held  that  since  ' '  it  was  conceded  that 


1  Florida,  C.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
State  ex  rel.  Tavares,  31  Fla.  482, 
13  So.  103,  20  L.  R.  A.  419,  34  Am. 
St.  Rep.  30  (1893). 

However  where  there  are  sta- 
tional  facilities  at  a  certain  point 
which  the  railroad  has  unreason- 
ably ceased  to  make  a  stopping 
place  the  regulating  authorities  will 
have  no  hesitation  in  ordering 
that  particular  station  to  be  re- 
opened and  service  resumed.  See 
in  addition  the  various  cases  cited 
in  the  preceding  paragraph.  Min- 
neapolis, St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Railroad  Commission,  136 
Wis.  146,  116  N.  W.  905,  17  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  821  (1908). 

*67  N.  H.  464,  41  Atl.  263,  74 
N.  W.  893,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  358, 
40  L.  R.  A.  389  (1893). 

But  there  are  several  cases  which 
hold  that  there  is  no  obligation  to 
locate  stations  at  an  intersecting 
point  as  such. 

United  States. — Atchison,  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Denver  &  N.  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  110  U.  S.  667,  28  L.  ed. 
291  (1884);  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S. 
132,  53  L.  ed.  441  (1909). 

[688] 


Kentucky. — Shelby ville  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Louisville,  C.  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  82 
Ky.  541  (1885). 

Missouri. — State  v.  Railroad  Co., 
105  Mo.  App.  207  (1904). 

Virginia. — See  Commonwealth  v. 
Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Va.),  68 
S.  E.  351  (1910). 

It  would  seem  that  where  a  rail- 
road terminates  upon  a  wharf  upon 
navigable  water,  public  necessity 
would  require  that  this  should  be  a 
public  station.  See: 

Florida. — Indian  R.  S.  Co.  v. 
East  Coast  Transp.  Co.,  28  Fla. 
387,  10  So.  480,  29  Am.  St.  Rep. 
258  (1891). 

Georgia. — Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Graham,  117  Ga.  555,  43 
S.  E.  1000  (1903). 

But  see  to  the  contrary: 

United  States.— Louisville  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  West  Coast  N.  S.  Co., 
198  U.  S.  483,  49  L.  ed.  1135,  25 
Sup.  Ct.745  (1905);  IlwacoRy.&  N. 
Co.  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co., 
57  Fed.  673,  6  C.  C.  A.  495  (1893). 

New  York.— Alexandria  Bay  Stb. 
Co.  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.,  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091,  18  N.  Y. 
App.  527  (1897). 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  812 

the  public  good  requires  that  there  should  be  a  union 
passenger  station  in  the  city  of  Manchester,  to  be  used 
by  the  railroads  connecting  at  that  point,  for  the  accom- 
modation of  the  public  as  well  as  for  their  own  convenience 
and  advantage,  from  this  concession  it  necessarily  follows 
that  it  is  the  legal  duty  of  the  parties  to  locate,  erect,  and 
maintain  such  a  depot  as  public  necessity  requires  which 
the  court  might  designate  if  the  parties  were  unable  to 
agree."  A  problem  as  to  which  there  is  much  litigation 
arises  when  a  covenant  by  a  railroad  with  a  landowner 
as  to  the  exact  location  of  stations  is  brought  to  court. 
A  mere  stipulation  that  a  certain  station  shall  be  main- 
tained, the  railroad  being  free  to  open  others,  is  not  neces- 
sarily void.1  But  a  condition,  that  no  other  station  shall 
be  maintained  than  the  one  erected  upon  the  land  con- 
veyed, is  void,  as  public  policy  requires  that  the  railroad 
should  be  free  to  open  stations  wherever  public  conveni- 
ence requires.2 

§  812.  Proper  facilities  at  stations. 

A  stopping  place  does  not  necessarily  involve  station 
buildings;3  but  at  common  law  the  duty  of  the  railroad 

1  Illinois. — Lyman   v.    Suburban      R.  Co.  v.  Mathers,  71  111.  592,  22 
R.  R.  Co.,  190  111.  320,  60  N.  E.  515,      Am.  Rep.  122  (1874). 

52  L.  R.  A.  645  (1901).  Iowa.— Williamson   v.    C.,  R.    I. 

Indiana.— Cleveland,    C.,    C.    &  &  P.  R.  Co.,  53  la.  126,  4  N.  W. 

I.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Coburn,  91  Ind.  557  870,  36  Am.  Rep.  206  (1880). 

(1883).  Kansas. — St.   Joseph   &    Denver 

Iowa.— First  Nat'l  Bk.  v.  Hen-  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  11  Kans. 

drie,  49  Iowa,  402,  31  Am.  Rep.  602,  15  Am.  Rep.  357  (1873). 

153(1878).  Massachusetts. —  See     Fuller     v. 

Pennsylvania.— Cumberland      V.  Dame,  18  Pick.  472  (1836). 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Baab,  9  Watts.  458,  36  3  In  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S. 

Am.  Dec.  132  (1840).  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commis- 

Wisconsin. — Horner  v.  Chicago,  sion,  136  Wis.  146,  116  N.  W.  905, 

M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Wis.  165  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  821  (1908),  it 

(1875).  was  held  sufficient  to  maintain  a 

2  Illinois. — St.  Louis,  J.  &  C.  R.  mere  platform.    Such  platforms  are 

44  [  689  ] 


§  813]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

would  undoubtedly  go  so  far  as  to  make  it  negligent  in 
not  providing  adequate  buildings  at  stations  where  much 
business  is  done.1  Certainly  it  must  keep  its  station 
buildings  up  to  the  requirements  of  the  business  exist- 
ing. One  of  the  matters  which  is  coming  within  the  juris- 
diction of  railroad  commissions  is  the  requirement  of 
proper  station  buildings  where  it  deems  them  requisite; 
and  even  the  ordering  of  minor  improvements  in  existing 
stations.  By  these  principles  a  regulation  of  a  railroad 
company  is  unreasonable  and  void  under  which  the  sale 
of  tickets  to  any  regular  station  of  a  train  is  refused,  or 
by  which,  although  a  passenger  holding  a  through  ticket 
may  himself  get  off  at  any  such  station,  he  is  not  per- 
mitted also  to  remove  his  baggage.2  On  the  other  hand, 
railroads  need  not  make  provisions  for  passengers  enter- 
ing or  leaving  cars  at  unexpected  and  unusual  places.3 

§  813.  Establishment  of  freight  stations. 

All  the  law  discussed  in  this  topic  is  as  applicable  to 
freight  stations  as  to  passenger  stations.    The  true  issue, 

not  stations  within  the  meaning  of          Louisiana. — Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R. 

statutes  referring  to  stations.     Kel-  &  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commis- 

logg  v.  Suffolk  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  100  sion,     109    La.    247,    33   So.    214 

N.  C.  158,  5  S.  E.  379  (1888).  (1902). 

On  the  other  hand,  in  St.  Louis,  Missouri. — Lackland  v.  Chicago 

I.  M.  &  So.  Ry.  v.  State,  84  Ark.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Mo.  App.  420 

150,  104  S.  W.  1106  (1907),  the  de-  (1903). 

cision  based  upon  the  existence  of          l  Missouri. — Eichorn  v.  Missouri, 

the  duty  to  provide  proper  freight  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  130  Mo.  575,  32  S. 

houses  for  the  receiving  of  freight  W.  993  (1895). 
awaiting  transportation.     And  this          South  Dakota. — State  v.  Chicago, 

duty  was  recognized  in  another  re-  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.),  81 

cent  case  where  the  building  of  a  N.  W.  503  (1900). 
grain   elevator  by   a  railroad   was          2  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

held    permissible    to    this    extent.  v.  Lyon,  123  Pa.  St.  140,  16  Atl. 

People  ex  rel.   v.   Illinois  Central  607,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  517  (1888). 
R.  R.  Co.,  233  111.  378,  84  N.  E.          '  Central  R.   R.    Co.   v.   Smith, 

368,  116  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  604,  122  76    Ga.  209,    2  Am.  St.  Rep.  31 

Am.  St.  Rep.  181  (1908).  (1886). 

[690] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES      [  §  814 

as  has  been  said,  is  whether  the  existing  freight  stations 
are  so  situated  as  to  meet  the  reasonable  demands  of 
shippers  from  that  district,  and  is  not  whether  the  freight 
business  that  probably  will  be  offered  at  the  place  pro- 
posed for  a  new  station  is  enough  to  justify  the  require- 
ment of  the  new  station.1  Indeed  in  large  cities  the  pas- 
senger stations  may  be  in  one  district,  while  the  freight 
terminals  may  properly  be  in  another.2  Moreover  freight 
stations  may  be  specialized,  some  for  the  reception  of 
package  freight,  others  for  bulk  freight.3  And  a  railroad 
may  have  cattle  stations  and  mineral  stations,  for  exam- 
ple, or  special  sidings  for  the  reception  of  special  freight.4 
But  if  the  business  will  not  justify  this  differentiation  it 
may  concentrate  all  at  one  point  with  appropriate  prem- 
ises properly  equipped. 

§  814.  Establishing  offices  in  other  services. 
This  law  is  applicable  to  other  services  besides  carriage. 

1  People  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal      bulk  need  not  be  taken  except  from 
Co.,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  850,  32  App.      the  shipper's  tipple. 

Div.  120  (1898).  4  Thus  the  cases  permit  the  rail- 

2  Maintaining    a   special    freight  road  to  compel  cattle  to  be  handled 
station    at    a   terminal    city    while  through  a  stock  yard  station — but  it 
merely  side  tracking  cars  at  a  way  may  not  make  a  special  charge  for 
station    is    justifiable.      Michie    v.  terminal    facilities.      Covington   S. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  151  Y.  Co.  v.  Keith,  139  U.  S.  128,  35 
Fed.  694  (1907).  L.  ed.  73,  11  Sup.  Ct.  461  (1891); 

3  This   matter  of   the   establish-  but  see  Central  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ment  of  separate  stations  for  spe-  ville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  192  M.  S.  568, 
cial  freight  should  obviously  be  left  48  L.   ed.   565,   24  Sup.   Ct.   339 
almost  entirely  to  the  discretion  of  (1904). 

the  company.     The  cases  thus  far          But   the   cases   as   to   providing 

hold  simply  that  the  company  may  facilities  for  handling   cattle  only 

do  so.    Robinson  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  require     that     proper     equipment 

Ry.  Co.,  129  Fed.  753,  64  C.  C.  A.  must  be  provided  at  regular  sta- 

281  (1904).  tions.    See  Missouri,  .K.  &  T.  Ry. 

See  further  Harp.  v.  Choctaw,  O.  Co.  v.  Byrne,  100  Fed.  359,  40  C.  C. 

&  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Fed.  445,  61  A.  402  (1900),  and  Flint  v.  Boston 

C.  C.  A.  405  (1903),  going   to  the  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  H.  141,  59 

extreme   of   holding   that   coal   in  Atl.  938  (1905). 

[691] 


§815]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

The  location  of  telegraph  offices  for  example,  is  plainly 
subject  to  similar  principles.  While  these  must  be  estab- 
lished at  reasonable  intervals,  their  establishment  is  within 
the  discretion  of  the  company.  These  offices  may  be  closed 
if  experience  shows  that  they  are  not  required,  and  their 
location  may  be  shifted  later,  unless  the  change  is  distinctly 
contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  public  served.1  Courts 
would  always  hesitate  to  give  orders  in  regard  to  these 
matters  on  their  own  initiative,  and  some  would  refuse 
altogether.  But  the  orders  of  proper  authorities  must  be 
respected  unless  obedience  would  mean  practical  confisca- 
tion.2 All  this  is  doubtless  true  of  the  pay  stations  of  a 
telephone  company,  although,  there  is  not  much  by  way 
of  judicial  opinion  as  yet. 

Topic  D.  Provision  of  Private  Installation 

§  815.  No  right  to  private  sidings  generally. 

The  general  rule  as  has  just  been  seen  is  that  those 
having  freight  to  ship  must  bring  it  to  the  regularly  estab- 
lished freight  stations,  just  as  travelers  wishing  to  be  trans- 
ported must  present  themselves  at  the  regularly  established 
passenger  stations.  At  common  law  no  shipper  or  con- 
signee of  ordinary  freight,  no  matter  how  large  the  busi- 
ness which  he  does  with  the  railroad  may  be  in  the  aggre- 
gate, has  any  right  to  have  freight  trains  stopped  at  his 
premises  or  freight  cars  spotted  at  his  siding,  even  if  his 
premises  abut  upon  the  right  of  way  or  he  has  constructed 
a  siding  to  the  railroad  grade  ready  for  connection  with 
the  through  tracks.3  Even  if  a  patron  is  enjoying  the 

1  Kansas. — State  v.  Western  Un-      Telegraph  Co.  v.  Mississippi  R.  R. 
ion  Telegraph   Co.,  75  Kan.  609,      Commission,  74  Miss.  80,  21  So.  15 
90  Pac.  299  (1907).  (1896). 

North  Carolina. — Railroad   Com-  Ohio. — Railroad  Co.  v.  Telegraph 

missioners  v.  Western  Union  Tele-  Co.,  38  Ohio  St.  24  (1882). 

graph  Co.,  113  N.  C.  213,  18  S.  E.  3  United  States.— Bedford   B.    G. 

389  (1893).  S.    Co.    v.    Oman,    134  Fed.  441 

2  Mississippi.  —  Western    Union  (1904). 

[692] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES      [  §  816 


privilege  of  having  cars  left  upon  a  siding  for  him  and 
taken  away  when  loaded,  the  railroad  may  discontinue 
this  service  on  short  notice.1  Indeed  since  there  is  no 
duty  in  the  matter  it  is  not  discrimination  to  permit  one 
shipper  to  have  a  private  switch  while  others  similarly 
situated  are  not  allowed  the  same  privilege.2  What  has 
been  said  in  this  paragraph  does  not  apply  to  the  peculiar 
case  of  the  terminal  railroad  as  the  peculiar  business  of 
such  railroads  is  to  switch  loaded  cars  to  and  from  sidings.8 

§  816.  Rights  of  the  railroad  paramount. 

It  is  certainly  true  that  under  no  circumstances  can 
anyone  insist  that  there  shall  be  a  switch  connection, 
when  it  would  interfere  with  the  business  of  the  railroad 
if  there  should  be  such  an  intermediate  switch  at  that 
point.4  So  the  railroad  is  excused  in  all  cases  where  it 
appears  that  there  would  be  danger  in  maintaining  the 


1  Durden  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  2 
Ga.  App.  66,  58  S.  E.  299  (1907). 

2  Cedar  Rapids  &  I.  C.  Ry.  &  L. 
Co.    v.    Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.  R. 
R.    Co.    (Iowa),    124    N.   W.   323 
(1910). 

3  Interstate  Stock  Yards  Co.  v. 
Indianapolis  U.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Fed. 
472  (1900). 

It  does  not  subject  a  railroad 
company  to  indictment  under  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  for  it  to 
refuse  to  furnish  a  switch  connec- 
tion to  a  shipper  tendering  in- 
terstate traffic  for  transportation, 
although  such  connections  are  fur- 
nished to  other  shippers,  especially 
where  the  indictment  does  not 
charge  that  the  connections  de- 
manded are  reasonably  practicable 
and  could  be  put  in  with  safety 
and  would  furnish  sufficient  busi- 
ness to  justify  the  expense  of  their 


construction  and  maintenance,  nor 
that  the  person  or  company  ask- 
ing for  the  same  offered  to  pay  such 
portion  of  the  cost  as  is  usual  and 
reasonable.  United  States  v.  Bal- 
timore &  O.  R.  Co.,  153  Fed.  997 
(1907). 

An  order  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  which  forbids 
a  carrier  to  allow  or  pay  to  the 
owner  of  an  elevator  any  compen- 
sation for  elevation  in  transit  of 
grain  which  he  ships,  unless  he  re- 
fuses to  clean,  clip,  mix,  inspect 
or  grade  the  grain  while  it  is  passing 
through  the  elevator,  is  beyond  its 
powers.  Peavey  &  Co.  v.  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  176  Fed.  409  (1910). 

4  Jones  v.  Newport,  N.  &  M.  V. 
Co.,  65  Fed.  736,  31  U.  S.  App.  92, 
13  C.  C.  A.  95  (1895),  switch  con- 
nection at  dangerous  point  from 
the  operating  point  of  view. 

[693] 


§817] 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 


switch  service  desired.1  However,  evidence  on  behalf  of 
the  applicant  for  a  switch,  that  a  few  years  before  the 
defendant  railroad  had  maintained  a  side  track  at  this 
point  for  two  years  without  any  inconvenience  or  accident 
resulting  is  competent  to  show  the  practicability  of  a 
side  track  being  continued  at  this  point.2  Upon  similar 
principles  it  has  been  held  that  wherever  a  railroad  has 
been  delivering  freight  of  a  certain  class  for  certain  ship- 
pers at  certain  places  beside  its  track  that  have  been 
designated,  it  may  be  considered  as  professing  to  do  so 
and  it  cannot  then  refuse  in  a  particular  case  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  impracticable.3 

§  817.  When  private  switches  must  be  granted. 

On  the  other  hand  there  are  exceptional  businesses 
where  the  commercial  necessity  for  private  switches  is 
recognized  by  the  common  law  to  be  overruling.4  This  is 


1  Mercantile   Trust   Co.    v.    Co- 
lumbus, S.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Fed. 
148  (1898),  siding  itself  in  danger- 
ous condition. 

2  Industrial  Siding  Case,  140  N. 
C.  239,  52  S.  E.  941  (1905). 

See  also  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Wynne,  H.  &  C.  Co.,  81  Ark. 
373,  99  S.  W.  375  (1907). 

3  State  ex  rel.  Ellis  v.  Atlantic, 
C.  L.  R.  Co.,  52  Fla.  646,  41  S. 
O.  705  (1906);  Cumberland  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Morgan's  L.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.,  51  La.  Ann.  29,  24  So.  803,  72 
Am.  St.  Rep.  442  (1899),  accord. 

4  United  States. — Harp    v.    Choc- 
taw,  O.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Fed.  445, 
61  C.  C.  A.  405  (1903),  collieries; 
Olanta  Coal  M.  Co.  v.  Beech  Creek 
R.  R.  Co.,   144  Fed.   150   (1906), 
collieries. 

Illinois. — Vincent  v.  Chicago  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  111.  33   (1868), 
[694} 


grain  elevators;  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  People,  56  111.  365,  8 
Am.  Rep.  690  (1870),  grain  eleva- 
tors. 

Kentucky. — B  e  d  f  o  r  d  -  Bowling 
Green  Stone  Co.  v.  Oman,  115  Ky. 
369,  73  S.  W.  1038  (1903),  quarries. 

Iowa. — Richmond  v.  Dubuque 
&  Sioux  City  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Iowa, 
191  (1868),  grain  elevators. 

Louisiana. — Cumberland  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  R. 
Co.,  51  La.  Ann.  29,  24  So.  803,  72 
Am.  St.  Rep.  442  (1889),  semble, 
timbers. 

Nebraska. — Roby  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Farmers'  G.  &  L.  S.  Co.,  76  Neb. 
450,  107  N.  W.  766  (1906),  grain 
elevators. 

Pennsylvania. — Continental  Coal 
Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  702  (1904),  collier- 
ies. 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  818 

peculiarly  true  of  those  who  ship  or  receive  freight  in 
bulk.  Thus  private  switches  should  be  permitted  at 
grain  elevators,  coal  tipples,  ore  smelters,  and  oil  tanks, 
provided  the  shipments  from  them  are  of  reasonable  size. 
And  the  same  is  true  of  those  who  are  shippers  and  re- 
ceivers in  considerable  quantities  of  such  freight  as  it 
would  be  actually  impracticable  or  peculiarly  disadvan- 
tageous to  transport  by  teams  over  the  roads.  Examples 
of  this  would  be  iron  castings  and  heavy  machinery, 
blocks  of  marble  and  great  timbers.  As  Mr.  Justice  Baxter 
said,  in  discussing  this  whole  question  in  Coe  v.  Louisville 
&  Nashville  Railroad  Company: x  "This  rule  is  just  and 
convenient,  and  necessary  to  an  expeditious  and  econom- 
ical delivery  of  freights.  It  has  regard  to  their  proper 
classification,  and  to  the  circumstances  of  the  particular 
case.  Under  it  articles  susceptible  of  easy  transfer  may 
be  delivered  at  a  general  delivery  depot  provided  for  the 
purpose.  But  live  stock,  coal,  ore,  grain  in  bulk,  marble, 
etc.,  do  not  belong  to  this  class.  For  these  some  other 
and  more  appropriate  mode  of  delivery  must  be  provided." 

§  818.  The  problem  of  stock  yards. 

In  the  quotation  just  given  live  stock  was  included 
among  the  bulky  articles  which  a  carrier  must  receive  and 
deliver  beside  its  track.  This  is  apparently  not  law  now. 
The  cost  of  transporting  live  stock  through  a  town  to  a 
single  station  is  not  prohibitive,  since  the  animals  go  on 
their  own  legs.  It  is  therefore  permissible  for  the  carrier 
to  establish  a  single  station  for  the  reception  of  live  stock, 
provided  such  a  station  is  properly  equipped  for  the  pur- 
pose and  furnishes  sufficient  facilities  for  the  neighborhood. 
Consequently  it  is  now  held  that  there  is  no  duty  owed 
to  the  owner  of  cattle  to  make  special  delivery  of  them 
at  any  place  along  the  line  that  he  designates.  On  the 
1 3  Fed.  775(1880). 

[695] 


§  819  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

contrary  it  is  held  that  the  railroad  may  designate  certain 
points  of  delivery  if  reasonably  convenient,  as  it  may  for 
other  freight  which  it  has  undertaken  to  carry.  Upon  this 
basis  the  courts  have  permitted  the  railroad  to  designate 
one  of  several  private  stock  yards  as  its  cattle  station 
where  it  will  deliver  cattle  consigned  to  that  point  and 
have  accordingly  justified  it  in  refusing  to  deliver  at  other 
stock  yards.1  This  was  well  enough  so  long  as  the  courts 
held  strictly  that  no  charge  could  be  made  under  such 
circumstances  for  yardage  if  the  consignee  was  ready  to 
take  the  cattle  away.2  Under  a  late  decision  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  has  permitted  a  stock  yards  com- 
pany to  make  an  additional  charge  as  a  connecting  carrier.3 
But  in  the  latest  Supreme  Court  case  it  is  held  that  the 
railway  may  make  connections  with  the  trackage  of  one 
stock  yard  while  refusing  to  make  such  connection  with 
another:4 

§  819.  Constitutionality  of  further  legislation. 

Legislation  along  these  lines  has  become  somewhat 
common,  as  indeed  it  has  become  generally  in  relation 
to  the  provision  of  facilities.  Legislation  is  not  so  un- 
reasonable as  to  be  unconstitutional  if  it  ignores  the  com- 
mon law  distinction  between  movable  and  immovable 
freights  which  has  just  been  discussed.5  Thus  a  railroad 

1  Butchers  &   D.   S.   Y.   Co.   v.  4  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Fed.  Central  S.  Y.  Co.,  212  U.  S.  132, 
35,  14  C.  C.  A.  290  (1895);  Walker  53  L.  ed.  441,  29  S.  Ct.  246  (1909).' 
v.  Keenan,  73  Fed.  758,  19  C.  C.  A.  See  also  Central  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Louis- 
668  (1896).  ville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  568, 

2  Covington  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Keith,  48   L.   ed.   565,   24  Sup.   Ct.   339 
139  U.  S.  128,  35  L.  ed.  73,  11  Sup.  (1904). 

Ct.  461  (1891).  B  This  is  assumed  in  Mays  v.  Sea- 

3  Interstate  Commerce  Comm.  v.      board  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  75  S.  C. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  186      455,  56  S.  E.  30  (1906). 

U.  S.  320,  46  L.  ed.  1182,  22  Sup. 
Ct.  824  (1902). 

[696] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  820 

commission  may  be  given  power  to  give  orders  for  the 
installation  of  switches  or  to  prohibit  the  removal  of 
private  switches  where  the  commercial  necessity  for  them 
sufficiently  appears.1  There  is  the  possibility  that  an 
order  of  the  commission  for  the  establishment  of  a  switch 
connection  may  be  held  outrageous  if  it  would  interfere 
too  much  with  the  business  of  the  railroad.2  But  cer- 
tainly legislation  can  confirm  the  right  of  shippers  of 
bulky  freights  to  have  switch  connections.3 

§  820.  Railroad  never  obliged  to  construct  siding. 

The  extent  to  which  such  legislation  in  regard  to  sidings 
may  go  has  been  under  examination  in  several  recent 
cases  both  State  and  Federal.  These  cases  establish  be- 
yond question  that  the  utmost  extent  to  which  the  duty 
may  be  pressed  is  to  permit  the  making  of  the  switch  con- 
nection. Neither  the  legislature  nor  its  commission  can 
compel  the  railroad  to  construct  the  sidings  at  its  own  ex- 
pense, as  was  pointed  out  in  one  of  the  recent  State  cases.4 
And  therefore  a  statute  was  recently  held  unconstitutional 
by  a  State  court  which  although  requiring  the  individual 
to  build  provided  that  he  should  be  repaid  that  cost  by 
a  reduction  of  twenty  per  cent  from  his  freight  bills  for 
each  year.5  Two  cases  finally  reaching  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  settled  this  side  of  the  general  problem 
for  the  Federal  courts.  In  the  earlier  case  6  a  Nebraska 
statute  requiring  every  railroad  to  permit  all  those  who 

1  For  example,  see  Railroad  Com-      M.  Co.  v.  Beech  Creek  R.  R.  Co., 
mission  of  La.  v.  Kansas  City  So.       144  Fed.  150  (1906). 

Ry.  Co.,  Ill  La.  133,  35  So.  487  4  Northwestern  Warehouse  Co. 
(1903).  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  32  Wash. 

2  This  is  assumed  in  the  Indus-      218,  73  Pac.  388  (1903). 

trial  Siding  Case,  140  N.  C.  239  6  Mays  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry. 
(1905).  Co.,  75  S.  C.  455,  56  S.  E.  30  (1906). 

3  For  example,  see  Olanta  Coal          6  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ne- 

braska, 164  U.  S.  403  (1896). 

[697] 


§  821  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

desired  to  build  a  grain  elevator  upon  the  right  of  way  of 
a  railroad  was  held  to  deprive  the  company  of  its  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law.  In  the  later  case  l  the 
Nebraska  statute  as  amended  permitting  the  railroad  to 
refuse  to  grant  a  location  if  it  would  construct  a  siding  to 
any  elevator  established  on  land  adjoining  its  right  of 
way  was  held  unconstitutional  as  compelling  the  railroad 
to  pay  for  a  private  facility. 

§  821.  Duty  confined  to  permitting  connection. 

At  common  law  the  duty  of  the  railroad  as  a  carrier  of 
freight  is  confined  to  taking  up  or  setting  down  freight 
along  its  route,  or  more  exactly  beside  its  tracks  as  con- 
structed. The  most  that  the  common  law  requires  of  a 
railroad  in  any  case  is  to  receive  or  leave  cars  at  the  point 
where  the  spur  constructed  by  the  shipper  comes  upon 
the  right  of  way  of  the  railroad.  Doubtless  the  railroad 
must  put  in  the  switch  itself,  and  certainly  it  can  decide 
upon  the  details  of  its  location.  •  As  to  the  matter  of  opera- 
tion, the  railroad  must  plainly  move  the  car  on  and  off  the 
switch,  since  it  would  not  permit  the  shipper  to  break  in 
upon  its  own  operation  over  its  public  tracks.  But  cer- 
tainly as  a  common  law  matter  the  railroad  cannot  be 

1  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 

Nebraska,  217  U.  S.  196  (1910).  (Iowa),  124  N.  W.  323  (1910). 

A  contract  between  two  railroad  But  in  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co. 
companies  providing  for  the  con-  v.  Standard  Lumber  Co.,  174  Fed. 
struction  of  a  spur  track  to  a  cus-  107,  98  C.  C.  A.  81  (1909),  it  was 
tomer  and  the  switching  of  cars  held  that  refunding  to  a  certain 
over  the  same  for  a  specified  charge  shipper  ten  per  cent  of  his  freight 
has  been  held  not  to  violate  the  bills  until  his  expenditures  in  con- 
Interstate  Commerce  Act,  it  not  structing  his  siding  and  its  equip- 
appearing  that  any  discrimination  ment  were  paid  for  constituted  a 
was  made  against  other  customers  violation  of  the  Interstate  Corn- 
seeking  to  have  like  privileges.  Ce-  merce  Act,  although  the  siding  and 
dar  Rapids  &  I.  C.  Ry.  &  Light  its  equipment  were  thus  to  become 

the  property  of  the  railroad. 

[698] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  822 

compelled  to  perform  the  shunting  service  over  the  private 
spur  of  the  shipper,  as  it  cannot  be  compelled  to  haul  be- 
yond its  own  rails.1  On  the  other  hand  if  it  undertakes 
such  service  generally  it  must  apparently  perform  the 
service  for  all  shippers  indifferently  at  reasonable  rates.2 
As  this  is  so  close  a  question  it  is  probable  that  a  legisla- 
tive requirement  or  a  commission  ruling  requiring  such 
service  would  not  be  outrageous.  And  there  are  cases 
enough  that  show  that  when  the  service  is  undertaken  the 
charges  for  switching  can  be  regulated  and  discrimination 
in  them  forbidden. 

§  822.  Obligation  to  receive  upon  spurs. 

Another  distinction  remains,  which  may  explain  much. 
Public  spurs  which  are  really  part  of  the  railroad's  trackage 
and  operated  as  such  should  be  distinguished  from  special 
sidings  which  are  the  private  property  of  individual  ship- 
pers. A  railroad  in  operating  a  public  lateral  must  deal 
with  all  shipments  offered  or  consigned  to  it  without 
discrimination.  It  may  not  treat  one  patron  located  upon 
it  differently  from  another.3  On  the  other  hand  the  owners 

1  Brooks   Mfg.   Co.   v.   Southern  Louisiana. — Kansas    City,   S.   & 
Ry.  Co.  (N.  C.),  68  S.  E.  243  (1910).  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Louisiana,  etc.,  Ry. 

2  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lar-  Co.,  116  La.  178,  40  So.  627,  5  L. 
abee  Flour  Mills  Co.,  211  U.  S.  612,  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  512  (1905). 

29  Sup.  Ct.  214  (1909).  Minnesota.— State  ex  rel.   R.   & 

3  Alabama. — Agee  &  Co.  v.  Louis-  W.  Com.  v.  Willmar  &  S.  F.  R.  Ry. 
ville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  142  Ala.  344,  37  Co.,  88  Minn.  448,  93  N.  W.  112 
So.  680  (1904).  (1903). 

Georgia. — Butler  v.  Tifton,  T.  &  Nebraska. — Roby  v.  State  ex  rel. 

G.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  Ga.  817,  49  S.  E.  Farmers'  G.  &  L.  S.  Co.,  76  Neb. 

763  (1904).  450,  107  N.  W.  766  (1906). 

Illinois. — Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  New  York. — Kellogg  v.  Sowerby, 

Co.  v.  Suffern,  129  111.  274,  21  N.  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  412,  93  App.  Div. 

E.  824  (1889).  124  (1904). 

Kentucky. — Louisville,  etc.,  R.  R.  South  Carolina. — Avingerv.South 

Co.  v.  Pittsburg  &  K.  Coal  Co.,  Ill  Carolina  Ry.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  265,  7 

Ky.  960,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1318,  64  S.  S.  E.  493,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  716 

W.  969,  55  L.  R.  A.  601  (1901).  (1888). 

[6991 


§  823  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

of  a  private  siding  may  refuse  to  let  any  other  shipper 
utilize  it.1  This  distinction  is  well  brought  out  by  two 
cases  both  involving  one  Oman  and  the  Bedford-Bowling 
Green  Stone  Company.  In  the  earlier  case  in  the  Ken- 
tucky court 2  it  appeared  that  the  siding  had  been  con- 
structed by  the  railroad  which  still  owned  some  of  the 
abutting  lands  and  it  was  held  that  freight  must  be  ac- 
cepted from  the  complainant  if  tendered  on  these  lands. 
In  the  later  case  3  in  the  Federal  courts  it  transpired  that 
the  railroad  in  the  interval  had  sold  the  trackage  and  all 
the  adjoining  lands  to  the  favored  concern;  and  the  court 
thereupon  felt  constrained  to  hold  that  this  was  a  private 
switch  upon  which  no  one  else  but  the  owner  had  any 
right  to  be  offering  freight. 

§  823.  The  company  need  only  provide  requisite  facil- 
ities. 

It  may  seem  an  obvious  proposition  that  the  company 
need  only  provide  the  facilities  requisite  for  giving  the 
service  it  is  under  obligation  to  provide.  And  yet  in  its 
application  this  is  not  a  matter  free  from  difficulty  when 
the  limits  of  the  doctrine  are  approached.  In  the  case  of 
the  carrier  of  passengers  for  example,  it  is  plain  that  the 
railroad  must  provide  a  safe  and  comfortable  car.  It 

Texas. — Railroad  Commissioners  3  Bedford-Bowling    Green   Stone 

v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  Ry.,  80  S.  W.  Co.  v.  Oman,  134  Fed.  441  (1904). 

102  (1904).  This  of  course  means  that  a  sid- 

1  See  particularly :  ing  may  always  be  abandoned. 

Arkansas. — Edgar  Lumber  Co.  v.  United  States. — Mercantile  Trust 

Cornie  Stave  Co.,  130  S.  W.  452  Co.  v.  Columbus,  S.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 

(1910).  90  Fed.  148  (1898);  Jones  v.  New- 
Michigan. — Mann  v.  Pere  Mar-  port  News  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 

quette  R.  R.  Co.,  135  Mich.  210,  C.  C.  A.  95,  65  Fed.  736,  31  U.  S. 

97  N.  W.  721  (1903).  App.  92  (1895). 

J  Bedford-Bowling    Green    Stone  Georgia. — Burden     v.     Southern 

Co.  v.  Oman,  115  Ky.  369,  73  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Ga.  App.  66,  58  S.  E. 

1038  (1903).  299  (1907). 

[700] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES       [  §  824 

must  even  see  to  the  provision,  upon  a  long  journey,  of 
facilities  for  eating  and  sleeping,1  but  it  does  not  have  to 
provide  overcoats  and  toothbrushes.  In  the  case  of  the 
municipal  services  the  supplying  company  must,  of  course, 
construct  the  necessary  plant ;  the  electric  company  must 
supply  its  station,  and  the  gas  company  must  construct 
its  retorts.  The  supply  wires  of  the  electric  company  and 
the  street  mains  of  the  gas  company,  it  is  plain,  are  in  the 
same  category.  On  the  other  hand  the  electroliers  and 
chandeliers  as  well  as  the  bulbs  and  burners  are  provided 
by  the  consumer.2  Of  course  it  is  all  a  question  of  degree, 
the  test  being  in  any  particular  case  what  is  the  usual 
undertaking  of  the  company  engaged  in  that  business  as 
it  is  conducted.  A  telephone  company  for  example,  need 
provide  at  the  regular  rate  only  the  necessary  facilities 
for  speaking  and  hearing;  it  need  not  provide  additional 
equipment.3  A  turnpike  company,  at  the  other  extreme, 
provides  nothing  but  an  open  road,  the  customer  furnish- 
ing his  own  vehicles.4 

§  824.  Provision  of  service  pipes  and  feed  wires. 

In  regard  to  the  supply  services,  there  is,  however,  a 
debatable  ground  between  these  extremes.  For  example 
it  is  not  settled  whether  a  water  company  is  obliged  to 
lay  and  pay  for  the  service  pipes  from  the  street  mains 
to  the  premises  of  the  consumer,  or  whether  the  consumer 

1  See   for   example:   Peniston   v.          3  See  Chesapeake  &  P.  Telephone 
Chicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Co.  v.   Manning,  186  U.  S.  238,  22 
34  La.  Ann.  777,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  S.  Ct.  881,  46  L.  ed.  1144  (1902), 
444    (1882),   responsibility  for  ap-  such  as  telephone  cabinets  and  ex- 
proaches  to  eating  houses.  tension  sets. 

2  See  for  example:  Snell  v.  Clin-          4See  Downing  v.  Mt.  Washing- 
ton Electric  L.  H.  &  P.  Co.,  196  ton  Road  Co.,  40  N.  H.  230  (1860), 
111.  626,  63  N.  E.  1082,  89  Am.  St.  ultra  vires    for  turnpike  company 
Rep.  341,  58  L.  R.  A.  284  (1902),  to  run  stage  line  over  it. 

no    concern  with  the  interior  elec- 
tric fittings. 

[701] 


§  824  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

himself  must  pay  for  the  service  pipes.  There  are  some 
cases  which  are  positive  that  the  company  should  lay  the 
service  pipe  and  make  the  necessary  connections  at  its 
own  expense.1  It  is  well  argued  in  these  cases  that  the 
main  and  all  laterals,  fixtures  and  connections  to  the  fran- 
chise limit  of  the  lot  line  belong  to  the  company,  and  alto- 
gether constitute  the  water  system.  It  does  not  seem  to  be 
the  business  of  the  consumer  to  construct  any  part  of 
the  company's  system,  any  more  than  it  is  the  company's 
business  to  place  the  pipes  and  fixtures  in  the  consumer's 
premises.  On  the  other  hand  there  is  as  much  authority, 
if  not  more,  to  the  effect  that  the  requirement  by  legis- 
lation or  even  by  the  regulation  of  the  company  that  the 
consumer  shall  pay  for  his  service  pipe  is  not  outrageous, 
as  this  installation  is  peculiarly  for  his  benefit  and  no  part 
of  the  general  facilities  of  the  system  in  the  use  of  which 
all  share  to  some  degree.2  This  argument  will  also  apply 
to  gas  supply;  and  obviously  that  case  is  correct  which 
holds  in  effect  that  the  gas  company  has  no  obligation 
with  regard  to  rising  pipes  within  the  building.3  Upon 
similar  principles  an  electric  company  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  interior  wiring.4 

1  Idaho.— Hatch    v.    Consumers'      Danville,  154  111.  156, 38  N.  E.  1067 
Co.,  17  Idaho,  204,  104  Pac.  670      (1894). 

(1909);    Pocatello    Water    Co.    v.  North  Dakota.— Jackson  v.  Ellen- 

Standley,  7  Idaho,  155,  61  Pac.  518  dale,  4  N.  D.  478,  61  N.  W.  1030 

(1900) ;  Bothwell  v.  Consumers'  Co.,  (1894) . 

13  Idaho,  568,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  Wisconsin— Gleasonv.Waukesha 

485,  92  Pac.  533  (1907).  County,  103  Wis.  225,  79  N.  W.  249 

New  York.— Alvord  v.  Syracuse,  (1899). 

163  N.  Y.  158,  57  N.  E.  310  (1900).  »  Ferguson  v.  Metropolitan  Gas 

Texas.— International  Water  Co.  Light  Co.,  37  How.  Pr.  189  (1868). 

v.  El  Paso  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  112  « Snell  v.  Clinton  Electric  L.  H. 

S.  W.  816  (1908).  &  P.  Co.,  196  111.  626,  63  N.  E.  1082, 

2  lUinais.— Prindiville    v.    Jack-  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  341,  58  L.  R.  A. 
son,  79  111.  337  (1875);  Warren  v.  284  (1902). 

Chicago,  118  111.  329,  9  N.  E.  883,  Where  a  city,  operating  a  system 
11  N.  E.  218  (1887);  Palmer  v.  of  waterworks  furnishing  water  to 

[702] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES      [  §  825 


§  825.  Provision  of  transformers  and  meters. 

Must  the  electric  company  provide  a  transformer,  or 
the  gas  company  supply  a  meter?  There  are  conflicting 
decisions  as  to  this  matter.  In  the  case  of  the  transformer 
it  was  apparently  held  in  a  recent  case  l  that  the  provi- 
sion of  a  transformer  was  involved  in  the  service  proposed; 
and  this  is  believed  to  be  sound  because  it  would  seem 
that  the  electric  company  must  provide  all  facilities  neces- 
sary for  delivering  current  to  the  consumer.2  However, 
there  are  various  cases  as  to  meters  which  hold  that  the 
supplying  company  can  compel  the  consumer  to  provide 
his  own  meter,  or  pay  rental,  as  such,  for  the  meter  pro- 
vided by  the  company.3  But  by  other,  and  it  is  believed 
better,  authorities  it  is  held  improper  for  the  supplying 
company  to  compel  the  consumer  to  provide  a  meter,  or 
to  charge  meter  rent  as  such.4  Many  of  the  former  cases, 


its  citizens,  controlled  the  cock  at 
the  junction  of  service  pipes  and 
the  main  pipe,  by  which  water  was 
let  on  and  off,  it  must  remove  an 
obstruction  therein  within  a  reason- 
able time.  City  of  Jackson  v.  An- 
derson (Miss.),  51  So.  896  (1910). 

^nell  v.  Clinton  Electric  Co., 
196  111.  626,  63  N.  E.  1082,  58  L.  R. 
A.  284,  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  341  (1902). 

2  The  cost  of  the  transformer  may 
be  taken  into  account  in  determin- 
ing  the    minimum    charge   against 
the  particular  consumer.    Gould  v. 
Edison  Electric  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  Misc. 
241,  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  559  (1899). 

3  California. — Smith    v.    Capital 
Gas  Co.,  132  Cal.  209,  64  Pac.  258, 
54  L.  R.  A.  769  (1901),  regulation. 

Kansas. — Cooper  v.  Goodland, 
80  Kan.  121,  102  Pac.  244,  23  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  410  (1909),  ordi- 
nance. 

Illinois. — Anderson  v.  Village  of 


Berwyn,  135  111.  App.  8  (1907),  or- 
dinance. 

Massachusetts. — Shaw  Stocking 
Co.  v.  Lowell,  199  Mass.  118,  85 
N.  E.  90,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  746 
(1908). 

Missouri. — Mallon  v.  Board  of 
Water  Commrs.,  144  Mo.  App. 
104,  128  S.  W.  764  (1910),  munic- 
ipal charter. 

New  York. — Hill  v.  Thompson, 
18  Jones  &  S.  165  (1884),  statute; 
Swanberg  v.  New  York,  123  App. 
Div.  774,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  364 
(1908),  municipal  supply. 

Wisconsin. — State  ex  rel.  v.  Gos- 
nell,  116  Wis.  606,  93  N.  W.  542, 
61  L.  R.  A.  33  (1903),  ordinance; 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Manitowoc  Water- 
works Co.,  114  Wis.  487,  90  N.  W. 
442  (1902),  regulation. 

4  Alabama. — Smith  v.  Birming- 
ham Waterworks  Co..  104  Ala.  315, 
16  So.  123  (1893). 

[703] 


§  825  ]  PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

however,  really  go  no  further  than  to  hold  that  when  this 
requirement  is  imposed  upon  customers  by  legislation  or 
regulation,  this  policy  is  not  so  unreasonable  as  to  be 
invalid.  Others  of  them  hold  that  if  the  consumer  wishes 
the  privilege  of  getting  by  measure  instead  of  by  estimate 
he  must  furnish  the  meter.  Few  cases  of  these  cited 
would  go  so  far  as  to  permit  the  company  to  force  a  meas- 
ured taking  upon  a  consumer  against  his  will  and  make 
him  pay  for  the  meter.  As  to  these  typical  municipal 
services,  the  writer  is  rather  inclined  to  go  to  some  length 
in  favor  of  the  consumer,  insisting  that  the  supply  com- 
pany should  deliver  to  him  what  is  sold,  usable  elec- 
tricity at  the  house,  measured  gas  at  the  cellar.  These 
companies  are  engaged  in  a  public  service,  and  all  the  equip- 
ment necessary  to  perform  that  service,  it  would  seem, 
should  be  provided  by  the  supply  company,  within  rea- 
sonable limits.  This  may  involve  a  larger  capitalization; 
but  that  is  not  sufficient  reason  in  itself  why  the  public 
company  should  not  provide  all  equipment  necessary  to 
give  the  service  offered.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be 
argued  fairly  enough,  that  if  the  company  provides  all 
the  facilities  which  are  for  the  service  of  the  whole  public, 
such  as  the  street  mains,  the  separate  takers  may  not  un- 
reasonably be  obliged  to  provide  their  individual  installa- 
tion. 


Arkansas. — W  i  1  s  o  n    Water    &  Nebraska. — Albert    v.  Davis,    49 

Elec.  Co.  v.  Arkadelphia,  129  S.  W.  Neb.  579,  68  N.  W.  945  (1896). 

1091(1910).  New  Jersey.— Red    Star    Steam- 

Kentucky. — Capital  Gas  &  Elec.  ship  Co.  v.  Jersey  City,  45  N.  J.  L. 

L.  Co.  v.  Gaines,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  1464,  246  (1883). 

49S.W.  462(1899).    See  also  Louis-  New  York.— Buffalo    v.    Buffalo 

ville  Gas  Co.  v.  Dulaney  &  Alex-  Gas   Co.,  81    App.    Div.    505,  80 

ander,  100  Ky.  405  (1897).  N.  Y.  Supp.  1093  (1903). 

Missouri. — State  ex  rel.   v.   Se-  Texas. — Walker    v.    McDonald, 

dalia  Gaslight  Co.,  34  Mo.  App.  49  Tex.  458  (1878). 
501  (1889). 

[704] 


PROVISION  OF  ADEQUATE  FACILITIES        [§826 

§  826.  Dictation  as  to  fittings. 

It  would  seem  to  follow  that  where  the  obligation  of  the 
company  to  provide  facilities  ceases,  its  right  to  dictate  to 
its  patron  as  the  character  of  his  own  facilities  would  also 
cease.  And  this,  indeed,  is  the  general  principle.  This 
will  often  be  found  to  be  modified  by  the  right  of  the  com- 
pany to  protect  its  own  interests,  when  these  are  involved. 
Thus  a  gas  company  may  regulate  the  placing  of  governors 
upon  his  pipes  by  the  owner  himself  if  there  is  danger  that 
their  operation  may  affect  the  operation  of  the  meter; 
but  its  right  to  interfere  cannot  go  further  than  this.1 
Surely  an  electric  company  cannot  give  orders  to  its  cus- 
tomers as  to  the  fittings  they  shall  use,  unless  they  might 
be  of  such  a  construction  as  to  interfere  with  its  circuits.2 
It  should  be  noted  in  connection  with  all  of  these  cases 
that  where  the  service  company  makes  a  regulation  as 
to  the  fittings  to  be  used,  it  will  be  supported  unless  plainly 
outrageous.  Thus  the  cases  as  to  water  companies  hold 
that  they  may  by  regulation  determine  what  style  of  shut- 
off  hydrant  shall  be  used.3  This  is  particularly  true  as  has 
been  seen  in  telephone  service  where  a  regulation  forbid- 

1  It  may  regulate  the  placing  of      mating  Co.,  102  N.  Y.   Supp.  206 
governors  and  mixers.     Blondell  v.       (1907). 

Consolidated  Gas  Co.,  89  Md.  732,          3  State  ex  rel.  v.  Goodfellow,   1 

43  Atl.  817  (1899).    But  not  pro-  Mo.  App.  495  (1876). 
hibit   them     altogether.       Indiana          Thus    an    applicant    for    service 

Natural  &  Illuminating  Gas  Co.  v.  may  be  required  to  present  a  cer- 

Anthony,  26  Ind.  App.  307,  58  N.  tificate  from  a  reputable  plumber 

E.  868  (1900).  that    his   interior   installation   has 

2  Thus  it  may  not  insist  that  the  been  properly  made.    State  ex  rel. 
wiring  shall  be  done  by  its  own  de-  v.  New  Orleans  Gaslight  Co.,  108 
partment.     Snell  v.  Clinton  Elec-  La.  67,  32  So.  179  (1902).    But  it 
trie  L.   H.  &  P.  Co.,    196  111.  626,  would  be  unreasonable  for  a  com- 
63    N.    E.    1082,     58    L.    R.    A.  pany  to  insist  that  certain  plumb- 
284,  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  341   (1902).  era   should    be  employed.     Franke 
But  it  can  refuse  to   supply  elec-  v.  Paducah  Water  Supply  Co.,  88 
tricity     to    premises     dangerously  Ky.  467,  11  S.  W.  432,  4  L.  R.  A. 
wired.     Benson  v.  American  Ilium-  265  (1889). 

45  [  705  ] 


§  826  ]          PUBLIC  SERVICE  CORPORATIONS 

ding  the  attachment  of  devices  to  the  instruments  sup- 
plied is  held  reasonable.1 

1  Gardner    v.    Providence    Tele-  era  furnished  their  own  instruments, 

phone  Co.,  23  R.   I.  312,  50  Atl.  the  company  was  held  nevertheless 

1014,  23  R.  I.  262,  49  Atl.  1004,  55  entitled,  if  it  so  desired,  to  furnish 

L.  R.  A.  113  (1901).  its   instruments   making    no    extra 

Where  in  the  franchise  of  a  tele-  charge  therefor.     Wright  v.   Glen 

phone    company    it    was    provided  Telephone  Co.,  112  App.  Div.  745, 

that  it  should  furnish  service  at  a  99  N.  Y.  S.  85  (1906). 
certain  rate,  provided  the  subscrib- 


[706] 


LAW  LIBRARY 


DC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A     000698199     7 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

'-•os  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  belo 


